



Development, Disease, and Democracy: Understanding the Roots of Poor Social Development in Sindh, Pakistan and Outlining The Possibilities for Reform

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Development, Disease, and Democracy:
Understanding the Roots of Poor Social Development in Sindh, Pakistan and
Outlining The Possibilities for Reform

An Essay Presented
by
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to
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Chapter 1: The Ideas of Development and the Example of Pakistan

Introduction

Since the 1700s, the Sindh province of modern-day Pakistan has had one of South Asia's highest per-capita income levels, but today has one of Pakistan's highest income and social inequality levels (Ghaus et al., 1996 and Pasha, 2015). Against the classical development hypotheses of some scholars, which posit high income levels as determinants for such things like the healthiness and literacy of a population (Filmer, 2003), the Sindh province of Pakistan supports an alternate theory: despite the fact that Sindh has consistently been at the top of Pakistan's per-capita GDP levels by province and has led Pakistan's per-capita income levels, Sindh is currently the only province in Pakistan with a district experiencing rapid declines in life expectancy levels and literacy rates (Jamal et al., 2007 and Pasha, 2015).

A neighboring province, Punjab—which has not had such a strong, modern-sector economy and which exists as a largely agrarian economy—has been called the agricultural “backwater” of Pakistan (Crompton, 2006, p. 31), by contrast, tells a surprisingly different story. The Punjab province of Pakistan has lower poverty rates, higher literacy rates, and lower infant mortality rates across both its rural and urban settings when compared to Sindh (Ghaus et al., 1996). Whereas Sindh is home to “modern” industrial economies and to 50 million citizens, it is

unable to provide a decent level of social development across its province, Punjab, which is home to largely “traditional” agrarian economies and to 100 million citizens, *is* able to provide a higher level of development to its citizens. What is the narrative of social development—or the development of social infrastructures that support such things as health, education, and sanitation works—between these two provinces, and where can modern efforts to improve such trajectories locate themselves?

The onus on the provinces of Pakistan to lead social development projects has only become more pressing: Pakistan’s Local Government Ordinance of 2001 has completely shifted the responsibility of health and education to provincial legislatures and policy-makers, and the dissolution of Pakistan’s Ministry of Health in 2011, in favor of giving the provinces greater autonomy on health policy, has made Pakistan the only modern-day federal, democratic republic without a national-level health services body (Anjum, 2001, Dawn, 2011, and Nishtar, 2013). Understanding the discrepancies, between two neighboring provinces in Pakistan, in terms of their institutions, governance, and historical trends that may be driving such differences in the lived-conditions of people on the ground, can offer insights into how social development happens and can offer insights towards how we can better understand global development needs.

But such a lens—of looking at development and its divergences *within* Pakistan—is widely unacknowledged in the prominent development literature surrounding Pakistan (McCartney, 1974, Easterly, 2012, and World Bank, 2017). In one example, William Easterly, a scholar of development, writes:

“Pakistan is a poster child for the hypothesis that a society polarized by class, gender, and ethnic group does poorly at providing public services” (p. 465, 2012).

This statement, I argue, casts far too wide of a net: such a blinding nationalization of Pakistan’s state of development fails to realize the productive heterogeneities in social development that exist within Pakistan. Such universalizing views of development, present throughout this literature, subscribe (intentionally or not) to Euro-centric notions of the homogenized nation-state, to simplify complex issues into intelligible arguments that fit our current worldview, and fail to account for Pakistan’s indigenous heterogeneity that spans from its social development levels to its various languages. Stating that “Pakistan (as a whole) is a poster child for the hypothesis that a society polarized by class, gender, and ethnic group” (parenthetical added by the author) serves to homogenize the wealth and breadth of distinct societies found across Pakistan into ‘one society,’ and further serves to infantilize Pakistan as a ‘lost-cause’ to be showcased to the world. Such statements service outdated development ideals that attempt to nationalize, internationalize, and export vocabularies that have worked within a Western context to other, non-Western settings often times without an interest in or an understanding of local conditions as they actually exist (Marglin, 1987, J. and J. Comaroff, 1991, Marglin 1992, Escobar, 1995).

Instead of accounting for Pakistan’s deep pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial histories of autonomy and difference within the provinces, and the incredibly devolved nature of national governmental responsibilities to the purview of the provinces (clearly seen today through the 18th amendment and

Local Governance Ordinance of 2001), much of the theoretical scholarship on Pakistan and its development has resulted in broad and generalized characterizations of Pakistan's constitutive communities, economies, and politics writ large.

The Failures of Classical Economic Development Theories

The classical economic development scholarship has also failed, not just in failing to recognize important differences that exist within local contexts, but in providing shaky justifications for direct economic intervention in countries.¹ Specifically, it is clear that the development paradigms of the 1980s—that of neoliberal economics—have largely failed in attaining global development efforts to improve access to education, healthcare, and general livelihood.² The case of Zimbabwe, in 1984, proves illustrative: from an economic growth level of 4% per year and infant mortality rates at its historic low, Zimbabwe represented a strong state with a commitment to social development (World Bank Performance Audit Report, 1995, and Ismi, 2004). But after signing into the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) of the World Bank and as a result of the SAP-required cuts to government spending on healthcare and education (in order to promote the private

¹ Classical development economics can be best encapsulated by priorities given to free-markets, encouraging private economy and its subsequent growth through private consumption, a shift in 'type' of economy from traditional sectors (like agriculture) to modern sectors (like manufacturing) to encourage greater GDP-levels and exports, to name a few (Engel, 2010).

² The development theories of neoliberal thinkers centered around the privatization of the economy, encouraging foreign corporate and direct investments, and cutting government spending (Engel, 2010).

economy), Zimbabwe rapidly witnessed declines in education and health (maternal mortality in one city had doubled by 1999), and spiraled into a manufactured economic crisis. The privatization and liberalization of Zimbabwe's economy, promoted by the 'rule-of-thumb' development theories the World Bank employed across the world, led, by 1994, to the reversal of Zimbabwe's encouraging 1980 health trends (Performance Audit Report, World Bank, 1995, and Ismi, 2004).³

We cannot use simple 'rules-of-thumb' like the complete privatization of the economy or the transfer of the labor force from 'traditional' agricultural activity to 'modern' manufacturing sector jobs to predict how well a society will do. In the case of Sindh, a bustling 'modern' economy exists side-by-side poor living conditions across the province's urban and rural populations (Jamal et al., 2007). The fact that Sindh is the heart of Pakistan's modern economy (46.5% of Pakistan's manufacturing sector is located in Sindh) has done little, historically, to improve social development in Sindh's rural areas, whereas Punjab's agrarian economies have brought greater social development to both urban and rural conditions (Ghaus et al., 1996). Further 'fixes' to the private economy present little structural change for unjust institutional arrangements, like this thesis's study of feudalism, that perpetuate and foster poverty. There is a need for a model of development that goes beyond economic development ideals towards social development programs. Further, the development scholarship—just like

³ Further research on the failures of neoliberalism to address social development needs exist in "Blind Spot: How Neoliberalism Infiltrated Global Health" (Keshavjee, 2014)

development interventions—cannot be homogenizing or universalizing, or else be doomed to repeat the severe mistakes of previous development efforts.

