



Intrastate Politics: How Political Parties and the State Shape Each Other

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Intrastate Politics: How Political Parties and the State Shape Each Other

A dissertation presented

by

Natasha Murtaza

to

The Department of Government

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in the subject of

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Harvard University

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Intrastate Politics: How Political Parties and the State Shape Each Other

Abstract

My dissertation focuses on the interplay between political parties and the state. When do governments invest in building impartial and effective state institutions? How does the extraction of state resources and rents by politicians affect party building and political development? Why might the interaction between parties and the state shape regime type and determine regime stability? I employ a diverse range of methods to study these questions, from digitizing archival publications and web scraping government records for statistical analysis to interviews and participant observation.

Weak and decrepit states are an endemic problem in the Global South. Effective state institutions are critical for development in these low and middle-income countries. Yet, we still do not understand enough about when and how these state structures are built up or reformed. The conventional wisdom states that electoral competition leads to state-building (Geddes 1994, O'Dwyer 2006, Gryzmala-Busse 2007). The first paper shows that contra to much of the existing literature, electoral competition undermines, rather than encourages, state-building. I argue that competitive elections lead politicians to have short time horizons. Politicians rely on state rents and resources to fund their electoral campaigns in electoral democracies in the developing world. Electoral competition creates perverse incentives that encourage political interference in day-to-day administration to access the spoils of office. The consequent politicization of state

institutions erodes bureaucratic capacity as governments prioritize their organizational imperatives over the needs of the state.

Counterintuitively, I argue that dominant parties are more likely to invest in improving state capacity. Dominant parties have longer time horizons since they anticipate remaining in office for the foreseeable future. These parties view the state as an effective tool through which to implement their agenda, which can be developmental or exclusionary. The insulation of the bureaucracy by the party removes politics from administration, which improves the effectiveness of state institutions. I test this argument in India with an original dataset on the postings of Indian Administrative Service officers. Longitudinal data from 1953 to 2019 on the national and subnational levels show that competitive elections increase political interference in the bureaucracy, while single-party dominance results in the opposite. Qualitative archival data and interviews provide evidence for the causal mechanism, demonstrating that this rent-seeking behavior is politically motivated and negatively impacts bureaucratic capacity.

The second paper examines where strong parties come from and why weak parties persist in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). I investigate why governing parties in Arab Republics have remained weak compared to their Islamist opposition and the impact of this disparity on regime transitions in the MENA region. Through a medium-N case analysis, I show that regime parties fragmented following the Arab uprisings due to their dependence on state-funded patronage networks. In contrast, the Islamist opposition proved resilient due to the networks they built in society when deprived of access to the state. This imbalanced party system foreclosed the possibility of negotiated or ‘pacted’ transitions that proved to be successful in Western Europe and Latin America.

The third paper centers on the important, but understudied, topic of political parties and militaries. The civil-military relations literature focuses on the military part of this relationship, finding that certain types of militaries are prone to interfere in civilian governance. In a co-authored paper with Daniel K. Baissa (Harvard University), we argue that the civilian state and political parties are critical in shaping military strategy. We find that the relationship between the military and civilian governments structures politics and determines coup propensity. Through Cox Proportional Hazards models, we show that state and party strength better predict the likelihood of a military coup than established indicators of military strength. These findings underline the importance of theorizing about the civil part of civil-military relations by incorporating insights from studies on political institutions.

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1 Governing the State: The Erosion of Bureaucratic Capacity Under Party Competition in India

1 Introduction

When do governments invest in building the institutional capacity of the state? Low state capacity is an endemic problem in the developing world. Understanding when and how states in the Global South are built up or reformed is critical since strong state institutions are essential for governance, economic and social development, and regime stability. Yet, we still know relatively little about where state capacity comes from in the contemporary period.

A dominant explanation for state-building centers on electoral competition. The conventional wisdom holds that electoral competition encourages political parties to build effective state institutions. Parties implement bureaucratic reforms and improve state capacity when facing the threat of replacement (Geddes 1994; O'Dwyer 2006; Grzymala-Busse 2007). However, this approach has not held empirically in democracies across the developing world. In Bangladesh, high levels of competition have resulted in political parties utilizing state rents and resources to hold onto office, leading to rampant corruption and the politicization of state institutions. Similar patterns have been observed in Ghana, Indonesia, Argentina, and Pakistan. In these countries, politicians are driven by more immediate electoral concerns, leading them to raid the state to improve their political prospects.

In contrast, a lack of political competition in India led the governing Congress party to protect state institutions from political interference for the first two decades after independence. India is not an outlier; this has also been true in Japan, Israel, Botswana, and Malaysia. Dominant parties in

these countries have prioritized state-building and reforms to improve institutional effectiveness.

This paper argues that electoral competition may undermine state building and that under certain conditions, party dominance may induce it. Parties have shorter time horizons when they encounter competition. Politicians are concerned with their political futures and willing to use any means at their disposal to hold onto power, including leveraging the state apparatus placed under their charge. Parties and politicians rely on state rents and resources to contest close elections, building patronage networks from the spoils of office. The increased political interference in the bureaucracy to access these resources leads to the erosion of state capacity.

Conversely, dominant parties are more likely to build state institutions because they have longer time horizons. These parties anticipate benefiting from investing in the state since they see themselves as its proprietors for the foreseeable future. The party leadership views state institutions not only as a source of patronage but also as effective tools to implement their policy agendas. These goals are not always normatively good as they can range from welfare provision to the institution of discriminatory naturalization policies. However, only dominant parties with high organizational capacity can undertake the task of building the state; without a centralized and bureaucratic organization, the party leadership cannot translate preferences for reform into actions. This type of party is increasingly uncommon, making rule by these dominant parties rare cases of successful state-building.

I test this logic in India, an ideal case since political competition has varied considerably in the country. Its federal structure also results in variation in competition and bureaucratic capacity across subunits. To test the argument, I use an original dataset of Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officers, constructed from online service records. The data covers the period from 1953 to 2019 at the national and subnational levels, with 13,577 officers represented and 157,116 overall

postings. The data on postings and transfers measures the level of political interference in the bureaucracy since politicians in India exert influence on state institutions through their control over the movement of civil servants. This claim is substantiated by interviews, memoirs, government documents, and party records.

A paired comparative case study of two periods of Indian National Congress (INC) dominance on the national level, and the transition from INC dominance to competition on the subnational level during the same period, provides evidence of the causal mechanism. Qualitative data from government and party archives show how competition and party organizational capacity shape the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats.

The paper offers new insights into the study of political parties, state-building, and bureaucracy by exploring the interconnections between them. It demonstrates that studies on the internal structures of party organizations can be extended and applied to our understanding of how parties govern the state. Furthermore, it delves into the connections between the work on clientelism and the state, considering the long-term implications of clientelist and patronage politics for state capacity and autonomy. Lastly, it inserts politics back into studies on bureaucratic performance, showing how politics shapes bureaucratic outcomes.

The paper proceeds in six parts. The second section presents the argument and relates it to the existing literature on state-building. The third lays out the research design to test the argument and details the conceptualization and measurement of the variables. The fourth section discusses the quantitative data and results for the India case at the national and subnational levels, and the fifth presents qualitative evidence to corroborate these findings. The sixth concludes with the larger implications of this study for state capacity and governance in South Asia and states in the developing world broadly, identifying a potential trade-off between greater responsiveness and

accountability today for better state capacity tomorrow.

2 Parties, Electoral Competition, and the State

2.1 State-Building through Electoral Contestation

The state-building literature argues that electoral competition encourages parties to build effective bureaucracies. Geddes (1994) contends that parties are more likely to deliver on civil service reforms if patronage is distributed evenly across major parties. Even distribution of patronage occurs when parties hold a roughly equal number of seats in the legislature and alternate control of the executive. In such a situation, no party would be at a disadvantage relative to their competitor if they limit party access to state resources. Party discipline makes this more likely since it allows executives to limit patronage without losing support in the legislature. Conversely, when one party dominates, the legislators of this party are unlikely to implement reforms since they receive no benefit from these actions. The majority party has exclusive access to patronage because they hold government consecutively and will only cut off access to these state resources under extraordinary circumstances. In this context, parties with limited access to patronage are more likely to support reforms that starve the dominant party of resources.

Parties with equal amounts of patronage are incentivized to implement reforms because it improves their electoral prospects. There is a built-in assumption underlying this approach that voter demands for state reform are salient and constant across time. Other studies have corroborated these findings. In Post-Communist states, party institutionalization and competition are cited as critical for voters to identify and punish parties engaged in patronage politics (O'Dwyer 2006). Robust competition is credited with the construction of regulatory institutions in Eastern Europe

that cut off party access to state resources (Grzymala-Busse 2007). These studies argue that voters punish parties for engaging in patronage politics and successfully do so under competition.

2.2 Competition and Short Time Horizons

This dominant approach has both theoretical and empirical limitations. These studies argue that parties are confident in their political futures under competition, and politicians play the long game when they are assured of democratic continuity. However, in much of the developing world, parties and politicians have short time horizons that encourage clientelism and patronage. For instance, in Ghana, party volunteers are empowered to demand patronage from elected officials in more competitive local districts (Driscoll 2018). Politicians also hire co-partisans in low-skilled public sector jobs when there is a change in government (Brierley 2020). Empirically, there are numerous cases of state plunder under competition in such diverse cases as Bangladesh (Sobhan 2004), Indonesia (Berenschot 2018), Argentina (Bambaci, Spiller, and Tommasi 2007), Ghana (ESID Briefing 2016), and Pakistan (Wilder 2009). In these countries, politicians and parties often depend on access to the state to fund campaigns or launch initiatives that appeal to voters. Parties that fail to deliver on their promises to supporters can disappear or be replaced in the next electoral cycle. Hence, cartel parties, which seek to embed themselves in the state to ensure their survival, have emerged even in first and second-wave democracies (Katz and Mair 1995).

Parties in newer democracies have a broader range of strategies available to them to win office as weak state institutions are unable to discipline parties involved in vote-buying (Hicken 2011; Stokes et al. 2013), patronage (Chandra 2007), and violence (Wilkinson 2004). Voters are a weak substitute for an institutional check on this rent-seeking behavior. Low information environments (Chandra 2007) and weak institutional contexts (Mainwaring and Scully 1995) complicate voters'

ability to identify offenders. Voters also selectively and unevenly inflict punishment on parties because politicians' criminal behavior might ultimately benefit voters that are provided goods and services (Vaishnav 2017).

Under competition, parties focus on providing short-term material benefits to voters at the expense of longer-term institutional gains. Politicians are primarily concerned with holding onto their office and the government. Therefore, they put a premium on policies that give a payout before the next elections so incumbents can point to it as a symbol of their achievements. Parties fail to prioritize better administration or state reforms since these are not as visible to voters. Officeholders are more concerned with building schools and hospitals than staffing them with trained professionals or ensuring that they are financially viable. The photo op with the building or the highway is more marketable than laboring over the staffing or financing, even if these are ultimately more important for the efficiency with which services are delivered. Efforts to implement civil service reforms, restructure ministries, update state regulations, and upgrade technology in state offices are sidelined since elected officials cannot take credit for them if they are no longer in office when they come to fruition. Governing parties blame state inefficiency on previous governments as parties cycle through office with no party taking responsibility for the state.

In fact, evenly matched parties are more likely to weaken state institutions. Elected officials are incentivized to interfere in day-to-day administration to address the complaints and concerns of their supporters, return political favors, sell state licensing and contracts, provide better service delivery for their constituency, and siphon money for their electoral campaigns. To do this with impunity, they place a premium on loyalty instead of ability when posting and promoting bureaucrats. Punitive measures by elected officials demoralize bureaucrats and reduce the effectiveness of the bureaucracy. Using state resources and administration to win elections politicizes bureaucracies and exacerbates

corruption, which can have serious consequences for bureaucratic capacity over time.

2.3 Dominance and the Incentives to Build Bureaucratic Capacity

Dominant parties are more likely to build effective state institutions because they have longer time horizons and anticipate benefiting from reforms that improve state capacity. Dominant parties are confident in their political futures and are incentivized to play the long game to hold onto power. The party prioritizes administrative concerns over its organizational imperatives since high levels of state capacity allow dominant parties to carry out their policies effectively. The leadership views the state as an essential tool to implement its agenda. Limiting patronage to build a more effective bureaucracy is less costly for these parties since they already hold an electoral advantage over their opponents and do not fear losing elections without patronage. Parties use state institutions to implement programs that span the political spectrum. These policies can reinforce a party's support among its existing constituency or help it form a larger coalition by providing voters with better administration and services. The Nationalist Party in South Africa used bureaucratic capacity to institute apartheid while the Social Democratic Worker's Party of Sweden constructed a welfare state. The United Malays National Organisation in Malaysia carried out economic development while discriminating against the ethnic Chinese. In these circumstances, the governing party becomes synonymous with the state as the party uses the state as an extension of itself.

State reforms also allow the party leadership to centralize control of the bureaucracy. The leadership is driven to consolidate power to ensure that it determines where and how state rents and resources are utilized. This concentration of power means that the leadership sets administrative policy at the upper levels of government, removing political interference at lower levels of the bureaucracy. Politicians that disagree with this party policy are hesitant to exit the party to avoid

losing the spoils of office while those in the opposition are motivated to join the party to access these benefits.

The United States models this logic with state-building and reform taking place in the country under Republican Party dominance at the national and state levels. The Progressives, a faction within the Republican Party, led efforts to remove patronage with the push for civil service reforms coming from within the dominant party instead of its weaker competitor. The Progressives concentrated power in institutions they dominated while opposing the political machines and patronage organizations they lacked access to. The New Dealers in the 1930s carried out administrative reforms for similar reasons under Democratic Party dominance (Shefter 1994).

Not all dominant parties are able to implement positive reforms in the state; the governing party must have a degree of organizational capacity to do this. A party's organizational characteristics can determine whether the party leadership can translate its preferences for reforms into actions.

2.4 Organizational Capacity in the Governing Party

A party's organizational capacity can shape the relationship between elected officials and bureaucrats. The behavior of politicians is determined by the incentives they face in the political arena and in their party organizations (Duverger 1959; Panebianco 1988). A strong party organization serves to constrain and direct the behavior of party members. In a party with high organizational capacity, the leadership sets administrative policy and members help implement it. The leadership in such a party can punish the rank and file for deviations from the party's stated policies. In a party with low organizational capacity, the leadership cannot control the actions of its members. Elected officials are driven by concerns about their personal and political futures when interacting with state officials, rather than party directives.

In a party with high organizational capacity, the leadership is able to direct its membership because it has the means to discipline individual members. The party is centralized with bureaucratic structures that allow the leadership control over nominations and resources. In centralized parties, nominations are determined through a procedural process with discretion or final say afforded to the leadership. Politicians that are part of parties with high levels of centralization are more apt to follow the policies set by the leadership to avoid any negative consequences for their future in the party. In bureaucratic parties, resources are held and distributed by the party organization. Indiscipline can lead to a halt in resources for any member, which can hinder their efforts to gain influence in and out of the party. Bureaucratic centralized parties are increasingly rare (Schmitter 2001), making their brand of governing the state exceptional.

Most parties in the developing world are personalist; these types of parties do not have high organizational capacity. These patrimonial parties are constituted from resource networks formed by individual members. Members rely on their ability to acquire resources, which diminishes the power held by the party leadership. Control over resources is often unstable in a party comprised of personalist clientelist networks. Personalist parties can be centralized, with leaders' personal preferences guiding decision-making. However, this can lead to sycophantic behavior toward the leader of the party instead of a commitment to the larger party organization.

2.5 Political Incentives to Extract from or Invest in the State

Figure 1 outlines the theoretical argument and its observable outcomes in the bureaucracy. The argument is limited to electoral democracies in the developing world, defined by a Polity 5 scoring of 4-10. The numbering of the cells signifies the expected level of political interference in each case, with one standing for the least and four for the highest level of politicization in the bureaucracy.

		Electoral Competition	
		High	Low
Governing Party Organizational Capacity	High	2 Extraction of State Resources by <i>Party Organization</i> <i>Ex. – Britain</i>	1 Builds Bureaucratic Capacity <i>Ex. – Israel, Malaysia</i>
	Low	4 Extraction of State Resources by <i>Individuals</i> <i>(For inter and intra-party disputes)</i> <i>Ex. – Bangladesh</i>	3 Extraction of State Resources by <i>Individuals</i> <i>(For intra-party disputes)</i> <i>Ex. – Italy, South Africa</i>

FIGURE 1: Argument

2.5.1 Building State Capacity Under Dominance (cell 1)

In a dominant party with high organizational capacity, the party leadership determines policy and maintains discipline through its control over nominations and resources. Patronage is not essential for moving up party ranks or becoming part of the leadership. In Japan, the factional contestation for power within the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) preoccupied politicians, who were focused on their political futures within the party and less interested in interfering in the bureaucracy (Johnson 1975). Political competition occurs inside the party, removing incentives to interfere in the bureaucracy to tilt the electoral playing field. In India, politicians vying for power within the Indian National Congress (INC) were focused on rigging the party organization's internal elections. Allegations of interference in local elections only emerged in the late 1960s as the margins of victory for INC politicians narrowed (Vaishnav 2017, 85-88). Politicians who do not get the party ticket

do not leave the dominant party as it is the best way to access resources and retain office for the foreseeable future.

Dominant parties with high organizational capacity are more likely to build bureaucratic capacity. The party leadership controls bureaucratic structures through officeholders who serve as ministers of various state agencies and those who hold office in districts where civil servants are posted. Internal centralization in the party allows for effective monitoring of bureaucrats. At the same time, bureaucratization ensures that these elected officials do not interfere in the day-to-day functioning of the state without the approval of the senior leadership in the party. In effect, the party leadership is the principal that dictates the behavior of its agents, the bureaucrats, through monitoring by party members.

A centrally controlled bureaucracy allows individuals indifferent to the governing party to work without negative consequences to their careers as long as the indifference does not transform into open hostility. This enables state institutions to maintain a commitment to technical competence instead of political allegiance. This has been true in Botswana with the Botswana Democratic Party (Charlton 1991; Lotshwao 2011), in Israel with the Mapai (Medding 2010), in Malaysia with the United Malays National Organisation (Chin 2017), and in Sweden with the Swedish Social Democratic Party (Dahlström and Niklasson 2013). In these contexts, the party leadership insulates bureaucrats from any influence or pressure applied by elected officials. This does not mean that dominant parties are benevolent actors—the fusion between the state and party results in the dominant party building the state to empower itself. The difference is that the party promotes bureaucrats based on merit instead of partisan affiliation to ensure that it can effectively implement its agenda. However, part of the dominant party's goals is to provide good governance to its constituency, as the party is aware that it is ultimately replaceable in a democratic system if it

consistently fails to meet its voters' expectations (which has taken place in every democracy that has had a dominant party in government).

2.5.2 Personalist Patronage Networks Under Fractionalized Dominance (cell 3)

Dominant parties with low organizational capacity often splinter into internal factions. Patronage networks form around political personages as they battle each other for office. Political opportunism guides actions as politicians exit the dominant party if they fail to win the party ticket and have amassed enough of a following to defeat the party's chosen candidate. Individual politicians' electoral motivations drive their behavior, unconstrained by party considerations.

