



Putin's Imperial Aspirations: How Russian Nationalism Drives Foreign Policy and Military Strategy

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Putin's Imperial Aspirations: How Russian Nationalism Drives Foreign Policy and Military
Strategy

C.J. Akins

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Abstract

Vladimir Putin became prime minister in 1999 and has been in federal office as either prime minister or president ever since. His control over Russian politics has cemented his position and furthered his influence over the culture. In this respect, Putin's nationalist views affect how he enacts foreign and domestic policy. This research examines the relationship between nationalism and Russian foreign policy and military strategy. An inductive analysis of Putin's primary sources characterized the nationalist and foreign policy themes into a set of nationalist institutional orders. These patterns showed four antagonistic approaches to foreign policy with other countries and international institutions: duplicitous cooperation, subversion, aggressive rhetoric, and overt aggression. These approaches advance Putin's historical views of Russian Imperial and Soviet boundaries, emphasizing the reunification of people of Russian ethnicity. Putin also views Russia as the successor to Imperial and Soviet status as one part of the bipolar world order established during the Cold War.

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my sister, Rebekah, for supporting me these past five years in getting my master's, proofreading nearly every paper, listening to every crazy idea, and being there through all the ups and downs. Thank you for everything.

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Chapter I.

Introduction

Russian foreign policy and military strategy are not immune to the influence of nationalism. Indeed, it is one of its worst offenders. President Vladimir Putin's autocratic policies are threatening the civil liberties of Russian citizens and are more openly hostile to neighboring countries, alliances, and regions than most of his international counterparts. This thesis seeks to answer the question: how has Russian nationalism influenced its foreign policy and military strategy since Putin gained national office in 1999 to the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine?

I hypothesize that Putin's beliefs around Russian society, history, and international position have been influential in Russia's provocative foreign policy against the United States, its aggressive military strategy against former Soviet republics, and its countercultural influence in international institutional orders to supplant the United States as the world hegemon and regain its prominence as one half of a bipolar world order.

A significant amount of research already exists on Putin's political and philosophical beliefs. Several scholars noted that Putin's views on Russian society emphasize an autocratic Russia based on illiberalism, orthodoxy, sovereignty, and opposition to the West.¹ Whereas Putin's autocratic government is a modern consensus of his leadership, Matthew Blackburn notes that this would not be possible without Russian

¹ McFaul, *Putin, Putinism, and the Domestic Determinants of Russian Foreign Policy*. Pg. 139.

imperial and Soviet history.² While imperial and Soviet governments differed substantially in ideologies, both established strong executive governments with few to no limits on their power.

Further research on civilization nationalism in Russia reiterates that Putin's principles are the driving force toward autocratic government and the negation of democratic governance.³ Whereas Putin's Russia creates a façade of democracy, most of the international community recognizes Russia's autocratic governance and support of other illiberal regimes. This creates a geopolitical dynamic similar to that of the Cold War in similar arenas in Eastern Europe, international institutions, South Asia, and the Middle East. This dynamic produced competing alliances between Russia and its authoritarian allies versus the United States and its allies from varying regimes. For example, in the Middle East, this resulted in Russia's continuing support for Syria and Iran, and Putin's pleas to recognize the Taliban government in Afghanistan for the sake of global stability and security.⁴ The most recent and daunting example is support for Russia from countries like China, Belarus, and Turkey after it invaded Ukraine while the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United States, and most of its allies have supported Ukraine in its defense of its country through their supply of weapons, technology, and humanitarian aid.⁵ Russia and China's burgeoning partnership poses the greatest concern to the liberal world order and the United States' hegemonic status,

² Blackburn, "Mainstream Russian Nationalism and the State-Civilization Identity: Perspectives from Below." Pg. 90.

³ Verkhovskii and Pain, "Civilizational Nationalism."

⁴ Troianovski, "Putin Takes Shot at West, but Says He'll Work to 'Normalize' Afghanistan."

⁵ Times, "Russia-Ukraine War."

especially as they pledge to establish a “Greater Eurasia” and an alliance against the United States’ hegemony.⁶

As Russia seeks to position itself as a superpower through military might and subversive foreign policy, it is important to examine the motivations, philosophical outlook, and ideological goals of Vladimir Putin. Whereas Putin’s foreign policy has always demanded respect for Russia’s place in global politics, his increasingly violent military strategy demonstrates his disregard for human rights, the rule of law, and the sovereignty of independent nations.

Nationalism Ascendant

The past two centuries saw the crumbling of empires and the rise of populist-led governments around the world. While centuries are a significant amount of time, those cataclysmic shifts in identity and the trajectory of national history have left many people with competing ideals, values, customs, and perspectives. As these competing identities have intensified within countries, a resurgence of nationalism has spread throughout the global community. These movements are present in countries like the United States, Japan, France, Germany, Poland, Brazil, India, Uganda, Venezuela, China, and Russia as well as many others.

It is significant when discussing these movements to note that many have established governing regimes with restrictive authoritarian governance, discriminatory practices, and combative foreign policy agendas. This distinction becomes more important as some of these ruling regimes reconsider their country’s stance on the use of

⁶ Bordachev, “Greater Eurasia and Russian Foreign Policy Priorities.” Pg. 603.

nuclear weapons and other forms of military engagement against neighboring countries and regions. Whereas a principle of non-nuclear engagement has existed since WWII, nationalist regimes like North Korea and Russia have increased their rhetoric around the use of these weapons as a deterrent to international involvement in their ongoing conflicts with neighboring countries. Moreover, nationalist regimes have increasingly sought to weaken or abandon regional or international institutions designed to stabilize the global community and prevent current or further conflicts from developing, worsening, or expanding.

The conceptualization of nationalism has been approached from multiple perspectives and often examines the relationship between nationalism and other facets of culture, like religion, geography, education, and history. Anna Triandafyllidou examined the evolution of nationalism and its study through four chronological periods corresponding to shifting international institutional orders and threats to the nation-state.⁷ Triandafyllidou's research offers a timeline of the study of nationalism as well as references to how scholarly literature came to include ethnicity, race, the current study of populism, and exclusionary statist nationalism. Roger Brubaker expands on this research by observing the emergence of an integrated field of study around ethnicity, race, and nationalism, which he describes as comparative, global, cross-disciplinary, and multiparadigmatic.⁸ Brubaker argues that ethnicity, race, and nationhood are not things in the world, but perspectives on it. This is similar to his discussion of one of the four approaches to studying nationalism and religion. In that religious approach, Brubaker

⁷ Triandafyllidou, "Contextualising Nationalism."

⁸ Brubaker, "Ethnicity, Race, and Nationalism."

posits that religion can be viewed as analogous to nationalism, the cause of nationalism, intertwined with nationalism, or its distinct kind of nationalism.

Francis Fukuyama builds upon this approach in his book, *Identity: The Demand for Dignity and Politics of Resentment*, by adding to the importance of shared language and the communication of ideas to further nationalism. Fukuyama summarizes the advent of nationalism's rise in Europe and particularly Germany through the communication of philosophical ideas to a newly literate population. Fukuyama goes on to define nationalism as "a doctrine that political borders ought to correspond to cultural communities, with culture largely defined by a shared language." His analysis details how the transition from a village community to an urban community due to the modernization of the economy caused a psychological dislocation leaving individuals yearning for the nostalgia of an imagined homogenous past without the divisions and confusions of a modern plural society.⁹ Fukuyama highlights that nationalism is the byproduct of massive social, economic, and political changes—a reoccurring phenomenon in Russian history.

Russian Nationalism

As previously noted, scholars like Michael McFaul observed that Russia's autocratic government has been largely shaped by Putin's ideas of illiberalism, orthodoxy, sovereignty, and the West.¹⁰ These principles are largely influenced by Putin's personal upbringing, education, and experiences. Several biographers have noted how Putin's upbringing in the Soviet Union gave him both a belief in the superiority of

⁹ Fukuyama, *Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment*. Pg. 55-65.

¹⁰ McFaul, *Putin, Putinism, and the Domestic Determinants of Russian Foreign Policy*. Pg. 139.

Russia as a major power as well as the belief that Russia has suffered from internal mismanagement and duplicitous promises from the West designed to weaken the country.

This complicated view of Russia's status is the result of an equally complicated history. Russia saw multiple revolutions and the massive social, economic, and political changes Fukuyama mentioned earlier. This analysis will focus on three major periods in Russian history: imperial Russia, Soviet Russia, and the Russian Federation (for this research, the provisional period is a preliminary beginning to the Soviet era). While Ivan the Terrible was crowned Tsar of Russia in 1547, Imperial Russia didn't begin until 1721, with Peter the Great establishing the Russian Empire to replace the Tsardom, building its new capital of St. Petersburg, and establishing rule over 5.7 million square miles. At the apex of its imperial history in 1866, Russia ruled over 8,803,000 square miles.¹¹ This period of Russian history is characterized by decades-long wars with other monarchical governments, the rule of the Romanov dynasty through generations of emperors and empresses, and the domination of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Scholars like Orlando Figues argue that Russia's revolutionary identity began to preliminarily form during the famine of 1891 which resulted in the increase of political involvement in local districts and a rise in literacy rates across the country.¹² However, most scholars recognize Russia's revolutionary identity starting in 1917 with the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II and the formation of a provisional government.¹³ Due to disorganization and infighting, the provisional government never held an effective Constituent Assembly and therefore never established a sustainable government. The

¹¹ Colton, *Russia: What Everyone Needs to Know*. Pg.13-30.

¹² Figues, *Revolutionary Russia: 1891-1991 A History*. Pg. 7-24.

¹³ Beevor, *Russia: Revolution and Civil War 1917-1921*; Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution*.

Bolsheviks led by Vladimir Lenin took advantage of this in 1917 and took power in the October Revolution. The next five years were dominated by the Russian Civil War and the establishment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1922.

After the death of Lenin two years later, Joseph Stalin took power and began a period of rapid industrialization, collectivization, and ascension into superpower status with Russia's involvement in WWII.¹⁴ This is especially true as Russia's identity as one of the defeaters of the Nazis took hold both domestically and abroad. During Stalin's rule, the USSR took in half a million square miles, annexed from neighboring countries.¹⁵ At the end of World War II, Russia entered the Cold War with an antagonistic relationship between the United States, NATO, and other US allies. This period is categorized by several ongoing themes: the advent of the nuclear arms race; both cold and hot wars in the Middle East, South Asia, Central America, South America, and Eastern Europe; the spread and combat of communism; and covert operations by both the US and Russia to undermine their adversary's viability as a global superpower.¹⁶

After decades of social and political change, the Soviet Union eventually collapsed in 1991, The Russian Federation rose as its successor with Boris Yeltsin becoming its first elected president. The nine years that Yeltsin was president were an unstable period in Russian history due to a massive economic depression, instability with the governance of the country, consolidation of presidential powers, and ongoing conflicts within its borders. In 1999, Yeltsin suddenly resigned. Putin became acting president after being recently appointed prime minister and Yeltsin's chosen successor.¹⁷

¹⁴ Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution*.

¹⁵ Colton, *Russia: What Everyone Needs to Know*. Pg. 52.

¹⁶ Powaski, *The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1917-1991*.

¹⁷ Short, *Putin*. Pg. 241-290.

Much like Yeltsin before him, Putin has sought ways to consolidate his power through regional control over the governor selection process, changing the tenure and term limit of the presidential office, and aggressive internal military tactics to quell rebellion or protest against separatists, protestors, or opposition seeking democratic reforms. Putin's military approach to neighboring countries became increasingly aggressive with invasions in Georgia, Crimea, and most recently Ukraine. Putin fortified alliances with countries opposed to the United States' democratic values and openly sought to oppose the liberal world order.

Russian History and Nationalism

Russia's imperial and Soviet history were formative foundations for Putin's administration. Their conquest over vast swaths of territory contributed to his belief that all Russian speakers should be within the same borders and that Crimea, Georgia, Ukraine, and other former territories of historical Russia should be a part of Russia. This is reminiscent of a less pluralistic political order, as Fukuyama suggested, while also recalling a "mythical past" in which Russia's strong state status was beneficial to its political leaders even though millions of Russians and Soviets suffered under the yoke of imperial and Soviet rule.¹⁸ Whereas Russian history has generally supported autocratic rule, the country's nationalism makes this support of authoritarian leaders like Peter the Great, Stalin, and Putin possible, and may explain why and where Putin's current expansionist military strategy could continue.

¹⁸ Fukuyama, *Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment*; Paxton, "The Five Stages of Fascism" Author (s): Robert O. Paxton Source : The Journal of Modern History , Vol . 70 , No . 1 (March 1998), Pp . 1-23 Published by : The University of Chicago Press Stable URL : <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/235001> Accessed."

Chapter II.

Defining Putin's Nationalism

This section will explore a comprehensive definition of current Russian nationalism and the facets of its societal influence. Understanding how Russian nationalism developed to its current status as well as contextualizing it through the previously discussed historical periods will be essential to examining the different mechanisms through which foreign policy and military strategy are rationalized and enacted.

Research Methods

To provide the most comprehensive analysis of how Russian nationalism affects Putin's foreign policy decision-making, a qualitative analysis of his speeches, interviews, writings, and policies where Putin references foreign policy will provide the coding rubric. This coding of Putin's rhetoric will generate a chronological timeline allowing for the comparison of foreign policy or military events corresponding with the themes of his nationalism.

My analysis of these sources will be divided into six chronological periods of Putin's leadership corresponding to his national offices: FSB director/first premiership (these positions are combined because of the relatively short periods in each position), acting president/first presidential term, second presidential term, second premiership, third presidential term, and his current presidential term. This analysis will consist of analyzing the primary sources by coding the language through the lens of nationalist

institutional orders and providing a thematic analysis for each of the periods of Putin's leadership as well as a cumulative analysis.

Putin's Periods of Leadership

According to several biographers and journalists, Putin has always had an affinity towards a strong state system, which has been evidenced in his career choices and eventual rise from obscurity to one of the most powerful men in the world.¹⁹ Before the six periods of this analysis, Putin was the only living child of parents born in St. Petersburg on October 7th, 1952. After graduating from Leningrad State University, he joined the KGB (State Security Committee) in 1975. He was then posted in Dresden, East Germany in 1984 where he worked for the Foreign Intelligence Service.