Defining Social Development

In understanding the development theories that form the foundations of this thesis, I turn to the idea of analyzing development through the lens of *social development*. Social development has been termed by scholars, such as Dreze and Sen (2002), as a development index that fundamentally encompasses a wide variety of metrics like literacy rates, access to healthcare, and infant and maternal mortality rates, and that can shed light onto the *quality* of life lived. This realm of scholarship builds of the work of the influential international development scholar, Mahbub ul Haq, who had invented the Human Development Index—an index oriented towards capturing the levels of access people have to schools, hospitals, and sanitation networks (to name a few) (Haq, 1996, and UN Development Program, 2015). Through this revised definition of ‘development,’ which, instead of placing emphasis on macroeconomic per-capita GDP or fixations on the ‘modern economy,’ focuses on the *lived* conditions of people on the ground, such scholars argue that one can receive a fuller understanding of the opportunities and social conditions of those living within specific states. Against the *in-vitro* theories of neoliberal thinkers which located development only in (models and) modes of labor or production, these thinkers have asked: what are the implications of an individual’s society that they are a larger part of—its

politics, economics, culture—on the capabilities that are afforded to this individual? In other words, in what ways can we assess human flourishing? Important to this thesis is the establishment of assessing metrics in education, health, and access to sanitation infrastructure (instead of GDP or share of the labor in modern sector economies) as ways one can interpret the level of ‘capabilities’ afforded to an individual, in this scholarship’s greater project of improving human flourishing globally.

The Project of this Thesis

The question of how social development occurs, and why it fails, is central to this case study. My case study is concerned with how human development occurs and why it fails, specifically within the context of Pakistan’s Sindh province. In this chapter, I hope to ascribe the differences in human health, viability, and welfare across Pakistan mainly to differences of provincial-level planning. In other words, analyses of the provinces of Pakistan (which are the major administrative units under the federal state) are better able to demonstrate differences in human welfare, than Pakistan-wide analyses like aggregate economic or social development conditions. What is more, comparison between states with ostensibly similar economic development levels enables us to distinguish between the factors likely to be contributing to unequal social development growth. Realizing the short-comings of previous development theories, this study focuses on social development oriented at the level of the

local, or the “Provincial.”

The central question that has driven this research and why I hope to place emphasis on understanding the distinct history of development of provinces is: what causes the Sindh province to have overall lower literacy rates, higher infant and maternal mortality, and higher poverty levels than provinces like Punjab, which, at the current moment, have analogous per-capita income and economic outputs?



Figure 1.1: A Map of Pakistan’s Provinces,
Wikipedia Commons

Before continuing, it must be clear that Sindh has a GDP per capita of \$1780 per capita whereas Punjab has had an analogous GDP per capita of \$1558 per capita (Pasha, 2015). Furthermore, the Sindhi capital city of Karachi has produced a GDP of \$212 billion in 2017, compared to Punjab's highest producing city, Lahore, which had a GDP of \$127 billion in 2017 (Pasha, 205). Central to this thesis is the question: why hasn't Sindh's economic development been matched by its social development?


*Percentage Share of Provinces in Population Quartile,
• by Level of Development*

Quartile	Punjab	Sindh	NWFP	Balochistan	Total (%)
Top Quartile	61.1	31.5	5.6	1.8	100.0
Second Quartile	55.8	23.6	20.4	0.2	100.0
Third Quartile	55.8	23.6	20.4	0.2	100.0
Bottom Quartile	33.4	31.5	8.7	26.3	100.0
Overall Population Share	55.2	24.1	13.9	6.8	100.0

Table 1.1: Differences in Social Development Across Provinces, taken from Ghaus and Pasha, 1996.

Table 1.1 represents the divergence in human development indices between Sindh and Punjab: the people of Punjab predominantly live in the top three quartiles of human development conditions in Pakistan (that is, they have a generally decent access to healthcare, education, and sanitation) whereas the people of Sindh seem to separate into two quartiles of human development, the

top and the bottom.⁴ As well, Figures 1.2 and 1.3 provide further analyses of metrics, and where such divergences in human capital—or an average individual’s access to healthcare, education, clean water, et cetera—can be located, specifically between the rural settings of Punjab and Sindh. From viewing these data together, it becomes clear that—although Sindh and Punjab share many similar economic output trends, there social indicators diverge significantly. Whereas Punjab is able to match its economic development with its social development across its urban and rural settings, Sindh is able to only match its economic development within its urban settings, with Sindh’s rural settings having lagged national trends for the past forty years.



Figures 1.2 and 1.3: Differences in Human Capital Levels in each Province of Pakistan, from 1979-2008. Taken from Khan and Rehman, 2012

Here a fundamental ‘development paradox’ emerges. If we take the theories of


⁴ This will be a key table for this thesis, so it must be pointed out, for clarity, that Sindh has the same share of its population living in poor development conditions as in high development conditions. This is contrast with the Punjab, which shows upward trends in the development conditions people are living in (Ghaus and Pasha, 1996).

Filmer (2013) which place per-capita income as *the* major indicator of social development, we have an inconsistent narrative of development for the province of Sindh, specifically, which has astounding levels of economic growth, but Pakistan's largest inequality levels in health and education. But if we take the criteria suggested by Singh (2015) who sees the presence of publically-sponsored projects as *the* major indicator of social development, we are unable to explain the paradox in Sindh, which has public expenditures in health and education on par with the other provinces (Pakistan Expenditure Portfolio, 2015, and Singh, 2015). Obviously, then, other measures and explanations need to be mobilized to gain insight into this paradox. In the hope of more effectively addressing this paradox in relation to the development literature, this thesis enters into academic conversation with the works of scholars from the disciplines of economics, history, anthropology.

It is important to mention, as well, that these divergences have not existed without notice: when Punjab eclipsed Sindh and became the province in Pakistan with the lowest infant mortality rates from the 2014 UNICEF Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys, there was public outcry (UNICEF, 2014, Dawn, 2015, Relief Web, 2015). From the national newspaper of Pakistan, *Dawn*:

“The report asked tough questions, which it wanted to be answered. The foremost of them was why the children dying in the (Sindh) province with increasing trends while in other provinces (Punjab) the same was decreasing.

Officials said during the course of the survey they received tough stances from various segments of civil society who said the government in Sindh should face accountability and answer what it had delivered during its eight-year rule when more children were dying of preventable deaths” (Dawn, “Sindh's child mortality ratio higher than Punjab's: Report,” 2015).