Parties with a decentralized or patrimonial internal party structure are detrimental to the state. The party cannot implement positive reforms in the state because its leadership is unable to direct party members. The African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa is bureaucratic but not centralized, which means that the ANC's national leadership cannot stop local conflicts over patronage among party members (Mac Giollabhui 2018). A dominant party without clear hierarchies results in party members forming factions and turning to the state to bolster their electoral prospects.

Less centralized control over the bureaucracy results in political and personal loyalty to a politician qualifying civil servants for a job instead of their ability to do said job. This can mean loyalty not just to the party but to specific patrons in the party. Italy's Christian Democrats (DC) exemplify this with their factionalism-driven engagement in patronage politics (Shefter 1977). DC legislators chose bureaucratic inefficiency and corruption in their efforts to provide constituency services and retain their office (Golden and Chang 2001; Golden 2003).

2.5.3 Extraction of Rents and Resources Under Electoral Contestation (cell 2)

When faced with competition, governing parties with high organizational capacity utilize state rents and resources to build themselves up. A party governed by the policies set by its leadership is more coordinated in extracting state resources. The party's organizational imperatives guide this behavior and are controlled by it as well. This means that this extraction does not occur at all levels; it is not widespread across the state. The leadership can prevent its members from engaging in this behavior primarily for personal gain, ensuring that parts of the state are insulated from rent-seeking behavior.

Parties in nineteenth-century England and the United States were built through access to patronage and state rents (Huntington 1968, 70). Politicians built political machines and engaged in clientelism to contest elections. However, governing parties were still able to construct and manage state institutions that were effective at development and colonial expansion.

2.5.4 State Plunder By Politicians Under Fractionalized Competition (cell 4)

When faced with competition, parties that lack organizational capacity are likely to be unrestrained in their plunder of the state. Factions within the governing party are incentivized to use state resources in disputes within the party and contests against external competitors. The party cannot stop politicians from utilizing state resources to benefit themselves politically and personally. Political corruption is pervasive at all levels of the state as politicians extract state resources to hold onto their office or to enrich themselves.

This is modeled by the Awami League (AL) and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) in Bangladesh. AL and BNP party members utilize state resources in their fight against factions within their party and opposition parties. Corruption is widespread and endemic, politicizing state

administration and leading to the deterioration of bureaucratic capacity (Jahan 1974; Rahman 2019).

2.6 Hypotheses

The argument of the paper, in a nutshell, is that the level of political competition in a party system impacts the behavior of politicians and parties. Whether the threat of replacement a governing party faces is immediate or just a possibility determines the time horizons of its leadership and shapes its governing preferences in office. Competition incentivizes political interference in the bureaucracy, while dominance encourages insulation from political pressures. The governing party's organizational capacity determines whether these preferences are translated into actions by the party rank and file.

Hypothesis 1 directly emerges from this, *high levels of electoral competition result in greater politicization of state institutions.*

Hypothesis 2 states that *dominant parties with high organizational capacity limit political interference in state institutions, building state capacity.*

3 Research Design

The two hypotheses are tested through a mixed-methods research design. Statistical tests establish the relationship between party competition and capacity and the level of politicization in the bureaucracy. This quantitative analysis is supplemented by party records, government documents, memoirs, and interviews that provide evidence for the causal mechanism. Comparative case studies

at the national and subnational levels show how changes in a party's organizational capacity and competition creates incentives to invest in bureaucratic capacity through insulation or to extract resources through interference in the bureaucracy.

3.1 Case Selection

India is an ideal case to test this argument since it varies in levels of party competition as it transitions from INC dominance (1947-1989) to an era of coalition governments (1989-2014) to the beginning of another possible period of dominance under the BJP (2014-present). The governing party's organizational capacity similarly varies over time from high (1947-1969) to low (1969-2014) to high (2014-present) again.

The paper incorporates a subnational analysis of Indian states from 1947 (or the date they were created) to 2019 to confirm the validity of the findings. The subnational analysis has a larger N to test the hypothesized relationship between the independent variables and outcomes in the bureaucracy. The state-level analysis also controls for other variables that have been shown to affect state capacity in the state-building literature. Electoral institutions, economic growth, federalism, bureaucratic culture, and colonialism are held constant. This allows the study to demonstrate that the identified independent variables have explanatory power even when alternative explanations for levels of state capacity are accounted for. Electoral competition and party organizational capacity are shown to be two among several factors that impact state effectiveness.

3.2 Measuring Competition and Party Organizational Capacity

In this study, political competition refers to electoral competition, specifically the threat a party faces from other parties in its efforts to form a government. Parties assess how likely they are to be

replaced in relation to other contenders for office. For governing parties, the second largest party is the biggest threat to their continuance in office. Competition is measured by the difference in seat share between the governing party and its primary competitor. This is a continuous measure with a greater difference in seat share indicative of lower competition, while a lower difference means higher competition. The type of electoral institutions in a country determine the relevant measure for competitiveness. The selected case has a parliamentary system with single-member districts at the national and state levels, which results in high disproportionality or ‘wasted votes.’ This requires the use of seat-share to measure competition, rather than vote-share, since seat-share is a better indicator of a party’s ability to form a government.

A party’s organizational capacity is determined by whether the leadership controls nominations and resources. In a centralized party, the leadership has the final say in selecting candidates, and in a bureaucratic one, it determines the distribution of resources. The process through which a party decides who will be on the party ticket differs widely. This can range from open primaries to backroom deals and incorporate all citizens who identify with the party or depend on one individual. For the selection of candidates to be centralized, the leadership must have the final say or veto power over nominations, irrespective of the process. If the nomination is left entirely to the party membership or predetermined due to the uncontested stature of individual candidates, then power is dispersed in a political party.

Parties hold various resources that can help individuals get elected. These include the immaterial, such as a brand, and the material, such as party workers. Intangible resources like name recognition, reputation, and brand are widely shared by all members of a party and often nonexcludable and non-divisible (Lupu 2016). Material resources are both excludable and divisible, with access dependent on your position in the party. A party is bureaucratic if the leadership controls the distribution

of material resources among members. Bureaucratization is determined by the presence of party offices and cadres under the control of the party leadership across the geographical unit in which the party contests elections. Where individual members rely on themselves for money, offices, workers, and networks to win elections, the party is patrimonial, and the leadership cannot cut off access to material resources (Tavits 2013; Poguntke et al. 2016). Party organizational capacity is operationalized as a binary variable. A party that has cadres and offices under the control of the party leadership and has veto power over nominations is coded as 1; the rest are coded as 0.¹

3.3 Bureaucratic Capacity

State capacity refers to the capabilities of the state, which incorporates the military and civilian bureaucracy. I focus on the civilian bureaucracy as it is the part of the state tasked with governance. Bureaucratic capacity refers to the ability of state ministries or agencies to implement a government's policies (Evans and Rauch 1999; Soifer and Vom Hau 2008). Studies of bureaucratic capacity range from examining the overall bureaucracy to focusing on a specific state agency. This study looks at the functioning of the overall bureaucracy instead of concentrating on one particular field or ministry since it is concerned with day-to-day administration. It does this by examining the civil service, which serves as the linchpin of the civilian bureaucracy.

The civil service comprises career bureaucrats that have served in the state for decades. They know the ins and outs of the state better than anyone because of their training, knowledge, and experience. Comparatively, government officials serve shorter stints in the upper echelons of the state and rely on the civil service to provide technical expertise and continuity as governments

¹The organizational capacity of parties is manually coded for each governing party based on party records, news reports, memoirs, studies, and interviews with experts on the subject. Control over nominations and resources is determined for each governing party for the period, 1947 to 2019.

cycle through. Civil servants create a more interconnected and unified bureaucracy as they move through various positions and ministries, exchanging knowledge and creating relationships between personnel from diverse policy fields. Their critical role in building and operating the machinery of the state makes them the ideal avenue to study the relationship between the government and the state.

India's civil service consists of several cadres ranging from the foreign service to the police service. The most powerful is the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), which emerged out of the British Indian Civil Service (ICS). IAS officers occupy the top positions in all ministries at the national and state levels. They are also the highest state authorities at the district level.² As the ICS was the 'steel frame' through which the British ruled, the IAS is the 'steel frame' through which governments in India have continued to govern after independence (Vaishnav and Khosla 2016). The important role the IAS plays in governance justifies the focus on them when discussing bureaucratic capacity.

3.3.1 Measuring Effectiveness

The presence of politics in the bureaucracy is seen as the antithesis of high capacity (Weber 1947). Political interference brings with it various personal and professional agendas that can conflict with technocrats' objective implementation of policy. This political interference can have positive results but these are often haphazard fixes. An elected official can influence the selection of a teacher that she personally knows to be highly skilled or pressure a civil servant to approve a petition mired by red tape. This can create greater accountability and responsiveness. However, politics is an unpredictable and unreliable basis on which to build bureaucratic effectiveness. When said elected

²The table in Appendix A.1 provides evidence of the crucial role the Indian Administrative Service plays in the central government.

official leaves office, the next one might remove the same highly skilled teacher or charge a fee to help people bypass red tape. Any improvement in capacity through political interference in the bureaucracy's day-to-day functioning is unsustainable in the long run since it is dependent on the political circumstances upholding it to remain the same.

In practice, the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats lies between the apolitical ideal type laid out by Weber and principal-agent models (Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 1981). A completely autonomous bureaucracy would not be accountable to the people, while in a principal-agent formulation, it would be entirely subservient to the whims of politicians. The relationship between bureaucratic autonomy and capacity can be conceptualized as an inverted U (Fukuyama 2013). The less skilled the bureaucrat, the more political oversight will improve responsiveness and accountability. Conversely, insulating skilled bureaucrats from political pressures will result in higher efficiency. Political influence in these circumstances interferes with the technocratic implementation of policy.

This study focuses on the civil service in India, entry into which is determined by highly competitive merit-based exams administered by the Union Public Service Commission. These bureaucrats can be classified as highly skilled. Consequently, this study will assume that political interference in the day-to-day functioning of the civil service is undesirable and erodes capacity. In this context, political interference in the bureaucracy has a negative impact, ranging from incentivizing risk-averse behavior that creates stagnation to encouraging sycophantic behavior that ignores technocratic training and knowledge. Qualitative evidence from the case will highlight some of these hard-to-capture effects on the bureaucracy.

3.3.2 Politically Motivated Movement of Bureaucrats

Politicians redirect or extract resources from the state through bureaucrats since bureaucrats control the distribution of state resources (Berenschot 2018). Bureaucrats must agree to this distribution or reallocation of state resources. Elected officials use the leverage they have over public servants to ensure compliance. This can take various forms, dependent on context. In India, civil servants are protected from dismissal under civil service laws at the national and subnational levels. However, elected officials hold the power to transfer bureaucrats from their positions. This threat of transfer to a less desirable posting has career and personal costs for bureaucrats, which is how politicians ensure civil servants' compliance. It is an open secret that politicians use postings and transfers in India to control the civil service (Iyer and Mani 2012). This measure is not specific to India. Politicians evaded civil service laws in U.S. cities in the twentieth century by controlling the movement of personnel (through assignment, discipline, and promotion of civil servants) (Key 1935). National politicians in postwar Italy also circumvented civil service laws by manipulating the movement and promotion of personnel (Golden 2003).

Political interference is measured by the variation in the frequency with which IAS officers cycle through various positions and their length of tenure in each position. The variation in the transfer rate and tenure length serve as proxies for politicians' attempts to interfere in the day-to-day administration of the state. This measure is comparable across units since IAS officers are recruited through a federal process before assignment to a state cadre and are subject to the same rules and regulations on the national and state levels.

The effect of this political interference on the functioning of the bureaucracy is evident in the measure itself. Civil servants, especially generalists, go through a cycle of learning, building on

the work of their predecessors and cementing their innovations in each position they hold. This requires bureaucrats to serve a certain amount of time in each posting (civil service rules mandate that officers must be promoted or transferred from a posting within three years, which prevents bureaucratic capture). The shorter tenure and more frequent turnover in these positions lead civil servants to be less informed of their responsibilities, less knowledgeable about the subject matter they are working on, less willing to invest significant effort, and unable to build on the expertise of past occupants of their office.³ This assertion is backed by accounts of bureaucrats themselves in interviews, surveys, and memoirs and demonstrated in studies on this subject (Banik 2001). These behaviors create inefficiencies in the bureaucracy and reduce its capacity.

4 Data and Results

4.1 Indian Administrative Service Data

The Indian Administrative Service (IAS) dataset used to test the argument is constructed from the Executive Record Sheets of IAS officers, publicly available on the website of the Department of Personnel and Training in the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions (MoPPG). There are 13,577 officers in the dataset and 157,116 overall postings. Postings in the central government have been separated from those at the state level, creating a national and subnational dataset of IAS postings.⁴ The postings of IAS officers in the central government are under the authority of the Prime Minister, who also serves as the Minister of MoPPG. The postings for each state cadre are under the control of the Chief Minister of that state (except for union territories

³Interviews of junior and senior IAS officers conducted in New Delhi and Boston, 2019-2020. Interview protocols are detailed in Appendix 2.2.

⁴IAS officers are recruited and trained through a federal process before being assigned to a state cadre, senior officers are deputed or 'loaned' to the central government.

and states with joint cadres), who also serves as the Minister of the Department of Appointment and Personnel (DoAP) or equivalent ministry at the state level. The institutional setup is meant to place civil servants under the direct control of the chief executive at the federal and state levels. This arrangement allows us to test how incentives within and across political parties affect the relationship between politicians and civil servants at the national and subnational levels.

The IAS dataset holds the service records of IAS officers from the time of digitization to 2019 (the data was scraped in 2020), which means there are more observations for the contemporary period. To account for missing data and increases in IAS cadre strength over time, I calculated a transfer rate for each year.⁵ The transfer rate provides the average number of transfers an IAS officer undergoes in a year.⁶ Since the exclusion of IAS officers in the database is related to their retirement date, not the number or length of their postings, this provides a more accurate figure for transfers that is comparable over time. The tenure length of IAS officers is similarly calculated by averaging the difference in start and end date of postings for every year. This gives the average number of days IAS officers served in a posting that year.

4.2 National-level Analysis

Figure 2 shows that as the seat share of a governing party, relative to its competitor (x-axis), increases, the average number of transfers an IAS officer undergoes during that year (y-axis) decreases in the central government. This is not dependent on the behavior of a specific party but rather attributed to the political incentives all governing parties face. This is best exemplified by the Indian

⁵Appendix A.2 compares actual IAS cadre strength with the number of IAS officers in the dataset for the period, 1950 – 2019.

⁶The IAS dataset has entries for each posting an officer served in, these were aggregated to obtain the number of postings that ended each year. The end date signifies the move of an officer to a new post. The transfer rate was calculated by dividing the number of postings that end each year by the number of IAS officers in the database for that year.

National Congress (INC) and its offshoot INC(I), whose governments have varied considerably in the number of transfers they have implemented over more than four decades of rule. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has similarly diverged in the administrative policy it has instituted during its terms in office. The Janata Party (JP) is the only party that shows greater stability, however, this is due to its limited time (3 years) in office.

FIGURE 2: The Effect of Competition on the Transfer Rate of IAS Officers in the National Government





Figure 3 shows that the mean tenure length in postings for IAS officers (y-axis) increases as the governing party holds a larger seat share relative to its competitor (x-axis). This means that IAS officers serve longer in their postings with less competition. The color-coded observations in the plot demonstrate that this result is dependent on a governing party's political incentives, not a specific party's time in office.

FIGURE 3: The Effect of Competition on the Average Tenure of IAS Officers in the National Government



Note: The regression line shows that as competition decreases, IAS officers' tenure in postings increases. The full model results can be found in Column 4 of Table A.4 in Appendix 2.4

4.3 OLS Regression Models and Results for the National Level

The four models in Table 1 test whether the relationships presented in the plots are significant at the national level in India. The independent variables of competition and organizational capacity capture the governing party's incentives and constraints with the transfer rate and tenure length proxying for the subsequent variation in the politicization of the bureaucracy. Competition is measured by the difference in seat share between the two most voted for parties. The interaction term captures the effects of competition as mediated through the organizational capacity of the governing party, which determines whether the party implements the administrative policy set by its leadership.

Controls for election year⁷ and turnover in office⁸ are added to the models to ensure that the results are not driven by an increase in the movement of bureaucrats due to elections or the formation of a new government. Since the number of observations is limited, only variables that might directly affect the variation in transfer rate and tenure length are included in these models.

⁷The election year variable is binary with a 1 if there is an election that year and 0 otherwise.

⁸The turnover in office variable is binary with a 1 for a change in governing party and 0 otherwise.

TABLE 1: India National Level Models

	<i>Dependent Variable:</i>			
	Transfer Rate		Tenure Length	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Seat Share Difference	−0.470*** (0.059)	−0.401*** (0.077)	72.648*** (25.290)	61.922** (30.090)
Party Org. Capacity		0.079 (0.056)		−10.327 (20.551)
Election Year	0.005 (0.048)	−0.001 (0.048)	−5.050 (18.224)	−4.365 (18.082)
Office Turnover	−0.0004 (0.094)	−0.001 (0.097)	14.433 (25.894)	14.687 (25.893)
Seat Share Diff*Org Capacity		−0.180* (0.108)		26.990 (53.994)
Observations	63	63	63	63
R ²	0.436	0.451	0.131	0.135

Note: clustered standard errors in parentheses.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Hypothesis 1 states that political competition will result in greater politicization of the bureaucracy. This means an increase in the transfer rate and decrease in tenure length for IAS officers as politicians attempt to extract state rents through civil servants. The hypothesis is tested through the seat share difference variable in the first and third models in Table 1.⁹ The seat share variable, which captures political competition, shows a significant, negative relationship with the transfer rate and a significant, positive relationship with tenure length. This means that when the governing party faces less competition, the transfer rate for IAS officers decreases, and their length of tenure in postings increases.

A change of 10% in seat share results on average in a decrease of .47 postings in a year and an

⁹The seat share for each party is calculated by dividing the number of seats won by the party from the overall number of seats in the state legislature for that year. This gives the seat share of the two most voted for parties in the state assembly, the difference between which forms the seat share difference variable. This ranges from 0 to 1.

increase of 73 days in a posting for an IAS officer in the central government. To put it in context, the mean and median of the transfer rate is 1.28 with a range of 1 to 1.66, which translates to an average of 1.28 postings per year for every IAS officer at the national level. For tenure length, the mean is 530.3 days, and the median is 525.6 days with a range of 429.4 to 648 days, which means that, on average, IAS officers served 530.3 days in each posting.

Hypothesis 2 states that under dominance, a party with organizational capacity should reduce the level of politicization, while a party under competition is likely to increase politicization. The interaction term accounts for the effects of competition as mitigated through the governing party's organizational capacity. This is tested in the second and fourth models in Table 1 with the same controls as the other models. The term shows no significant effect, likely due to the lack of variation in the organizational capacity variable; the subnational data provides more variation against which to retest the hypothesis.


