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dc.contributor.authorCavaliere, Matteo
dc.contributor.authorSedwards, Sean
dc.contributor.authorTarnita, Corina Elena
dc.contributor.authorNowak, Martin A.
dc.contributor.authorCsikász-Nagy, Attila
dc.date.accessioned2012-03-05T17:09:53Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.citationCavaliere, Matteo, Sean Sedwards, Corina Elena Tarnita, Martin A. Nowak, and Attila Csikász-Nagy. Forthcoming. Prosperity is associated with instability in dynamical networks. Journal of Theoretical Biology.en_US
dc.identifier.issn0022-5193en_US
dc.identifier.issn1095-8541en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:8311705
dc.description.abstractSocial, biological and economic networks grow and decline with occasional fragmentation and re-formation, often explained in terms of external perturbations. We show that these phenomena can be a direct consequence of simple imitation and internal conflicts between ‘cooperators’ and ‘defectors’. We employ a game-theoretic model of dynamic network formation where successful individuals are more likely to be imitated by newcomers who adopt their strategies and copy their social network. We find that, despite using the same mechanism, cooperators promote well-connected highly prosperous networks and defectors cause the network to fragment and lose its prosperity; defectors are unable to maintain the highly connected networks they invade. Once the network is fragmented it can be reconstructed by a new invasion of cooperators, leading to the cycle of formation and fragmentation seen, for example, in bacterial communities and socio-economic networks. In this endless struggle between cooperators and defectors we observe that cooperation leads to prosperity, but prosperity is associated with instability. Cooperation is prosperous when the network has frequent formation and fragmentation.en_US
dc.description.sponsorshipMathematicsen_US
dc.description.sponsorshipOther Research Uniten_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.relation.isversionofdoi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.09.005en_US
dc.relation.hasversionhttp://arxiv.org/abs/1102.4947en_US
dash.licenseOAP
dc.subjectevolutionary game theoryen_US
dc.subjectnetwork dynamicsen_US
dc.subjectimitationen_US
dc.subjectevolution of cooperationen_US
dc.subjectnetwork formation and fragmentationen_US
dc.subjectpopulations and evolutionen_US
dc.titleProsperity is Associated with Instability in Dynamical Networksen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.description.versionAuthor's Originalen_US
dc.relation.journalJournal of Theoretical Biologyen_US
dash.depositing.authorNowak, Martin A.
dc.date.available2012-03-05T17:09:53Z
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.jtbi.2011.09.005*
dash.contributor.affiliatedTarnita, Corina
dash.contributor.affiliatedNowak, Martin


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