Figures 1.4: Modern Trends in Infant Mortality between Punjab and Sindh (UNICEF, 2014)

Moving towards Provincial Analyses

In this project, I hope to contribute to the wealth of literature that has already been produced about human capital levels in Pakistan, and to focus on making a contribution to the scarce scholarship which attempts to explain the stark divergences between human capital levels along the provincial lines of Pakistan. It is encouraging to note that, in the vein of other scholars of modern development in South Asia, the lens of social development along specifically provincial lines has been used before; the political scientist, Prerna Singh (2015),

who has written about divergences in human welfare—in literacy rates, mortality rates, and poverty—along state lines in India, reinforces this thesis’s use of provinces within Pakistan to understand social development.⁵

Currently, the scholarship on Pakistan’s human capital levels along provincial lines tends to limited to analyses like this: “As such, there are many clear inter-provincial differences in regional development in Pakistan. This may reflect historical differences in the level of public allocations per capita to the social sectors” (Ghaus et al., 1996). Beyond the commentary provided at the conclusions of such research, more analysis of the determinants and roots of social development divergences along provincial lines is hard to find. I place this thesis within the gap in the literature that has failed to explain why such divergences can be seen between the provinces, and further, I intend to use this thesis to explore where future social development trends are heading. In this thesis, I hope to engage directly with the question: what has led to the current state of Sindh in Pakistan, where initial prospects for growth have not kept pace with comparable provinces, and where economic development has not been equated with social development? In this thesis, I hope to explain how and why such divergences have persisted, and in order to envision their change, I investigate the implications of this divergence on Sindh’s modern-day political economy and its social subjectivities, to assess the productive potential of its civil society to reform these historical trajectories. Although I will be using the social development theories outlined by Haq (1996) and Dreze and Sen (2002) to assess

⁵ Effectively, the province is to Pakistan as the state is to India.

the historical and modern conditions of Pakistan's Sindh province, it is important to highlight the limitations of this theoretical lens.

Critiques of Social Development

But it is also important to note, for this thesis's use of the lens of social development, that the 'social development' approach has not gone without criticism: it, too, has also been accused of falling into 'essentialized' and 'homogenized' tools, and by some more radical theorists, another excuse for the reproduction of Western power. In one instance, the social development goal of 'expanding women's literacy' within a community in Nigeria was shown to exacerbate the hindrances illiterate women have to gaining agricultural jobs, which do not need literacy as a requirement. Promoted by a wealth of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and aid programs, literacy had become a minimum across sectors that did not need the skills of literacy, and served to actively demean and group illiterate women into the 'impoverished,' in addition to preventing them equal opportunity to agricultural jobs. What's further pressing in this study is that it has found women in neighboring communities, who were literate and middle class, to have a less deep political consciousness, through the "internalization of Western patriarchal norms" and its "sexist system" (Nzegwe, 1995, p. 450, and Charusheela, 2009). Against their literate counterparts, the illiterate rural women had been engaged in political organizations and demonstrations since Nigeria's Colonial rule (Nzegwe, 1995, and Charusheela,

2009). These scholars' point is clear: 'social development' agendas are not excused from the paternalism that characterized neoliberal development agendas, and instead serve to support fundamentally unjust power structures (like Western-dominance over Nigeria).

In salvaging what one can from the important project of working to improve the lived and material conditions of people across the world, new social development scholarship needs to be locally informed and locally-produced in nature; that is, social development initiatives must, instead of "bringing development" to areas of poverty, work towards "creating development" with local people after understanding the specific and local conditions, structures, histories, economies, and cultures of those people (Marglin, 1987). But unlike those who cast away all forms of development sponsored by the West as 'neocolonialism' and are critical of the development project writ large—scholars such as Walter Rodney, James Ferguson, Arturo Escobar, and Makua Mutua—I argue that the project of development, sponsored by the international community, for the purposes of improving the material and social conditions of people across this world, remains an important one. (Rodney, 1972, Ferguson, 1990, Escobar, 1995, and Mutua, 2008).

Although we must be wary of development initiatives of the past and present which can work under the global hegemonies of powerful and rich nations, and although we must be cognizant of our own development failures in the last half to the 20th century, scholars cannot be doomed into thinking that the project of social development is over. Rather, there has never been a time in

human history where more money has existed within international aid with the potential of improving the lived, on-the-ground realities of individuals across our world (OECD, 2015). I argue there can be a place for material wealth to sustainably and radically improve the material conditions of our world's most impoverished people—but the means through which we undergo such development must be informed by a critical development scholarship that is actively attuned to the realities as they exist on the ground. One cannot be discouraged by development efforts in Zimbabwe in 1980 and close the entire chapter of development initiatives.

My Definition of Social Development and The Paradox

Receptive to the criticisms of development, I hope to first attempt to locate social development, not at the Pakistan-national level, but at the local, or the “Provincial”-level. Then, I hope to define ‘social development’ not only within the human capital levels, as assessed by the UNDP and scholars of social development from Pakistan, but also by locating how human welfare has been reported across studies from pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial eras. In further locating social development in the local and the lived, I also went to Sindh to see and understand from people on the ground how they understood and perceived of their material and social conditions, and where important and collaborative development initiatives could take place.

This thesis explores the ways in which the province of Sindh, specifically, has historically engaged with its project of social development, where such failures in social development have occurred, and where this has left the state of the province today — with an analysis of the potential for this province’s future progress. Instead of attempting to project universalizing statements, this thesis on development hopes to locate its investigation and its understanding of what is going on, specifically, within Sindh.

Methodology

The methodology of this thesis takes from the disciplines of economic, history, and anthropology to gain a fuller and more deep discussion into how social development is occurring in Sindh.

In Chapter 2, I will engage in a reconstructive history of Sindh, that traces the origins and development of Sindh’s feudalism, through the theoretical methodology of “Ethnography and the Historical Imagination” (J. and J. Comaroff, 1992). In line with the Comaroffs’ argument that, to really understand a present social situation within a particular location, one needs to recover and reconstruct its past from a variety of sources, I will employ primary and secondary sources across Sindh’s colonial and post-colonial history to understand how a seemingly ancient institution, like feudalism, has modernized in the province.

Then in Chapter 3, I will investigate what the current implications of this feudalism have been for Sindh’s wider social development trajectory and for its

citizens. Here, I hope to use a mixed-method analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data, which I defend more fully within the chapter itself. Central to the discussion within this Chapter, I include in my local ethnography—as an anthropologist with family roots in Karachi—an attempt to understand the intersection of Sindh’s macroeconomic trajectories with the climate of its urban civil society. In moving development from the universal to the local, I use the locus of public healthcare to understand: how do people today assess their own development conditions, and where do they see possible transformation occurring?⁶

Through using these methods with Sindh’s historical and modern realities, I hypothesize, in this thesis, that it has been the structure of a single, long-standing institution within Sindh, that of ‘feudalism,’ that has actively worked against social development throughout Sindh’s modern history, and that presents the greatest challenge to Sindh’s future social development. It is then natural to first turn to a historical investigation that seeks to ask: how did this institution come to exist, and why has it persisted?

⁶ Please see **Appendix B** for more information regarding the IRB process for each healthcare setting

Chapter 2: The Historical Saga of the *Wadero*-System

Introduction

As I attempted during my field visit in Karachi to figure out what could explain the stark divergences I saw between the human capital data from Sindh and those of Punjab, I sat down for an afternoon chai with a friend, Ricky, who I had come in contact with through my family. As we began our conversation, Ricky—a veteran campaign leader in Karachi for the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), one of Pakistan’s many democratic political organizations—stopped me in mid-sentence. “If you want to understand why public health has failed here [in Sindh], and also why democracy has failed here, look to the *waderos* in rural Sindh. *This* is our province’s problem.” (Personal Interview, June 12th, 2017).