4.4 Subnational Analysis

The states in India show a clearer picture of the relationship between competition and the movement of bureaucrats as national-level variables are held constant in the subnational cases. The argument's logic should apply at the state level because of the federal structure of the Indian state, which places state administration under the purview of elected state assemblies. The IAS data on the subnational level is across 21 states; this creates 1,046 cross-sectional time series observations for the transfer rate and tenure length of IAS officers.¹⁰

¹⁰Most states have their own cadre of IAS officers, except for the 3 joint cadres of Manipur-Tripura, Assam-Meghalaya, and AGMUT (Arunachal Pradesh, Goa, Mizoram, and Union Territories). This doesn't allow for the civil service data to align with state assemblies and so these states drop out of the dataset and are not represented in the plots or the regression analysis. Union territories are also excluded because the state administration is under the control of the central government. There are 27 cadres of the IAS in the dataset but only 21 states are represented here.

Figure 4 shows the difference in seat share in state assembly elections on the x-axis and the transfer rate of IAS officers on the y-axis.¹¹ As the governing party's relative seat share increases, transfers decrease. The color-coded observations show that parties vary widely in their transfer policies when in office with no specific party driving the results.

FIGURE 4: The Effect of Competition on the Transfer Rate of IAS Officers in States




Note: The full regression model results can be found in Column 1 of Table A.5 in Appendix 2.4

¹¹This is the number of postings that end in a particular state in a year divided by the number of officers in the dataset for that state in that year.

Figure 5 shows the average tenure length of IAS officers at the state level. The plot suggests that under competition, IAS officers serve less time in postings. This holds irrespective of the type of party in office, demonstrated by the diversity of parties represented in the data.

FIGURE 5: The Effect of Competition on the Tenure Length of IAS Officers in States



Note: The full regression model results can be found in Column 4 of Table A.5 in Appendix 2.4

4.5 Pooled OLS and State Fixed Effects Models

The pooled OLS regression models in Table 2 below test the argument using time series cross-sectional data on the state level in India. The models also control for additional factors that might explain the variation in the data. An increase in the movement of bureaucrats could be attributed to the formation of a new government or a change in governing party after an election. Dummy variables for election year and office turnover are included to verify that the results hold even with a new government's expected placement of different officials.

Creating a new political unit and concurrent administrative state is also likely to lead to an adjustment period where officials are either being moved around to fill vacant positions or their tenure is prolonged because of a lack of replacements. The new state variable captures whether a state was created in the last five years and accounts for any unique patterns associated with a newly formed administrative unit.

In a federal system, the national government can remove local officials and institute central control of a subnational unit under certain circumstances. In India, the national government brings state administration under its direct purview by invoking rule by the president instead of the elected state assembly. The president's rule variable accounts for any changes instituted by a non-elected chief executive in a state.

State capacity is shaped by the characteristics of prior state structures. The British Indian state on the subnational level was an amalgam of state types that may still have a discernable impact on the functioning of state administrations. The Categories variable accounts for the different histories of the states in India, classifying the states as A, B, C, or D. This classification of states was used in the 1950 Constitution of India to identify whether a state in British India had an elected governor

(A), was a princely state (B), run by a Chief Commissioner (C), or administered by a Lieutenant Governor chosen by the central government (D).

As with Table 1, the first and third models test the first hypothesis. A larger seat share held by the governing party leads to, on average, a decrease in the transfer rate and an increase in tenure length. A 10% increase in seat share leads to a reduction of around .2 in the number of postings an IAS officer holds in a year. To put this in context, the average number of postings an IAS officer holds is 1.29 per year at the state level, with a median of 1.24 and a range of 1 to 2.3. A 10% increase in seat share leads to an increase of 82 days in a posting (the mean tenure length in the dataset is 573 days, and the median is 557 days, with a range of 106.5 to 1338.5 days).

TABLE 2: India State Pooled Regression Models

	<i>Dependent Variable:</i>			
	Transfer Rate		Tenure Length	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Seat Share Difference	−0.192*** (0.066)	−0.144** (0.063)	82.150*** (22.456)	52.873*** (19.182)
Party Org. Capacity		0.060 (0.060)		−41.989 (26.005)
Election Year	−0.021 (0.023)	−0.020 (0.022)	42.150** (16.574)	42.821** (17.490)
New State	−0.045 (0.050)	−0.023 (0.053)	−44.705 (42.123)	−55.539 (45.082)
Office Turnover	0.128*** (0.032)	0.129*** (0.031)	−71.147*** (18.970)	−73.347*** (19.020)
President's Rule	−0.091*** (0.032)	−0.100*** (0.032)	20.532 (13.469)	25.171* (13.362)
Category B	−0.024 (0.027)	−0.034 (0.024)	−33.846 (20.962)	−28.148 (20.174)
Category C	0.144*** (0.019)	0.128*** (0.022)	−57.107*** (20.655)	−48.047** (19.766)
Seat Share Diff*Org Capacity		−0.225 (0.148)		130.993*** (48.346)
Observations	1,046	1,046	1,046	1,046
R ²	0.107	0.116	0.041	0.048

Note: clustered standard errors in parentheses.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The second and fourth models test the second hypothesis. The interaction between seat share difference and party organizational capacity is significant for tenure length but not the transfer rate. This could be attributed to the lack of variation in the party organization variable on the subnational level, with only four parties (the INC, BJP, and the Communist Parties in Kerala and Bengal) coded as having high organizational capacity.¹² The marginal effects plots below show that when a governing party with high organizational capacity is faced with low levels of competition, the transfer rate decreases at a higher rate than with a party with low organizational capacity. When a governing party with high organizational capacity has a larger seat share than its competitor, it results in longer tenures in postings for IAS officers.




FIGURE 6: Marginal Effects Plots

Note: The plots show that when governing parties have high organizational capacity, IAS officers are transferred less often and serve longer in postings than when parties with low organizational capacity are in office. The full regression model results for the interaction terms can be found in Columns 3 and 6 of Table A.5 in Appendix 2.4

¹²This coding is corroborated by other studies. See: Auerbach et al. "Rethinking the study of electoral politics in the developing world: Reflections on the Indian case." *Perspectives on Politics* 20, no. 1 (2022): 250-264.

Table 3 presents state fixed effects models to verify that the identified relationships hold despite the variation found amongst Indian states. This includes differing levels of economic growth, development, conflict, ethnic diversity, prior state capacity, and colonization, identified by the state-building literature as key explanators of state capacity. Fifteen states are represented in the models; only states with 50 or more observations are included to ensure that there is enough data from the state to identify a pattern within it.¹³ The first hypothesis is confirmed through the first and third models. The second hypothesis is confirmed for tenure length in the fourth model but not for transfer rate in the second model.

¹³These states are Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Nagaland, Odisha, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal.

TABLE 3: India State Fixed Effects Models

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Transfer Rate		Tenure Length	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Seat Share Difference	−0.174** (0.072)	−0.138** (0.067)	70.319*** (23.694)	42.080* (24.161)
Party Org. Capacity		0.040 (0.056)		−37.103 (26.251)
Election Year	−0.015 (0.022)	−0.014 (0.019)	21.643** (11.014)	21.833** (10.592)
New State	−0.103*** (0.038)	−0.070 (0.052)	−102.402** (41.311)	−124.354*** (44.445)
Office Turnover	0.112*** (0.029)	0.112*** (0.028)	−53.650*** (15.712)	−55.195*** (15.100)
President's Rule	−0.118*** (0.026)	−0.125*** (0.026)	38.611*** (10.855)	43.903*** (9.843)
Seat Share Diff*Org Capacity		−0.158 (0.135)		121.072** (57.413)
Observations	902	902	902	902
R ²	0.094	0.100	0.038	0.044

Note: clustered standard errors in parentheses.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

The quantitative data on the governing party's organizational capacity and outcomes in the state are highly suggestive of the theorized relationship but not conclusive. The following section uses qualitative data to corroborate and confirm these findings while providing evidence for the causal mechanism, demonstrating how competition shapes a party's administrative policy and its organization determines whether this policy is instituted by party members.

5 INC Organizational Capacity and the State

There have been four party systems in India (Yadav 1999, Vaishnav and Hinton 2019), constituted by differing levels of political competition and the INC's organizational characteristics. The incentives and constraints faced by politicians have similarly diverged, which has shaped their interactions with the state. This has created four distinct periods of governance in the country, evidenced by the data on the IAS (as shown in Figure 7). In this section, I focus on the first two periods to investigate the effect the INC's organizational capacity has on the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats on the national level. I turn to the subnational level to highlight the causal mechanisms through which competition and low party organizational capacity reshape the bureaucracy.




FIGURE 7: Transfer Rate and Tenure Length of IAS Officers in the National Government

The INC dominated national politics in India for four decades after independence.¹⁴ This dominance can be divided into two periods, the first, 1947-1969, and the second, 1969-1989. The first period of party dominance is under a INC party organization that is bureaucratic and centralized. The second period of dominance is under the INC(I) with a party organization that is centralized but patrimonial. Internal party reports and correspondence as well as declassified documents from the Home Ministry and Prime Minister's Secretariat show that the leaders of both parties, Nehru and Gandhi, were determined to eliminate elected officials' interference in the day-to-day functioning of the bureaucracy. While Nehru was successful at restraining politicians from exerting pressure on bureaucrats, Gandhi largely failed to do so.

5.1 Bureaucratic Effectiveness Under INC Dominance on the National Level

The INC leadership established a clear distinction between the party and administration after independence.¹⁵ Nehru, the Prime Minister from 1947 to 1964, did not believe that all government business was up for discussion and vote in the Congress Working Committee, which determined party policy. He permitted the party to influence policy but did not allow party members a say in matters of state. Chief Ministers also maintained this division at the state level, which Nehru actively encouraged.¹⁶ The leadership was committed to this endeavor, and the party organization was the means through which this separation was enforced. The party restricted members from publicly criticizing or seeking the dismissal of civil servants. Complaints were to be lodged with

¹⁴In the qualitative analysis, a dominant party is defined as a party that wins 10% or more of the seat share than the second most voted for party and holds at least 50% or more of the overall seats in the legislature. This focuses on a party's perception of the electoral threat presented by its closest competitor and its overall position in the party system, taking into account both relative and absolute levels of competition. All other parties are classified as competitive.

¹⁵Sardar Patel, Minister of Home Affairs, Speech to IAS Probationers, April 21, 1947, <https://icsindia.weebly.com/patel.html>

¹⁶F. No 2682, Installment I, All India Congress Committee Papers, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, India. p. 173.

the INC leadership in the national and state governments or parties. The INC president at the state level was to take disciplinary action against any party members that interfered in official matters.¹⁷

The INC headquarters in Delhi reinforced this message to the state parties, providing guidelines for the relationship between the Provincial Congress Committees (PCCs) and government cabinets at the state level. While legislation was to be discussed with the PCC, “The Ministers should be allowed to carry on their day-to-day administrative functions freely, and there should be no interference in the matters of transfers, appointments, promotions, and dismissals.”¹⁸ Across the board, Chief Ministers, when asked about their opinions on the relationship between the party organization and government, stated that while consultation on policy matters was good for building cooperation, interference by the party organization in day-to-day administration was unacceptable to them.¹⁹ The Chief Minister of Assam even set up an office to receive and evaluate the merits of any complaints about individual bureaucrats by party members.²⁰

5.2 Low Organizational Capacity and the Politicization of the State on the National Level

In 1969, Indira Gandhi was expelled by a majority decision of the Congress Working Committee for violating party discipline. The INC split into the INC (O) and INC (I), the O standing for the organizational branch of the INC and the I for Indira. The majority of the Congress Parliamentary Party (the legislative branch) comprised of Congress Members of Parliament (MPs) left with her.

Indira Gandhi’s INC was highly centralized, with ultimate authority resting with Gandhi instead

¹⁷F. No. 1496, Installment II, All India Congress Committee Papers, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, India. p. 4.

¹⁸F. No. 1496, Installment II, All India Congress Committee Papers, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, India. p. 4

¹⁹F. No. 2682, Installment II, All India Congress Committee Papers, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, India. p. 37-57, 70-80, 100-147

²⁰F. No. 2682, Installment II, All India Congress Committee Papers, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, India. p. 100-147.

of the Congress Working Committee. While Gandhi had the final say in nominations, she did not control resources.

Without the bureaucratic structure of the original INC, party members had to rely on their personal networks to raise resources. Congress incumbents built patronage networks with the spoils of office. Politicians accessed state rents and resources through bureaucrats, taking advantage of their ability to affect the posting and transfers of civil servants. As a Minister wrote to Indira Gandhi in response to a letter on the subject, "...quite a large number of references are received from Members of Parliament and MLAs, making recommendations or intervening about local transfers and promotions. . . . However, in order that this exercise could be successful and effective, it may be necessary for the Prime Minister or for the Minister of Parliamentary Affairs to make a suitable request to the M.Ps. that they may refrain from taking up individual cases of transfer, promotion, etc." (p. 67).²¹

Gandhi wanted to maintain the separation between the party and administration set up by previous INC governments. In a meeting with cabinet secretaries, the "Prime Minister also referred to the need for a commitment to national interest. It does not mean commitment to a person or a party but in the system in which we work it does mean commitment to the national objectives and programmes of the Government in power at the time which have to be carried out with enthusiasm."²² She was concerned that political interference in the bureaucracy was affecting the productivity and ability of civil servants to do their jobs. In 1975, Gandhi sent a letter to her Cabinet Ministers (along with all Chief and State Ministers) stating, "The civil service consists of people whom we have recruited, trained and posted to different offices. If they do not deliver the goods then it is for us to

²¹Letter to Indira Gandhi, No.123-PMO/75, Prime Minister's Office Files, National Archives of India, New Delhi, India. p. 67

²²Notes from Prime Minister's Meeting with Secretaries, Sept.5, 1981, Prime Minister's Office Files, National Archives of India, New Delhi, India. pp. 141-142.

examine what goes wrong and to take corrective measures.” She continues, “It is no less important for us to adopt measures which will build up the morale of the services. They should feel that they will have full political protection if they act with speed and honesty, even if in the process they make some mistakes.”²³

Gandhi’s appeal for eliminating political interference in day-to-day administration provided much-needed support for her Cabinet Ministers, who were inundated with demands from party officials. As Veerandra Patil, the Minister of Petroleum and Chemicals, put it, “I have been receiving numerous representations from MPs, MLAs, and other VIPs with requests to interfere with postings and transfers. . . I have tried to avoid any interference in administrative matters. Your timely instructions have strengthened my hands in this regard.”²⁴ Ministers across the central government agreed with Indira Gandhi’s missive to limit attempts at political interference at all levels of the state. Minister for Irrigation, Kedar Panday, in a reply to Gandhi, wrote “. . . unnecessary interference in routine administrative matters by politicians and public men should be resisted. I am grateful to you for issuing such an exemplary directive which would strengthen our hands and save us from a lot of embarrassment.”²⁵

Government officials saw party members’ attempts to direct the state at lower levels as a hindrance to bureaucratic efficiency. The party leadership in the central government tried to protect civil servants from reprisals by party members for not doing as they were told, even when those demands violated the civil service rules of conduct or the rule of law. As the Minister of Communications put it, “The resultant atmosphere is one of a feeling of freedom for the officers

²³No.123-PMO/75, April 25, 1975, Prime Minister’s Office Files, National Archives of India, New Delhi, India. p.75-76.

²⁴No.123-PMO/75, April 25, 1975, Prime Minister’s Office Files, National Archives of India, New Delhi, India. p. 26

²⁵No.123-PMO/75, April 25, 1975, Prime Minister’s Office Files, National Archives of India, New Delhi, India. p. 28.

without fear of interference, and also an increasing consciousness for self-restraint (p. 25).”²⁶ Gandhi met with the Secretaries of the Ministries at the national level to stress to civil servants the importance of disregarding or pushing back on any political pressure exerted on them.²⁷ Gandhi was able to limit this behavior in the central government through appeals to ministers that served directly under her, but she could not eliminate it.²⁸ She was ineffective at constraining the actions of party members without a bureaucratic party organization that effectively regulated the behavior of its members. This was especially evident at the state level as Gandhi did not maintain or build up INC(I) state parties.

5.3 Erosion of Bureaucratic Capacity Under Competition and Low Organizational Capacity

On the subnational level, INC dominance in the first period was followed by competition in the second. INC internal party correspondence, declassified government documents, and memoirs show that as elections got more competitive, politicians started to extract resources from the state to retain their office. State governing parties also transitioned from high to low organizational capacity as the INC was replaced by the INC(I), which intensified the politicization of the bureaucracy at the state level.

INC election losses in Odisha in 1967, West Bengal and Punjab in 1969, and Uttar Pradesh in 1976 shifted Congress politicians’ attentions from intra-party rivals in organizational elections to inter-party competitors in state elections. This recalibration is evidenced by allegations of election rigging emerging in the late 1960s, replacing accusations of fraudulent membership rolls in INC

²⁶No.123-PMO/75, April 25, 1975, Prime Minister’s Office Files, National Archives of India, New Delhi, India.

²⁷Notes from Prime Minister’s meeting with Secretaries: Sept.5, 1981, Prime Minister’s Office Files, National Archives of India, New Delhi, India. p.145

²⁸Gandhi’s letter to the party president makes it clear that she had tried various avenues to address this issue and was unsuccessful in affecting a change in behavior(Indira Gandhi letter to Congress President, April 25, 1975, No.123-PMO/75, Prime Minister’s Office Files, National Archives of India, New Delhi, India. p.77).

organizational elections (Vaishnav 2017, 85-88). Morarji Desai, leader of the INC(O), asserted that “The unscrupulous and corrupt manner in which unbelievable amounts of funds were collected by the Ministers and office-bearers of the Ruling Party reflected itself in the expenditure incurred by the Ruling Party candidates on their elections. There was an unscrupulous use of Government machinery and authority on an unprecedented scale and the elections were rigged in several places.”²⁹

The erosion of organizational capacity in the INC compounded the problem as politicians came to rely primarily on individual resource networks. Previously, the state party leadership was chosen by registered members, and this leadership made nominations that the Central Election Committee reviewed before confirmation. Party members that wanted to hold party or legislative office at the state level had to build support among the membership, which led to the recruitment of new members and the mobilization of existing members. INC state party organizations were built up through these organizational elections, with the elected leadership setting party policies, directing cadres, and doling out patronage.

Factions within INC state parties battled for control in organizational elections, which also served as a mechanism through which they resolved their differences.³⁰ The Congress ticket gave politicians a position in the ruling government and with it the privileges of office. However, Congress members holding public office were ineligible to serve as officers in the party.³¹ This rule ensured that the Provincial Congress Committees (organizational branch) and the Congress Parliamentary Parties (legislative branch) remained separate and served as a check on the other. The legislative party members worked to maintain their support in the party to get the party nomination in the next

²⁹K. Santhanam, *The Record of Mrs. Indira Gandhi as Prime Minister*. Barathan Publications, Madras. 1973. p. 4.

³⁰State committees were tasked with creating closer coordination between the organization and legislative wings, eliminating factionalism or ‘groupism’ and limiting public criticism of fellow Congressman. [F.No. 1496, Installment II, All India Congress Committee Papers, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, India. pg. 5]

³¹F. No. 1496, Installment II, All India Congress Committee Papers, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi, India. p. 4]

election. While those who had failed to get the party nomination served in leadership positions in the party organization, building up support with state and national party leaders to get the party ticket in the next round of elections.

