



The UKUSA Agreement: The History of an Enduring Relationship

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The UKUSA Agreement: The History of an Enduring Relationship

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A Thesis in the Field of International Relations

for the Degree of Master of Liberal Arts in Extension Studies

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Abstract

This thesis seeks to broaden the historical narrative of western intelligence alliances. Specifically, the 1946 UKUSA Agreement's evolution into the 'Five Eyes' intelligence-sharing network. The 1946 Agreement served as a foundational link between the intelligence agencies of the United Kingdom and the United States to share intercepted communications. Within a decade, the arrangement integrated Australia, Canada, and New Zealand creating 'Five Eyes.' This alliance played a decisive role in supporting allied missions during World War II, monitoring nuclear arsenals during the Cold War, and tracking terrorist groups following September 11, 2001.

Through a chronological review of internal and external events impacting these transnational partnerships, this thesis offers an analytical timeline of Five Eyes to understand this enduring alliance better. Sustainability is attributed to interdependence, grounded in synergetic operations and trust. Shared democratic values drove common geopolitical interests. Even in times of political strains, governments not only cooperated on intelligence matters but surrendered unprecedented levels of operational control, subordinating national interests to support a constellation of intelligence excellence. Such commitment to uncommon unity has hardened Five Eyes' durability to weather the tests of time from past to present. Despite member states' changing domestic or foreign policies and shifts in the international threat landscape, the Five Eyes alliance has kept citizens safe and remains a valuable tool of statecraft today and tomorrow.

Dedication

To the Five Eyes Intelligence Community. A collection of exceptional people who, for over seventy-five years, have sustained a cooperative, trusting partnership underpinned by shared values and an unwavering belief in the importance of protecting democracy to foster peace and prosperity around the world.

Though their value and contributions to global security can never be fully revealed, this work hopefully sheds light on what makes them an extraordinary example of international cooperation.

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During my time at Harvard Extension School, I have been privileged to receive guidance and inspiration from several extraordinary professors.

First, I would like to express my deepest appreciation to my thesis director, Dr. Michael Miner, who never wavered in providing invaluable insights, feedback, and support. Every step of the journey, from formulating the research question to exploring the obscure world of intelligence more deeply, Dr. Miner's personal and professional counsel was exceptional. I am grateful for his direction and the opportunity to have collaborated with him.

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Chapter I.

Introduction

In this chapter, I describe the research problem and background that underpin and drive this thesis. Also included is a definition of terms, the research methodology used, and the limitations encountered. Lastly, this research covers the period 1941 to 2010, when the UKUSA Agreements were (partially) declassified.

Research Problem and Background

The American Intelligence Community (IC) forewarns an increasingly hostile security environment.¹ “The US and its allies will face a diverse array of threats. The complexity of the threats...and the potential for cascading events in an increasingly interconnected and mobile world create new challenges for the IC.”² These challenges threaten to undermine America’s global leadership, Western-led institutions, democratic systems, the rule of law, as well as the American way of life, economic prosperity, and stability. Further intensifying the problems posed by an unprecedented threat landscape is America’s inability to counter them. The scope, scale, and depth of challenges exceed America’s national capabilities and can only be mitigated through greater cooperation with

¹ The IC is made up of 18 organizations, see: “Members of the IC,” United States Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2021, <https://www.dni.gov/index.php/what-we-do/members-of-the-ic>.

² For specifics on current threats to the US, see: *Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community: Reports 2006 – Present*, United States Office of the Director of National Intelligence, INTEL: IC Annual Threat Assessment, accessed July 9, 2022, <https://www.intelligence.gov/ic-annual-threat-assessment>.

allies, alliances, and partners. “Not a single challenge...can be met by one nation acting alone. We need alliances...more than ever. We need to...revitalize our alliances.”³

These two points, unprecedented national security challenges and the need to mitigate those challenges through alliances, are the overarching problems underpinning this thesis and prompting an analysis of the UKUSA Agreement / Five Eyes alliance. If relationships require modernization, a framework depicting factors that contribute to an effective, robust partnership can help guide the reform process. However, no such guiding framework exists, opening the possibility for a reform process laden with faulty judgments that waste time and resources and contribute to the decay of American national security. Concerning the Five Eyes alliance, there remains an insufficient understanding of its history, evolution, operations, and importance as a tool of statecraft keeping the US and its allies safe from emerging threat vectors. Uncovering vital historical lessons may inform decision-makers on how better to navigate the security challenges of today and beyond.

With the hegemonic expansion of illiberal states in operations and impact, from China to Russia, and smaller yet geopolitically influential states such as Iran or North Korea, there is increasing tension between democracies and authoritarian states as they vie for influence, resources, and pursue self-defined national interests. The extended reach intersects and clashes with US interests and threatens to uproot traditional global norms and the post-Cold War international order.

³ See Anthony Blinken speeches: Anthony Blinken, speech given at the U.S. Dep’t of State, Washington, D.C.: A Foreign Policy for the American People, March 3, 2021, transcript and video, 27:44, <https://www.state.gov/a-foreign-policy-for-the-american-people/>; Anthony Blinken, speech given at NATO headquarters, Brussels, Belg.: Reaffirming and Reimagining America’s Alliances, May 24, 2021, transcript and video, 23:58, <https://www.state.gov/reaffirming-and-reimagining-americas-alliances/>.

In its quest to solidify and spread influence globally, Beijing employs a whole-of-government strategy to compete with and undermine the US militarily, economically, and technologically. Through increased military activities, Beijing asserts itself more aggressively in the disputed areas of the South China Sea, East China Sea, and the waters and airspace surrounding Taiwan. Repeated statements underscore their commitment to reunification with Taiwan. Collectively, these actions have the potential to obstruct freedom of navigation and safe passage in international waters, posing heightened economic, social, and geopolitical challenges.

Furthermore, Beijing continues to expand its military and space capabilities, including upgrading and diversifying its blue water naval assets, nuclear arsenal, and satellite reconnaissance systems. In cyberspace, China is unrivaled in the scope, scale, and sophistication of its cyber-intrusion and cyber-espionage operations, denying access to or disrupting critical infrastructure services and pilfering sensitive information, including invaluable intellectual property. The level of data theft is unparalleled and estimated to be “the largest transfers of wealth in human history.”⁴

Following a different playbook and employing different tools and tactics than China, Russia’s provocative behavior also threatens to destabilize the US domestically, erode its influence globally, and splinter Western alliances and institutions.⁵ Moscow’s overarching strategy is multi-dimensional, mutually reinforcing, and serves multiple

⁴ Amanda Macias, “FBI Chief Slams Chinese Cyberattacks on U.S., Calls It ‘One of the Largest Transfers of Wealth in Human History,’” CNBC: Politics, updated July 8, 2020, <https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/07/fbi-chief-slams-chinese-cyberattacks-against-us-hudson-institute.html>.

⁵ Graham Allison, “Graham Allison on Russia: Insights and Recommendations,” Russia Matters, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, April 19, 2018, <https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/graham-allison-russia-insights-and-recommendations>.

ends. Using a vast assortment of tools - hard and soft, covert and overt - Russia seeks to discredit the West, specifically the US, to elevate its standing in the emerging multipolar world order. The equation is simple. As American authority decays, Russia faces less resistance in pursuing its objectives and can more easily establish itself as a significant player on the international scene.

Already positioned as a nuclear superpower, Russia seeks to modernize its cyber and space capabilities by developing cutting-edge cyber and space-based weapons capable of disrupting or destroying American assets critical to national security.

Furthermore, the Russian intelligence services play an instrumental role in supporting and advancing Moscow's objectives. Beyond traditional espionage, counterintelligence, and surveillance activities, the services are proficient in employing influence operations and election interference campaigns to destabilize nations, fuel civil discontent, exploit political divisions, expose democratic flaws, and break Western cohesion. The services' activities are frequently carried out in the cyber domain and have successfully influenced populations, producing decision-making outcomes advantageous to Moscow.

An additional tool of coercion is energy. Russia leverages its vast oil and natural gas supplies to manipulate the policies of neighbors and near neighbors, cutting off deliveries to non-compliers and generating divisions both within the European Union (EU) and between the EU and US. Nordstream 2, a natural gas pipeline intended to connect Russian gas fields directly to Germany, has been a thorny issue for years. Deemed by Washington as a geopolitical ploy to increase Europe's dependence on Russia, the US has expressed its distaste for the project, installing sanctions on numerous contractors and urging Europeans to cancel the pipeline altogether. The Nordstream 2

debate has strained relations between the US and its long-time NATO ally Germany, as well as with other European nations.⁶

Collectively, these shifts in the international security space and the increase in threat actors and vectors suggest a long-term competition between democracies and authoritarian states that may define the future of world order.⁷ Some have even questioned whether the security space has already entered Cold War 2.0.⁸ This environment implies that how the US and democratic allies organize themselves now will prove decisive in the years ahead. The relationships of the next generation, instruments of statecraft, and common security interests will be instrumental in fending off this global competition and preventing major conflict.

As has been suggested by the American IC and other national security practitioners and scholars, the Cold War alliances of the twentieth and early twenty-first century are no longer adequate to safeguard democracy.⁹ And the rift between alliance

⁶ Sammy Westfall, Claire Parker, Rachel Pannett, and Erin Cunningham, “What Is the Nord Stream 2 Pipeline, and How Does It Relate to the Ukraine Crisis?” *Washington Post*, February 8, 2022, updated February 24, 2022, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/07/21/faq-nord-stream-2/>.

⁷ Graham Allison and Fred Hu, “An Unsentimental China Policy,” *Foreign Affairs*, February 18, 2021, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-02-18/unsentimental-china-policy>; Hal Brands and Zack Cooper, “U.S.-Chinese Rivalry Is a Battle over Values,” *Foreign Affairs*, March 16, 2021, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-03-16/us-china-rivalry-battle-over-values>.

⁸ Graham Allison and Niall Ferguson, “Niall Ferguson - Cold War 2.0?” discussion presented by the Applied History Project of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, March 25, 2021, <https://www.belfercenter.org/event/niall-ferguson-cold-war-20>.

⁹ Blinken speeches; *Democracy and the NATO Alliance: Upholding Our Shared Democratic Values: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Eur., Eurasia, Energy, and the Env't of the Comm. On Foreign Affairs*. 116th Cong., 1st sess., November 13, 2019, statement of Matthias Matthijs, Johns Hopkins University, and the Council on Foreign Relations, United States Congress, House of Representatives, https://cdn.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/Democracy%20and%20the%20NATO%20Alliance.%20Upholding%20Our%20Shared%20Democratic%20Values.pdf; Jacob Parakilas, “Don’t Count on NATO to Save Liberal Values,” Chatham House, April 4, 2019, <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2019/04/dont-count-nato-save-liberal-values>.

capabilities and projected future threats is expanding.¹⁰ In a globalized world, where 21st-century national security threats transcend geography, American resources alone cannot counter the multitude of challenges.¹¹ A stronger allied forewarning system is essential if the US and its allies intend to meet the rise of China and other authoritarian states seeking to contain, constrain, or undermine democracy. The world is transforming too fast, and other powers and non-state actors are rising too quickly. No nation can be everywhere all the time, and like-minded partners must rely more heavily on each other beyond traditional norms to strengthen their own security.

Thus, this research seeks to offer a richer, more complete narrative of Five Eyes' evolution by mapping out a timeline of its organizational structure, missions, and the external threat environment and identifying trigger events or influences that affected its trajectory and contributed to unity. Such an exploration of history can help us understand past inflection points to adapt to the challenges of today and tomorrow. As such, this paper focuses on four cascading questions:

- What internal and external drivers prompted the development of intelligence-sharing agreements between Western democracies during World War II?
- What internal and external events or influences impacted the partnership over time? More precisely, what, if any, situations strengthened unity? And what, if any, obstacles, challenges, or crises threatened it?
- What role did these agreements play in supporting major foreign policy decisions?
- What factors proved most consequential in the sustainment and operation of the partnership, the external threat environment, national security objectives, or interdependency?

¹⁰ *Global Trends 2040: A More Contested World*. United States National Intelligence Council, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, March 2021, <https://www.odni.gov/index.php/gt2040-home/gt2040-media-and-downloads>.

¹¹ Blinken speeches.

The thesis unfolds in multiple parts. First presented are the key concepts and original mission of the 1946 UKUSA Agreement, as well as the historical background under which the relationship was formed. Next, there is an examination of changes over time and their impact on Five Eyes' missions and the partners' relationships over three eras: the Cold War (1945-1991), the Post-Cold War (1992-2001), and the War on Terror (2001-2008). Finally, the thesis concludes with a view to the future and what partner states should consider given today's 'Great Power Competition.'

This thesis argues that member states' interdependency, underpinned by synergetic operations, strong interpersonal relationships, and shared geopolitical interests and democratic values, is the bedrock of the partnership's longevity.

Limitations

One significant challenge while conducting this research was accessibility to government and agency documents. Many reports are heavily redacted, and even more remain classified.

Definition of Terms and Acronyms

A brief explanation of the intelligence cycle and gathering practices is necessary to understand the intricacies of intelligence work better.

Intelligence cycle: Policymakers initiate the cycle by posing a question (does country X have space-based weapons?). Intelligence agencies collect, process, and analyze raw data to produce assessments, typically called 'products.' Products are

returned to policymakers and serve to reduce uncertainty, provide strategic warning, and bring clarity to leaders entrusted to make national security decisions.¹²

Intelligence gathering: There are numerous means to collect confidential information: Human sources, such as spies or defectors (HUMINT), photography or imagery sources (IMINT), or intercepted communications or electronic signals (SIGINT). SIGINT capabilities have evolved with technological advancements, from hand cryptography to mechanical cryptanalysis in the 1930s and 1940s, to computer-aided cryptoanalysis in the 1950s, and satellite collection in the 1960s. The greatest SIGINT transformation occurred in the 1990s with the internet.¹³ The signals collected are processed and analyzed to generate a situational assessment, or as noted above, an intelligence product.¹⁴

Five Eyes is tasked with the global collection of SIGINT emanating from telemetry (signals from ballistic missiles), radars (from ships or air defense systems), ground-to-satellite communications, and microwave emissions (telecommunication systems used to enable phone calls).¹⁵ In short, Five Eyes sweeps up diplomatic, military, political, and commercial communications sent via radio, radiotelephone, microwave

¹² Mark M. Lowenthal, *Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy*, 8th ed., (Thousand Oaks, California: Cq Press, 2020), 78-80.

¹³ Richard J. Aldrich, "From Sigint to Cyber: A Hundred Years of Britain's Biggest Intelligence Agency," *Intelligence and National Security* 36, no. 6 (March 18, 2021), 910-17, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2021.1899636>.

¹⁴ Lowenthal, *Intelligence*, 4-9.

¹⁵ "Official Committee Hansard: Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Reference: Pine Gap," August 9, 1999 (Desmond John Ball, professor), Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, ACT, accessed April 21, 2021, <http://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Ball-Dibb-testimony-to-JSCOT-Inquiry-into-An-Agreement-to-extend-the-period-of-operation-of-the-Joint-Defence-Facility-at-Pine-Gap.-Report-26-1999.pdf>.

towers, or other satellites. With advancements in technology and the increased use of electronic data transmission, SIGINT has become a critical and valuable means of collection and has enhanced the importance of the Five Eyes partnership.

Research Methods

To understand the future of intelligence alliances, we must first better understand the past. Therefore, this work adopted a largely historical lens in addition to a focus on national security, intelligence, and international relations work. Testing my hypothesis that interdependency contributed to Five Eyes' sustainability relied on qualitative tools, including but not limited to process tracing, to make descriptive and causal inferences. This hypothesis is supported by empirical evidence that highlights that despite other factors impacting the relationship at various times, interdependence was the critical component behind its endurance.

To describe and analyze how Five Eyes changed over time while staying mindful of the sequence of events and factors influencing its trajectory, observations are presented inferring the consequential factors that contributed to a robust, sustainable, and unified partnership. Under examination were domestic and foreign influences, legal agreements, and national security objectives from all five nations. Publicly available primary sources, secondary accounts, and interviews with retired practitioners and subject matter experts were critical to the process.

Chapter II.

The HMS Prince of Wales: The Beginning of a Special Relationship

1941 - 1946

“Ultra (intelligence) shortened the war by not less than two years and probably by four years.”¹⁶

Given the secretive nature of intelligence work and the need to protect sources and methods, sensitive documents are declassified sporadically and rarely without redactions, making a precise analysis of intelligence activities challenging, if not impossible. Current documentation suggests formal wartime intelligence collaboration between the US and the UK took on heightened priority in August 1941, before the US entered World War II. Bonded by shared geopolitical interests and a common goal to defeat Germany and Japan, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill met off the shores of Newfoundland aboard the HMS Prince of Wales to discuss maritime war strategies and the sharing of German and Japanese intercepted and decrypted signals communications.¹⁷

This was not the first conversation on increasing intelligence cooperation between the United States and Great Britain.¹⁸ As early as February 1941 the military and

¹⁶ Harry Hinsley, “The Influence of ULTRA in the Second World War,” talk given at Babbage Lecture Theater, University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory, Cambridge, UK, CIX, October 19, 1993, CIX, <http://www.cix.co.uk/~klockstone/hinsley.htm>.

¹⁷ Anthony Wells, *Between Five Eyes: 50 Years of Intelligence Sharing* (Haverton, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2020), 1-4.

intelligence services had begun sharing deciphered codes of Imperial Japan and the Third Reich in preparation for a more formal arrangement between national leaders. Positive momentum of informal, collegial cooperation fostered substantive progress upon which a lasting relationship would rest in the years ahead. The subsequent formal meeting and resultant Atlantic Charter laid the foundation from which further agreements, declarations, and treaties would emanate, and unforeseeable at the time, would initiate a special relationship between American and British intelligence agencies that would underpin decades of continuous cooperation.¹⁹

Shared Vision

The 1941 Atlantic Charter highlighted the two leaders' vision for postwar international order, including principles to liberalize global trade, promote freedom of the seas and respect the right of all people to self-determination.²⁰ The Charter not only demonstrated the two nations' alignment on certain foreign policies but also highlighted America's solidarity with Britain and commitment to its survival. Churchill's desire for the US to enter the war is well documented. Yet, until the attack on Pearl Harbor, America remained generally neutral as public opinion and certain post-World War I laws opposed direct involvement.²¹ Roosevelt, declaring, "our national policy is to keep war

¹⁸ For a detailed view, this forthcoming work explores the special relationship between the US and UK in depth: Michael Smith, *The Real Special Relationship: The True Story of How the British and US Secret Services Work Together* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2022).

¹⁹ "The Atlantic Charter," Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum, accessed July 8, 2022, <https://www.fdrlibrary.org/atlantic-charter>.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ "Lend Lease and Military Aid to the Allies in the Early Years of World War II," United States Department of State, in *Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations*, Office of the Historian, accessed January 13, 2022, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/lend-lease>.

away from this country,”²² recognized the need to support the Allies’ efforts against the Axis powers and provided assistance through legally compliant initiatives, such as the Destroyers for Bases Agreement and the Lend-Lease program.²³

Lending military hardware and other war-related supplies was helpful to the British effort, yet perhaps even more beneficial was the ‘lending’ of intelligence, specifically, signals intelligence concerning German and Japanese efforts. Indeed, one might argue that the German Enigma machine began the process of hardwiring SIGINT cooperation on an unprecedented level. Perhaps more than any other event in the runup to and duration of WWII, it was German and Japanese encryption that provided the catalyst for the early development of what would become Five Eyes.

Cooperation Grounded in Cryptology

As early as summer 1940, after Hitler’s forces swept through France and an invasion of Britain seemed inevitable, the US and UK were exchanging signals intelligence and technology related to German radio transmissions and submarine signals.²⁴ American cooperation was logical. Britain was the last remaining democracy in Europe yet to be overtaken by the Nazis, and Roosevelt believed London could not

²² “Roosevelt and Churchill: A Friendship That Saved the World,” United States National Park Service, updated November 17, 2015, <https://www.nps.gov/articles/fdrww2.htm>.

²³ Cordell Hull, “Destroyers for Bases Agreement,” official correspondence to British Ambassador C.H. Lothian, Washington, DC: Department of State, September 2, 1940, Naval History and Heritage Command, March 20, 2018, <https://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/d/destroyers-for-bases-agreement-1941.html>; United States Department of State, “Lend Lease.”

²⁴ Thomas R. Johnson, *American Cryptology during the Cold War 1945-1989: The Complete Declassified Official Four-Volume History of the NSA* (Florida: Red and Black Publishers, 2017), 17-18, first published 1995 by the Center for Cryptologic History, Washington, DC.

survive on its own merits.²⁵ Should the UK fall, the security of the Northern Hemisphere was at risk and possibly access to the Suez Canal, which American and British vessels relied on for expeditious passage to Asia.²⁶

To advance intelligence cooperation, a series of meetings occurred with US Army and Navy signals delegations visiting the British Government Code and Cipher School (GC&CS) to discuss cryptologic analysis.²⁷ On the first visit in February 1941 to Bletchley Park, the secret home of GC&CS north of London, the Americans recognized and respected, better yet, were in awe of the advanced capabilities and sophistication of the British cryptologic organization. Indeed, the British were well versed in intelligence efforts as managing their vast empire relied heavily on knowing, understanding, and assessing developments within its territories. Although the British were far more advanced than the Americans, collaboration would be mutually beneficial. GC&CS would receive otherwise unattainable intelligence from the American Army and Navy signals branches. In turn, the Americans, whose tools and techniques were relatively

²⁵ “Documents Related to FDR and Churchill,” Educator Resources, United States National Archives, last reviewed September 23, 2016, <https://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/fdr-churchill>.

²⁶ Franklin Delano Roosevelt, “December 29, 1940: Fireside Chat 16: On the ‘Arsenal of Democracy,’” Presidential Speeches: Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidency, Miller Center, University of Virginia, transcript and audio 36:56, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/december-29-1940-fireside-chat-16-arsenal-democracy>; “The Atlantic Conference and Charter, 1941,” United States Department of State, in *Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations*, Office of the Historian, accessed March 15, 2022, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/atlantic-conf>.

²⁷ David Sherman, *The First Americans: The 1941 US Codebreaking Mission to Bletchley Park*, Special Series: United States Cryptologic History, vol. 12, Fort George G. Meade, MD: Center for Cryptologic History, United States National Security Agency, 2016, <https://www.nsa.gov/portals/75/documents/about/cryptologic-heritage/historical-figures-publications/publications/wwii/sherman-the-first-americans.pdf>, 3-4.

underdeveloped, would learn side by side from, perhaps, the most experienced and far-reaching intelligence organization in the world.²⁸

During this first meeting in the UK, the US informed the British of their success in breaking Japan's diplomatic cipher code machine "Purple," providing them with a replica of its analog.²⁹ The gesture presumably marked the first exchange of advanced signals collection equipment and was apparently well-received. Cross-Atlantic visits would continue for both parties, eventually prompting the embedment of liaison units into the signals departments of each other's services.³⁰ Thus, American personnel would work alongside their British counterparts in the UK and British representatives with their corresponding American colleagues in the US.

Expanding the Intelligence Network: The Dominions

Canada, too would join the SIGINT sharing relationship. Accounts are inconsistent, yet it has been suggested that already in 1940, American and Canadian army and navy services began sharing decoded enemy signals traffic.³¹ The Canadian Foreign Intelligence Section (housed in the Royal Canadian Navy), the Intercept Section (part of the Royal Canadian Army), and a civilian center (the Examination Unit XU, created in June 1941), collected and encrypted signals pertaining to the positions of German U-boats, the communications of the Vichy delegation stationed in Canada, and German

²⁸ "UK-USA Episode One - a Cautious Collaboration," posted November 17, 2021, Bletchley Park, YouTube video, 43:02, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ohhDcFJ1oas>.

²⁹ Sherman, *The First Americans*, 16.

³⁰ Johnson, *American Cryptology*, 17-23.

³¹ *Ibid*, 21.

transmissions to operatives in South America, Germany, and Portugal.³² The intelligence collected would be shared securely between Ottawa, London, Washington, DC, and Allied operatives positioned on enemy territory through the Canadian-built Hydra communications system.³³ Not only was Hydra a highly secure means to communicate, but it was also fitted with a cipher component to intercept enemy communications. Put into service in May 1942, the Hydra system was a valuable Canadian contribution to the Allied effort.³⁴

Canada offered geographical benefits as well, specifically in ocean surveillance.³⁵ Given its geographic reach far north into the Arctic, Canadian observational outposts could monitor enemy ships and pick up certain signals from Germany, Japan, and Russia that other nations could not.³⁶ Initially, the exchanges and service-to-service relationships between the US and Canada were informal and decentralized, yet this would change after Pearl Harbor and again with the signing of the BRUSA, UKUSA, and CANUSA Agreements.

³² “A Timeline of Notable Events,” [Canada] Communications Security Establishment, modified March 14, 2022, <https://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/en/culture-and-community/history/timeline>; Jeffrey T. Richelson and Desmond Ball, *The Ties That Bind: Intelligence Cooperation between the UKUSA Countries, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Canada, Australia and New Zealand*, 2nd ed., (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990), 3-4.

³³ [Canada] Communications Security Establishment, “Timeline of Notable Events.”

³⁴ “Episode 2: Hydra and Rockex,” Newsreel Issue No. 2. transcript and video, 1:50, [Canada] Communications Security Establishment, modified September 2, 2021, <https://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/en/information-and-resources/artifacts/episode-2-hydra-and-rockex>.

³⁵ Richelson and Ball, *Ties That Bind*, 3-4.

³⁶ Wesley Wark, “Favourable Geography: Canada’s Arctic Signals Intelligence Mission,” *Intelligence and National Security* 35, no. 3 (2020), 319-30, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684527.2020.1724629?journalCode=fint20>.

Aligning Capabilities: Merging National Comparative Advantages

After the US entered the war, American and British maritime assets required a coordinated strategy and an increase in SIGINT sharing.³⁷ Although the US Navy was already escorting British vessels carrying Lend-Lease materials over portions of the Atlantic, American wartime activities would be more complex. The dual nation naval convoys and operations, needing precise, actionable information about enemy movements, received SIGINT from US, UK, and Canadian agencies, which, through direct communication links, were operating almost as a “single organization.”³⁸ Collaboration would continue to intensify throughout the war years, along with increased support from British outposts and Dominions, including Australia and New Zealand.

Australia took an early, proactive role in the realm of codebreaking. Upon consultation with the UK’s Dominion Office, Australia created a cipher group in January 1940 “to study foreign codes...in case they might be required in the future” and quickly succeeded in breaking the codes of the Japanese mission stationed in Australia.³⁹ After Pearl Harbor, Australia’s importance heightened, housing the Allied intelligence and military operations headquarters in the South West Pacific Area (SWPA included Australia, the Philippines, Papua, New Guinea, and the surrounding waters). American General Douglas MacArthur, Commander of the SWPA Allied forces, arrived on the

³⁷ Jeffrey T. Richelson, *The U.S. Intelligence Community*, 6th ed., (Boulder, Co: Westview Press 2012), 375.