The *wadero* is a landowner (used here in the same sense as the Mughal term, *zamindar*) who owns not only just a large swathe of private property, but also ‘owns’ the people who work on his land. The *wadero-system* of land-holding, characterized by the unrestricted ability of the *wadero* to extract taxes and rents from tenants, and to serve as the supreme judiciary for their tenants, is a relic from before the arrival of the British colonists to the Subcontinent (Ahmed, 1984). The notion of the *wadero-system*—a system akin to the economic relationship of feudal landlords to their tenants—as outdated was firmly contested across those I interviewed.

Just a few days after my conversation with Ricky, I visited a rural township, Rehri Goth, on the very outskirts of Karachi, where the ‘feudal’ aspects of Sindh’s more rural areas became clear. After speaking to the Rehri Goth Union Council Leader (the political head of this rural, fishing village), I would discover that a few landlords held a vast amount of property in this area, and that both those in power in the provincial government and those who own considerable land in Rehri Goth have done little to further the health, education, or sanitation of the citizens of this village.

Throughout my field visit in Karachi, many questions I had regarding social development divergences, the state of public hospitals in Sindh, and the climate of Karachi’s civil society, constantly returned to the *wadero* landlords, and their capture of Sindh’s economic, political, and social spheres. How this seemingly ‘undemocratic’ system of land-holding has remained so strongly entrenched within putatively democratic times, and the subsequent implications for the provision of public services, will be the query at the center of this second chapter. To understand modern Sindh, I will undertake, in this chapter, a history of the *wadero* institution, and how it has both engaged with and countered the history of modernization in Sindh.

Feudalism as the Historical Argument for Poor Social Development

Trajectories

In order to understand the divergences in social development across Pakistan—and with the specific focus of understanding the seemingly contradictory economic success and social development failure of Sindh—one must look back into the history of Sindh and the origins and evolution of its institutions. The current gap in the literature and public discourse is clear—studies upon studies have outlined through quantitative means the divergences in human development across Punjab and Sindh (Ghaus and Pasha et al, 1996, Karim and Zaidi, 1999, Jamal and Khan, 2007, Khan and Rehman, 2012, and Bhutta et al, 2013). Further, this sentiment was shared among many of my interview subjects and news reports, with one of my informants asking: “I don’t understand why the poor person in Punjab is so much better off than the poor person in Sindh” (Personal Interview, June 6th, 2017). But no study that I could find specifically takes on the task of explaining such divergences, which is evident from metrics as diverse as infant mortality rates and access to healthcare to public financial security and access to credit (Multidimensional Poverty in Pakistan, 2016). Indeed, data on human capital levels and social development indices provides only quantitative information on the divergence rather than causal mechanisms or explanations for the divergence.

The closest any study gets to such an analysis of *why* we see such divergences between these two provinces in Pakistan, again to reiterate, is a concluding sentence in one academic paper, “Social Development Ranking of Districts in Pakistan” (1996): “This [stark differences in development between

Punjab and Sindh] may reflect historical differences in the level of public allocations per capita to the social sectors” (Ghaus and Pasha, 1996).

The focus of this chapter is to argue for a historical answer to such divergences that are seen in social development between Sindh and Punjab and to produce a cohesive narrative of how social development has operated in Sindh. Specifically, I argue in this chapter that the *wadero*-system of ‘feudalism’ is the root of modern-day social development divergences between the provinces.

I argue in this chapter that a major factor that can explain the divergence in social development between Sindh and Punjab is the relative prevalence of the *wadero*-system of landowning or of the ‘feudal’ character within each province. Through both a comparative analysis of the *wadero*-system in Sindh and Punjab, set in the context of a colonial and contemporary history, and then through a subsequent discussion of Sindh’s ‘feudalism’ and its impact on the social development, I hypothesize that the divergences in ‘feudal’ character between Sindh and Punjab manifest themselves in the stark differences one sees between the provinces in their level of social development— differences that pose a significant challenge for Pakistan today more generally. This chapter argues that the divergence one sees today, between the social development levels of Sindh and that of Punjab, is inextricably linked to the two separate paths taken in Sindh and Punjab of the *wadero*-system.

Specifically, I argue: the ancient *wadero* institution has persisted, with modern transformations, specifically within Sindh (as opposed to in Punjab), and while assuming thoroughly contemporary features, maintains the poor record of

welfare provisions that has come to mark the Sindh province, in both its rural and urban areas—and places it on an entirely separate development trajectory (a society more polarized at either high-quality or low-quality development conditions versus the middle-to high-quality average of Punjab’s society(see Table 1.1)). This is contrasted with the story of Punjab, where the *wadero*-system was impeded across its history.

Defining Feudalism and My Argument

To begin, it is necessary to explain my definition of ‘feudalism.’ For the purposes of this analysis. It is important to distinguish my use of the term from the conventional, European model of feudalism, which, as an aside, was not a monolithic political and economic institution within Europe, but was practiced in multiple and different ways, albeit with some overarching congruencies (e.g. lord-vassal commendation ceremonies, similar models of feudal land tenure, et cetera) (Stephenson, 1942). Although a fuller discussion of the particularities of Sindh’s ‘feudal’ character will be presented further on in the chapter, it is important to note that my use of ‘feudal’ to describe the characteristics of the *wadero*-system can most directly be summarized as: (1) a land-holding arrangement where one or more landowners maintain ownership of a large amount of land (at or above 50 acres), while (2) engaging in contracts with their tenants in agricultural labor, in which (3) such contracts are often devoid of modern land reform laws and their judicial oversight which have attempted to curb abusive land-owner-and-tenant

relationships, and where (4) such contracts are often compromised and breached by land-owners, who face little executive oversight from the provincial government.

Of course, I am not alone in identifying the feudal quality of the political-economy of Sindh, or Pakistan writ large: journalists and academics have pursued the topic of “Feudalism in Pakistan” (Kristof, 2009) and have sufficiently explored the violence and hindrance that such ‘feudalism’ presents to Pakistan’s project of democracy as well as to its economic and social development (Ahmed, 1984, Khan, 2002, Shahla, 2002, Dawn, 2013, Dawn, 2012).

However, I argue that more nuance about the particularities of Pakistan’s feudalism needs to be made, and I argue that one must implicate feudalism in the social development of Pakistan’s provinces. Following from Pakistan’s feudal scholarship (Alam, 1974, Ahmed, 1984, Gill, 1989, and Khan, 2002) that traces many current instances of large land-holdings across Pakistan as descendent from the 17th century, Mughal-era *zamindars*,⁷ or large land-owners, who were responsible for the extraction of rent from tenants in order to produce payments to their royal authorities, there exists general agreement on the heterogeneity of the *wadero*-system in its strength and expansiveness across Pakistan. From under the rule of the colonial British to the modern states of Pakistan and India, land reform agendas aimed at breaking up the *wadero*-system within the Subcontinent have been implemented differently across provinces and have had varying levels of

⁷ Many modern scholars have referenced that *wadero* and *zamindar*, although different in Mughal history, are analogous terms often used interchangeably to denote the modern era ‘feudal’ landholdings and characteristics of the Subcontinent (Ahmed, 1984, Khan, 2002, and Alam, 1974). I will treat them as analogous terms in this analysis.

success in their fundamental goal of breaking up and removing land power from the *wadero*-system of land-holding towards a model that gives tenants greater land-ownership and security (Ahmed, 1984, and Khan, 2002).

