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Now showing items 1-6 of 6
The Growth of Executive Pay
(Oxford University Press (OUP), 2005)
This paper examines both empirically and theoretically the growth of US executive pay during the period 1993–2003. During this period, pay has grown much beyond the increase that could be explained by changes in firm size, ...
The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power
(Harvard University, Harvard Law School, 2005)
This paper reconsiders the basic allocation of power between boards and shareholders in publicly traded companies with dispersed ownership. U.S. corporate law has long precluded shareholders from initiating any changes in ...
The Costs of Entrenched Boards
(Elsevier, 2005)
This paper investigates empirically how the value of publicly traded firms is affected by arrangements that protect management from removal. Staggered boards, which a majority of U.S. public companies have, substantially ...
Executive Pensions
(University of Iowa, College of Law, 2005)
This paper presents evidence of the extent to which omitting the value of pension benefits has undermined the accuracy of existing estimates of executive pay, its variability, and its sensitivity to performance.We study ...
Pay without Performance: Overview of the Issues
(University of Iowa, College of Law, 2005)
In our recent book, Pay without Performance, and in several accompanying and subsequent papers, we seek to provide a full account of how managerial power and influence have shaped executive compensation in publicly traded ...
Placing Election Bylaws on the Corporate Ballot
(2005)
This piece provides our amicus curiae brief in the case of American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees Pension Plan v. American International Group, which is now under consideration by the Second Circuit ...