As the INC transformed from a bureaucratic party to a personalist one, the leadership lost the organizational capacity through which it previously disciplined members. Gandhi focused on maintaining the party's dominance through the INC's state legislative parties. She believed that the legislative branches were crucial for winning elections, whereas the organization was left to deteriorate. The state leadership was chosen by Gandhi and then approved by the state INC(I) parties. The top-down assertion of power undercut the competition within state party organizations and incentivized appeasing Gandhi and her inner circle over the party membership. Consequently, factions began to bypass the party organization and built extensive personal resource networks that were largely independent of the party. Groups and personages that were sidelined began to form regional parties or join newly created parties to contest against the INC(I) in state elections, taking their political networks with them.

Gandhi was aware of the resultant increase in political pressure being put to bear on bureaucrats in state administrations. In 1980, Gandhi wrote in a letter to all Chief Ministers and State Ministers: "I am told that many MLAs show undue interest in transfers. This means that Ministers spend considerable time in deciding the postings and transfers of officials. This is getting our Party a bad name and is affecting the efficient functioning of the administration. . . M.Ps., M.L.As. and MLCs must be firmly told to exercise self-restraint in this matter. Ministers on the other hand must withstand all such pressure from political and other public figures."³²

³²Indira Gandhi's Letter to all Chief Ministers, Cabinet Ministers, Ministers of State and Deputy Ministers, Aug. 19, 1980, No. 1407-PMO/80, Prime Minister's Office Files, National Archives of India, New Delhi, India. p.1-2.]

Chief Ministers shared Gandhi's concerns about the adverse effects of this political interference on civil servants. The Chief Minister of Himachal Pradesh wrote in response, "I fully share your concern in this regard. There can be no doubt that such interference can have a demoralizing effect on Government servants and adversely affect the efficiency of the Administration."³³ The Chief Minister of Orissa, J.B. Patnaik, "That frittering away of our energy on unimportant items like transfers and postings should stop, need hardly be emphasized."³⁴ The Chief Minister of Punjab, Darbara Singh, agreed, "As for transfers, I have asked my Cabinet colleagues to firmly resist pressures from M.L.A.s' and politicians. We are also taking steps to ensure that routine transfers are left to the discretion of the appropriate delegated authority in the departments so that Ministers are left free to attend to more important matters of policy formulation and implementation."³⁵ The Chief Minister of Bihar concurred that action must be taken "...to ensure that the time of the administration is not wasted on this and that the pressures that usually build up are eliminated."³⁶ Despite these assertions, Chief Ministers continued to use their office to build patronage networks to consolidate their power.

Indira Gandhi's appeals to Chief Ministers were largely ineffective as they went unheeded by party members. Unsuccessful at affecting a change in behavior, she reached out to the INC president for help at the suggestion that the party organization might be able to assist with this matter.³⁷ However, Gandhi's own failure to build up the party organization made it an untenable avenue through which to affect change.

³³Prime Minister's Secretariate S.No. 1, National Archives of India, New Delhi, India. p.38

³⁴Prime Minister's Secretariate S.No. 1, National Archives of India, New Delhi, India. p.55

³⁵D.O No. 18/108/80, GC(1)/13665, Prime Minister's Secretariate S.No. 31, Prime Minister's Office Files, National Archives of India, New Delhi, India.

³⁶Prime Minister's Secretariate S.No. 1, Prime Minister's Office Files, National Archives of India, New Delhi, India. p.128.

³⁷Indira Gandhi letter to Congress President, April 25, 1975, No.123-PMO/75, Prime Minister's Office Files, National Archives of India, New Delhi, India. p.77.

6 Conclusion

This study finds that high levels of competition hurt bureaucratic capacity and that dominance, under certain circumstances, leads to improvements in state administration. These findings contradict the conventional wisdom among scholars that electoral competition encourages state-building and reforms that improve state capacity. Longitudinal data on India's national and subnational levels show that competition results in shorter time horizons for political actors. Under competition, politicians interfere in day-to-day administration to extract state rents and resources to contest elections, politicizing state institutions. This is demonstrated by the increase in transfers and decrease in tenure length for IAS officers. The increased frequency of transfers creates instability and uncertainty for civil servants, not only in their careers but also in their personal lives. Serving less time in postings leads to a decline in knowledge and expertise. This has serious consequences for long-term planning and progress in departments and ministries at the national and subnational levels.

In contrast, dominance leads to long time horizons and is more likely to incentivize governing parties to invest in the state. This is demonstrated by the decrease in transfers and increase in tenure length for IAS officers under dominance. The organizational capacity of the governing party plays a mediating role, determining whether party members implement the party leadership's preferred administrative policies. Scholars of India often disparage INC dominance in the first few decades of the country's existence, viewing it as a barrier to a more representative government. Studies of democracy see high levels of party competition and turnover in office as the golden standard to aspire to. Yet, INC dominance served to stabilize India at a crucial time in its history, helping it weather through the crises of partition and incorporation of princely states in the union

while preserving its democracy. The Muslim League in neighboring Pakistan could not do the same when faced with similar challenges due to party fractionalization and the resulting rise in competition. Unthreatened by external challengers, Congress officeholders chose to work through the state to fulfill their developmental agenda. This allowed India to develop its national state institutions for decades without politicization, while Pakistan and Bangladesh have encountered it since independence.

India is heading into another period of party dominance at the national and subnational levels under the BJP (Chhibber and Verma 2019). Early indications are that this is leading to a decline in the transfer rate and an increase in tenure length for IAS officers in states where the BJP is dominant and on the national level. This might explain why the BJP has been effective at governance despite its divisive actions when in government. It also indicates that their successes in government might not be driven by ideology but by organizational mechanisms, helping the BJP deliver on promises of competent governance that continue to pay off at the polls.

The larger implication of this study for democracies in the developing world is the possible trade-off between greater accountability and responsiveness today for better state capacity and effectiveness tomorrow. Electoral competition leads politicians to prioritize the short-term acquisition of voters over the state's long-term needs. The excessive political interference in bureaucratic structures to provide voters goods and services adversely affects institutional capacity. Institution building is a more prolonged and laborious process than improving responsiveness and accountability, necessitating political actors who are secure in their positions and benefit from undertaking the task. This security also makes these actors less disposed to respond to voter demands.

2 Embedded in the State: Explaining Party Weakness in the Middle East and North Africa

1 Introduction

Why do parties remain weak in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region? I argue that the lack of party strength in the MENA region is due to governing parties gaining access to state resources early in their founding. Political parties in the Middle East were organizationally weak after independence, mainly sustaining themselves through exclusive access to state resources. This might seem like an outsized advantage for governing parties, but, in fact, it resulted in the opposite. Opposition parties are stronger than regime parties in the region because they draw their resources from society, which is more sustainable in the long run as it helps them survive in and out of office. Early access to state resources by governing parties resulted, counterintuitively, in a lack of organizational strength in governing parties and the opposite in opposition parties in the region.

I argue that a governing party's organizational capacity prior to taking office determines its resilience in and out of office. Parties that are organizationally strong before becoming part of the government can better maintain a party organization independent from the state. Under these circumstances, governing parties utilize state resources to build or maintain the party but are less likely to become dependent on the state to function. Conversely, newly formed parties, or those created by government officials when in office, are more likely to rely on state resources, making it difficult for them to function when they no longer have access to state resources during regime transitions. This argument is tested through a medium-N analysis of governing parties in the

MENA region to determine the impact of early and late access to state resources on party organizations' dependence on the state and their ability to survive transitions.

Political party development has lagged and even decreased in the MENA region compared to other regions of the world. Party-building in the region has primarily been undertaken by conservative parties that serve as oppositions to regime parties, resulting in imbalanced party systems with strong organizations existing primarily on one side of the political spectrum. This has negative consequences for effective governance in authoritarian and hybrid regimes in the region and has led to fraught regime transitions during the Arab Spring. Political parties have historically played a crucial role in regime transitions and democratic stability in Western Europe and Latin America by constraining hardliners and guaranteeing old regime elites continued access to power. Therefore, the lack of party strength across the political spectrum and the reasons behind them are critical to study to better explain patterns of democratization and authoritarian durability in the MENA region.

The paper proceeds in five parts. The next section applies theories on the relationship between the state and political parties to the Middle East and demonstrates how the region can provide valuable insights for the party literature. The third and fourth sections test the impact of early and late access to state resources on party organizations' level of dependence on the state and their ability to survive transitions through case studies of political parties in the MENA region. The fifth section concludes with a discussion of the consequences of these patterns for regime transitions.

2 Party Institutionalization

Schmitter argues that ‘parties are not what they once were’ since they are no longer incentivized to build their organizations as they did in previous eras (Schmitter 2001). Scholars attribute this to the advent of mass media, which has allowed candidates to reach voters directly through television and radio instead of local party branches and organizations that inform and mobilize voters. Yet, scholars concur that party building and institutionalization continue to be essential for legislating, party branding, voter information, partisanship, and other substantive elements of democratic politics (Mainwaring 2016). The presence or strength of political parties might not cause a democratic transition and even hinder it when a strong governing party exists, but their presence helps to stabilize the process once it is initiated. Party institutionalization has been identified as critical during regime change since political parties are often key players in negotiations during transition periods. In Sub-Saharan Africa, democratization was more successful in institutionalized, as opposed to personalist, authoritarian regimes (Bratton and Van de Walle 1994). Recent studies have found that party institutionalization is also critical in authoritarian regimes (Hicken and Kuhonta 2011, Bizarro et al 2018). Party strength has led to authoritarian persistence, while party weakness has led to liberalization (Way 2015).

Equivalence in party strength across the political spectrum is also critical for democratic transitions. Strong opposition parties present a cohesive and mobilized front for regime change, bringing sustained pressure on interim governments to follow the rule of law, control extremists on their side, demand elections, and stabilize party systems in founding elections. Regime parties are also important in restraining the military, negotiating concession or amnesty deals to allow for smoother transitions, and pacifying the old political elite by continuing to represent and protect

their interests in a new system. While democracy advocates might hold that it is better to start anew with parties not associated with the previous authoritarian regime, scholars have no such consensus on the subject. This is evidenced by the important role resilient Conservative parties played in the transition and consolidation of democracy in Western Europe (Ziblatt 2017). Similarly, Communist parties' ability to reinvent themselves led to stable transitions in Eastern Europe (Grzymala-Busse 2006). In Latin America and Europe, cohesive parties on the right were able to constrain militaries during transitions (O'Donnell and Schmitter 2013, Linz and Stephan 1996).

However, regime parties in the MENA region have failed to play a similar role during transitions by limiting the power of the military, negotiating compromises, and assuring the old guard that they will retain some power in the new system. More attention needs to be paid to why regime parties collapsed in the region during crises and their consequent impact, not only during the Arab Spring but also across other transition moments. One of the defining characteristics of regime parties in the Middle East has been their relationship with the state apparatus, which I will argue is the key to explaining their weakness.

2.1 The State and Political Parties

Studies on political parties have been slow to address the relationship between parties and state structures. Shefter was one of the first to highlight the important role state patronage plays in the build-up of party organizations. He argued that the Jacksonians in the United States used positions in the bureaucracy to reward cadres in the party, leading to the creation of more professional staff in political parties in the 19th century (Shefter 1993). This focus on parties relying on the state, instead of civil society organizations, to survive in older democracies brought renewed attention

to the intersection between party and state. Katz and Mair contended that a new type of party has emerged in the contemporary period, the cartel party, which is an evolution in party organizations in the face of new challenges. Parties have been absorbed into the state and transformed into semi-state agencies due to their access to state resources (Katz and Mair 1995). This is not a new phenomenon, as parties have historically utilized the state to remain in office, accessing state resources to engage in clientelism in older and newer democracies. Moreover, in hybrid and authoritarian regimes, incumbent parties' access to the state gives them an outsized advantage over their opponents and helps them retain control over the populace.

The party literature has largely discounted the consequences of the party-state relationship for party-building and party organizations. Governing parties that do not anticipate losing office are unincentivized to build up their organizational structure. However, a party that does not build up its organization and stays reliant on state resources cannot maintain its strength out of office. While most parties in democracies can sustain themselves without the state, this is not true of other regime types. In authoritarian and hybrid contexts, parties utilize the state apparatus to hold onto power. A party's organizational capacity, independent from the state, reflects its true organizational strength. This distinction becomes critical during democratic transitions when state-based regime parties are more likely to collapse when forced out of office, leading to greater instability and uncertainty in an already fraught process. In the first wave of democratization in Western Europe and the US, parties across the political spectrum had equivalent access to state resources before the advent of universal suffrage, which resulted in stable party systems after democratic transitions; this has not been the case in subsequent waves of democratization.


I argue that *when* parties become part of the government is determinative of their future organizational strength. Parties that are organizationally strong before taking office use state

resources to further empower their cadres and maintain their support among their constituencies. Parties that were weak before taking office or were formed by ruling elites remain so since they rely on state patronage to maintain their popularity among the electorate. These parties depend on the institutional strength of the state to suppress their opposition. This logic is in line with work on the importance of historical timing in institution building (Pierson 2011). It is also similar to arguments advanced by others on the effect of resources on institutions with countries that had prior institutional strength having the ability to avoid the resource curse while those with weaker institutions becoming more susceptible to the booms and busts of commodity markets (Smith 2007). I test this argument, that early access to state resources weakens a party's organizational strength in the long term, through a study of party formation and party building in the MENA region.

3 State-Based Regime Parties in the Middle East and North Africa

Political party development in the MENA region has been lower than in other regions of the world (*refer to Figure 1*) and favors one side of the political spectrum more than the other. There are two broad typologies of state-party relations in the Middle East. The first is in the Arab Republics, where parties in government use state resources while the opposition is cut off from them. The second is where the state is controlled by a monarchy or military, which seeks to rule through contingent patronage and shares state resources with political parties. I will show that the result is the same, when newly formed parties gain access to state resources they are less likely to build party organizations independent from the state. This has negative consequences for effective governance in authoritarian regimes and for democratization since governing parties cannot maintain their strength during periods of transition.

Figure 1



3.1 The Arab Republics

Table 1 below shows the various governing parties in the Arab Republics, the age of the party when it became part of a government, and whether the party has survived a regime transition. The medium-N analysis of governing parties in the MENA region shows that the patterns predicted by the argument largely hold, explaining the weakness of most regime parties in the MENA region and the relative strength of the opposition. The socialist and Arab nationalist parties in government in the postcolonial Middle East in the 1950s and 1960s were elite-led and largely failed to build themselves up organizationally before taking office. The impetus to build themselves up before becoming part of the government was absent as these political actors took office through military coups and built extensive top-down patronage networks to sustain themselves once in government.

Conversely, Islamist parties lacked access to state resources and were forced to take a bottom-up strategy involving grassroots mobilization. In North Africa, strong parties formed around anticolonial movements and fought for independence, these included the Neo-Destour in Tunisia and Istiqlal in Morocco. These nationalist parties could win mass support because of the anticolonial and nationalist nature of their founding.

During transitions, most regime parties, such as the NDP in Egypt and the Ba'th Party in Iraq, that were reputed to be strong could not function without the dictator and his patronage networks (Brownlee 2007, Blaydes 2008). They did not have the organizational cohesiveness to reinvent and rebrand the party in the transitional moment, leaving their Islamist oppositions as the most organized forces in these Arab countries. The exception to this rule were parties in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories that were organizationally strong before they took office and have sustained this strength while in and out of government. The next section details how a party's relationship with the state shapes its actions and determines its organizational capacity.

Table 1: Parties in the Arab Republics

Country	Governing Parties¹	Year of Formation	Year Part of Government	Survived Transition
Egypt	National Democratic Party	1962	1962	No
Syria	Arab Socialist Ba'th Party	1966	1966	No
Iraq	Arab Socialist Ba'th Party	1966	1968	No
Tunisia	Neo-Destour	1934	1956	Yes (party elites formed Nidaa Tounes)
Algeria	Fronte de Liberation Nationale (FLN)	1954	1962	N/A (but weakened during moments of crisis in 1991 and 2011)
Libya	--	--	--	--
Lebanon	Amal	1974	2005	Yes
	Hezbollah	1982	2005	Yes
	Lebanese Forces	1976	2005	Yes
	Future Movement	2007	2007	N/A
	Free Patriotic Movement	1994	2008	Yes
Palestine (<i>Palestinian National Authority formed in 1994</i>)	Fatah	1959	1994	Yes
	Hamas	1987	2007	Yes

¹ Some of the parties listed went through several name changes during efforts at rebranding by new rulers, but the organizations remain the same.

3.2 Weak Nationalist Socialist Parties in the Arab Republics

The decolonization of the Middle East, limited after WWI, swept across the region after WWII and brought with it the heyday of Arab nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s. The period saw the rise of Arab nationalist parties across the Levant that sought to unite the people of the region under a common Arab identity formed by a shared history and language. The Arab nationalist parties at the time were elite-led and socialist, advocating for a secular nationalism meant to appeal to the masses irrespective of religious affiliation and territorial origin. Pan-Arabism turned into an Arab nationalism based on the territorial unit of the state, instead of linguistic ties, as governments across the region focused on the national interests of their own state over regional pan-Arab grievances (Dawisha 2016). While these parties' nationalist message was widely popular, it was driven by opposition to continuing interference in the region by colonial powers and lacked the organizational structure and cadre to maintain itself in the longer term. Political parties turned to the state to empower themselves instead of cultivating grass root linkages.

The end of WWII led to the creation of the Arab republics of Egypt, Iraq, and Syria. In 1958 and 1963, the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party gained power in Iraq and Syria, and the Arab Socialist Union was created in 1962 under Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt (the center offshoot of the Arab Socialist Union went on to become the National Democratic Party or NDP under Anwar Sadat). These parties gained most of their influence through leaders that took power through coups and used state structures to maintain their rule. The MENA region saw a build-up of the state apparatus with increased state spending in health and education and a rise in state sector employment. These jobs in the bureaucracy provided crucial sources of patronage for ruling parties and the means to buy support from society, despite their declared ideological commitments to use the state to provide for the population. Egypt's government sector grew by 26% from 1960 to

1970, with 650,000 public officials added between 1951-2 and 1965-6, and Syria's by 14.4%, with civil servants increasing from 34,000 in 1960 to around 170,000 in 1975. In oil-rich Iraq, the Ba'th party used state oil revenues to create patronage networks, with the government sector growing by 15.8% from 1960-1970 and employees increasing from 12,000 to 80,000 between 1956 and 1960. The armies in each country also saw similar increases in size (Owen 2013, 24-25).

Facing no incentives to incorporate civil society into these newly formed, state-empowered parties, the governments instead established corporatist ties. The Egyptian, Syrian, and Iraqi governments implemented policies to redistribute land, which was relatively successful in Egypt and less so in Syria and Iraq. However, this was not to carry out a socialist agenda as more land remained in government hands as an outcome of these policies than redistributed to peasants. Instead, these actions were effective at disempowering landowners. Owen claims that Egyptian land reforms passed in 1961 were more of a 'limited attack on landlord power (37).' The Syrian Ba'th party made some efforts to recruit party cadres in rural areas compared with a brief attempt at this strategy in the 1960s in Egypt and nonexistent efforts to incorporate rural areas in Iraq. The agricultural policy was enforced from the top down. This strategy was also implemented in urban areas. Instead of using labor as an important linkage to civil society, the socialist regime parties turned them into corporatist structures that operated in a more top-down than bottom-up manner. Labor was a partner of convenience but never an essential foundation of these parties; when they became too disruptive, they were brutally repressed (Owen 2013, 28-37).

