Information, Institutions and, Constitutional Arrangements

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Information, Institutions and, Constitutional Arrangements

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Title: Information, Institutions and, Constitutional Arrangements
Author: Muthoo, Abhinay; Shepsle, Kenneth A.

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Shepsle, Kenneth A. 2009. Information, institutions, and constitutional arrangements. Public Choice 144(1-2): 1-36.
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Abstract: This paper develops a theory of optimal institutional structure for staggered-term (overlapping generations) organizations such as legislative bodies. Our model is a simple stochastic game of multi-principal, multi-agent dynamic relationships. Our results emphasize two key features that are determined by legislative founders at the “constitutional moment”. First, they will agree to institute a mechanism that endows (imperfectly informed) legislators with information about the history of play. Second, we provide conditions in which legislative founders will be indifferent to the structure of legislative procedures.
Published Version: doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9500-5
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#OAP
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4783875
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