Representations and Decision Rules in the Theory of Self-Deception

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Representations and Decision Rules in the Theory of Self-Deception

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Title: Representations and Decision Rules in the Theory of Self-Deception
Author: Pinker, Steven
Citation: Pinker, Steven. 2011. Representations and decision rules in the theory of self-deception. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34(1): 35-37.
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Abstract: Self-deception is a powerful but overapplied theory. It is adaptive only when a deception-detecting audience is in the loop, not when an inaccurate representation is invoked as an internal motivator. First, an inaccurate representation cannot be equated with self-deception, which entails two representations, one inaccurate and the other accurate. Second, any motivational advantages are best achieved with an adjustment to the decision rule on when to act, not with a systematic error in an internal representation.
Published Version: doi:10.1017/S0140525X1000261X
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#OAP
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:8874911
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