³⁸ Hayden B. Peake and Samuel Halpern, eds., *In the Name of Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Walter Pforzheimer* (NIBC Press, 1994), 100-101.

³⁹ Christopher Andrew, “The Growth of the Australian Intelligence Community and the Anglo-American Connection,” *Intelligence and National Security* 4, no. 2 (April 1989), 213-56, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02684528908431996>.

continent in March 1942, bringing with him a large intelligence apparatus, the most crucial component being signals collection capabilities.⁴⁰ To better facilitate collaboration amongst the numerous intelligence organizations stationed in Australia, the Allied Central Bureau (created in 1942) pooled the personnel and resources of Australia and the US Army and Air Force signals units and collaborated with the SIGINT services of the UK, Canada, and New Zealand.⁴¹ Thus, by the fate of geography and its relationship with the UK, Australia was embedded into the intelligence community of the British and American services.

New Zealand was a natural ally of Britain. Like Australia, the country was linked economically and culturally to the UK and reliant on them for national security assistance.⁴² Given New Zealand's ties to the UK, Wellington supported the British war operations on land, sea, and in the air by providing soldiers, naval vessels, and bombers.⁴³ Under the direction of the British Admiralty, the New Zealand Navy used its high-frequency direction-finding (HF DF) stations and intercept units to collect intelligence on the movements of German and Italian naval units and to monitor German and Japanese radio traffic and consular cable messages between Japanese delegations in New Zealand and Tokyo.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid; David Horner, *Spy Catchers: The Official History of ASIO, 1949 - 1963* (Crows Nest, N.S.W.: Allen & Unwin, 2014), part 1, section 1, Kindle.

⁴² "Second World War Overview: Fighting for Britain," New Zealand Ministry for Culture and Heritage, New Zealand History, updated December 20, 2012, <https://nzhistory.govt.nz/war/second-world-war/fighting-for-britain>.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ David Filer, "Signals Intelligence in New Zealand during World War II," Security and Surveillance History Series, Victoria University of Wellington, February 2019,

As the war in the Pacific intensified, British, Australian, Canadian, and American intelligence personnel worked more closely with their New Zealand counterparts, helping them to expand their national network of coast watching stations and those on nearby Pacific islands, including stations in Fiji and Singapore.⁴⁵ The daily intelligence summaries highlighting the previous day's locations of enemy naval units were shared with American and British personnel. The HF DF stations were instrumental in locating Japanese ships and monitoring radio communications, and at times, located enemy submarines in Australian waters before the Australians did.⁴⁶

Indeed, all parties benefited from collaboration. The shared SIGINT helped the Allies to better coordinate their strategies during the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway and aided in avoiding German wolf packs. In turn, the New Zealanders gained first-hand experience in the realm of intelligence collection and analysis.⁴⁷ Although the New Zealand SIGINT unit was relatively small versus those of the British and Americans, the country's geographic location and contributions to Allied operations were disproportionately large. A small component in the larger context of American and British SIGINT efforts, New Zealand provided intelligence that was challenging for others to collect.

<https://www.wgtn.ac.nz/stout-centre/research-units/security-and-surveillance-project/security-and-surveillance-publications>.

⁴⁵ "Naval Intelligence WWII," National Museum of the Royal New Zealand Navy, accessed October 22, 2015, <https://navymuseum.co.nz/explore/by-themes/world-war-two-by-themes/naval-intelligence-ww11/#>.

⁴⁶ Filer, "Signals Intelligence in New Zealand."

⁴⁷ National Museum of the Royal New Zealand Navy, "Naval Intelligence WWII."

Formalizing Relations: BRUSA – UKUSA

The US Navy had engaged in prewar naval escort operations and therefore was experienced in sharing SIGINT with the British. Upon America's entrance into the war, the US Army needed to be taken more deeply into the fold on Allied SIGINT sharing, and their integration would be codified in the British-USA Communications Intelligence Agreement (BRUSA, later updated and renamed the UKUSA Agreement).⁴⁸ The 1943 BRUSA Agreement formalized operational cooperation to support wartime objectives.⁴⁹ Specifically, BRUSA obliged the US War Department and the British GC&CS to “exchange completely all information concerning the detection, identification, and interception of signals from, and the solution of codes and ciphers used by, the military and air forces of the Axis power, including secret services” and personnel.⁵⁰ Moreover, BRUSA regulated security measures pertaining to the dissemination of Ultra “special intelligence.”⁵¹ Ultra-intelligence, closely guarded as one of the UK's most valued intelligence assets, was SIGINT derived from decrypted German communications that passed through the Enigma encryption machine.⁵² BRUSA also specified areas of

⁴⁸ Peake and Halpern, eds., *In the Name of Intelligence*, 95-102.

⁴⁹ “Memorandum for the Chief of Staff: Subject: Agreement between British Code and Cipher School and US War Department in Regard to Certain ‘Special Intelligence’ June 1943,” United States National Security Agency/Central Security Service, declassified April 7, 2010, <https://www.nsa.gov/Helpful-Links/NSA-FOIA/Declassification-Transparency-Initiatives/Historical-Releases/UKUSA/>; “A Brief History of the UKUSA Agreement,” [United Kingdom] Government Communications Headquarters, published March 5, 2021, <https://www.gchq.gov.uk/information/brief-history-of-ukusa>.

⁵⁰ United States National Security Agency/Central Security Service, “Memorandum for the Chief of Staff.”

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

⁵² Harry Hinsley, “The Influence of ULTRA in the Second World War,” Annual Liddle Hart Center for Military Archives Lecture, King's College London, February 18, 1992, <https://www.kcl.ac.uk/library/assets/archives/1992-lecture.pdf>.

responsibility, the Americans would focus on Japanese military and air force signals, and the British would target German and Italian traffic.⁵³

In sum, the Agreement produced a synergetic, interdependent relationship between the signatories and, by association, with the Dominions of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, to maximize resources and avoid duplication by dividing tasks and sharing intelligence, tools, and techniques. Thus, the impetus behind BRUSA was not only to enhance and formalize SIGINT sharing but also to regulate and maintain the security and secrecy of Ultra and to allow US personnel to gain experience in the field of SIGINT. Several hundred Americans took up residence in Bletchley Park, working side by side with the British to hone their codebreaking and traffic analysis skills.⁵⁴ The synergetic, force-multiplying arrangement continued throughout the war years, fostered close personal and professional relationships, and generated trust and respect amongst the SIGINTers.⁵⁵

As the war was winding down, British and American cryptologists and military leadership assessed that an emerging Soviet threat was replacing the German one. Given “the disturbed conditions of the world,” it was suggested that continued cooperation during peacetime would be mutually beneficial.⁵⁶ The proposal was unprecedented. Historically, the US downgraded, if not completely disbanded, its intelligence enterprises

⁵³ United States National Security Agency/Central Security Service, “Memorandum for the Chief of Staff.”

⁵⁴ Sherman, *The First Americans*, 39-40.

⁵⁵ Ferris, *Behind the Enigma: The Authorised History of GCHQ, Britain's Secret Cyber-Intelligence Agency* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2020), 359-370.

⁵⁶ Johnson, *American Cryptology*, 20.

with the conclusion of a conflict. Intelligence activities were reserved for wartime, not peacetime.⁵⁷ Yet, as the Allies were to remain in Europe as occupying powers, there were compelling arguments to maintain the partnership and manage tasks together.

The UKUSA Agreement

On September 12, 1945, President Truman authorized continued cooperation in a one-sentence memorandum, and therein laid another foundational stone for the UKUSA Agreement: “The Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy are hereby authorized to direct the Chief of Staff, US Army and the Commander in Chief, US Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations to continue collaboration in the field of communication intelligence between the United States Army and Navy and the British, and to extend, modify or discontinue this collaboration, as determined to be in the best interests of the United States.”⁵⁸ In effect, the memorandum granted the military service leaders considerable flexibility to manage the bilateral relationship. Unforeseeable at the time considering the rapid pace of evolution of the intelligence space, the managerial flexibility would allow the Chiefs to implement operational and personnel exchange programs that would further intensify cooperation and strengthen interpersonal relationships.

A year later, the collaborative arrangement would be further defined and formalized in the 1946 UKUSA Agreement between the US State-Army-Navy

⁵⁷ Lock K. Johnson, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 107-110.

⁵⁸ Harry S. Truman, “Memorandum for the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy,” official memorandum, September 12, 1945, approved for release September 11, 2018, accessed within “1 Historical Note on the UKUSA Comint Agreement,” contributed by Privacy International, Document Cloud, <https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5759136-1-Historical-Note-on-the-UKUSA-COMINT-Agreement.html>.

Communication Intelligence Board (STANCIB) and the London Signals Intelligence Board (SIGINT Board).⁵⁹ The seven-page secret document outlined the terms of the relationship and committed signatory agencies to a wide range of intelligence cooperation pertaining to intercepted foreign communications. UKUSA dictated regulations related to products, methods, dissemination, and security. Products to be shared included: “(1) collection of traffic, (2) communication documents and equipment, (3) traffic analysis, (4) cryptanalysis, (5) decryption and translation, (6) communication organizations, practices, procedures, and equipment.”⁶⁰ Beyond sharing products, methods and techniques would also be exchanged. Secrecy was critical and revealing the Agreement’s existence to third parties was forbidden.⁶¹

Though not signatories to the Agreement or third parties, guidelines were provided for cooperation with the Dominions Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. The UK was required to inform the US of any agreements or arrangements made with or proposed to the Dominions. For its part, the US was forbidden to make any arrangements with Australia and New Zealand without London’s approval yet was permitted to negotiate bilateral agreements with Canada independently.⁶² The final regulations defined how intelligence would be shared and protected. The US and UK would share all signals

⁵⁹ STANCIB consisted of representatives from the US State Department, the US Navy, the US Army and other US SIGINT entities. For UKUSA declassified documents, see: “UKUSA Agreement Release,” [release of appendices to the UKUSA Agreement, 1943 - 1961 in June 2010], United States National Security/Central Security Service, <https://www.nsa.gov/Helpful-Links/NSA-FOIA/Declassification-Transparency-Initiatives/Historical-Releases/UKUSA/>.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

intelligence. Yet London SIGINT Board approval was needed before the US could share with any British Empire or Dominion states (other than Canada), and joint US-UK approval was required for dissemination to third parties.⁶³ Appendices stipulated the division of labor, authorized the embedment of liaison officials in each other's services, and allowed for unrestricted access to the other's operating agencies.⁶⁴

The Agreement obliged the independent national intelligence agencies of the US and the UK to exchange personnel, divide tasks, and share tools, techniques and information collected. The freedom and flexibilities Truman granted to the service Chiefs to manage the bilateral relationship were preserved in the UKUSA Agreement. No grand strategy or specific missions were defined, which allowed the prioritization and execution of long and short-term operations to be done through the personal exchanges between agency directors of both countries. Thus, upon regular consultation with each other, the London SIGINT Board and STANCIB directors cooperated with each other yet operated their domestic agencies independently of the other. Maintaining these key features, the Agreement would be amended to include Canada (1949), New Zealand (1956), and Australia (1956) and will be discussed later.

SIGINT: A Force Multiplier

The collective wartime efforts of the Allies' signals intelligence services have been credited as being decisive in bringing about victory. As no nation was deemed capable of victory alone, the shared SIGINT served as a force multiplier, providing

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid, Appendices A-G.

expanded coverage and almost real-time information on enemy movements, if not advanced warning of intentions. SIGINT informed wartime strategy and, in some cases, influenced battle outcomes. SIGINT provided advanced warning of Japanese attack plans, routes, and the composition of forces before the Battle of Midway.⁶⁵ The forewarning allowed Allied forces to prepare for battle and contributed to eliminating four large aircraft carriers and over 200 aircraft.⁶⁶ Without the intelligence, the balance of power in the Pacific most likely would have remained in favor of the Japanese, or at least a frozen conflict. Similar Allied successes guided by SIGINT were the destruction of Japanese merchant convoys and German blockade runners carrying materials vital to Japan's war efforts.⁶⁷

The largest and most complex operation relying on SIGINT was the Allied invasion of Normandy. The partners pooled intelligence on German force compositions, locations, intentions, and the German's perception of Allied intentions.⁶⁸ Although it is impossible to assess precisely how the war and specific battles would have played out without collaboration, consumers of allied SIGINT praised its value. General Eisenhower, a regular consumer of Ultra and other SIGINT products, believed the intelligence shortened the war, saved thousands of British and American lives, and contributed to the enemies surrendering.⁶⁹ Sir Harry Hinsley, a British cryptanalyst at

⁶⁵ "Role and Effectiveness of Signals Intelligence during World War II," Australian Signals Directorate, declassified April 15, 2021, <https://www.asd.gov.au/sites/default/files/2022-03/Role-and-Effectiveness-of-Signals-Intelligence-in-World-War-2.pdf>, 2-4.

⁶⁶ Ibid, 2-4.

⁶⁷ Ibid, 3-4.

⁶⁸ Ibid, 12-15.

Bletchley Park, estimated ULTRA “shortened the war by not less than two years and probably by four.”⁷⁰

The Allied wartime collaboration was unique in that sovereign nations voluntarily surrendered their most secretive intelligence and the tools and techniques employed for collection and decryption.⁷¹ Cooperation was born more out of necessity than binding bilateral or multilateral, formal or informal agreements, as a British defeat would have negatively impacted the economic and security interests of the US, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. Since no one nation possessed the capabilities to defeat Germany or Japan, Britain’s survival hinged upon collaboration. By pooling country-specific advantages to support the UK, each nation strengthened its own national security and protected economic interests. Indeed, the five nations were unified by the hostile security environment while also being mindful of narrowly defined national self-interests.

Background to Cooperation: National Interests Align

The UK brought to the partnership advantages no other partner could - superior SIGINT capabilities, geography, and relationships.⁷² Indeed, the British Army and Royal Navy gained experience and honed codebreaking and cryptanalytical skills during World

⁶⁹ Peake and Halpern, eds., *In the Name of Intelligence*, 95-97.

⁷⁰ Hinsley, “Influence of ULTRA.”

⁷¹ Robert Louis Benson, *A History of U.S. Communications Intelligence during World War II: Policy and Administration*, United States Cryptologic History, Series IV, World War II, vol. 8, Center for Cryptologic History, United States National Security Agency, 1997, https://www.nsa.gov/portals/75/documents/about/cryptologic-heritage/historical-figures-publications/publications/wwii/history_us_comms.pdf, vii.

⁷² Sarah Mainwaring and Richard J. Aldrich, “The Secret Empire of Signals Intelligence: GCHQ and the Persistence of the Colonial Presence,” *The International History Review* 43, no. 1 (2021): 54-71, <https://doi.org/10.1080/07075332.2019.1675082>.

War I. SIGINT facilities were established across the empire, including listening and intercept stations in Europe, Africa, and Asia.⁷³ Tools and techniques were refined throughout the war, and holistically developed relationships were established in key locations. By the war's end, the UK laid claim to roughly 100 intercept stations collecting enemy traffic.⁷⁴ Unknowingly or unintentionally, the British had created an informal process of international intelligence collaboration sustained by a network of working relationships in strategic locations.

Britain's SIGINT collection was magnified significantly through its colonial ties. The expansive geographic spread of the overseas empire provided vast tracks of real estate for collection sites, and the established relationships with local authorities eased the acquisition of manpower and critical resources. The combination of advanced capabilities, geographic reach, and colonial relationships enabled the UK to collect signals in areas of the world that otherwise would be unattainable. The benefits derived from the enlarged SIGINT collection served not only the British but also individual states. On an individual state level, the UK helped bolster an ally's national defense by sharing SIGINT relevant to its specific area. For example, from colonial outposts in the Southwest Pacific, British SIGINT was especially beneficial to Australia and New Zealand, whose SIGINT services were in the development stages with limited reach.

⁷³ Ferris, *Behind the Enigma*, 29-65.

⁷⁴ *Ibid*, 31.

Dominion Interests

Beyond receiving SIGINT vital to homeland protection, the Dominions of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand had other incentives to partner with the UK. They enjoyed preferential trade conditions and relied on their former, stronger Colonial Master in matters of national defense.⁷⁵ With an encroaching and militant Japanese threat, Australia and New Zealand were further motivated to stand by the UK, given the latter's traditional naval strength and presence in the South Pacific region. Thus, the Dominions' solidarity was not purely altruistic, grounded in colonial ties, shared democratic values, and common culture. Rather, solidarity was driven by nationally defined economic and security concerns.

American Interests

National objectives also incentivized the US to collaborate with the British. Prior to entering the war, America's SIGINT apparatus was modest and decentralized. The US Army and Navy SIGINT agencies were smaller and less proficient than their British counterparts and prone to inter-agency rivalry.⁷⁶ Both services had limited collection capabilities, and efforts focused on foreign diplomatic traffic in Japan, Germany, Italy, and Latin America. Coverage of foreign military communications was lacking due to inadequate resources of experienced personnel and monitoring stations. One exception was Japanese army messages, which the US intercepted from a monitoring station on the

⁷⁵ David Sanders and David Patrick Houghton, *Losing an Empire, Finding a Role: British Foreign Policy since 1945* (London: Palgrave Macmillan Education, 2017), 29-55.

⁷⁶ Johnson, *American Cryptology*, 10-15.

Philippine Islands, yet decryption was beyond America's capabilities. A significant prewar success was the US Army breaking the Japanese diplomatic cipher machine Purple in the Fall of 1940.⁷⁷

Despite the breakthrough with Purple, institutional challenges constrained the efficiency and effectiveness of US SIGINT efforts. The decentralized agencies were not structured to manage multinational, global military operations, which required collecting and delivering more information to more partners faster.⁷⁸ Indeed, prior to America entering the war, the organizational structure and capabilities of the SIGINT agencies were inadequate to meet the high demands of generating tactical and strategic intelligence necessary for global operations.

The impetus for American cooperation was also driven by domestic security and economic concerns. Indicators were apparent in Roosevelt's speeches and, more subtly, in the Atlantic Charter. Roosevelt repeatedly declared his desire to keep the war out of the Northern Hemisphere, maintaining America's "future security is greatly dependent on" Britain's survival.⁷⁹ Aid would be channeled through the Lend-Lease Act and the Destroyers for Bases Agreement. However, the deals were more strategic than self-sacrificing. Instead of receiving financial repayment, Roosevelt accepted leases on British territories, which allowed for an expansion of America's air and naval reach and better defensive protection of the Northern Hemisphere.⁸⁰

⁷⁷ Benson, *United States Communications Intelligence*.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*

⁷⁹ Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Arsenal of Democracy."

⁸⁰ United States Department of State, "Atlantic Conference and Charter, 1941;" Hull, "Destroyers for Bases;" United States Department of State, "Lend Lease."

Roosevelt's economic aims were detected in the Atlantic Charter principles. By supporting self-determination and economic liberalization, Roosevelt intended to weaken the UK's influence over its colonies and dismantle preferential trade agreements. A general whittling down of Britain's global influence, especially in the oil-rich Middle East region, would allow the US better trade conditions and political relations vital to support American national objectives. Collectively, the aid arrangements and the Atlantic Charter would transform the postwar economic order to America's advantage. Thus, like the Dominions, American cooperation was driven by narrowly defined national self-interests.

United Intelligence: Greater Than the Sum of the Parts

The wartime collaboration wove together a partnership of nation-states from North America, Europe, and the South Pacific to achieve a specific mission. Largely though not exclusively, the Third Reich's offensive in Europe and their use of the Enigma machine provided a catalyst for increasing cooperation between democratic allies. Unified by a shared geopolitical goal to save Britain while being mindful of national self-interests, each partner leveraged its unique national advantages for the collective good. The US provided manpower, money, and machinery. The UK offered SIGINT expertise and global relationships, and the Dominions provided strategically vital geography.

The relationships began informally and independently, allowing agency directors flexibility to implement operational and personnel exchange programs that intensified cooperation and built trust. National efforts were streamlined to achieve maximum efficiency by dividing tasks, pooling resources, and sharing intelligence in an

international way. Perhaps unintended at the time, the synergetic relationship cemented ties and generated interdependency. By splitting up global coverage, each nation had a monopoly on the intelligence collected. Thus, the partners were dependent on each other to share information critical to keeping their populations safe. If one decoupled from the arrangement, the national security of all partners would be jeopardized.

Throughout the war years, the family of nations took on more formality and regulation through bi-and multilateral agreements and set the foundation for a systematic process upon which future relations could deepen. The Agreements, however, were not the bedrock components that fostered unity but rather the understanding that when confronted with a common threat, the five nations' complementing competencies were greater together than the sum of their parts. Each nation benefited from and was dependent on the other. The unprecedented wartime collaboration defined in the UKUSA Agreement would set the framework for seventy-five years of continuous activities.

Chapter III.

UKUSA: Defending Democracy

1946 - 1991

“The Five Eyes Community was key to our ability to avoid war with the Soviet Union and finally win the Cold War.”⁸¹

Alliances or partnerships are temporary and typically dissolve after the unifying threat is over, implying that with the conclusion of WWII, American and British cooperation was no longer needed.⁸² Yet, although the initial, unifying drivers prompting SIGINT cooperation had been dispensed with – German and Japanese aggression – other factors compelled the continuation of the US-UK partnership. Specifically, an evolving security threat from the Soviet Union. The developments prompted Washington to reflect on three intertwining questions. What is happening in the world? What should be done about it? Lastly, what information is needed to support accomplishing American objectives? In short, leaders needed strategic warning of global threats, a strategy to counter the threats, and superior intelligence to support executing the strategy. Intricacies aside, the equation was unfolding. The Soviets were the threat, deterrence the strategy, and superior intelligence the driving component supporting allied efforts.

⁸¹ Comments from Lord West of Splithead. *Wells, Between Five Eyes*, viii.

⁸² Stephen M Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” *International Security* 9, no. 4 (1985): 3–43, <https://doi.org/10.2307/2538540>; Lowenthal, *Intelligence*, 12-14.

Postwar Security Environment

Relations with the Soviet Union were on a downward trajectory even before the war ended, with tense discussions over postwar peace settlements concerning Germany and Japan forewarning a clash of foreign policies between Moscow and Washington.⁸³ Indicators of troublesome postwar relations were unfolding across Europe and the Middle East as the Soviets violated wartime commitments by failing to remove troops from Iran, honor the terms of the Lend-Lease Agreement, or implement democratic practices in Germany.⁸⁴ Further flashpoints demonstrated the Soviet's expansionist intentions as Moscow exerted pressure on Iran for oil concessions and Turkey for freedom of movement through the Turkish Straits.⁸⁵

The growing divide was more formally evinced in Stalin's February 1946 speech and his assertion that a world economic system dominated by capitalist nations competing for resources inevitably leads to war and must be countered with a more robust national defense posture.⁸⁶ It became increasingly apparent that Soviet attempts to

⁸³ Political strains were apparent at the 1945 Yalta, 1945 Potsdam and 1946 Paris Ministers Conferences, see: "The Yalta Conference, 1945," United States Department of State, in *Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations*, Office of the Historian, accessed July 2, 2022, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/yalta-conf>; "The Potsdam Conference, 1945," United States Department of State, in *Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations*, Office of the Historian, accessed March 10, 2022, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1937-1945/potsdam-conf>; "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Council of Foreign Ministers, Volume II," United States Department of State, Office of the Historian, accessed January 29, 2022, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1946v02/d65>.

⁸⁴ Clark Clifford, "American Relations with the Soviet Union," ["Clifford-Elsey Report"], September 24, 1946, box 11, subject file series, Rose Conway Files, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum, Independence, MO., accessed June 15, 2022, <https://www.trumanlibrary.gov/library/research-files/report-american-relations-soviet-union-clark-clifford-clifford-elsey-report?documentid=NA&pagenumber=1>.

⁸⁵ Sanders and Houghton, *Losing an Empire*, 62-65.

gain relative power and influence challenged not only the postwar order of international cooperation and permanent peace as envisioned in the Atlantic Charter but also threatened American and British national security and economic interests in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. The international security landscape was evolving, with Soviet communism replacing Axis fascism as the premier security concern.

Recalibration in the United States

In early 1947, Truman signaled sweeping changes in US foreign policy.⁸⁷ Whereas traditionally, Washington avoided interfering in the affairs of other states in peacetime and those outside the Western Hemisphere, Truman now reasoned that national security concerns transcended American territory to include far-away nations and regions.⁸⁸ Guided by this new line of thinking, Truman argued that the best means to safeguard US security and interests would be to engage overseas and provide military, economic, and political aid to democracies under threat by Soviet totalitarianism.⁸⁹ Thus, Truman justified and sanctioned America's global role to bolster democratic stability and shield vulnerable states from Soviet absorption.

⁸⁶ Joseph Stalin, "Speech Delivered by J.V. Stalin at a Meeting of Voters of the Stalin Electoral District, Moscow," February 9, 1946, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Wilson Center, accessed July 19, 2021, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116179>.

⁸⁷ "The Truman Doctrine, 1947," United States Department of State, in *Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations*, Office of the Historian, accessed March 11, 2022, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/truman-doctrine>.

⁸⁸ Historically, the US lacked significant security threats from neighbors or overseas powers and had limited overseas interests that required support from a permanent intelligence apparatus, see: Lowenthal, *Intelligence*, 12-13.

⁸⁹ United States Department of State, "Truman Doctrine."

To implement his objectives and better coordinate US national security policies, Truman authorized the National Security Act of 1947.⁹⁰ The Act restructured the American military and intelligence communities to reduce redundancies and provide for more robust security by creating or reorganizing, amongst other entities, the National Security Council (NSC), the Department of Defense (DoD), and the CIA. Beyond merging the Army, Navy, and Marine Corps into the DoD under the leadership of a Secretary of Defense, the Act also authorized the centralized coordination of intelligence produced by numerous intelligence agencies under the direction of a Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). Thus, the CIA would become the government's principal, authoritative civilian intelligence agency and was given broad provisions for collecting and analyzing intelligence and developing next-generation technical systems, including signals, reconnaissance, and imagery.⁹¹ The new framework legalized a permanent national intelligence body and highlighted the critical role intelligence played in national defense – in war and peacetime.

Shifting Western Strategy

American strategists were taking notice of the shifting security environment, analyzing and piecing together Soviet intentions as they unfolded. In February 1946, a State Department communique stressed that Moscow's historical "neurotic view of world affairs...and instinctive sense of insecurity" would prompt policies of military build-up

⁹⁰ *National Security Act of 1947*, [United States] Public Law 235 of July 26, 1947, 61 Stat. 496, Office of the Director of National Intelligence: IC Legal Reference Book, <https://www.dni.gov/index.php/ic-legal-reference-book/national-security-act-of-1947>.

⁹¹ Richelson, *U.S. Intelligence Community*, 19-21.

and territorial expansionism.⁹² For the Soviets, national security was a zero-sum game, achievable only through the complete destruction of its enemies. Under these assumptions, the author forewarned a long-term, deadly battle between the Soviets and western states and suggested the US counter with policies of containment and military preparedness.