Putin returned to Russia in 1989 with the cover of deputy rector for the international affairs department at Leningrad State University while still working for the KGB. Two years later, he began working for Anatoly Sobchak, mayor of St. Petersburg, as the chairman of the committee on foreign relations. During that period, he resigned from his position with the KGB on the second day of the coup launched against President Mikhail Gorbachev. In 1996, Putin moved from St. Petersburg to Moscow to work for the presidential administration under Yeltsin. He was then appointed head of the Federal Security Service (FSB, federation successor of the KGB) in 1998.²⁰

While Putin did interact with foreign policy in these previous positions, his personal opinions on those policies are mostly unknown because of the confidential nature of his work with the KGB and because of his relative obscurity as a midlevel

¹⁹ Short, *Putin*; Hill and Gaddy, *Mr. Putin: Operative in The Kremlin*.

²⁰ Short, *Putin*. Pg. 257. Monitoring, "Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin." October 8, 1998.

official in St. Petersburg. The following periods have a greater wealth of analyzable material and are important in detailing Putin's rise to power.

FSB Director/First Premiership

During Putin's time as FSB Director and Prime Minister in 1998 and 1999, his main foreign policy concern was Russia's relationship with the West while the Chechen War proved the most pressing military priority. The most paramount issue for Yeltsin's administration was the expansion of NATO. The 2000 election added importance to this issue because a political changeover would likely lead to the feared expansion instead of the stagnation hoped for.²¹ These would be concerns that would carry over into Putin's acting/first term after Yeltsin's surprise resignation in 2000.

Acting/First Presidential Term

Early in Putin's acting term as president, his rhetoric would be indicative of his propensity towards consolidated power with his election slogan, "The stronger the state, the freer the individual."²² In August of 2000, Putin was heavily criticized for his handling of the Kursk submarine sinking in the Barents Sea. The incident killed all 118 crew members even though foreign assistance was offered by the American and European navies.²³

The following year, the Azerbaijani secret service would claim to have prevented an attack against him, and the Swiss firm Noga would attempt to seize his property in

²¹ Short, *Putin*. Pg. 257-277.

²² Monitoring, "Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin." February 25, 2000.

²³ Short, *Putin*. Pg. 324-329. Gessen, *The Man Without a Face*. Pg. 164-172.

connection with an alleged debt of the Russian government.²⁴ During this time, there was also a brief period of collaboration between the United States and Russia after the 9/11 attacks in Washington, DC, and New York.²⁵ However, this cooperation did not result in a lasting partnership after President Bush withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and invaded Iraq in 2003.²⁶

Second Presidential Term

On September 1, 2004, Chechen separatists stormed a school taking more than 1,000 children and adults hostage. Two days later, the siege ended with special forces storming the building and leaving 330 people dead.²⁷ A month later, Putin submitted a bill to the Duma canceling gubernatorial elections and consolidating power into the president's ability to appoint governors, and it was adopted two months later.²⁸ This period was also characterized by a continuing distrust of NATO and abandonment of international treaties like the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe.²⁹ Additionally, Putin accused the United States of establishing a "unipolar" world and imposing its beliefs on the rest of the world. His second term then culminated with a speech in January proclaiming Russia as an international superpower again and a final meeting with President George W. Bush before they both left their offices.³⁰

²⁴ Monitoring, "Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin." October 17, 2001.

²⁵ Short, *Putin*. Pg. 372-385.

²⁶ Hill and Gaddy, *Mr. Putin: Operative in The Kremlin*. Pg. 304.

²⁷ Monitoring, "Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin." September 1-3, 2004.

²⁸ Monitoring. October 4, 2004.

²⁹ Putin, "Transcript of Annual Big Press Conference." February 14, 2008.

³⁰ Monitoring, "Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin." January 8, 2008 & April 6, 2008.

Second Premiership

The day after leaving office, Putin's successor Dmitry Medvedev named him as prime minister. At the advent of his second premiership, Georgia launched a tank-led attack on the separatist capital of South Ossetia and air strikes on the pro-Russian South Ossetian Rebels.³¹ On August 8th, he met with President Bush about the ongoing hostilities in Georgia, and the next day made accusations against Georgia of perpetrating a "genocide" against the South Ossetian refugees.³² He accused the United States of provoking the war to win an election.³³ During this period, Putin addressed internal terrorist attacks happening within the country: a bombing that derailed a train between Moscow and St. Petersburg leaving 26 people dead, and a bombing in Moscow killing 39 people.³⁴ In December 2011, he accused US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton of setting the tone of protesters to oppose the results of the Duma elections.³⁵ At the beginning of 2012, he prepared to run for president again and defended the Russia-China veto of a UN resolution condemning Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.³⁶

Third Presidency

Putin's anti-Western attitude continued throughout his third term. Most notably, Putin would repeatedly claim that the United States and the West were interfering in the internal affairs of Russia.³⁷ This adversarial relationship with the US would continue

³¹ Monitoring. August 7, 2008.

³² Monitoring. August 9, 2008.

³³ Monitoring. August 28, 2008.

³⁴ Monitoring. November 27, 2009 & March 10, 2010.

³⁵ Hill and Gaddy, *Mr. Putin: Operative in The Kremlin*. Pg. 235.

³⁶ Monitoring, "Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin." November 27, 2011. Colton, *Russia: What Everyone Needs to Know*. Pg. 200.

³⁷ Short, *Putin*. Pg. 538-611.

through the Syrian Civil War with continuing support of Assad and providing military assistance including air strikes and military advisors. Closer to its border, Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. During this time, Putin's pro-Russian choice for president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovich, was ousted from power after switching economic alliances from a deal with the EU, as promised, to closer ties with Russia. Putin then used the event to invade Crimea, force a referendum, and annex the peninsula to Russia.³⁸

Fourth/Current Presidency

Putin's current term as the president faced some unprecedented challenges and some unprecedented aggression in response. One such challenge was the Coronavirus Pandemic as millions of people around the world sheltered at home and governments and private industries rushed to produce a viable vaccine.³⁹ During the pandemic, relations with Ukraine continued to deteriorate. This was compounded by Putin's paranoia and threats against NATO expanding its membership.⁴⁰

In January 2022, Russian forces began amassing near the Russian-Ukrainian border. On February 22, 2022, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Internationally, Ukrainians received overwhelming support from most countries. However, several countries have continued to support Russia in their invasion, most notably China which opposes the US' involvement and ongoing military and economic support for Ukraine (as well as for Taiwan).⁴¹

³⁸ Short. Pg. 577

³⁹ Monitoring, "Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin." March 25, 2020.

⁴⁰ Times, "Russia-Ukraine War."

⁴¹ Times; Monitoring, "Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin." September 15, 2022.

As the conflict continued, the list of war crimes committed by Russians continued to rise with millions of Ukrainians fleeing to neighboring countries for safety, thousands of civilians being killed by Russian forces, and constant and consistent threats of nuclear engagement from Putin.⁴² In addition to the threat of nuclear engagement, Putin leveraged Europe's reliance on Russian oil and gas to deter international involvement in the ongoing conflict.⁴³

Nationalism's Institutional Orders

Putin's decisions throughout these foreign policy and military events indicate a pattern of aggressive behavior towards the West, the United States in particular, and neighboring former Soviet and imperial Russian countries. To better understand this pattern and those nationalist behaviors and attitudes, the nationalist institutional orders used to produce a thematic analysis of these events will be the following:

References to one or more social, political, or economic crises. References to these catastrophic national events are indicative of circumstances within a state that make a nation vulnerable to authoritarian forces because of disillusionment with political systems and the democratic process.⁴⁴ These circumstances could include one or more of the following: a financial crisis, resource scarcity, public health crisis, natural disaster, the collapse of government institutions, war internally or with one or more countries, or domestic or foreign terrorism.

⁴² Times, "Russia-Ukraine War."

⁴³ Times.

⁴⁴Paxton, "The Five Stages of Fascism Author (s): Robert O . Paxton Source : The Journal of Modern History , Vol . 70 , No . 1 (March 1998), Pp . 1-23 Published by : The University of Chicago Press Stable URL : [Http://Www.Jstor.Org/Stable/10.1086/235001](http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/235001) Accessed."

A defined ideology with exclusionary institutional orders. These ideologies are designed to scapegoat groups for the hardships of the state and regulate a hierarchal structure based on the ideological author's perspectives on society. These hierarchal structures could include one or more of the following: racial hierarchy, patriarchal hierarchy, religious hierarchy, political or philosophical hierarchy, geographic hierarchy, or ethnic hierarchy.⁴⁵ These hierarchal structures impose a set of values meant to define a narrow view of the cultural outlook within a state.

The presence of oppressive, violent behavior. This behavior indicates calls to action and directives to enact violence on behalf of the exclusionary ideology espoused. These behaviors manifest in one or more of the following ways: systematic bodily harm to a targeted minority group(s), the passage of restrictive legislation specifically targeting one or more minority groups, or propaganda falsely placing blame on a minority group(s) for the aftereffects of a national crisis.

Aggressive foreign policy or military strategy against neighboring countries, regional alliances, or international institutions. The state exhibits these behaviors through one or more of the following: invasion of another country without just cause or provocation, crimes against humanity in another country, use of proxies to attack another country, or political maneuvers or actions meant to weaken or obstruct international institutions, regional alliances, or individual countries.

Calls or actions taken to restrict rights and liberties normally guaranteed in democratic states. The repeated calls or actions taken to restrict rights and liberties indicate an intention to delegitimize or illegalize opposition to the nationalist regime. The rights or

⁴⁵ Stanley, "Chapter 5: Hierarchy."

liberties restricted or curtailed could include one or more of the following: freedom of media, freedom of speech, restriction of information, freedom of association, ability to petition the government, free and fair elections, use of state-sanctioned violence, right to trial, freedom of religion, equality under the law, security, right to property, and gender equality.

Chapter III.

Putin's Periods of Power and Foreign Policy

To better understand how Putin's nationalism affects foreign policy and military strategy, it is essential to understand the parameters of the offices held by Putin, as well as the constitutional and extra-constitutional powers used to achieve his foreign policy and military goals. Reviewing this information will help illustrate the methods of achieving those goals and later demonstrate how nationalism influenced those motivations and provided rhetorical support or justification for those actions. Because the structure of the office of president and the dynamics of being prime minister changed over the decades Putin has been in office, Putin's tenure in each office requires analysis as well as the entirety of his time in the executive office.

Whereas other officials held the office of president or influenced Russian foreign policy (such as the foreign minister, ambassadors, prime ministers, and representatives to various international organizations), Putin held the longest and most impactful position over foreign policy and has the most centralized control over policy both domestically and abroad. Other officials have influenced and wielded it but not nearly to the same extent or with as much authority. The centralized authority of Putin's sustained position ensured that his agenda determined relations with major international actors. The progressive or regressive changes in these relationships help to demonstrate how nationalism's influence on foreign policy affected the current international order, strengthened authoritarian or democratic alliances, or maintained or disrupted the fragile

status quo of international agreements and institutions. Establishing these six periods is essential to understanding these relationships and the other factors discussed above.

Executive Positions under Yeltsin: FSB Director and Prime Minister

While Putin served in Yeltsin's administration before becoming FSB director, this position was his first foray into leading a federal agency, and an agency of great importance and prestige as the successor to the KGB.⁴⁶ Putin became FSB director in July of 1998 after a string of five less-than-desirable candidates were appointed and subsequently fired or resigned. Like his predecessors, Putin served in the position for a little less than a year. Unlike his predecessors, he made substantial progress in reforming the FSB by culling outdated systems and firing high-ranking officials, regardless of their prestige and military rank.

More pertinent to foreign policy, Putin concurrently served as Secretary of the Security Council in his new role, which drastically increased his influence in foreign policy and military strategy with an accompanying public spotlight. The most prominent example of that spotlight would be Putin's role in the incident at the Pristina airport on June 11, 1999, where Putin allegedly ordered Russian troops to take control of the airport ahead of the NATO troops arriving the next day.⁴⁷ Russia and NATO previously agreed upon a joint arrival for the combined peacekeeping force. While resolved peacefully, the incident heightened tensions between the two entities and potentially could have led to a violent confrontation.⁴⁸

⁴⁶ Short, *Putin*. Pg. 257-277.

⁴⁷ Hill and Gaddy, *Mr. Putin: Operative in The Kremlin*. Pg. 299-300.

⁴⁸ Short, *Putin*. Pg. 270-273. "Russian Security Chief: Cooperation, Not Confrontation in Kosovo."

Within six months of the incident, Yeltsin elevated Putin to prime minister. Putin retained his position on the Security Council and began more directly influencing foreign policy as the head of government. Putin could now see to the government's day-to-day affairs as well as nominate the federal ministers who would implement policies both foreign and domestic.

As prime minister, Putin could represent the government as an institution in foreign relations including with heads of state. One such meeting was with U.S. President Bill Clinton on September 12, 1999. Before the meeting, Yeltsin told Clinton that Putin would be replacing him as president within a few months.⁴⁹ Putin's meeting with Clinton mainly concerned the eastward expansion of NATO but also dealt with other global issues such as arms and nuclear treaties, Russia's relationship with North Korea, sanctions against Iran and Iraq, and terrorism in and from Chechnya.⁵⁰ Putin's meeting typified the duality of relations with Western partners during this period with duplicitous friendships and reverberations of Cold War sentiments while also trying to establish a new democratic force or at least a democratic facade.

Taking the Reins of Russia: Acting President and First Presidency

Part of Russia's new democratic structure should have been the practice of free elections to choose the next president. What occurred was the machinations of Yeltsin choosing his successor and elevating him to the post through a surprise resignation on December 31, 1999. Becoming acting president catapulted him into control of the Russian state and its election process, making it easier for him to be elected to his first

⁴⁹ Short, *Putin*. Pg. 279.

