Now showing items 382-401 of 1911

    • Decentralization Debunked 

      Frug, Gerald Ellison (DODS, 2007)
    • Deciding by Default 

      Sunstein, Cass Robert (University of Pennsylvania, 2013)
    • Deciding What's Best for Children 

      Coons, John; Mnookin, Robert H.; Sugarman, Stephen (1993)
    • Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional 

      Goldberg, Arthur J.; Dershowitz, Alan Morton (Harvard Law School, 1970)
    • Defensive Localism: A View of the Field from the Field 

      Frug, Gerald Ellison; Barron, David J. (The University of Virginia, 2005)
    • Deference and Due Process 

      Vermeule, Cornelius Adrian (2015)
      In the textbooks, procedural due process is a strictly judicial enterprise; although substantive entitlements are created by legislative and executive action, it is for courts to decide independently what process the ...
    • Deferred Compensation Revisited 

      Halperin, Daniel I.; Yale, Ethan (Tax Analysts and Advocates, 2007)
      The tax rules governing deferred compensation, codified at section 409A, are harsh and complex. The rules are focused on the least important policy considerations and overlook the most important. Professors Halperin and ...
    • Degrees of Freedom, Dimensions of Power 

      Benkler, Yochai (Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press (MIT Press), 2016)
      The original Internet design combined technical, organizational, and cultural characteristics that decentralized power along diverse dimensions. Decentralized institutional, technical, and market power maximized freedom ...
    • Delaware and Washington as Corporate Lawmakers 

      Roe, Mark J. (Delaware Law School of Widener College, 2009)
      American corporate law scholars have long focused on state-to-state jurisdictional competition as a powerful engine in the making of American corporate law. Yet much corporate law is made in Washington, D.C. Federal ...
    • Delaware Law as Lingua Franca: Theory and Evidence 

      Broughman, Brian; Fried, Jesse M.; Ibrahim, Darian (University of Chicago Press, 2012)
      Why would a firm incorporate in Delaware rather than in its home state? Prior explanations have focused on the inherent features of Delaware corporate law, as well as the positive network externalities created by so many ...
    • Delaware's Choice 

      Subramanian, Guhan (2015)
      This Article first documents the shift to annual elections of all directors at most U.S. corporations, and argues that the alternative of "ineffective" staggered boards would have been more desirable, as a policy matter, ...
    • Delaware's Competition 

      Roe, Mark J. (Harvard Law School, 2003)
      One of corporate law's enduring issues has been the extent to which state-to-state competitive pressures on Delaware make for a race to the top or the bottom. States, or at least some of them, are said to compete with their ...
    • Delaware's Politics 

      Roe, Mark J. (Ames Foundation at the Harvard Law School, The, 2005)
      Delaware makes the corporate law governing most large American corporations. Since Washington can take away any, or all, of that lawmaking, a deep conception of American corporate law should show how, when, and where ...
    • Delaware's Shrinking Half-Life 

      Roe, Mark J. (Stanford Law School, 2009)
      A revisionist consensus among corporate law academics has begun to coalesce that, after a century of academic thinking to the contrary, states do not compete head-to-head on an ongoing basis for chartering revenues, leaving ...
    • Delegating to Enemies 

      Gersen, Jacob E.; Vermeule, Cornelius Adrian (Columbia Law Review Association, Inc., 2012)
      An axiom of institutional design is known as the ally principle: All else equal, voters, legislators, or other principals will rationally delegate more authority to agents who share their preferences (“allies”). The ally ...
    • Delegating to Enemies 

      Gersen, Jacob E.; Vermeule, Cornelius Adrian (Columbia Law Review Association, Inc., 2012)
      An axiom of institutional design is known as the ally principle: all else equal, voters, legislators or other principals will rationally delegate more authority to agents who share their preferences (“allies”). The ally ...
    • The Delegation Lottery 

      Vermeule, Cornelius Adrian (Harvard University, Harvard Law School, 2006)
      Replying to Matthew C. Stephenson, Legislative Allocation of Delegated Power: Uncertainty, Risk and the Choice Between Agencies and Courts, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1035 (2006). Matthew Stephenson models "the decision calculus ...
    • Deliberating about Dollars: The Severity Shift 

      Sunstein, Cass Robert; Schakde, David; Kahneman, Daniel (2000)
      How does jury deliberation affect the pre-deliberation judgments of individual jurors? In this paper we make progress on that question by reporting the results of a study of over 500 mock juries composed of over 3000 jury ...
    • Democracy and Corruption 

      Heymann, Philip B. (1996)
      I was asked to speak about corruption and democracy. I have a long history of concern about that relationship. The subject of corruption and democracy is best broken into three separate areas. First, there are questions ...