A month later, former British Prime Minister Churchill painted a similar hostile future with the Soviets, warning an American audience that Moscow's spreading influence in and control over parts of eastern Europe had created an "iron curtain."⁹³ The development was a crisis on a global scale and required a firm western response. To preserve peace and democracy, Churchill proposed that America and Britain stand together as a bulwark against Soviet political, military, and ideological ambitions. American officials, including the public, agreed.⁹⁴

Three other US government reports offered a deeper analysis of Soviet intentions and potential American response strategies. Truman Advisor Clark Clifford's report, "American Relations with the Soviet Union," aligned with assessments made by Churchill and the State Department, confirming the Soviets sought world domination militarily, politically, and ideologically and posed an existential threat to American

⁹² "The Long Telegram, from George Kennan in Moscow to the Secretary of State, February 22, 1946," National Security Archive (George Washington University, 2019), published February 22, 2021, <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/document/21042-long-telegram-original>.

⁹³ Winston Churchill, "The Sinews of Peace ('Iron Curtain Speech')," speech at Westminster College, Fulton, MO., March 5, 1946, The International Churchill Society, transcript, accessed April 13, 2022, <https://winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1946-1963-elder-statesman/the-sinews-of-peace/>.

⁹⁴ In 1946, 71% of Americans disapproved of Moscow's foreign policies, see: R.J. Reinhart, "Gallup Vault: Americans' Views as the Iron Curtain Descended," Gallup: Gallup Vault, March 2, 2021, <https://news.gallup.com/vault/330926/gallup-vault-americans-views-iron-curtain-descended.aspx>.

national security and economic interests. Clifford advocated that the US “maintain sufficient military strength to restrain the Soviet Union.”⁹⁵ The second assessment, produced by the CIA, added to the ominous narrative by highlighting the trends and drivers influencing US-Soviet relations and concluded that the US should “be prepared for the eventuality of war with the USSR.”⁹⁶

Perhaps the most determinative report reinforcing previous assessments was NSC-68, the “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,” which outlined Soviet geopolitical ambitions, strategies, and capabilities.⁹⁷ NSC-68 estimated with high probability the continuous growth of the Soviet’s military arsenal, including nuclear weapons. The report warned that the Soviet’s ultimate goal was “to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world.”⁹⁸ Furthermore, it suggested Washington should strengthen the “political, economic and military strength of the free world” to deter Soviet aggression and protect American territory and interests.⁹⁹ Fundamentally, NSC-68 inspired a considerable expansion in military capabilities, substantial investment in advanced technologies, and proactive engagement abroad.

⁹⁵ Clifford, “American Relations with the Soviet Union.”

⁹⁶ *Threats to the Security of the United States, ORE 60-48, September 28, 1948*, United States Central Intelligence Agency, accessed January 7, 2022, <https://catalog.archives.gov/id/225249206>.

⁹⁷ *National Security Council Report, NSC 68, “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,” April 14, 1950*, United States National Security Council, (History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, United States National Archives, Wilson Center), accessed February 3, 2022, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116191.pdf>; “NSC 68, 1950,” United States Department of State, in *Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations*, Office of the Historian, 2019, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/NSC68>.

⁹⁸ United States Department of State, *NSC 68*, 54.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

In the early years, the dynamics of SIGINT dependency influenced member states' political policies, with leaders often subordinating narrow national interests to UKUSA cohesion. One example was decolonization. Roosevelt's wish for a postwar dismantling of the British colonial system was well known. Yet after the war, Washington did not push London to unravel the empire.¹⁰⁰ America's hesitancy to pressure decolonization implied that Washington prioritized the intelligence relationship over potentially losing it due to political fissures. The British appear to have reciprocated in kind as London officials were increasingly factoring American preferences into foreign policy decisions, at times even deferring to Washington's policies irrespective of the implications.¹⁰¹

The culmination of the threat assessments forced American officials to rethink national defense strategies and inspired reactionary, threat-based foreign and national security policies and legislation. Unforeseeable at the time, a continuity of deterrence policies with slight variations of Presidential doctrines and public rhetoric would shape US foreign policy for over 40 years. Yet, the way forward drove future intelligence requirements, showcasing more precisely what decision-makers required for policy. Specifically, a professional, permanent intelligence system with superior, global collection and analytical capabilities providing in-depth knowledge of Soviet activities, intentions, and strategic weapons.

¹⁰⁰ David Sherman, "From Improvisation to Permanence: American Perspectives on the U.S. Signals Intelligence Relationship with Britain, 1940–1950," *Journal of Intelligence History* 18, no. 1 (October 24, 2018): 63–85, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/16161262.2018.1537729?journalCode=rjih20>.

¹⁰¹ Mark Garnett, Simon Mabon, and Robert Smith, *British Foreign Policy since 1945* (London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2018), 118.

Intelligence Collection: Allied Weaknesses Exposed

The policy pivot necessitated a better understanding of the Soviet's intentions, military capabilities, and developments in weaponry and other scientific technologies. Yet, collecting intelligence on the USSR was problematic. First and most daunting was its territorial spread.¹⁰² By 1946, the USSR was the largest country in the world, encompassing over six million square miles spread across two continents. More than double the size of the US, the USSR had a 6000-mile East to West span, the bulk of which hovered above the 49th parallel. Second, the Soviet system was a closed, oppressive society with no free press and littered with security and intelligence personnel tightly monitoring the population.¹⁰³ Even if a human agent were to successfully infiltrate Soviet territory, obtaining valuable intelligence from locals or public media would be difficult.¹⁰⁴ The geographical and societal challenges hindered America's ability to assess developments behind the Iron Curtain and exposed the limitations of Washington's intelligence capabilities. American assets were simply inadequate to meet policymakers' intelligence requirements and the gap demanded greater collaboration with UKUSA partners.

¹⁰² Matthew M. Aid, ed., "Cold War Intelligence: Background: The Soviet Target: The U.S. Intelligence Community versus the USSR 1945-1991," Introduction to *Cold War Intelligence*, edited by Matthew M. Aid, (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2015), <https://primarysources.brillonline.com/browse/cold-war-intelligence>.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid.

The United Kingdom

London had numerous incentives to continue cooperation. Britain emerged from the war with diminished economic, political, and military strength, leaving London with waning influence and ability to protect vital overseas interests, specifically its oil facilities in Iran and control over the Suez Canal.¹⁰⁵ Influenced by financial and political constraints, London was decoupling from certain colonial relationships and withdrawing from foreign economic and military commitments.¹⁰⁶

Domestically, Britain was struggling with a fragile economy, underpinned by a structurally weak industrial base and overburdened by war debts and interest payments.¹⁰⁷ The economic conditions left leaders questioning Britain's ability to provide an adequate national defense posture. More than a few officials feared the homeland was vulnerable to a Pearl Harbor-like surprise attack, possibly one laden with atomic weapons.¹⁰⁸ Yet, despite the security concerns and need for a robust and timely forewarning system, the British scaled back a critical component supporting national security – collecting SIGINT.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁵ For information on Britain's postwar standing, see: Garnett, Mabon, and Smith, *British Foreign Policy*, 97-131; Sanders and Houghton, *Losing an Empire*, 29-56.

¹⁰⁶ Between 1947 and 1948, Britain relinquished control of an estimated seventy-five percent of the empire's subjects, see: Calder Walton, *Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, the Cold War and the Twilight of Empire* (London: William Collins, 2014), 113-114.

¹⁰⁷ Sanders and Houghton, *Losing an Empire*, 56-59.

¹⁰⁸ Richard Aldrich, "British Intelligence and the Anglo-American 'Special Relationship' during the Cold War," *Review of International Studies* 24, no. 3 (July 1998): 331-51, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20097530>.

¹⁰⁹ Sherman states in 1945 SIGINT efforts were "dramatically reduced," see: Sherman, "From Improvisation to Permanence," 79; Ferris adds, in 1945, the UK employed over 30,000 SIGINTers versus roughly 7,000 a year later, see: Ferris, *Behind the Enigma*, 390.

British anxieties extended to the international security environment, and London's assessments that Soviet aggression and expansionism threatened national interests and security mostly aligned with Washington's.¹¹⁰ British officials had long understood the implications of Moscow's double punch strategy. They viewed the current situation as an extension of the 'Great Game' of the 19th and early 20th century – Soviet territorial expansionism coupled with subversive activities undermined British interests.¹¹¹ In sum, the British desire for continued cooperation was fueled by domestic economic and security concerns and growing external threats that could not be mitigated with national capabilities.

Canada

Canada had long, strong ties to the UK on economic and national defense issues, yet Britain's postwar decline left Ottawa shifting relations closer to the US. The border nations were already linked through a permanent defense alliance (the Ogdensburg Agreement),¹¹² yet Canada's postwar security situation required intensified protection. Canadian geography, advantageous during the war for collecting enemy SIGINT, had become problematic in the postwar world. Sitting directly between the USSR and US made the country and, more specifically, the Northwest Passage strategically

¹¹⁰ Sanders and Houghton, *Losing an Empire*, 80-81.

¹¹¹ Walton, *Empire of Secrets*, 16.

¹¹² In 1940, the US and Canada agreed to collaborate on issues concerning national security, see: *Joint Statement by the Governments of Canada and the United States of America Regarding Defence Cooperation between the Two Countries*, Canada Treaty Series no. 43, 1947, <https://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/text-texte.aspx?id=100977>.

vulnerable.¹¹³ Essentially, Canada was a barrier between the superpowers, and defending the Arctic-Far North became a continental security imperative far exceeding Canadian defense capabilities.

Domestic issues also shaped the country's security concerns. The 1945 defection of Igor Gouzenko, a Soviet cipher clerk stationed in the Soviet embassy in Ottawa, exposed that the former ally had been spying on Canada.¹¹⁴ Gouzenko revealed to Canadian officials the scope of activities and the depth of penetration within diplomatic, military, and scientific circles, exposing, for example, a nuclear research scientist, a Parliamentarian, and other government officials in key positions. Ottawa feared the possibility that other rings of undercover sleeper agents were nestled in the country, ready to oblige Moscow's demands. Thus, Ottawa was grappling with internal and external security issues that surpassed Canadian resources, and to secure its objectives better, outside assistance was necessary.

Australia

Australia had strong security and economic ties to the UK and benefitted from defense assistance and preferential trade conditions. With the UK's postwar decline, Canberra was eager to strengthen relations with Washington, particularly on security and trade issues.¹¹⁵ Australian officials were cognizant of the Soviet threat and the spread of

¹¹³ For more information concerning the Arctic's strategic location, see: Wark, "Favourable Geography;" Elena Baldassarri, "The Northwest Passage as a Matter of National Security," in "The Northwest Passage: Myth, Environment, and Resources," Environment & Society Portal Virtual Exhibitions 2017, no.1. Rachel Carson Center for Environment and Society, doi.org/10.5282/rcc/6254.

¹¹⁴ Horner, *Spy Catchers*, part 1, section 2.

communism in Asia.¹¹⁶ Yet, given its geography, Canberra's primary concerns were a revival of Japanese military strength and the implications a military build-up would have on trade and the flow of goods in the Pacific.¹¹⁷ Under this backdrop, Australia required - desired - a strong, friendly military presence in the Indo-Pacific region to realize its economic and security objectives yet lacked the naval capabilities to protect its sea interests. Thus, Australia strove for closer ties to the US in the form of a "treaty of friendship, commerce, and navigation."¹¹⁸

Canberra had notable internal security concerns as well. The wartime experience exposed weaknesses within Australia's borders and intelligence services. In the early 1940s, Canberra was plagued by security breaches and leaks of allied SIGINT to the Japanese, including sensitive intelligence related to Ultra and General MacArthur's operations.¹¹⁹ The discovery was made by a joint team of British, American, and Australian SIGINTers that had intercepted messages passing through Soviet and Chinese diplomatic stations in Australia, confirming secret allied intelligence was being forwarded to the Japanese. The leaks continued intermittently throughout the war and underscored Australia's shortfalls in protecting the homeland.¹²⁰ Domestic stability was

¹¹⁵ Minister Percy Spender lobbied for the "closest possible co-operation with the United States" with the intent of obtaining a security pact for the Pacific region, see: *Parliamentary Debates*, Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives, 19th Parliament, 1st Session. March 9, 1950 (Percy Spender, Minister for External Affairs and External Territories), Historic Hansard, http://historichansard.net/hofreps/1950/19500309_reps_19_206/#subdebate-30-0, 635-636.

¹¹⁶ Horner, *Spy Catchers*, part 1, section 2.

¹¹⁷ "Department of State Policy Statement Australia, April 1950," United States Department of State, in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, Office of the Historian, accessed February 21, 2022, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v06/d96>.

¹¹⁸ Commonwealth of Australia, *Debates*, March 9, 1950, 631-632.

¹¹⁹ Horner, *Spy Catchers*, part 1, section 1.

also challenged by the increasing strength of the Communist Party of Australia (CPA), whose members in 1945 made up roughly 45% of all unionists within the country's trade unions. It was feared that the CPA had the power to disrupt Australia's industrial base and that the national intelligence services were not sufficiently managing the potential threat.¹²¹

These concerns were dwarfed by the enormity of the Venona intercepts, communication cables and telegrams between Soviet intelligence services and operatives stationed in embassies abroad that American cryptanalysts had been collecting since the mid-1904s.¹²² The deciphered intercepts revealed the existence and activities of Soviet spy rings in Australia, causing much concern in London and Washington about the security of shared SIGINT and resulting in Canberra's temporary exclusion from the partnership.¹²³ Already struggling with domestic security, Australia lost access to a component crucial to supporting security. The leaks, revelations of Soviet espionage, and loss of intelligence weakened the country's defenses and laid bare Australia's structural shortcomings. Thus, getting back into the good graces of the US and the UK was critical to Australia's security and economic interests.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ Ibid, part 1, section 2.

¹²² "Venona Documents," [release of Venona documents in July 1995], United States National Security Agency/Central Security Service, accessed October 4, 2021, <https://www.nsa.gov/Helpful-Links/NSA-FOIA/Declassification-Transparency-Initiatives/Historical-Releases/Venona/>; Johnson, *American Cryptology*, 89-95.

¹²³ Access was limited from 1948-1953, see: Johnson, *American Cryptology*, 22-23.

New Zealand

Given its proximity to Australia, New Zealand shared similar strategic concerns with its Pacific neighbor - deteriorating relations with the Soviets, expanding communism in Asia, the diminishing presence of British naval assets in the region, fear of a resurging Japanese military, and the loss of MacArthur's massive intelligence apparatus.¹²⁴ Not only did New Zealand lack the military resources to defend itself adequately,¹²⁵ but it also had no national external intelligence service monitoring foreign threats before 1956, leaving Wellington mostly blind to developments outside its borders and reliant on shared intelligence from the UKUSA partners.¹²⁶ Specifically, Wellington's - like Canberra's - access to SIGINT was facilitated through London's signals agency, Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ).

Trade was a significant area of concern as well. New Zealand's small economy and limited domestic market made Wellington reliant on overseas trade. Like other Dominions, New Zealand benefited from privileged trade conditions with the UK, yet the war years temporarily disrupted exchanges. The sluggish economy received a modest financial boost from the presence of Allied soldiers, yet Wellington was eager to increase postwar trade and access to new markets, both required safe navigation of the Pacific.¹²⁷

¹²⁴ For an overview of New Zealand's priorities and policies, see: David J. McCraw, "New Zealand's Foreign Policy in the 1990s: In the National Tradition?" *The Pacific Review* 13, no. 4 (2000): 577-94, <https://doi.org/10.1080/095127400455332>; Ferris, *Behind the Enigma*, 370-377.

¹²⁵ "Treaties and Alliances - the Cold War," New Zealand Ministry for Culture and Heritage, updated February 18, 2020, <https://nzhistory.govt.nz/war/new-zealand-forces-in-asia/nz-military-involvement>.

¹²⁶ Richelson and Ball, *Ties That Bind*, 68-69; "History," New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, accessed May 1, 2022, <https://www.nzsis.govt.nz/about-us/nzsis-history/>.

Thus, with fewer British ships patrolling Asian Pacific waters, New Zealand could not independently realize its security, defense, and trade objectives and needed continued cooperation with the UKUSA partners.

Intersecting National Strengths and Growing Interdependency

Although the US and UK (Dominions included) had slightly different national security priorities, substantially different resources, and diverging assumptions about Soviet capabilities, fundamentally, these points were secondary relative to the broader picture.¹²⁸ Soviet communism and territorial grabs posed an existential threat to western democracies against which no one nation had the capabilities to defend. The geopolitical developments and evolving security threats were strategic issues of mutual concern and building comprehensive intelligence capabilities through the UKUSA partnership to strengthen national strategies became essential for all five nations. If Germany pushed the US and UK together, the USSR was keeping them united.

The wartime experience had created a system of interwoven operational infrastructures, resulting in an elaborate level of integration on a global scale and helped develop close, trusting personal relations between key individuals in all five countries. The Dominions were integrated through exchange programs, embassy liaisons, and interconnected communication links. Building on these established processes, the

¹²⁷ Rachel Harris, "Borders and Battles: How Trade and Security Have Intertwined to Define the United States-New Zealand Relationship from 1940 to 2014," *Canterbury Law Review*, 2013: 164-81, <http://www.nzlii.org/nz/journals/CanterLawRw/2013/7.html>.

¹²⁸ Before 1949, the British had underestimated the Soviet's scientific capabilities to advance their military arsenal and thus had implemented less assertive short and long-term defense plans than the Americans. Furthermore, the UK's proximity to the USSR made it overall more cautious, see: Aldrich, "Special Relationship."

UKUSA partners were well-positioned to deepen ties and further cement the relationship by leveraging their national strengths to confront the Soviet problem together.

The UK brought to the partnership superior SIGINT capabilities and strategically located colonial outposts and relationships. Although London had retracted militarily from most colonial sites, for the most part, the intelligence collection infrastructures remained intact, as did personal contacts with locals.¹²⁹ Equally beneficial was the geographic spread of the outposts and installations; many were based in Asia, where the US had weak or comparatively limited political relations.

London also offered advantages regarding the Dominions. Fundamentally, the UK was the controlling channel through which cooperation with the Dominions was possible. Recall that under the UKUSA Agreement terms, the US could not approach the Dominions (except Canada) without first consulting the British. Given London's more dominant position with the Dominions, the UK served as manager and mentor, and could shape and enhance the national intelligence services of Ottawa, Wellington, and Canberra. In sum, the UK's contributions significantly benefited the partnership, as London provided superior SIGINT competencies, invaluable collection sites, and relationships that no other partner could.

Canada, Australia, and New Zealand afforded the partnership greater geographic coverage and additional personnel amongst whom tasks could be divided. The combination generated a significant increase in signals collected as more targets in more locations could be covered. Presumably, Canada focused on the USSR and parts of

¹²⁹ Aldrich, "Special Relationship;" Calder Walton offers a comprehensive look at the relationships between the British intelligence services and the colonies in *Empire of Secrets*.

China, Australia monitored South and East Asia, and New Zealand covered the South Pacific and Southeast Asia.¹³⁰ Over time, the Dominions' capabilities and contributions increased, and together they handled roughly 30% of the intercept and analytical workload.¹³¹ The expanded collection capabilities freed up American and British resources, allowing the US to focus on the Caribbean, China, parts of the USSR, the Middle East, and Africa, while the UK monitored Europe and the western portions of the USSR.¹³²

For its part, the US offered disproportionately more to the intelligence sharing network as no other partner could match Washington's dominance politically, economically, technologically, or militarily.¹³³ Positioned as the guardian of the free world, the US orchestrated and financed a collection of international bodies intended to maintain peace, promote democracy, and vitalize economies (i.e., NATO, the Marshall Plan, the United Nations). Perhaps equally significant to revitalizing partners' economies and underwriting security commitments were America's investments to sustain the UKUSA partnership and strengthen member states' capabilities.

It should be noted that the disparity in member states' national security threats and financial strength did not prevent unity but rather drew them closer together. As no

¹³⁰ Exact collection areas are not disclosed yet national security practitioners suggest possible scenarios, see: James Cox, "Canada and the Five Eyes Intelligence Community," *Open Canada*, December 18, 2012, <https://opencanada.org/canada-and-the-five-eyes-intelligence-community/>.

¹³¹ Ferris, *Behind the Enigma*, 370.

¹³² Cox, "Canada and the Five Eyes Intelligence Community."

¹³³ "1945-1952: The Early Cold War," United States Department of State, in *Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations*, Office of the Historian, accessed February 2, 2022, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952>.

member possessed the resources, technology, and real estate to collect signals globally, togetherness outweighed going it alone. The US provided the bulk of financing, equipment, technology, and manpower, with the others contributing similar, albeit less, assets. This was a mutually beneficial - mutually dependent partnership, with each partner gaining access to otherwise unattainable intelligence.

To summarize, shortly after the war's end, geopolitical shifts had produced a global bi-polar security environment defined as East vs. West, communism vs. capitalism, or authoritarianism vs. democracy, with each side vying for military, economic, and ideological dominance. The threatening landscape, the convergence of national interests, and the acknowledgment that the challenges could not be met alone fueled maintaining and strengthening the UKUSA network. The allies better understood what was happening in the world and based on that intelligence, proposed a strategy of containment. Together, the five nations recognized the common threat environment, clarified objectives, and identified intelligence requirements that would support containment measures.

UKUSA Expands Cooperation

Under this backdrop, the pathway for intensified cooperation began almost immediately, and the once provisional relationships took on more formality and permanence through several amendments to the 1946 Agreement, including the integration of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand as full members.¹³⁴ The addition of

¹³⁴ United States National Security Agency/Central Security Service, "UKUSA Agreement Release;" [United Kingdom] Government Communications Headquarters, "A Brief History of the UKUSA Agreement."

the Dominions prompted a rebranding of UKUSA to ‘Five Eyes,’ a shortened version of AUS/CAN/NZ/UK/US, the five sets of eyes authorized to read intercepted communications.¹³⁵ Five Eyes did not become a centrally organized body but rather maintained its original structure as a network of independent intelligence agencies working together. Today, these agencies are the National Security Agency (NSA, USA), GCHQ (UK), Australian Signals Directorate (ASD, Australia), Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB, New Zealand), and Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC, Canada).¹³⁶

The process of closer collaboration was further supported by reforms to American SIGINT practices and new or amended bi- and multilateral agreements.¹³⁷ New legislation and a reshuffling of tasks resulted in the CIA being the principal SIGINT agency, and later additions to the SIGINT apparatus increased America’s strengths.¹³⁸ Over time, the newer and expanding NSA assumed responsibility for SIGINT missions, and the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) served as the national coordinating agency for satellite reconnaissance efforts.¹³⁹ Responsible for space-based intelligence

¹³⁵ Cox, “Canada and the Five Eyes Intelligence Community.”

¹³⁶ Jeffrey Dailey, “The Intelligence Club: A Comparative Look at Five Eyes,” *Journal of Political Sciences & Public Affairs* 05, no. 02 (2017), <https://doi.org/10.4172/2332-0761.1000261>.

¹³⁷ The 1949 CANUSA Agreement codified the SIGINT relationship between the US and Canada, see: “CANUSA Agreement,” (correspondence from Chairman G.G. Crean of the (Canadian) Communications Research Committee to Major General C.P. Cabell of the US Communication Intelligence Board, May 1949), Government of Canada: Communications Security Establishment, modified March 20, 2021, <https://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/en/culture-and-community/history/archives/canusa-agreement>.

¹³⁸ Given the DCI’s role to coordinate national intelligence, the CIA’s SIGINT advisor had broad responsibilities over all US SIGINT efforts, see: Richelson, *US Intelligence Community*, 18-19.

¹³⁹ Richelson, *US Intelligence Community*, 31-40; Bruce Berkowitz, *The National Reconnaissance Office at 50 Years: A Brief History*, with Michael Suk, 2nd ed., Chantilly, VA: Center for the Study of National Reconnaissance, National Reconnaissance Office, July 2018, <https://www.nro.gov/Portals/65/documents/about/50thanniv/The%20NRO%20at%2050%20Years%20>

systems, the NRO would later share intelligence unilaterally with all five countries, establish facilities in all five countries, and exchange personnel across the facilities.¹⁴⁰ The geographic diversity would offer a significant benefit for collecting intelligence, basing for surveillance aircraft, and providing logistical support. The facilities would not only intercept adversary communications, but the SIGINT collected would also be used to identify who was listening to someone else. Meaning, the UKUSA members knew what adversaries knew.¹⁴¹ In sum, the reforms streamlined collaboration both within the US government and with Five Eyes partners by reducing the redundancies inherent in multiple agencies having overlapping missions.

The UK played a crucial role in assisting Australia and New Zealand to develop their SIGINT competencies and improve relations with the Americans, who still harbored doubts about their capabilities given the wartime security breaches. GCHQ helped shape the organizational structure and culture of Canberra's and Wellington's services and created reciprocal bodies through which better collaboration was facilitated.¹⁴² Canberra merged its signals bodies into the Defense Signals Bureau (DSB, renamed ASD in 2013),¹⁴³ and Wellington's small signals team eventually developed into the GCSB. Both were linked operationally to GCHQ, forming an independent Commonwealth network

%20A%20Brief%20History%20-%20Second%20Edition.pdf?ver=2019-03-06-141009-113&tamp=1551900924364.

¹⁴⁰ Wells, *Between Five Eyes*, 16-17.

¹⁴¹ Ibid.

¹⁴² Ferris, *Behind the Enigma*, 370-377.

¹⁴³ For a brief overview of Australia's signals agencies, see: "History," Australian Signals Directorate, accessed July 16, 2022, <https://www.asd.gov.au/about/history>.

outside of but complementing the capabilities of the US-UK partnership.¹⁴⁴ Initially, the Australian bureau was led by a British Director and supported by British, New Zealand, and Australian SIGINTers.¹⁴⁵ Working side by side in Australia, Singapore, and Hong Kong, the arrangement created opportunities for personnel to learn from each other, build trust and confidence, and develop strong interpersonal relations.¹⁴⁶ SIGINT was a team sport, and intermingling the personnel made for a more cohesive team. Indeed, the British served as mentors and mediators for the Pacific Dominions. Under GCHQ's stewardship, GCSB and DSB gained expertise, enlarged their services, and bridged the Americans' confidence gap, thus enabling a smoother integration into the family of nations and bolstering Five Eyes' collective capabilities.

Canada required less British assistance in strengthening its signals capabilities as Ottawa had an existing independent signals relationship with the US and considerable wartime experience, giving it a solid foundation upon which to expand.¹⁴⁷ Early on, US-Canadian ties and interlocking operational systems were deepened through a joint initiative to establish a string of communications collection bases extending over 3000 miles in Canada.¹⁴⁸ The installations were equipped with electronic sensors and over-the-

¹⁴⁴ Ferris, *Behind the Enigma*, 370-377.

¹⁴⁵ Horner, *Spy Catchers*, part 1, sections 2-4.