⁵⁰ "Memorandum of Conversation: Meeting with Prime Minister Vladimir Putin of Russia."

full term in March and assuming office in his own right on May 7th, 2000. Similarly, to his position as prime minister, Putin was able to represent the head of state in international relations with other countries. The distinct difference between the two positions was that Putin was now able to more definitely direct that foreign policy as president.⁵¹ Putin's diplomatic status as president now allowed him to conduct negotiations, sign ratification documents, sign international treaties, and appoint and recall diplomats. Whereas he had a supportive decision-making role with the military as prime minister, Putin became commander-in-chief of the armed forces which enabled him to issue military directives, direct defense policy, appoint the high command of the armed forces, order the mobilization of the military, pronounce martial law, and oversee the war industry.

During his debut presidency, Putin faced several foreign policy and military challenges. Closest to home was the Second Chechen War which began during his tenure as prime minister and lasted until 2009.⁵² This included several terrorist attacks by Chechen rebels within Chechnya itself, Dagestan, and several Russian cities. In 2001, terrorism became the focus of international discussion and cooperation after the 9/11 attacks in Washington DC, and New York City. Initially, Putin's prompt support to President George W. Bush and agreement to continually support the U.S. in its efforts against terrorism fostered amicable relations between the two countries.

However, the U.S.' subsequent invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq sparked major international concerns, especially for Putin, about the principles of international law and particularly sovereignty. The U.S. would later withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile

⁵¹ Short, *Putin*. Pg. 301-305. Colton, *Russia: What Everyone Needs to Know*. Pg. 111-112.

⁵² Monitoring, "Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin." August 10, 1999. "Russia 'Ends Chechnya Operation.'"

Treaty (ABM Treaty) because of those wars and the possibility of an attack from a terrorist group or adversarial state. Russia voiced major concerns about the withdrawal because it could create a significant nuclear imbalance and lead to another Cold War-like arms race. Russia could not afford this as Putin was concentrating the country's finances on paying back numerous loans to foreign countries and international institutions to bolster the economy and eliminate the Soviet-era debt.⁵³

To pay back this debt, Putin relied heavily on the export of oil and gas to former Soviet countries and European partners. While these economic partnerships strengthened relationships, NATO expansion threatened the fragile post-Cold War peace. Russia vehemently opposed the expansion of NATO, which Putin saw as a continuation of hostilities against a Soviet country that no longer existed. Previous administrations gave guarantees that there would be no NATO expansion for ten years. This promise was definitively broken at the end of Putin's first term when seven former Soviet and other Eastern European countries were admitted in March of 2004: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. With NATO now on Russia's border and an American invasion in the Middle East, Russia's concerns for its sovereignty intensified and further deferred its desired image as part of a multipolar world order.

U.S. Overreach and Russian Underhandedness: Second Presidency

NATO encroachment drove Putin to enact a foreign policy geared at shoring up Russia's sphere of influence through military and economic alliances. While Russia cooperated with Europe on oil and gas production projects such as its pipeline through

⁵³ Short, *Putin*. Pg. 376-377. Hill and Gaddy, *Mr. Putin: Operative in The Kremlin*. Pg. 133-134.

the Baltics, Putin primarily concentrated on relationships with former Soviet countries, especially in the Commonwealth of Independent States (C.I.S.), and authoritarian countries like Iran and China. Whereas Russia is the national successor of the USSR, C.I.S. is its successor as the sphere of influence over the other former Soviet republics. This includes military cooperation on defense issues and economic cooperation as a counterbalance to the European Union and economic juggernauts like China, India, and the U.S. However, the C.I.S. is much less unified than other regional governing bodies like the European Union.⁵⁴ These states frequently disagree with Russia's perspective and act independently in favor of their interests. During Putin's second presidency, Ukraine was a prime example of this behavior.⁵⁵

Ukraine was divided on whether to support closer ties with Europe or with Russia. Frequently, Ukrainian officials found it more beneficial to partner with Europe, economically and militarily than with Russia. The growing divide between the two countries was extremely concerning for Russia because of the significant investments made in the country, an ongoing oil and gas deal between the two, and concerns that Ukraine's European alliances would lead to further militarization on the Russian border. Therefore, Putin started to influence Ukrainian politics covertly and overtly.

The most prominent example of was Putin's support for the pro-Kremlin Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich when he ran for president. Unlike previous elections, Putin made several visits to Ukraine supporting Yanukovich. After surpassing the threshold in the first round of elections in 2004, Yanukovich was running against opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko, a pro-Western candidate who was against further integration into

⁵⁴ Hill and Gaddy, *Mr. Putin: Operative in The Kremlin*. Pg. 33-34.

⁵⁵ Colton, *Russia: What Everyone Needs to Know*. Pg. 100-101.

C.I.S., wanted more integration into Europe, and received support from U.S. and EU politicians. When the election occurred at the end of October 2004, many Yushchenko supporters and Western officials believed there was widespread election fraud. This led to the October Revolution where protesters demanded a rerun of the election, which was then ordered by the Ukrainian Supreme Court. In the new election, Yushchenko won the presidency as expected. This reversal was a major embarrassment for Putin and a hit to his influence in the other former Soviet republics.⁵⁶

Putin's rhetoric and diplomatic and military strategy became progressively more aggressive. One example of this would be Putin's alleged poisoning of an ex-FSB officer on British soil in 2006. Putin further strained relations by refusing to extradite the culprit, which led to the British expelling Russian diplomats from the country. In 2007, Russia withdrew from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. This would allow for Russia's military expansion and weapons development. Western politicians were concerned as Putin also developed stronger military alliances with authoritarian countries.

Later in 2007, Russia assumed patrol flights on their border and military exercises in the Mediterranean Sea after their joint military exercises with other countries in the Shanghai Cooperative Organization, a defense organization established by Russia and China in 2001. In addition to stronger ties with major powers like China, Putin strengthened ties with anti-Western countries such as Iran. While symbolically this was represented by Putin being the only Russian leader to visit since Stalin, these ties were intensified by political, economic, and military support. By the time Bush and Putin met

⁵⁶ Hill and Gaddy, *Mr. Putin: Operative in The Kremlin*. Pg.360-363.

in 2008 for their final meeting in Sochi about missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic, the relationship between Russia and the West was far more strained than it had been when Putin took office eight years before.⁵⁷

From President to Prime Minister

In May 2008, Putin was constitutionally required to leave the president's office. When Dmitry Medvedev, his chosen successor, assumed the presidency in his place, Putin resumed the premiership. Whereas Putin's premiership with Yeltsin was dependent on the direction of Yeltsin's vision for the country, the reverse was true for Medvedev's presidency with Putin's vision for the country still holding supremacy over Russian foreign and domestic politics. Philip Short and other scholars called this a tandemocracy because the prime minister and president shared responsibility over the country but offered a not-so-thinly-veiled impression that Medvedev was the country's leader. While out of the presidency, a constitutional amendment extended the presidential term from four to six years following the 2012 election. This façade of democracy ensured Putin's control of Russia once he regained office.

During Putin's second premiership, two major international events occurred concerning Russia: Russia's war with Georgia began in 2008, and Russia's backing of President Bashar al-Assad in the Syrian Civil War in 2011. Tensions with Georgia had been growing since the fall of the USSR in 1991. They finally came to a head in 2008. On August 1st, Russian-backed separatists in South Ossetia began attacking Georgian villagers with heavy weapons. The Georgian army units were sent into South Ossetia on

⁵⁷ Short, *Putin*. Pg. 365-430.; Hill and Gaddy, *Mr. Putin: Operative in The Kremlin*. Pg. 301-309.

August 7th to stop these attacks and took control of the separatist stronghold of Tskhinvali. Russian troops crossed the border on August 7th and launched military operations on August 8th.⁵⁸ Russia falsely claimed that Georgia was committing a “genocide” as their reason for intervening in South Ossetia. After several days of fighting and a second front opening up in Abkhaz, the conflict ended with President Sarkozy of France negotiating a ceasefire. Throughout the process, South Ossetian and Russian forces were allegedly responsible for war crimes including torture, inhuman treatment, and outrages upon personal dignity.⁵⁹

Russia’s military activities in Georgia would be far from the last time that Putin would align the country’s foreign policy with human rights violators. In 2011, the Arab Spring spread to Syria and led to large-scale protests against the Assad regime. After crackdowns on these protests by the Assad government, several armed groups began forming against the Syrian government. Within a year, the conflict escalated into a civil war with Western-, Arab-, and NATO-supported rebel groups fighting against the Russian-Iranian-supported Assad government. Russia blocked several American-led initiatives to end the conflict and to chastise the Assad government in the UN Security Council. These initiatives would have blocked a lucrative arms-sale relationship between the two countries and damaged a diplomatic relationship dating back to the USSR. The conflict would worsen as Putin’s tandemocracy with Medvedev ended and he resumed the presidency.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Monitoring, “Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin.” August 7, 8, 9, 2008.

⁵⁹ Short, *Putin*. Pg. 495-503. Abdallah, “Situation in Georgia: ICC Pre-Trial Chamber Delivers Three Arrest Warrants.”

⁶⁰ Short, *Putin*. Pg.555-559. Hill and Gaddy, *Mr. Putin: Operative in The Kremlin*. Pg. 309-311.

Redonning the Crown of State: Third Presidency

After Putin resumed the presidency in May 2012, Russia's aggression in the Syrian Civil War increased as well. Starting in 2015, Russia engaged in devastating air strikes and ground operations that targeted civilians and rebel groups alike. The attacks by the pro-Assad and Russian forces killed hundreds of thousands of citizens and completely demolished entire cities. The U.S. and other Western allies were limited in their interventions against such atrocities not wanting to be drawn into the conflict while also wanting to oppose the Islamist terrorist groups, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).⁶¹ This limited response from the U.S. and other Western allies, even after the discovery of Syria's use of chemical weapons allowed for Russia's subversion of the U.S.-led international institutional order.

During his third presidency, Putin sought numerous ways to undercut U.S. global leadership. Putin took one such opportunity when Edward Snowden disclosed the U.S. spying program. With Snowden's revelations in *The Guardian* and *The Washington Post*, he revealed the U.S. had numerous global surveillance programs. On June 23, 2013, Snowden landed in Moscow. For a month, he was restricted to the airport before receiving asylum from Russia. The disclosure undercut trust in American leadership, especially with its European partners like Germany because of revelations like US spying on Angela Merkel's cell phone.⁶² Putin also sought to undercut American leadership in Eastern Europe by expanding Russia's economic alliances with other former Soviet countries Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus by forming the Eurasian Economic Union.

⁶¹ McFaul, *Putin, Putinism, and the Domestic Determinants of Russian Foreign Policy*.

⁶² Short, *Putin*. Pg. 565-567. Hill and Gaddy, *Mr. Putin: Operative in The Kremlin*. Pg. 345-347.

Russia hoped that the EAEU would rival the European Union in political and economic power.⁶³

Putin was determined to deter the EU's and NATO's eastward expansion and was willing to show overt aggression to make that possible. In February 2014, Russia initiated its annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. After the Ukrainian president, Viktor Yanukovich, failed to sign the Ukraine-European Union Association Agreement, he was forced to flee the country over the resulting protests. Through misinformation and the use of unmarked Russian forces (aka little green men), Putin responded by taking over the Crimean government and installing a pro-Russian regime. Russia further inflamed tensions by supporting separatists in the Donbas region. Eventually, the conflict opened a new front in the Ukrainian war with Russian troops and separatists mobilizing in the area in 2014 and 2015. These constant instabilities and hostilities prevented Ukraine from joining NATO because of ongoing involvement in a conflict.

Using similar logic as he did in Georgia, Putin claimed that ethnic Russians were being persecuted in Crimea and that Ukrainian citizens wanted Russian intervention to be reunited with Russia. Putin further claimed that Crimea had always been a part of Russia and was only given to Ukraine as capitulation for the country agreeing to remain in the USSR. The West rejected this historical view and supported the interim government that deposed Yanukovich after he fled to Russia. The West reinforced this view by implementing sanctions against the Russian government.⁶⁴

Putin responded two years later by employing covert and cyber campaigns against those countries. The most prominent example of this was Russia's interference in the

⁶³ Bordachev, "Greater Eurasia and Russian Foreign Policy Priorities."

⁶⁴ Short, *Putin*. Pg.572-579. Colton, *Russia: What Everyone Needs to Know*. Pg. 182-240.

2016 U.S. presidential election. Russian cyber farms engaged in the creation of fake accounts promoting false information in support of Donald Trump, disparaging Hilary Clinton, organizing events, hacking into prominent Democratic political operatives, and releasing any damaging resulting material. While it cannot be conclusively shown that Russia determined the outcome of a Trump presidency, it is clear that Putin had an adversarial relationship with Clinton who criticized his leadership of Russia, human rights violations, military aggression, and foreign policy tactics. Once elected, President Trump was more amenable to Putin's views on foreign policy such as weakening support for NATO, more positive rhetoric about Putin and his leadership of Russia, and improvement in relations with North Korea.⁶⁵

Global State of Crisis: Current Presidency

Putin was reelected to his fourth term as president in 2018. Two years after his re-election, constitutional amendments were enacted to allow Putin to stay in office for 12 more years. These amendments also required future presidents to have lived in Russia for the past 25 years without having been a citizen or permanent resident of another country. These amendments were enacted to disqualify political opposition in the guise of national pride while also allowing Putin to stay in power which was supported by rhetoric about continued stability. The continued stability would be a hard argument to make as Putin's fourth term progressed and a global state of crisis ensued.

