Now showing items 1-10 of 750
Race and Child Welfare: Disproportionality, Disparity, Discrimination: Re-assessing the Facts, Re-Thinking the Policy Options
The Conference, Race & Child Welfare: Disproportionality, Disparity, Discrimination: Re‐Assessing the Facts, Re‐Thinking the Policy Options, took place January 28‐29, 2011, at Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA
Rose's Human Nature of Property
(College of William and Mary, 2011)
Many social theories claim to have the human being at their center. That has been more a matter of theory than practice in many of those theories. But in the case of Carol Rose’s scholarship on property it could not be ...
The First Amendment and Political Risk
(Oxford University Press, 2012)
First Amendment doctrine is at its core about the correct response to the fact that speech can increase the risk of social harm. First Amendment risk varies along several dimensions, including distribution of risk, its ...
The Science, Fiction, and Science Fiction of Unsex Mothering
Response to Darren Rosenblum’s UnsexMothering: Toward a Culture of New Parenting
Administrative Law in the 1930s: The Supreme Court's Accommodation of Progressive Legal Theory
In the first decades of the twentieth century, Progressive politicians and legal theorists advocated the creation and then the expansion of administrative agencies. These agencies, they argued, could address rapidly changing ...
Law and Local Knowledge in the History of the Civil Rights Movement
(Harvard Law Review Pub. Association, 2012)
Book Review Essay focusing on Tomiko Brown Nagin's Courage to Dissent: Atlanta and The Long History of the Civil Rights Movement (Oxford University Press, 2012), which assesses recent political science-oriented scholarship ...
Complementary Constraints: Separation of Powers, Rational Voting, and Constitutional Design
(Harvard University, Harvard Law School, 2010)
This Article explores how the separation of powers affects voters’ electoral strategies, and how this interaction influences the performance of different institutional arrangements. We show that when one political agent, ...