¹⁴⁶ Ferris, *Behind the Enigma*, 375-377.

¹⁴⁷ For more information on Canadian signals activities, see: "A Timeline of Notable Events," [Canada] Communications Security Establishment, October 27, 2022, <https://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/en/culture-and-community/history/timeline>; Maria A. Robson, "The Third Eye: Canada's Development of Autonomous Signals Intelligence to Contribute to Five Eyes Intelligence Sharing," *Intelligence and National Security* 35, no. 7 (May 19, 2020): 954-69, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2020.1768477>; Wesley Wark, "The Road to CANUSA: How Canadian Signals Intelligence Won Its Independence and Helped Create the Five Eyes," *Intelligence and National Security* 35, no. 1 (2020): 20-34, published online November 7, 2019, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2019.1685285>.

horizon radar systems and provided Distant Early Warning against incoming Soviet aircraft or missiles.¹⁴⁹ Recall the bulk of USSR geography sits above the 49th parallel, an area from which Canada was ideally positioned to collect signals. The SIGINT was crucial for continental defense and monitoring technical advancements of Soviet weaponry. Ottawa also shared intelligence acquired through Canadian diplomatic stations and overseas military establishments, which served as collection hubs and made Canada a source of information on areas other partners could not easily access, such as Cuba or Vietnam.¹⁵⁰

Each of the five nations brought unique and complementing capabilities to the partnership and made considerable changes to domestic structures to facilitate closer collaboration. Indeed, the partners had similar intelligence requirements and pooled their national advantages to realize a common goal.

Singular Mission: The USSR

It is important to highlight that a relatively stable and predictable bipolar balance of power defined the international security environment, with the US and USSR dominating geopolitical affairs throughout the Cold War.¹⁵¹ Although tensions and

¹⁴⁸ *Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America Concerning the Organization and Operation of the North American Air Defence Command (NORAD)*, May 12, 1958, 1958 Canada Treaty Series No. 9, <https://www.treaty-accord.gc.ca/text-texte.aspx?id=101015>.

¹⁴⁹ *The Fifth Estate: The Espionage Establishment*, originally aired January 9, 1974, on CBC, CBC News: Canada, video, 58:49, <https://www.cbc.ca/player/play/2661556131>.

¹⁵⁰ Don Munton, "Our Men in Havana: Canadian Foreign Intelligence Operations in Castro's Cuba," *International Journal* 70, no. 1 (2015): 23–39, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/24709374>.

¹⁵¹ Balance of power theory states bipolarity produces less risky behavior. Unipolarity enhances risk-taking and great power competition entails multiple states competing to shape global norms, rules, institutions, see: Walt, "Alliance Formation."

clashes unfolded globally and required monitoring, they were primarily rooted in the Cold War conflict, meaning the UKUSA partners had a singular mission: to monitor the Soviet Union.

As noted earlier, the challenges of intelligence collection inside the USSR and its Eastern European allies were formidable. Multiple obstacles inherent in a closed society constrained the effectiveness of human intelligence operations – strict entry requirements for foreigners, heavily patrolled borders, random spot checks for identity and travel papers, and a pervasive security services apparatus. With limited physical accessibility, the partners were forced to resort to - and improve - technical collection methods, such as aerial reconnaissance and signals interception.

As early as 1947, the British and other allies conducted low-level reconnaissance overflights of Soviet territory.¹⁵² The operations were supported with American equipment, cameras, film, and aircraft and flown primarily by British Royal Air Force crews. Taking off from the UK, Japan, and other allied territories, the flights provided imagery of Soviet industrial centers and military installations, including naval bases, shipyards, and airfields. Washington relied on the shared intelligence until the US Air Force began its own (officially acknowledged) overflights in 1949, often undertaking joint flights with the British.¹⁵³

Reconnaissance capabilities were enhanced with the introduction of the U-2 spy plane, a CIA asset capable of flying at 70,000 feet (presumably an altitude above Soviet

¹⁵² Matthew M. Aid, ed., “U.S. Intelligence on Europe 1945-1995: Background: The Declassified History of American Intelligence Operations in Europe,” introduction to *U.S. Intelligence on Europe 1945-1995*, edited by Matthew M. Aid, (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2014), <https://primarysources.brillonline.com/browse/us-intelligence-on-europe>.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

detection), over a range of 3000 miles, and carrying 700 pounds of high-resolution camera equipment.¹⁵⁴ The U-2 flights began in 1956 and provided photo imagery of Soviet installations, yielding valuable intelligence on Soviet military capabilities and dispelling the American's belief that the Soviets were mass-producing missiles, including ones capable of long-range attacks.¹⁵⁵ Indeed, the intelligence collected was informative and guided decision-makers' defense planning, posture, and policies. The U-2 program, however, was short-lived. The 1960 shooting down of Gary Powers' aircraft prompted the termination of overflights and gave more urgency to develop satellite reconnaissance capabilities.¹⁵⁶ Similar events underscoring the importance of strategic warning, such as the launch of Sputnik or the invasion of South Korea, that surprised, if not shocked, the UKUSA partners, contributed to the push to improve warning systems.¹⁵⁷

Lacking intelligence from overflights, American photoreconnaissance satellite programs filled the gap by providing broad area search and high-resolution imagery on Soviet launch sites, naval bases, radars, shipyards, and other key facilities related to missile and space programs.¹⁵⁸ Running parallel to the photoreconnaissance programs

¹⁵⁴ "The U-2 Dragon Lady," Lockheed Martin, accessed May 25, 2022, <https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/news/features/history/u2.html>.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ "Reports to USIB by Satellite Intelligence Requirements Committee and the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance," (circa 1960), United States Central Intelligence Agency, approved for release June 24, 2004, <https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP79M00098A000100130001-6.pdf>.

¹⁵⁷ Jeffrey T. Richelson, ed., "U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Space Program: Declassified Records Trace U.S. Monitoring and Analyses of a Critical Area of Cold War Competition," National Security Archive (George Washington University, February 4, 2015), <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB501/>.

¹⁵⁸ Programs included Corona (1960-1972), GAMBIT-1 (1963-1967), GAMBIT-3 (1966-1984) and HEXAGON (1971-1984), see: James E. David, ed., "President's Daily Brief Spotlit Soviet Missile and Space Programs in the 1960s and 1970s," National Security Archive (George Washington University,

were signals collection satellite programs, which expanded collection and located and intercepted signals from defensive systems associated with radars and anti-ballistic missiles.¹⁵⁹ Both reconnaissance and satellite programs provided decision-makers with better situational awareness of developments within the USSR and would be further improved with advancements in technological development.

Advanced Technology and Pine Gap Deepen Interdependency

The signals satellite programs proved to be a game changer, one that Five Eyes would develop further with a new, technologically advanced surveillance base in the Australian Outback. Per the terms of the 1966 Joint Defence Space Research Facility Agreement, the US and Australia created a permanent installation at Pine Gap.¹⁶⁰ In reality, the defense facility served as a secret ground station with the primary mission to operate advanced signals intelligence satellites.¹⁶¹

Australia was an ideal location. Given its proximity to China and eastern Soviet Union, Pine Gap extended the geographic reach of US communications systems by controlling and receiving data from Rhyolite satellites as they orbited over the Asia

December 20, 2016), <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/intelligence-nuclear-vault/2016-12-20/presidents-daily-brief-spotlighted-soviet-missile-space-programs-1960s-1970s>.

¹⁵⁹ Programs included GRAB (1960-1962), POPPY (1962-1970), and AFTRACK (1970-1967), see: David, ed., "President's Daily Brief."

¹⁶⁰ *Agreement between the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia and the Government of the United States of America Relating to the Establishment of a Joint Defence Space Research Facility [Pine Gap, NT] [1966]*, Australian Treaty Series 17, entered into force December 9, 1966, Australasian Legal Information Institute, <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/dfat/treaties/1966/17.html>.

¹⁶¹ Jeffrey T. Richelson, ed., "Lifting the Veil on NRO Satellite Systems and Ground Stations," National Security Archive (George Washington University, October 4, 2012), <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB392/>; Jeffrey T. Richelson, ed., "The CIA and Signals Intelligence," National Security Archive, (George Washington University, March 20, 2015), <https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/cyber-vault-intelligence/2015-03-20/cia-and-signals-intelligence>.

Pacific region.¹⁶² The Rhyolites, a product of CIA and private sector efforts, offered revolutionary intercept capabilities otherwise not possible from airborne systems or intercept systems on ships and submarines.¹⁶³ Parked essentially in fixed orbit 23,000 miles above the equator, the satellites covered a vast sliver of earth ranging from 60 degrees East to 150 degrees West, which included the USSR, China, the Middle East, and the entire Southeast and East Asia region. Essentially, all the critical areas of concern for the Five Eyes partners. Rhyolite's collected four categories of diplomatic, military, political, and commercial communication signals: telemetry (signals from ballistic missiles), radars (from ships or air defense systems), ground to satellite communications, and microwave emissions (telecommunication systems used to enable phone calls).¹⁶⁴ Thus, Five Eyes could sweep up communications transmitted via radio, radiotelephone, microwave towers, and other satellites, including Soviet and Chinese communications and military activities and signals related to nuclear detonations and intercontinental and anti-ballistic missile launches.

The first Rhyolite, launched in 1970, targeted primarily signals over two key Soviet missile sites in Kazakhstan, Sary Shagan and Tyuratam, and was intermittently redirected to monitor developments in Vietnam and the Indian-Pakistan War.¹⁶⁵ Missions were determined predominately according to CIA, and later NSA requirements and target

¹⁶² Richelson, ed., "Lifting the Veil."

¹⁶³ Commonwealth of Australia, "Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Reference: Pine Gap."

¹⁶⁴ Ibid.

¹⁶⁵ Desmond Ball, Bill Robinson, and Richard Tanter, "The SIGINT Satellites of Pine Gap: Conception, Development and in Orbit," Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, 2015, <https://nautilus.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/PG-SIGINT-Satellites.pdf>.

areas changed to accommodate intelligence needs.¹⁶⁶ Capabilities expanded in 1973 with an additional satellite hovering over the Horn of Africa and sweeping up signals from ICBM launches over western Russia, thus allowing the first Rhyolite to collect signals over China and Vietnam more frequently.¹⁶⁷ Each satellite had an estimated 20-meter-diameter intercept antenna, and the surface area from which it could collect signal emissions depended on the signal frequency being monitored. For example, if the Rhyolite was monitoring frequencies at 10GHz, it could only cover an area of 1,900 square kilometers. Monitoring frequencies at 1GHz expanded surface coverage to 190,000 square kilometers.¹⁶⁸ Thus, the two-satellite constellation allowed for variations in frequencies collected and the surface area covered. One was almost permanently fixed over Soviet ICBM and ABM testing sites.¹⁶⁹

Although precise operations remain classified, given Australia's presumed area of responsibility and the satellites' capabilities, it is highly probable SIGINT was collected on almost all significant events within its range. Beyond collecting telemetry from Soviet systems - which helped partners craft defense strategy and verify arms limitations agreements - Pine Gap also monitored, and in some cases forewarned, events such as the North Vietnamese offensive against Saigon and Soviet airlifts operations to Angola in the mid-1970s.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁶ Commonwealth of Australia, "Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Reference: Pine Gap."

¹⁶⁷ Ball, Robinson, and Tanter, "SIGINT Satellites of Pine Gap," 8-21.

¹⁶⁸ Ibid, 41-43.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid, 9-10.

Throughout the Cold War, more satellites with advanced technologies were added to Pine Gap's stable, further increasing geographic coverage and the types of signals collected. Each advancement in Soviet strategic weapons capabilities necessitated a corresponding development in Five Eye's collection capabilities to detect the new signals. Likewise, the American development of stealth technology and stealth aircraft drove the Soviets to upgrade their early warning radar systems with advanced detector technology.¹⁷¹ This became an escalatory cycle, and the UKUSA partners continued to improve systems, eventually developing larger satellites with intercept antennas capable of detecting "broadcasts from radios the size of a wristwatch."¹⁷² Undoubtedly, emerging technologies generated advantages for both sides, and maintaining scientific superiority became a continuous and expensive quest.

The Rhyolites and Pine Gap significantly enlarged Five Eyes' mission scope and collections capabilities, and essentially transformed the partnership into a global intelligence agency. Initially tasked to collect signals from communications, radars, ballistic missiles, and other strategic weapons in the development and testing phase, the scope expanded to support military missions and verify arms control agreements, such as SALT 1 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.¹⁷³ Coverage was continuous and

¹⁷⁰ Matthew Aid, ed., "National Security Agency Releases History of Cold War Intelligence Activities," National Security Archive (George Washington University, November 14, 2008), <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB260/index.htm>; Aid, ed. "Cold War Intelligence."

¹⁷¹ David Rosenberg, *Pine Gap: Close to God's Ear: NSA Eavesdropping Memoirs*, 3rd ed. (Pennsauken, NJ: BookBaby, 2020), chpt. 2, Kindle.

¹⁷² Ball, Robinson, and Tanter, "SIGINT Satellites of Pine Gap," 25.

¹⁷³ Commonwealth of Australia, "Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Reference: Pine Gap;" Tom Gilling, *Project Rainfall: The Secret History of Pine Gap* (Crows Nest, N.S.W.: Allen & Unwin, 2019), chpts., 20 and 21, Kindle.

geographically magnified, which resulted in more data being collected, translated, and analyzed, providing decision-makers with a broader and more precise picture of global developments.

The addition of Pine Gap to the Five Eyes apparatus was transformative, and its impact was noticeable politically, operationally, and individually. Politically, the joint base deepened Australia's relations with the world's superpower. Yet, in the 1970s, societal and political changes in Australia strained ties almost to a breaking point. Baby boomers were critical of American actions in Vietnam and demanded Australia end its involvement in the war.¹⁷⁴ Politically, interests diverged as Prime Minister Whitlam's aspirational domestic policies clashed considerably with America's.¹⁷⁵ In a quest to gain more independence from foreign influence, Whitlam initiated reforms to undermine Australia's close relationship with British and American intelligence agencies.¹⁷⁶ He further sought to ban nuclear weapons testing, supported a non-alignment platform, publicly criticized America's bombings campaigns in Vietnam, and threatened to close foreign military facilities, including Pine Gap.¹⁷⁷ Breaking decades of secrecy, Whitlam was the first Five Eyes partner to publicly confirm that Australia's intelligence services

¹⁷⁴ John Blaxland, *The Protest Years. Volume II: The Official History of ASIO, 1963-1975*, (Crows Nest, N.S.W.: Allen & Unwin, 2016), Introduction, parts 1 and 3, Kindle.

¹⁷⁵ "National Security Study Australia Memorandum 204: U.S. Policy Toward Australia, July 1, 1974," United States Department of State, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, Office of the Historian, accessed April 2, 2022, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve12/d49>.

¹⁷⁶ Blaxland, *The Protest Years*, part 3, Kindle.

¹⁷⁷ Blaxland, *The Protest Years*, part 3, Kindle; John Pilger, "The British-American Coup That Ended Australian Independence," *The Guardian*, October 23, 2014, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/oct/23/gough-whitlam-1975-coup-ended-australian-independence>; James Curran, "Intelligence and Politics: Australia, the US and Pine Gap," interview by Mark Colvin, ABC, June 1, 2015. <https://www.abc.net.au/pm/content/2015/s4246417.htm>.

collected SIGINT with allies. His remarks threatened to expose Pine Gap's cover as a 'defense research facility.'¹⁷⁸ Certain Australian officials added to the elevated tensions by claiming that American facilities brought Australia into the crosshairs of Soviet nuclear weapons.¹⁷⁹ The prospects of Pine Gap's closure and the loss of SIGINT critical to achieving US objectives were crippling. Pine Gap was one of America's most vital assets and needed to be maintained.¹⁸⁰

The disconnect over policies was resolved with Whitlam's dismissal. His successor, Malcolm Fraser, was more cooperative, suggesting to President Ford that SIGINT collaboration be increased, and Pine Gap's lease contract renegotiated to longer terms.¹⁸¹ A key point to recognize is that during this period of political contention, there was no visible indication that Five Eyes' functionality was negatively impacted. American contributions to Five Eyes and Pine Gap were inextricably linked to Australia's national security, and the absence of visible negative consequences would imply that the benefits derived from the interdependent relationship transcended political differences.

¹⁷⁸ Ferris, *Behind the Enigma*, 376.

¹⁷⁹ Commonwealth of Australia, "Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Reference: Pine Gap."

¹⁸⁰ W.R. Smyser, "Memorandum for Secretary Kissinger. Subject: Australian NSSM," official memorandum, August 22, 1974, folder "Senior Review Group Meeting, 8/15/74-Australia (NSSM 204) (1)," box 12, National Security Council Institutional Files, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library & Museum, Ann Arbor and Grand Rapids, MI.: declassified April 15, 2014, <https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/LIBRARY/document/0398/1981991.pdf>.

¹⁸¹ Ford, Gerald, Henry Kissinger, J. Malcolm Fraser, et al., "Memorandum of Conversation," official memorandum, July 27, 1976, box 20, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973-1977, National Security Adviser Files, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library & Museum, Anna Arbor and Grand Rapids, MI.: declassified November 26, 2002, <https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0314/1553517.pdf>; "Telegram 8624 from the Embassy in Australia to the Department of State, December 31, 1975," United States Department of State, in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976*, Office of the Historian, accessed April 30, 2021, <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve12/d59>.

Pine Gap served as a military-security tool of statecraft as well as a diplomatic one. Apparently, the diplomatic tool was used to improve US-China relations in the 1970s when the Nixon Administration shared intelligence, including SIGINT, with Beijing.¹⁸² China received details on Indian forces aligned on the Pakistani border, the placement of Soviet deployments on China's border, and an analysis of Soviet troops, tactical aircraft, missiles, and nuclear weapons. The Nixon Administration also offered a direct link connecting US military satellites to Beijing. Given Pine Gap's collection area, it is highly probable that the SIGINT shared and satellite link in question were sourced from the base.

From an intelligence perspective, Pine Gap reduced the knowledge gap on the Soviets and other areas of concern and aided decision-makers in shaping foreign and defense policies. The interconnected communications systems provided partners with almost real-time access to collected, translated, and analyzed data.¹⁸³ It is well to remember the drive that prompted increased collaboration and bound the agencies closer together. Human intelligence (HUMINT) collection efforts in Soviet territory were, for

¹⁸² Numerous sources cover this issue, see: William Burr, ed., "Statements on the US Tilt towards China from *The Kissinger Transcripts: The Top Secret Talks with Beijing and Moscow*," National Security Archive (George Washington University), accessed April 21, 2022, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nsa/publications/DOC_readers/kissinger/tilt.htm; William Burr, ed., "New Documentary Reveals Secret U.S., Chinese Diplomacy behind Nixon's Trip," National Security Archive (George Washington University, December 21, 2004), <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB145/index.htm>; William Burr, ed., "Nixon's Trip to China," National Security Archive (George Washington University, December 11, 2003), <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB106/>; William Burr, ed., "The Beijing-Washington Back Channel: Henry Kissinger's Secret Trip to China, September 1970-July 1971," National Security Archive (George Washington University, February 27, 2002), <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/>; "Memorandum of Conversation [Henry Kissinger's Meeting in the PRC]," National Security Archive (George Washington University, June 11, 2003), <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB145/10.pdf>.

¹⁸³ David Rosenberg, "Pine Gap: An Historical Perspective on Australia's Intelligence-Sharing Partnership with the United States in a Time of Political Change," Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, July 30, 2019, <https://www.rusinsw.org.au/Papers/20190730.pdf>.

the most part, unsuccessful, with almost all operations ending in the capture or death of agents.¹⁸⁴ Reconnaissance overflights yielded valuable imagery intelligence (IMINT) of military installations, and other assets of interest yet were politically risky and dangerous; as Soviet detection capabilities increased, so did the risks to pilots. Furthermore, IMINT provided only a snapshot in time but not insights into a leader's intentions or plans. SIGINT, however, was a more prized category. Data were continuously collected and relayed to a ground site with no risk to pilots or aircraft. Unsurprisingly, SIGINT's value increased exponentially during the Cold War as the agencies became more technically proficient in satellites and support systems. Indeed, signals satellites were "the wave of the future, and they offered breathtaking new opportunities."¹⁸⁵

On an individual level, extensive collaboration went into developing the satellites and the base, bringing together specialists and officials from the CIA, NSA, Australia, and private sector scientists and engineers.¹⁸⁶ Yet, perhaps more beneficial was the collaboration amongst the broader team of Five Eyes personnel. Initially, Pine Gap was led by an American Director alongside an Australian Deputy Director and staffed with highly skilled officers from various agencies and partner countries.¹⁸⁷ The effect of having an intermixed and permanent staff on base strengthened interpersonal and inter-agency relations. The level of collaboration went beyond merely sending data back and forth or exchanging liaison officers.

¹⁸⁴ The loss of agents sent into the USSR was just under 100%, see: Aid, ed., "Cold War Intelligence."

¹⁸⁵ Johnson, *American Cryptology*, 221.

¹⁸⁶ Ball, Robinson, and Tanter, "The SIGINT Satellites of Pine Gap," 10-19.

¹⁸⁷ Commonwealth of Australia, "Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Reference: Pine Gap."

Australians, Americans, and other Five Eyes personnel were living, socializing, and working side by side in an isolated Outback valley. This shared space increased communication and cooperation, helping to build trust amongst the personnel. Irrespective of rank or position, relationships evolved through regular and fixed, formal and informal interactions, rotations across working divisions, and 24/7 communications channels.¹⁸⁸ Collectively, the opportunities to interact generated strong, trusting bonds at Pine Gap and across the Five Eyes community. These relationships reinforced cohesion and helped to defuse clashes and manage crises easier and swifter.

The Echelon Program was another example of advanced technologies supporting Five Eyes missions.¹⁸⁹ Echelon is a network of satellite communications surveillance systems that intercepts private and commercial traffic from specific civilian communications satellites based on pre-determined keyword filters. The targeted collection is automatically distributed to those who set the keyword filters, providing them with topic-relevant raw data as well as reducing the workload of sifting through millions of irrelevant intercepts. Echelon ground stations are located within the Five Eyes nations and beyond, and like Pine Gap, the network is a testament to the partners' commitment to gain an intelligence advantage over the Soviets.

Under the principles of pooling resources and dividing tasks, each partner shared their best tools, techniques, and technologies. They worked together to develop new collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination capabilities, split up global coverage

¹⁸⁸ Rosenberg, *Pine Gap*, chpt. 4, Kindle.

¹⁸⁹ Jeffrey T. Richelson and Michael Evans, eds., "The National Security Agency: Declassified," National Security Archive (George Washington University, January 13, 2000), <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB23/index.html>; Gilling, *Project Rainfall*, chpt. 24, Kindle; Richelson, *US Intelligence Community*, 242-243, 375-379.

based on geography and capabilities, and interconnected communications systems for timely and secure exchange of information. Indeed, the collaboration enhanced each partner state's national capabilities and security. More importantly, this collaboration weathered the challenges of the Cold War and succeeded in accomplishing the partners' objectives – avoid war with the USSR.

End of an Era

The relatively stable bipolar balance of power during the Cold War was supported by Five Eyes SIGINT. Despite countless possibilities for flashpoints to erupt into direct USSR-US conflict, none occurred.¹⁹⁰ Allies were broadly informed of Moscow's strengths, weaknesses, and at times, intentions. Beyond monitoring the USSR, Five Eyes observed almost all major events within this forty-plus-year period, helping leadership better understand the world's complexities.

Indeed, the environment was moving in unprecedented directions, each development potentially leading to a major misstep or miscalculation. In the early years,

¹⁹⁰ Several sources cover key events from the Cold War era, see: "1945-1952: The Early Cold War," United States Department of State, in *Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations*, Office of the Historian, accessed February 2, 2022, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952>; "1953-1960: Entrenchment of a Bi-Polar Foreign Policy," United States Department of State, in *Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations*, Office of the Historian, accessed February 4, 2022, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1953-1960>; "1961-1968: The Presidencies of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson," United States Department of State, in *Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations*, Office of the Historian, accessed February 7, 2022, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968>; "1969-1976: The Presidencies of Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford," United States Department of State, in *Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations*, Office of the Historian, accessed February 19, 2022, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976>; "1977-1981: The Presidency of Jimmy Carter," United States Department of State, in *Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations*, Office of the Historian, accessed March 2, 2022, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980>; "1981-1988: The Presidency of Ronald W. Reagan," United States Department of State, in *Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations*, Office of the Historian, accessed May 15, 2022, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1981-1988>; "The Cold War, 1948-1960: The Arms Race and the Space Race," BBC Bitesize, accessed March 3, 2022, <https://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/guides/zxds4j6/revision/3>.

communism gained ground, as evidenced by the Iron Curtain, the Chinese Revolution, and the Korean War. Turbulent events and shifting landscapes unfolded in Indochina, the Taiwan Straits, and the Suez Canal. Sputnik was launched, tensions flared in Berlin, and Gary Powers' U-2 was shot down. Hostilities continued to heat up from the 1960s to the late 1970s. This was a period dominated by regional conflicts and global uncertainty, including the Cuban missile crises, the Vietnam, India-Pakistan, and Arab-Israel wars, and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. However, positive steps suggesting a warming of relations were made, including arms control and limitations treaties between the US and USSR, along with American rapprochement with China.

In the 1980s, Europe was the centerpiece of the American - Soviet struggle. President Reagan diverted from containment strategy, replacing it with a more aggressive policy to 'roll back' communism. He supported the development of a missile defense system and upgraded Pershing missiles stationed in Europe.¹⁹¹ The pivot was controversial, if not provocative, and the Soviets responded. Ground troops in Poland, East Germany, and the Baltics were increased, and nuclear-capable bombers in East Germany were put on runway alert.¹⁹² Tensions escalated further when the USSR perceived NATO's Able Archer exercises in Europe as a ruse of war.¹⁹³ Yet, the animosities reversed dramatically in the latter half of the 1980s as Moscow and Washington took constructive measures to bury the arms race and defuse the hostile

¹⁹¹ John T. Correll, "The Euromissile Showdown," *Air Force Magazine*, February 1, 2020, <https://www.airforcemag.com/article/the-euromissile-showdown/>.

¹⁹² Aid, ed., "Cold War Intelligence."

¹⁹³ Ibid.

relationship.¹⁹⁴ Internal frailties within the East European communist nations and deteriorating economic and social unrest in the USSR eventually led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

The UKUSA partners played a crucial role in monitoring most, if not all, of these turbulent events, supplying member states' political leaders with strategic intelligence vital to crafting policies and pursuing national objectives. Five Eyes' collection scope and missions continuously expanded with each jump in technological advancements. Mutual trust and strong interpersonal relations amongst key Five Eyes leaders created conditions for success, allowing partners to overcome internal strains and respond to external urgencies with agility and expertise. This period solidified Five Eyes' cooperation and unity. They were an unwavering team, with teammates spread across Europe, North America, and Asia Pacific. Armed with superior technical capabilities and globally positioned assets and linked by shared democratic values and common interests, the Five Eyes partners contributed to maintaining a relatively stable environment.