While Putin and Trump maintained a mostly positive relationship during their concurrent terms in office, global instability became the hallmark of international

⁶⁵ Short, *Putin*. Pg. 555-611. Lewis, "Geopolitical Imaginaries in Russian Foreign Policy: The Evolution of 'Greater Eurasia.'"

relations with the outbreak of COVID-19. In 2019, the first case of the virus showed up in Wuhan, China. Within a few months, cases were spreading across the globe and the World Health Organization declared COVID-19 a pandemic on March 11, 2020. Most countries established quarantine and masking regulations or guidelines to combat the spread of the disease, including Russia. A worldwide effort began to develop effective vaccines against the virus. The bulk of the vaccines come from research firms in the U.S., China, and Russia. Russia announced the first vaccine with the Sputnik V on August 11, 2020. However, there were several concerns about the efficacy of the vaccine and whether it was properly tested in such a short period. A large motivating factor for hastily rolling out the vaccine could have been the economic downturn during the time of quarantine and a desire to initiate a resurgence in the Russian economy.⁶⁶

Trump faced similar obstacles in 2020 while running for reelection. His response to COVID-19 was one of the prominent factors that contributed to his defeat by Joe Biden. Putin capitalized on Trump's false claims of election fraud and called into question whether Biden should be recognized as President. This put further strain on an already frayed relationship between the two leaders. Furthermore, Biden supported NATO engagement and expansion, which Putin was vehemently opposed to. Beginning in 2021, Russia began amassing troops on the Ukrainian border. In December 2021, U.S. intelligence officials released reports of Russia's impending invasion. On February 24th, the invasion commenced with missiles and airstrikes within minutes of Putin's announcement of a special military operation. Putin's familiar claims of Russophobia and

⁶⁶ Monitoring, "Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin." August 11, 2020.

persecution of ethnic Russians resurfaced in this conflict. Putin claimed that this operation was an attempt to “demilitarize and denazify” Ukraine.⁶⁷

Foreign Policy and Military Strategy Approaches

Putin has been in power for nearly a quarter century. While he made substantial progress in shoring up the economic health of Russia from where it had been in the 1990s, his legacy will now be forever linked with the multiple and catastrophic invasions of neighboring former Soviet countries. From his actions, it is evident that Putin opposes a U.S.-led international order, opposes the growth of economic and military alliances like NATO and the EU, and is willing to partner with other autocratic regimes to sustain Russia’s influence and development of its identity as an opposing multipolar world order. Observing the tenure of Putin’s regime, I determined there are two categories of his foreign policy and military strategy: cooperative and antagonistic.

Cooperative Approaches

Whereas Putin has definitively created an antagonistic persona for himself in global politics, there are areas where he actively cooperates with foreign countries and institutions to achieve mutually beneficial goals:

Mundane Cooperation. Mundane cooperation is an approach where Russian foreign policy deals with day-to-day issues that require collaboration for usually economic or security reasons. Examples of this could be visas for workers traveling between countries such as Germany and Kaliningrad which is separate from the Russian mainland. Another

⁶⁷ Putin, “Address by the President of the Russian Federation.”; Short, *Putin*. Pg. 656-665.

example could be economic cooperation that ensures the steady flow of oil and gas between neighboring countries or regions. While we will later explore how the control of exports could also be used as a tool of control, many countries still receive or did receive oil and gas from Russia daily and maintain a steady supply of the resources.

Mutually Beneficial. Mutually beneficial cooperation is an approach that requires collaboration between two or more parties where the end goal provides economic, diplomatic, or security benefits. For example, negotiations or agreements on intelligence sharing were beneficial for fighting terrorism after the attacks in Moscow, New York, and Washington D.C. These mutually beneficial arrangements can change over time as relationships between countries become more antagonistic.

Common Goal. The pursuit of a common goal between multiple parties requires a cooperative effort. Examples of this include the earlier example of fighting terrorism but could also include other international goals like reducing the effects of climate change, nuclear nonproliferation (although this can also change as the relationship becomes more antagonistic), and even Russia's membership in the World Trade Organization.

Common Enemy. Cooperation in fighting against a common enemy or a problem that threatens the interests of both countries or as part of a multilateral alliance. A historical example of this would be Russia, the U.S., and the U.K.'s alliance against Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and Fascist Italy. Early examples could also be Russian and NATO cooperation in ending the Kosovo conflict which threatened to destabilize both regions.

Antagonistic Approaches

Antagonistic approaches emphasize the superiority of Russia's vision for a global world order where Putin can determine its borders by his interpretation of shared history, language, and culture. These approaches adversely affect the other parties in the international event in favor of advancing Russian national interests.

Duplicitous Cooperation. Duplicitous cooperation is an approach that is deceptively similar to the cooperative approaches. However, it is an agreement to common goals that also has a turnback or double-speak to Russian national interests such as undercutting American leadership or subverting the international order. Duplicitous cooperation could also be a facade of cooperation while taking covert actions to undercut the effectiveness of the partnership in favor of Russian interests.

Subversion. Subversion is about actively undermining international or regional institutions or foreign adversaries such as U.S. global leadership, the growth and effectiveness of the E.U., and the expansion or validity of NATO. Subversion is also about creating, sustaining, or strengthening parallel organizations that are beneficial to Russian interests, which could be Russian-led organizations like the Collective Security Treaty Organization or the Commonwealth of Independent States or it could be led by other American-antagonistic organizations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization led by China.

Aggressive Rhetoric. Aggressive rhetoric refers to threatening rhetoric intended to dissuade or intimidate foreign adversaries from a particular course of action that may be averse to Russian interests or to ensure compliance with Russia's demands. For example,

Russia's nuclear threat against Western allies of Ukraine is meant to deter the international community from intervening in the conflict.

Overt Aggression. Overt aggression means that Russia has taken military action, used paramilitary groups, or deployed cyber warfare against a group, country, or region to further Russian goals or interests. The most prominent examples of overt aggression were Russia's invasion of Georgia, Crimea, and Ukraine but other examples could include Russia's airstrikes in Syria and the use of cyber espionage to interfere in the 2016 U.S. election.

Chapter IV.

Putin's Nationalism

This chapter will discuss the results of the analysis of Putin's rhetoric and its relationship to nationalism and his foreign policy approaches. After analyzing 103 primary sources from across 24 years of Putin's time in various federal offices, passages were tagged with corresponding nationalist or foreign policy-related themes through an inductive analysis developed through their reading and analysis. These themes were then categorized into the nationalist institutional orders introduced in Chapter II: crises, identities and ideologies, oppression and supporting rhetoric, aggressive foreign policy, authoritarian governance, and allusions to a mythical past. The following analysis observed how often these themes emerged in speeches as well as the progression of how these developed through Putin's various offices: 1999-2000 as prime minister, 2000-2004 as president, 2004-2008 for his second term, 2008-2012 for his second premiership, 2012-2018 for his third term as president, and 2018-2022 for his current presidential term. The relationship between these nationalist institutional orders and Russian foreign policy and military strategy is important because it illustrates Putin's motivations, rationale, and modus operandi for interactions with countries, regions, and institutions.

Nationalist Institutional Orders

Nationalism is about identification with one's nation's support for its interests, especially to the exclusion or detriment of the interests of other nations. The sources analyzed were chosen for their relation to foreign policy and military strategy. While these sources were directed to Russian and international audiences, because of extensive

media attention on Russia and Putin's leadership, most of these sources were consumed by both audiences. Whereas Putin tailors his rhetoric to specific objectives during these speeches, it is obvious that he recognizes their proliferation by the international media requires a balance between appealing to his political base and recognition from foreign governments and international institutions. This dichotomy creates several instances of hypocrisy and accusations against the international community.

Crises

Putin based many of his justifications for his foreign policy and military actions as a response to a crisis. These crises referenced Russia's past, present, or potential future social, economic, political, or security threats. References to these crises created the premise for extraordinary actions or a centralizing of authority to respond swiftly and effectively, even as these responses came at the cost of Russia's citizens, international institutions, or foreign partners. Putin refers to three main categories of crisis: international order, ethnic, and threats to sovereignty.

International order crises: Putin referenced these crises to emphasize a threat to the stability of the international order and an undermining of Russia's standing within it. From 2002 to 2022, Putin referred to an external foreign enemy 23 times with references to competing countries with geopolitical ambitions, terrorism, foreign influence in internal political processes, and adversarial military alliances like NATO. This helped to justify military expansion including Russia's nuclear arsenal, discriminatory immigration policies, and support of authoritarian alliances like Syria in the fight against terrorism. From 2020 to 2022, Putin referred to a Western conspiracy against Russia at least five times about such events as US and NATO support for Ukraine in the Crimean conflict

and the Ukrainian War in 2022, the doping scandal in the 2008 Olympics, and other subsequent sporting competitions, claiming direct conspiracies against Russian allies like Belarus, and references to Britain's initial cooperation with Nazi Germany as evidence of a conspiracy against the Soviet Union as well as a similar pattern of cooperation existing in today's governments with alleged Nazis in Ukraine. From 2014 to 2022, Putin referenced a resurgence of Nazism in five sources. These references are his justification for the invasion of Georgia and Ukraine, and Russia's support of the separatist groups fighting there.

Ethnic Crises: The references to Nazism are how Putin reinforces the assertion that foreign governments are targeting ethnic Russians. These are crises in which Russia is under threat from foreign governments interfering in domestic society to ferment conflicts between different ethnic groups or foreign governments targeting Russian-speaking citizens with state-sanctioned discriminatory regulations or violence. From 2012 to 2016, Putin refers to the risk of ethnic conflict in three of the sources analyzed stating that external enemies are fermenting this discord to disrupt the unity of the country and are committing genocide against ethnic Russians. Putin's defense of his discriminatory immigration policies referenced his need for the cohesion of the country's unity, which would be disrupted by non-ethnic Russian immigrants.

Sovereignty-related crisis: Putin referred to several sovereignty-related crises because he believed Western countries were committing the referenced atrocities to weaken Russian support. These references alluded to a distortion of sovereignty as a basic principle of international law. These crises referred to external threats to Russia's society, security, and sovereignty. Putin makes two explicit references to compromised

Russian security between 2021 and 2022, which he uses as justification for the invasion of Ukraine because of NATO's eastward expansion in Europe and Western political, economic, and military support for Ukraine. From 2014 to 2022, Putin made four references to Ukrainian protestors as nationalists and equated them to terrorists committing a coup d'état against President Viktor Yanukovych after being pressured into exile in Russia for supporting closer ties with the Kremlin rather than the European Union. Putin asserted that these protesters were supported by Western governments in an attempt to undermine Russia's influence over Yanukovych and destabilize his regime in Ukraine.

Identities and Ideologies

For Putin to create these crises, he needed to exploit Russian identities and ideologies to consolidate his view of the country and its place in the world order. These themes are essential components of Putin's ideology and belief system used in making policy decisions. The three main components of this institutional order are culturally based ideology, historical identities, antagonistic international ideology, and an international order protector identity.

Culturally based ideology: This ideology refers to Putin's belief that people of a similar culture should be administered or live under the control of a central authority. In this case, ethnic Russians should live under the control of the Russian government, whether that is through international influence or reunification with the Russian state. Thirty-five sources from 2001 to 2022 mention Russian ethnicity concerning people outside of Russia who speak Russian with a shared history, culture, and religious

background. It was the main justification used for overt aggression against Ukraine on the mainland and Crimean Peninsula, as well as northern Georgia.

Putin took several steps to further enhance those cultural connections through cultural imperialism and increasing the presence of Russian history and language in neighboring countries. From 2013 to 2022, Putin refers to foreign or domestic policy programs geared toward establishing Russian as the national language; exporting the teaching of Russian to former Soviet countries; promoting Russian art, history, and orthodox religious beliefs; and the Russification of immigrants domestically. By building up these cultural components in neighboring former Soviet/Imperial countries, Putin hoped to cement pro-Russian populism within the populations. From 2014 to 2022, Putin encouraged or supported Georgian and Ukrainian separatists in favor of Russian reunification.

From 2001 to 2022, Putin emphasized the importance of Russian orthodoxy as part of Russian ethnicity, with nine sources referencing orthodox ideology. This was further emphasized by Putin's role in the reunification of the orthodox church outside of Russia in 2007. These are components of Putin's push to create a defined ideology, a daunting task he has been trying to accomplish to stabilize the country after the fall of the Soviet Union. From 1999 to 2017, nine sources referenced components of that defined ideology which is centered around promoting national unity, the reunification of Russian speakers, defined common national values, and promotion of Russian ethnicity under the guise of pluralism.

Historical Identities: Putin's institutional orders are derived from the belief that Russia's history should drive the progression of its policy decisions in the future. In this

regard, Putin strongly believes in focusing on the strong side of Russian history and discounting those themes that are conciliatory or promote a perceived weakened position for Russia.

Whereas it may seem antithetical to Putin's beliefs to espouse anti-Stalinist sentiments because of the dictator's position in Russian history, Putin often expressed disparaging views of Joseph Stalin. From 2008 to 2022, Putin made statements in ten speeches admonishing the Soviet leader in the guise of anti-authoritarianism and his near destruction of the Orthodox Church. This view helped to create a façade of democratic values.

Putin similarly espoused disparaging views of Vladimir Lenin because he handled the 1917 revolution and the breakup of the Russian Empire including the loss of Finland and Ukraine. For this reason, Putin also made hypocritical pro-Stalinist comments about the policies he enacted to re-expand the Soviet Union and its influence over the lost Russian Empire territories as well as Russia's projection of strength in WWII and the defeat of the Nazis. Throughout Putin's time in federal office, the majority of his foreign policy focused on retaining influence over former Soviet Union or Russian Empire countries with fifty-one of the speeches made between 1999 and 2022 focusing on one or more of those countries.

Antagonistic International Ideology: Putin once called the fall of the Soviet Union the greatest geopolitical mistake in Russian history. He largely blamed Western partners for the hardships suffered after the government collapsed. This sentiment created an antagonistic international ideology opposed to the current US-led world order. Throughout Putin's time in federal office, twenty-five of his primary sources included the

theme of distrust of foreign influence. This referred to international institutions exploiting Russian economic weakness after the collapse of the Soviet Union, distrust of foreign politicians' comments on Russian elections, claiming that non-governmental organizations who dissent are influenced by foreign entities, shifting blame to foreign influence for the conflict in Chechnya, and distrusting foreign cooperation between Ukraine and any Western ally, especially the United States.

From 2014 to 2021, Putin expressed in nine sources anti-European Liberalism sentiments such as European support for Viktor Yushchenko over Yanukovych, a distrust of Ukrainian-EU ties, European support of sanctions against Russia, and Europe's opposition to Russia's military campaign in Syria. Putin often used Western arguments as a guise against foreign policy agendas he disagreed with. This theme can be seen in his anti-nationalist guise in five sources from 2014 to 2022. In these cases, he referenced opposition to the Orange Revolution Ukrainian protesters he termed as nationalists as well as Ukrainians in support of independence in 1917 and 1990. This is while also hypocritically denying his brand of Russian nationalism and support of an ideology based on Russian ethnicity.

