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dc.contributor.authorGelber, Alexander
dc.contributor.authorWeinzierl, Matthew Charles
dc.date.accessioned2012-09-17T14:35:30Z
dc.date.issued2012-09-17
dc.identifier.citationGelber, Alexander, and Matthew Weinzierl. "Equalizing Outcomes vs. Equalizing Opportunities: Optimal Taxation when Children's Abilities Depend on Parents' Resources." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 13-014, August 2012.en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:9556367
dc.description.abstractEmpirical research suggests that parents’ economic resources affect their children’s future earnings abilities. Optimal tax policy therefore will treat future ability distributions as endogenous to current taxes. We model this endogeneity, calibrate the model to match estimates of the intergenerational transmission of earnings ability in the United States, and use the model to simulate optimal policy numerically. Optimal policy is more redistributive toward low-income parents than existing U.S. tax policy. The optimal policy increases the probability that low-income children move up the economic ladder, generating a present-value welfare gain of 1.28% of consumption in our baseline case.en_US
dc.language.isoen_USen_US
dash.licenseOAP
dc.titleEqualizing Outcomes vs. Equalizing Opportunities: Optimal Taxation when Children' s Abilities Depend on Parents' Resourcesen_US
dc.typeResearch Paper or Reporten_US
dc.description.versionAuthor's Originalen_US
dc.relation.journalHarvard Business School working paper series # 13-014en_US
dash.depositing.authorWeinzierl, Matthew Charles
dc.date.available2012-09-17T14:35:30Z
dash.contributor.affiliatedWeinzierl, Matthew


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