Assessing the Measurement of Gubernatorial Budgetary Power

Assessing the Measurement of Gubernatorial Budgetary Power

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Abstract

The subject of studying the budgetary power of state governors has largely been expressed on a macro level. The budgetary power is the most important piece of legislation that governors have to deal with on an annual basis. Governors cannot implement their legislative and administrative visions for the state if they are not otherwise given the funds to do it. The most recognized method for measuring the formal and informal powers of state governors was created by Joseph A. Schlesinger in 1960, with Thad Beyle carrying on the work and providing periodical updates to the index. The existing Beyle score does not incorporate the powers that the legislature has in amending those powers, and also does not seek to find what the governor can do to counteract these amendatory powers. The Beyle score falls short in recognizing what could happen after the legislature amends the budget. Measuring the budgetary power can be important for scholars and citizens alike. Further knowledge of the governor's role in the political process can give voters and researchers a better sense of what a governor may be able to accomplish, and may serve as a possible predictor of policy success. This thesis reviews and reworks the Beyle score in an effort to identify power differences between states in terms of budgetary power. A time period comparison for the years 1980-2005 shows that the new score find less change in budgetary power than the Beyle score.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Measuring the institutional powers of state governors can be an important and rewarding exercise. The states allow 50 unique opportunities to study the executive branch, especially the relationship between the governors and the other branches of government. Studies on state policymaking consistently conclude that the governor's role is as chief legislator. State legislators look to the governor to set the policy agenda, and the governor frequently uses an array of formal and informal powers to shape legislation. It is agreed that there is a significant variation across states and governors in the degree to which governors are able to get their program passed by the legislature.

Instead of finding differences through a combined index with measurement issues, differences are better calculated through a closer focus on an individual power category. This thesis will only concentrate on one category: The executive budgetary power. One can believe that significant differences exist within this category. A restructuring of the budgetary power scales will help to reveal these differences. And instead of a broad expansion of the subject, it is best to refine existing measures.

The budgetary power is the most important piece of legislation that governors have to deal with on an annual basis. Governors cannot implement their legislative and administrative visions for the state, if they are not otherwise given the funds to do it. Scholars observed that governing and budgeting are now largely the same thing. The final budget often represents the success or failure of governors delivering on their campaign promises and agenda. Measuring the budgetary power of governors in terms of formulation and implementation is crucial. Funding programs is what turns an agenda into a policy.

The purpose of the thesis is to challenge the existing methods of measuring the budgetary power score and suggest improved ways to measure the formal and informal powers of state governors. The thesis will have three main research chapters.

The research of chapter 2 involves the formulation of the conceptual frameworks of gubernatorial power. Scholars have introduced various ideas and perspectives for studying gubernatorial power. They have become adept at quantifying and measuring the attributes of governor's power. But scholars lacked to recognize that human institutions and behavior are changeable. Consequently, the conceptual frameworks of gubernatorial power used for studies should also change. This section examines cases where measures have not kept pace with the subject of gubernatorial power. This chapter reviews the general conceptual issues involved in applying the indexes from Schlesinger, Beyle, Mueller, Dometrius, Krupnikov and Shipan, and Neustadt. The conceptual framework to be used to study gubernatorial power is a longitudinal analysis. The argument is that scholars' works tend to crystallize the power index's temporal issues. The power index ought to measure control over the bureaucracy. On can call the power index as the Gubernatorial Strength Index (GSI).

The first research section of chapter 3 involves the review of the Beyle's budgetary power and reveals that it does not adequately reflect the position of governors in the budgetary process. The Beyle coding approach identifies who is in charge of creating the budget, but fails to explain what they can and cannot do in the process. In this section, we have transformed a four-point scale into a nine-point scale index score. This characterization is explained by the fact that governors have varying levels of powers in changing the budget after the legislature has amended it, such as the power to amend the language of individual items. There are three separate types of language amendments possible: the three special language powers. The new coding approach for budgetary power score includes item vetoes, program funding, language changes, and appropriation reduction and substitution. One can see noticeable difference.

The second research section of chapter 3 is used to compare the change in budgetary power in the time period from 1980 to 2005 for both the Beyle BP score and the new BP score. Using the Beyle score is problematic due to the structure of the index. Updates over time to the budgetary power should be included for different institutional factors. Although these changes over time, the Beyle score has not accounted these coding shifts.

The third section of chapter 3 demonstrates that the gubernatorial power score is likely affected by the professionalization of the legislature. While Beyle and other scholars were focused on these gubernatorial power scores, other scholars such as Alan Rosenthal and Peverill Squire were arguing for the legislatures to professionalize and strengthen their policymaking capability. The argument is that innovative states and wealthy states enhanced the power of their governors substantially during the last 20 year period, however, a professional legislature in those states hindered increases in formal gubernatorial power. Some state legislatures are more formidable adversaries for the governor than are others. This section shows the relationship between the legislature's professionalization score and the new score from the previous first research section of chapter 3.

The first research section of the last chapter 4 demonstrates why we want to use another data source, more reliable across states and periods: The new ASAP score, which is the measurement of the governor's influence over the budget in a longitudinal analysis. The analysis draws on surveys of state agency leaders by ASAP (American State Administrators Project). The agency leaders were asked to rate separately the governor's and legislature's influences on the total budget of their agency and the budget for specific programs carried out by their agency. The hypothesis is that one of the strengths of the new ASAP score is combining formal powers with informal sources of influence, and the Beyle score ignore the latter. This research section provides a discussion of the measurement of executive and legislative influence over state administrative agencies from 1978 to 1998. The main point and contribution is to see whether the new ASAP score is correlated with the new BP score from the previous chapter 3.

There are some limitations to this thesis. The new BP score identified differences among states on a micro level, but they did not make a significant difference on the macro level. The important conclusion to be drawn is that perhaps budgetary power is best researched at the individual state level. Including all 50 states failed to reflect significant level of change.

Just as researchers cannot be sure that they have identified all of the elements necessary to measure gubernatorial budgetary power, the thesis cannot claim to have found all of the individual elements necessary to completely measure the budgetary power. It can only hope to inspire further study towards perhaps accomplishing that goal.

Another limitation is that the thesis uses the BOTS and ASAP for its information. Any lack of information will subsequently be shared by this study. The BOTS and ASAP provided the best reference option for this thesis. The information sources used for the study may contain mistakes that could affect the findings. It is recommended that future studies in the subjects may need to consult additional sources to verify the information contained in these texts.

Chapter 2

Conceptual Issues

Governors vary widely in the amount of formal power that they exercise, especially in their dealings with the legislatures. In some states, powerful governors can dominate the legislatures that are understaffed. In other states, governors are highly constrained by the legislatures. These differences in governors' power are examples of institutional conditions that may affect outcomes at the state level. Over the past decade, scholars have measured governor's power relying on the power index, a commonly used power score. This power index has undergone numerous changes. Scholars have introduced various ideas and perspectives for studying gubernatorial power. They have become adept at quantifying and measuring the attributes of governor's power. One can recognize that human institutions and behavior are changeable. Consequently, the conceptual frameworks of gubernatorial power used for studies should also change. This thesis examines cases where measures have not kept pace with the subject of gubernatorial power. Joseph Schlesinger first proposed measuring executive powers, and introduced the index in his 1960 study. The index has shown strong resilience and the use of it has continued despite critics about its construction. Other scholars have proposed additions and warnings not to equate formal power with actual influence. The power index has become a victim of its own subject. The past decade has seen widespread increases in the formal power of governors. But changes in states have reduced the validity of the powers' components and have weakened the ability of the summary index to identify differences between governors in states. Consequently, it is problematic to use the power index or any of its components in studies of the contemporary governorship.

This chapter reviews the general conceptual issues involved in applying the indexes from Schlesinger, Beyle, Mueller, Dometrius, Krupnikov and Shipan, and Neustadt. The conceptual framework to be used to study gubernatorial power is a longitudinal analysis. The argument is that scholars' works tend to crystallize the power index's temporal issues. The power index ought to measure control over the bureaucracy. On can call the power index as the Gubernatorial Strength Index (GSI). Since the 1960s, numerous new agencies have been created. Most of them have been created by legislative rather than constitutional action. And many are also headed by gubernatorial appointees. Some state legislatures intentionally created new agencies to increase the governor's power, while simultaneously bypassing the challenging task of amending the state constitution to restructure old agencies.

Joseph Schlesinger

Joseph Schlesinger's ideas and perspectives for studying gubernatorial power were highlighting the limitations governors faced in dealing with their legislatures and state administrators. Creating a power index measuring formal power was necessary to address the different limitations governors faced. Measuring the actual formal powers of governors was one consequence of the study, but the intent was to define the lack of power. Schlesinger served to highlight the presence of power in the states and encouraged further review of the subject.

Schlesinger's 1960 methodology was to send a survey to each of the fifty state governors asking what formal and informal obstacles existed that prevented them from successfully administering their states. His study was meant as an introductory study of the role of executive in the states. Schlesinger intended to study the politics of state administration by looking into the ambiguous role of the state in the American political system.[1] The study was inspired by the fact that the author felt that states were excellent laboratories in which to study political arrangements.[2] In this initial study Schlesinger foreshadows the changing face of the governorship. Governors have been increasing their overall institutional power since the inception of the index. According to Schlesinger, there was a diminishing fear of the executive in America, which has translated to more formal and institutional powers for state governors. This highlights an important function that the index can serve as a historical timeline for how much state executive powers have changed.[3] A governor does not have to necessarily use their formal powers to influence the legislature to have an effect on their actions. Under the pretense that the office of governor is a truly political position, one can assume a measure of institutional power can be a combination of formal and informal powers.

Schlesinger recognized the influential power of the governor's office in deciding which powers to include in the index. His study asks only governors to give their views on what limits their powers. Their answers constitute more opinion than constitutional or

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[1] Joseph A. Schlesinger, "The Politics of the Executive," in *Politics in the American States*, ed. Herbert Jacob and Kenneth N. Vines (Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), 210.

[2] Schlesinger, "The Politics of the Executive," 212.

[3] Schlesinger, "The Politics of the Executive," 221.

statutory fact in terms of measuring their formal powers. A review of state constitutions is probably the best way to measure these levels of power. With a research tool for only governors, Schlesinger's study undoubtedly contains a level of bias towards governors themselves because only their views are recorded. Given the complex interaction between state agencies, the legislature and the executive office, it would be prudent to seek the views of other levels of government to assess whether the governors are being truthful in their responses. Also it is unclear in the study whether governors responded personally to the survey or had a subordinate fulfill the duty. Thus one cannot be certain that the responses reflect the actual views of the governors themselves. There are also questions involved in the use of the categories. Schlesinger combines each of the power categories into a single index, giving each individual category equal weight in the total score. Consequently, the governor with the highest score becomes the most powerful governor in the United States. This practice raises questions on the importance of each category, since all of the categories are not truly equal. One can only conclude from the cumulative index that Schlesinger is implying that all of the categories are of equal importance. Schlesinger's study is not a constitutional review, and therefore is open to criticism that it does not completely measure formal powers in the states.