In the first part of this chapter, I will first argue within the vantage of a colonial-centered historical view of feudalism that the *wadero-system* was specifically preserved in Sindh and was intentionally broken down in Punjab during the British Colonial Rule of the Subcontinent (1858-1947). By arguing that the British allowed the *wadero-system* to work for its own economic and political ends in Sindh, while forcibly disintegrating it when for the sake of efficiency interests in the Punjab, I will then further explore the ramifications of Sindh's feudalism in key historical moments through three sections: (a) its clout in the government of Sindh, as seen through the Sindh Provincial Assembly's management of the crisis of Partition (1948), (b) in Sindh's political potential within Pakistan's transition to democracy (1972), and (c) in the manner in which Sindh's feudal structures have been attributed to the failure of World Bank development projects that were attempted in the province, and other modern-day failures (1980-1990). Through these examples, which will illustrate the transformation and entrance into modernity of an evolving institution with ancient roots, I argue that the societal institution of existing, modern 'feudalism' (which I use, for clarity, as akin to the modern-day *wadero-system*) has operated against social development throughout Sindh's history by specifically creating inefficiencies in Sindh's (a) executive government's ability to carry through

development initiatives, in (b) its democratic political process, and (c) in the ability of non-state actors to pursue development initiatives in Sindh.

Finally, I will spend the last part of this chapter exploring the political reactions to Sindh's social development failures (1972 – 2000), and the evolution of civil society within the province in response to such failures and the persistence of such feudal institutions. In understanding how the Sindh province has been impacted and has impacted the institution of the *wadero*-system, I place this final section as a bridge to understand conditions as they exist in 2017.

A Colonial History of Sindh's Feudalism and a Study of Early Colonial Land Laws in the Subcontinent (1854-1900)

The system of patronage that confronts Sindh today, though it has not remained unchanged through time, has deep historical roots. In 1854, Lieutenant Pelly, a British officer, writes upon his arrival at Sindh:

“The system obtaining (for revenue) is that which was once prevalent throughout Sind, under the name of Buttai, being a grain payment, of the most clumsy, fraudulent, demoralizing, and so far as the collectors are concerned, of the most unhealthy description.” (parenthetical added by author, “Brief Notes relative to the Khyrpoor State in Upper Sind, by Lieutenant Lewis Pelly, 1854, Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, New Series No. 7, p. 119).

This form of revenue collection, from the agricultural produce of the tenant to their landlords and then to the royal authorities, was so severely extractive in Sindh that another British explorer in Sindh, Alexander Baillie, assessed it in the late 1880s as thus:

“the cultivator realized only one-fourth of the profit of his labour, the other three-fourths being seized by the collectors of the Amirs (princes). It is not a matter of surprise that the lower classes were squalid and miserable, for the screw was turned until they delivered up to the Amirs and...the last Tunga (small piece) left to them after the absolute necessities for keeping body and soul together had been supplied, and it was a fortunate day for the poor wretches when they were transferred for ever from the rule of the Princes of Sind and the Khans of Kelat, to the less enacting British sovereignty, even though the salt duty may have been imposed.” (parenthetical added by author, p.33, Alexander Baillie, Kurrachee: Past, Present, and Future, 1890).

So exacting and unfair were the conditions of the Sindhi tenants, under the control of their large landlords, that their poverty to this British explorer was clear—and invoked the moral justification of a ‘better,’ ‘fairer’ British rule.⁸

Scholars have noted that, at the time of the British conquest of Sindh in 1843, land in Sindh was not under the control of the Mughal state, as it had been under other areas of the Subcontinent, but was under the control of a few individual landlords (Kothari, 2002, Cheesman, 2013, Ahmed 1984, Khan, 2002). One scholar states, “These de facto landowners [in Sindh] had established one of the most repressive feudal systems on the Indian Subcontinent” (Khan, 2002, p. 214). Unbeknownst to Baillie was that very similar modes of labor and production—i.e. Sindhi feudalism—would reproduce themselves well into the modern day, where peasants in the province continue to face poor living conditions.

The onset of British rule of the Sindh province in 1843 (first by the East India Company, and then after 1858 under the British Crown via the Government

⁸ Modern scholarship stresses the need to understand the motives involved in colonial reports. I argue that the severity of Sindh’s feudal system was not overly-exaggerated to satisfy the colonial notion of ‘progress’ with the advent of colonial rule, specifically because the feudal system of Sindh was explained in similar ways both between a lieutenant arriving in Sindh in 1854, and then by a civilian explorer, Alexander Baillie, who arrived in Sindh in the 1890s.

of India Act of 1858), was not always bent on removing power from the “Princes of Sind” and becoming “less enacting” to the tenants, as Baillie suggests. In fact, as I will show, Sindh was subject to far fewer attempts to break power from the *waderos* and transfer greater economic and social rights to tenants under Colonial rule than was the Punjab, with implications for social development well beyond colonial history.

As one will see, advantages did exist within the pre-modern feudal systems of Sindh. Lieutenant Pelly continues in 1854, in another journal entry: “Civil justice is administered after a patriarchal fashion...Criminals are confined by the local authorities, and their cases disposed of either by these functionaries or by higher powers...The Meer’s maintenance of his Zemindars as local judicial authorities is, perhaps, the one and sole point in which his administration has an advantage over ours.” (Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, New Series No. 7, p.121). The “advantage” of the *zamindar*, as described by Lieutenant Pelly, was vested in the *zamindar*’s position as both the proprietor and judge of the land he owned. Such administrative set-ups that consolidated elite authority, like other forms of indirect rule, were useful to the British colonial government in maintaining control across large areas of territory—in fact, working with and preserving the positions of native elites by the British has been a method of governance that has been the focus of many post-colonial scholars given how extensively it was implemented across the British Empire (Bose and

Jalal, 2011 and J. and J. Comaroffs, 1991).⁹

Beyond the *wadero-system*'s general 'usefulness' as a method of governance (of economic and social control), I argue that the preservation of the *wadero-system* in Sindh was specifically due to the fact that Sindh was viewed, first by the East India Company (1843-1857) and then by the British Crown rule (1858 – onwards), as an agricultural “backwater” at the periphery of the Empire, serving in its most prominent roles as a frontier territory, a simple agrarian province, and an area on the path to the Indian Ocean trade network (Ahmed, 1984, Khan, 2002, Kothari, 2004).

One historian of colonial Sindh, Rita Kothari, writes, “The region of Sindh was largely a hunting ground for English officials and the Bombay government's attitude to Sindh remained indifferent making the province's transition from feudalism to colonial modernity considerably slow” (Kothari, 2004). Because Sindh was seen as a source of raw materials, like cotton for the textile mills in Bombay and London or food grains for the other colonial provinces, a simple policy of revenue collection and raw material transport was maintained by the British during the colonial rule of Sindh that did little to disrupt the long-standing social or economic institutions in the province (1843-1947) (Ahmed, 1984, Khan, 2002). In other words, the British were able to satisfy their desired revenues and economic needs more effectively and with less administrative pain by keeping the centuries-old *zamindari* system intact in Sindh, rather than re-working the

⁹ As another scholar of colonialism and development writes, “Colonial development plans attempted to do no more than construct an infrastructure most suited to the preservation and promotion of privilege” (Jalal, 2014, p. 65).

fundamental institutions of the province.

