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A Note on Joint and Several Liability: Insolvency, Settlement, and Incentives
(University of Chicago Press, 1994)
No abstract provided.
On the Efficiency of Privately Stipulated Damages for Breach of Contract: Entry Barriers, Reliance, and Renegotiation
(RAND, 1995)
Two roles for stipulated damage provisions have been debated in the literature: protecting relationship-specific investments and inefficiently excluding competitors. Aghion and Bolton (1987) formally demonstrate the latter ...
Pretrial Bargaining and the Design of Fee-Shifting Rules
(RAND, 1994)
Legal rules for allocating the private costs of civil litigation, or ''fee-shifting'' rules, provide powerful incentives for settlement. Within the context of a direct-revelation mechanism, the fee-shifting rule that ...
Incomplete Contracts and Signaling
(RAND, 1992)
This article Presents a principal-agent model in which asymmetric information leads to contractual incompleteness. I show that in the presence of transactions costs, incompleteness may act as a signal of the principal's ...
A Note on the Divergence between the Private and the Social Motive to Settle under a Negligence Rule
(University of Chicago Press, 1997)
The private motives to settle civil lawsuits are seldom aligned with the interests of society. This article presents a simple model of a negligence rule where there is too much settlement. During pretrial bargaining, the ...
Burdens of Proof in Civil Litigation: An Economic Perspective
(University of Chicago Press, 1997)
Burden of proof rules, which require a specified party to produce evidence on a contested issue, are central to the adversary system. In this article, we model burden of proof rules as a device for minimizing the costs of ...