Thad Beyle

Thad Beyle proposed numerous studies into the subject of measuring gubernatorial power. His ideas and perspectives were highlighting that it is difficult to find a valid theoretical or statistical measure that would find each of the categories to be of equal importance. In light of these concerns, identifying trends and changes in overall executive power can be better achieved by a closer look at the individual categories of the index. Beyle accounted a new organizational set up, such as adding new categories like the budget power to the index.

Beyle replicates Schlesinger's study by sending a survey to state administrators, rather than governors, in all fifty states to gauge whether their answers to Schlesinger's original survey were the same as the responses of their state governors. The goal of this analysis was to find if governors perceive their powers the same as state administrators.[4] Indeed, state administrators saw executive power in much the same way as their executives in Beyle's study, answering that governors felt much more restricted in their powers.[5] With this independent research, Beyle was able to conclude that Schlesinger's study was pretty reliable. One issue with the research that is not addressed by either Schlesinger or Beyle is the weighting of each category.

Thad Beyle's 1980 research builds on his earlier analysis of Schlesinger and provides the initial theoretical and statistical framework for the thesis. Beyle reexamines the Schlesinger categories with the goal of finding how well states provide for a governor to govern.[6] In his research, Beyle sets the groundwork for building the index. The scoring scale and the disclosure of the interval measures are the model used for all of his subsequent updates of the index. The scores attained by the states are given according to the quintile they are grouped in. This creates a few theoretical problems that will be

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[4] Thad Beyle, "The Governor's Formal Powers: A View from the Governor's Chair," *Public Administration Review* 28, no. 2 (1968): 540.

[5] Beyle, "The Governor's Formal Powers" (1968), 541.

[6] Thad Beyle, "Governors" in *Politics in the American States*, 4th ed., ed. Virginia Gray, Herbert Jacob, and Kenneth N. Vines (Boston: Little, Brown, 1983), 180.

discussed later on in the thesis. Beyle views the governor as one of many players in a complex inter-branch relationship between the executive, legislature and state agencies. As such, the powers given to governors are largely dependent on what the other government entities allow and what the governors can take for themselves. One can note that the legislature and bureaucracies constantly seek more power. It is obvious that Beyle believes that power is not a zero sum enterprise. It can be either dominated by one entity or shared by many. With their principal role as chief legislators, Beyle envisions governors as an active party to a constant power struggle contained within each state government.[7] Later, Beyle did independent updates to the executive power index in 1983, 1990, 1996, 2001 and 2004. He dropped the quintile scoring system in 1983. Beyle incorporated the organizational changes to reflect the growing number of state agencies and bureaucracy. Reforms in emergency authorities, consolidation in existing state agencies, and creation of new agencies, led scholars to account a new organizational set up. Beyle added the category of budget power (BP) to the index to determine how powerful a governor is in preparing the state budget. This change is entirely relevant theoretically, and represents a tool through which the index can better differentiate power between states. The thesis will share this view, and attempt to place particularly the governor's budgetary power within this context. Beyle notes in his analysis of budgetary power that strong budget authority can overcome many weaknesses such as for a governor in appointing officials.[8] Preparing a budget allows a governor to provide for

[7] Beyle, "Governors" (1968), 181.

[8] Beyle, "Governors" (1968), 198.

their own policy priorities and fund their agendas.[9] On the other hand, his research also accounts for the possibility of governors losing their budgetary power. Some state legislatures are exploring to regain the budgetary authority.[10] Beyle is under no impression that the index can be used to predict the actual exercise of power. It is described as a measure of potential power.[11]

Keith Mueller

Keith Mueller's ideas and perspectives were highlighting a methodology using the same coding criteria and data sources as Schlesinger did for a contemporary update. And he demonstrated that governors are more powerful in 1982 than in 1960.

Mueller conducted an analysis of changing executive powers. Comparing the relative position of governors from the period of 1960 to 1982, Mueller sought to find whether Schlesinger's 1960 work reflects the reality of changing powers. This type of comparison is what the thesis attempts to recreate for only budgetary power category. Mueller's research into the transforming powers of state executives is one of the most comprehensive independent uses of the index outside of Beyle's work. Mueller was convinced of the index's utility by the 1968 Beyle research and the 1979 Bernick research (Also a survey of state administrators). His methodology for measuring change was to use the same coding criteria and data sources as Schlesinger did in 1960 for a contemporary update. Mueller compared the two indices (Schlesinger's 1960 and his own

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[9] Beyle, "Governors" (1968), 198.

[10] Beyle, "Governors" (1980), 199.

[11] Beyle, "Governors" (1980), 202.

1982 index) using correlation and regression analysis to try and explain any variation between the two indices.[12] The executive power is considered to have changed if the correlation coefficient is lower between the two indices. This is an indication that the executive powers have not remained constant.

Furthermore, Mueller also attempted to demonstrate that governors had become more powerful in the years after the Schlesinger research. As a result, he successfully demonstrated that governors are more powerful in 1982 than in 1960.[13] But he also found that the executive budgetary power category lacked a significant amount of variation.

In addition, Mueller's analysis allows him to reject the Dometrius theory that higher expenditures fuel a need for more executive power.[14] On the contrary, states that show policy initiative, higher legislative activity and more income (not spending) were more likely to grant their governors more significant powers.[15] Mueller mentioned that Dometrius is incorrect in assuming that governors' power lay in the professionalism and efficiency of the legislature. On the contrary, he finds that governors' power came from a confrontational relationship between the executive and legislative branches. Mueller views the governor's role as a political player using informal powers, instead of the fiscal manager depicted by Dometrius. These findings serve as strong evidence that party control is extremely important in a competitive relationship between the executive and

[12] Keith Mueller, "Explaining Variation and Change in Gubernatorial Powers, 1960-1982," *Western Political Quarterly* 38, no. 3 (1985): 424.

[13] Mueller, "Explaining Variation and Change in Gubernatorial Powers," 427.

[14] Mueller, "Explaining Variation and Change in Gubernatorial Powers," 429.

[15] Mueller, "Explaining Variation and Change in Gubernatorial Powers," 430.

the legislature. On the other hand, Dometrius revealed some limitations. There are some measurement problems in the Beyle, Schlesinger and Mueller studies. The use of quintiles is criticized because of its inability to fully measure potential changes. There is a problem in using quintiles of 1 to 5 points, because it only groups states according to relative ranking, and not actual power.

Nelson Dometrius

Nelson Dometrius was one of the first researchers to attempt to improve the power index as a measurement tool. His ideas and perspectives were refining the details of the existing power index, by strongly questioning its construction. He created a modified version of the index by excluding the party control component, which looks at the position of the governor's party in the legislature. More importantly, part of his validation process includes a closer look at the individual categories separately to measure changes of gubernatorial power in a longitudinal analysis.

Statistically, Dometrius has a mixed reaction to the cumulative index employed by Schlesinger and Beyle. Dometrius is correct in his assessment that the overall index needs significant work.[16] The focus of the correction is that Schlesinger mistakenly views each of the categories to be of equal weight, which is a violation of interval validity.[17] Dometrius measured the index and found that the interval measure requires that the distance between two points is equal, and the categories in the index fail to achieve this.[18]

[16] Dometrius, "Measuring Gubernatorial Power," 595.

[17] Dometrius, "Measuring Gubernatorial Power," 593.

[18] Dometrius, "Measuring Gubernatorial Power," 601.

In addition, Dometrius used a regression analysis to measure the significance of each category, and found that they do not combine well.[19] Consequently, he focused on the strengths of the index: Looking at individual categories of executive power separately to measure changes over time. The solution is to simplify the measure, separate the categories and look at the powers of governors independently. Dometrius had quantitative goals and his assertion was that an index should be easily calculated and that it should measure what it is supposed to measure.[20] Also, an important aspect of power is having power over someone, meaning that both formal and informal relationship exist between a governor and the rest of the state government.[21] After the Schlesinger/Beyle combined power index had been utilized in several studies of state government, Dometrius' intent was to ensure that the index was an accurate measure of actual executive power. While supportive of the idea of an index in general, he attempted to make the index of more use to other researchers.

Yanna Krupnikov and Charles Shipan

Yanna Krupnikov and Charles Shipan have considered the relationship between gubernatorial power and political outcomes. Their ideas and perspectives were highlighting that the power index maintained by Beyle suffers from a key measurement error that is problematic in analyses of time series data due to the structure of the index.

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[19] Nelson C. Dometrius, "Measuring Gubernatorial Power," *Journal of Politics* 41, no. 2 (1979): 604.

[20] Dometrius, "Measuring Gubernatorial Power," 589.

[21] Dometrius, "Measuring Gubernatorial Power," 596.

The argument is that updates over time to the power index have accounted for different institutional factors. As a result, a state that has an identical score at different points in time, could have different institutional structures at those times. On the other hand, a state whose institutional structures remained unchanged, may have received a different score in each update due to a change in the way the score has been constructed. Krupnikov and Shipan have noted that although the coding criteria changed, research has nonetheless continued to treat this measure as longitudinal. Consequently, they introduced a new measure of gubernatorial power, one better suited to analyses that require a consideration of institutional conditions overtime. Krupnikov and Shipan modified the coding criteria for gubernatorial power score by adding the shared power score in the overall power index.

Richard Neustadt

According to Robert E. Crew, Jr., governors' success comes from a combination of several factors. He emphasized importance of the factor of character involving motivation, cognitive and behavioral styles,[22] and the factor of political skill,[23] referred as governmental experience. These elements are difficult to quantify and are best known as informal powers analyzed by Richard Neustadt's studies.

[22] Robert E. Crew, Jr., "Understanding Gubernatorial Behavior: A Framework for Analysis," in *Governors and Hard Times* (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1992), 16.

[23] Crew, "Understanding Gubernatorial Behavior," 17.

Informal Gubernatorial Power

According to Neustadt[24], there is very little governors can do entirely on their own authority. The best use of their authorities is in bargaining, threatening to take particular actions in exchange for actions others agree to take. Governors' ability to make bargains, that is, to persuade, depends on their professional reputation. They gain professional reputation by using authority, strategically forming mutually advantageous alliances, and following through on promised actions.

Bargaining

Governors very seldom act entirely on their own, unless they can persuade others to support them. Governors who act unilaterally can be frustrated and even humiliated. For instance, on the presidential level, most of the executive orders that president Obama issued in his second term are about to be nullified by the courts, congress, or president Trump. These orders were effective for a while because president Obama was able to get his own cabinet to implement them, but they were nullified as soon as others acted against them. President Obama acted unilaterally because there was no way the republican controlled congress would bargain with him. But he would have preferred making bargains, even if the results were not exactly what he wanted.

