Input Constraints and the Efficiency of Entry: Lessons from Cardiac Surgery

DSpace/Manakin Repository

Input Constraints and the Efficiency of Entry: Lessons from Cardiac Surgery

Citable link to this page

 

 
Title: Input Constraints and the Efficiency of Entry: Lessons from Cardiac Surgery
Author: Cutler, David M.; Huckman, Robert Steven; Kolstad, Jonathan T.

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Cutler, David M., Robert S. Huckman, and Jonathan T. Kolstad. 2010. Input constraints and the efficiency of entry: lessons from cardiac surgery. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 2(1): 51-76.
Full Text & Related Files:
Abstract: Prior studies suggest that, with elastically supplied inputs, free entry may lead to an inefficiently high number of firms in equilibrium. Under input scarcity, however, the welfare loss from free entry is reduced. Further, free entry may increase use of high-quality inputs, as oligopolistic firms underuse these inputs when entry is constrained. We assess these predictions by examining how the 1996 repeal of certificate-of-need (CON) legislation in Pennsylvania affected the market for cardiac surgery in the state. We show that entry led to a redistribution of surgeries to higher-quality this entry was approximately welfare neutral.
Published Version: doi:10.1257/pol.2.1.51
Other Sources: http://www.hbs.edu/research/pdf/10-011.pdf
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15214
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#OAP
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:5344226
Downloads of this work:

Show full Dublin Core record

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

 
 

Search DASH


Advanced Search
 
 

Submitters