¹⁹⁴ For declassified documents concerning the INF Treaty, see: Svetlana Savranskaya and Thomas Blanton, eds., "The INF Treaty and the Washington Summit: 20 Years Later," National Security Archive (George Washington University, December 10, 2007), <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB238/index.htm>.

Chapter IV.

The Era of Uncertainty: Missing a Mandate in the Post-Cold War World

1991 - 2001

“If you don’t have enemies, who is there to spy on?”¹⁹⁵

International Security Environment

The post-Cold War era was more unpredictable than the prior half-century. The collapse of the USSR left an immediate vacuum precipitating a shift in the global balance of power. Furthermore, this shift in global power dynamics exposed long-suppressed regional tensions or allowed for the emergence of new ones. The transformation was dramatic, and four decades of established norms were upended within a few short years. The Iron Curtain disappeared, millions of people were liberated, and communism was discredited, leaving the US as the sole superpower.¹⁹⁶

The threat of global nuclear war had receded, and initiatives between the US and the emerging Russian Federation were taken to reduce strategic nuclear weapons as defined in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I, 1991) and START II Treaty (1993).¹⁹⁷ Despite real progress in nuclear security, the peaceful reunification of

¹⁹⁵ Comments from a senior House Armed Services Committee member after the USSR collapsed, see: “Facing the Post-Cold War Era,” *Cryptologic Quarterly*, approved for release December 1, 2011, https://www.nsa.gov/portals/75/documents/news-features/declassified-documents/cryptologic-quarterly/Facing_the_Post_Cold_War_Era.pdf.

¹⁹⁶ For National Security Strategies and Global Trends reports from this period, see: “National Security Strategy Reports [1987-2022],” National Security Strategy Archive, accessed March 3, 2022, <https://nssarchive.us>; “Global Trends [2010 - 2040],” United States Office of the Director of National Intelligence, accessed July 1, 2022, <https://www.odni.gov/index.php/gt2040-home/gt2040-media-and-downloads>.

Germany, and the general positive view of the coming century, the international landscape faced an increase in violent extremism, regional conflicts, terrorism, and transnational crime.¹⁹⁸ The 1990s reflected a transition period for the international security space in Western societies as nation-states faced shifting political winds and felt the impact of economic globalization. Social, economic, and technological advancement pushed populations in new directions as there was a great rewiring underway.

How the Five Eyes grappled with this emerging new world order tells most of the story in this time and space. Changing security paradigms and new threat vectors reflected overwhelming tasks and responsibilities for intelligence systems on the tail end of the Cold War. Smaller budgets, an exodus of personnel for the private sector, and indecisive leaders in Washington and other capitals compounded the challenge. Similar internal debates concerning policy approaches and security priorities raged in London, Canberra, Ottawa, and Wellington. How the leadership of the Five Eyes struggled to weather the storm of changing conditions can be traced through shifting priorities and

¹⁹⁷ “Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, 1991 and 1993,” United States Department of State Archive, accessed September 15, 2021, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/pcw/104210.htm>.

¹⁹⁸ For details on specific threats, see: *The 2001 Annual Report of the United States Intelligence Community*, United States Central Intelligence Agency, February 2002, (Homeland Security Digital Library) <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=441136>; *The 2002 Annual Report of the United States Intelligence Community*, United States Central Intelligence Agency, January 2003, (Homeland Security Digital Library), <https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=2809>; *Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence*, United States Office of the Director of National Intelligence, February 2006, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/20060202_testimony.pdf; *Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence*, United States Office of the Director of National Intelligence, January 2007, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/20070111_testimony.pdf; For National Security Strategies, see: National Security Strategy Archive, “National Security Strategy Reports [1987-2022];” For Global Trends reports, see: United States Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Global Trends [2010 - 2040].”

approaches by national leaders, reflected in their policy documents and national security strategies between 1991 and 2001.

Changing Paradigms and New Threat Vectors

The rise in security threats coincided with revolutionary digital and telecommunications systems such as the Internet and satellite phones, which allowed for almost instantaneous communications amongst nonstate actors or criminal bands running operations. Indeed, this era marked an increase in threats and threat actors across a broader range of issues and with an abruptness that surprised, if not overwhelmed, most national security practitioners. Technology, economic globalization, and changing environmental conditions drove internal conflicts that fostered instability.

With little to no forewarning, civil wars and acts of ethnic cleansing sprung up across the globe, causing upheaval in Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East.¹⁹⁹ Yugoslavia dissolved. Conflicts erupted in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Somalia. Rwanda was consumed with genocide. Civil unrest shook Liberia. Iraq rattled Kuwait. And India, Pakistan, and North Korea tested advanced nuclear weapons. Ethnic conflicts and failed, failing, or rogue states were not the only challenges to global security. Hyper empowered individuals and non-state actors came to the forefront of national security concern.

Acts of terrorism, already noticeable in the 1980s in the Middle East, North Africa, and Europe, were on the rise, striking the US homeland and overseas interests,

¹⁹⁹ “US Foreign Policy Crises since the End of the Cold War 1989-2019,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed July 6, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/Discussion%20Paper_Stares_Crises%20List.pdf; *Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue about the Future with Nongovernment Experts*, United States National Intelligence Council, (ODNI, December 2000), <https://www.odni.gov/index.php/gt2040-home/gt2040-media-and-downloads>.

including the World Trade Center Tower in New York City, American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania and the USS Cole off the coast of Yemen.²⁰⁰ Transnational organized criminal groups, capitalizing on vulnerable, displaced populations, open or porous borders, or ineffective controls over nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, were trafficking people, drugs, and weapons.²⁰¹ Acts of piracy in international waters were on the rise, particularly in the Gulfs of Aden and Guinea and the Straights of Singapore, threatening human life and the flow of international trade.²⁰²

Globalization and technological evolution produced more threats and expanded already gaping vulnerabilities. Advanced information technologies facilitated a global economy, yet the interconnected and interdependent economies generated new challenges as economic crises spilled over into other regions, sparking in some financial volatility, social hardships, conflicts, and instability.²⁰³ Components supporting globalization, such as IT-driven communications and the relatively effortless movement of people, money, information, and goods, offered criminals, terrorists, and malignant nation-states increased opportunities to advance their objectives.

²⁰⁰ “Counterterrorism Guide: Historic Timeline,” United States Office of the Director of National Intelligence, accessed October 1, 2021, <https://www.dni.gov/nctc/timeline.html#1990>.

²⁰¹ United States Department of Defense, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review May 1997*, (Washington, DC: DOD, May 1997), <https://history.defense.gov/Historical-Sources/Quadrennial-Defense-Review/>; White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* [1995], Washington, DC: The White House, February 1995, (National Security Strategy Archive), <https://nssarchive.us>, 1-8; United States National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2015*.

²⁰² International Maritime Organization, *Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report 2010*, MSC.4/Circ. 169, April 2011, https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Security/Documents/169_Annual2010.pdf, Annex 4.

²⁰³ Lynn E. Davis, *Globalization’s Security Implications*, IP-245- RC, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003), https://www.rand.org/pubs/issue_papers/IP245.html; United States National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2015*, 10.

Indeed, the singular-threat security environment of the Soviet era was succeeded by one more complex, fluid, and erratic, with challenges transcending traditional boundaries. The diffusion of power produced more threat actors and more ‘functional’ topic threats, such as organized crime, terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.²⁰⁴ The changes in threats, threat actors and technology, and the fractured and violent state of the international security environment necessitated a recalibrated intelligence strategy.

Leadership now required timely, accurate, actionable intelligence on more individuals, groups, nation-states, and locations. This was a far grander mission than the one preceding it: Focused competition with the Soviet Union. Fractured threats and numerous vectors created a more dangerous world. Targets required prioritization and systemic investment in capabilities – technology and personnel – to enhance monitoring, collecting, translating, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence. New intelligence requirements altered and expanded the American IC’s mission mandate, requiring more agility to identify and respond to unpredictable threats. As international demands exceeded national capacity, US cooperation with Five Eyes would return as paramount and by new century quickly became one of existential necessity.

²⁰⁴ *Annual Report 1995*, Command Paper [Cm.] 3198, United Kingdom Intelligence and Security Committee, (London: 1996), Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, https://isc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/1995_ISC_AR.pdf.

US National Security Strategies (NSS)

Although the trends, drivers, and warning indicators signaling substantial changes in the international security landscape were blinking red, American leadership struggled to adapt, define, and formalize a grand security strategy and intelligence priorities befitting the challenges. Throughout the George H.W. Bush administration, national security strategy was fundamentally grounded in Soviet/Russian relations, arms control efforts, US military preparedness, and economic prosperity. The 1991 Strategy, produced after America's involvement in Kuwait, adopted four military-strategic pillars, "deterrence and defense; forward presence; crisis response; and the ability to return to a threat-based system quickly."²⁰⁵ It is worthwhile to compare the Senate committee report on intelligence requirements produced before Bush's strategy, which noted that inadequate resources were allotted to counterterrorism and that more investments should be made to avoid technological surprises.²⁰⁶ The Committee's suggestions appear to have garnered little attention from the Bush Administration.

Bush's 1993 Strategy echoed the 1991 report regarding political, economic, and military objectives and the continued utility of America's four military defense pillars.²⁰⁷

²⁰⁵ White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States* [1991], (Washington, DC: The White House, August 1991), National Security Strategy Archive, <https://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/1991.pdf>; Don M. Snider, *The National Security Strategy: Documenting Strategic Vision*, 2nd ed., Strategic Studies Institute, March 15, 1995, accessed through National Security Strategy Archive, <https://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Snider.pdf>.

²⁰⁶ United States Congress, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, *Authorizing Appropriations for the Fiscal Year 1991 for the Intelligence Activities of the U.S. Government*, 102nd Congress, 1st sess., Report 102-85, June 19, 1991, <https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/publications/10285.pdf>, 4-5.

²⁰⁷ White House, *National Security Strategy of the United States* [1993], (Washington, DC: The White House, 1993), National Security Strategy Archive, <https://nssarchive.us>; Snider, *National Security Strategy*.

The objectives demonstrated a slight shift from Cold War containment policy to a broader policy of promoting peace and the democratic international order through “collective engagement.”²⁰⁸ Indeed, in contrast to the nature and scope of the threat environment, the Bush reports neglected to present an actionable strategy for the future and instead showcased his past accomplishments as the steward of the “Age of Democratic Peace.”²⁰⁹

President William J. Clinton’s first NSS was presented a year after his inauguration and signaled an evolving understanding of the changing threat environment and a vision of how to navigate it, yet inadequately articulated priorities.²¹⁰ The 1994 Strategy expanded previous administrations’ perception and scope of national security issues, with Clinton now defining security to include “protect our people, our territory, and our way of life.”²¹¹ Clinton’s strategy further outlined three main goals: sustain military preparedness, revitalize the American economy, and advance democracy aboard.²¹² Traditional and evolving threats were acknowledged, including Russia’s uncertain development, China’s authoritarian regime, and fragile or roque nations struggling politically or economically. Attention was also given to evolving transnational

²⁰⁸ White House, *National Security Strategy* [1993], ii, 5-15; Snider, *National Security Strategy*.

²⁰⁹ White House, *National Security Strategy* [1993], ii; Snider, *National Security Strategy*.

²¹⁰ White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* [1994], (Washington, DC: The White House, July 1994), National Security Strategy Archive, <https://nssarchive.us>; Snider, “National Security Strategy.”

²¹¹ Snider, *National Security Strategy*, 12.

²¹² White House, *National Security Strategy* [1994], 4.

threats, such as the rise of nationalism, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, terrorism, and the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.

To counter the threats, Clinton supported “selective engagement” overseas and enlarging the community of democratic nations through defense or economic initiatives, such as NATO’s Partners for Peace, the North American Free Trade Agreement, the Organization for Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation, and General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The strategy envisioned international cooperation on humanitarian relief and peacekeeping missions and the continued pursuit of strategic arms control agreements. Indeed, the 1994 Strategy was broad, yet tackling the large array of issues was fundamentally grounded on promoting democratic principles through international institutions. Less attention was dedicated to traditional methods of pursuing security, such as nuclear deterrence, or prioritizing objectives, a decisive element in executing grand strategy.²¹³

A year later, the administration sought to clarify priorities in Presidential Decision Directive-35 (PDD-35), which categorized by issue or country the President’s highest intelligence priorities into “tiers” and thus provided the IC tactical and strategic guidance on collection and analysis tasks.²¹⁴ Tier 0, for example, contained the highest priority issues, including identifying global trends, monitoring any crisis or military threats that may endanger US interests or require US military involvement, and supporting military

²¹³ Snider, *National Security Strategy*, 13.

²¹⁴ Federation of American Scientists, “PDD-35 Intelligence Requirements / National Need Process,” Intelligence Resource Program: Presidential Directives and Executive Orders, March 2, 1995, <https://irp.fas.org/offdocs/pdd/index.html>; See the Executive Summary of the Intelligence Requirements Process, in: *IC21 the Intelligence Community in the 21st Century: Staff Study Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence*, United States Congress, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, 104th Cong., 2nd sess., June 5, 1996, <https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/GPO-IC21>.

operations worldwide with timely, accurate, actionable intelligence.²¹⁵ Tier 1A priorities comprised rogue or hostile states threatening to the US or possessing nuclear weapons, such as Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and China. Tier 1B contained transnational issues of concern, such as terrorism, organized crime, proliferation, and foreign economic developments.²¹⁶

Despite the clarifications within PDD-35, there still existed a continued lack of understanding within the Clinton administration on the realities of the international security space. The rift was apparent in the 2001 *Global Age* report, which reiterated the importance of promoting peace, prosperity, and democracy globally, using American economic, diplomatic, or military tools of statecraft and institutions such as NATO or the World Trade Organization.²¹⁷ Indeed, initiatives were introduced to enlarge NATO membership. Preexisting security commitments to allies were revised and new ones established. Engagement with Russia and China focused on political and economic reforms to improve relations and foster democracy, free trade, the rule of law, and human rights. Appraisals of traditional and evolving threats included the proliferation of WMD, the rise of regional tension on the Korean peninsula and the Persian Gulf, and the potential dangers advanced technologies posed to American information security and critical infrastructure. Indeed, there was little divergence from previous reports. As the

²¹⁵ “A Note from the Director: Intelligence Priorities - Excerpt from PDD-35,” United States National Security Agency, *Communicator: NSA’s Employee Publication*, October 1995, accessed July 12, 2022, <https://www.nsa.gov/portals/75/documents/news-features/declassified-documents/communicators/Communicator-III-40.pdf>.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ White House, *A National Security Strategy for a Global Age* [2001], (Washington, DC: The White House, 2000), National Security Strategy Archive, <https://nssarchive.us>.

“prosperity and security in America depend on prosperity and security around the globe,” the US reemphasized its global commitment.²¹⁸

Essentially, Bush’s and Clinton’s post-Cold War vision of national security focused predominantly on democracy and economic growth while missing the mark to understand the threat environment, define a robust grand strategy, and adequately prioritize objectives. In short, if everything is important, nothing is important. The enormous range of justifiable objectives (and designating democracy as the benchmark objective) was not a solid foundation upon which to anchor foreign and domestic policies.²¹⁹ Indeed, both failed to recognize the growing hatred within certain radical Islamic groups towards the West.

In particular, Clinton’s wide array of issues suggested the American IC needed to monitor not only traditional concerns, such as nuclear proliferation, Russia, China, and North Korea but also the spread of sensitive technologies, terrorism, organized crime, economic competitors and compliance with international agreements while also supporting military, humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts.²²⁰ PDD-35 prioritized supporting military operations and identifying challenges to America’s political, economic, and military interests, yet the matrix failed to recognize and incorporate other growing threats. There was a significant mismatch in grand strategic vision from interests to objectives and waning Congressional support for a robust American IC.²²¹

²¹⁸ White House, *National Security Strategy for a Global Age* [2001], iii.

²¹⁹ James Schlesinger, “Quest for a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy,” *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 1 (February 1993), <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1992-01-01/quest-post-cold-war-foreign-policy>.

²²⁰ W. Bruce Weinrod, “U.S. Intelligence Priorities in the Post-Cold War Era,” *World Affairs* 159, no. 1 (1996): 3–11, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20672472?seq=1>.

Expectedly, the lack of strategic concept and prioritization from leadership coupled with significant budget cuts had several implications for the IC.²²² Recall, the IC performs tasks according to leadership's requirements. First, without a coherent strategy, the IC was forced to be reactionary, scrambling to respond to unexpected situations or threats, often in regions or nations typically on the 'low' to no priority list instead of providing strategic forewarning. Second, absent clearly articulated prioritized targets, the IC was hindered from planning for future missions and investments, be it new technological capabilities or personnel. Third, reduced funding demonstrated leadership's perception that intelligence was a wartime task and not a permanent peacetime necessity and means to support foreign policy. The cuts also meant adequate coverage of the increased and diverse threats could not be achieved solely with national resources. Lastly, the growth and scope of concerns, notably transnational ones, highlighted the importance of closer collaboration and information-sharing amongst the Five Eyes partners, yet that urgency was not conveyed.

In sum, the structures, procedures, and tools that prevailed in the Cold War were inadequate in a more complex and technologically interconnected period. The security requirements for the post-Cold War period necessitated an agile intelligence apparatus, clearly defined tasks, the capability to cover more targets and analyze a broader scope of issues, and continued investment in next-generation technologies. Under this backdrop, American foreign policy objectives and strategies were misaligned with the realities of

²²¹ The IC was criticized for its perceived excessive, wasteful spending, with Senator Moynihan apparently suggesting the CIA should be eliminated. *Ibid*, 7.

²²² Michael Miner, "The Perennial Quest: Intelligence Integration from London to Washington, 1936-2019," PhD diss., King's College London, 2019.

the threat environment, and hence, a lagging and misguided approach to meeting intelligence requirements.

The United Kingdom: Attuned to Terrorism

The Five Eyes partners recognized the changing nature of threats and domains. Yet, despite variations in national priorities, there existed issues of mutual concern supporting intensified collaboration. Indeed, heightened transnational threats and budgetary constraints further incentivized cooperation.²²³ London's strategic defense policies from 1994 to 1998 consistently highlighted similar themes and expanded over time. The likelihood of direct, major military threats to the UK were remote, the security environment was increasingly less certain and stable, and the American alliance was critical to British defense. Security policies evolved with the changing landscape, initially highlighting uncertainty about Russia's development, the rise of nationalism and terrorism, and the risks of interconnectivity with foreign partners.²²⁴

The British were also more attuned to terrorism, given their history with the Irish Republican Army. This would later prove beneficial to the American IC and the wider Five Eyes network as the allies would seek to adapt their systems for a new Global War on Terror. It was the British experience of the latter half of the 20th century and the

²²³ Military Spending/Defense Budget comparisons from 1986 to 1995 as measured by GDP: US 6.6% to 3.8%; UK 4.5% to 2.5%; Canada 2.1% to 1.5%; Australia 2.5% to 2.0%; New Zealand 2.3% to 1.8%, see: "Military Spending/Defense Budget by Country," Macrotrends, accessed May 25, 2022, <https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/ranking/military-spending-defense-budget>.

²²⁴ United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, *Statements on the Defence Estimates 1994*, (London: HMSO, 1994), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/272117/2550.pdf.

1990s, along with another close ally in Israel, that helped the United States rapidly shift their national security operations in the years ahead.²²⁵ Nevertheless, in the mid 1990s London was in a similar position inasmuch they were facing a changing world without the political capital to rapidly adapt and modernize their intelligence system. Things would improve by the late 1990s under the astute leadership of Sir David Omand at GCHQ and the next generation of leaders serving the Blair government.

London's priorities in 1997 expanded to include stability in Europe, economic growth, and enhancing technological capabilities to counter the trend of easily accessible technology being used by adversaries.²²⁶ Britain's security lens broadened beyond nation-states to include transnational issues as well. London estimated that the radical external changes – the rise of ethnic conflicts, extremism, terrorism, and the spread of technologically enhanced weaponry – were increasingly threatening to British security and economic interests and required more overseas engagement and multinational responses.

To undertake overseas deployments, project power, and prevent conflicts, the military force posture needed modernization and reorganization, including better intelligence to support operations.²²⁷ Thus, GCHQ, Britain's national asset and ace-card with allies, would invest in advanced collection capabilities and information technology

²²⁵ Miner, "The Perennial Quest."

²²⁶ Tom Dodd, *The Strategic Defence Review*, House of Commons Library Research Paper 97/106, October 23, 1997, Research Briefing, U.K. Parliament, <https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/RP97-106/RP97-106.pdf>.

²²⁷ United Kingdom Ministry of Defence, *Strategic Defence Review: Modern Forces for the Modern World*, (London: HMSO, 1998), https://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/ukgwa/20121026065214/www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/65F3D7AC-4340-4119-93A2-20825848E50E/0/sdr1998_complete.pdf; Dodd, *The Strategic Defence Review*.

systems, bringing it into the modern digital age and allowing for expanded signals collection on the diverse and far-reaching external threats as well as improved precision for military missions.²²⁸ Overall, British strategy called for continued strong relations with the US and proactive foreign engagement to protect its national interests.

Canada: Peaceful Engagement

Canada's threat assessments aligned closely with those of the UK and US in that the long-standing Soviet threat had diminished and no external threat specific to Canada existed.²²⁹ For Ottawa, this meant that previous assumptions and tactics concerning foreign and defense policies were less sound. Problems that were minor or non-existent in the past had become higher priority threats, a view that the US did not fully share. Transformations in the international landscape created unfamiliar and unpredictable sources of conflict, threatening regional stability, and potentially generating wider conflicts or jeopardizing Canada's economic interests and security. Ottawa estimated ethnic conflicts, religious fundamentalism, the growing economic divide between developed and developing nations, and globalization could fuel even more security threats in the form of illegal immigration, drug trafficking, and terrorism.

Thus, Ottawa's strategic policies prioritized defending Canada by maintaining strong defense and collective security measures, supporting a peaceful world order and stability through humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, and resolving conflict

²²⁸ Ferris, *Behind the Enigma*, 676-713.

²²⁹ Government of Canada, *Canadian Defence Policy*, Department of National Defence, April 1992, https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2012/dn-nd/D3-7-1992-eng.pdf.

through international bodies, such as NATO or the UN. The military services would be reformed and modernized to not only defend the homeland but also to support global operations. Ottawa assumed such missions had the potential to make Canada a target for terrorists, which necessitated investments and reforms within the intelligence services, specifically in counterterrorism efforts.

With CSIS's slightly higher budget, more resources were allotted to counterterrorism and investments were made to enhance Arctic and maritime surveillance capabilities, sub-surface acoustic detection systems, and other intelligence collection capabilities.²³⁰ Internal initiatives were taken for foreign-based Canadian liaison officers to share more intelligence proactively.²³¹ Ottawa's intentions for more coalition engagement intersected with, indeed supported, its trade security objectives. Canadian trade in the Asia Pacific region intensified, and thus it was in Ottawa's economic interest that the area remained politically and militarily stable. In sum, Canada sought to enhance its security through cooperative defense arrangements and support global stability through international entities.

Australia: Regional Focus

Fundamentally, this period marked Canberra's first independent foreign policy. It varied from past strategies in that more emphasis was placed on Australian national

²³⁰ [Canada] Security Intelligence Review Committee, *Annual Report 1991-1992*, Ottawa: SIRC, 1992, <https://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/JS71-1-1992E.pdf>.

²³¹ CSIS expenditures increased slightly for three consecutive years: \$204m in 1991, \$225m in 1992 and \$244m in 1994, see: [Canada] Security Intelligence Review Committee, *Annual Report 1995 - 1996: An Operational Audit of CSIS Activities*, (Ottawa: SIRC, 1996), <http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/anrran/1995-1996/index-eng.html>.

interests versus appealing to those of a protector.²³² Canberra's Australian-centric defense and foreign policies highlighted its desire to be more self-reliant in security while recognizing that the American alliance was a "key element in Australia's defense" amidst concerns for stability in the broader Asia Pacific region.²³³

Communism had fallen in Europe and elsewhere but not in East Asia. Canberra assessed that without the Cold War bipolar balance of power, regional power struggles would emerge with competitors vying for political, military, or economic dominance and generating flashpoints that could harm Australian security and interests. Canberra was concerned that the rise of certain Asian economies, notably China's, would encourage expansionism, a military built-up or armed conflict potentially destabilizing the region or possibly resulting in a direct attack against Australia. Under this line of thinking, Canberra prioritized military preparedness. Yet, austerity measures led to investments in signals, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities, contributing to better sea and air intelligence and fewer expenditures on new military capabilities such as minehunter ships, air defense radars, upgrades to surveillance aircraft, and other hardware.²³⁴

Australian concerns focused predominately on Asia Pacific stability and security, particularly the strategic postures of China, Japan, and India, uncertainty on the Korean peninsula, rising Asian economies and their impact on Australia, and the proliferation of

²³² Gareth Evans, "Australia's Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s," speech to the National Press Club, Canberra, November 4, 1991, Gareth Evans, personal website, http://www.gevans.org/speeches/old/1991/041191_fm_australiasforeignrelations.pdf.

²³³ Australian Department of Defence, *Defending Australia: Defence White Paper 1994*, (Canberra ACT: Australian Government Publishing Service, National Library of Australia, 1994), <https://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-1194418619/view?partId=nla.obj-1198245248#page/n3/mode/1up>.

²³⁴ Ibid.

weapons of mass destruction. Collectively, the uncertainties inspired increased engagement in the region to protect and advance Australian interests. Under this backdrop, Canberra supported international and regional organizations, such as the UN, NATO, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the South Pacific Forum (now Pacific Islands Forum), to promote peace, security, and fair-trade diplomacy.

New Zealand: Regional Engagement to Promote Security and Trade

Consistent with past foreign and defense policies, Wellington prioritized security and trade issues, and like Australia, its focus was Asia Pacific-centric. The narrower national focus was understandable. Given its relatively weak defense posture and small economy, New Zealand sought and depended on good relations with allies for its economic prosperity and national defense.²³⁵ Yet, given the volatile, unpredictable state of global and regional security, Wellington's primary objective was to improve political, security, and economic relations with the US.²³⁶ Achieving the first objective of improved ties supported Wellington's other goals: revitalizing the economy and increasing access to trade markets.

It is well to remember that US-New Zealand relations were downgraded in the mid-1980s, with the US suspending New Zealand from the Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Agreement (ANZUS Treaty, 1951) due to diverging views over Wellington's nuclear-free legislation, which effectively banned all US nuclear powered

²³⁵ McCraw, "New Zealand's Foreign Policy in the 1990s: In the National Tradition?"

²³⁶ Ibid.

or armed vessels from New Zealand's ports and waters.²³⁷ The suspension of ANZUS effectively removed the country's backbone of security. The loss underscored the significance of regaining favor with the Americans.