International Order Protector Identities: Whereas an antagonistic ideology is about the distrust of Western values, Russia's international order protector identities are about its status in the global community. These identities are about leveling the playing field with the United States in an attempt to reject the idea of American hegemony. Most often the identity that Putin tried to project is the international order protector. This identity existed throughout Putin's time in federal office from events like the NATO-Kosovo standoff in 1999 to the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States to American

withdrawal from various troop, weapons, and nuclear proliferation treaties. Within this identity, Putin claims the persona of taking international actions to protect international law and norms. He claimed that more aggressive nations like the United States and their Western allies ignore or act hypocritically towards those norms.

By equating Russia to an international order protector, Putin claimed the Soviet Union's role as the US' polar opposite as Russia was the national successor to the Cold War world order. Putin references the multipolar order thirty-two times from 2000 to 2017. This identity is coupled with references to Russia's great power status which emphasizes its influence over other countries and regions, as a bulwark to the United States, and a leader in international institutions like the United Nations.

Putin referenced thirty-seven sources over the same period to become a Eurasian Leader. This identity highlights the unique political and geographic position of Russia spanning two continents, building relationships with European nations as well as China and the Middle East for economic and security purposes that weaken some of the US' diplomatic arsenal against Russia such as sanctions and denying attendance at international institutions like the G8. Even before the imposition of sanctions, Putin referenced being an economic protector in twenty-four speeches. This identity projected the idea that Russia advocated for a fair global market as it competed against American, Asian, European, and Middle Eastern markets for oil and gas as well as other goods. Putin projected this identity to reinforce at home and abroad that Russia does not plan to fall into the same economic collapse it experienced after the fall of the Soviet Union.

In addition to competing with these countries economically, Putin recognized that his legitimacy as a global leader is tied to the political processes of Russia. Therefore,

Putin attempted to build a façade of democracy in which elections were considered fair and votes were untampered with and cast with no fear of reprisal, even though almost all international election organizations agree that this was far from the truth. From 2012 to 2022, sixteen of Putin's primary sources referenced the electoral process of Russia and defended it as democratic. While this veneer does little to increase the global community's assessment of Russia's democracy, Putin still looked for ways to assert Russian legitimacy and superiority. Putin claimed victory over two such areas in the size of its nuclear arsenal and its alliance with Syria against terrorism. This ignored the atrocities committed by the Syrian government against its people and instead touted Russian leadership as more effective than the US' previous attempts in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Oppression and Supporting Propaganda

Russia's support of Syria reinforces Putin's belief in the sovereignty of other authoritarian regimes and their ability to trample human rights. Most importantly, this mutual support gives Putin an ally in his oppressive treatment of Russia's citizens and an ally in propagating oppressive rhetoric and propaganda in domestic and foreign policy.

Oppressive Rhetoric: Putin's oppressive rhetoric was designed to deter any internal dissension or external criticism that would jeopardize his leadership, control over the country, or foreign policy agenda. While Putin continued to interfere with Russia's internal elections to maintain these priorities, he recognized that without internal support the Russian populace could depose him like other populaces have done or attempted to do in countries like Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Turkey.

For Putin, this meant having to deny actions taken or even the existence of problems in the country altogether. From 2002 to 2021, five sources utilized this tactic when discussing foreign policy events such as denying weapons crossing the border into Russia in 2002, stating violence ceased in Chechnya in 2003 (violence continued well into 2009), denying that Russian hostilities over the pipeline contributed to strained relations with Poland in 2008 (this was after Russia's invasion in Georgia), denying Russian involvement in US election interference in 2018, and denial of cyber warfare and technological cooperation with Iran in 2021.

This should be differentiated from Putin's outright use of falsehoods to promote the narrative or façade most suitable to his oppressive needs. From 2007 to 2022, sixteen of Putin's primary sources reference an outright falsehood. While this is not a comprehensive list of all the falsehoods made by Putin in public statements or written articles, some of these examples provide insight into the breadth and depth of subjects Putin is willing to lie about, such as declaring the Soviet transfer of power was completely peacefully ignoring the August coup in 1991, denying any involvement by the Russian government in the death of former-KGB agent Alexander Litvinenko, denying the presence of Russian troops in Georgia in 2008, denying the presence of Russian troops in Crimea in 2014, claiming that Russian troops were in Crimea in 2015 to ensure the legitimacy of the vote on the referendum, claiming in 2017 that Ukraine was never an independent state, and denying Syria's use of chemical weapons despite substantial evidence to the contrary.

Whereas Putin's falsehoods were about directly contradicting the truth, Putin's use of propaganda was a way of initiating an emotional response from his audience

whether that was fear, pride, connection, etc. Putin's use of propaganda extended to both internal and external audiences through speeches and articles written and published in the Russian and foreign press. Putin consistently used propaganda throughout his time in federal office with the theme appearing in twenty-three of the sources analyzed. Most of the propaganda referenced was used to reinforce the ethnic connections between Russia and other former Soviet Union countries, especially Ukraine. This usually entailed the promotion of the Russian language, a shared history between the countries, and emphasizing foreign influences as leading to ethnic divisions. This was particularly pertinent to Putin's assertion about Western countries allowing the re-Nazification and militarization of Ukraine to weaken Russia. As previously mentioned, Russia takes great pride in identifying as the defeaters of the Nazis. Therefore, Putin's use of propaganda to forewarn the return of Nazism in Ukraine was supposed to elicit anger and fear at the potential return of an old enemy and prompt a desire to protect the ethnic Russians living there because of their shared connection through language, culture, and history.

Oppressive actions: Putin's use of oppressive rhetoric and propaganda underpins his oppressive actions in Russia and discriminatory actions against non-ethnic Russians. Putin references these actions throughout his time in federal office with the main categories of these actions being the restriction of minority rights, discriminatory immigration, domestic use of violence, and human rights violations. During Putin's third term as president, his speeches and interviews began referencing the restriction of LGBTQIA rights, specifically referring to them as "sexual minorities" or homosexuals. Putin's references to the restriction of rights often highlighted that doing so was for the protection of Russian children. He alluded to homosexuality as pedophilia and

emphasized that support for LGBTQIA rights was the result of outside influence rather than produced by Russian compatriots. Putin equated this support to an invasive foreign culture that needed to be combatted with orthodox values.

Furthermore, Putin was fearful of foreign influence from immigrants coming into the country from non-former-Soviet countries (i.e. non-ethnic Russians). The main reason for this was wanting to ensure that those immigrating to the country would not disrupt Russia's culture. This included hypocritical discriminatory practices against the acceptance of Syrian refugees after the devastation of several Syrian cities by the Assad, rebel, and ISIS assaults, as well as Russian airstrikes.

The airstrikes and support for the Assad regime even after evidence of chemical weapons use were not the only examples of Putin's support or perpetration of human rights violations. Throughout the Second Chechen War, Russia engaged in war crimes such as assassinations and extrajudicial imprisonment. China's similar extrajudicial imprisonment and re-education of the Uyghur people received support from Putin as well.

Antagonistic Foreign Policy

The previous chapter detailed the differences in Putin's cooperative and antagonistic foreign policy. This section will focus on the nationalist themes or motivations evident in the antagonistic foreign policy approaches.

Duplicitous Cooperation: Duplicitous cooperation is an agreement to common goals that also has a turnback or double-speak to Russian national interests such as undercutting American leadership or subverting the international order. Duplicitous cooperation could also be a façade of cooperation while also taking covert actions to

undercut the effectiveness of the partnership in favor of Russian interests. Duplicitous cooperation is the most prolific theme throughout Putin's time in office with sixty-three sources being identified as possessing one or more references. Putin often referred to common goals or common enemies between individual countries as well as the international community. Examples included references to terrorism, global warming, global economic cooperation, and the recent COVID-19 pandemic. However, corresponding foreign policy events show that Putin wanted support for his actions in Chechnya or further Russian influence in the Middle East, continuing to utilize fossil fuels as a means of driving the economy, controlling the conditions of the bilateral relations or the global market to benefit Russia, and seeking to outpace the United States in vaccine development, respectively.

During his third and fourth presidential terms, Putin appealed to American populism in five of the sources analyzed. These appeals referenced American populist opposition to America's involvement in Syria, claimed that American foreign policy is crafted to benefit one party over the other, trumpeted Donald Trump as the candidate who appealed to working-class voters, and portrayed Joe Biden as appealing to elitists. This was a long way from Putin's appeals to the West for foreign investment in the early years of his presidency. Because of Russia's economic success, Putin instead touted the paying off of foreign debt in a speech in 2015 as an example of superiority.

Putin achieved economic success by superseding Russian interests over cooperative economic collaboration. Two such methods for doing so included using exports and imports as tools of control. Because oil and gas have been necessities for Europe's market since Putin took federal office, he took advantage of the demand

scenario to persuade, pressure, and demand economic negotiations best suited to Russia's selling position, especially related to Ukraine and Georgia's supply terms. Conversely, Putin also used the import of goods as a tool of foreign policy to build connections between Eastern European and Asian countries, to deny revenue to adversaries, or to cause embarrassment such as with Russia's denial of American meat products because of sanitation concerns.

Subversion: Subversion is about actively undermining international or regional institutions or foreign adversaries as well as creating, sustaining, or strengthening parallel organizations that are beneficial to Russian interests and led by Russia or another American antagonist. The primary goal of Russian subversion is to challenge American hegemony. Throughout Putin's time in federal office, he pointed to American aggression as a threat to the international order. Putin most often referenced the American invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan as examples.

Because NATO was founded through American leadership, Putin equated NATO expansion as another form of American aggression, and subsequently any movement to add members or allow military support is equated as American aggression as well. In 2012 and 2014, Putin pointed to the imposed sanctions after the death of Sergei Magnitsky, a Russian dissident exposing government corruption, and the invasion of Crimea, respectively, as further examples of American-led aggression. After returning to the presidency for his third term, Putin began correlating American aggression with American failure, often highlighting America's failure of leadership in his public speeches and articles. This included examples like America's withdrawal from the ABM and INF Treaties, the rise of terrorist groups out of Iraq and Afghanistan after the 2003

invasion, the creation of power vacuums in Iraq and Libya, and alleging that the US ignored democratic norms in providing monetary support to the protesters during Yanukovych's removal and exile from power.

Putin alleged that America frequently engaged in nation-building, citing examples in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Ukraine as well as referencing influencing regime change in Libya after the death of Muammar Gadhafi. This ignored the several instances of Putin's exertion of influence through foreign proxies such as his support of separatists in the Donbas region in Ukraine, support of separatists in Georgia, support of Viktor Yanukovych as the pro-Kremlin candidate for Ukraine's presidency, and Lukashenko as the pro-Kremlin candidate in Belarus. This foreign control through proxy was designed to increase Putin's support as a foil to American leadership. Putin gained additional support through the establishment and maintenance of alliances with other authoritarian leaders like China, North Korea, Iran, Syria, Chechnya, etc. From 2006 to 2022, Putin made supportive comments about the leaders of these countries or Russian republics in 24 sources.

Aggressive Rhetoric: Aggressive rhetoric refers to threatening rhetoric intended to dissuade or intimidate foreign adversaries from a particular course of action that may be averse to Russian interests or to ensure compliance with Russia's demands. The main area where aggressive rhetoric became apparent was NATO. Whether threatening the alliance's eastward expansion or countries gaining closer military ties, Putin always opposed the alliance. Putin often referred to NATO as an outdated relic of the Cold War that continues to act as a provocateur rather than increasing regional stability. Most concerning to Putin was the presence of US nuclear weapons in NATO countries.

While the invasions of Georgia or Ukraine were acts of overt aggression, Putin's rhetoric around the use of nuclear weapons should NATO, the US, or any other Western country interfere was aggressive rhetoric meant to deter international involvement.

Overt Aggression: Overt aggression is about how Russia took military action, used paramilitary groups, or deployed cyber warfare against a group, country, or region to further Russian goals or interests. The most obvious examples of this type of aggression are the invasions of Georgia, Crimea, and Ukraine. However, it is pertinent to note that for these invasions Putin forced Russia to don a guise of peacekeeping to justify the direct military action in the country. Similarly, Putin equated Russia's actions in Chechnya to defeating international terrorists. This logic was also used to justify the airstrikes in Syria. In all of these cases, Russia utilized overt aggression to advance its national interests such as retaking Soviet territory or re-exerting influence over the Middle East. Doing so in the guise of peacekeeping was Putin's attempt to gain international legitimacy for Russia's action and hypocritically refute any dissension as opposing the protection of citizens in these countries.

Authoritarianism

Authoritarianism is about the concentration of power at the cost of collective and individual freedoms. While Russia's authoritarianism is about domestic restrictions, it is important to note that these restrictions do influence the allies Putin chooses, the façade of democracy he projects to the international community, and how he shifts blame to international influences rather than internal discontent. Throughout Putin's time in federal office, he defended the concentration of power as a positive force for the Russian people. One example of this was the president's ability to appoint governors rather than

them being elected. Putin alleged that this was to help curtail corruption, but, in reality, was a method of making the governors answerable to the president and strengthening the federal center. The regional consolidation was just part of Putin's removal of democratic norms over his tenure. Putin instated election rules limiting who could and could not run for the presidency, which were designed to limit competition and ensure his maintenance of power.

From 2004 to 2016, fifteen sources analyzed referenced election controls with claims that the elections were not unduly influenced or manipulated, that closer controls over the Duma and presidential elections ensured fairness, that he was more concerned with Russia's future than with the integrity of democratic institutions, and that he equated dissension of his leadership to dissident nationalism. This was part of Putin's efforts to deter dissension of his leadership. Throughout his time in federal office, sixteen of the primary sources analyzed had a reoccurring theme of deterring dissension. Putin made claims that dissension would destabilize the country, and weaken its global position, that it came from foreign nefarious sources, and that it therefore required the detaining and jailing of journalists and political opponents.

Because of the assertion that dissension came from foreign sources, Putin argued that he has the legal power to detain individuals like Alexi Navalny for acts of treason. Putin used this legal power justification in foreign policy matters as he denied the extradition of individuals involved in the hacking of the 2016 US election and argued that the Minsk Agreement gave him the authority to interfere in the Donbas region of Ukraine. Putin's aversion to dissension's weakening of the state was how he rationalized the restriction of media and speech, which he also equated to nefarious foreign influence.