Cuts in state spending in the 1980s meant a decrease in patronage and an increased personalization of these state-based parties, and a turn to patrimonialism. Fiscal cuts in the state meant less patronage for parties and a resultant shrinking of the reach of these parties. In response, the leaders formed patrimonial ties to maintain their rule, turning them into personalist parties that

ensured a subsection of elites had a material interest in supporting the ruling regime. The presence of state resources dictated party strategies, with parties dependent on the state and unable to survive without state resources. It was a measure of how weak and dependent these regime parties were on the state that rulers could personalize parties and establish patrimonial ties through it without any resistance from those in the parties. In Egypt, with the succession of Sadat, a junior officer in the military, the military became a junior partner in the regime, and the NDP was used to create a new societal base of power for the less charismatic and relatively unknown new leader. During Mubarak's era, elections were used to identify powerful elites who were given a place in the party. The NDP was used for distributing rent instead of providing an avenue for elite bargaining and compromise (Blaydes 2010). Power was concentrated not in the hands of party apparatchiks but in Mubarak's own family, with party leadership appointed from above instead of selected from below by rank and file members (Brownlee 2007). Mubarak was publicly grooming his son, Gamal, to succeed him before the uprising in Egypt despite public dissatisfaction with this hereditary succession in the military and party.

In Syria, multiple coups displayed the incapability of the Ba'th party to resolve internal conflicts and provide stability in the country. Hafiz al-Assad took power and concentrated power under his own personhood instead of the party, with the establishment of a cult of personality to legitimize his rule (Wedeen 2015). The army, security apparatus, party, corporatist actors, and the public sector ensured the stability of his rule (Abboud 2018, 16-52). Bashir al-Assad implemented neo-liberal reforms that cut state spending and privatized industries as the World Bank mandated. However, instead of a more equitable distribution, Assad handed lucrative state licenses and companies to his family and friends, ushering in an era of crony capitalism in the country (Haddad 2011).

In Iraq, the Ba'th party maintained its formal organizational structure, but in practice, Saddam Hussein determined who occupied the upper echelon of the party and government structure and decided party policies. Ba'th party members continued to be entrenched in the state apparatus; however, this was a top-down instead of a bottom-up phenomenon as people had to gain membership in the party to be eligible for high-ranking positions in the administrative state.² Allegiance to the ruling regime was necessary, not a commitment to the Ba'thist ideology and principles (Blaydes 2018, 42). This ensured that the Ba'th party maintained control throughout the administrative state. However, since the party was a tool for Hussein, this sanctioned his rule rather than setting up a powerful party that could function independently of the state. To ensure his control, Hussein placed individuals who had regional and tribal ties to him in positions of power across the country. People that hailed from Tikrit, his town of origin, or in neighboring provincial towns were given important positions in the party, owing their loyalty and continuing success to him directly instead of the party (Baram 2003, 99). In effect, Hussein turned the party into a vehicle through which he maintained his personal power, setting up his sons to succeed him.

The plots below show the decrease in party institutionalization³, as measured by the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge 2020), in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria in the 1940s and 1950s as the NDP and Ba'th parties took power. Regime parties survived by relying on state resources, using the party mainly for patronage distribution. The subsequent uptick of party institutionalization in Egypt in the 1980s and Iraq in the 2000s can be explained by the rise of Islamist parties, who largely maintained their strength (this is discussed further in the next section). While opposition parties

² Historical Note, Collection Guide, Hizb al-Ba'th al-'Arabī al-Ishtirākī records, Hoover Institution Archives. <http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/c84j0cg3/admin/#ref11>.

³ The party institutionalization variable in the Varieties of Democracy Dataset measures the level of institutionalization of all political parties in a country with a focus on larger parties. Institutionalization refers to the amount and depth of organization, civil society links, presence of party activists and supporters, distinguishable ideologies and party platforms, and party voting in the legislature.

relied primarily on local populations to build and sustain themselves, regime parties chose instead to build up security forces to monitor and police the population. Party build-up was uneven across the political spectrum, with Islamist parties in the opposition having greater organizational strength than governing parties. In Syria, the regime eliminates the Islamists, so the party institutionalization measure remains low for the country.




Figure 2: Party Institutionalization in the Arab Republics

The NDP in Egypt and Ba'th Party in Iraq collapsed when the parties left the government, and the patronage-based loyalty to the Ba'th Party in Syria became evident with the scale and diversity of society represented in the initial protests in 2011. Instead of building civil society linkages, these governments built up the state's coercive apparatus to maintain their rule (Bellin 2004). In the case of Egypt, the state turned on the NDP, and in the case of Iraq, the US removed the cadre of the Ba'th party from the state. Without state sponsorship of the Ba'th party, the remnants of the party were unable to reinvent themselves and, over time, came to bolster the cadre of the newly formed ISIS. In Syria, the party successfully used state resources and capacity to

maintain its rule after protests, but this was more a function of conflict dynamics than the strength of the Ba'th party.

3.3 The Islamist Opposition

The party literature cites the importance of civil society networks in helping parties create a strong local presence and partisans. Samuels and Zucco emphasize the role civil society organizations can play in giving legitimacy and mobilization capability to local party branches and offices (Samuels and Zucco 2014). However, civil society organizations themselves can also spawn effective party structures by utilizing their existing social ties in new ways. Civil society organizations have bolstered the political power of Islamists (Abdo 2002, Brooke 2015). The MENA region showcases that political parties that emerge from social organizations and movements can use these resources in moments of crisis. Islamists' societal linkages and organizations are the source of their organizational strength; the diversity of organizations under their purview has allowed Islamist parties to adapt and evolve under difficult conditions.⁴ During regime transitions, Islamist parties are able to outlast state-based regime parties because they rely on society for material and human resources. This narrative is illustrated in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, where the strongest parties in the countries emerged in the opposition in the 1980s and 1990s.

⁴ Claims that the power of Islamists in the MENA region stems from their powerful religious message that resonates with the population overlook the fact that no one has sole ownership over religion. There are multiple Islamic actors on the political stage in these countries. This has been evident in elections held in the region after regime transitions with the number of parties and individuals that proclaimed to be inspired by religion and the variation in their religious messaging and branding. A prominent example is Egypt, where the Muslim Brotherhood was not the only Islamist actor participating in elections and faced significant opposition from Salafists, who were further right on the political spectrum than the Islamist party. What differentiated the Muslim Brotherhood from other actors was not their religious orientation but rather their organizational strength that allowed them to maintain sustained pressure on the Mubarak regime to hold elections through protests. They were also able to quickly mobilize their cadres to run for office right after the transition.

In the 1980s, when the Egyptian government withdrew the array of social services it provided to its citizens due to financial limitations, the Muslim Brotherhood filled the void left behind. Believing in the all-encompassing function of Islam in society, the Muslim Brotherhood build a parallel society in Egypt consisting of voluntary associations, hospitals, schools, and charity organizations based on Islamic values and ideals. Through this grass roots organization, the Muslim Brotherhood created a sympathetic and supportive public in Egypt for Islamists and embedded itself in society (Berman 2003, 263). People who were a part of and came out of the Muslim Brotherhood Islamism milieu were more politically active and ready to serve the cause of the Islamists. These activists have formed the core of the organization and were vital in gaining as much political ground as the regime allowed at the time (Wickham 2002, 164). The party itself had an extensive field organization that started with a family or cell structure that was firmly embedded in society and extended up to the branch, district, and ultimately governate level in a clear hierarchy (Tadros 2012, 7-8).

The Muslim Brotherhood was the most organized opposition against the Mubarak regime before the Arab Spring and was part of the mass protests and high-level negotiations during the transition. As the 2011 and 2012 elections proved, the Muslim Brotherhood was unmatched in organizational capacity in Egypt (Masoud 2014). The Muslim Brotherhood was able to win elections because of the social organizational structure it had set up in Egypt over decades. When the Brotherhood formed the Freedom and Justice Party, they could use their extensive organizational networks to mobilize their constituency and appeal to the larger Egyptian population. The former NDP leadership and the leftists, by comparison, did not have either the organizational capacity or the broad social networks to compete successfully with the Muslim Brotherhood. This created a tilted party system with the conservative right dominating politics,

leading the left to ally with the military to overturn the disadvantageous position they found themselves in.

In Iraq, the strongest parties in the country also formed in opposition to the regime during the 1980s and 1990s. The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), the Islamic Dawa Party, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) were all parties that, from their inception, faced repression under Ba'th Party rule. The parties were forced to go underground with their leaders exiled but, with the U.S.-backed regime change, emerged as the strongest contenders in elections in the post-Saddam Hussein era. These parties expanded their societal presence in the newly democratic Iraq, negotiating amongst themselves to form stable governing coalitions and creating favorable conditions for themselves. Shia parties allied together to run the national government, while Kurdish parties effectively negotiated autonomous zones where they retained significant governing power. The only losers in the new arrangement were the Sunnis, who did not have a recreated Ba'th party representing their interests in negotiations and in parliament. As in Egypt, this resulted in a tilted party system, leading to former Ba'thist members joining ISIS in an attempt to overturn the disadvantageous position they found themselves in.

In Syria, the Muslim Brotherhood was, organizationally, the strongest party in the country until the regime brutally cracked down, ending its presence in the country in the 1982 massacre in Hama (Abboud 2018, 16-52). When protests broke out in 2011, there was no organized opposition party to back protestors and negotiate with the regime as there was in Egypt. This led to a weaker, divided societal movement that could not stand against Bashir Al-Assad's military onslaught. Assad was effective in buying off key elites in the regime and the Alawite community, successfully utilizing state resources to remain in power. The protests revealed the weakness of the Ba'th party

with its failure to incorporate wide swaths of the population into its membership but the party nonetheless survived because its fragmented opposition was unable to remove it from office.

3.4 Conflict and Party-Building

When parties developed organizational capacity before entering government, party strength was unaffected by the parties' proximity and access to the state. In the Levant, the strongest parties in government have been in Lebanon and Palestine, two countries that have witnessed high levels of internal conflict. Theories on party building can provide insight into this uneven level of party development. Levitsky et al assert that adversity and conflict lead parties to form strong institutions that can better weather future crises. They argue that intense or extraordinary conflicts, such as civil wars, repression, and social revolutions, lead to high levels of polarization. This creates strong partisan attachments, internal cohesion, and grassroots mobilization, effectively building strong party organizations (Levitsky et al 2016). Lebanon and Palestine went through long periods of conflict that helped create strong parties that have maintained their organizational strength. These parties were first formed as non-state armed groups during the Lebanese civil war and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Their organizational strength was later used to build up effective political wings as they chose to participate in elections and serve in government positions, while still maintaining their armed wings and civil society organizations. Thus, mobilization during conflict generated investments in building societal organizations, which were repurposed after the conflict into stable and durable parties.

The civil war in Lebanon ended in 1989 with the Taif Accords, which were enforced by a large presence of Syrian troops in the country. In the aftermath, the most institutionalized parties that emerged were those that participated in the civil war. Hezbollah and Amal were armed groups

that vied for support within the Lebanese Shia community during the civil war and became the strongest parties representing that constituency in the new political system (Norton 1987).⁵ Both Amal and Hezbollah have maintained their organizational strength, irrespective of their actual number of seats in the parliament, because of their extensive social presence that they translate effectively into political support (Early 2006, Harb 2007).⁶ The Kataeb Party, Lebanese Forces, and the Free Patriotic Movement are primarily Christian parties that participated in the civil war and were suppressed by Syrian forces in post-civil war Lebanon. After the Cedar Revolution in 2005, all three parties emerged stronger than ever in parliamentary elections. They were able to maintain the organizational strength they built during the civil war for more than 15 years due to their strong material ties to the Maronite Christian community. In contrast, the Future Movement, which was founded in 2005, has remained weak even though it is the primary representative of the Sunni community in Lebanese politics. The party was founded and led by the Hariri family with its vast financial resources. However, it has been unable to maintain its cohesiveness despite the popularity of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. The party did not build up an organizational structure before it took office in 2005 and has had no impetus to do so since then. Lebanon's

⁵ Amal gained widespread support in the 1970s after Operation Litani, the Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon in 1978. By the late 1980s, Amal had become corrupt and inept. Hezbollah was formed as an umbrella movement that incorporated Amal defectors and other Islamic organizations participating in the resistance against Israeli occupation. As Amal and Hezbollah vied for the support of the Lebanese Shia community and operated in the same arena, tensions grew and resulted in clashes between the two organizations' militias for control of the Shia areas of Lebanon. In the fall of 1988, Hezbollah won control of the southern suburbs of Beirut, and in 1989 Hezbollah succeeded in diminishing Amal's position in the South.

⁶ In the early years of its existence, the organization formed a complete social welfare system by building schools, hospitals, and charitable relief systems. Hezbollah provided a higher quality of social services to the Lebanese Shias during the Lebanese civil war than the Lebanese state had ever provided for them. After the civil war, with the help of Iranian funds, Hezbollah improved its education and healthcare programs to the extent that they are some of the best in the country. Hezbollah's services outmatch the Lebanese national government's in the poorest regions of Southern Lebanon, an area that is predominately Shia. Hezbollah has created an efficient and effective network of NGOs and social welfare institutions

periodic elections and coalitional governments have also ensured that no one party is able to dominate the state and rely on state resources to maintain itself.

Similarly, Fatah and Hamas were forged in conflict and retained their organizational strength after taking office. Fatah was formed in 1959 and played a major role in the initial struggle for Palestine. The party became part of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1967 and then the Palestinian National Authority in 1994. Fatah has maintained its popularity in the West Bank despite numerous allegations of corruption and the emergence of a powerful rival, Hamas. Hamas was created as a semi-autonomous resistance wing of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood in 1987 and soon became more popular and visible than its other branches.⁷ Hamas' social-political sector predated its armed wing and provided much-needed social services like healthcare and education to Palestinians (Gunning 2004). Hamas also formed outside the Palestinian governing structure and, through elections, won control of Gaza in 2007. Despite dissatisfaction among Palestinians with their governments, Fatah and Hamas have continued to hold on to the West Bank and Gaza, not just due to their control of the Palestinian state, but because of their continued organizational strength on the ground.

The Lebanese and Palestinian state structures are relatively weak but governing parties have maintained their strength irrespective of this and are often considered to be more powerful than the state structures through which they govern. The plots below show high levels of party institutionalization in Gaza as well as in the West Bank after the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1994. A similar pattern emerged in Lebanon as parties grew in strength after independence, the civil war, and the Syrian withdrawal from the country in 2005. The plots show

⁷ As such, the political wing of Hamas has since its inception remained at the center of the organization and is not a subsidiary and “front” for its military operation.

that parties in Palestine and Lebanon maintained their strength during crises and moments of transition.



Figure 3: Party Institutionalization in Post-Conflict Countries

3.5 The Maghreb: Variation in Independence Parties

The variation in party building and strength in the Maghreb can also be explained by political parties' proximity to the state. North Africa had a different experience with colonization than the Levant since Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya were all colonized for a longer period and had closer ties with the metropolis. In these countries, parties that were involved in the struggle for independence had decades to strengthen before they were effective in their demands for independence and came to form their own governments, while others were more recent constructions.

The regime and opposition parties in Tunisia were organizationally strong, ensuring that when regime transition took place, it was supported by a stable party system and strong parties on the right and left of the political spectrum. Neo-Destour was organizationally strong before forming a government and continued to be so while in office. The Destour (*Constitution*) party

was formed in 1920 and, as suggested by its name, fought to establish a constitution in the country that set up a representative government. The Destour's Tunis-based old elite was quickly challenged by a rising class of French-educated youth from the provinces. These radicals, with their demands for direct confrontation with the French, led by Habib Bourguiba, split from, and came to replace the Destour party under the banner of the Neo-Destour in 1934. The Neo-Destour actively sought to and successfully expanded their base to include the urban working class and the tribes in the rural interior. During this time, they transitioned from an elite-led organization to a more mass-based, representative one, ultimately becoming synonymous with the independence movement. The party created a cell structure to combat threats to the party leadership by the colonial government as the party became the voice of the anti-colonial movement in Tunisia (Willis 2012, 24-25). The Neo-Destour that took control of the government after independence under Bourguiba already had a strong organization with a pyramid configuration and local party cells. Bourguiba added extensive structures to the party that mirrored local and regional administration to ensure party control of the state at all levels (Willis 2012, 64-65).

Hizb al-Nahda was founded as The Movement of Islamic Tendency (MTI) in 1981. During the tenure of both Bourguiba and Ben Ali, the Nahda party was brutally repressed with its members imprisoned, tortured, and killed, while most of its leadership went into exile (Alexander 1997). Yet, Nahda was the most organized political opposition against the Ben Ali regime before the Arab Spring and its individuals were part of the mass protests in 2010-2011. During the second round of protests in Tunisia, from January 18 to March 4, the Nahda was also part of the coalition of Islamists, trade unions, leftists, and human rights groups that fought to ensure that the leftovers from the Ben Ali regime did not gain control of the transition. During the electoral campaigning of 2011, new political parties formed, and old ones sought to reestablish their organizational

structures in Tunisia. Nahda was able to win a big electoral victory because it already had a better institutional structure in Tunisia than other newly formed or reinstated parties. Nahda won the Constituent Assembly elections by a landslide and dominated the legislature, capturing around 41% of the vote and 89 of the 217 seats. However, its initial domination raised concerns about a lack of representation of all voices in the government. The emergence of a newly reinvented Neo-Destour in the form of Nidaa Tounes in 2012 to contend against the Nahda ameliorated some of these fears.

In Algeria, the organizational weakness of the *Fronte de Liberation Nationale* (FLN) resulted in its members using the state to resolve internal disagreements and stripping it of its power. A relatively unknown organization named the FLN launched an insurrection against French rule in 1954. Throughout its 8 year struggle against the French, FLN deliberately maintained a collective leadership instead of one central head of the organization (Willis 2012, 31). During that time, the FLN was able to gain widespread support among the population (Willis 2012, 32). When France granted Algeria independence in 1962, different factions of the FLN clashed over which branch of the organization would rule, with the victorious faction forming a politburo that appointed the National Assembly, which in turn elected the head of the politburo, Ben Bella, as the president of Algeria (Willis 2012, 47-48). When Ben Bella tried to personalize power, he was replaced by the Council of the Revolution led by Boumedienne. Boumedienne likewise concentrated power in his personage. However, instead of alienating key actors as Ben Bella did, he chose to rely on the military to uphold his rule while sidelining what was left of the FLN after its post-independence infighting (Willis 2012, 66-67). Boumedienne's successor, Chadli, could not wield the patronage distribution channel FLN had become and gain the favor of the various clans in the party, instead choosing to hold elections to cultivate popular support for himself. In

the 1990 and 1991 elections, members of the original FLN leadership formed parties to compete against the FLN.