Even when a source of crisis—the global supply shock in cotton during the American Civil War (1861-1865)—challenged the economic relationships between the cotton-rich Sindh and the Empire, development efforts by the British were narrow. Rapid development by the British was confined only to the port city of Karachi, transforming the relatively minor and obscure Sindhi city of Karachi into one of the Empire’s most important ports, and to building modern railroads that would connect Sindh’s cotton fields and Karachi to New Delhi and Bombay (Zaidi, 1997).

Due to the opening of the Suez Canal, exports of wheat from Karachi exceeded those from Bombay by 1886 (Karachi became much closer to London than Bombay), and Karachi blossomed as trading city. Important within this argument is that, although Karachi was gifted, in 1886 , with the benefits of an integrated municipal water and sanitation system, a far better system of hospitals, and new educational institutions, as a result of newfound British interests in the city, the rest of Sindh did not share in such social development gains (Baillie, 1890, Zaidi, 1997).

Beyond Karachi, which was under direct British rule, the British really had no deep interests in the rest of Sindh. From the standpoint of colonial interests, maintaining the *zamindari* (or feudal) style of land-ownership and the subsequent ownership of the judicial system by such *zamindars* in Sindh was effective in keeping a large amount of land at the edge of their Empire under their indirect control. In whatever development projects the British *did* choose to

pursue, such as in establishing irrigation and damming infrastructures, they regularly gave ownership of such development projects to the feudal lords, preferring a more indirect rule of the rural areas of Sindh, even when undertaking large-scale institutional reforms in other parts of the Subcontinent (Ahmed 1984, Zaidi, 1997, Broich, 2007). Indeed, the British saw no reason to actually change the deep structures within Sindh; rather, the British found an administrative ally in keeping the *zamindari* system intact in Sindh. Although the British required some form of revenue generation, they found no need to re-invent the system of *zamindar* governance and rule of law in Sindh.

Specific to this discussion on how the *wadero*-system has persisted and transformed in Sindh's modernity, it is important to realize that, under Crown rule, no piece of tenancy legislation¹⁰ was passed in Sindh, by either the British or those at the helm of the Bombay Presidency, to support the plight of the tenants under the *wadero*-system. Further, although the Bombay Presidency (which included Sindh administratively until it became a recognized province in 1936) passed the Bombay Act III of 1899, under which land-ownership regulations and 'right to occupancy' legalities were outlined, the impacts on Sindh's *wadero*-system and the implications for oppressed tenants have been seen as microscopic (Ahmed, 1984), or non-existent (Khan, 2002). Instead, there exists a consensus amongst scholars that, although Sindh was administratively under the Bombay Presidency during both the East India Company and the British Crown (until 1936

¹⁰ A branch of law that is connected to the rights of tenants in contractual agreements with private-land owners.

when it received provincial status and achieved greater political representation within the Empire and a larger share of provincial power), many of the legislative and governmental enactments of the Bombay Presidency neither impacted nor applied to Sindh, and were never enforced through the executive authority of the British Crown rule (Ahmed, 1984, Khan, 2002). Even when Sindh did achieve colonial provincial status (1936-1947), which equipped it with greater self-governance powers, no legislation on land reform was passed. At the periphery, Sindh was more or less autonomously governed by the *waderos*, from well before the time Lieutenant Pelly first stepped onto the sands of Sindh through, as I will continue to argue, the modern day. What is worse, as this above discussion hopes to have made clear: the subjugation of tenants in Sindh, vividly described by Baillie upon his arrival at Sindh, was not relieved or radically altered by the British—it was preserved.

The Case of the Punjab (1857-1914)

To be clear, the long-standing British attitude of neglect towards transforming land ownership in Sindh was not reproduced across the Empire. Instead, British land reform policies and their enforcement varied across the Subcontinent based on a region's importance to the colonial political economy and the balance the British had to navigate between the consolidation of their own colonial power and the maintenance of local elites' power. In comparison to the administrative neglect the British exercised in Sindh, the Punjab provides an

important foil.

As a populous province and the largest source of soldiers to the British Empire's Indian army—in addition to being the agricultural 'breadbasket' of the Subcontinent—those in power in the British Crown rule needed to be involved throughout the Punjab province (Bose and Jalal, 2011). For British rule in the Subcontinent, they needed Punjab to thrive.

In the aftermath of the 1857 rebellion—where rule by 'foreigners' was violently contested across many segments of Indian society and across religious lines, as most clearly expressed through the re-institution of the Mughal emperor by both Hindu and Muslim *sepoys* for a brief year—the British Crown took control of the East India Company via the Government of India Act of 1858. Immediately, the British began a commitment to promote their idea of 'bringing development' to the Subcontinent as a 'peaceful' and 'natural' succession to the former Mughal Rule (Bose and Jalal, 2011). Specifically, it was in the Punjab where the British needed to keep peace and upkeep their military machinery, which could only be done by placating the Punjabis, who were viewed as one of the most important 'martial races' for their army (Bose and Jalal, 2011): in 1857, one third of the British Indian Army came from the Punjab, and by 1914, three-fifths of the British Empire's Indian Army was composed by Punjabis, although Punjabis at the time made up only one-tenth of the total population of British India (Talbot, 1988). Because of the Punjab's military pre-eminence in the British colonial design, the Punjab would be the place where the British could directly engineer and sustain 'loyalism' to the Crown.

Because of the need to keep peace in in the province with the single largest contribution to the standing army of the Empire—along with its great population, its incredibly fertile lands, and its proximity to the capital of the British Empire, New Delhi—the Punjab was designed by the British Crown rule to become the “model agricultural province” of British India (Ian Talbot, 2013, p.3). This province, intimately connected to the British state and military system, would receive the greatest benefits of development via modernized agricultural techniques, irrigation systems, extensive railroads throughout rural *and* urban settings—and perhaps greatest of all, land reform legislations that would break up large, *wadero* land holdings into smaller, more equitable land plots (Ian Talbot, 2011). The British, through extensive land administration laws and development, brought “middle class” regulation to Punjab—and with this stability, peace within the imperial heartland and a constant supply of manpower and food for further frontier forays (Ian Talbot, 2011).

To be specific, in the case of Punjab, the British passed two monumental tenancy acts to protect the rights and land security of Punjabi tenants and sharecroppers, including placing acreage ceilings for large landholdings, and by enforcing the legal transfer of land from *wadero* to tenants after established contracts were completed (via the Punjab Tenancy Acts of 1868 and 1887). Beyond the legislation and enforcement that the British pursued to create a stable Punjab, but also a Punjab where no single, powerful class could wrest power or challenge the authority of British Indian officials, the tenants and subsistence-farmers gained significant political and economic power through these tenancy

laws. Whereas much of pre-colonial India was ruled by royal or local *zamindars*, that maintained similarly unilateral engagements with their tenants—the Punjabi tenants under an analogous *wadero-system* in Colonial India, were, through the 1868 and 1887 tenancy legislations, freed from an ancient institution that was characterized by deep socio-economic inequity and deprivation. This difference, with the Punjab receiving tenancy laws and their subsequent enforcement that Sindh did not, marks the inception of a political and legal divergence between Sindh and Punjab that underpin their respective institutional histories, and what I wager has, influenced the social development divergence in the modern era between these two provinces.