From an economic perspective, Wellington encouraged trade liberalization and sought to foster better relations by increasing its involvement in regional organizations such as APEC. The strategy aligned with the nuances of Wellington's economy. Roughly one-third of New Zealand's exports went to East Asian countries, and deepening trade relations and increasing access to Asian markets would revitalize the lagging economy. Securing the waterways was beyond the country's naval and intelligence capabilities and required external capabilities to protect New Zealand's green and blue water interests.

Wellington's underlying strategy to achieve both its security and trade ambitions was to prove itself a reliable, engaged partner on the world stage. Thus, New Zealand increased its role internationally, supporting UN and NATO peacekeeping, humanitarian, and aid efforts.²³⁸ In sum, contending with a nominal defense posture, weak national intelligence services, an unpredictable regional security environment, and economic aspirations for free trade agreements, New Zealand prioritized improved relations with the US to bolster regional security and economic development.

²³⁷ ANZUS committed the US, Australia, and New Zealand to uphold the security of the Pacific, see: "The Australian, New Zealand and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS), 1951," United States Department of State, in *Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations*, Office of the Historian, accessed April 19, 2022, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/anzus>.

²³⁸ Don McKinnon, "The National Governments Foreign Policy Open and Internationally Engaged," Beehive, September 19, 1996, <https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/national-governments-foreign-policy-open-and-internationally-engaged>.

Aligning Strategies: Seeing the World with Five Eyes

It is interesting to note the general lack of consensus on defining and prioritizing international security concerns within and amongst governments and national security experts in the 1990s. For example, PDD-35 neglected to designate terrorism as a high-priority issue. Yet, the UK intelligence community had already shifted operational efforts and resources away from traditional Soviet tasks to enhance coverage on terrorism, proliferation, and organized crime in 1995.²³⁹ Again in 1998, after estimating that global terrorist attacks within recent years averaged roughly 60 a month, the British increased resources devoted to terrorism by over 16%.²⁴⁰ Indeed, the US Department of Defense forecasted in 1997 that “increasingly capable and violent terrorists will continue to directly threaten the lives of American citizens and try to undermine US policies and alliances.”²⁴¹ Some analysts assessed the trends and dangers of terrorist groups, stressing intelligence, not military might, plays a crucial role in countering the threats.²⁴²

Globalization and disruptive technologies were other misaligned issues. In 1997, the CIA highlighted the risks to stability and security associated with globalization and the rapid spread of information technology, which, if refitted, could be used by terrorists, proliferators, organized criminals, and malcontent states to enhance their activities.²⁴³

²³⁹ United Kingdom Intelligence and Security Committee, *Annual Report 1995*, 13-14.

²⁴⁰ *Annual Report 1997 - 98*, Cm. 4073, United Kingdom Intelligence and Security Committee, Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, (London:1998), https://isc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/1997-1998_ISC_AR.pdf, vi, 8.

²⁴¹ United States Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review 1997*, 4.

²⁴² Bruce Hoffman, “Intelligence and Terrorism: Emerging Threats and New Security Challenges in the Post-Cold War Era,” *Intelligence and National Security* 11, no. 2 (April 1996): 207–23, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02684529608432353>; Schlesinger, “Quest for a Post-Cold War Foreign Policy.

Yet, in US decision-making circles, the assessment went unheeded. Indeed, British policymakers were quicker than the other partners to recognize the severity of the threats.

The Five Eyes partners' security definitions, concerns, and strategies were not wholly synonymous. Each had different priorities and approaches to tackle them. The UK was more attuned to terrorism given its history with the IRA. Australia and New Zealand focused their strategies on the broader Asia-Pacific region, while Canada emphasized peaceful international engagement to strengthen national defense.

However, the least common denominator amongst the four was the desire, better yet, necessity, to maintain, if not strengthen, American defense commitments. For its part, the US lacked clarity on the diversity of threat vectors, some of which were understood and some not. Flailing under too many objectives, Washington prioritized spreading democracy and selective overseas engagement.

Despite the disparities, all five partners shared a common vision of collective action to uphold security and prevent crises in areas of interest. The commonalities would prompt an expansion of Five Eyes' mandate to monitor and support political, economic, military, peacekeeping, and humanitarian efforts.

Five Eyes: Adapting to the Evolving Environment

Five Eyes SIGINT during the Cold War was instrumental in shaping and implementing the partners' foreign policies and defense strategies for over forty years. The insights into Soviet weapons programs alleviated fears and paranoia of a "bomber gap" in the 1950s, and a "missile gap" in the 1960s, ultimately altering the partner states'

²⁴³ United States Central Intelligence Agency, *Global Trends 2015*, 9-10; United States Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review 1997*, 4.

strategic planning. With advancements in technology and faster dissemination, Five Eyes guided military operations on the battlefields of Vietnam and observed major events elsewhere. Ultimately, the intelligence contributed to the successful accomplishment of member states' objective – to avoid war with the Soviets.

However, in this era of varied and shifting threats, traditional military operations and single-target intelligence collection were less effective against indiscriminate, unpredictable uprisings or acts of terrorism and highlighted the nexus between intelligence and asymmetric warfare. The security situation required not necessarily more or better kinetic force but rather more and better intelligence, especially SIGINT which offered a broader take on a greater range of targets.

Funding for intelligence services was less of a priority in this period than during the Cold War. Fiscal policy was dominated by governments seeking to reap “peace dividends,” with most partners drawing down their intelligence agencies' budgets, affecting personnel and investments in new capabilities. Overall, the British services were targeted with 20% budget cuts and 50% for those previously focused on Warsaw Pact nations.²⁴⁴ Similarly, Australia's ASIO budget suffered a 30% downsizing between 1991 and 1998, despite the increased intelligence demands associated with hosting the 2000 Olympic Games.²⁴⁵ Figures for New Zealand remain classified, yet, given Wellington was traditionally reliant on financial support from GCHQ and NSA, it is reasonable to assume they too trimmed intelligence budgets. Interestingly, Canadian

²⁴⁴ Ferris, *Behind the Enigma*, 677.

²⁴⁵ Australian Security Intelligence Organization, *Report to Parliament 1998-1999*, (Canberra: ASIO, October 5, 1999), <https://www.asio.gov.au/sites/default/files/ASIO%20Report%20to%20Parliament%201998-99.pdf>, 3.

services received a slight bump in the early 1990s, only to decline to levels below the initial figures in the latter half of the decade.²⁴⁶ Notably, funding for the technical development program was terminated in 1997.²⁴⁷

The US IC lost or eliminated over 23,000 people or positions in the 1990s, and its combined estimated budget from the peak period of 1989 to 2000 plummeted from “125% to 80% above 1980” figures.²⁴⁸ Alone the NSA suffered a 30% cut in funding and personnel.²⁴⁹ The budget cuts were felt across the board in capital investments, analysis capabilities, and the demographics of analysts.²⁵⁰ On the technical side, large, expensive collection capabilities, such as satellites, were more susceptible to budget cuts as leadership deemed these more appropriate to the Cold War requirements of penetrating closed societies.²⁵¹ Indeed, roughly one-half of the IC’s budget targeted the USSR and its allies during the Cold War.²⁵²

²⁴⁶ Expenditures fluctuated from \$205m in 1992, to \$244m in 1994, to \$184 in 1996. [Canada] Security Intelligence Review Committee, *Annual Report 1997-1998: An Operational Audit of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Activities*, (Ottawa: SIRC, 1998), <http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/anrran/1997-1998/index-eng.html>.

²⁴⁷ [Canada] Security Intelligence Review Committee, *Annual Report 1998-1999: An Operational Audit of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service*, (Ottawa: SIRC, 1999), http://www.sirc-csars.gc.ca/pdfs/ar_1998-1999-eng.pdf.

²⁴⁸ Estimated figures, see: *Intelligence Spending and Appropriations: Issues for Congress*, R42061, names redacted, (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, September 18, 2013), https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/20130918_R42061_df58a8933d5b6f22f5defbd1a57a07f2ba8567b0.pdf; Michael E. Devine, *Intelligence Community Spending: Trends and Issues*, CSR Report 44381 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, report updated November 6, 2019), <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/intel/R44381.pdf>.

²⁴⁹ Michael V Hayden, *Playing to the Edge - American Intelligence in the Age of Terror* (Penguin Putnam Inc, 2017), 2-4.

²⁵⁰ Lowenthal, *Intelligence*, 191-93.

²⁵¹ Congress supported a shift from traditional collection and processing infrastructure to one more flexible and less costly, see: Lowenthal, *Intelligence*, 83-85; Richelson, *Wizards of Langley*, chpt. 10, Kindle.

From a personnel perspective, experienced workers, such as analysts, were made redundant or retired, and replacements were rarely, if at all, hired. The net result was weaker competitive analysis and a loss of institutional memory, with little to no transfer of experience and tradecraft to the next generation of analysts.²⁵³ The compounding effects meant fewer, less experienced personnel were tasked to monitor more threats on antiquated computer systems. These massive cuts in intelligence systems, including hardware and especially personnel, could not have come at a worse time as the international security space was in the midst of a monumental shift and national security depended on reinforcing America's first line of defense.²⁵⁴

Disaster struck in January 2000. The results of neglecting to invest in the technological infrastructure and failing to retain or hire personnel contributed to the NSA's systems going off-line for over three days, rendering the NSA essentially "brain dead."²⁵⁵ Recall, signals collection is a 24/7, continuous process. With the increased volume of global communications, the outdated NSA systems were receiving amounts of data far exceeding their capacity. The intake paralyzed systems and prohibited personnel from accessing, processing, and analyzing the raw data. Although GCHQ managed much of America's SIGINT activities during the shutdown, this marked a historical failure for US SIGINT collection and processing.²⁵⁶

²⁵² Lowenthal, *Intelligence*, 14.

²⁵³ Lowenthal, *Intelligence*, 184-85.

²⁵⁴ Miner, "The Perennial Quest."

²⁵⁵ Hayden, *Playing to the Edge*, 2-4.

²⁵⁶ Ferris, *Behind the Enigma*, 325.

During and following the blackout, it took very little imagination to consider what the implications could have been if this had occurred during a major war. This was a historical lesson that resonated with the next generation. The blackout was a severe concern as policy and military decision-makers were not receiving timely, up-to-date intelligence. Perhaps far more dangerous was the possibility of adversaries exploiting this vulnerability to attack the US homeland and overseas interests – had they known about the system breakdown. Amidst this backdrop of common concerns, slashed budgets, and an inability to tackle the challenges alone, Five Eyes missions would focus on supporting military, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations.

Disparate 1990s: Missions Drove Unity

The Middle East was long brewing with political and religious frailties, and one of Five Eyes' first major post-Cold War missions was to support the UN-approved American-led coalition to oust Iraqi forces from Kuwait.²⁵⁷ During the pre-combat and combat phases of the operation, Five Eyes supplied political and military leaders with advanced intelligence on the force posture and capabilities of the Iraqi military, helping to guide allied ground forces and airstrikes, as well as locating and rescuing downed aircraft and pilots. The SIGINT provided was invaluable in forming and executing offensive and defensive tactics. Intelligence allowed commanders to move troops more safely within Kuwait and direct missile strikes more accurately, resulting in fewer deaths

²⁵⁷ Wells, *Between Five Eyes*, 90-93, 160-164; Ferris, *Behind the Enigma*, 686.

and civilian damage. Five Eyes intelligence also guided search and rescue efforts of downed pilots by intercepting the signals emanating from their distress beacons.²⁵⁸

However, as beneficial as the intelligence was, there were issues of concern. One was locating and destroying Iraq's mobile missile launchers. Five Eyes collected radar emissions from the launcher systems yet could not locate them precisely as the signals disappeared before enough information was gathered.²⁵⁹ A second concern was integrating and disseminating intelligence. To support fluid, joint operations, commanders needed a multi-sourced intelligence collection and distribution system in almost real-time, integrating intelligence from signals, electronics, and imagery, along with data from other sensor systems to support the warfighter.²⁶⁰ A year later, with NSA funding and technical pioneering, advanced collection techniques were being developed to allow for more centralization and faster reporting and sharing of intelligence.

As in the past, American innovations trickled down to the other partners, and NSA systems were further integrated with GCHQ's and others.²⁶¹ Integration of partners' systems had a dual effect. More information was shared faster, and as NSA collected more data than it could handle, cooperation increased as partner agencies eased the burden by helping process it. The Gulf mission was a success for the UN coalition and beneficial for Five Eyes. The operation exposed weaknesses in capabilities, allowing them to learn, evolve and strengthen collaboration through interdependency.

²⁵⁸ Rosenberg, *Pine Gap*, chpt. 5, Kindle.

²⁵⁹ Ibid.

²⁶⁰ Wells, *Between Five Eyes*, 142.

²⁶¹ Ferris, *Behind the Enigma*, 361-362.

Humanitarian and peacekeeping missions were shared policies amongst political leaders. The UN-approved, US-led mission to provide relief in Somalia was supported by the partners. The country was experiencing not only a devastating famine but also vicious fighting amongst opposing groups. Coalition forces, tasked to provide and protect food supplies, were supported by Five Eyes SIGINT, which was tracking the actions of key factional leaders and their assets.²⁶² The intelligence shed light on events inside Somalia, allowing military planners to strategize the safe movement of UN forces in the country. However, Five Eyes' satellites were, for the most part, muted in Somalia. Given the country's underdeveloped communications systems, the volume of valuable signals to collect was limited. The Somalian operation demonstrated the limitations of SIGINT, forcing partners to contemplate alternative means of intelligence collection.

Terrorism also compelled Five Eyes into action. In response to the 1993 bombing in New York City, Five Eyes increased global monitoring of terror suspects.²⁶³ Presumably, the enlarged scope and scale of monitoring were supported by the Echelon word-filtering system, which allowed for more precise targeting of communications by filtering out intercepts that contained predetermined keywords, such as bombs or attacks, and forwarding them to the analysts who initiated the word searches. Similar to tracking Somalian warlords, the New York City bombing highlighted the partners' inability to monitor and forewarn asymmetric threats. The weakness, however, was not necessarily a lack of signals to collect but more attributable to the organizational structure of the American intelligence apparatus and its strict separation of domestic (FBI) and foreign

²⁶² Rosenberg, *Pine Gap*, chpt 6, Kindle.

²⁶³ Wells, *Between Five Eyes*, 90-92.

intelligence sharing and activities (CIA and NSA). The deficit was outside the purview of a Five Eyes solution and persisted until after the events of 9/11. At the core, collection and signals were less of an issue than the authorities, processing, and integration of intelligence for policymaking.

Selective engagement in regional and ethnic wars alongside ‘problems without passports’ was a common policy amongst Five Eyes’ political leaders.²⁶⁴ Thus, when NATO forces intervened in the Bosnian and Kosovo wars, Five Eyes contributed to the planners’ offensive bombing strategy by locating adversarial weapons and radar systems, allowing for more precise missile strikes, and as in Kuwait, helped guide search and rescue operations for downed pilots.²⁶⁵ To stem nuclear proliferation, Five Eyes supported the American and British bombing campaign against Iraq by providing SIGINT on the country’s weapons research and storage facilities, air defense systems, and troop readiness and positions, allowing for more accuracy in striking targets to minimize civilian damage and deaths.²⁶⁶ It is interesting to note the unity amongst the five partners. Although only US and UK forces were involved in the operation, all five partners contributed to the SIGINT effort. Unity was again demonstrated when Australia sought to promote peace and stability in East Timor, and the UK intervened in Sierra Leone’s civil war. Both Canberra’s and London’s operations received the full range of Five Eyes SIGINT, despite the absence of other members’ troops in the operations.²⁶⁷

²⁶⁴ Kofi A. Annan, “Problems without Passports,” *Foreign Policy*, November 9, 2009, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/11/09/problems-without-passports/>.

²⁶⁵ Wells, *Between Five Eyes*, 119-120.

²⁶⁶ Rosenberg, *Pine Gap*, chpt. 6, Kindle.

²⁶⁷ Wells, *Between Five Eyes*, 119-124.

Throughout this period, despite budget cuts, NSA and its partners continued to innovate and develop advanced technologies to expand and modernize collection and analysis capabilities. The results were most notable at Pine Gap. Initially, in 1970, Pine Gap was supported by 400 people and had two antennas to control and communicate with the CIA's two Rhyolite satellites. By 1999, personnel grew to over 800, the number of antennas to 15, and satellites to three.²⁶⁸ Between 1970 and 1996, a total of seven satellites were launched, either adding or replacing capacity.

Each satellite presumably had a synchronous leap in capabilities. The 1985 Orion-1 satellite, for example, was the largest spacecraft in geosynchronous orbit at the time in terms of weight and size of an intercept antenna, roughly the width of a football field.²⁶⁹ Orion-1 provided enhanced detection capabilities and extended longevity, presumably, offering more than twice the lifespan of the Rhyolites. Another advanced development was Orion-3, launched in 1995. Like its predecessor, Orion-3 had a 100-meter diameter antenna yet was also fitted with additional, more sensitive secondary ones, which allowed for the interception of lower-powered signals over a broader range of frequencies, such as mobile calls within aircraft.²⁷⁰ Indeed, one must pause and reflect on the advancements made in satellite technology. Earlier satellites were constructed for a mean mission life span of under five years and to serve the analog age. Yet, some, like the Orion-1 continued to function successfully in the digital age.²⁷¹

²⁶⁸ Commonwealth of Australia, "Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, Reference: Pine Gap."

²⁶⁹ Ball, Robinson, Tanter, "SIGINT Satellites of Pine Gap," 24-25.

²⁷⁰ *Ibid*, 28-29.

²⁷¹ *Ibid*, 26-27.

Collectively, Five Eyes' operations covered a broad range of partners' objectives. In addition to the continuous coverage of the Russian Federation and its military arsenal and testing facilities, missions expanded to include promoting peace and stability in areas of interest, monitoring the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Iraq and China, tracking terrorists in the Middle East, Africa and beyond and supporting international humanitarian operations.²⁷² Five Eyes' SIGINT was a tool of statecraft, informing and guiding the political partners' defense and foreign policies. Yet, it is equally important to recognize how the missions impacted the intelligence agencies' partnership.

First, the ties between the agencies and operators were strengthened personally and operationally. As noted earlier, not all member states partook in military operations, yet each contributed vital intelligence to those missions, allowing a supporting member state to pursue its own national interests. On a personal level, in times of uncertainty, colleagues agonized or celebrated together. For example, during the initial attack on Iraqi forces in Kuwait, colleagues across the Five Eyes community collectively watched the British and American forces in action, speculating the outcome, hoping for the best, and sighing in relief when the mission unfolded better than anticipated. When colleagues discovered that four American soldiers had lost their lives, the loss was felt amongst the community, regardless of nationality.²⁷³ Similarly, during search and rescue operations, the longer a pilot was unaccounted for, the more desperate the mood amongst SIGINTers. Insiders claim there are no tasks within the intelligence community higher than searching

²⁷² David Rosenberg, "Pine Gap: An Historical Perspective on Australia's Intelligence-Sharing Partnership with the United States in a Time of Political Change," *United Service* 70, no. 3 (September 2019): 13-16, <https://www.rusinsw.org.au/Papers/20190730.pdf>.

²⁷³ Rosenberg, *Pine Gap*, chpt. 5, Kindle.

for a pilot's distress signal and no greater sense of collective relief than when a colleague is rescued.²⁷⁴ Regardless of a pilot's nationality, these experiences left their mark on and tightened the bonds amongst Five Eyes colleagues.

Second, from an operational standpoint, the increased and diverse joint missions allowed member states not only to learn from each other but also to identify vulnerabilities in tradecraft and collaborate on developing new tools and techniques to hone skills and capabilities. For example, warfare missions that combined partners' maritime expeditionary forces highlighted the need for agile, flexible, and better-integrated systems.²⁷⁵ As partners' navies and air forces undertook an increasing number of joint operations, they required a coordinated, constant stream of up-to-date, actionable, multi-sourced intelligence across five-way communications systems. After the vulnerability was apparent, partners developed technologies that would integrate numerous systems into one multi-sourced collection and dissemination system almost in real-time.²⁷⁶ Similarly, when NSA's systems shut down due to excessive volumes of data downlinks, not only were NSA's systems modernized but partners' systems were better integrated to allow for more burden-sharing to process and analyze the raw data. During the shutdown, GCHQ stepped in to assist NSA's SIGINT efforts, a true testament of trust, loyalty, and commitment. Indeed, sharing secrets is untypical in a world that prizes secrecy. Yet, sharing secrets concerning one's own vulnerabilities is the pinnacle of trust and NSA and its partner agencies do that rather naturally.

²⁷⁴ Ibid.

²⁷⁵ Wells, *Between Five Eyes*, 120-121.

²⁷⁶ Ibid, 142.

Five Eyes insiders claim this period was relatively calm, underpinned by a business “as usual” sentiment.²⁷⁷ Compared to the intensity of the Cold War or the urgency of World War II, one could argue that this was a less taxing era. Five Eyes fulfilled the tasks mandated by policymakers, improved technologies and tradecraft within its financial means, and remained trustworthy, dependable partners to each other. However, one could equally argue the benchmark for success was misplaced. Five Eyes accomplished what it was tasked to do, yet the tasks were flawed. The failings that occurred between 1991 and 2000, however, would not become fully apparent to policymakers until September 11, 2001.

²⁷⁷ Ibid, 82.

Chapter V.
The Global War on Terror
2001 - 2008

“Friends do not leave friends at moments like these.”²⁷⁸

September 11, 2001. Roughly one hour after terror attacks struck the US, American airspace closed, and over 4500 civil aircraft in flight scrambled to land at the nearest airport as soon as possible.²⁷⁹ For over forty-eight hours, airspace remained closed for civilian planes. With one exception; The plane carrying NSA’s “best friend,” GCHQ.²⁸⁰ When the leaders of Britain’s intelligence services, GCHQ, MI5, and MI6, landed in Washington, they were acting on instructions received from Prime Minister Tony Blair, in essence, ‘to help the Americans however you can.’²⁸¹

No definitive assessment of the situation had been made. Yet, hours after the attacks, British intelligence leaders stood in CIA headquarters offering unconditional support. This little-known event demonstrates the close bonds between the American and British governments and their national intelligence agencies. This moment marked the

²⁷⁸ The response from a New Zealand liaison operative stationed at NSA on September 11, 2001, after being told to evacuate. Hayden, *Playing to the Edge*, 33.

²⁷⁹ “Chronology of the September 11 Attacks and Subsequent Events through October 24, 2001,” National Security Archive (George Washington University), accessed January 16, 2022, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB165/faa4.pdf>.

²⁸⁰ Hayden, *Playing to the Edge*, 10.

²⁸¹ *Ibid*, 33.

beginning of Five Eyes' expanded global fight against terrorism, a watershed moment for a new generation that echoed the historic lessons of early WWII and a stark reminder that the security challenges of the world remained far grander than any single state.

Terrorism Becomes a Global Security Priority

Terrorism was not a new security phenomenon. Indeed, the threat had been a national security concern for many countries, and some, for decades, if not centuries. Traditional acts of terrorism were predominately geographically confined and tailored to a specific grievance, such as the struggles between the IRA and the UK. This largely internal conflict raged for almost thirty years, making the UK the deadliest country in Western Europe in terms of terrorist-related deaths.²⁸² Yet the trend from geographically isolated attacks to indiscriminate ones became increasingly apparent.

Between the 1980s and 1990s, American interests and citizens had become more vulnerable at home and abroad. In the 1980s, American civilians and the CIA's station chief were kidnapped in Lebanon, and within two years, three separate bombings struck US military and diplomatic facilities in Beirut, killing over 250 American civilians and military personnel.²⁸³ The American embassy in Kuwait and eight US facilities in Spain were bombed in 1983, and two years later, TWA flight 847 from Cairo to San Diego was hijacked, resulting in the death of a US Navy officer. More Americans died in the hijacking of the cruise ship *Achille Lauro*, bombings at Rome and Vienna airports, and at

²⁸² Death tolls 1970 to 1990, see: Hannah Ritchie, Joe Hasell, Edouard Mathieu, Cameron Appel, and Max Roser, "Terrorism," *Our World in Data*, 2013, <https://ourworldindata.org/terrorism>.

²⁸³ "Terrorist Attacks on Americans, 1979-1988," PBS Frontline: Target America, accessed May 4, 2022, <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/target/etc/cron.html>.

a discotheque in Germany. The decade ended with the downing of Pan Am flight 103 over Scotland, killing 259 people, including 190 Americans, several of whom were US intelligence specialists.²⁸⁴

In the 1990s, acts of terrorism targeting US interests and citizens increased in scope, scale, and destruction and were not limited to foreign territory but also became a domestic concern.²⁸⁵ In 1993, the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City claimed six Americans' lives, and an attack on CIA personnel outside agency headquarters in Virginia resulted in two more deaths. Later in the decade, Osama Bin Laden declared war on the West and called for a global campaign to kill Americans regardless of location. Attacks struck Americans in Pakistan and Sri Lanka, American military barracks and advisory offices in Saudi Arabia, US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya, and the USS Cole in the Gulf of Aden. Collectively, the incidents of the 1990s took the lives of hundreds of American civilians and service members.

Although there were numerous alarms and ample strategic warning from the CIA and other intelligence partners across the community, SIGINT remained tied to priorities as set by policymakers within a system that was slow-moving and ill-equipped to bridge the foreign and domestic divide.²⁸⁶ The interim years from the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 to the events of September 11, 2001 were a transitional period for

²⁸⁴ John Ashton and Ian Ferguson, "Flight from the Truth," *The Guardian*, June 26, 2001, <https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2001/jun/27/lockerbie.features11>.

²⁸⁵ "Counterterrorism Guide: Historic Timeline," United States Office of the Director of National Intelligence, accessed October 1, 2021, <https://www.dni.gov/nctc/timeline.html#1990>.

²⁸⁶ Sean Power, Calder Walton, and Michael Miner, "Report-9/11: Intelligence and National Security Twenty Years Later," Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, September 23, 2021, <https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/report-911-intelligence-and-national-security-twenty-years-later>.

American intelligence, with national leadership not always certain about their evolving role within the new security environment. Policy debates and discussions in Washington identified priorities underpinning grand strategies of liberal internationalism to arguments for a more isolated role, cooperative versus hegemonic. Some called for increased or status-quo budgetary allocations for intelligence and military capabilities. Yet most sought to reap political benefits of the post-Cold War environment: slashing investment in America's first line of defense and early warning while simultaneously championing engagement of a world in the throes of economic globalization. As the decade continued to unfold, there was a clear mismatch of capabilities to meet new priorities and stated intention to engage with the world on a grander scale.

US policies promoted increased engagement in regional conflicts and humanitarian intervention, liberalization of trade, and the spread of democracy through international entities that supported American objectives.²⁸⁷ America's Cold War containment doctrine was succeeded by one of international cooperation and underestimated the evolving threat of global terrorism. Despite the apparent trends, the Five Eyes partners were slow to respond to these changes. The United States, perhaps first among equals in this intelligence sharing alliance, was unable to recalibrate its existing capabilities to meet evolving requirements as the pace of events accelerated.