While Putin's rhetoric was oxymoronic concerning the façade of democratic values and the concentration of state power, both narratives served his goals of maintaining power over the country and promoting Russia as a foil of American leadership.

Mythical Past

The claims Putin made to support his domestic and foreign policy agenda required an adherence to a specific interpretation of history. This was what Robert Paxton called a mythical past.⁶⁸ This adherence fortified Putin's argument that the former Soviet Union and former Russian Empire countries were a unified state that desired their reunification and embraced Russia's unique pluralism. That assumption ignored the history of countries opposed to Russian or Soviet domination. However, Putin's efforts to create a unified Russian history curriculum emphasized his belief in the importance of a revisionist history to support the idea of reunification. Putin referenced the concept of a Russian/Soviet diaspora in twenty sources. This diaspora described how ethnic Russians living in other former Soviet countries found themselves outside of Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union. Putin claimed that the separatists in Ukraine, Crimea, and Georgia as well as other ethnic Russians desired the ability to be able to return to Russia. His appeal to a mythical past undergirds the reasoning for Putin's invasions in these countries, even though it is based on a false narrative driven by Russian national interests and pride.

⁶⁸ Paxton, "The Five Stages of Fascism Author (s): Robert O . Paxton Source : The Journal of Modern History , Vol . 70 , No . 1 (March 1998), Pp . 1-23 Published by : The University of Chicago Press Stable URL : [Http://Www.Jstor.Org/Stable/10.1086/235001](http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/235001) Accessed."

Chapter V.

Conclusion

The research question explored how Putin's influence over nationalism influenced foreign policy and military strategy while he was in federal office. Through the analysis of Putin's rhetoric and foreign policy history in office, key patterns emerged that defined Putin's nationalism and the antagonistic relationship it caused with foreign adversaries.

Putin's Nationalism and Foreign Policy

Putin's nationalism drives his motivations for an antagonistic foreign policy. This is significant as the patterns of rhetoric and behavior produced by the analysis of this relationship could provide further insight into Russian foreign policy priorities and where further overt aggression may be enacted. The messages analyzed in these speeches are also significant because of their relation to Putin's support for power. While a lot of that support comes from overt threats or acts of violence, Putin has political supporters throughout Russia who agree with his nationalist views of former Soviet and Imperial territory. The messages communicated to those supporters, or the international persona projected, reflect culturally significant trends in Russia that influence his foreign and domestic policy.

Putin's nationalism is based on the belief that the Russian Federation is the successor to the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. He therefore believes that Russia is entitled to the same territory, regional control, and sphere of influence as its predecessors. This is furthered by his belief that all ethnic Russians should be united under the same flag and united by a common culture. He views American hegemony as a

threat to that vision because of the US leadership in furthering military, political, and economic alliances in support of the independence of former Imperial and Soviet countries. Therefore, Putin desires a reconstitution of a multipolar world order led by Russia and its authoritarian allies to impose their ideas of sovereignty and governance rather than the Western view of liberal democracies.

Putin's nationalism is consequently related to the four antagonistic foreign policy approaches: duplicitous cooperation, subversion, aggressive rhetoric, and overt aggression. Duplicitous cooperation concentrated on advancing or achieving Russian interests or goals over its partners or the global community. Putin's rhetoric reinforced this by undercutting Russia's partners' credibility or advancing a shared goal only as far as it benefits Russia. This may mean risking conflict or utilizing economic, political, diplomatic, or military threats or coercion.

Subversion concentrated on undermining American hegemony and reconfiguring international institutions to support Russian interests or positions in direct opposition to Western or American views. Subversion also concentrated on re-establishing or furthering economic, political, diplomatic, and military alliances with historic allies furthering Russia's sphere of influence and through the formation of new alliances meant to further a multipolar world order. This was intended to help Russia claim this as the successor state of the Soviet Union.

Aggressive rhetoric concentrated on repelling foreign adversaries from a course of action adverse to Russian interests or influence. Putin primarily used this approach to repel NATO's eastward expansion because he viewed it as a threat to the re-establishment of Russia's historic sphere of influence. Additionally, it was used to deter

international involvement in Russia's military invasion of Georgia, Crimea, and Ukraine, which Putin would claim as a historic part of the Russian Empire and Soviet Union.

When aggressive rhetoric did not produce the intended result, Putin resorted to more direct violence. Overt aggression's main goal was to reclaim the historic Russian Empire or Soviet Union territory or challenge American hegemony through election interference and challenging their spheres of influence in the Middle East. For the former Russian Empire and Soviet Union countries invaded, Russian ethnicity was the primary motivator and propaganda tool for the invasions in Georgia, Crimea, and Ukraine.

Research Limitations

While this research may be replicable and applicable to other nationalist regimes, it does have limitations that should be acknowledged. First and foremost, the content analyzed was English translations of Russian primary sources rather than being analyzed in the original Russian. This could have affected nuances of the language that communicated specific references to culture or ethnicity that may have been lost in the translation. Additionally, the primary source of these translations was the Kremlin's online archives. This presents another limitation because of the Kremlin's ability to censor embarrassing information or alter transcripts to reflect more favorable interactions. While the image and rhetoric projected by the Kremlin may reveal patterns about Russian nationalism and foreign policy, pertinent details may be lost because of these alternations or negations.

Furthermore, the primary sources analyzed showed that it is difficult to differentiate between domestic and foreign audiences because of the global reach of media. Therefore, a limitation of this research is also completely separating foreign

policy from domestic policy especially when examining military strategy in Chechnya. The last limitation concerns the inductive analysis of these sources, which is largely predicated on interpretation. Throughout the qualitative analysis of these sources, the themes derived from these speeches often overlapped and could be interpreted differently or additional themes could appear depending on the analyst.

Further Research

While these limitations present constraints on the research conducted, there are many opportunities for further research related to this topic. The first of such opportunities would be examining Russian nationalism's influence on domestic policy. As previously mentioned, domestic and foreign policy are often interconnected. While this was previously mentioned as a barrier, it is also an opportunity for future research as nationalism may produce similar phenomena regarding domestic policy. Furthermore, Russian nationalism has not been stagnant throughout its history. Exploring the history of Russian nationalism may reveal more pertinent information about how regime change influenced its formation through its distinct historical periods: federation nationalism vs. Soviet nationalism vs. imperial nationalism.

This model of analysis may also be replicable in other nationalist regimes such as in North Korea, China, or Iran. Further examining their nationalism and how it interacts with their foreign policy may produce similar patterns or help to define the specific differences in results based on their respective cultural worldviews. A particular area of interest was Russia's use of rhetoric to threaten nuclear weapons use against direct international intervention in Ukraine. Similar dynamics exist between other countries with a nationalist aggressor regime such as China against Taiwan, North Korea against

South Korea, and India and Pakistan over Kashmir. This area of research could provide a better understanding of these nationalist regimes and potential methods to de-escalate the conflict or curtail the likelihood of nationalist regimes using these weapons or committing other atrocities. The atrocities Putin has committed in the war in Ukraine show a disregard for internationally recognized human rights, and it is crucial to understand his motivations and methods in getting to this point to better prevent further atrocities against other former Soviet/Imperial territories. It will be just as crucial with other nationalist regimes as the international community seeks methods and means to prevent other conflicts from intensifying.

Appendix 1.

Putin's Primary Sources and Nationalism and Foreign Policy Themes

Primary Sources	Nationalism and Foreign Policy Themes
Hoffman, David. "Kremlin to Bolster Nuclear Stockpile; NATO's Airstrikes Are Making Russia Worried, Sources Say: [FINAL EDITION]." Washington Post, April 30, 1999.	Aggressive foreign policy, duplicitous cooperation, nuclear leader
"Memorandum of Conversation: Meeting with Prime Minister Vladimir Putin of Russia." The White House, September 12, 1999.	Duplicitous cooperation, international hypocrisy, subversion
Putin, Vladimir. "Russia at the Turn of the Millennium, Section from First Person." University of Oregon, December 30, 1999.	Crisis, defined ideology, deterrence of dissention, distrust of foreign influence, duplicitous cooperation, subversion
"Russian Security Chief: Cooperation, Not Confrontation in Kosovo." BBC Worldwide Limited, June 15, 1999.	Duplicitous cooperation, subversion, superseding Russian interests
Putin, Vladimir. "A Statement Regarding the Decision of the Administration of the United States to Withdraw from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 1972." Kremlin, December 13, 2001.	Subversion, duplicitous cooperation, multi-polar world order
———. "Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation." Kremlin, May 16, 2003.	Great power, superseding Russian interests, strong state, distrust of foreign influence, external foreign enemy, subversion, defined ideology, mythical past, denial of issue, Chechen terrorists equated to international terrorists, duplicitous cooperation, foreign investment, former Soviet Union, multi-polar world order, Russian ethnicity, international hypocrisy, Eurasian leader
———. "Article by Russian President Vladimir Putin 'Russia: New Eastern Perspectives.'" Kremlin, November 9, 2000.	Duplicitous cooperation, Eurasian leader, superseding Russian interests
———. "Excerpts from a Transcript of a TV and Radio Broadcast (Hotline with the President of Russia)." Kremlin, December 19, 2002.	Shifting blame, Russian ethnicity, strong state, duplicitous cooperation, Chechen terrorists equated to international terrorists,

Primary Sources	Nationalism and Foreign Policy Themes
	mythical past, Nazi defeaters, external foreign enemy, former Soviet Union, defined ideology, crisis, international hypocrisy, subversion
———. “Excerpts from the President’s Live Television and Radio Dialogue with the Nation.” Kremlin, December 18, 2003.	Strong state, duplicitous cooperation, Eurasian leader, Chechen terrorists equated to international terrorists, international hypocrisy, multi-polar world order, great power, former Soviet Union, Russian ethnicity, unique pluralism
———. “Interview to ‘BBC Breakfast with Frost,’” March 5, 2000.	Duplicitous cooperation, great power, international hypocrisy, mythical past
———. “Interview with the American Broadcasting Company ABC.” Kremlin, November 7, 2001.	Duplicitous cooperation, great power, mythical past, subversion, international hypocrisy, defined ideology, multi-polar world order, distrust of foreign influence
———. “Introductory Remarks at the Meeting with the Members of the International Affairs Committees of the Two Houses of the Federal Assembly.” Kremlin, November 22, 2001.	Duplicitous cooperation, great power, strong state
———. “Live with President Vladimir Putin — Hot Line (Excerpts).” Kremlin, December 24, 2001.	Former Soviet Union, Russian ethnicity, subversion, duplicitous cooperation, Eurasian leader, orthodox ideology, multi-polar world order, international hypocrisy, distrust of foreign influence
———. “News Conference after the G8 Summit.” Kremlin, June 28, 2002.	Denial of issue, international hypocrisy, former Soviet Union
———. “News Conference Following the G8 Summit.” Kremlin, June 3, 2003.	Duplicitous cooperation, subversion, great power, nuclear leader
———. “Opening Address to a Moscow Foreign Ministers’ Meeting of the Multilateral Steering Group of the Middle East Peace Process.” Kremlin, February 1, 2000.	Duplicitous cooperation, international hypocrisy, subversion
———. “Opening Remarks at a State Council Presidium Meeting on Foreign Policy Issues.” Kremlin, May 22, 2002.	Former Soviet Union, subversion, duplicitous cooperation, Eurasian leader

Primary Sources	Nationalism and Foreign Policy Themes
———. “Opening Speech at a Security Council Meeting on the North Caucasian Counter-Terrorist Operation and Measures to Help Chechnya’s Transition to Peacetime.” Kremlin, February 25, 2000.	Aggressive rhetoric, crisis, overt aggression, strong state
———. “Press Statement on Iraq.” Kremlin, April 3, 2003.	Subversion, duplicitous cooperation, Chechen terrorists equated to international terrorists
———. “Speech at a Meeting of the NATO-Russia Council.” Kremlin, May 28, 2002.	Duplicitous cooperation, former Soviet Union, mythical past, Nazi defeaters, Eurasian leader, great power
———. “Speech at an International Conference of the Association of Election Organisers in Central and Eastern Europe.” Kremlin, September 26, 2002.	Duplicitous cooperation, distrust of foreign influence, Former Soviet Union, international hypocrisy
———. “Speech at the 58th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.” Kremlin, September 25, 2003.	Duplicitous cooperation, international hypocrisy, multi-polar order, Chechen terrorists equated to international terrorists, crisis, great power, Eurasian leader, subversion
———. “Statement on Iraq at a Kremlin Meeting.” Kremlin, March 20, 2003.	International hypocrisy, multi-polar world order, subversion
———. “Statement on the Ratification of the START II Treaty and Documents Relating to the May 26, 1972 Treaty Between the USSR and US on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.” Kremlin, April 14, 2000.	Duplicitous cooperation, great power, multi-polar world order
Putin, Vladimir. “50 Years of the European Integration and Russia.” Kremlin, March 25, 2007.	Propaganda, mythical past, Eurasian leader, great power, former Russian Empire, former Soviet Union, duplicitous cooperation, international order protector, multi-polar world order, subversion
———. “Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation.” Kremlin, May 26, 2004.	Crisis, strong state, Chechen terrorists equated to international terrorists, great power, subversion, superseding Russian interests, international hypocrisy, multi-polar world order, shifting blame, external foreign enemy, nuclear leader, Eurasian leader, duplicitous cooperation, deterrence of