To maximize influence, governors have many assets in bargaining. They can support provisions that others want. For instance, supporting an unrelated bill that the legislature wants to pass. Governors can reward or punish cabinet members by proposing

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[24] Harry A. Bailey Jr., "Neustadt's Thesis Revisited: Toward the Two Faces of Presidential Power," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 11, no. 3 (1981): 351.

agency budget increase or cut. They can reward people in particular localities by appointing their members to key positions. Governors can also discourage opposition by threatening to cut a budget or oppose a bill. They don't just take actions out of the goodness of their hearts. They make offers in return for specific reciprocal actions and they reward those who help them. Governors and other politicians including interest groups, exchange many benefits over an extended period. Governors and their bargaining partners say or do something positive just to maintain a good relationship, but nobody simply gives something away. These actions are often decried as politics at its worst, but they have always served an important function, enabling governors to assemble enough support to advance ambitious policy agendas. When it comes to advancing legislation, governors must bargain with many individuals and across many issues all at the same time. Different members of the legislature might require different inducements, forcing the governor to support or oppose bills other than the one immediately at hand. This means that governors must understand not only their own agenda, but those of their potential allies and opponents as well.

Governors must understand their combination of powers, traditions, institutional constraints, and political issues. Some of them can issue policies and propose legislation directly while others must get the approval of other parties. These institutional structures help determine whom a governor must listen to and persuade, but none of them guarantees or prevents governors from developing influence. Furthermore, unanimously elected governors, who at first glance look more autonomous, might depend on narrow constituencies and might struggle to gain the attention of the legislature.[25] Differences in

[25] Bailey, "Neustadt's Thesis Revisited," 352.

state political structure pose different challenges and affect governors' tactical priorities. Nevertheless, all governors can make consequential decisions and enhance their power above and beyond their formal legal status. The issues will vary over time at the state level, but to be powerful a governor will always need to persuade.

Professional Reputation

A good professional reputation is based on the belief that governors know how to play the cards they are dealt and are a force to be reckoned with. To maximize influence, governors must build a professional reputation by successfully building coalitions, making collaborators out of former fence sitters, and causing one-time opponents to want to be on their side. To be effective in any setting, governors must assemble coalitions for positive actions and prevent others from building coalitions against them. Governors can also build a professional reputation by effectively using the bully pulpit to make persuasive arguments to voters, praise and defend those who want to act in ways they approve, and discourage negative actions through criticism or implied threats. Conversely, governors can lose professional reputation by being passive, taking inconsistent positions, or failing to deliver on promises and threats. Neustadt's argument about the importance of executive power can be unsettling. One can ask, does this imply that executives shouldn't care about good policy, and instead work to enhance their own prospects? The argument strongly suggests that both goal attainment and good outcomes help build their professional reputation.

Personal Prestige

When it comes to turning prestige into power, governors are not in the same ballpark as presidents. Presidents are constantly covered by the media, and everyone in the country has an opinion about them, so presidents can readily turn popularity into votes. Governors are seldom well known or covered by the media. Still, they can make arguments in public and try to educate citizens about issues under their purview, for instance the link between budget and education quality. If governors were to follow Neustadt, they would not neglect the key leadership function of making meaning for issues and events. A governor's ability to educate citizens, or to make professional buzzwords, is a key resource. A governor who can transcend a discussion on how reframing issue can create new leverage can attract new sources of support. Explaining particular ideas and events in detail also influences grassroots members whose interest in issues relates to what people in power are talking about. To maximize influence via prestige, governors should issue press releases about their actions, including legislative testimony and issue reports. They should hold press conferences and give speeches on their priorities whenever possible. They should seek to have a public image and to be identified as the person leading the fight for common goals. In the long run, governors are more likely to exercise influence with skillful use of their formal powers, their central position in multiple information networks, and their professional reputation.

Concluding that certain components of executive power vary between states. Rather than using the index score to define high and low levels of power, the individual categories are best utilized independently to measure differences in certain aspects of executive power between states.[26] There are many theoretical and statistical issues involved in declaring that one governor is more powerful than another by the existing

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[26] Nelson C. Dometrius, "Changing Gubernatorial Power: The Measure vs. the Reality," *Western Political Quarterly* 40, no. 2. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publishing (1987): 321.

executive power measures. Instead of finding differences through a combined index with measurement issues, differences are better calculated through a closer focus on an individual power category. That's the reason why the thesis will only concentrate on one category: The executive budgetary power. One can believe that significant differences exist within this category. A restructuring of the budgetary power scales will help to reveal these differences. Instead of a broad expansion of the subject, it is best to refine existing measures.

Chapter 3

Assessing Beyle Gubernatorial Budgetary Power Score

The budgetary power is the most important piece of legislation that governors have to deal with on an annual basis. Governors cannot implement their legislative and administrative visions for the state, if they are not otherwise given the funds to do it. Researchers observed that governing and budgeting are now largely the same thing. The final budget often represents the success or failure of governors delivering on their campaign promises and agenda. Budgeting is also ensuring that the existing programs and agencies are kept adequately funded. Measuring the budgetary power of governors in terms of formulation and implementation is crucial. Funding programs is what turns an agenda into a policy.

On the other hand, there is another side to budget negotiations: The legislature. State legislatures have an opportunity to fund agendas and advance their individual or collective interests in the budgetary process. As well, the budgetary process is a good opportunity to officially disagree with the governor. And also to reject or oppose programs that the members of the legislature find unacceptable. Conflicts with the executive branch are not always guaranteed, but disagreements are likely, even if the governor's party dominates the legislature. Members of the legislature have their own campaign promises and constituents to satisfy in the appropriation process. Of all legislation that is considered by the legislature, the budget is the most likely to involve potential disagreements. It is recognized that these potential conflicts can be resolved prior to the bill being officially amended or changed. The legislature and the governor must do these unofficial revisions knowing that official powers may be utilized in the future. Budgetary power does not always have to be officially used to be effective.

Budgeting is a contentious negotiation between the two branches of government, leading researchers to treat governors' budgetary power in the context of their ability to influence the process. Governors have varying starting points in the negotiation of the budget, which can have a significant effect on their influence in the process.

First, it is important to identify who is given the responsibility of preparing the initial draft of the budget: The governor or the legislature. Secondly, identify what the governor or legislature can do if they do not agree with certain components of the budget. The branch that proposes the initial budget is essentially beginning the negotiation with the branch that must approve it. The appropriations involved will most likely be the starting point of potential revision and compromise. The branch that must review the proposal is at disadvantage because they cannot begin the negotiations the way they wish by coming up with their own numbers.

Assessing Beyle Coding Approach

A review of the Beyle's budgetary power reveals that it does not adequately reflect the position of governors in the budgetary process. The Beyle score identifies who is in charge of creating the budget, but does not explain what they can and cannot do in the process. However, the evolution of the Beyle score shows that the budgetary power appears to have changed over time. The only way to validate for instance, a governor with a power score of 4 in 1980 and a score of 1 in 2005, is to use the same coding approach for both time periods. Also, Beyle has begun to recognize the legislature's role in the budget process, as he incorporated legislative amendatory powers only from 1994. The two branches are involved in a constant battle to gain power over each other. While most literature on the subject focuses on the increasing nature of executive power, it is important for the index score to be able to measure decreases in some aspects of power. It is possible in this cross branch struggle that the legislature may wrest some official powers away from the governor over time. Any measurement of budgetary power should take this into account. Through the years this is how Beyle's measurement of budgetary power looked like in Table 1.

Table 1: Beyle's coding criteria for budgetary power score

Score	1960
1	Governor prepares budget only as a member of a group, usually of other elected state officials or members of the legislature.
2	Governor shares authority with another officials whom he does not appoint, the elected state auditor.
3	Governor shares power with a committee selected by himself, but from a restricted list.
4	Governor has the responsibility but shares it either with a civil service appointee or an appointee of someone other than himself.
5	Governor has the responsibility for preparing the budget and shares it only with persons appointed by him.

Score	1968 and 1980
1	Governor shares responsibility with several others with independent sources of strength.
2	Governor shares responsibility with another popularly elected officials.
3	Governor shares responsibility with legislature.
4	Governor shares responsibility with a civil service appointee or with person appointed by someone else.
5	Governor has full responsibility.

Score	1988
1	Governor shares responsibility with several others with independent sources of strength.
2	Governor shares responsibility with other elected officials.
3	Governor shares responsibility with legislature.
4	Governor shares responsibility with civil servants or other person appointed by someone else.
5	Governor has full responsibility.

Score	1994, 1988 and 2001
1	Governor shares responsibility with other elected officials, and legislature has unlimited power to change executive budget.
2	Governor shares responsibility, and legislature has unlimited power to change executive budget.
3	Governor has full responsibility, and legislature has unlimited power to change executive budget.
4	Governor has full responsibility, and legislature can increase by special majority vote or subject it to item veto.
5	Governor has full responsibility, and legislature may not increase executive budget.

Source: Thad Beyle "State and Local Government: Gubernatorial Power" 2005.
https://www.unc.edu/polisci_old/beyle/gubnewpwr.html

New Coding Approach

The new score attempts to combine Beyle's findings on who prepares the budget with the formal process a governor must contend with in the budgetary process. Similar to Beyle's coding approach, the new coding rates governors higher who prepare the budget on their own as opposed to governors who must share the responsibility. The new coding approach incorporates the powers the legislature has in amending those powers, but it also seeks to find what the governor can do to counteract these amendatory powers. The Beyle coding approach falls short in recognizing what could happen after the legislature amends the budget.

In this section, we have transformed a four-point scale into a nine-point scale index score. This characterization is explained by the fact that governors have varying levels of powers in changing the budget after the legislature has amended it.

Four levels of powers affect the new score: First, governors enjoy their normal veto powers in the budgetary process. Second, some governors are also afforded the option of revising or striking down proposed program funding. This can have an important effect on either the governor or legislature, as a governor could take a rival's project out of the state budget or confirm the final funding of their initiatives. Third, another important power in the budget process for governors, is the power to amend the language of individual items. Instead of striking down an entire item, some governors are allowed to change the wording of appropriation items. This has multitude possibilities, including effectively changing the purpose of the appropriation. Fourth, the new coding approach recognizes the governors who have the capability of reducing the quantity of an appropriation or substitute new appropriation numbers on their own. It is hypothesized that the new coding approach creates separation by identifying differences in governors that were not recognized in the Beyle coding approach.

