Information, Institutions and, Constitutional Arrangements
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CitationShepsle, Kenneth A. 2009. Information, institutions, and constitutional arrangements. Public Choice 144(1-2): 1-36.
AbstractThis paper develops a theory of optimal institutional structure for staggered-term (overlapping generations) organizations such as legislative bodies. Our model is a simple stochastic game of multi-principal, multi-agent dynamic relationships. Our results emphasize two key features that are determined by legislative founders at the “constitutional moment”. First, they will agree to institute a mechanism that endows (imperfectly informed) legislators with information about the history of play. Second, we provide conditions in which legislative founders will be indifferent to the structure of legislative procedures.
Citable link to this pagehttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4783875
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