Primary Sources	Nationalism and Foreign Policy Themes
	dissention, distrust of foreign influence
———. “APEC-Russia’s Choice of Principle in the Asia-Pacific Region.” Kremlin, November 17, 2006.	Eurasian leader, great power, common goal, subversion, Chechen terrorists equated to international terrorists, external foreign enemy, unique pluralism, duplicitous cooperation
———. “Beginning of Summit of the Heads of State of the Commonwealth of Independent States.” Kremlin, February 22, 2008.	Subversion, former Soviet Union, Russian/Soviet diaspora, Russian ethnicity, common goal
———. “Gerhard Schroeder and International Politics.” Kremlin, November 30, 2005.	Former Soviet Union, Nazi defeaters, multi-polar world order, Chechen terrorists equated to international terrorists, duplicitous cooperation
———. “Live with President Vladimir Putin-Hot Line (Experts).” Kremlin, October 18, 2007.	Former Soviet Union, Russian ethnicity, American aggressor, military expansion, multi-polar world order, subversion, shifting blame, duplicitous cooperation, superseding Russian interests, authoritarian alliances, nuclear leader, export as a tool of control, economic protector, Russian/Soviet diaspora, common goal, Eurasian leader, Chechen terrorists equated to international terrorists, external foreign enemy, propaganda, election control, population growth, Nazi defeaters
———. “Opening Address at Meeting on Developing Russia’s Nuclear Weapons Complex.” Kremlin, March 30, 2006.	External foreign enemy, great power, nuclear leader, military expansion
———. “President’s Live Television and Radio Dialogue with the Nation.” Kremlin, September 27, 2005.	Distrust of foreign influence, foreign investment, duplicitous cooperation, former Soviet Union, superseding Russian interests, military expansion, Nazi defeaters, election control, Eurasian leader, great power, subversion, shifting blame, Russian ethnicity, mythical past, self-hypocrisy, unique pluralism, victimization,

Primary Sources	Nationalism and Foreign Policy Themes
	Russian/Soviet diaspora, propaganda, international hypocrisy
———. “Press Conference Following Russian-U.S. Talks.” Kremlin, April 6, 2008.	Duplicitous cooperation, common goal, international order protector, multi-polar world order, American aggressor, NATO as provocateur
———. “Press Conference on the Results of Russian-Ukrainian Talks.” Kremlin, March 19, 2005.	Duplicitous cooperation, former Soviet Union, mythical past, Russian ethnicity, Nazi defeaters, propaganda, military expansion, subversion, Eurasian leader, great power
———. “Press Conference with Russian and Foreign Media.” Kremlin, December 23, 2004.	Duplicitous cooperation, Eurasian leader, former Soviet Union, great power, external foreign enemy, international hypocrisy, Chechen terrorists equated to international terrorists, Russian ethnicity, election control, mythical past, deterrence of dissension, unique pluralism, subversion, concentration of power, strong state, multi-polar world order, self-hypocrisy, distrust of foreign influence, propaganda, Nazi defeaters, common goal
———. “Russia and APEC: Towards Sustained and Stable Development in Asia-Pacific Region.” Kremlin, September 7, 2007.	Propaganda, duplicitous cooperation, superseding Russian interests, Eurasian leader, common goal
———. “Russia-EU Partnership Crucial for United, Prosperous Europe.” Kremlin, November 23, 2006.	Duplicitous cooperation, Eurasian leader, unique pluralism
———. “SCO-a New Model of Successful International Cooperation.” Kremlin, June 14, 2006.	Eurasian leader, great power, multi-polar world order, subversion, Chechen terrorists equated to international terrorists, authoritarian alliances, external foreign enemy, duplicitous cooperation
———. “Speech and Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy.” Kremlin, February 10, 2007.	Great power, multi-polar world order, subversion, international hypocrisy, crisis, external foreign enemy, international order protector, falsehood, self-hypocrisy,

Primary Sources	Nationalism and Foreign Policy Themes
	nuclear leader, NATO as provocateur, duplicitous cooperation, common goal, foreign investment, economic protector, distrust of foreign influence, election control, Eurasian leader, unique pluralism, exports as tool of control, shifting blame, authoritarian alliances, superseding Russian interests, former Soviet Union
———. “Speech at the 60th Session of the UN General Assembly.” Kremlin, September 15, 2005.	Nazi defeaters, duplicitous cooperation, international hypocrisy, great power, common goal, former Soviet Union, subversion, multi-polar world order
———. “Speech at the Session of the UN Security Council.” Kremlin, September 14, 2005.	Duplicitous cooperation
———. “Speech to a Gathering of the Supporters of the President of Russia.” Kremlin, November 21, 2007.	Election control, defined ideology, Chechen terrorists equated to international terrorists, external foreign enemy, propaganda, crisis, former Soviet Union, mythical past, Russian/Soviet diaspora
———. “Televised Address to Russian Citizens in Connection with the Forthcoming State Duma Elections.” Kremlin, November 29, 2007.	Election control, military expansion
———. “The Lessons of Victory Over Nazism.” Kremlin, May 7, 2005.	Nazi defeaters, Chechen terrorists equated to international terrorists, external foreign enemy, former Soviet Union, mythical past, great power, propaganda, duplicitous cooperation, international hypocrisy, self-hypocrisy, Russian ethnicity, victimization, subversion, shifting blame
———. “Transcript of Annual Big Press Conference.” Kremlin, February 14, 2008.	American aggressor, duplicitous cooperation, international hypocrisy, former Soviet Union, nuclear leader, subversion, Nazi defeaters, authoritarian alliances, Eurasian leader, Chechen terrorists equated to international terrorists,

Primary Sources	Nationalism and Foreign Policy Themes
	common goal, external foreign enemy, denial of issue, export as a tool of control, shifting blame, election control, international order protector, victimization, former Russian Empire, great power, military expansion, mythical past, strong state, superseding Russian interests, NATO as provocateur, economic protector, Russian/Soviet diaspora, Russian ethnicity, deterrence of dissension, distrust of foreign influence, defined ideology, equating the family to the state, unique pluralism
———. “Transcript of the Hot Line with President of Russia Vladimir Putin.” Kremlin, October 25, 2006.	Foreign investment, nuclear leader, shifting blame, duplicitous cooperation, former Soviet Union, Russian/Soviet diaspora, Russian ethnicity, international hypocrisy, former Russian Empire, great power, unique pluralism, military expansion, common goal, superseding Russian interests, Nazi defeaters, Eurasian leader, subversion, aggressive rhetoric, economic protector, external foreign enemy, illegal immigration
Putin, Vladimir. “An Honest Democracy for Russia.” The Washington Post, February 9, 2012.	Crisis, former Soviet Union, defined ideology, election control
———. “Our Quest for a Modern Economy.” The Globe and Mail (1936-); Feb 2, 2012; ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The Globe and Mail pg. A17, February 2, 2012.	Crisis, former Soviet Union, subversion
———. “Putin Outlines Russia’s Defense Priorities.” Current Digest of the Russian Press, The (https://dlib-eastview-com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/browse/publication/6765), No. 8, Vol. 64, February 20, 2012, February 20, 2012.	American aggressor, international order protector, subversion, external foreign enemy, strong state, military expansion, nuclear leader, aggressive rhetoric, crisis, international hypocrisy, Eurasian leader, former Soviet Union, invasion in the guise of peacekeeping, overt aggression,

Primary Sources	Nationalism and Foreign Policy Themes
	great power, multi-polar world order, NATO as provocateur
———. “Putin Showcases New Economic Policies.” Current Digest of the Russian Press, The (https://dlib-eastview-com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/browse/publication/6765), No. 5, Vol. 64, January 30, 2012, January 30, 2012.	Anti-Stalin, nuclear leader, distrust of foreign influence, external foreign enemy, economic protector, subversion
———. “Putin Tackles Ethnic Relations in Russia.” Current Digest of the Russian Press, The (https://dlib-eastview-com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/browse/publication/6765), No. 4, Vol. 64, January 23, 2012, January 23, 2012.	Unique pluralism, crisis, former Russian Empire, former Soviet Union, Russian/Soviet diaspora, Russian ethnicity, defined ideology, external foreign enemy, propaganda, strong state, cultural imperialism, deterrence of dissension, risk of ethnic conflict, restriction of media, restriction of speech, election control, discriminatory immigration
———. “Putin Tackles Issue of Democracy in Russia.” Current Digest of the Russian Press, The (https://dlib-eastview-com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/browse/publication/6765), No. 6, Vol. 64, February 06, 2012, February 6, 2012.	Crisis, former Soviet Union, election control, façade of democracy, strong state, cultural imperialism, orthodox ideology, Russian ethnicity, unique pluralism, concentration of power
———. “Putin Unveils New Political Program.” Current Digest of the Russian Press, The (https://dlib-eastview-com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/browse/publication/6765), No. 3, Vol. 64, January 16, 2012, January 16, 2012.	1917 callback, strong state, orthodox ideology, unique pluralism, crisis, deterrence of dissension, propaganda, international order protector, multi-polar world order, subversion, American aggressor, Eurasian leader, great power, distrust of foreign influence
———. “The World Should Not Fear a Eurasian Union; Russia Wants to Forge a New Economic Power out of the Nations of the Old Soviet Union.” News International Associated Services Limited, October 6, 2011.	Duplicitous cooperation, former Soviet Union, Russian ethnicity, Eurasian leader, subversion, propaganda
———. “Transcript: CNN Interview with Vladimir Putin.” CNN, August 29, 2008.	Overt aggression, subversion, former Russian Empire, mythical past, Russian/Soviet diaspora, anti-Stalin, shifting blame, former Soviet Union, Russian ethnicity,

Primary Sources	Nationalism and Foreign Policy Themes
	orthodox ideology, falsehood, victimization, international hypocrisy, international order protector, American aggressor, American election conspiracy, propaganda, multi-polar world order, aggressive foreign policy, exports as a tool of control, imports as a tool of control
———. “Trust between Nations Is the Key to Tacking Global Problems.” <i>The Independent</i> , January 31, 2009.	Crisis, falsehood, international order protector, propaganda, subversion
Putin, Vladimir. “70th Session of the UN General Assembly.” Kremlin, September 28, 2015.	Former Soviet Union, great power, Nazi defeaters, international order protector, American aggressor, American failure, subversion, Syria as ally against terrorism, NATO as provocateur, economic protector, victimization
———. “Address by President of the Russian Federation.” Kremlin, March 18, 2014.	Former Russian Empire, former Soviet Union, invasion in the guise of peacekeeping, overt aggression, reunification, Russian/Soviet diaspora, Russian ethnicity, unique pluralism, 1917 callback, mythical past, duplicitous cooperation, revisionist education, subversion, resurgence of Nazis, victimization, Nazi defeaters, international hypocrisy, international order protector, American aggressor, multi-polar order
———. “Address by Vladimir Putin on Russia Assuming the G20 Presidency.” Kremlin, December 1, 2012.	Common goal, economic protector
———. “BRICS: Towards New Horizons of Strategic Partnership.” Kremlin, September 1, 2017.	Subversion, duplicitous cooperation, authoritarian alliances, nuclear leader, economic protector, victimization
———. “Direct Line with Vladimir Putin.” Kremlin, April 25, 2013.	Crisis, economic protector, distrust of foreign influence, election control, deterrence of dissension, falsehood, Chechen terrorists equated to international terrorists,

Primary Sources	Nationalism and Foreign Policy Themes
	victimization, external foreign enemy, international hypocrisy, anti-Stalin, American aggressor, subversion, duplicitous cooperation, former Soviet Union, Nazi defeaters, great power, propaganda, revisionist education, common goal, cultural imperialism, discriminatory immigration, orthodox ideology, military expansion, restriction of media, restriction of speech, international order protector, invasive foreign culture, restriction of minority rights, exports as a tool of control, Russian ethnicity
———. “Direct Line with Vladimir Putin.” Kremlin, April 17, 2014.	Foreign control through proxy, former Russian Empire, former Soviet Union, Russian/Soviet diaspora, Russian ethnicity, anti-nationalist guise, façade of democracy, duplicitous cooperation, falsehood, overt aggression, invasion in the guise of peacekeeping, victimization, military expansion, aggressive foreign policy, aggressive rhetoric, international order protector, anti-European liberalism, international hypocrisy, American aggressor, authoritarian alliances, Eurasian leader, multi-polar world order, subversion, mythical past, election control, 1917 callback, reunification, revisionist education, resurgence of Nazis, cultural imperialism, Ukrainian nationalists equated to terrorists, NATO as provocateur, propaganda, exports as a tool of control, anti-Stalin, unique pluralism, deterrence of dissension. Distrust of foreign influence, self-hypocrisy

Primary Sources	Nationalism and Foreign Policy Themes
———. “Direct Line with Vladimir Putin.” Kremlin, April 16, 2015.	Duplicitous cooperation, economic protector, former Soviet Union, lack of impact from foreign action, exports as tool of control, imports as tool of control, subversion, authoritarian alliances, great power, international hypocrisy, multi-polar world order, superseding Russian interests, American aggressor, legal power justification, former Russian Empire, cultural imperialism, revisionist education, Russian/Soviet diaspora, Russian ethnicity, deterrence of dissension, domestic use of violence, façade of democracy, falsehood, overt aggression, shifting blame, election control, foreign control through proxy, anti-nationalist guise, distrust of foreign influence, foreign investment, self-hypocrisy, Nazi defeaters, pro-Stalin, nuclear leader, resurgence of Nazis, military expansion, NATO as provocateur
———. “Direct Line with Vladimir Putin.” Kremlin, April 14, 2016.	Chechen terrorists equated to international terrorists, façade of democracy, international order protector, overt aggression, subversion, authoritarian alliances, human rights violations, invasion of guise of peacekeeping, duplicitous cooperation, common goal, international hypocrisy, distrust of foreign influence, American aggressor, election control, deterrence of dissension, exports as tool of control, former Russian Empire, former Soviet Union, Eurasian leader, economic protector, aggressive rhetoric, great power, multi-polar world order, import as tool of control, anti-

Primary Sources	Nationalism and Foreign Policy Themes
	European liberalism, military expansion
———. “Direct Line with Vladimir Putin.” Kremlin, June 15, 2017.	1917 callback, American aggressor, American election conspiracy, falsehood, international hypocrisy, victimization, lack of impact from foreign action, subversion, authoritarian alliances, aggressive rhetoric, defined ideology, façade democracy, invasion in the guise of peacekeeping, mythical past, Russian/Soviet diaspora, Russian ethnicity, duplicitous cooperation, economic protector, foreign control through proxy, superseding Russian interests, former Russian Empire, former Soviet Union, Nazi defeaters, resurgence of Nazis, cultural imperialism, restriction of media, anti-Stalin, orthodox ideology, multi-polar world order, nuclear leader, aggressive foreign policy
———. “Interview to American TV Channel CBS and PBS.” Kremlin, September 29, 2015.	Authoritarian alliances, international order protector, multi-polar world order, subversion, human rights violations, international hypocrisy, shifting blame, American aggressor, American failure, anti-Assad forces equated to terrorists, propaganda, common enemy, great power, nuclear leader, American populism, common goal, former Soviet Union, Nazi defeaters, façade of democracy, restriction of media, anti-Stalin, invasive foreign culture, protecting Russian children, restriction of minority rights, falsehood, former Russian Empire, reunification, Russian/Soviet diaspora, Russian ethnicity, duplicitous cooperation, aggressive rhetoric, invasion in the guise of