Furthermore, the new nine-point scale index score includes the power to amend the language of individual items, and there are three separate types of language amendments possible: language accompanying appropriation, footnote language, and proviso language.[27] First, language accompanying appropriation comes directly after the appropriation, and changing it can change its purpose.[28] Second, footnote language describes how the money designated for a program is supposed to be spent.[29] Changing this can affect how the money is distributed. Third, proviso language is a conditional statement that explains what an executive must do before receiving a designated appropriation.[30] Changing the wording can increase or decrease the possibility of an appropriation being awarded. This can have significant political consequences. Some governors are allowed all three special language powers, and some are allowed only one. And this is characterized in the new nine-point scale index score. All of the special language powers granted to governors are significant in their own right, but not enough to consider completely on their own. Skilled governors may use any of the language amendment powers to their advantage. Therefore governors who enjoy at least one language power will be scored as having the ability to change language.

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[27] National Conference of State Legislatures (NSCL), "Gubernatorial Veto Authority with Respect to Major Budget Bill(s), 2008. http://www.ncsl.org/research/fiscal-policy/gubernatorial-veto-authority-with-respect-to-major.aspx.

[28] NSCL, "Gubernatorial Veto Authority with Respect to Major Budget Bill(s)," 2008.

[29] NSCL, "Gubernatorial Veto Authority with Respect to Major Budget Bill(s)," 2008.

[30] NSCL, "Gubernatorial Veto Authority with Respect to Major Budget Bill(s)," 2008.

To characterize the new nine-point scale index score, priority on the new coding approach is first given to states where the governor is solely responsible for preparing the budget. Secondly, states will be separated by the presence of a line item veto. Then, ordering will be done according to the legislature's ability to change the budget. Then, the new score will be affected by the three special language powers, funding programs, and reducing or substituting numbers. All three special language powers will be treated equally, with states possessing more special powers ranked higher than those with fewer. The new coding approach is shown below in Table 2, followed by the comparison of scores for the 2005 Beyle budgetary power score and the new budgetary power score in Table 3, and finally the ranking comparison of the states in Table 4.

Table 2: New coding criteria for budgetary power score

Score	New coding approach
0	Governor has no budget responsibility or authority
0.2	Governor shares responsibility with elected officials outside legislature, governor must veto entire budget, legislature has unlimited power to change executive budget
0.4	Governor shares responsibility with elected officials outside legislature, governor has line-item veto, legislature has unlimited power to change executive budget
0.6	Governor shares responsibility with elected officials outside legislature, governor has line-item veto, one special power, and legislature has unlimited power to change executive budget
0.8	Governor shares responsibility with elected officials outside legislature, governor has line-item veto, two special powers, and legislature has unlimited power to change executive budget
1	Governor shares responsibility with elected officials outside legislature, governor has line-item veto, three special powers, and legislature has unlimited power to change executive budget
1.2	Governor shares responsibility, must veto entire budget, legislature has unlimited power to change executive budget
1.4	Governor shares responsibility, governor has line-item veto, legislature has unlimited power to change executive budget
1.6	Governor shares responsibility, governor has line-item veto, has one special power and legislature has unlimited power to change executive budget
1.8	Governor shares responsibility, governor has line-item veto, has two special powers, and legislature has unlimited power to change executive budget
2	Governor shares responsibility, governor has line-item veto, three special powers, and legislature has unlimited power to change executive budget
2.2	Governor has full responsibility, must veto entire budget, and legislature has unlimited power to change executive budget
2.4	Governor has full responsibility, governor has line-item veto and legislature has unlimited power to change executive budget
2.6	Governor has full responsibility, governor has line-item veto, one special power, and legislature has unlimited power to change executive budget
2.8	Governor has full responsibility, governor has line-item veto, two special powers and legislature has unlimited power to change executive budget
3	Governor has full responsibility, governor has line-item veto, three special powers and legislature has unlimited power to change executive budget
3.2	Governor has full responsibility, must veto entire budget, and legislature can increase only by special majority vote
3.4	Governor has full responsibility, governor has line-item veto, and legislature can increase only by special majority vote
3.6	Governor has full responsibility, governor has line-item veto, one special power, and legislature can increase only by special majority vote
3.8	Governor has full responsibility, governor has line-item veto, two special powers and legislature can increase only by special majority vote
4	Governor has full responsibility, governor has line-item veto, three special powers and legislature can increase only by special majority vote
4.2	Governor has full responsibility, must veto entire budget, legislature may not increase executive budget
4.4	Governor has full responsibility, governor has line-item veto, and legislature may not increase executive budget
4.6	Governor has full responsibility, governor has line-item veto, one special power and legislature may not increase executive budget
4.8	Governor has full responsibility, governor has line-item veto, two special powers and legislature may not increase executive budget
5	Governor has full responsibility, governor has line-item veto, three special powers and legislature may not increase executive budget

Source: The Book of the States 2006

By including item vetoes, program funding, language changes and appropriation reduction and substitution, one can see noticeable difference in states scored 3 in Beyle's coding approach. The score of 3 leads one to believe that these governors share equal powers in the budgetary process. But by taking into account the governor's powers and limitations in the process, one can see that this is not necessarily the case.

Table 3: Beyle BP score vs. New BP score

State	Beyle BP score	New BP score
Alabama	3.00	2.60
Alaska	3.00	2.80
Arizona	3.00	2.60
Arkansas	3.00	2.60
California	3.00	3.00
Colorado	3.00	2.80
Connecticut	3.00	2.60
Delaware	3.00	2.40
Florida	3.00	2.40
Georgia	3.00	2.80
Hawaii	3.00	2.40
Idaho	3.00	2.40
Illinois	3.00	2.80
Indiana	3.00	2.20
Iowa	3.00	2.80
Kansas	3.00	2.40
Kentucky	3.00	2.80
Louisiana	3.00	2.80
Maine	3.00	2.60
Maryland	5.00	5.00
Massachusetts	3.00	3.00
Michigan	3.00	2.80
Minnesota	3.00	2.60
Mississippi	3.00	2.80
Missouri	3.00	2.80
Montana	3.00	2.80
Nebraska	4.00	3.80
Nevada	3.00	2.20
New Hampshire	3.00	2.20
New Jersey	3.00	3.00
New Mexico	3.00	2.80
New York	4.00	3.80
North Carolina	3.00	2.20
North Dakota	3.00	2.80
Ohio	3.00	2.80
Oklahoma	3.00	2.80
Oregon	3.00	2.60
Pennsylvania	3.00	2.60
Rhode Island	3.00	2.20
South Carolina	2.00	1.20
South Dakota	3.00	2.40
Tennessee	3.00	2.80
Texas	2.00	1.60
Utah	3.00	2.40
Vermont	3.00	2.20
Virginia	3.00	2.80
Washington	3.00	2.80
West Virginia	5.00	5.00
Wisconsin	3.00	3.00
Wyoming	3.00	2.80

Source: The Book of the States 2006
Source: Thad Beyle "State and Local Government: Gubernatorial Power" 2005.
https://www.unc.edu/polisci_old/beyle/gubnewpwr.html

Also, the difference was that it occurs in an interval in which the legislature has unlimited power to change the executive budget. The Beyle coding approach looks no further than this situation, while the new coding approach looks at what each governor can do to counteract this possibility.

Table 4: Ranking: Beyle BP score vs. New BP score

Rank	State	Beyle BP score
1	Maryland	5.00
1	West Virginia	5.00
3	Nebraska	4.00
3	New York	4.00
5	Alabama	3.00
5	Alaska	3.00
5	Arizona	3.00
5	Arkansas	3.00
5	California	3.00
5	Colorado	3.00
5	Connecticut	3.00
5	Delaware	3.00
5	Florida	3.00
5	Georgia	3.00
5	Hawaii	3.00
5	Idaho	3.00
5	Illinois	3.00
5	Indiana	3.00
5	Iowa	3.00
5	Kansas	3.00
5	Kentucky	3.00
5	Louisiana	3.00
5	Maine	3.00
5	Massachusetts	3.00
5	Michigan	3.00
5	Minnesota	3.00
5	Mississippi	3.00
5	Missouri	3.00
5	Montana	3.00
5	Nevada	3.00
5	New Hampshire	3.00
5	New Jersey	3.00
5	New Mexico	3.00
5	North Carolina	3.00
5	North Dakota	3.00
5	Ohio	3.00
5	Oklahoma	3.00
5	Oregon	3.00
5	Pennsylvania	3.00
5	Rhode Island	3.00
5	South Dakota	3.00
5	Tennessee	3.00
5	Utah	3.00
5	Vermont	3.00
5	Virginia	3.00
5	Washington	3.00
5	Wisconsin	3.00
5	Wyoming	3.00
48	South Carolina	2.00
48	Texas	2.00
	Beyle BP score average	**3.08**

Rank	State	New BP score
1	Maryland	5.00
1	West Virginia	5.00
3	Nebraska	3.80
3	New York	3.80
5	California	3.00
5	Massachusetts	3.00
5	New Jersey	3.00
5	Wisconsin	3.00
9	Alaska	2.80
9	Colorado	2.80
9	Georgia	2.80
9	Illinois	2.80
9	Iowa	2.80
9	Kentucky	2.80
9	Louisiana	2.80
9	Michigan	2.80
9	Mississippi	2.80
9	Missouri	2.80
9	Montana	2.80
9	New Mexico	2.80
9	North Dakota	2.80
9	Ohio	2.80
9	Oklahoma	2.80
9	Tennessee	2.80
9	Virginia	2.80
9	Washington	2.80
9	Wyoming	2.80
28	Alabama	2.60
28	Arizona	2.60
28	Arkansas	2.60
28	Connecticut	2.60
28	Maine	2.60
28	Minnesota	2.60
28	Oregon	2.60
28	Pennsylvania	2.60
36	Delaware	2.40
36	Florida	2.40
36	Hawaii	2.40
36	Idaho	2.40
36	Kansas	2.40
36	South Dakota	2.40
36	Utah	2.40
43	Indiana	2.20
43	Nevada	2.20
43	New Hampshire	2.20
43	North Carolina	2.20
43	Rhode Island	2.20
43	Vermont	2.20
49	Texas	1.60
50	South Carolina	1.20
	New BP score average	**2.73**

Source: The Book of the States 2006
Source: Thad Beyle "State and Local Government: Gubernatorial Power" 2005.
https://www.unc.edu/polisci_old/beyle/gubnewpwr.html

Beyle was correct in his ordering of governors according to who prepared the budget and what the legislature could do, but he did not factor in the governor's total power in the formation of the budget. If the budget is considered as a single bill that is passed between the legislative and executive branches only once, the Beyle coding approach can measure the budgetary power accurately. The new coding approach is meant to take a closer look at the governor's role in the contentious, politically significant process of budget formation.