Front Islamique du Salut (FIS), a newly formed Islamist party, emerged as the strongest opposition to the existing political system. In response to the FIS's success, the military establishment canceled the second round of elections with the other parties, including the FLN, protesting the palace coup (Willis 2012, 136 - 138). The military leadership created a new party, the Rassemblement National Democratique (RND), in 1997 to govern and eventually bought the FLN back into the fold as well (Willis 2012, 139). State patronage, through the military, helped maintain both parties until large-scale protests (labeled the Hirak Movement) in 2019 led to the resignation of President Bouteflika and calls for an overhaul of the political leadership. Once again, proving that parties reliant on state patronage fare poorly in moments of crisis and transition (the use of state patronage by militaries will be further addressed in the fourth section).

When protests broke out in Libya in the wake of the Arab Spring in 2011, there were no organized political groups to mobilize and carry out a negotiated transition, instead various familial and tribal groups clashed over state rents and power. Libya gained independence from Italy in 1951 with the monarchy ruling until 1969. The process of de-politicization and selective patronage based on familial, tribal, and provincial ties implemented by the king prevented the emergence of distinct groups that mobilized along socioeconomic or national lines (Vandewalle 2012, 72-73). A military coup by junior officers in 1969 replaced the monarchy with a Revolutionary Command Council led by Mu'ammār al-Qadhafi (Vandewalle 2012, 78-79). Qadhafi's regime proceeded to dismantle parts of the state, believing a stateless society to be a preferable system. (Vandewalle 2012, 99-100) This was possible due to oil rents that funded various patrimonial patronage

networks which absolved the regime of creating a unified, strong national identity through state institutions (Vandewalle 2012, 108).

The figures below demonstrate that parties in Tunisia have largely maintained their strength since independence, with an upshot in party institutionalization after the democratic transition in 2011. Algeria shows a lack of party strength until the ramp-up to elections in the 90s and stability after the military-led government consolidates power (with a decrease as the Hirak Movement gains steam in 2019). Libya displays a complete lack of party strength until a rapid climb and fall with the collapse of the Qadhafi regime.




Figure 4: Party Institutionalization in North Africa

4 State Patronage of Parties: The Monarchies and Iran

The monarchies in the MENA region put a new spin on state sponsorship of parties if they allowed parties at all. The various kingdoms sought to control political parties through selective access to state resources, attempting to consciously disempower parties by setting them up against each other while removing themselves as the opposition. In Morocco, the traditional and conservative

elites of Fes banded together with the more European-educated and inspired elites of Rabat to form the Kutla al-Amal al-Watani (National Action Bloc) in the early 1930s. This organization refashioned itself into the Istiqlal (Independence) party in 1944, whose largely elite members worked to mobilize different segments of society to broaden their base of support. Their activism in towns and cities in the French zone of the protectorate gained them significant support among urban workers in the part of Morocco that came to dominate national politics (Willis 2012, 25-26).

However, unlike other North African countries, Istiqlal was accompanied by the Moroccan monarchy in its struggle for independence. Consequently, both vied for a superior position in the post-independence set-up, with the monarchy emerging as the victor because of its historical legitimacy, role in the anti-colonial movement, and greater cohesiveness (Willis 2012, 41-42). Subsequently, the monarchy, empowered through its control of the state apparatus, dealt strategically with any political opposition to its rule through divide-and-rule tactics, cooptation, and counter-balancing of parties. In recent years, the Party of Justice and Development (PJD) has emerged as an Islamist counter to the increasingly corrupt and ineffective Istiqlal (which continues to survive because of its social networks and organization). Yet, because of the continuing dependence of political parties on the state patronage provided by the monarchy, PJD has also become closely aligned with the monarchy (Benchamsi 2012).

A similar narrative emerged in Jordan, where the monarchy allowed the existence of political parties in the country in 1989 and since then has instituted electoral systems that intentionally weaken parties (Lust-Okar 2006). One of the strongest parties in the country, the Islamic Action Front (the political wing of the Muslim Brotherhood), has consistently been the target of electoral manipulation by the state. The monarchies in Kuwait and Bahrain have also chosen to weaken parties through cooptation and the institution of disadvantageous electoral

systems while portraying themselves above the political fray (Lust-Okar and Jamal 2002). In the face of this direct pressure, the parties that have survived have been those that have some semblance of an organizational structure and societal linkages.

The plots below show that party institutionalization is present in Morocco, Jordan, Kuwait, and Bahrain, which have allowed parties to exist and compete in elections. Yet, it is unstable as monarchies seek to actively weaken parties by selective state patronage and institute laws that separate parties from their electorates. Only parties that are already organizationally strong and have societal ties have survived, like the Istiqlal in Morocco and the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, but they remain largely ineffective.




Figure 5: Party Institutionalization in Monarchies

A similar pattern can be discerned in Iran, where the Islamists and the Tudeh party were able to organize a revolution to overcome the maneuverings of the Iranian monarchy. The Khomeini-led Islamists eliminated their primary rival, the communist Tudeh party while consolidating their power after the overthrow of the Shah. In Iran's case, the Islamists did not just utilize state resources for themselves but reconstructed the state itself, embedding themselves in it

and making the government synonymous with the state, much like the Arab monarchies did at independence. Since then, elections have involved contestation among elites over different visions of the future for the regime but no parties, with the chosen candidates representing factions in the regime that arise around popular figures during electoral periods. Since candidates must go through a screening process led by the Council of Guardians (and heavily influenced by the Supreme Leader), the incentives to build parties to contest in elections are nonexistent, let alone forming anti-regime parties.

4.1 Military-led Governments

The military-led governments of the MENA region have not embedded themselves as firmly in the state as the monarchies and the Iranian regime but have also provided state patronage to allied parties with similar effects. The Algerian military relied on the RND and later FIS to rule, giving them access to state resources. The weakening of the FIS during recent protests in Algeria highlights its dependence on the state to survive. While the Turkish military, after its initial sponsorship of the Republican People's Party, has refrained from state patronage of political parties. This has resulted in strong party institutionalization in Turkey.

Mustafa Kemal, or Atatürk, created the Republican People's Party (CHP) in Turkey a few years after taking power through a coup. He utilized state resources to build local branches that oversaw the state until 1945, when multi-party competition was allowed. The CHP lost the 1950 elections and was forced to build a party organization independent of the state afterward. The women and youth wings of the party were constructed during this time. The Democrat Party (DP), founded by expelled members of the CHP in 1945, took office in 1950 and was similarly elite-led

and organizationally weak, choosing to utilize state resources to quell dissent in the party and silence opposition parties until the party was forced out of office in 1961.

While the military attempted to control party behavior through coup d'états and new laws after 1945, they did not seek to do it through selective state patronage. Consequently, parties were incentivized to build and maintain ties to society to compete effectively in elections (Ahmad 1993, 161). Frequent elections and turnover in Turkey have ensured that parties across the political spectrum have relatively equal access to state resources over time and similar incentives to build their organizations. This is reflected in the politics of the contemporary period. After the AKP's victory, the party used state resources to maintain patronage networks and provide funds for party members (Luca and Rodriguez-Pose 2017). Since then, AKP support has stagnated, with their opposition actively engaged in party building on the local level, a strategy starting to pay dividends in recent municipal elections in Istanbul, the traditional base of power for the AKP.⁸

The plot below shows the instability of parties in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s as the CHP and DP are dislodged from the state apparatus they relied on to sustain themselves. Party institutionalization rose and stabilized in the early 1980s as military rule gave way to frequent elections that incentivized party-building across the political spectrum, with no one party monopolizing state resources.

⁸ Gall, Carlotta. "A Political Quake in Turkey as Erdogan's Party Loses in His Home Base of Support." *International New York Times*, 2019.




Figure 6: Party Institutionalization in Turkey

5 Conclusion

The literature on parties needs to distinguish between the incentives faced by parties in government and outside of it. This is especially salient for discussions on party building in authoritarian and hybrid regimes. Access to state resources or state patronage can lead political parties to rely on the state instead of society to sustain themselves, disincentivizing the creation of extensive and durable societal linkages and the building of organizational capacity. Party-building and institutionalization have been historically low in the Middle East and North Africa because of political parties' relationship with the state. This has serious consequences for party-building, party institutionalization, and regime change in the region.

In the MENA region, newly formed governing parties that gained access to state resources before they built up their organization have become reliant on the state to sustain themselves. At the same time, their Islamist oppositions were forced to build societal networks to survive and maintain their organizational strength in and out of government. This dynamic has allowed governing parties to remain weak and increasingly personalist. In contrast, the most institutionalized parties have emerged in opposition to the regime, creating a dangerous imbalance

across the political spectrum. The lack of party institutionalization in the MENA region has negative consequences for governance and democratization since weak regime parties are often unwilling to cede to demands for elections and unable to serve as effective oppositions after a transition. When scholars of the Middle East discuss the lessons learned from the Arab Spring, they often overlook the critical role regime parties play in the democratization process. Studies do not address the failure of regime parties in sidelining militaries and assuring the old guard that their interests will be protected in the new political system, which provides an incomplete narrative of democratic failure and authoritarian persistence in the MENA region.

3 Theorizing about the Civil in Civil-Military Relations: How Civilian Institutions Dictate Military Behavior

1 Introduction

The exclusion of political institutions in discussions on the relationship between the military and civilians privileges explanations focusing on military characteristics and one-half of the equation. Studies attribute a military's willingness to interfere in politics to its level of professionalization or other internal characteristics, such as its commitment to democratic values. These accounts focus on the emergence of the 'modern' or 'professional' army as the key to the military's removal from politics in new democracies, citing the experience of the developed world as evidence. However, the historical work on Western Europe credits the coevolution of the state and military as critical to the successful subjugation of the military to civilians (Tilly 1985). By focusing on just the military component, these studies overlook an important timing effect that was present in states with civilian control of the military. The strength of civilian political institutions preceded the professionalization of the military and the resultant institutional strength of militaries in the developed world. Accounts of civilian control that focus on the professionalization of the military are incomplete without a discussion of the initial political conditions that made civilian control possible. This oversight has resulted in an incapability of theory to explain the variation in civil-military relations in authoritarian regimes and new democracies because accounts of how old democracies achieved civilian control are incomplete. This study will show that the characteristics of civilian political institutions are critical in shaping civilians' relationship with the military and determines whether militaries implement coup d'états in a country.

We utilize Cox Proportional Hazard models to demonstrate that state capacity and political party cohesiveness better predict the incidence of a coup than indicators of military strength. Countries with strong state apparatuses that are effective at implementing the rule of law are less likely to witness a coup. Militaries also tend to strategically choose their actions based on a political party's strength, responding to some political parties with impunity while remaining weary of others. Rather than privileging one institution's determinative power over another, we argue that the internal dynamics of militaries shape their preferences, and their strategic interaction with civilian institutions dictates their actions. When civilian authorities demonstrate an ability to maintain order or garner political consensus, militaries are less likely to implement a coup because of a lack of opportunity or incentive to do so.

The study contributes to the literature on civil-military relations, democratic backsliding, and coup propensity. We show that civilian institutions are the critical missing link in explaining civilian control of the military in the developed world and the mixed pattern present in the developing world today. Civilian institutional strength shapes the level of influence militaries have in politics and the likelihood of a military coup in a country, which has important consequences for regime transitions. The paper proceeds in six sections. The following section engages with existing scholarship on civilian control of the military, and the third section incorporates studies on the state and political parties to move this literature forward. The fourth section outlines our argument that civilian institutions dictate how militaries choose to engage in politics. The fifth section presents data and results to test the impact of civilian institutions on a specific outcome, coup propensity, and the sixth concludes with other outcomes that a focus on civilian institutions might explain.

2 Military Professionalization and Civilian Control

The foundational literature on civil-military relations attributes civilian control of the military to an ethic of non-interference in militaries. The reason for the existence of this ethic differs between the opposing approaches, focusing on values or institutions. Studies focused on norms argue that military integration with civilians and society is critical to civilian control (Janowitz 1960). This leads the military to share the values and wishes of society, which prefers the military to adhere to the mandates of elected civilian governments. The other strand of the literature focuses on how institutional characteristics shape values. It credits the evolution of the military into a professional organization as responsible for civilian control in the developed world, with scholars arguing that an ethos of non-interference in politics is built into professionalized military organizations (Huntington 1956). More recent studies assert that by focusing only on the internal control mechanisms of the military when explaining civilian control, these foundational accounts have defined away the civil-military problematique with their understanding of professionalism (Feaver 1996, Abrahamsson 1972, Finer 2002). They argue that military professionalism does not preempt military interference in politics, rather, adherence to the principle of civilian control is independent of it. These arguments hold in the developing world, where professionalization has not always led to an ethic of political non-interference in civilian politics, as exemplified by militaries in Egypt, Turkey, and Pakistan. Non-interference in civilian affairs is kept distinct from the definition of professionalism as it is an unproven consequence of a modern military.

We argue that professionalism can lead militaries to contrary policies of interference and non-interference, dependent on the context. Professional or strong militaries have chosen to either

adhere to civilian rule or become an arbiter of civilian politics, playing the role of guardian. Professionalism can impair civilian control because militaries have the structure and institutional identity to interfere in civilian affairs effectively. However, this does not necessarily mean that they do so. Instead of becoming just a tool of the government, strong militaries have different kinds of relationships with civilian governments. Professionalization creates a cohesive organization with a strong corporate identity. This comes with a sense of purpose as the defender of the state and not just the regime in power, leading militaries to interfere in civilian politics when politicians threaten its institutional interests or when the military leadership is concerned about the state's survival. We adopt the organizational definition of professionalization laid out by *Finer*, which highlights the cohesiveness of modern militaries (*Finer* 2002). A professional army has five central components: centralized command, hierarchy, discipline, intercommunication, and an *esprit de corps* that results in a sense of solidarity and purpose.¹ We argue that professionalization or institutionalization leads to an ethic of political neutrality. A professional military is less likely to involve itself in civilian politics by allying itself with a specific political party or civilian faction against other civilians. This is because the resultant politicization of the military threatens the centralization of command, clear hierarchies, and its sense of unity and discipline. A professionalized military is primarily concerned with its institutional interests instead of individual or sub-group ambitions in the military organization.

¹ Centralization refers to a chain of command that extends from the lowest echelons to the highest levels of the military command, which directs all functional directives that are carried out. A hierarchy implies a pyramid-like authority structure with each level clearly delineated by rank and insignia. Authority is determined by rank, not the individual, and each member is subject to the institutional rules that demand obedience to superiors on pain of punishment. Vertical and horizontal communication throughout the military is crucial to make the organization a seamless, responsive unit. A sense of solidarity and unity, built on common beliefs, sentiments, and a way of life, permeates the institution.

Conversely, an unprofessional military is not a cohesive and unified organization with an institutional identity. It is fractionalized and fragmented, with officers more interested in their ambitions than empowering the military organization. This leads parts of the military to ally with political actors that can give them access to material benefits and political power. Its politicization empowers individuals at the expense of the military institution. Civilian politicians do not have to make deals with the military institution because they can buy off parts of it. This allows civilians to exploit fractures in the military for their interests, which includes subordination by the civilian government.

We argue that the strength of civilian institutions guides the actions of professional and unprofessional militaries and predicts the type of civil-military relations in a state. A military's preferences are limited by its internal characteristics (of which professionalization is key), but external factors determine its actions. A military's level of professionalization reveals its preferences and incentives, but it does not predict the course of action it pursues. This is because the military responds to the other key player in the civil-military relationship, the civilians.

3 Civilian Institutions: The State, Party Systems, and Political Parties

The civilian part of the civil-military relationship is often overlooked in the literature, which refers to the civilian component only vis-a-vis the military. Perhaps the most explicit discussion of the importance of civilian institutions for civil-military relations is by Huntington, who asserts that weak political institutions create the opportunity for military coups. He is vague about which political institutions are the most crucial, citing elites, societal relations, political parties, and bureaucracies at various points (Huntington 1968). We focus on the 'civilian' state, which consists of the bureaucratic state and the government comprising politicians and political parties. Countries

have differing levels of administrative or infrastructural state strength and party and party system institutionalization (Soifer 2008, Mainwaring and Scully 1995). We show that this can have implications for the power the civilian state wields over the coercive apparatus of the state, the military.

Strong state institutions can prevent abuses of power that lead to political corruption or instability, which incentivize military interference in civilian affairs. Strong state institutions that can implement the rule of law are better equipped to maintain law and order. They can prevent or stop riots, criminality, and upheaval resulting from political or economic crises. This prevents militaries from stepping in to maintain order and play the ‘guardian’ of the state by preference or necessity. Weak state institutions that cannot police the streets create opportunities for military interference. The state's capacity can also shape politics, regulating the behavior of political actors (O'Donnell 1998).

Strong civilian governments are also more likely to turn de jure control of a professional or unprofessional military into a de facto reality. Parties and party systems function as an effective medium through which to organize and enforce elite bargains and power-sharing agreements (Aldrich 1995). A party system's institutionalization indicates the strength of the parties in it. A party is a tool that various societal forces, elites, and even the military utilize to govern, with strong parties creating effective political institutions in a state. A stronger party views itself as having a longer time horizon in government to carry out its policies and is relatively confident of its continuing electoral success (Geddes 1994). Strong parties incorporating a wide range of societal actors can empower civilian governments. Institutionalized parties are less likely to allow the military to become or remain a counterweight to their power. They want to subordinate the military to the state they control instead of letting it retain its independence. They have the political power

and legitimacy to reform the military and are more likely to subordinate it, as was seen in Turkey by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) after an attempted military coup in 2016. While strong states and parties might be able to subjugate an unprofessional military, they have a harder time doing so completely with a professional military, which maintains a separate institutional identity. This is why democracies and autocracies with professional militaries continue to have civil-military friction that can take the form of lobbying for policies that directly affect their organizational interests. This can range from the provision of benefits, as seen with the push for reforms in the U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs, to dissuading a restructuring of the military, as seen by the public march on Moscow by the Wagner Group in Russia.

Conversely, party weakness is more likely to lead to the establishment of a professional military as a separate sphere of influence in the state or the politicization of an unprofessional military. A weakly institutionalized party system has weak parties with unstable and unpredictable vote shares in elections. This results in greater uncertainty of electoral outcomes among politicians and voters, leading to the privileging of shorter time horizons by parties in government (Mainwaring 1998). Weak and fragmented civilian institutions are less interested and empowered in subordinating militaries in the short term. Elites are disunited with a lack of institutional mechanisms to resolve disagreements before they escalate. Professional militaries hold an inordinate amount of power and influence in a state with weak civilian institutions, as they are one of the strongest organizations in the country. Parties are more focused on elections and willing to involve the military in civilian political disputes to gain the upper hand, which was observed in Pakistan with the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) in the 2018 elections and in Egypt in 2013 in protests against the government of the Muslim Brotherhood. The ineffectiveness of weak civilian institutions is often the pretext or cause of military intervention by strong militaries, who come to

view them as a threat to the state and its survival. Weaker military organizations are easier to control by civilians and are less likely to mount a unified campaign to replace the civilian government because they are often politicized and fragmented (Dix 1994). The literature on coup-proofing shows that political elites are aware of this and deliberately weaken military organizations, even if this results in a less effective military on the battlefield (Biddle and Zirkle 1996, Talmadge 2015, Albrecht 2015). Unprofessional militaries often come to share power with weak civilian institutions, with factions within each working together to empower specific individuals or groups.