A compelling argument can be made that the events of September 11 were the tragic result of complacency, driven by a "business as usual" attitude.²⁸⁸ The attacks

²⁸⁷ Richard N. Haass, "Defining U.S. Foreign Policy in a Post-Post-Cold War World," the 2002 Arthur Ross Lecture, Remarks to Foreign Policy Association, New York, NY, April 22, 2002, United States Department of State Archive, transcript, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/p/rem/9632.htm>.

²⁸⁸ Wells, *Between Five Eyes*, 82.

demonstrated unprecedented sophistication in terms of coordination, reach, and destruction that could not be readily dismissed. Enhanced communications technology coupled with the ease of moving money and people allowed for greater efficiency in carrying out attacks on an international scale. No longer confined to national boundaries or singular grievances, terrorism was now a global threat with the potential to claim thousands of lives. This forced policymakers to revise national security priorities beyond traditional challenges to incorporate transnational issues and invest in the next generation of intelligence professionals, capabilities, and platforms to defend the homeland.

If a superpower such as the US was vulnerable to terror attacks, then previously held notions of security were no longer applicable. September 11 spawned the urgency to combat terrorism and incentivized the family of Five Eyes partners to unprecedented levels of unity and collaboration. Political leaders of the Five Eyes community immediately expressed sympathy and solidarity with their American partner. Australian Prime Minister John Howard denounced the attacks as an “appalling and repugnant” assault on free societies. He pledged to invoke the ANZUS Treaty and support, within Australia’s capabilities, American-led operations against the perpetrators.²⁸⁹

Recognizing its small size and limited resources, New Zealand offered to help in “any way” possible.²⁹⁰ Similarly, Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien pledged to join the American effort to defend the Northern Hemisphere and defeat terrorism worldwide,

²⁸⁹ Graeme Dobell, “Great Australian Foreign Policy Speeches: Howard on 9/11 and the US Alliance,” *The Interpreter*, The Lowy Institute, August 15, 2014, <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/great-australian-foreign-policy-speeches-howard-911-and-us-alliance>.

²⁹⁰ Jim Anderton, “New Zealand Response to US Attacks,” release, September 12, 2001, Beehive, <https://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/new-zealand-response-us-attacks>.

stressing, “when you need us, we will be there.”²⁹¹ British Prime Minister Tony Blair, claiming mass terrorism as the new evil in the world, pledged to stand shoulder to shoulder with America to extinguish terrorism globally.²⁹² The world had changed, never again to be as it had been on September 10, 2001.

New Threats, New Processes: Reforming the National Security Apparatus

President Bush’s 2002 National Security Strategy called for the most comprehensive government restructuring since the 1940s, aiming to centralize and bolster homeland security and bring America’s defense posture in line with twenty-first-century challenges.²⁹³ Specifically, this would be accomplished through a new federal Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and a series of legislative reforms to America’s national security apparatus, including the military and intelligence communities.²⁹⁴ This whole-of-government effort would lead to the transformation of military forces, operations, and capabilities, including expanding overseas bases and ports while leveraging advanced technologies at a faster pace.

²⁹¹ Note, during the lockdown of American airspace, Canada hosted over 45,000 Americans stranded at Canadian airports. George W. Bush and Jean Chretien, “Terrorist Attacks in the U.S.,” remarks by President Bush and Prime Minister Chretien, C-SPAN, September 24, 2001, video, 05:23, <https://www.c-span.org/video/?166265-1/terrorist-attacks-us>.

²⁹² Tony Blair, “Full Transcript of Tony Blair’s Statement,” *The Guardian*, September 11, 2001, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/sep/11/september11.usa23>.

²⁹³ White House, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America* [2002], (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002), National Security Strategy Archive <https://nssarchive.us>.

²⁹⁴ “History,” United States Department of Homeland Security, updated April 26, 2022, <https://www.dhs.gov/history>.

The intelligence community would be significantly overhauled and granted new authorities befitting the changed security environment. First, since terrorism was both a foreign and homegrown threat, intelligence agencies needed to be better integrated with policymakers, law enforcement, and military officials.²⁹⁵ Thus, legal barriers that obstructed collaboration between domestic and foreign national security entities were modified through the USA PATRIOT Act, the Homeland Security Act, and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA). The National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) was created to centralize, analyze, and share domestic and foreign terrorist-related intelligence.²⁹⁶

Second, the operational and organizational processes of the IC were styled for a different threat environment and not framed for a unipolar world order, globalization, cyberspace, or terrorism. Thus, new legislation was enacted to give the IC the necessary authorities to fulfill its evolving mandate. For example, changes in the parameters to obtain surveillance warrants with the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) were required to expand surveillance operations.²⁹⁷ New laws incorporated the digital domain including the NSA's role in exploiting data at rest. Recall, the NSA collected

²⁹⁵ A. Denis Clift, "Catching Field Mice: Intelligence and Policy in the Twenty-First Century," Paper presented at the Seminar on Intelligence, Command, and Control, Program on Information Resources Policy, Harvard University and the Center for Information Policy Research, May 2003, http://www.pirp.harvard.edu/pubs_pdf/clift/clift-i03-1.pdf.

²⁹⁶ For detailed information, see: "Background and Authorities - Information Sharing Environment," United States Office of the Director of National Intelligence, accessed January 10, 2022, <https://www.dni.gov/index.php/who-we-are/organizations/national-security-partnerships/ise/about-the-ise/ise-background-and-authorities>.

²⁹⁷ Foreign intelligence investigative activities, including wire taps, electronic surveillance, or physical searches, require a warrant from the FISC, see: "About the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court," United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, accessed May 25, 2022, <https://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/about-foreign-intelligence-surveillance-court>.

signals in transit. However, the digital revolution generated an enormous amount of data that was stored, never to be transmitted electronically - notes, files, spreadsheets, and other forms of data. The changes authorized NSA to proactively collect data at rest versus waiting for it to travel over a cable or a satellite.²⁹⁸

Third, global threats necessitated continuous surveillance worldwide, on land, sea, air, and in space, as well as dissemination on secure systems in real-time to more agencies, military leaders, and allies. The requirements necessitated closer collaboration with private sector technology firms, sustained investments in the collection, analysis, and communications systems, and an overhaul of the security clearance process.

Lastly, guided by the belief that no nation alone had the resources to adequately monitor and analyze terrorist groups, collaborating with foreign partners was essential, as was the role of America's closest partners. Analysts, often working on ambiguous, fragmented data concerning the operational and organizational structure of terrorist networks, could better fill in the gaps by sharing more pieces of the puzzle.²⁹⁹

In sum, Bush's "internationalism" doctrine sought to harness the country's unparalleled military, economic and political strength to promote peaceful international relations, political and economic freedom, and democracy. The war against terror groups of global reach and those exploiting technologies or seeking weapons of mass destruction

²⁹⁸ Hayden, *Playing to the Edge*, 132-134.

²⁹⁹ For the IC's assessments, see: United States Central Intelligence Agency, *Director of Central Intelligence: The 2002 Annual Report of the United States Intelligence Community* (Langley, VA: CIA, 2003), United States Homeland Security Digital Library, <https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=2809>; For annual threat assessments from 2006 - present, see: United States Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community: Reports 2006 - 2022," INTEL: IC Annual Threat Assessment, accessed July 9, 2022, <https://www.intelligence.gov/ic-annual-threat-assessment>; For Global Trend Reports published between 1997-2022, see: United States Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "Global Trends Reports [Reports from 2010 - 2040]."

would be indefinite. Bush's agenda to bolster homeland security and fight terrorism required considerable increases in funding.³⁰⁰

The British government, responding to the events of September 11, the Bali bombings, and the Mombasa attacks, made sweeping changes in the intelligence community, enacting new legislation to expand their authorities, increase funding for new hires, and drive technical development programs.³⁰¹ Like the US, the UK sought not only to identify terror threats but also to stop them pre-emptively. The shift fundamentally changed the intelligence collection process. The services needed to gather more evidentiary intelligence suitable to convict suspects in court and required closer collaboration amongst MI5, MI6, GCHQ, law enforcement entities, and foreign partners.³⁰² Beyond legislative changes, the services themselves were transformational for the British intelligence community, much akin to the American experience.

GCHQ consolidated operations into a new, modern headquarters and invested substantial resources to upgrade IT systems and create advanced collection

³⁰⁰ Estimates suggest between 2001 and 2003 funding increased by \$145-160bn. Budgets would continue to increase throughout the decade. For details on counterterrorism spending, see: Marcus Corbin, Steven M. Kosiak, Cindy Williams, David Gold, et al., *Security after 9/11 Strategy Choices and Budget Tradeoffs*, Washington, DC: Center for Defense Information, January 2003, available through ETH Zurich, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/28261/security-after-911.pdf>, 7-11; Laicie Heeley, Amy Belasco, Mackenzie Eaglen, Luke Hartig, et al., *Counterterrorism Spending: Protecting America While Promoting Efficiencies and Accountability*, Stimson Center, May 2018, https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/file-attachments/CT_Spending_Report_0.pdf, 11-14; "U.S. Intelligence Community Budget," United States Office of the Director of National Intelligence, accessed April 21, 2022, <https://www.dni.gov/index.php/what-we-do/ic-budget?highlight=WyJidWRnZXQiLCJidWRnZXRpbmciLCJidWRnZXRzIiwuYnVkJ2V0ZWQhXQ==>.

³⁰¹ *Annual Report 2002- 2003*, Cm. 5837, United Kingdom Intelligence and Security Committee, Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, (London, 2003), https://isc.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/2002-2003_ISC_AR.pdf.

³⁰² Frank Foley, "The Expansion of Intelligence Agency Mandates: British Counter-Terrorism in Comparative Perspective," *Review of International Studies* 35, no. 4 (2009): 983-95, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40588098>.

capabilities.³⁰³ The British services continued monitoring the proliferation of WMDs, organized crime, and threats to critical infrastructure. However, they also continued to invest additional resources in counterterrorism at levels never before seen in the history of Great Britain. The pivot revealed collection gaps that the intelligence services were keenly aware of and attempted to minimize through risk management assessments and increased collaboration with foreign intelligence partners.³⁰⁴

Australia, New Zealand, and Canada were relatively untouched by terrorist acts in a comparative light. Yet, their citizens and interests abroad had suffered attacks, and global trends confirmed a disturbing pattern – casualties per attack were on the rise.³⁰⁵ It was September 11, however, that profoundly transformed the perception of vulnerability that Canberra, Wellington, and Ottawa could not ignore. Geographic remoteness to traditional terrorist flashpoints was no longer a protective shield. Planes seized as weapons made every nation vulnerable to mass casualty events, or in Canada’s case, a launchpad from which to attack the US.³⁰⁶

Like their American and British partners, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada elevated radical Islamic terrorism as a high-level national security threat and initiated a series of legislative reforms to protect their citizens better. The reforms included additional funding, revised mandates, and enhanced powers for the intelligence services

³⁰³ Ferris, 676-713.

³⁰⁴ United Kingdom Intelligence and Security Committee, *Annual Report 2002-2003*.

³⁰⁵ Between 1991 and 2000 Canada, New Zealand, and Australia averaged less than four terrorist attacks a year. Trends indicate a decrease in attacks and an increase in casualties: 1992: 5071 vs 9742; 1997: 3197 vs 10,924; 2001: 1906 vs 7729, see: Ritchie et al., “Terrorism.”

³⁰⁶ Greg Fyffe, “The Canadian Intelligence Community after 9/11,” *Journal of Military and Strategic Studies* 13, no. 3 (April 2011): 1-17, <https://jmss.org/article/view/57976/43631>.

to better identify, monitor, deter, and convict terrorists.³⁰⁷ For example, prior to 9/11, Australia had no legal mechanisms to address terrorism.³⁰⁸ Canberra rectified the inadequacies by adopting “extraordinary” measures, which dramatically expanded the scope of both ASIO’s and ASIS’s authorities.³⁰⁹ Underpinned by a ‘pre-crime’ approach to intervention in the preparatory stages of an attack, the new legislation allowed the intelligence community unprecedented preventative powers. These included conditions for warrantless searches, covert surveillance of non-suspects, the secret detention and interrogation of suspects without charge, and the monitoring of anyone (including lawyers and physicians) who communicates with a suspected terrorist.³¹⁰ Indeed, the reforms were sweeping and reflective of the urgency to prevent acts of terrorism within or through Australia’s borders.

³⁰⁷ For Canadian reforms, see: Government of Canada, “The Government of Canada’s Response to the Terrorist Attacks of 9/11,” modified December 2, 2015, <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/ntnl-scrnt/cntr-trrrsm/sptmbr-11th/gvrnmnt-rspns-en.aspx>; Australian reforms, see: Cat Barker, “Counter-Terrorism and National Security Legislation Reviews: A Comparative Overview,” Parliamentary Library, Research Paper Series 2014-15, August 7, 2014, Parliament of Australia, https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/pubs/rp/rp1415/CounterTerrorism; *Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2003, no. 77, 2003*, Australian Government: Federal Register of Legislation, 2003, <https://www.legislation.gov.au/Details/C2004A01162>; New Zealand reforms: *Terrorism Suppression Act 2002* [New Zealand], version as at 28 October 2021, Public Act 2002 no. 34, Parliamentary Counsel Office: New Zealand Legislation, <https://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2002/0034/latest/DLM151491.html#DLM152702>.

³⁰⁸ Rebecca Ananian-Welsh and Keiran Hardy, “Before 9/11, Australia Had No Counter-Terrorism Laws, Now We Have 92 - but Are We Safer?” *The Conversation*, September 8, 2021, <https://theconversation.com/before-9-11-australia-had-no-counter-terrorism-laws-now-we-have-92-but-are-we-safer-166273>.

³⁰⁹ Rebecca Ananian-Welsh and George Williams, “The New Terrorists: The Normalization and Spread of Anti-Terror Laws in Australia,” *Melbourne University Law Review* 38, no. 2 (2014): 362-408, https://law.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0008/1586987/382Ananian-WelshandWilliams2.pdf.

³¹⁰ Nick Evershed and Michael Safi, “All of Australia’s National Security Changes since 9/11 in a Timeline,” *The Guardian*, 2015, <https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/ng-interactive/2015/oct/19/all-of-australias-national-security-changes-since-911-in-a-timeline>.

Ottawa enacted similar counterterrorism legislation to expand the IC's authorities, resources, and mandate and integrate its activities closer with the law enforcement community. As such, the CSE was granted permission to intercept communications between a person within the country and one outside of it, allowing for a better understanding of what was happening domestically and abroad.³¹¹ Budget increases deepened and broadened collection coverage and analysis, and cooperation with domestic and foreign security services was intensified.³¹²

Wellington was slower to enact legislative reforms. However, recognizing that New Zealand no longer enjoyed an "incredibly benign strategic environment," political leaders radically transformed the country's foreign policy, pivoting from predominately peacekeeping and humanitarian missions to authorizing the use of force in conjunction with the international community.³¹³ GCSB was granted broad authorities that many believed resembled the tools and practices of a police state.³¹⁴ Others claimed Wellington was outsourcing its foreign policy to the US, as GCSB was an accommodating player

³¹¹ Fyffe, "The Canadian Intelligence Community after 9/11."

³¹² The IC's budget increased from \$196m to \$430 between 2000-2009, see: Canadian Security Intelligence Service, *Public Report 2009-2010*, 2010, Public Safety Canada. <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/lbrr/archives/cn24357-2009-2010-eng.pdf>.

³¹³ M.L. Cavanaugh, "New Zealand's Dangerous Strategic Apathy in an Uncertain Age," *The Strategist* (blog), Australian Strategic Policy Institute, February 12, 2020, <https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/new-zealands-dangerous-strategic-apaty-in-an-uncertain-age/>; Helen Clark, "Opinion: 9/11 Changed How We Viewed the Threat of Terrorism," *Stuff*, September 11, 2021, <https://www.stuff.co.nz/opinion/300404911/helen-clark-911-changed-how-we-viewed-the-threat-of-terrorism>.

³¹⁴ Tim McBride, "Stewart, Blair --- "Heightened State Surveillance in New Zealand, Post-9/11" - Privacy under Threat," *Privacy and Law Policy Reporter* 158, 11 (6), 2005, accessed July 22, 2022, <http://classic.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/journals/PrivLawPRpr/2005/9.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query=Heightened%20State%20Surveillance%20in%20New%20Zealand>.

within the Echelon group and hence deferential to the NSA. The assumption triggered demands for the GCSB to sever all ties with foreign intelligence agencies. Despite the controversy, surveillance powers were expanded to include collection on financial institutions and lawyers suspected of supporting terrorist entities, and telecommunications, internet providers, and phone companies were forced to ensure communications were capable of interception by agencies.

In sum, the reforms highlighted the urgency and severity of the new security environment.³¹⁵ Understanding international developments informed domestic security and highlighted that a war on terrorism could not be fought or won in isolation. Perhaps no event since the origins of the UKUSA Agreement had there been such a monumental shift in the international security environment. The necessity of cooperation for a Global War on Terror surpassed even the Cold War. All five partners provided the intelligence services with the necessary legal tools and resources to enhance collaboration.

Five Eyes: An Intelligence-Driven War Against Terrorism

The American intelligence community quickly suspected the 9/11 attacks were orchestrated by Osama bin Laden, the leader of the terrorist group al-Qaida based in Afghanistan. The organization purportedly enjoyed the support of the Taliban government in control of the country in the mid-1990s.³¹⁶ Nine days later, President Bush announced the “war on terror begins with al-Qaida,” and within a month, Operation

³¹⁵ Geoffrey Miller, “How 9/11 Changed New Zealand’s Foreign Policy,” *The Diplomat*, September 10, 2021, <https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/how-9-11-changed-new-zealands-foreign-policy/>.

³¹⁶ Michael J. Morell, *The Great War of Our Time: The CIA’s Fight against Terrorism: From al Qa’ida to ISIS*, with Bill Harlow (New York: Twelve, Hachette Book Group, 2016), 55.

Enduring Freedom began in Afghanistan with an American and British bombing campaign targeting Taliban and al-Qaida-controlled regions.³¹⁷ The Five Eyes partners undertook the challenge of fighting an asymmetric war based less on kinetic force and more on technological superiority and geographic proximity: Both of which required continuous support from the intelligence agencies' evolving capabilities.

Combating terrorism hinged on staying ahead of technological advancements in communications and the flow of information.³¹⁸ This was a war driven by intelligence in a way that had not existed prior to the new century. Contrary to the Cold War processes of locating large slow-moving platforms such as Soviet tanks or ICBM sites, finding terrorists hiding in unknown caves was comparably more difficult.³¹⁹ Indeed, finding terrorists, in general, was challenging. They were globally dispersed, exploited perceived weaknesses of Western societies, and possessed a fragmented hierarchy whereby few members had a comprehensive understanding of the network's organizational structure or plans.³²⁰ The inverse scenario of an intelligence-driven war required a shift in operations and a stronger reliance on SIGINT and intelligence sharing.

The internet and telecommunications revolution transformed global connectivity, allowing remotely located terrorists to communicate instantaneously and securely via

³¹⁷ "Global War on Terror," George W. Bush Presidential Library and Museum, accessed May 1, 2022, <https://www.georgewbushlibrary.gov/research/topic-guides/global-war-terror>; George Tenet, *At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA*, with Bill Harlow, (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 179.

³¹⁸ Derek S. Reveron, "Old Allies, New Friends: Intelligence-Sharing in the War on Terror," *Orbis* 50, no. 3 (Summer 2006): 453–468, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2006.04.005>.

³¹⁹ Hayden, *Playing to the Edge*, 32.

³²⁰ Daniel Byman, "The Intelligence War on Terrorism," *Intelligence and National Security* 29, no. 6 (2014): 837–63, published online December 16, 2013, <https://doi.org/10.1080/02684527.2013.851876>.

commercially available satellite phones or other devices. Thus SIGINT was a crucial tool to find al-Qaida and other terrorist groups and gain insights into their organizational structure and intentions.³²¹ Five Eyes prioritized operations to follow the movements of money, goods (weapons, chemicals, etc.), and people suspected to be associated with terrorism.³²² With this narrow focus and evolving capabilities including geolocating and metadata analysis, NSA, GCHQ, and the other partners were able to determine patterns in how suspected terrorists' phones were used, such as which devices called each other or how long a conversation lasted. Piecing together the trends with other intelligence sources, analysts could assess what a person was doing and where they were located. The new analytical approach led to the elimination of several high-ranking al-Qaida leaders and set into motion the institutionalization of merging signals and imagery to better track, deter, and eliminate adversaries.³²³

The collection and analytical processes were supported by the long-established practice of dividing tasks and pooling results. Technical enhancements linked Five Eyes systems across more platforms on a deeper level than ever before. For example, overburdened with the enlarged coverage posture and more raw data than it could process, the NSA diverted information to Australia's Defence Signals Directorate and others for processing and analysis.³²⁴ The partners were also linked into a new tactical network that shared real-time signals and imagery intelligence on activities in

³²¹ Wells, *Between Five Eyes*, 87-89; Former NSA Director Michael Hayden explains the challenges of staying ahead of the communications revolution in *Playing to the Edge*.

³²² Hayden, *Playing to the Edge*, 30.

³²³ *Ibid*, 30-31.

³²⁴ *Ibid*, 37-38.

Afghanistan and Iraq.³²⁵ Created by the NSA and dubbed Center Ice, the system was a considerable achievement as it integrated multi-sourced raw data and processed intelligence from numerous partners, and shared it with allied combatants in the field instantaneously. Center Ice allowed for more precise offensive operations as well as defensive actions protecting men and women in uniform. Allied soldiers encircled by enemies and facing imminent ambush communicated their situation in real-time through Center Ice, wherein overhead allied forces could track and eliminate anti-coalition militants.³²⁶ This system was an effective battlefield tool that would be continuously upgraded through technological advancement.

All Five Eyes partners provided military assets to the Afghanistan operation along with 24/7 monitoring and actionable intelligence. The five-way communications made possible the longest deployment of a US navy vessel – measured in consecutive days at sea – since World War II.³²⁷ The record-breaking deployment demonstrated the partners’ superior intelligence collection and dissemination capabilities, and supported maritime power projection.

Nevertheless, geography still mattered. The British bases in Diego Garcia and Cyprus or Australia’s Pine Gap facility were instrumental in collecting signals and supporting military operations.³²⁸ Intelligence collected globally and channeled into the

³²⁵ Hayden, *Playing to the Edge*, 29-39; Henrik Moltke, “Mission Creep: How the NSA’s Game-Changing Targeting System Built for Iraq and Afghanistan Ended up on the Mexico Border,” *The Intercept*, May 29, 2019, <https://theintercept.com/2019/05/29/nsa-data-afghanistan-iraq-mexico-border/>.

³²⁶ Moltke, “Mission Creep.”

³²⁷ The USS Theodore Roosevelt was at sea for 159 days. Wells, *Between Five Eyes*, 121.

³²⁸ *Ibid.*

five-way communications system served as a force multiplier and provided Five Eyes with tactical and strategic advantages. The Afghanistan operation heightened the partners' interdependency. Through intensified collaboration, constant technological innovation, and the sharing of advanced tools and technologies, the Five Eyes partners strengthened their national comparative advantages and collective capabilities.

Iraq: Kinetic War, Eliminating an Existential Threat

The US was convinced Iraq possessed and produced weapons of mass destruction and supported terrorist groups, including al-Qaida, and deemed Iraq an existential threat. Together with the UK, Australia, and others, Washington built a coalition to disarm the country and dismantle terrorists' networks.³²⁹ However, the decision to invade Iraq was not universally supported by the political leaders of Five Eyes.³³⁰ Lacking a UN Security Council mandate and skeptical of intelligence assessments linking Iraq to al-Qaida, Canada and New Zealand broke ranks and refrained from joining their allies on the battlefield. Remarkably, despite a very public break with American policy, they continued to supply mission-critical SIGINT.³³¹ That political disagreement on policy

³²⁹ Colin L. Powell, "Remarks to the United Nations Security Council," New York, NY, February 5, 2003, United States Department of State Archive, transcript, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2003/17300.htm>; George W. Bush, "President Bush Addresses the Nation: Operation Iraqi Freedom," George W. Bush White House Archives, March 19, 2003, <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/iraq/news/20030319-17.html>.

³³⁰ Phil Goff, "Iraq Crisis: NZ's Position," speech, March 14, 2003, Beehive, transcript, <https://www.beehive.govt.nz/speech/iraq-crisis-nzs-position>; "PM Says Canada Won't Fight in Iraq," CBC News Canada, March 18, 2003, <https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/pm-says-canada-won-t-fight-in-iraq-1.405808>; Alan Barnes, "How Canada's Intelligence Agencies Helped Keep the Country out of the 2003 Iraq War," *Open Canada*, November 18, 2020, <https://opencanada.org/how-canadas-intelligence-agencies-helped-keep-the-country-out-of-the-2003-iraq-war/>.

³³¹ Ferris, *Behind the Enigma*, 385.

and strategy in Iraq was overlooked by the longstanding partnership of Five Eye nations and SIGINTers was an extraordinary display of how resilient the relationships had become amongst members of this small community.

Five Eyes SIGINT supported the air campaign and allowed for safer maneuverability of ground troops by providing information on the locations and capabilities of Iraq's GPS jamming systems. If left unchecked, Baghdad could have disrupted the flight path of allied missiles or any other assets dependent on GPS satellites.³³² NSA, GCHQ and the partner agencies had surpassed the mark of simply sharing SIGINT. They were now fully integrated into the command-and-control structure of the military branches delivering force.³³³ The integration met, if not surpassed, allied requirements, and assisted in locating and capturing Saddam Hussein while minimizing threats to troops. SIGINT was less instrumental in finding WMDs or terrorist safe havens for the simple reason that neither existed. This considerable failure on the part of American policy shaped internal reform efforts of the American IC structure through 2005 and beyond.

Traditional Targets, Evolving Threats, and Natural Disasters

Combating terrorism was Five Eyes' top priority. However, traditional targets, emerging threats, and crises demanded comprehensive approaches more akin to the Cold War in scope, but with faster operations and deeper penetration of harder targets

³³² Rosenberg, *Pine Gap*, chpt. 7, Kindle.

³³³ Ferris, *Behind the Enigma*, 694-695; Hear supporting comments from Former NSA Director Michael Hayden, in: Matteo Faini, Michael Hayden, James Walsh, and David Gioe, "Sharing Secrets: Obstacles and Solutions to International Intelligence Sharing," *New America*, March 10, 2015, YouTube video, 1:35:43, <https://www.newamerica.org/international-security/events/sharing-secrets/>.

possessing counterintelligence capabilities. Five Eyes was vigilant in monitoring Russian and Chinese weapons systems and expanded coverage on North Korea as Pyongyang increased testing on advanced weapons systems, including nuclear.³³⁴ Iran became an increasingly challenging threat and monitoring Tehran's weapons programs, nuclear-related supply chains, and scientists took on a heightened priority.