Time Period Comparison: Budgetary Power Change 1980-2005

The second section of this chapter is used to compare the change in budgetary power in the time period from 1980 to 2005 for both the Beyle score and the new score. The Beyle score is widespread. It is a useful index that draws on legitimate differences in executive budgetary power across states. But it is a source of concern when researchers rely on it to make longitudinal claims. Using the Beyle score is problematic due to the structure of the index. In particular, updates over time to the budgetary power should be included for different institutional factors. Although these changes over time, the Beyle score has not accounted these coding shifts and changes to the measure, and continued to treat this measure as longitudinal. One should exercise caution when measuring budgetary power over time. In this section, a new score of budgetary power, is better suited to analyses that require a consideration of institutional conditions over time.

The Beyle score is drawn from data published by the Book of the States (BOTS), and the information used to compile the index changed over years from 1980 through 2005 at the mean level. The changes in scores lie in the relationship between the codes and their original source data. The analysis uses scores from Beyle's studies of 1980 and 2005 for the budgetary power.[31] The difference found between the 1980 Beyle score and the 2005 Beyle score is analyzed and produces a positive or negative percentage change. A positive percentage of change indicates that the budgetary power has increased over that time period. Whereas, a negative percentage of change indicates that governors' budgetary power has decreased in the time period studied. The same procedure is applied for the new score for the budgetary power, using the same coding criteria for 1980 and 2005 from data published by the National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO). Then, a positive or negative percentage change is calculated from the results. Then, the two percentages calculated from both the Beyle score and the new score time period studies will be compared at the mean level to see if they produced noticeable percentage differences in budgetary power change for the time period.

Beyle's original 2005 time period analysis reached back to Schlesinger's 1960 study, and the results were fairly significant. According to the Beyle study for the time period of 1960-2005, the budgetary power lost 14%.[32] One can determine whether the changes from 1980 to 2005 were as dramatic as the ones seen in the Beyle analysis for the time period of 1960-2005. This will also reveal what time period the majority of changes occurred: 1960-1980 or 1980-2005. These findings can be important because one can gauge the effectiveness of the Beyle coding approach. It has been hypothesized that the Beyle coding approach does not reflect political and constitutional realities in the

[31] Thad Beyle, "Governors: Elections, Campaign Costs and Powers," *The Book of the States: 2005*, Vol. 37 (Lexington, KY: The Council of State Governments Press, 2005), 200.

[32] Beyle, "Governors: Elections, Campaign Costs and Powers," 201.

states. Consequently, it is predicted that the changes seen in the Beyle score from 1980 to 2005 will be somewhat different from the findings of the new score for the same time period.

In 1980 and 1988, the BOTS reported information about whether the governor had full responsibility over the budget or whether he shared responsibility with the legislature. Drawing on this information, Beyle created the BP score for 1980 and 1988, which show that the vast majority of governors have full responsibility over the budget. During these years the BOTS also contained some information about legislative powers. The BOTS identified states where the legislature had unlimited powers to change the budget. However, this information was not part of the Beyle coding approach. No data was available. From 1994 to 2005, Beyle began to incorporate the legislature into his coding, as what he refers shared power category. This means that the 2005 codes incorporate previously unused BOTS information to create the BP score. Consequently, the 1980 Beyle BP score would have been different, if Beyle had used the same coding approach as in 2005.

There are some measurement difficulties that the study must contend with. The budgetary power was affected by a lack of information. No data was available in 1980 that would determine whether governors enjoyed a line item veto for appropriations, which was one of the key components of the new score coding approach. As such, for the new BP score, the 1980 values will incorporate the line item veto recorded in 2005 as constant. Furthermore, no data was available as to whether governors had the ability to amend language, reduce or substitute numbers, or amend program funding. These special powers were highlighted in the new coding approach, but cannot be found in the 1980 calculation for the Beyle score. The special powers enjoyed by governors in 2005 will be held constant in the 1980 calculation of the new score. Given these problems for longitudinal analysis, the new BP score will be consistent over time by using the most recent coding rules to recode 1980 and 1988 years.

Table 5 below shows the change for the time period from 1980 to 2005 for the budgetary power of governors.

Table 5: Time period comparison − Beyle BP score vs. New BP score 1980-2005

	Budgetary Power (BP)				
	1980	**1990**	**2000**	**2005**	**% Variation**
Beyle Score	4.68	3.80	3.00	3.08	-34.19%
New Score	3.47	3.45	3.50	3.50	0.86%

Source: BOTS for the Beyle score and NASBO for the new score from 1980 to 2005

The Beyle BP score saw a significant decrease by -34.2% from 1980 to 1990, while the new BP score saw barely any change by 0.7% from 1980 to 1990. This is most likely due to some factors staying constant in the new BP score calculations. This time period calculation also reveals that perhaps the majority of change in governor power was seen in the period 1960 to 1980, as evidenced by the relatively low percentage of change for this period (1980-2005) as compared to the 1960 to 2005 Beyle study.

There are two possible explanations for the increase in executive budgetary powers since 1960 are the U.S. Supreme Court decision Baker vs. Carr in 1962 (369 U.S. 186) and the large influx of money sent to the states as a result of Lyndon Johnson's

Great Society programs. The Baker vs. Carr decision ended unfair legislative redistricting, which in turn enforced the value of each vote in state legislative districts. The Great Society programs had a large impact on states, which were tasked with the distribution of a tremendous influx of federal funds in their states. State executives were likely given increased administrative power in the disbursement of these funds. Therefore, provisions increasing a governor's role in budgetary power, could be attributed to the need for executive action on increased funding to the states.

By considering the underlying structure, the analysis has demonstrated that the Beyle BP score has a measurement difficulty. It is not directly comparable across years, especially due to the coding changes that occurred in 1994. These changes limit the use of the score longitudinally. Given that researchers are interested in longitudinal questions, the new BP score offer a more consistent portrait enabling longitudinal tests. But the new score has its own limits. Although the results of the analysis are not overwhelming, they do support the project's assertion that major differences are best noticed at the individual state level. Differences can be found among the states, but they do not have to mean anything significant to an overall index. The overall index is best used for broad statements of budgetary power, but its overall lack of movement using either the Beyle or new BP scores makes reaching conclusions difficult. The new BP score allow researchers to see relative differences among states where they were not evident before. This small change seen by the new BP score compares favorably to the hypothesis of the study that the Beyle BP score was not completely accurate. It is possible that the budgetary power has changed less than previously thought, due to the fact that the Beyle BP score overestimated the significance of each change. The new BP score identified differences among states on a micro level, but they did not make a significant difference on the macro level. The important conclusion to be drawn is that perhaps budgetary power is best researched at the individual state level. Including all 50 states failed to reflect significant level of change. Even though the budgetary power did not have a large effect on an overall average, it was worthwhile to revisit the coding approach and attempt to ensure they measured political realities. Hopefully new data can be found to help further complete this time period study and gauge whether there are any further differences in the amount of change seen between the BP scores. At least, researchers armed with new data to complete a more thorough study can use the coding approach introduced in this thesis.

Professionalization of the Legislature

Another key point is that the gubernatorial power score is likely affected by the professionalization of the legislature. While Beyle and other scholars were focused on these gubernatorial power scores, other scholars such as Alan Rosenthal and Peverill Squire were arguing for the legislatures to professionalize and strengthen their policymaking capability. The argument is that innovative states and wealthy states enhanced the power of their governors substantially during the last 20-year period, however, a professional legislature in those states hindered increases in formal gubernatorial power. Richard Neustadt argued that the power of the executive lies in his ability to persuade. He posited that if executives want to accomplish their agenda goals, they must persuade the legislature to comply.

In his studies about the state executive,[33] Alan Rosenthal examines this bargaining between the governor and the legislature. He pointed to several factors that are likely to affect the governor's willingness to bargain including his attitude towards the legislature, his leadership style, and the extent to which the governor's party is represented in the legislature. One of the main factors that influences the governor's success from bargaining is the institutional strength of the legislature. Some state legislatures are more formidable adversaries for the governor than are others. The professionalism of the legislature, which can range from citizen to professional, greatly affects the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches in state government. Since these legislators benefit from increased staff and a full time schedule, they have a higher capacity to gather information and formulate policy, giving them a bargaining advantage. In addition, full-time legislatures can afford to be more patient when bargaining with the governor. Consequently, as the legislature becomes more professionalized and is of the opposite party as the governor, it should have opposing preferences with the governor, and be more adept at acting on those preferences, thus decreasing the governor's power.

Peverill Squire developed a measure of professionalization that uses relevant attributes of congress as a baseline against which to compare those same attributes in other legislative bodies. Squire collected data[34] from 1986 to 1988 on member pay, staff members per legislator, and total days in session for Congress and the 50 state

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[33] Alan Rosenthal, "Governors and Legislatures: Contending Powers," *Political Science Quarterly* 106, no. 1 (1991): 162.

[34] Peverill Squire, "Legislative Professionalization and Membership Diversity," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 17 (1992): 72.

legislatures. The measure calculated is designed to show how closely a state legislature approximates the professional characteristics of the legislature.

Based on table 6, the 50 state legislatures are ranked according to the measure (Mean level). 4 legislatures are clearly more professionalized than the other 46: New York, Michigan, California, and Massachusetts. Those legislatures pay well, meet in unlimited sessions, and provide ample staff. A few legislatures, such as Pennsylvania and Ohio are substantially professionalized. Most others are not: 30 of the states are between

Table 6: Professionalization levels of state legislatures

Rank	State	Mean	Rank	State	Mean
1	**New York**	**0.659**	26	Louisiana	0.185
2	**Michigan**	**0.653**	27	Oregon	0.183
3	**California**	**0.625**	28	South Carolina	0.178
4	**Massachusetts**	**0.614**	29	Virginia	0.170
5	**Pennsylvania**	**0.336**	30	Maine	0.161
6	**Ohio**	**0.329**	31	Mississippi	0.160
7	Alaska	0.311	32	Nevada	0.160
8	Illinois	0.302	33	Alabama	0.158
9	Colorado	0.300	34	Kansas	0.152
10	Missouri	0.287	35	Rhode Island	0.148
11	Hawaii	0.276	36	Vermont	0.145
12	Wisconsin	0.270	37	Indiana	0.139
13	Florida	0.255	38	Tennessee	0.135
14	New Jersey	0.255	39	Georgia	0.133
15	Arizona	0.250	40	West Virginia	0.125
16	Oklahoma	0.250	41	Idaho	0.119
17	Connecticut	0.233	42	Montana	0.110
18	Washington	0.230	43	Arkansas	0.105
19	Iowa	0.225	44	Kentucky	0.101
20	Texas	0.210	45	New Mexico	0.098
21	Maryland	0.204	**46**	**South Dakota**	**0.083**
22	North Carolina	0.203	**47**	**Utah**	**0.082**
23	Minnesota	0.199	**48**	**North Dakota**	**0.075**
24	Delaware	0.192	**49**	**Wyoming**	**0.056**
25	Nebraska	0.186	**50**	**New Hampshire**	**0.042**

Source: Peverill Squire: Legislative Professionalization and Membership Diversity (1992).