In contrast with Sindh, since 1887 a long history exists of colonial authorities in Punjab readily breaking apart feudalism and the *zamindari* system: a heavy blow to the *zamindars* happened via the Punjab Tenancy Act of 1887— but no act of this sort sought to protect the rights of tenants in Sindh during its colonial period (1853-1946). The liquidation of land holdings via the Act of 1887 also seemed to reduce the widespread inequality of its society. Indeed, the Punjab’s Tenancy Act of 1887 was seen to produce a completely different society, where one important civil bureaucrat, Mr. Madan Gopal, who had been involved with the drafting and implementation of the Tenancy Act of 1887, noted,

“arrangements with their tenants or neighbours more resembled a co-operative system than that of a community composed of wealthy and poor” ((Page 5, “The Punjab Tenancy Act, (XIV of 1887), with Introduction, Notes, Rules and Debates in Council, by Madan Gopal, revised 1899).

Underlining the picture revealed by a fundamental table of this thesis (Table 1.1, Chapter 1) where I described the level of development each segment of the population in the modern day was living in, this historical fact—of the legal disintegration of major feudal landholdings in the Punjab and the decentralization of economic power (via land) from the hands of the wealthy landlords to the villagers—is important in the narrative of how the societies of Sindh and Punjab began diverging. Beyond the removal of the *wadero-system* in Punjab, the sorts of ‘intensive development’ initiatives that had been undertaken in the Punjab, the agricultural heartland (‘breadbasket of India’) within a stone’s throw of New Delhi, were not employed in Sindh, the agricultural hinterland (Kothari, 2004, Ahmed, 1984, Khan 2002).

Obviously, it was not as if the British ‘could not’ develop Sindh in the same way as in the Punjab—the case of Karachi, in Sindh, at 1886 is a great example of the speed and effectiveness of British optimization techniques when it came to modernizing development efforts. The underlying reason for why the British chose to maintain the *wadero* system in Sindh and break it apart in Punjab, I argue, is because the British preferred a method of more indirect rule towards Sindh (for agricultural goods), and a method of more direct rule towards the Punjab (for the upkeep of the British Indian Army and also for higher agricultural yields). When it came to indirect rule, the British were able to still extract raw materials and revenues through working *with* the *waderos*, whereas with direct rule, the British had to remove any class with significant powers that could challenge its priorities within a region. And although Sindh did have a luxury

resource — cotton — which could have been extracted and processed in more efficient ways by British direct rule, it was specifically because the British, as stewards of their global empire, were constrained in their resources and in their breadth that they had to focus their development efforts with specificity — and had to yield some provinces to indirect rule (via working with the *wadero*-system) and lower economic yields.

As one continues through this history that implicates the *waderos* in Sindh's current and specific modernity, the transition from colonial rule to independence will be key. As greater democratic participation grew, and dissatisfaction with Colonial rule rose, democratic contests were held between the Indian National Congress (INC) and the Muslim League (ML) (Bose and Jalal, 2011). The fact that Sindh remained fairly independent within both the Bombay Presidency and under the provincial, power-sharing structures of British rule made it so that the elites in control of Sindh at the turn of Independence (1940s) wanted desperately to maintain their autonomy, specifically in their governance and their grasp over their tenants. The turn towards the ML seems to have been a calculated one — specifically because the *waderos* of late-colonial Sindh despised the INC. As one scholar states:

“Sindhi *waderos* abhorred the idea of any contact (of the INC) with the *haris* (tenants) for that might have led to awakening of the latter's political consciousness and the weakening of *wadero* control.” (parenthetical added by author, Khan, 2002, page 217).

It was the Indian National Congress's model of mass mobilization that influenced the Sindh elite towards the less reformist ML, and to later support the

idea of a Pakistan (as a state that would afford them a legitimate source of authority, as opposed to the centralizing bureaucracy of the INC). It's important to add here that *waderos* were attuned to the power and clout of the INC against their own, undemocratic power-structures: not too long before the political contests of the 1930s and the 1940s, the system of feudalism in one province of India, Bihar, had become so repressive for tenants in 1917 that Gandhi himself organized a mass documentation and reporting initiative throughout the province (documenting tenant experiences and labor conditions). He had assembled over 8000 testimonies within a few months of his survey, and by 1918, Gandhi pressured the British government with the report against *wadero* landowners, and later in 1918, a series of land laws and tenancy legislations were imposed in Bihar (Global Nonviolent Action Database, 2010).

In fact, the *waderos* were so against the Indian National Congress and their techniques of mass mobilization, that they all politically fled to the ML and to later gave support to the idea of an independent Pakistan (as a state that would afford them a legitimate source of authority, as opposed to the centralizing bureaucracy of the INC); so concentrated were the *waderos* in the ML that one source comments: "the Pakistan Muslim League... was almost wholly dominated by feudal lords (The Free Library, 2007). And this political preservation of *wadero* interests will be key to understanding the events during and after the separation of Pakistan and India (1947).

Although a complete history of social development in colonial India would be beyond the discussions of this thesis, the central point I argue here is

this: the placement of the provinces, of Sindh and of Punjab, within the greater design of the British Empire dictated the sorts of institutions that were preserved and those that underwent rapid change—to the end that Sindh, as I will begin to explore in the following sections, has maintained a greater feudal character, in comparison to Punjab.

Now that I have established a completely different political economy between these two provinces under Colonial rule—one where Sindh maintained the ancient *wadero-system* and was subject to ‘extensive’ cultivation (where increased revenue and production was generated by more contracts between the Sindhi *waderos* and the British provincial managers) and one where Punjab was rid of much of its *wadero* characteristics and rapidly modernized (railroads and irrigation works) in an ‘intensive’ way across its rural and urban settings,¹¹ I hope to shift now to understand: what has been the result, in how specifically Sindh has entered the modern era, of the interaction between the maintained *wadero-system* and the variety of historical moments that contained great potential for Sindh’s social development. In other words, how has the *wadero* socio-economic system, that the British first observed in 1854 and then choose to preserve, engaged and transformed with the events and encounters that have radically shaped Sindh—if

¹¹ I use ‘extensive’ and ‘intensive’ as a vocabulary borrowed from other colonial and post-colonial theorists of South Asia with regards to how the British viewed and pursued their own aims in the Province. Sindh was a form of ‘extensive’ cultivation, wherein modernizing elements (tenancy legislations, improved fertilizers, etc) did not need to be brought thoroughly to rural areas, as in order to enlarge revenue and production, the British simply pursued more deals with *waderos* in the rural areas. Even the irrigation works the British did bring quickly fell into the hands of the *waderos*—without complaint by the British (Ahmed, 1984).

not the Sub-continent. The specific moments that I will devote the rest of this chapter to are: (a) the Partition (1947), b) Pakistan's First General Elections (1970), and c) World Bank-sponsored development initiatives in Sindh (1980-1990).