3.1 Civilian Control in Autocracies and Democracies

Studies often assert that civilian control of the military is a precondition for democracy. However, democratization in the developed and developing world has demonstrated that there is great variation in civil-military relations in new democracies. Rather than referring to the similarities and differences present in historical experiences of democratization, civil-military relations scholars often turn to the relatively recent past of Western democracies for answers (Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010). The literature is built on contemporary civil-military relations in the developed world and extended to the emerging democracies of the developing world. Huntington set the standard by advocating for the benefits of a professional military and objective civilian control, leading policymakers to conclude that this is ideal for newly democratizing states (Huntington 1968). These accounts overlook an important timing effect present in older democracies where civilian control preceded military professionalization. They do not address how civilians in new democracies subordinate professional militaries or why distancing the military from the civilian government is critical when civilian control is already fragile in a state. This sequencing is a critical

part of the narrative and highlights the importance of civilian institutions in achieving civilian control.

The importance of strong civilian institutions for civilian control of the military is best exemplified by the historical experiences of the developed world. The historical work on Western Europe and the U.S. credits the coevolution of the state and military as crucial for successfully subjugating the military to civilians. The strength of civilian political institutions preceded the professionalization, and resulting institutional strength, of militaries in the developed world. During transitions to democracy in Western Europe, militaries were unprofessional and often integrated with the civilian government. There was no clear distinction between the political and the military since military and political leadership were merged and shared a common origin and outlook (Huntington 1956). The military was the tool of European monarchs and later the civilian governments because of the oversight that governments built into the state as the military professionalized. In the U.S., the political elite was concerned with maintaining civilian supremacy and created constitutional provisions to ensure it. They sanctioned the presence of state militias that prevented the centralization of military power in a regular, standing army. The military was also drawn into political conflicts since Congress and the president were granted control over it. Historically, civilian political institutions in the U.S. and Western Europe were stronger than military organizations. Militaries grew in power over time in older democracies as they professionalized. By the time militaries built their organizational strength and presented a unified political threat, the civilian government had established strong institutional mechanisms to limit the military's role in politics. Strong civilian institutions successfully transformed professional armies' ethic of neutrality into non-interfere through monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.

Civilian institutional strength is central to civilian control, irrespective of authoritarian or democratic context, because institutions order politics in authoritarian and democratic regimes (Magaloni 2006, Brownlee 2007, Hicken and Kuhonta 2011, Weeks 2014). Differentiating between regime types in discussions about the military also creates problems of endogeneity since military coups are responsible for a majority of regime changes in the contemporary period and are one of the most prevalent reasons for democratic failures (Svolik 2008, Goemans and Marinov 2008, Bellin 2012).

4 The Effect of Civilian Institutions on Military Actions

We theorize that the relationship between the military and civilian institutions results in four types of civil-military relationships: civilian control with no civil-military friction, civilian control with civil-military friction, shared military and civilian control, and military domination. We argue that different types of military and civilian institutions have distinct incentives that interact to produce specific outcomes. We focus on one particular outcome, a military coup d'état, as a measurable form of military intervention in politics. Coup propensity is attributed to military characteristics, political development, social mobilization, economic factors, and the legacy of military rule (Zimmermann 1979, Johnson et al 1983, Jenkins and Kposowa 1990, Dix 1994). The failure or success of coups is often attributed to intra-military dynamics (Powell 2012, Singh 2014). We show that civilian institutions better predict the occurrence of a coup d'état. We focus on the likelihood of military intervention, not its success or failure, to demonstrate that a military's decision to intercede in civilian politics is a facet of its calculations vis-à-vis the state and political parties. Figure 1 outlines the distinct trajectories and patterns of civil-military relations that this paper theorizes results in states from this interaction.

Figure 1: Varieties of Civil-Military Relations

		<i>Civilian Institutions</i>	
		Strong	Weak
<i>Military</i>	Strong	1 Civilian Control <i>(Civil-Military Friction)</i> Likelihood of Coup: Low	2 Military Domination <i>(Tutelary Rule)</i> Likelihood of Coup: High
	Weak	3 Civilian Control <i>(No Civil-Military Friction)</i> Likelihood of Coup: Low	4 Shared Military-Civilian Control <i>(High Military Influence)</i> Likelihood of Coup: Medium

A professional military and strong civilian institutions often result in civil-military friction with a low likelihood of a coup (cell 1). We theorize that professional militaries are more effective at impairing civilian control than unprofessional ones, but they are also incentivized not to interfere in civil affairs when civilian institutions are strong. A professional military's institutional interests discourage it from governing because of the inherent dangers of politicization when in power. While the military still seeks to protect its interests, which causes some friction between civilian and military organizations, it does so through other avenues available to them, like lobbying, instead of a coup. Professional militaries are more likely to adhere to civilian mandates set by a

strong party. Over time this leads to the institutionalization of civilian control, as was the case in India with the Congress party.

A professional military and weak civilian institutions often result in military domination with a high likelihood of a coup (cell 2). Strong militaries are willing to interfere in civilian affairs if the military determines civilian institutions are endangering the state or encroaching on what the military views as its purview, primarily security-related issues. When the military interferes in civilian affairs, it comes to appoint itself as not only the guardian of the state but also the policeman of civilian governments and parties. Over time this can lead militaries to encroach further into the civilian government's domain, creating a separate sphere of influence in the state to empower itself. This military dominance or tutelary rule is characterized by a high incidence of coups, as witnessed in Pakistan, Thailand, and Bangladesh. This does not mean civilian control in these states is impossible to achieve, just highly unlikely if neither the military nor civil institutions change over time. Civilian institutions can be built up and come to subdue a professional military. A party that comes to dominate civilian politics and represents the majority of society can subordinate the military, as evidenced in Turkey with the AKP. Conversely, professional militaries can be dislodged if the military's inclusion in governance leads to politicization, which interferes with its organizational cohesiveness and sense of unity and purpose. The South Korean transition to democracy highlights the effectiveness of this approach.

When the military is unprofessional and strong civilian institutions are in place, civilian control is maintained without civil-military friction (cell 3). An unprofessional military becomes a tool of the civilian state and the party in power. The civilian government can use the disunity of the military and its individuals' ambitions to its advantage. There is a low likelihood of a coup since civilian governments can establish patron-client relationships with parts of the military. Over

time, this civilian control is institutionalized through monitoring mechanisms. This pattern is best exemplified by civilian governments in Russia and other Eastern European countries, which were able to retain civilian control because of the fragmentation of the military with the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

Weak and fragmented civilian and military institutions result in shared military and civilian control (cell 4). Under these circumstances, militaries are likely to be subordinate to civilian governments since they are often involved in politics. This influence can lead to unintended consequences as it weakens the corporate identity and unity of the military establishment. Military prerogatives can gradually be removed without the military perceiving these actions as threatening its institutional power. This happens in a haphazard way, with multiple steps backward and forward toward civilian control. This scenario is modeled by the military in Brazil, which used its influence to continue to be part of the legislature and involve itself in civilian politics after a democratic transition. The eroding of military prerogatives took place slowly and without a concerted and organized effort by weak party institutions to disempower the military, and so the military did not foresee the threat (Hunter 1997). This was also demonstrated in the democratic transition in Indonesia with the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998.

5 Data and Methods

We employ Cox Proportional Hazards (Cox PH) models to examine the likelihood of a coup occurring in a country while accounting for a range of political, institutional, and military factors. Survival analysis is a statistical domain concerned with time-to-event data analysis, where the outcome of interest is the time until a particular event occurs (Kalbfleisch and Prentice 2011). The Cox PH model is an established method in survival analysis, which concentrates on the time until a specific event of interest transpires (Cox 1972). As a fundamental tool in survival analysis, the

Cox PH model is apt for modeling the time until a coup takes place in a country. In many instances, the exact coup timing may not be observed for all countries, either because a coup has not yet transpired or due to incomplete data. This type of incomplete information is known as censored data. The Cox PH model is specifically designed to manage censored data, rendering it a suitable choice for modeling coup timing in countries with incomplete or ongoing observations (Jackson et al 2014). By estimating the hazard rate as a function of predictor variables, the model facilitates a comprehensive understanding of factors influencing coup timing and forms the basis for making predictions about the duration a country remains coup-free (Bouزيد 2011, Rabinowitz and Jargowsky 2018, Koehler and Albrecht 2021, Song 2022). The model allows us to test which factors, military or civilian, are more likely to result in a coup. We are also able to determine which civilian institutions affect coup propensity.

The Cox PH model is semi-parametric, meaning it does not necessitate the specification of the underlying baseline hazard function (Cox 1972). This flexibility permits the model to accommodate a wide array of time-to-event data without requiring strong assumptions regarding the baseline hazard function's shape. Consequently, the Cox PH model can deliver robust and reliable estimates of predictor variable effects on the hazard rate, even in situations where the true baseline hazard function is unknown or challenging to specify (Kleinbaum and Klein 1996). The Cox PH model enables the incorporation of multiple predictor variables, allowing for the analysis of various factors potentially influencing coup likelihood. By including relevant covariates such as political instability, economic conditions, regional conflicts, and historical precedent, the model offers a comprehensive understanding of coup risk determinants (Bouزيد 2011, Rabinowitz and Jargowsky 2018, Koehler and Albrecht 2021, Song 2022). The Cox PH model's proportional hazards assumption posits that hazard ratios (i.e., the relative risks of the event occurring) remain

constant over time (Grambsch and Therneau 1994). While this assumption may not always hold, it simplifies the analysis and can still yield valuable insights into the relative importance of predictor variables (Royston and Parmar 2002).²

5.1 Variables

The dependent variable *Coups* (V-dem) represents the number of successful coups d'état in a given year. It is defined as any event that results in the irregular removal or resignation of the chief executive through violence or the threat of violence by an armed organization. The definition excludes transfers of power among civilians that don't involve force, and it places no restrictions on the origin of the armed group or the identity of the incoming ruler. The data is obtained from Przeworski et al. (2013) and covers the years 1789-2008.³

The independent variable, *Rule of Law Index* (V-dem), is a measure of the extent to which laws are transparently, independently, predictably, impartially, and equally enforced and the extent to which government officials comply with the law. It uses a scale from 0 to 1 and is based on Bayesian factor analysis of multiple indicators, including compliance with the high court, judiciary, court independence, executive respect for the constitution, transparent laws, access to justice, judicial accountability, public sector corruption and theft, executive bribery, and embezzlement.⁴ We use this variable as a measure of state capacity, testing whether a strong civilian state prevents coups. Our other key independent variable *Legislative Party Cohesion* (V-

² Researchers can assess the validity of this assumption using statistical tests and diagnostic plots and, if necessary, consider alternative models that relax this assumption, such as the stratified Cox model or time-varying coefficients models.

³ The variable may be less reliable for the pre-1950 era due to scarce information.

⁴ The index was created by Svend-Erik Skaaning and Jeffrey Staton and data is available from 1789 to 2020. The index is based on Pemstein et al. (2021) and V-Dem Codebook. The intercept has convergence issues in the model parameters.}

dem), is a measure of the extent to which members of the legislature tend to vote with other members of their party on important bills. It is a measure of the strength of political parties in a country. The variable is based on a 4-point ordinal scale, with response options ranging from "not really" to "yes, absolutely." It tests whether stronger parties lead to a lower incidence of coups in a country.⁵

We include several other variables in the model that capture other party characteristics to test their effect on the likelihood of a coup occurring in a country. *Party linkages* is a V-Dem metric that measures the form of linkage between major political parties and their constituents. The data was collected from 1789 to 2020 and asked about the most common form of linkage, which is the sort of "good" that a party offers in exchange for political support and participation in party activities. The responses range from 0 to 4 on an ordinal scale, with 0 being clientelistic (constituents are rewarded with goods, cash, and/or jobs) and four being policy/programmatic (constituents respond to a party's positions on national policies, general party programs, and visions for society).⁶ The variable captures whether the type of parties in a country influences the likelihood of a coup. The *Candidate selection-national/local* (V-dem) is a measurement of the degree of centralization in legislative candidate selection within political parties. The variable ranges from 0-5 and is based on the level of power that different party actors have in selecting national legislative candidates. The measurement is ordinal, with the different responses representing the relative influence of national party leaders, regional/state-level organizations,

⁵ The scale is converted to an interval scale by a Bayesian item response theory measurement model. The index was created by Allen Hicken and data is available from 1789 to 2020. The index is based on Pemstein et al. (2021) and V-Dem Codebook.

⁶ The cross-coder aggregation was performed using a Bayesian item response theory measurement model.

local party organizations, and constituency groups.⁷ The variable *Party branches* (V-dem) measure the number of parties that have permanent local party branches. The response options range from "None" (0) to "All" (4), and the scale is ordinal, which is later converted to an interval by the measurement model.⁸ *Party organizations* (V-dem) is a measure of the number of political parties on the national level that have permanent organizations. A permanent organization refers to a substantial number of personnel who are responsible for carrying out party activities outside of the election season. The responses range from 0 to 4, with 0 meaning no parties and four meaning all parties have permanent organizations.⁹

The variable *National party control* (V-dem) measures the level of unity in the control of the national government by political parties. It has three possible responses: 0 indicates a unified coalition control where a single multi-party coalition controls both the executive and legislative branches, 1 indicates divided party control where different parties or individuals control the executive and legislature, or the executive power is divided between a president/monarch and a prime minister, each belonging to different parties, and 2 indicates unified party control where a single party controls both the executive and legislative branches.¹⁰ The variable *Political Polarization* (V-dem) is a measure of the extent to which political differences affect social relationships beyond political discussions. The measurement is based on the level of friendliness between supporters of opposing political camps, with responses ranging from 0 ("Not at all" -

⁷ The data for this measurement was collected from 1789 to 2020 and was analyzed using a Bayesian item response theory measurement model. The data was aggregated by cross-coders and the measurement was released in data release 1-11.

⁸ The data for this variable was released in 1-11 data releases and cross-coder aggregation was done using a Bayesian item response theory measurement model. The data covers the years 1789-2020.

⁹ The measurement is ordinal and is converted to interval by a Bayesian item response theory measurement model. The data release is between 1-11, and the years of measurement are from 1789 to 2020.

¹⁰ The data is collected between 1900-2020 and has an ordinal scale, which is converted to interval by the measurement model. The data was collected and analyzed by Allen Hicken and the V-Dem project team using a Bayesian item response theory measurement model.

supporters interact in a friendly manner) to 4 ("Yes, to a large extent" - supporters generally interact in a hostile manner).¹¹ The variable captures polarization within a party system and tests whether military coups are more likely if parties are actively hostile against one another, often resulting in political instability and crisis.

The variable, *Defense Exp Per Cap*, is acquired from the Cross-National Time-Series (CNTS) dataset that focuses on National Defense Expenditure.¹² The data is presented in per capita form, which means that the measure is adjusted for population size. The variable proxies for military strength in the model and allows us to measure the effect of military strength relative to civilian institutional strength and type. Several variables control for the effect of economic factors on coup propensity. *Inflation* (V-dem) represents the annual inflation rate.¹³ *GDP per capita* (V-Dem) is a measure of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per person and is calculated by dividing the GDP of a country by its population.¹⁴ *GDP growth* (V-Dem) is a variable that measures the growth rate of a country's GDP per capita.¹⁵ A control for regime type is included in the model to

¹¹ The variable is ordinal, but has been converted to interval by the measurement model. It is based on data from 1900 to 2020 and was created by Project Managers Anna Lührmann and Sebastian Hellmeier. The data is released in versions 10-11 and cross-coder aggregation was performed using the Bayesian item response theory measurement model. The methodology and data can be found in Pemstein et al. (2021, V-Dem Working Paper Series 2021:21) and the V-Dem Codebook.

¹² It is calculated from two other data sets: National Government Expenditure (revexp5) and the ratio of National Defense Expenditure to National Government Expenditure (revexp7).

¹³ The data sourced from multiple sources including Clio Infra, Arroyo Abad, Davies and van Zanden, Montevideo-Oxford Latin America Economic History Database, De Zwart, Reinhart and Rogoff, Santing, and the World Bank. The data has been interpolated to fill missing values within the time-series using linear interpolation. The data was released as part of the 5th to 11th data release by Clio Infra and the years covered in the data are 1789-2010.

¹⁴ The data for this measure comes from The Maddison Project Database (2018) and covers the years 1789 to 2018. The data release is 2-11 and the citation for this information is Bolt and van Zanden (2020) and Bolt et al. (2014).

¹⁵ It is estimated from the data on GDP per capita, and the data source is The Maddison Project Database (2018). The data was released in data release 2-11, and the suggested citation for this variable is the V-Dem Codebook.

test its potential effect on coup propensity. The Polity 5 combined score is a measure of the political regime type of a country, ranging from strong democracy to strong autocracy.¹⁶

5.2 Results

In this section, we test which factors are more likely to reduce the likelihood of a coup d'état in a country. Our analysis examines the specific civilian institutions that contribute to coup risk reduction and investigates potential moderating factors that may influence the relationship between institutions and coup likelihood. We present the results across five different Cox proportional hazard models, using coup attempts as the dependent variable, as shown in Table 1.

¹⁶ The score is calculated by subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy score, resulting in a numeric scale that ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). The data is sourced from the Polity 5 database and the data release is 5-11. The data was last updated in 2020 and covers the years 1800 to 2018.

TABLE 1: Exploring Mechanisms and Moderating Factors

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Rule of Law	0.139***	0.222***	0.194***	0.608	
Legislative Party Coh	0.840***	0.867***	0.826***	0.844*	0.789**
Party linkages		0.858***		0.866	0.801**
Candidate selection			0.839***	0.821*	0.892
Party branches				1.228	1.533*
Party organizations				0.753	0.649**
Defense Exp Per Cap (\$ thousands)				0.893**	0.898**
Inflation				1.002*	1.001
GDP Per Capita				1.000	1.000
Year				0.991	0.990
GDP Growth				1.754	2.088
National party control				0.966	0.940
Political Polarization				1.053	1.173
Polity 5					0.943**
Region Fixed Effects	TRUE	TRUE	TRUE	TRUE	TRUE
N	742	742	742	256	229
AIC	5271.6	5264.9	5258.2	1236.7	1008.9
BIC	5322.3	5320.2	5313.5	1311.2	1081.0
RMSE	0.73	0.73	0.73	0.71	0.70


Note: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. The Hazard Ratio (HR) in this table represents the relative risk of an event occurring at a given point in time. An HR of 1 means that there is no difference in risk between the groups. An HR greater than 1 indicates an increased risk in the treatment group, whereas an HR less than 1 suggests a reduced risk.