0.10 and 0.25. Legislatures in South Dakota, Utah, North Dakota, Wyoming, and New Hampshire are deficient across the board.

To conclude, those results shows that there is a relationship with the new power score based on table 3 in the same chapter. States such as New York, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Ohio shows a weaker governor's power score due to more professionalized legislatures. While the Beyle power score shows a higher governor's power score for those states because the Beyle coding approach did not incorporate the legislatures and did not reflect political and constitutional realities in those states at this period of time. The important conclusion to be drawn is that perhaps gubernatorial power is best researched at the individual state level. Including all 50 states failed to reflect the accurate level of change.

Chapter 4

Measuring Gubernatorial Budgetary Influence over State Administrative Agencies

Prior research concluded that the Beyle BP score showed that governors were losing ground to legislatures in shaping the state budget, and the new BP score did not have a large movement over time. Despite the general acceptance of such measures of executive budgetary power and their widespread use, it is important to refute the assumptions of unimodality of these indices, and challenge their usefulness.

This chapter demonstrates why we want to use another data source, more reliable across states and periods: The new ASAP score, which is the measurement of the governor's influence over the budget in a longitudinal analysis. The analysis draws on surveys of state agency leaders by ASAP (American State Administrators Project). The agency leaders were asked to rate separately the governor's and legislature's influences on the total budget of their agency and the budget for specific programs carried out by their agency. The governor and legislature were evaluated independently on these two items based on a four-point scale wherein the degree of influence was measured as follows: From 1 None to 4 High. These same questions repeated across time enables to explore, whether governors have lost ground vis-à-vis the legislature. Many scholars have researched on budgetary influence to assess how the many changes in state governors and legislatures from 1970 on have affected the relative roles of these institutions.

The hypothesis is that one of the strengths of the new ASAP score is combining formal powers with informal sources of influence, and the Beyle score ignore the latter.

This chapter will provide a discussion of the measurement of executive and legislative influence over state administrative agencies from 1978 to 1998. The main point and contribution of this chapter is to see whether the new ASAP score is correlated with the new BP score from the previous chapter. This chapter will offer the full range of ways that governors can influence state policymaking, and will carry out empirical illustrations using the new ASAP score, and will demonstrate how the results vary from 1978 to 1998. This section will combine methodological and empirical focuses with a discussion of the reasons why this argument is important for substantive understandings of executive budgetary power.

Governor as Strategic Actor

What accounts for success across disparate political environments, might be explained by the fact that governors are strategic in selecting their legislative policy agendas, by publicly supporting popular issues that seem destined to sail through the legislature, and avoiding taking positions on controversial and complex issues that that have a much greater chance of defeat. This possibility has been explored at the presidential level. A president may withhold unpopular legislation to avoid defeat.[35] A president may engage in a strategic posturing to endorse what congress will do anyway to improve his personal standing.[36] Scholars found some evidence that Presidents Kennedy

[35] George C. Edwards, *At the Margins: Presidential Leadership in Congress* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 895.

[36] Jon R. Bond and Richard Fleisher. *Presidential Success in the Legislative Arena* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 643.

and Johnson took positions on bills that were not made public for strategic reasons.[37] On the other hand, there were interviews with the white house and congressional staff under presidents from Eisenhower to Reagan to build a case that presidents are generally sincere in public announcements of support or opposition to legislation.[38] If the governor is indeed behaving strategically in her selection of legislative policy agenda items, then one way to do so is to emphasize items in policy areas that engender less partisan conflict. Policy initiatives that emphasize growth, economic development, or infrastructure, are likely to receive broad bipartisan support, especially relative to issues facing significant partisan divides such as public programs pertaining to public assistance. Therefore one way that governors may act strategically is through placing an increased emphasis on issues that engender more bipartisan support in a divided government. If governors are acting strategically, then one can expect that governors facing a divided government would get more of their victories in easy policy areas, comparing to governors in the context of unified government, who may feel they have enough political power to tackle the most controversial issues. However, one can assume that there is a significant difference between the types of legislative programs put forth by governors under different partisan conditions. Therefore, success may not vary with legislative party control, but that governors in less powerful positions act strategically in adjusting their legislative agendas to compensate for their relative lack of power.

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[37] Cary R. Covington, "Congressional Support for the President: The View from the Kennedy/Johnson White House," *Journal of Politics* 48 (1986): 717.

[38] Mark A. Peterson, *Legislating Together: The White House and Capitol Hill from Eisenhower to Reagan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 98.

Comparison of Gubernatorial and Legislative Budgetary Influence from 1978 to 1998

Descriptive accounts of state policymaking consistently conclude that the governor's role is as chief legislator. State legislators look to the governor to set the policy agenda, and the governor frequently uses an array of formal and informal powers to shape legislation. It is widely agreed that there is a significant variation across states and governors in the degree to which governors are able to get their program passed by the legislature. Weak parties, divided government, powerful legislatures, or a lack of formal or informal powers have all been offered as potential variables that might impede executive success in the legislature.[39] To the extent that these constraints do in fact prevent the governor's agenda from being passed. This has significant consequences because governors are judged by their ability to pass their program, and consequently their success in the legislature often determines the success of their administrations.[40]

Many researches have been conducted over the years that examine the relationship between the governor and the legislature. Much of this research has been qualitative. Few studies have taken a more quantitative approach, and even fewer have utilized data for more than a handful of states. Some scholars have examined executive success in the budget process. According to Sharkansky's analysis of legislative appropriations in 19 states, governors exert considerable power over the legislature.[41] On

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[39] Sarah M. Morehouse, "Legislative Party Voting for the Governor's Program," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 21, no. 3 (1996): 359.

[40] Thad Beyle, "Governors" (1994), in *Politics in the American States*, 6th ed., ed. Virginia Gray and Herbert Jacob (Washington: CQ Press, 1996), 207.

[41] Ira Sharkansky, "Agency Requests, Gubernatorial Support, and Budget Success in State Legislatures," *American Political Science Review* 26 (1968): 1220.

the other hand, recent studies find that the legislature may be exhibiting a greater level of independence in budgetary matters[42] or that the power of the legislature is highly dependent upon legislative resources.[43] Budgetary data offer numerous advantages to studying executive influence, and the data seem to provide clear measures of executive preferences and legislative outcomes. However, since the executive branch is responsible for constructing the budget for the entire state government, there is no clear way of determining which budgetary items are important to the governor's program and which are not. Furthermore, while some aspects of the governor's program might request for a greater spending, the most important executive priorities often consist of policy innovations that have important consequences for policy content. Unfortunately, budgetary data do not tell anything about the policy content, and using such data to assess executive success undoubtedly misses one important dimension of executive policymaking.

Measures and Data

Previous studies failed to deal with the reasons for a declining executive budgetary influence (BI) over time. In the late 1960s through the 1970s, scholars commented on a growth spurt in the authority of the governorship.[44] With only a slight

[42] James Gosling, "Patterns of Influence and Choice in the Wisconsin Budgetary Process." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 10, no. 4 (1985): 457.

[43] Glenn Abney and Thomas P. Lauth, "Perceptions of the Impact of Governors and Legislatures in the State Appropriations Process," *Western Political Quarterly* 40, no. 2 (1987): 335.

[44] Beyle, "Governors" (1980), 180.

time lag, scholars also began to note the growing professionalism of state legislatures.[45] In the 1960s, state legislatures were lamented as poorly organized and ill equipped. Their biggest failure was the inability to exert any constructive influence upon their state budgets. But legislative resources began to improve with only a slight lag behind growing executive authority. Increased legislative capacity was combined with an increase in partisan divisions between the state executive and legislative branches.[46] Sharkansky[47] examined data from 1965 to 1967 on state agency budget requests. His studies concluded that legislatures generally deferred to the governor in budgetary matters. Thompson[48] replicated Sharkansky's studies with data from 1978 to 1980 and found a minor drop in executive influence over an agency's short-term budget success. Thompson found that the legislature defers to executive budget recommendations under unified government, but makes independent decisions under divided government.

Abney and Lauth surveyed each state's top executive and legislative budget officials in 1982, securing their views regarding the relative influence of the governor versus the legislature, and found that governors have the advantage over legislatures in

[45] Robert Dilger, George A. Krause and Randolph R. Moffett, "State Legislative Professionalism and Gubernatorial Effectiveness, 1978-1991," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 20, no. 4 (1995): 553.

[46] Morris P. Fiorina, "Divided Government in the American States: A Byproduct of Legislative Professionalism?" *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 6 (1994): 304.

[47] Ira Sharkansky, "Agency Requests, Gubernatorial Support, and Budget Success in State Legislatures," 1221.

[48] Joel A. Thompson, "Agency Requests, Gubernatorial Support, and Budget Success in State Legislatures, Revisited," *Journal of Politics* 49, no. 3 (1987): 756.

the appropriation process, but not by a decisive margin.[49] Abney and Lauth repeated their studies in 1994 and found the number of budget officials citing the governor as most influential dropped from 52 in 1982 to 36 in 1994. This led them to conclude that executive dominance over state appropriations has ended in the late 1990s. Considering their observed differences across time, they suggested a number of potential explanations for declining executive influence including increasing partisanship and increased legislative sophistication. In Goodman's 13 western states studies,[50] he found strong evidence for legislative dominance in the budget process, and found no connection between divided government and the governor's budget influence. Explanations for the changes that do exist in the studies are equally mixed. Given the ambiguous findings noted above, the purpose of this section is to empirically and systematically explore the unfolding picture of executive influence over the state budget.

First, this section begins with a review of data. Then, look at changes across time in the average budgetary influence of governors and legislatures. Finally, suggest and test possible explanations for the changes that have occurred. Methods to measure executive budget influence are generally more consensual than most other aspects of macro political science. In general, contributors focus on the formal prerogatives such as those included in written documents like constitutions. Very few methods systematically

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[49] Abney and Lauth, "Perceptions of the Impact of Governors and Legislatures in the State Appropriations Process," 337.

[50] Doug Goodman, "Determinants of Perceived Gubernatorial Budgetary Influence among State Executive Budget Analysts and Legislative Fiscal Analysts," *Political Research Quarterly* 60, no. 1 (2007): 43.

consider informal aspects of executive budgetary power. For cause, this aspect is more difficult to quantify and offers little hope of comparability.

To evaluate the potential validity of the various studies, I employ a descriptive method by bringing both more extensive and deeper state based data, and a different theoretical perspective aimed at resolving some of the conflicting results. While nationwide the slope is positive, some governors have lost influence while others have gained. Despite the strong theoretical reasoning of Goodman who produced a more sophisticated understanding of forces affecting the executive-legislative budget battle, the broader question of what explains the change remains unanswered. This is a major shortcoming because Goodman tested Abney and Lauth studies by offering explanations using only cross-sectional data. Understanding temporal changes requires a look across time. Consequently the new budgetary influence (BI) score relies on more than 1000 respondents and cover the years before, during, and after the Abney and Lauth surveys in 1982 and 1994.

