Prosperity is Associated with Instability in Dynamical Networks

DSpace/Manakin Repository

Prosperity is Associated with Instability in Dynamical Networks

Citable link to this page


Title: Prosperity is Associated with Instability in Dynamical Networks
Author: Cavaliere, Matteo; Sedwards, Sean; Csikász-Nagy, Attila; Tarnita, Corina Elena; Nowak, Martin A.

Note: Order does not necessarily reflect citation order of authors.

Citation: Cavaliere, Matteo, Sean Sedwards, Corina Elena Tarnita, Martin A. Nowak, and Attila Csikász-Nagy. Forthcoming. Prosperity is associated with instability in dynamical networks. Journal of Theoretical Biology.
Full Text & Related Files:
Abstract: Social, biological and economic networks grow and decline with occasional fragmentation and re-formation, often explained in terms of external perturbations. We show that these phenomena can be a direct consequence of simple imitation and internal conflicts between ‘cooperators’ and ‘defectors’. We employ a game-theoretic model of dynamic network formation where successful individuals are more likely to be imitated by newcomers who adopt their strategies and copy their social network. We find that, despite using the same mechanism, cooperators promote well-connected highly prosperous networks and defectors cause the network to fragment and lose its prosperity; defectors are unable to maintain the highly connected networks they invade. Once the network is fragmented it can be reconstructed by a new invasion of cooperators, leading to the cycle of formation and fragmentation seen, for example, in bacterial communities and socio-economic networks. In this endless struggle between cooperators and defectors we observe that cooperation leads to prosperity, but prosperity is associated with instability. Cooperation is prosperous when the network has frequent formation and fragmentation.
Published Version: doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.09.005
Other Sources:
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at
Citable link to this page:
Downloads of this work:

Show full Dublin Core record

This item appears in the following Collection(s)


Search DASH

Advanced Search