Primary Sources	Nationalism and Foreign Policy Themes
	peacekeeping, mythical past, cultural past, cultural imperialism, NATO as provocateur, lack of impact from foreign actions
———. “Interview to Bloomberg.” Kremlin, September 5, 2016.	Eurasian leader, duplicitous cooperation, authoritarian alliances, former Soviet Union, anti-European liberalism, lack of impact from foreign actions, military expansion, subversion, strong state, economic protector, exports as tool of control, deterrence of dissension, falsehood, shifting blame, international order protector, American populism, aggressive rhetoric, nuclear leader, international hypocrisy, American aggressor, multi-polar world order, NATO as provocateur, Chechen terrorists equated to international terrorists, former Russian Empire, invasion in the guise of peacekeeping, overt aggression, reunification, revisionist education, Russian/Soviet diaspora, Russian ethnicity, façade of democracy, distrust of foreign influence, election control
———. “Interview to American TV Channel NBC.” Kremlin, March 10, 2018.	American aggressor, military expansion, nuclear leader, international hypocrisy, international order protector, shifting blame, aggressive rhetoric, crisis, external foreign enemy, NATO as provocateur, former Soviet Union, strategic advantage, American election conspiracy, denial of issue, overt aggression, legal power justification, falsehood, lack of impact from foreign actions, authoritarian alliances, subversion, human rights violations, façade of democracy

Primary Sources	Nationalism and Foreign Policy Themes
———. “Meeting on Implementing State Armament Programme for Nuclear Deterrence.” Kremlin, July 26, 2012.	Military expansion, nuclear leader
———. “Meeting on Russia’s Armed Forces Actions in Syria.” Kremlin, November 17, 2015.	Overt aggression
———. “News Conference of Vladimir Putin.” Kremlin, December 20, 2012.	American aggressor, former Soviet Union, international hypocrisy, international order protector, propaganda, protecting Russian children, American election conspiracy, former Russian Empire, authoritarian alliances, duplicitous cooperation, invasion in the guise of peacekeeping, legal power justification, crisis, Eurasian leader, aggressive foreign policy, common goal, economic protector, superseding Russian interests, restriction of media, Chechen terrorists equated to international terrorists, discriminatory immigration, exports as a tool of control, subversion, aggressive rhetoric, election control, façade of democracy, unique pluralism, Russian ethnicity, NATO as provocateur, Nazi defeaters, great power, multi-polar world order, deterrence of dissension, distrust of foreign influence, external foreign enemy, restriction of speech
———. “News Conference of Vladimir Putin.” Kremlin, December 19, 2013.	Aggressive foreign policy, economic protector, exports as a tool of control, import as tool of control, subversion, superseding Russian interests, international hypocrisy, American aggressor, great power, multi-polar order, nuclear leader, invasive foreign culture, propaganda, protecting Russian culture, anti-Stalin, former Russian Empire, former Soviet Union, orthodox ideology, common goal, racist rhetoric, deterrence of

Primary Sources	Nationalism and Foreign Policy Themes
	dissension, distrust of foreign influence, strong state, duplicitous cooperation, international order protector, restriction of speech, election control, restriction of media, authoritarian alliances, invasion in the guise of peacekeeping, overt aggression, aggressive rhetoric, pro-Stalin, mythical past, revisionist education, Russian/Soviet diaspora, Russian ethnicity
———. “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly.” Kremlin, December 3, 2015.	Propaganda, mythical past, reunification, Russian/Soviet diaspora, Russian ethnicity, former Russian Empire, orthodox ideology, Duplicitous cooperation, former Soviet Union, Ukrainian nationalists equated to terrorists, American aggressor, victimization, aggressive foreign policy, aggressive rhetoric, superseding Russian interests, exports as a tool of control, lack of impact from foreign action, international hypocrisy, international order protector, Nazi defeaters, American failure, common goal, nuclear leader, economic protector, Eurasian leader, import as tool of control, subversion
———. “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly.” Kremlin, December 4, 2014.	Authoritarian alliances, overt aggression, propaganda, subversion, Syria as ally against terrorism, duplicitous cooperation, former Russian Empire, former Soviet Union, international order protector, unique pluralism, risk of ethnic conflict, Eurasian leader
———. “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly.” Kremlin, December 1, 2016.	1917 callback, lack of impact from foreign action, Eurasian leader, former Russian Empire, former Soviet Union, great power, multi-polar world order, subversion,

Primary Sources	Nationalism and Foreign Policy Themes
	authoritarian alliances, duplicitous cooperation
———. “Press Statement Following the CSTO Collective Security Council Summit.” Kremlin, September 23, 2013.	Former Soviet Union, subversion, military expansion, Syria as ally against terrorism
———. “Statement by the President of Russia.” Kremlin, December 30, 2016.	Aggressive rhetoric, American aggressor
———. “The Syrian Alternative.” Kremlin, September 12, 2013.	Nazi defeaters, American aggressor, American failure, American populism, subversion, Syria as an ally against terrorism, authoritarian alliances, international order protector
———. “Vladimir Putin Answered Journalist’ Questions on the Situation in Ukraine.” Kremlin, March 4, 2014.	International order protector, international hypocrisy, Ukrainian nationalists equated terrorists, pro-Russian sovereignty populism, aggressive rhetoric, invasion in the guise of peacekeeping, Russian/Soviet diaspora, Russian ethnicity, lack of impact from foreign action, subversion, American aggressor
———. “Vladimir Putin’s Annual News Conference.” Kremlin, December 17, 2015.	American aggressor, military expansion, nuclear leader, Russian superiority, former Russian Empire, former Soviet Union, Nazi defeaters, American election conspiracy, authoritarian alliances, duplicitous cooperation, external foreign enemy, international hypocrisy, subversion, common goal, invasion in the guise of peacekeeping, overt aggression, deterrence of dissension, restriction of media, falsehood, Ukrainian nationalists equated to terrorists, international order protector, multi-polar order, distrust of foreign influence, election control, façade of democracy, aggressive rhetoric, anti-European liberalism, reunification, shifting blame, 1917 callback

Primary Sources	Nationalism and Foreign Policy Themes
———. “Vladimir Putin’s Annual News Conference.” Kremlin, December 23, 2016.	Aggressive rhetoric, external foreign enemy, American aggressor, unique pluralism, international order protector, multi-polar world order, subversion, overt aggression, aggressive foreign policy, exports as a tool of control, imports as a tool of control, duplicitous cooperation, international hypocrisy, former Russian Empire, former Soviet Union, shifting blame, distrust of foreign influence, American election conspiracy, façade of democracy, Eurasian leader
———. “Vladimir Putin’s Annual News Conference.” Kremlin, December 14, 2017.	Cultural imperialism, Russian ethnicity, unique pluralism, American aggressor, great power, international hypocrisy, international order protector, multi-polar world order, nuclear leader, subversion, external foreign enemy, propaganda, shifting blame, authoritarian alliances, American election conspiracy, duplicitous cooperation, former Russian Empire, former Soviet Union, anti-European liberalism, invasion in the guise of peacekeeping, falsehood, foreign control through proxy, anti-nationalist guise, overt aggression, 1917 callback, mythical past, Nazi defeaters, revisionist education, Russian/Soviet diaspora, reunification, economic protector, exports as tool of control, imports as tool of control, Eurasian leader, Chechen terrorists equated to international terrorists, common goal, discriminatory immigration, human rights violations, lack of impact from foreign action
———. “Vladivostok 2012: Russian Agenda for the APEC Forum.” Kremlin, September 5, 2012.	Economic protector, exports as tool of control, former Soviet Union,

Primary Sources	Nationalism and Foreign Policy Themes
	import as tool of control, subversion
Putin, Vladimir. “75th Anniversary of the Great Victory: Shared Responsibility to History and Our Future.” Kremlin, June 19, 2020.	Nazi defeaters, mythical past, Chechen terrorists equated to international terrorists, Syria as an ally against terrorism, former Soviet Union, subversion, American failure, international hypocrisy, pro-Stalin, victimization, western conspiracy, anti-Stalin, international order protector, American aggressor
———. “Address by the President of the Russian Federation.” Kremlin, February 21, 2022.	Russian/Soviet diaspora, Russian ethnicity, former Russian Empire, Former Soviet Union, mythical past, revisionist education, 1917 callback, anti-Lenin, victimization, pro-Stalin, anti-nationalist guise, crisis, anti-Stalin, Ukrainian duplicitousness, resurgence of Nazis, subversion, cultural. Imperialism, international hypocrisy, American aggressor, American failure, American nation-building, distrust of foreign influence, international order protector, Ukrainian nationalists equated to terrorists, economic protector, façade of democracy, orthodox ideology, western conspiracy, NATO as provocateur, falsehood, self-defense
———. “Address by the President of the Russian Federation.” Kremlin, February 24, 2022.	American aggressor, NATO as provocateur, compromising Russian security, victimization, crisis, American failure, former Soviet Union, international hypocrisy, international order protector, multi-polar world order, Nazi defeaters, subversion, façade of democracy, aggressive foreign policy, aggressive rhetoric, Chechen terrorists equated to international terrorists, duplicitous cooperation,

Primary Sources	Nationalism and Foreign Policy Themes
	invasive foreign culture, mythical past, military expansion, nuclear leader, external foreign enemy, American nation-building, invasion in the guise of peacekeeping, genocide, Russian ethnicity, resurgence of Nazis, nuclear crisis, Syria as ally against terrorism, overt aggression, pro-Russian sovereignty populism, reunification, propaganda, anti-Stalin, Russian/Soviet diaspora, anti-nationalist guise, former Russian Empire, self-defense, revisionist education, deterrence of international involvement
———. “Article by Vladimir Putin ”Russia and China_ A Future-Oriented Strategic Partnership“ for the Chinese News Agency Xinhua.” Kremlin, February 3, 2022.	Authoritarian alliances, subversion, Eurasian leader, façade of democracy, international order protector, American aggressor, western conspiracy
———. “Direct Line with Vladimir Putin.” Kremlin, June 7, 2018.	American aggressor, economic protector, exports as tool of control, imports as tool of control, lack of impact from foreign action, subversion, international hypocrisy, international order protector
———. “Interview to NBC.” Kremlin, June 14, 2021.	Authoritarian alliances, falsehood, subversion, denial of issue, shifting blame, aggressive rhetoric, American aggressor, anti-European liberalism, international order protector, NATO as provocateur, American election conspiracy, American failure, duplicitous cooperation, nuclear leader, international hypocrisy, Syria as an ally against terrorism, American populism, overt aggression, deterrence of dissension, distrust of foreign influence, restriction of media, restriction of speech, human rights violations, aggressive foreign policy, compromising Russian

Primary Sources	Nationalism and Foreign Policy Themes
	security, military expansion, self-hypocrisy
———. “Interview with CNBC.” Kremlin, October 14, 2021.	Authoritarian alliances, duplicitous cooperation, American aggressor, American failure, economic protector, lack of impact from foreign action, subversion, deterrence of dissension, distrust of foreign influence, façade of democracy, legal power justification
———. “Joint Statement of the Leaders of the Five Nuclear-Weapons States on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races.” Kremlin, January 3, 2022.	Common goal, duplicitous cooperation, nuclear leader
———. “Meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club.” Kremlin, October 18, 2018.	Distrust of foreign influence, façade of democracy, international hypocrisy, international order protector, aggressive rhetoric, multi-polar world order, Nazi defeaters, strong state, subversion, Eurasian leader, common goal, duplicitous cooperation, American election conspiracy, American failure, common enemy, lack of impact from foreign action, authoritarian alliances, falsehood, American aggressor, anti-European liberalism, nuclear leader, former Soviet Union, superseding Russian interests, invasion in the guise of peacekeeping, crisis, former Russian Empire, Ukrainian duplicitousness, victimization, Western conspiracy, foreign control through proxy, economic protector, import as tool of control
———. “Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly.” Kremlin, April 21, 2021.	Aggressive rhetoric, American aggressor, American failure, anti-European liberalism, economic protector, international hypocrisy, international order protector, lack of impact from foreign action, authoritarian alliances, Ukrainian

Primary Sources	Nationalism and Foreign Policy Themes
	nationalists equated to terrorists, falsehood, propaganda, western conspiracy, NATO as provocateur, military expansion, nuclear leader, self-defense, subversion, Eurasian leader
———. “Statement by President of Russia Vladimir Putin on Russia’s Proposal to Convene Meeting of Heads of State of UN Security Council Permanent Members with Participation of Heads of Germany and Iran.” Kremlin, August 14, 2020.	American aggressor, Eurasian leader, subversion, common goal, crisis, duplicitous cooperation
———. “Statement by Vladimir Putin on Additional Steps to De-Escalate the Situation in Europe after the Termination of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty).” Kremlin, October 26, 2020.	American aggressor, American failure, American populism, international order protector, multi-polar world order, nuclear leader, subversion, duplicitous cooperation
———. “Valdai Discussion Club Session.” Kremlin, October 3, 2019.	Multi-polar world order, subversion, anti-European liberalism, deterrence of international involvement, international hypocrisy, Russian superiority, Syria as an ally against terrorism, diplomatic and military achievement, Eurasian leader, crisis, international order protector
———. “Vladimir Putin’s Annual News Conference.” Kremlin, December 23, 2021.	American failure, economic protector

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February 24, 2022.

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146879682210852. <https://doi.org/10.1177/14687968221085260>.

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<https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/20/world/europe/putin-afghanistan-merkel.html?searchResultPosition=1>.

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