The New ASAP Score Measuring Budgetary Influence

To characterize the executive budget influence (BI) score, the empirical analysis draws on surveys of state agency leaders by the American State Administrators Project (ASAP). These are data drawn from top-level agency heads who reported on their individual agency relationships with other government actors.[51] The American State Administrators Project (ASAP) data provide regular, as well as, identical sets of

[51] Jeffrey L. Brudney and Deil S. Wright, "Reinventing Government during the 1990s," *Public Administration Review* 62, no. 3 (2002): 353.

questions posed to these executives across multiple decades. The ASAP studies compensate for the data weaknesses of prior research in many ways.

First, the ASAP data include all 50 states. Contrary to Sharkansky who included 19 states, Thompson included 18 states, and Goodman included 13 states. Many of these limitations were due to their research strategy, comparing actual agency requests to executive recommendations. As Sharkansky[52] revealed in his study, a research approach relying on agency requests biases the sample toward non-reformed states (Separate agency requests), comparing to all agencies merged into a comprehensive executive budget.

Second, Abney and Lauth studies do cover all 50 states, but they rely on only 2 respondents per state: Each state's senior executive and legislative budget official. Consequently, the potential for measurement error is significant. The ASAP surveys used in this analysis range from 8 to 48 respondents per state. The mean was 25 respondents per state, largely more reliable than Abney and Lauth's 2 per state and Goodman's 17 per state.

Furthermore, to examine across time variations, it is important to have consistent across time data. Abney and Lauth[53] come closest to this, comparing their 1982 data to their 1994 data, but they are able to only offer explanations (Not testing) for perceived variations. Many scholars' studies have more limited temporal data such as Goodman from 2000 to 2001 (2 years) or Sharkansky from 1965 to 1969 (5 years). This is

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[52] Sharkansky, "Agency Requests, Gubernatorial Support, and Budget Success in State Legislatures," 1222.

[53] Abney and Lauth, "Perceptions of the Impact of Governors and Legislatures in the State Appropriations Process," 336.

problematic because each study used a different state sample with fewer than half of their cases matching those used by other studies. Consequently, it is impossible to know if differences are due to true variations across time or due to different samples.

Conversely, the demonstration will use constant sample sets of all 50 states for 20 years in order to examine more reliable across time variations. The data are from 5 replicated ASAP surveys conducted in 1978, 1984, 1988, 1994 and 1998. The agency leaders were asked to rate separately the governor's and legislature's influences on the overall budget of their agency, and the budget for specific programs carried out by their agency. In the ASAP surveys, the governor and legislature were evaluated independently on these two items based on a four-point scale wherein the degree of influence was measured as follows:

1: None

2: Slight

3: Moderate

4: High

These same questions repeated across time from 1978 to 1998 enabling to see whether governors have lost ground to the legislature and then, what might explain the variations that may have occurred.

The ASAP surveys are based on agency heads as defined in the council of state governments, classified by function. Due to different traditions across states, some functions may represent small agencies, while others include a vast number of employees and are allocated a substantial portion of the state's budget. To avoid potential problems induced by varying size and aggregation effects, each of the ASAP respondents was weighted. The agency respondents were also asked to report the total number of employees and the size of the annual budgets of the agencies they headed. Using these two variables, agencies within each state, were divided into quartiles on each size variable. The smallest agencies were given a weight of 1 on each measure and the largest a weight of 4. This scoring was done separately for the employee size variable and the agency budget variable, and the two weightings were then averaged to produce a weighted average for each respondent. These weighted average data were then used to produce means: A single score for each state in each time period, on the key variables of interest.

Table 7: Measures of executive and legislative influence over state administrative agencies in 1978, 1984, 1988, 1994, and 1998

All 50 states					
Influence over total agency budget	**1978**	**1984**	**1988**	**1994**	**1998**
Governor	3.57	3.57	3.57	3.59	3.64
Legislature	3.68	3.53	3.58	3.50	3.57
Difference	(0.11)	0.04	(0.01)	0.09	0.07
Influence over specific program budgets	**1978**	**1984**	**1988**	**1994**	**1998**
Governor	3.48	3.45	3.50	3.58	3.53
Legislature	3.57	3.50	3.60	3.56	3.54
Difference	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.10)	0.02	(0.01)

Goodman 13 western states					
Influence over total agency budget	**1978**	**1984**	**1988**	**1994**	**1998**
Governor	3.62	3.51	3.59	3.64	3.61
Legislature	3.77	3.66	3.66	3.57	3.62
Difference	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.07)	0.07	(0.01)
Influence over specific program budgets	**1978**	**1984**	**1988**	**1994**	**1998**
Governor	3.53	3.39	3.45	3.66	3.50
Legislature	3.64	3.67	3.63	3.64	3.54
Difference	(0.11)	(0.28)	(0.18)	0.02	(0.04)

N	50	50	50	50	50

Source: ASAP

Trends from 1978 to 1998

To what extent the governor's influence has declined across time to the legislature. The existing literature on executive budget power pictured a growth through the 1970s and 1980s, and a decline somewhat thereafter. However, the new approach using the ASAP data challenges the existing literature. The results do not reveal any consistent decline in executive budget influence. On the contrary, governors held their own or slightly increased their budgetary influence to the legislatures from the 1980s through the 1990s. Based on Table 7, the governor's influence over an agency's total budget was constant from 1978 to 1988 with a score of 3.57 and then increased in the 1990s with scores of 3.59, then 3.64. On the other hand, the legislature was rated higher than governors in influence in 1978 with a score of 3.68, but since that time it dropped lower than governor's except from 1988. These results are a reversal of the Abney and Lauth finding of the end of executive dominance. Viewing the difference by subtracting the legislature's budgetary influence level from that of the governor's, reveals a predominance of negative values meaning that generally, the legislature had more influence from 1978 to 1988, followed by values closer to zero meaning that it was tied in influence in the 1990s.

According to Goodman, legislatures in the 13 western states are stronger in budgetary influence than in the average state, but governors in those states are sometimes more influential over the budget than is the average governor. This is not a contradiction. Budgetary influence cannot be assumed to operate as a zero sum between these two parties only. Other parties such as interest groups or agency leaders can seek to influence the partitioning of the budgetary pie.

Table 8: Means, standard deviations, medians, and ranges of perceived differences in executive and legislative influence

Influence over total agency budgets	1978	1984	1988	1994	1998
Mean	(0.11)	0.04	(0.02)	0.01	0.06
Standard deviation	0.41	0.45	0.35	0.41	0.36
Median	(0.09)	0.09	0.02	0.06	0.11
Range High value (governor advantage)	0.97	0.72	0.47	0.57	0.57
Range Low value (legislature advantage)	(1.68)	(1.38)	(1.23)	(1.15)	(0.94)

Influence over specific program budgets	1978	1984	1988	1994	1998
Mean	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.01)
Standard deviation	0.33	0.39	0.32	0.36	0.32
Median	(0.09)	(0.01)	(0.04)	0.00	0.04
Range High value (governor advantage)	0.99	0.77	0.45	0.61	0.69
Range Low value (legislature advantage)	(1.13)	(1.18)	(1.19)	(1.12)	(0.90)

N	50	50	50	50	50

Source: ASAP

However, for both nationally and across the 13 western states, these averages hide significant variation both among states and within states across time. In order to examine in-state differences between the two parties, the analysis consisted in taking individual respondent, and subtracting the rating of the legislature from the governor in the state. A positive value for this difference means the respondent evaluated the governor as having more influence over the agency's budget than the legislature. On the other hand, a negative value means the opposite. These different values were aggregated to produce a mean value for each state.

The Table 8 displays the averages and variations across time. The results demonstrate that the averages (mean and median) remain close to zero across all time periods. However, the standard deviations and ranges display significant disparities among the states and significant variations across time. For total agency budget influence, the strongest governor (largest positive value) dropped in influence from 1978 through 1988, but then increased in influence through 1994 and 1998. Contrary to the legislature, the results display a consistent decline across all periods.

On the other hand, for specific program budget influence, the strongest legislature remained constant in influence, and declined slightly in the last period.

Explaining Changes across Time

One can demonstrate that explanatory variables can be first, whatever changes take place in executive budgetary influence, are due to social, political, and economic changes within the states, but not structural or institutional ones. Structural changes such as the increase of the governor's term from 2 to 4 years or the addition of the item veto, began in the late 1960s and were completed in most states by the late 1970s.[54] Since then, structural changes have been marginal. With most of the severe restrictions in executive power removed by the late 1970s, little room was left for other structural changes in the governorship to affect the executive-legislative budget battle after that point.

[54] Nelson C. Dometrius, Deil S. Wright, and Brendan Burke, "Strategies for Measuring Influence over State Agencies," *State Politics and Policy Quarterly* 8, no. 1 (2008): 88.

Consequently, one can expect that the variations in the influence of contemporary governors are from either political environment or personal political skills they bring to the office. These may enhance their formal authority.[55] On the other hand, the legislature continues to experience structural changes such as an increased level of professionalism or being subjected to term limits. These changes might significantly affect their influence.[56]

Second, the term budgetary influence means different thing to governors and legislators. Executive budget officers reported the governor as having the most influence, while the legislative budget officers saw the legislature to be more influential.[57] One can call the manifestation of the Miles law: "Where you stand depends on where you sit.[58]" The reason is that governors are held responsible for the overall economic health of the state including unemployment, budget shortfalls, and tax increases.[59] On the other hand, the legislator is more narrowly focused, and has some pet programs of interest affecting the district. Consequently, a governor has control over the broad contours of the state

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[55] Lee Sigelman and Nelson C. Dometrius, "Governors as Chief Administrators: The Linkage between Formal Powers and Informal Influence," *American Politics Quarterly* 16 (1988): 157.

[56] Peverill Squire, "Measuring State Legislative Professionalism: The Squire Index Revisited," *State Politics and Policy Quarterly* 7, no. 2 (2007): 211.

[57] Abney and Lauth, "Perceptions of the Impact of Governors and Legislatures in the State Appropriations Process," 337.

[58] Rufus Miles, "The origin and meaning of Miles' law," *Public Administration Review* 38, no. 5 (1978): 399.

[59] Richard G. Niemi, Harold W. Stanley, and Ronald J. Vogel, "State economies and state taxes: Do voters hold governors accountable?" *American Journal of Political Science* 39, no. 4 (1995): 936.

budget, while a legislator actively seek to significantly affect state monies going to the district. Each may then see as having primacy in the budget because they define the focus of interest and influence differently. The distinction in the data between agency overall budget and specific program budget within the agency may not fully capture the differences described above, but can serve as a reasonable substitute. One can see some differences in the variables that explain changes in these two budget influence measures. Some features that may enhance the governor's influence over the agency budget, may contribute to less influence over a specific program budget, and vice versa.

