Dynamic Matching with a Fall-Back Option

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Dynamic Matching with a Fall-Back Option

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Title: Dynamic Matching with a Fall-Back Option
Author: Gujar, Sujit; Parkes, David C.

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Citation: Gujar, Sujit, and David C. Parkes. 2010. Dynamic matching with a fall-back option. In Proceedings of the 2010 Conference on ECAI 2010: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence: August 16-20, 2010, Lisbon, Portugal, ed. Helder Coelho, Rudi Studer, and Michael Wooldridge, 263-268. Amsterdam: IOS Press.
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Abstract: We study dynamic matching without money when one side of the market is dynamic with arrivals and departures and the other is static and agents have strict preferences over agents on the other side of the market. In enabling stability properties, so that no pair of agents can usefully deviate from the match, we consider the use of a fall-back option where the dynamic agents can be matched, if needed, with a limited number of agents from a separate “reserve” pool. We introduce the GSODAS mechanism, which is truthful for agents on the static side of the market and stable. In simulations, we establish that GSODAS dominates in rank-efficiency a pair of randomized mechanisms that operate without the use of a fall-back option. In addition, we demonstrate good rank-efficiency in comparison to a non-truthful mechanism that employs online stochastic optimization.
Other Sources: http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1861020
Terms of Use: This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Open Access Policy Articles, as set forth at http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-use#OAP
Citable link to this page: http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:8919525
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