Now showing items 1-3 of 3

    • Bundling and Firm Reputation 

      Dana, James Dwight; Spier, Kathryn E. (John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business. Harvard Law School., 2009)
      By bundling experience goods, a manufacturer can more easily maintain a reputation for high quality over time. Formally, we extend Klein and Lefler's (1981) repeated moral hazard model of product quality to consider ...
    • Do Tying, Bundling, and Other Purchase Restraints Increase Product Quality? 

      Spier, Kathryn E.; Dana, James Dwight (Elsevier, 2015)
      Tying, bundling, minimum purchase requirements, loyalty discounts, exclusive dealing, and other purchase restraints can create stronger incentives for firms to invest in product quality. In our first example, the firm sells ...
    • Entry Deterrence in a Duopoly Market 

      Dana, James Dwight; Spier, Kathryn E. (Berkeley Electronic Press, 2007)
      In a homogeneous good, Cournot duopoly model, entry may occur even when the potential entrant has no cost advantage and no independent access to distribution. By sinking its costs of production before negotiating with the ...