Explanatory Variables

To evaluate the potential validity of the various studies, a descriptive method is employed by categorizing 2 explanatory variables: Socioeconomic changes and political changes.

Socioeconomic Changes

In the socioeconomic category, the analysis includes measures of population and unemployment change in each state. It has long been established that political participation drops when people change communities[60] because they must learn the politics of their new environment. Newly arrived citizens tend to focus first on the governor, due to extensive media coverage of the recipient and for policy leadership.[61]

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[60] Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nie, *Participation in America* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), 281.

[61] Greg D. Adams and Peverill Squire, "A Note on the Dynamics and Idiosyncrasies of Gubernatorial Popularity," *State Politics and Policy Quarterly* 1, no. 4 (2001): 380.

The legislature is creeping into the public's awareness much more slowly, and suffers in comparison. Consequently, those socioeconomic changes enhance the prestige of the executive office and contributes to executive influence in budgeting.[62] The population measure in the analysis reflecting mobility, is the percentage of the population residing in the state for less than five years. Nearly a quarter of states increased their population by 20% or more between 1990 and 2000, with Arizona increasing by 40% and Nevada increasing by 66%. The rapidly changing electorates of such states could be a resource for governors in their dealings with the legislature.

Second in this category is unemployment. Research on the governorship has established that voters hold the governor partially responsible for the state's economic health.[63] When unemployment rises, the governor's power declines, or vice versa.

Political Changes

In terms of political factors, the analysis looks first to changes in the governors themselves, both party affiliations and individual governors. Generally, Republicans run on low taxes and low spending. Republican governors may give far more scrutiny to budgetary issues than democratic ones. The analysis can establish a trichotomy having a score of +1 if the governor changed from a Democrat during the prior period to a republican during the current period. And a score of -1 if the switch was from republican

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[62] Lee E. Bernick, "Gubernatorial Tools: Formal vs. Informal," *Journal of Politics* 41, no. 2, Malden, MA: Blackwell (1979): 656.

[63] Susan B. Hansen, "Life Is Not Fair: Governors' Job Performance Ratings and State Economies," *Political Research Quarterly* 52, no. 1 (1999): 167.

to democrat. Finally, a score of 0 if there was no change in the governor's party affiliation, regardless of what that affiliation was.

Second, the analysis can establish a dummy variable with a score of 1 if the governor of the current period is different from that of the prior period, regardless of party; and a score of 0 otherwise. Governors, like presidents, encounter a honeymoon period followed by a consistent decline in popularity. If so, a long serving governor may have less influence than a new one. Furthermore, a new individual in office would be motivated in putting her or his stamp on state policies, while a long serving governor would be interested in maintaining programs adopted earlier, but not pushing a new agenda.[64]

Another political factor would be the control of the legislature, affecting the governor's influence.[65] The analysis can establish a trichotomy in order to measure the legislative control, having a score of 1 or 2 if the governor's party controls one or both legislative chambers. And a score of 0 if the governor's party controls neither legislative chamber.

The final political factor is the interparty competitiveness. When party competition is high, legislators will likely stake out their policy different from that of the governor, and will defend their stand vigorously. It is true when the executive and legislative branches are controlled by different parties. It would also affect legislators

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[64] Hansen, "Life Is Not fair: Governors' Job Performance Ratings and State Economies," 168.

[65] Abney and Lauth, "Perceptions of the Impact of Governors and Legislatures in the State Appropriations Process," 338.

who share the governor's party. Any legislator facing a competitive electoral arena would demonstrate to the voters her or his ability to get things done for the district, regardless of the governor's agenda. Consequently, one can expect that increased political competitiveness would lead to a greater executive-legislative battle over all political issues, including budgetary ones, decreasing the governor's influence.

Correlation between the New ASAP Score and the New BP Score

The main contribution of this chapter is to see whether the new ASAP score is correlated with the new BP score from the previous chapter. Based on table 9, the results reveal a positive correlation between the new ASAP score and the new BP score from the previous chapter over time from 1978 to 1998. And do not reveal any consistent decline in executive budget influence. On the contrary, governors held their own or slightly increased their budgetary influence.

Table 9: Correlation between the new ASAP score and the new BP score

All 50 states							
	1978	1984	1988	1994	1998	2005	Variation 1978-1998
Governor's influence over total agency budget	3.57	3.57	3.57	3.59	3.64	NA	1.96%
New BP score	3.47	3.50	3.45	3.47	3.50	3.50	0.86%
Correlation	0.10	0.07	0.12	0.12	0.14		

The objective of this chapter was to launch this analysis by questioning the view that governors were losing ground to legislatures over time, in shaping the state budget according to the Beyle index scores. The main point was to use another data source to characterize executive budgetary power in states. The hypothesis was that one of the strengths of the new ASAP score is combining formal powers with informal sources of influence, and the Beyle score ignore the latter. It was important to refute the assumptions of unimodality of these indices, and challenge their usefulness by introducing the measurement of the executive and legislative influence over state administrative agencies in a longitudinal analysis from 1978 to 1998.

The analysis drew on surveys of state agency leaders by the American State Administrators Project (ASAP). The agency leaders were asked to rate separately the governor's and legislature's influences on the total budget of their agency and the budget for specific programs carried out by their agency. The governor and legislature were evaluated independently on these two areas. These same questions repeated across time enabling to explore, whether governors have lost ground with regard to the legislature.

This section carried out empirical illustrations using the new ASAP scores, and demonstrated how the results vary over time. According to the new ASAP scores, differences found in executive budgetary influence from 1978 through 1998 are minor, and often favoring, rather than disadvantaging the governor, previously suggested by the Beyle scores.

More importantly, the new ASAP scores look at the explanatory variables dynamically across time, such as the socioeconomic and political changes, including governor's personal skills suggested by Neustadt. There are supports for our contention that governors and legislatures try to accomplish different objectives in the state budget. Certainly both parties are interested broadly in state policies and will do battles over various policy elements. But compromise is possible because each institution's agenda, along with some competing elements, also contains items of different importance.

Governors know that they are likely to take the bulk of the praise or blame for the big picture of the state's overall financial status. On the other hand, legislators can sacrifice some policy preferences, as long as they can get other items, especially from budget items for their constituencies that can assure their reelection prospects.

The new ASAP scores demonstrate the full range of ways that governors can influence state policymaking. One of the strengths of the ASAP measure is that it combines formal powers with informal sources of influence, and the Beyle scores altogether ignore the latter.

In addition, there are puzzling findings that pork barrel spending by the legislature enhanced the governor's budget influence.[66] Governors' bargaining might explain this result. The governor yields on some pork items in exchange for legislative support for items on the governor's agenda. This interpretation of data is notably consistent with the argument supported by findings that governors and legislatures focus on different items of the budget. One can conclude to what degree measurement error is responsible for potentially flawed inferences from analyses that use the Beyle scores. Future research into comparative institutional influence should explore this prospect further. The argument is that continuing to treat the budgetary power as unidimensional or a type of zero sum terms, may compare apples with oranges, especially, if the two institutions define the terms differently.

[66] Goodman, "Determinants of Perceived Gubernatorial Budgetary Influence among State Executive Budget Analysts and Legislative Fiscal Analysts," 44.

Chapter 5

Conclusion

Schlesinger deserves our thanks for creating the power index, a tool that has seen considerable use. However, the conclusion is that the index's utility has declined considerably. The power of the contemporary governorship has moved beyond the index's ability to measure it. The index no longer captures the true level of formal and informal powers held by governors, nor can it identify the relative positions of high, moderate, and low power in states. Beyle's additions to the power index are useful temporary opportunities, but they also cloud the weaknesses of the original components.

This thesis has attempted to restructure existing methods of measuring governor's budgetary power in the hopes of gaining a more accurate assessment of each state's relative standing. While most studies of the subject have focused on the overall powers of governors, this project has instead focused on the more tangible goal of measuring individually the budgetary power of governors. The budgetary power is the most important piece of legislation that governors have to deal with on an annual basis. Governors cannot implement their legislative and administrative visions for the state, if they are not otherwise given the funds to do it. The Schlesinger, Beyle, Mueller, and Dometrius studies were mainly focused on the overall measure of power, often with the consequence of overlooking the importance of studying the individual powers correctly. Also, scholars' works tend to crystallize the power index's temporal issues. Scholars lacked to recognize that institutions and behavior are changeable.

One important finding in the thesis was that the Beyle coding approach did not adequately reflect the position of governors in the budgetary process. The Beyle coding approach identified who was in charge of creating the budget, but failed to explain what they can and cannot do in the process. It was necessary to transform a four-point scale into a nine-point scale index score. This characterization was explained by the fact that governors have varying levels of powers in changing the budget after the legislature has amended it. After this adjustment was made, the thesis compared the change in budgetary power in the time period from 1980 to 2005 for both the Beyle BP score and the new BP score. The Beyle BP score saw a significant decrease by -34.2%, while the new BP score saw barely any change 0.7%. This was due to some factors staying constant in the new BP score calculations.

Furthermore, the study demonstrated why we wanted to use another data source, more reliable across states and periods: The new ASAP score, which is the measurement of the governor's influence over the budget in a longitudinal analysis. The hypothesis was that one of the strengths of the new ASAP score was combining formal powers with informal sources of influence, and the Beyle score ignored the latter. The main contribution was to see whether the new ASAP score was correlated with the new BP score performed previously. The results revealed a positive correlation between the new ASAP score and the new BP score over time from 1978 to 1998. And did not reveal any consistent decline in executive budget influence.

Further research would be helpful in advancing some of the ideas put forward in this thesis. While the study was primarily concerned with what governors could do within state governments, it must be recognized that legislatures can have a significant impact on how powerful a governor can be. State legislative professionalism can have a major effect on the governor's budgetary power. A well-prepared and knowledgeable legislature with sufficient resources can be either a significant obstacle or a strong proponent of the governor's policy goals. Since states have varying degrees of legislative professionalism, it would be prudent for researchers to look further into this factor to better gauge state executive-legislative relationships. After a thorough look at governors, the next recommended step in the research of state governors is to more fully assess the effect of legislatures on the budgetary power of governors.

The thesis has hopefully inspired a renewed focus on details in the study of formal and informal budgetary powers. Attempting to form a comprehensive study of the governor's budgetary power is a difficult task, as there is no assurance that researchers can identify and quantify all relevant sources of governor's budgetary power. What can be done, however, is to clarify the known elements of the budgetary power and place them into a political context. One must use relative criteria in order to do it. This thesis, when combined with the weighting and significance tests of others, can help to produce a more valid measure of governor's budgetary power. The thesis is meant as a suggestion that there may be ways to improve existing methods. It is hoped that this study will propel the subject of measuring the governor's budgetary power into a new era of debate, review and revision.

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