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Now showing items 1-10 of 37
Delaware's Shrinking Half-Life
(Stanford Law School, 2009)
A revisionist consensus among corporate law academics has begun to coalesce that, after a century of academic thinking to the contrary, states do not compete head-to-head on an ongoing basis for chartering revenues, leaving ...
Political Instability: Effects on Financial Development, Roots in the Severity of Economic Inequality
(Academic Press, 2011)
We here bring forward strong evidence that political instability impedes financial development, with its variation a primary determinant of differences in financial development around the world. As such, it needs to be ...
Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy
(Michigan Law Review, 2010)
Chrysler entered and exited bankruptcy in 42 days, making it one of the fastest major industrial bankruptcies in memory. It entered as a company widely thought to be ripe for liquidation if left on its own, obtained massive ...
Delaware and Washington as Corporate Lawmakers
(Delaware Law School of Widener College, 2009)
American corporate law scholars have long focused on state-to-state jurisdictional competition as a powerful engine in the making of American corporate law. Yet much corporate law is made in Washington, D.C. Federal ...
Clearinghouse Overconfidence
(California Law Review Inc., 2013)
Regulatory reaction to the 2008-2009 financial crisis focused on complex financial instruments that deepened the crisis. A consensus emerged that these risky financial instruments should move through safe, strong clearinghouses, ...
The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and Industrial Organization
(University of Pennsylvania, 2001)
Industrial organization affects the relative effectiveness of the shareholder wealth maximization norm in maximizing total social wealth. In nations where product markets are not strongly competitive, a strong shareholder ...
Juries and the Political Economy of Legal Origin
(San Diego [etc.] Academic Press, 2007)
Legal origin has been brought forward as a key influence on modern finance, because common law institutions protect investors better than do civil law institutions, it is claimed. These institutional differences are said, ...
Legal Origin and Modern Stock Markets
(Harvard University, Harvard Law School, 2006)
Legal origin - civil vs. common law - is said in much modern economic work to determine the strength of financial markets and the structure of corporate ownership, even in the world''s richer nations. The main means are ...
Derivatives Markets in Bankruptcy
(Harvard Law School, 2012)
By treating derivatives and financial repurchase agreements much more favorably than it treats other financial vehicles, American bankruptcy law subsidizes these arrangements relative to other financing channels. By ...
Is Delaware's Corporate Law Too Big to Fail?
(Brooklyn Law School, 2008)
An enduring inquiry for American corporate law scholars is why the small state of Delaware dominates corporate chartering in the United States. Several theories explain the result. I add another partial explanation: size ...