Model 1 reveals a significant negative relationship between *Rule of Law* and attempted coups, with a hazard ratio (HR) of 0.139, suggesting that increased rule of law is associated with a decreased likelihood of coups. *Legislative Party Cohesion* also demonstrates a significant negative relationship with coup attempts across all models, with hazard ratios ranging from 0.717 to 0.840, indicating that stronger party cohesion within legislatures reduces the risk of coups. Model 2 uncovers a significant negative relationship between *Party Linkages* and coup attempts,

with a hazard ratio of 0.858, implying that more programmatic linkages between parties and the electorate may reduce the likelihood of coup attempts. Model 3 exposes a significant negative relationship between *Candidate Selection* and attempted coups, with a hazard ratio of 0.839, signifying that more inclusive and participatory candidate selection processes within political parties can reduce the risk of coups.

Model 4 tests state, party, military, and economic factors against the dependent variable. *Legislative Party Cohesion* and *Candidate Selection* remain significant in reducing the likelihood of a coup d'état with the added control variables. Military strength, captured by *Defense Exp Per Cap*, is shown to increase the duration of time a country remains coup-free but is less effective in predicting coups than party variables. Model 5 incorporates the Polity 5 score as a control variable and demonstrates a significant negative relationship with coup attempts, with a hazard ratio of 0.963. This indicates that higher levels of democracy are associated with a lower likelihood of coup attempts. Our analysis unveils several civilian institutional factors, *Rule of Law*, *Legislative Party Cohesion*, *Party Linkages*, and *Candidate Selection*, that play a crucial role in decreasing the risk of attempted coups. To further explore the effects of *Legislative Party Cohesion*, we categorize the variable into three groups: high levels of cohesion, low levels of cohesion, and those falling in the middle. Figure 2 presents the results of the CH model.

Figure 1: Legislative Party Cohesion Drives Survival Probability



This figure displays the Survival Probability for regimes of various levels of *Legislative Party Cohesion*. Note that all systems drop in survival probability until they plateau. High *Legislative Party Cohesion* is associated with the best survival probability, with a 50% probability after 50 years.

The findings reveal that all states begin with a high probability of survival, indicating that coups are unlikely to occur within a year or two of the regime's establishment. Following this initial stability, there is a sharp decline in survival probability for all regimes, with the most dramatic decrease observed in those with the lowest levels of legislative party cohesion. Regimes with intermediate levels of cohesion also experience a significant drop, though not as rapidly as those with the lowest level of cohesion. However, after approximately 50 years, these regimes join their lower-level counterparts, with a survival probability of less than 25% overall. In contrast, regimes with the highest levels of legislative party cohesion follow a different trajectory. While they experience an initial decline, it is far less severe than for other regimes. Notably, after about

20 years, states with the highest legislative cohesion begin to diverge from other countries. At this point, the survival probability curve for those with the strongest legislative party cohesion starts to flatten and remains relatively stable from 50 years onward, hovering around a 50% probability. This suggests that political systems with strong parties are much more durable and less likely to face a coup compared to those with weaker civilian institutions.

TABLE 2: Civilian Institutions Matter in Democracies and Autocracies

	Polity ≥ 6 Hazard Ratio	Polity < 6 Hazard Ratio
Party linkages	0.159***	0.853*
Party branches	0.027***	1.850**
Party organizations	83.581***	0.502***
Legislative Party Coh	0.505*	0.717***
Candidate selection		0.959
Defense Exp Per Cap (\$ thousands)		0.890**
Inflation		1.001
GDP Per Capita		1.000
year		0.993
GDP Growth		3.028
National party control		0.929
Political Polarization		1.096
Region Fixed Effects	TRUE	TRUE
N	130	146
AIC	90.2	880.7
BIC	127.5	937.4
RMSE	0.25	0.81

Note: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$. Due to the few coup attempts in democratic regimes, fewer variables were used in the Polity ≥ 6 to prevent overfitting. The Hazard Ratio (HR) in this table represents the relative risk of an event occurring at a given point in time. An HR of 1 means that there is no difference in risk between the groups. An HR greater than 1 indicates an increased risk in the treatment group, whereas an HR less than 1 suggests a reduced risk.

Table 2 displays the results of the model when the data is separated by regime type, with a distinction made between countries with Polity scores greater than or equal to 6 (democracies) and those with Polity scores less than 6 (autocracies). In democracies ($\text{Polity} \geq 6$), we find strong evidence that *Party linkages* ($\text{HR} = 0.159$, $p < 0.01$) and *Party branches* ($\text{HR} = 0.027$, $p < 0.01$) are positively associated with coup risk reduction. *Legislative party cohesion* is also significant, with a positive relationship ($\text{HR} = 0.505$, $p < 0.1$) suggesting that greater cohesion within legislative parties contributes to the stability of democracies. Candidate selection, defense expenditures per capita, inflation, GDP per capita, and year were omitted in the democratic model due to the limited number of coup attempts in democracies, which necessitated the use of fewer variables to prevent overfitting.

In autocracies ($\text{Polity} < 6$), *Party linkages* ($\text{HR} = 0.853$, $p < 0.1$) also appear to have a positive impact on reducing coup risk. Additionally, *Party organizations* ($\text{HR} = 0.502$, $p < 0.01$) and *Legislative Party Cohesion* ($\text{HR} = 0.717$, $p < 0.01$) are negatively associated with coup risk, indicating that stronger organizations and more cohesive legislative parties in autocratic regime can also mitigate the likelihood of coup attempts. In autocracies, defense expenditures per capita ($\text{HR} = 0.890$, $p < 0.05$) were found to be significant, while candidate selection, inflation, GDP per capita, year, GDP growth, national party control, and political polarization were not significant. These results emphasize that civilian institutions are important in mitigating coup risk in democratic and autocratic regimes. The findings suggest that strengthening these institutions can contribute to greater political stability, regardless of regime type.

A more detailed examination of the effect of various types of civilian institutions on coup propensity shows that institutional design has a measurable impact on military actions. To classify

types of political institutions, we rely on the Anckar and Fredriksson dataset (Anckar and Fredriksson 2019). This data offers a comprehensive classification of political regimes from 1800 to 2016, encompassing democracies, autocracies, absolute monarchies, military rule, party-based rule, personalist rule, and oligarchies.¹⁷ The typology and dataset allow for a systematic analysis of the influence of various political institutions on our research outcome. Table 3 shows that political systems with more diluted political power, such as parliamentary systems, are less likely to face a coup. Compared to countries with parliamentary systems, all other institutional types exhibit significantly higher hazards of coup attempts. Our findings suggest that the more political players have a place at the table, the less likely the country is to experience a coup attempt. This relationship holds across various institutional types, with all other forms of political institutions having significantly higher hazard ratios of coup attempts compared to parliamentary systems.

¹⁷ The dataset is constructed using a combination of expert assessments, historical data, and existing databases to ensure the reliability and validity of the classification. Each country-year observation is assigned to one of the seven types of government based on the authors' criteria. We employ these classifications to control for the type of government in our analyses.


TABLE 3: Cox Proportional Hazard Model: Impact of Institutional Types on Coup Attempts

DV: Coup Attempts	
	Hazard Ratio
Semi-presidentialism	2.252**
Presidentialism	2.102**
Semi-monarchy	3.686***
Single-party rule	3.608***
Multi-party authoritarian rule	3.556***
Personalist rule	3.722***
Military rule	4.083***
Absolute Monarchy	4.311***
Monarchic oligarchy	4.507***
Other oligarchy	3.330***
Region Fixed Effects	TRUE
N	772
AIC	5529.1
BIC	5617.4
RMSE	0.74

Note: + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$ Parliamentary system is the reference group. Therefore, all groups are in reference to the Parliamentary system. All systems have hazard ratios exceeding the Parliamentary system indicating that they all are more likely to experience a coup attempt, with monarchies being particularly more likely.

When comparing the hazard ratios of Presidentialism, Single-party rule, Absolute Monarchy, and Personalist rule, we find meaningful differences. Presidentialism has a hazard ratio of 2.102, meaning that presidential systems are 2.102 times more likely to experience a coup attempt than parliamentary systems. In contrast, Single-party rule has a hazard ratio of 3.608, indicating that countries under single-party rule are 3.608 times more likely to face a coup attempt compared to parliamentary countries. Absolute Monarchy has a hazard ratio of 4.311, which suggests that absolute monarchies are 4.311 times more likely to experience a coup attempt compared to parliamentary countries. Lastly, Personalist rule has a hazard ratio of 3.722, implying that countries under personalist rule are 3.722 times more likely to face a coup attempt than parliamentary countries.

Figure 2: Survival Plots For Regime Type



This figure depicts the survival probability of each form of government with respect to years. Here we see that Parliaments perform the best on average, with other forms of democracy following behind. Personalist regimes and other authoritarian systems with singular power structures perform poorly on average when compared to democracies.

These findings highlight that greater institutionalization and specific institutional designs can impact military actions and ameliorate the risk of coups. Figure 2 shows that the likelihood of coup attempts varies significantly across different civilian institutional types. These findings imply a spectrum where more concentration of political power into a few hands results in a higher coup risk. Regimes where power is concentrated in the hands of a personalist dictator or absolute monarch, have much lower odds of survival compared to other regimes. Presidential systems have a greater concentration of political power compared to parliaments since their institutional design has a single executive who is not a part of the legislature. However, even here, we see that the oft-criticized presidential system is still more robust than a single-party or personalist regime on average. This suggests that more nuanced measures of civilian institutions should be examined in studies on military strategies and actions.

6 Conclusion

In this study, we examined various civilian institutions and their impact on coup risk reduction. We identified several significant factors, such as Rule of Law, Legislative Party Cohesion, Party Linkages, and Candidate Selection, that are crucial in mitigating coup likelihood. Moreover, our analysis identifies key mechanisms and moderating factors that contribute to the relationship between institutional design and coup likelihood. The results emphasize the importance of having more political players at the table and strengthening civilian institutions to promote political stability, regardless of regime type. These insights offer valuable guidance for policymakers and scholars

as they seek to better understand the complex relationship between institutional design and political stability.

The theoretical framework we present makes several new observations on civilian control that moves forward the existing literature on civil-military relations. We argue that it is better not to separate civilian and military institutions for democratizing states. Weaker states that emerge from their time of transition with the military involved in the civilian government structure are more likely to diminish the military influence and subjugate it to the civilians. If weaker democratizing states can politicize professional militaries during the transition to democracy, they have a better chance at civilian control. A simple, poorly organized military allows civilian governments to disassemble and restructure military institutions to fit the new democratic civilian governing structure. It is easier to control a fragmented military than to subordinate a complex, well-organized military to new civilian constraints when civilian governments are weak post-transition. The paradox of civil-military relations in most newly democratizing states is that an unprofessional military is more likely to make a truly 'democratic' army than a professional one.

The empirical reality of civil-military relations in the developing world can provide important insights into the established literature on civil-military relations in democracies. The theoretical framework presented in this paper attempts to revise our understanding of how older democracies achieved civilian control of the military to better address the challenges of civilian control in newer democracies. We argue that strong militaries can hinder democracy in a country with weak civilian institutions. Our findings indicate that strong civilian institutions can better subordinate militaries and reduce the likelihood of a coup. What seems to work in older democracies in the contemporary period can deter democratic politics in newer democracies.

Democracies and autocracies with weak militaries are more likely to have civilian control and build professional militaries with an ethos of noninterference in civilian politics.

A Appendix

A.1 Indian Civil Service

Table A.1: Distribution of officers serving in the central government by service (as of Nov. 1, 2000)

SL No	Service	Secretary level	Additional Secretary level	Joint Secretary level	Director level	Deputy Secretary level	Under Secretary level	Total	% of total
1	IAS	95	73	275	211	122	11	787	33.59
2	IPS	18	9	86	46	39	0	198	8.45
3	IFtS	1	0	1	22	7	0	31	1.32
4	IA&AS	2	1	14	7	19	0	43	1.84
5	ICAS	0	0	2	2	8	0	12	0.51
6	IDAS	0	2	10	2C	7	0	39	1.66
7	IES	0	0	2	34	12	0	48	2.05
8	IStS	0	0	0	13	7	0	20	0.85
9	IFS	6	0	9	6	3	1	25	1.07
10	ICES	2	6	7	13	15	0	43	1.84
11	ITS	1	4	12	31	30	0	78	3.33
12	IPoS	1	0	8	15	11	0	35	1.49
13	IIS	0	0	0	9	10	2	21	0.90
14	Rly. services	10	1	5	22	11	0	49	2.09
15	CPES	0	0	0	0	3	0	3	0.13
16	CWES	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0.04
17	CES	0	0	1	3	3	0	7	0.30
18	IDeTS	0	0	1	5	2	0	8	0.34
19	ILS	3	2	0	0	0	0	5	0.21
20	CSS	0	4	35	104	112	529	784	33.46
21	ISS	0	0	1	0	3	0	4	0.17
22	CCLS	0	0	0	2	0	0	2	0.09
23	IInS	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0.04
24	ITeS	3	0	0	1	1	0	5	0.21
25	IOFS	0	0	4	11	6	0	21	0.90
26	ICoAS	0	0	0	3	6	1	10	0.43
27	CTS	0	0	0	0	6	1	7	0.30
28	Others	14	3	1	16	16	6	56	2.39
	Total	157	105	474	597	459	551	2343	
Percentage of IAS officers to total		60.51	69.52	58.02	35.34	26.58	2.00		33.59
Percentage of CSS officers to total		0	3.81	7.38	17.42	24.40	96.01		33.46

Source: Department of Personnel and Training, Government of India

A.2 Interview Protocol

The public officials interviewed for this study were fully informed of the research topic and the researcher's affiliations. The interviews were all conducted on the condition of anonymity with the understanding that bureaucrats' names and specific positions would be kept confidential. Bureaucrats are intentionally referred by their cadre and seniority/grade to ensure that they cannot be identified and that there are no professional or personal costs attached to participation in the study. Interview questions revolved around bureaucrats' training, experiences in postings, and relationships with elected officials.

A.3 Missing Data

The Department of Personnel and Training website is missing service records from the 1950s and 1960s since these records were only digitized and made publicly available for active Indian Administrative Service (IAS) officers. Table 5 shows the IAS cadre strength in India in the 1950s and 1960s, the period with the least data available, and the number of officers included in the dataset.

Table A.2: Missing Data (1950-1969) in IAS Dataset

Year	IAS Cadre Strength	Number of Officers in the Dataset
1950	-	
1955	1173	11
1957	1561	43
1958	1676	58
1959	1722	100
1960	1786	120
1961	1825	128
1962	1918	208
1963	1982	218
1964	2145	291
1965	2232	295
1966	2325	386
1967	2543	416
1968	2619	578
1969	2725	676

Table 6 shows the number of serving IAS officers from 1951 to 2019 and the number of IAS officers represented in the dataset for the same period, to give a sense of the overall representation of officers in the dataset used in this study.

Table A.3: Missing Data (1951-2019) in IAS Dataset

Year	Number of officers in position (As on 1 st January)	Number of Officers in the Dataset
1951 (At the time of initial constitution of the service)	957 (Including 336 officers of the Indian Civil Service)	-
1961	1722 (Including 215 officers of the Indian Civil Service)	128
1971	2754 (Including 88 officers of the Indian Civil Service)	788
1981	3883	2016
1991	4881	2940
2001	5118	2858
2002	5051	2891
2003	4871	2663
2004	4791	2746
2005	4788	2728
2006	4790	2823
2007	4731	2799
2008	4761	2778
2009	4572	2620
2010	4534	2394
2011	4456	2333
2012	4377	2361
2013	4737	2106
2014	4619	1937
2015	4802	1809
2016	4926	1449
2017	5004	1668
2018	5104	1485
2019	5205	1159

Note: The IAS was the successor of the Indian Civil Service (ICS) in British India; when it was constituted, the ICS officers who chose to serve in India (instead of Pakistan) became part of the IAS.

A.4 OLS Regression Tables

TABLE 4: India National Level Models

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Transfer Rate			Tenure Length		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Seat Share Difference	-0.471*** (0.055)	-0.470*** (0.059)	-0.401*** (0.077)	71.537*** (24.913)	72.648*** (25.290)	61.922** (30.090)
Party Org. Capacity			0.079 (0.056)			-10.327 (20.551)
Election Year		0.005 (0.048)	-0.001 (0.048)		-5.050 (18.224)	-4.365 (18.082)
Office Turnover		-0.0004 (0.094)	-0.001 (0.097)		14.433 (25.894)	14.687 (25.893)
Seat Share Diff**Org Capacity			-0.180* (0.108)			26.990 (53.994)
Constant	1.470*** (0.027)	1.468*** (0.031)	1.442*** (0.042)	501.972*** (9.244)	501.589*** (9.686)	505.088*** (10.776)
Observations	63	63	63	63	63	63
R ²	0.436	0.436	0.451	0.127	0.131	0.135
Adjusted R ²	0.426	0.407	0.403	0.112	0.087	0.059

Note: clustered standard errors in parentheses.

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

TABLE 5: India State Pooled Regression Models

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Transfer Rate		Tenure Length		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Seat Share Difference	-0.203*** (0.066)	-0.192*** (0.066)	-0.144** (0.063)	75.138*** (21.214)	82.150*** (22.456)
Party Org. Capacity			0.060 (0.060)		-41.989 (26.005)
Election Year		-0.021 (0.023)	-0.020 (0.022)		42.150** (16.574)
New State		-0.045 (0.050)	-0.023 (0.053)		-44.705 (42.123)
Office Turnover		0.128*** (0.032)	0.129*** (0.031)		-71.147*** (18.970)
President's Rule		-0.091*** (0.032)	-0.100*** (0.032)		20.532 (13.469)
Category B		-0.024 (0.027)	-0.034 (0.024)		-33.846 (20.962)
Category C		0.144*** (0.019)	0.128*** (0.022)		-57.107*** (20.655)
Category E		0.053 (0.043)	0.040 (0.046)		7.780 (28.648)
Seat Share Diff*Org Capacity			-0.225 (0.148)		130.993*** (48.346)
Constant	1.349*** (0.038)	1.319*** (0.030)	1.315*** (0.033)	553.124*** (15.501)	555.696*** (20.983)
Observations	1,046	1,046	1,046	1,046	1,046
R ²	0.041	0.107	0.116	0.012	0.041
Adjusted R ²	0.040	0.100	0.107	0.011	0.034

Note: clustered standard errors in parentheses.

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

TABLE 6: India State Fixed Effects Models

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Transfer Rate		Tenure Length	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Seat Share Difference	−0.174** (0.072)	−0.138** (0.067)	70.319*** (23.694)	42.080* (24.161)
Party Org. Capacity		0.040 (0.056)		−37.103 (26.251)
Election Year	−0.015 (0.022)	−0.014 (0.019)	21.643** (11.014)	21.833** (10.592)
New State	−0.103*** (0.038)	−0.070 (0.052)	−102.402** (41.311)	−124.354*** (44.445)
Office Turnover	0.112*** (0.029)	0.112*** (0.028)	−53.650*** (15.712)	−55.195*** (15.100)
President's Rule	−0.118*** (0.026)	−0.125*** (0.026)	38.611*** (10.855)	43.903*** (9.843)
Seat Share Diff*Org Capacity		−0.158 (0.135)		121.072** (57.413)
Observations	902	902	902	902
R ²	0.094	0.100	0.038	0.044
Adjusted R ²	0.074	0.078	0.017	0.021

Note: clustered standard errors in parentheses.

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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