SIGINT also guided humanitarian relief missions tasked to evacuate people affected by the 2004 tsunami in South Asia, the 2006 conflict in Lebanon between Israel and Hezbollah and the earthquake in Haiti.³³⁵ Five Eyes intensified monitoring international waterways, such as the Gulfs of Aden and Guinea and the Straights of Singapore and provided allied navies and air forces with real-time tactical information to prevent or defend against acts of piracy and hijackings.³³⁶

This period also marked the militarization of the cyber domain, with muscle-flexing and cyberwarfare in cyberspace compromising the systems of individuals, firms, and governments while threatening the national security of all Five Eyes partners. The range of cyber threats was extensive. Attacks on critical infrastructure cut off electric grids and access to vital services. Governments, private firms, and citizens were victims of cyber intrusion, their data denied, corrupted, deleted, or stolen. Propaganda and misinformation campaigns fueled social divides, influenced free elections, and eroded democracy.³³⁷ Eliminating or defending against the threats in the cyber commons was

³³⁴ Rosenberg, *Pine Gap*, chpt. 3, Kindle.

³³⁵ Wells, *Between Five Eyes*, 119-124.

³³⁶ *Ibid.*

³³⁷ "Significant Cyber Incidents," Center for Strategic & International Studies, accessed May 4, 2022, <https://www.csis.org/programs/strategic-technologies-program/significant-cyber-incidents>; Former

beyond any government's capabilities. Protecting information systems and mitigating threats to critical infrastructure could only be achieved through the combined efforts of governments and the private sector. Thus, the governments of the Five Eyes partners incorporated the cyberspace domain into the portfolios of their signals agencies. The entities would be responsible for protecting not only the integrity of their domestic systems but also the combined systems and space assets of Five Eyes.³³⁸

Relative to the security environments of World War II, the Cold War, and the 1990s, this timeframe was fraught with an increase in threat actors with access to more vectors and opportunities to harm the citizens living in Five Eye countries. Asymmetric tactics, cyberspace, and globalization empowered adversaries with capabilities to inflict damage otherwise limited to major powers and oftentimes without any strategic forewarning. The globality of threats required cooperative approaches and continuous alignment of partners' vital national interests. This ultimately strengthened their interdependence. Indeed, the Five Eyes family of nations faced a new world that likely meant interdependence was more important than ever before.

All five partners strengthened their intelligence services by providing broader legal authorities and greater financial resources to enhance intelligence collection, analysis, and sharing on suspected terror groups or persons. Reforms permitted expanded surveillance, new national security entities centralized and streamlined terrorist-related

NSA Director Michael Hayden and Former DNI James Clapper discuss threats in the cyber domain, see: Hayden, *Playing to the Edge*; James R Clapper, *Facts and Fears: Hard Truths from a Life in Intelligence* (Editorial: New York: Penguin Putnam Inc, 2019).

³³⁸ Clapper, *Facts and Fears*, 135; Ferris, *Behind the Enigma*, xii; "Cyber Operations," [Canada] Communications Security Establishment, modified April 1, 2021, <https://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/en/mission/cyber-operations>; "Cyber Security," Australian Signals Directorate, accessed May 2, 2022, <https://www.asd.gov.au/cyber-security>; "National Cyber Security Centre," New Zealand Government Communications Security Bureau, accessed June 4, 2022, <https://www.gcsb.govt.nz/our-work/ncsc/>.

intelligence, and additional funding allowed for upgrades to antiquated computer and information technology systems, as well as innovation in technical development projects and an increase in personnel. Training programs were revised, more tailored to the nuances of the portfolio. Approaches used to track and analyze the movements and intentions of groups were different from those employed for nuclear weapons. Thus, educational programs were aligned to accommodate the new procedures.

The Five Eyes community took on more tasks and missions while maintaining coverage of traditional threats, including Russia, China, and North Korea. They assiduously learned from each other to improve tools, techniques, and capabilities together. Liaison exchange programs were expanded, offering a wider range of personnel more opportunities to hone their skills and build cooperative relationships. Geography was relevant in the fight against terrorism as each partner had unique insights into certain regions and groups that the others lacked. This heightened the need to pool resources, divide labor, and share benefits. Across the board, collaboration bolstered each other's national security but also intensified their interdependency.³³⁹

³³⁹ Susanne Kelly, Nick Fishwick, John Scarlett, John McLaughlin, David Irvine, and Dick Fadden, "International Summit by the Cipher Brief: The Future of Alliances - A Conversation about the Five Eyes Alliance," The Cipher Brief, May 24, 2021, YouTube Video, 1:09:57, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BKR2gpey2bM>; "The Importance of the Five Eyes in an Era of Global Insecurity," Policy Exchange, June 27, 2018, YouTube video, 1:15:52, <https://policyexchange.org.uk/pxevents/the-importance-of-the-five-eyes-in-an-era-of-global-insecurity/>.

Chapter VI.

Forging Five Eyes' Future:

The Era of Great Power Competition

“Is America stumbling towards Cold War 2.0?”³⁴⁰

Since the 1940s, the governments of the UK, the US, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have supported an international rules-based system that produced seven decades of relative peace and prosperity defined by no major global wars, unprecedented economic growth, and a decline in global poverty.³⁴¹ The efforts to construct and maintain this global environment were underpinned by the combined activities of the five nations' intelligence agencies. This intelligence-sharing collaboration, created during wartime and maintained in peacetime, was woven together by interdependency, grounded in synergetic operations, trust, and shared democratic values informing national interests to serve as a counterweight against common security threats. This relationship played a decisive role in navigating World War II, the Cold War, and the war on terrorism by stopping fascists and dictators, avoiding nuclear war, and thwarting terrorist plots.

By pooling resources, dividing tasks, and sharing results, the partners were more effective across the globe in collecting and analyzing intelligence that helped to inform

³⁴⁰ Graham Allison, *Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap?* (London: Scribe Publications, 2018).

³⁴¹ Matthew Kroenig and Jeffrey Cimmino, forward by Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Global Strategy 2021: An Allied Strategy for China*, Atlantic Council, December 16, 2020, <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/global-strategy-2021-an-allied-strategy-for-china/>.

decision-making across all levels of government. Actions and operations saved lives, constrained tyrants, and hindered the flow of weapons, illicit drugs, and trafficked persons. Partners met evolving security demands through shared innovation by adapting next-generation platforms to build upon a legacy of operational interdependence. This was true throughout the latter half of the twentieth century, continued in the first quarter of the twenty-first, and is likely to expand with common challenges on the horizon. As history reminds us, continued success requires maintaining evergreen strengths and exercising the organizational sinew that has propelled this alliance forward.

Interpersonal relationships evolved and strengthened through formal and informal interactions, exchanges of personnel, rotations across working divisions, and 24/7 communication channels.³⁴² Initiatives calibrated mutual trust and made coordination the default operating mode. Cooperation was a layered process that evolved over time, beginning with sharing data and products, and eventually generating advanced capabilities that led to mutually beneficial outcomes. Ultimately, the partners achieved the most intimate layer of cooperation – sharing what one does not know or cannot do.³⁴³ Revealing intelligence or capability gaps expose vulnerabilities, and such confessions are rare in the world of espionage, reserved only for the most trusted partners.

Over decades and through shared experiences, the Five Eyes colleagues blended a unique culture of their own, above and beyond national passports or political party

³⁴² Former Secretary General of the Commonwealth of New Zealand Sir Donald McKinnon stressed how vital personal interactions are for building trust, claiming even during Minister level meetings time is set aside to meet directly with Five Eyes personnel, see: Policy Exchange, “The Importance of the Five Eyes.”

³⁴³ Comments from Dr. David Gioe and former NSA Director Michael Hayden, see: Faini, et al., “Sharing Secrets.”

affiliations and shared more information with each other than within their own national intelligence systems or domestic agencies.³⁴⁴ The level of closeness has prompted the suggestion that foreign partners be granted dual citizenship status, authorities, and privileges when stationed in each other's intelligence domain.³⁴⁵ This idea was likely ahead of its time but nevertheless merits the most serious consideration given the increasing size, scope, and pace of new threat vectors. A classic lesson for intelligence systems is to remain at speed or ahead of new threat vectors. When threats outpace adaptation, vulnerability gaps expand, creating higher levels of risk to civilian populations. Expediting the ability for intelligence agencies to operate at pace in the twenty-first century is as real today and will only increase tomorrow.

The importance of trust and strong interpersonal relationships cannot be overstated. They are foundational elements of the partnership's cohesion, possibly more unifying than the UKUSA legal agreements. One only needs to observe how quickly tensions subside or crises are managed.³⁴⁶ Political strains over the American bombing campaigns in the Vietnam War or the 2003 American-led invasion of Iraq did not disrupt cooperation despite public fallout. Close personal ties among agency directors and high-level personnel overcame temporal political disruptions that are commonplace within democratic societies. Likewise, times of crises were met with swift reactions from partners. Hours after the September 11, 2001, attacks, senior leaders of Britain's

³⁴⁴ Ferris, *Behind the Enigma*, 324; Former NRO Director James Clapper commented to former NSA Director Michael Hayden, "we'd like you to treat us like the British," see: Faini, et al., "Sharing Secrets."

³⁴⁵ As suggested by Former DNI Director James Clapper. Clapper, *Facts and Fears*, 255.

³⁴⁶ Faini, et al., "Sharing Secrets."

intelligence services arrived in the US offering unconditional assistance. Similarly, when NSA's computer systems shut down in 1999, GCHQ ensured continuity of America's SIGINT operations by taking on additional tasks.³⁴⁷ Partners must rely on each other as no other domestic entities possess the infrastructure to handle the volume of signals traffic: Only NSA, GCHQ, ASD, CSEC, and GCSB.

Irrespective of a partner state's size, budget, or capabilities, over time, the relationships became more interdependent than even the founders had envisioned in the first half of the twentieth century. Although some contribute more than others and benefits do not flow equally to all, there is no apparent hierarchical structure or "superpower strutting."³⁴⁸ Intelligence collaboration is a team sport, with each partner providing national and natural advantages that contribute to durable, synergetic interdependence. Furthermore, the partners understand that intertwined systems and collaborative processes refined over seventy years make decoupling not only difficult but unacceptably detrimental to national security for all members.

The 1980s held an example for member states that chose politically motivated interests versus more direct security interests and those of their partners. New Zealand learned firsthand the disruptive effects of sitting on the sidelines. The only country to get on the wrong side of the partnership and lose access to the full stream of intelligence sharing, New Zealand's decision-makers quickly understood how indispensable the relationship had become and spent years trying to regain favor and edge its way back into

³⁴⁷ Note, if NSA and its fallback site were to become inoperable, continuity of American SIGINT operations falls to GCHQ and NSA's senior representative in the UK. Hayden, *Playing to the Edge*, 41-42.

³⁴⁸ Hayden, *Playing to the Edge*, 34.

the Five Eyes network.³⁴⁹ This experience served as the exception rather than the rule that most members would remain steadfast in their commitments. Such is the value of Five Eyes. The intelligence is the “gold standard, and the relationship priceless.”³⁵⁰

Five Eyes “is critically important, has made a difference to each nation’s respective national security and should not be taken for granted.”³⁵¹ Indispensability has kept the intelligence relationships “fairly immune” to the broader political relationships, partly due to the similar interests, values, and policies of the five nations.³⁵² Even in areas of differing political opinions among nationally elected leaders, the intelligence agencies continue working together in common space. Their tenure and position as critical components within the national security system make their function in government a vital tool of statecraft. For the next generation of policymakers and intelligence professionals, it is essential to understand the connective tissue that binds the alliance together and how tightly woven these relationships have become over the last seventy-plus years. Such understanding and appreciation can empower civil servants to build upon successful foundations and avoid mistakes of the past.

³⁴⁹ Comments from Former Secretary General of the Commonwealth of New Zealand, Sir Donald McKinnon, see: Policy Exchange, “The Importance of the Five Eyes.”

³⁵⁰ Comments from US Ambassador Douglas Lute, see: Policy Exchange, “The Importance of the Five Eyes.”

³⁵¹ Comments from ASIO Director Mike Burgess, who also stressed the importance of meeting counterparts personally to express gratitude, see: Andrew Hammond and Mike Burgess, “Spy Chiefs: Director-General of Security Mike Burgess, ASIO, Australia & America,” produced by International Spy Museum, *SpyCast*, June 7, 2022, podcast, 01:03:00, <https://podcasts.google.com/feed/aHR0cHM6Ly9mZWVkcyc5tZWdhcGhvbmUuZm0vc3B5Y2FzdA/episode/ZWIyMGFkYzQtN2ViMC0xMWVjLWl4NzMtYWZmYzdlOWVhZTI1?ep=14>.

³⁵² Comments from former NSA Director Michael Hayden, see: Faini, et al., “Sharing Secrets.”

Eyeing the Traits that Bind

The Five Eyes narrative reveals several consequential trends and commonalities that contributed to unity and are found in each era, regardless of the security challenges faced. Each of these dynamics points to the core strength that has come to define the resiliency of the intelligence alliance. Driving at the onset were shared political values across all partner societies insomuch their form of government: democracy.

The most common denominator was shared values. Democratic systems define and shape people, their way of life, preferences, and priorities. These naturally occurring cultural, political, and social values lend strong support to common interests that often run from the frontline of society all the way to the highest political offices in each country. Even if leaders did not always agree at the highest level on policy issues, the lower functional SIGINT levels continued to operate in support of each other, demonstrating the partnership's enduring strength and resilience.

Necessity was another binding component. The partners recognized early on and normalized during WWII that the world was too large and security threats too diverse for any single country to manage alone. To varying degrees, each nation was constrained by geography, capabilities, or resources. These limitations operationalized long-term interdependence beyond the scope of a single war or crisis. For national security to work across the board for all five nations, they had to work together.

A third sustaining factor was strong personal relationships. The UKUSA Agreement may be the legal bond formalizing cooperation, but the strong personal relationships formed the foundation upon which trust and collaboration grew and

ultimately thrived. These deep connections enabled partners to manage unexpected emergencies or de-escalate internal strains before they spiraled out of control.

Urgency was a fourth common thread. Five Eyes' cooperation, though consistent, ebbed and flowed in energy and effort concerning priorities. Grave national security challenges and shifts in the international context brought partners together and often closer than before. Grave threats triggered intensified collaboration and have been observable throughout Five Eyes' history, from cracking Enigma during WWII, innovating advanced satellites to peer behind the Iron Curtain during the Cold War, and developing a multi-sourced intelligence platform with real-time distribution during the Global War on Terror. Collectively, these factors were the core elements supporting Five Eyes' endurance, resiliency, and unity of effort in the past. If these conditions kept the partnership intact for decades, they also suggest appreciation for these conditions and historical lessons will strengthen cohesion in the years ahead. The most important lesson of history: despite the evolution and change in security environments, these relationships will endure no matter the obstacles or challenges ahead.

A Return to the Past, Lends an Eye to the Future

Five Eyes' history helps to understand better how complex challenges were resolved and can inform new approaches to future challenges. Specifically, the rise of authoritarian states undermining democracies and the increasing use of the cyber domain as a platform for war.³⁵³ A revanchist Russia, seeking to restore its status as a global

³⁵³ Former GCHQ Director Sir David Omand suggests future wars will be supported, if not fought, in the cyber domain, making SIGINT cooperation even more important, see: David Omand, "Talking UK

power, is more forcibly exerting itself, threatening peace and stability in Europe as well as the rules-based international order. In Asia Pacific, tensions are once again on the rise. China's increasingly aggressive and provocative expansionist behavior in the region and beyond is a significant, long-term threat. If left unchecked, will negatively, perhaps even irreversibly, impact global peace and stability.³⁵⁴

As the protective democratic shield against authoritarianism, Five Eyes sits center stage in the face of these major threats, and how the political masters respond may define the future of world order. Urgent challenges drive interdependence and deeper collaboration. The collapse of time and space combined with an increase in threat actors, vectors, and disruptive technologies has produced a more perilous security environment that moves faster and deeper than any prior era. Though many tools are at the disposal of national leaders, one clear competitive advantage for democratic states remains the indispensable alliance amongst the Five Eyes partners. How member states lead the democratic world and leverage this critical advantage may become, as was the case during WWII and the Cold War, a decisive moment in security competition. Simply said, Five Eyes must find new ways to do old things.³⁵⁵

Cyberwar with Sir David Omand," interview by Kevin Townsend, *SecurityWeek*, September 13, 2018, <https://www.securityweek.com/talking-uk-cyberwar-sir-david-omand>.

³⁵⁴ Gurjit Singh, "Not Russia, China Remains the Biggest Threat to Global Peace as It Fiercely Asserts Dominance in SCS - Expert Review," *EurAsian Times*, April 9, 2022, <https://eurasianimes.com/not-russia-china-remains-the-biggest-threat-to-global-peace-as-it-fiercely-asserts-dominance-in-scs-expert-review/>.

³⁵⁵ Sir Alexander Younger, former Chief of Britain's SIS, notes the intelligence model is fundamentally the same, yet has been disrupted. There is an urgency for Five Eyes to evolve its methods as the stakes for western liberal democracies are profound if they don't, see: Sir Alexander Younger, "Spying in the Digital Age: A Conversation with Sir Alexander Younger," conversation presented by the Intelligence Project of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, March 10, 2021, <https://www.belfercenter.org/event/spying-digital-age-conversation-sir-alexander-younger>.

There are several potential points of contention that could hinder Five Eyes' effectiveness in the future that require careful consideration. The partner states' political leaders must re-think and better align legal authorities, capabilities, and processes in all five nations, as even the slightest adjustments could be determinative for future outcomes.³⁵⁶ Specific issues include expanding the powers of collection, sharing more information with like-minded states, and reforming declassification procedures are a starting point. Broadened collection authorities would require nations to balance liberty, security, and privacy properly. Laws should not be so personally intrusive that they border on authoritarian tactics or so ineffective that they invite exploitation by competitors in elections, civil society, industrial sectors, and economic activities.

Yet one certainty remains: the pace, speed, and operational strengths of authoritarian competitors will remain a challenge for democratic states. National leaders need not throw out the same values, laws, and liberties that define our wellspring of democracy, but they need to seriously consider how to better meet these competitive challenges through cooperative measures that enhance shared democratic values across national borders while mitigating the gravest threats against free societies.

Some have argued that the criteria for declassifying intelligence should be relaxed, with more information being released at a faster pace. Others have suggested the barriers that restrict sharing intelligence with outside parties should be eased. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has shown that having timely access to sensitive information shapes outcomes in a constructive way for national security policy.

³⁵⁶ Correspondence with former DNI James Clapper, June 2022.

National discrepancies in personal data protection laws and regulations may be problematic and require greater alignment if cooperation is to intensify. For instance, Europe's General Data Protection Regulation mandates significantly stronger data safeguards than the US.³⁵⁷ Disagreements over supply chain security may also cause a rift amongst the five nations' political leaders.³⁵⁸ American concerns over the safety of Chinese technologies and the potential exploitation of vulnerabilities have been a sticking point amongst the partners. Washington contends the products threaten national security and have pressured partners to reconsider competitive intention.

Whereas enlarging Five Eyes to include other like-minded nations would boost the force multiplying equation by adding capabilities, resources, and personnel, the prospect is unlikely. Modernization of intelligence-sharing relationships can be achieved through intensifying existing ones. Formal expansion of Five Eyes stands to be too disruptive and unsettle its long-standing stable structure that is only achieved over time versus overnight implementation. Exclusion is not hinged on Five Eyes' Anglo make-up but rather its shared history. Decades of collaborative experiences and deep mutual trust have formed an unparalleled relationship that cannot easily be replicated or expanded. If history informs the future, the processes and procedures long-established and refined can be leveraged to meet the security demands of today and beyond.

³⁵⁷ "Data Privacy Laws by State: Comparison Charts," Bloomberg Law, February 2, 2022, <https://pro.bloomberglaw.com/brief/data-privacy-laws-in-the-u-s/>.

³⁵⁸ Andy Blatchford, "Canada Joins Five Eyes in Ban on Huawei and ZTE," Politico, May 19, 2022, <https://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/19/canada-five-eyes-ban-huawei-zte-00033920>.

Appendix 1.

Acronyms and Abbreviations

ABM:	Anti-Ballistic Missile
ANZUS:	Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty, 1951
APEC:	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASD:	Australian Signals Directorate (2013-present)
ASIO:	Australian Security Intelligence Organization
ASIS:	Australian Secret Intelligence Service
BMEWS:	Ballistic Missile Early Warning System
BRUSA:	British-US Communications Intelligence Agreement
CANUSA:	Signals agreement between Canada and the USA
CSEC:	Communications Security Establishment Canada
CIA:	Central Intelligence Agency (US)
COMINT:	Communications Intelligence
CPA:	Communist Party Australia
CSIS:	Canadian Security Intelligence Service
CTAG:	Combined Threat Assessment Centre (New Zealand)
DCI:	Director of Central Intelligence (US)
DNI:	Director of National Intelligence (US)
DOD:	Department of Defense (US)
DSB:	Defence Signals Bureau (Australia, 1947-1949)
DSB:	Defence Signals Branch (Australia, 1949-1964)
DSD:	Defence Signals Division (Australia, 1964-1977)
DSD:	Defence Signals Directorate (Australia, 1977-2013)
ELINT:	Electronic Intelligence
EU:	European Union
FISINT:	Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence
GC&CS:	Government Code and Cypher School (UK)
GCHQ:	Government Communications Headquarters (UK)
GCSB:	Government Communications Security Bureau (New Zealand)
GEOINT:	Geospatial Intelligence
HF DF:	High-Frequency Direction-Finding
HUMINT:	Human Intelligence
IA:	Intelligence Assessment; Information Assurance
IC:	Intelligence Community
ICA:	Intelligence Community Assessment
ICBM:	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IMINT:	Imagery Intelligence
ITAC:	Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (Canada)
JTAC:	Joint Threat Assessment Centre (UK)

MASINT: Measurement and Signature Intelligence
MI: Military Intelligence
NCTC: National Counterterrorism Center (US)
NIE: National Intelligence Estimate
NORAD: North American Air Defense Command
NRO: National Reconnaissance Office (US)
NSA: National Security Agency (US)
NSC: National Security Council (US)
NSC-68: National Security Council Report 68 (US)
NSS: National Security Strategy (US)
NTAC: National Threat Assessment Centre (Australia)
ODNI: Office of the Director of National Intelligence (US)
OP-20-G: US Navy cryptologic organization
PDD: Presidential Decision Directive (US)
SIGINT: Signals Intelligence
SIS: Signal Intelligence Service, US Army (changed in 1943 to SSA)
SSA: Signal Security Agency (US, formerly SIS)
STANCIB: United States State-Army-Navy Communications Intelligence Board
START: Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
SWPA: South West Pacific Area
UKUSA: Agreement between the UK, the US, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia
USCIB: United States Communication Intelligence Board
USIB: United States Intelligence Board

Appendix 2.

Declassified Agreement between British GC&CS and the US War Department³⁵⁹

~~SECRET~~ ~~SECRET~~ 643

WAR DEPARTMENT
WAR DEPARTMENT GENERAL STAFF
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DIVISION G-2
WASHINGTON

By authority A. C. of S., G-2
Date - 6/10/43 (DWB)
Initials

June 10, 1943.

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 04-07-2010 pursuant to E.O. 12958, as amended. ST56834

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:

Subject: Agreement between British Government Code and Cipher School and U.S. War Department in regard to certain "Special Intelligence."

I. Discussion.

1. There is attached an original copy of the agreement between the British Government Code and Cipher School and the U.S. War Department, signed by E. W. Travis, Deputy Director (Services), G.C. and C.S., acting for the British Chiefs of Staff, and by the undersigned, acting for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army.

2. This agreement covers the production, exchange and dissemination of all special intelligence derived by cryptanalysis of the communications of the military and air forces of the Axis powers, including their secret services. It does not cover traffic from non-service enemy or neutral sources. It provides for complete interchange of technical data and special intelligence from the sources covered, through liaison officers stationed at Washington and at London, and for dissemination of such intelligence to all field commanders through special channels and subject to special security regulations. Provision is also made for United States personnel to obtain experience by engaging in the independent solution of keys in Great Britain.

The United States assumes as a main responsibility the reading of Japanese military and air traffic; the British assume a like responsibility for German and Italian military and air traffic.

3. This agreement, when implemented, will enable us to fulfill our immediate needs for special intelligence from these sources and will safeguard our long term interests by allowing us to gain the experience required for achieving independence in this field.

APPROVED
By order of the Secretary of War
JOSEPH T. McNARNEY
Deputy Chief of Staff
15 JUN 1943
By G. C. MELSON
Col. G.S.C., Asst. to the Deputy Chief of Staff
GEO. V. STRONG,
Major General,
A.C. of S., G-2.

II. Action recommended.

Approval of this agreement is recommended.

Approved; by order of the Secretary of War.

JOSEPH T. McNARNEY,
Lieut. General, U. S. Army,
Deputy Chief of Staff.

1 Inclosure
Agreement between British
G.C. and C.S. and U.S. War
Department

FOR VICTORY
BUY
UNITED STATES
WAR
BONDS
AND
STAMPS

10 JUN 1943

³⁵⁹ United States National Security Agency/Central Security Service, "UKUSA Agreement Release."

Appendix 3.

Main Intelligence Bodies of the Five Eyes Nations ³⁶⁰

COUNTRY	SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE (SIGINT)	NATIONAL ASSESSMENT	DEFENCE INTELLIGENCE	SECURITY INTELLIGENCE	HUMAN INTELLIGENCE (HUMINT)	COUNTER-TERRORISM CENTERS
Canada	Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSEC)	International Assessment Staff (IAS)	Chief of Defence Intelligence (CDI)	Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)	CSIS (note)	Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC)
USA	National Security Agency (NSA)	Central Intelligence Agency/ Director of Intelligence (CIA/DI) US State Department/ Intelligence and Research Bureau (State/INR)	Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA)	Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)	Central Intelligence Agency/Director of Operations (CIA/DO)	National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC)
UK	Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)	Cabinet Office Assessment Staff (COAS)	Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS)	British Security Service (BSS) (MI-5)	Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) (MI-6)	Joint Threat Assessment Centre (JTAC)
Australia	Australian Signals Directorate (ASD)	Office of National Assessments (ONA)	Defence Intelligence Organization (DIO)	Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO)	Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS)	National Threat Assessment Centre (NTAC)
New Zealand	Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB)	National Assessment Bureau (NAB)	Directorate of Defence Intelligence and Security (DDIS)	New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (SIS)	(inherent in SIS mandate)	Combined Threat Assessment Centre (CTAG)

Note: CSIS’s mandate is security intelligence, not foreign intelligence. It serves as the Canadian counterpart to the CIA, SIS/MI-6, ASIS, and SIS HUMINT reporting.

³⁶⁰ Cox, “Canada and the Five Eyes Intelligence Community.”

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