The Partition (1947) and Executive Management with Feudalism

The Partition of British India in August of 1947 represented the single largest mass migration of people in human history. Ten million people crossed the Radcliffe line that was to demarcate two new states, and one million people died in the process (BBC, 2011). During this time of crisis, where new conceptions and realities of statehood were being formed by the nascent India and Pakistan, it was largely up to the provinces to lead integration and development efforts for the millions of people that migrated.

As one moves along through this history, and especially between the transition from colonial rule to self-rule, one important point must be made: just because Punjab had, after heavy British land reforms, sizably less of a *wadero* socio-economic character than Sindh did not mean that Punjabi politics were completely free of large landed interests. Instead, at the cusp of Independence, both the Sindh and Punjab provincial governments were overwhelming filled with *wadero* landlords (in 1951, 80% of Punjab's provincial government was composed by landlords, and in 1955, 90% of Sindh's provincial government was composed by landlords) (Alam, 1974).

But, as I will argue in this section, two completely different executive responses came from the Sindh and Punjab provincial governments as they each navigated the issue of large influxes of refugees—and it is specifically these responses, I argue, that reveal an answer to *why* social development divergences have persisted between these two provinces. These executive responses, I argue, define the deep motives¹² and institutions that pervaded each province at the time of colonial independence, with import to subsequent historical events. Central to this thesis’s study of Sindh, and how its *wadero*-system entered the modern era, Sindh at 1947 viewed Partition as an unnecessary hassle and responded to this crisis as an opportunity to attempt to further consolidate *wadero* economic power, through the legal transfer of abandoned land plots of evacuees to *wadero* landowners. In comparison, I argue that the Punjab viewed the Partition as an important event that needed executive development aid to reunite distant familial ties, and responded to this crisis by launching, from the provincial government, a series of relief and development efforts that encouraged, through provincial state-support, the growth of municipal and local development initiatives. In order to understand how the *wadero* institution has evolved in Sindh past the colonial era, one must understand Sindh’s involvement in the Partition response process, and the ways the *wadero*-system were impacted—with important relief to this case in understanding the responses from Punjab.

At the moment of Independence, the “Pakistan” that many powerful

¹² The motives at the heart of the provincial government and that is reflected in their legislations and the bills they propose, the intentions of those in the provincial government.

landholding individuals in the Sindh provincial government had wanted—a federalized union of states that allowed significant provincial autonomy (important for Sindh, which had wanted to be able to administer its own economic, judicial, and social policies)—was immediately compromised. The Sindhi city of Karachi, one of the Sub-continent's most developed port cities of the colonial era, became the capital of the state of Pakistan, and because 600,000 immigrants from across India settled in Karachi between 1947-1948, Urdu (the language of most Northern Indian immigrants), instead of the native Sindhi language, became the *lingua franca* of Sindh.¹³ Against the aspirations for provincial autonomy by those in power in the Sindh province, the state of Pakistan and Partition immigrants posed a significant challenge. One scholar states: “most Sindhis believe that for them the most repressive form of colonialism started after the creation of Pakistan.” (p. 218, Khan, 2002, Zaidi, 1997).

Those in power at the Sindh provincial government were so against the seizure of Karachi by the Pakistani state—some Sindhi politicians felt that they were being symbolically “beheaded”—that the chief minister at the helm of Sindh’s provincial government, Ayub Khuhro, was dismissed by the Pakistani state in 1948 on the grounds of his contestation over Karachi’s separation from Sindh (Khan, 2002, and Salim, 2004). Beyond the conflict of Karachi, the Sindhis in provincial power saw little connection with the incoming immigrants (termed

¹³ The population of Karachi before Partition was at 450,000 (Zaidi, 1997).

Muhajirs)—who were neither ethnically nor linguistically similar to the ruling Sindhis. Further, the ‘Islam’ that was meant to forge a sense of belonging across people within the new Pakistan, as one can anticipate by having seen the Sindh province’s lukewarm reception to the Muslim League in the 1940s, offered little social cohesion. It was then at the time of Partition that the Sindhis in provincial power felt cheated. Central to this section’s argument is that, for Sindh, the deep motives within the provincial government were not to work with the Pakistani state in development initiatives to address the needs of refugees in Sindh—let alone to change anything about their longstanding dominion over Sindh’s tenants through the *wadero-system*—but instead to enhance, through the crisis of Partition, the *wadero* powers of large Sindhi land-holders, an overwhelming number of whom were senior officials in the provincial government.

In 1948, the Sindh provincial government had numerous land remortgaging bills under consideration (Ahmed, 1984), which would have allowed the legal transfer of large plots of abandoned land, in the wake of the Partition and the evacuation of many land-holdings by Sindhi Hindus who had fled to India, to the Sindhi *waderos*. Although many tenants had viewed the possibilities for change that the Partition would bring to Sindh with eagerness, their aspirations of receiving abandoned land as a “gift of the creation of Pakistan” fell flat (Ahmed, 1984). Instead, with more than a healthy majority, the Sindh provincial government passed a land reclamation bill that favored the *waderos* and the consolidation of their economic interests. Although this bill was, immediately upon passing the Sindh provincial legislature, vetoed by the then

Governor-General, and head of the Pakistani state, Mohammad Ali Jinnah (Ahmed, 1984), the fact that the motives of the Sindh provincial government at the crisis of Partition were economically-oriented towards the sole benefit of *wadero* landholders presages the Sindh provincial government's later prioritization of *wadero* interests over tenant farmers.

Beyond this attempt at executive provincial action during the Partition by the Sindh government—to take land for the *waderos* and not deliver upon the interests of their tenants, or to refugees—it is important to add that, in the literature, there exists few if any examples of the executive ability of the Sindh provincial government, from 1947-1949, undertaking crisis management and social development agendas for those impacted by the Partition. No examples can be found of development initiatives by the Sindh provincial government on a major Sindhi city like Hyderabad (the new capital of the Sindh province), where, by 1950, 66% of Hyderabad's population were immigrants (*Muhajirs*) from the Partition (Jones, 2003). Although it is important to note that Sindh did not *have* to bear much of the responsibility of the Partition—Sindh itself was spared much of the widespread communal violence that plagued the Punjab, and the Pakistani state did take over Karachi where most *Muhajirs* had settled—the lack of province-sponsored development initiatives to support the transition and integration of *Muhajirs* into the socio-economic life of major Sindhi cities must be highlighted.

With the consolidation of *wadero* interests in the provincial government of Sindh at the time of Partition, and little executive development in response by the

Sindh government as independence was achieved across the Sub-continent, it is important to offer a different a reaction to the crisis of Partition: that of the Punjab's.

In comparison to the Sindh provincial government, which from 1947-1949 had gone through 3 chief ministers due to conflicts with the state of Pakistan and internal corruption, the Punjab province was led by 1 chief minister during the important time-period of the Partition and its transition (1947-1949) (Salim, 2004). In Punjab, first of all, the impacts of Partition were intimately felt across all levels of society—literally *at* the Radcliffe line separating India and West Pakistan, Punjab witnessed some of the most violent communal riots and murders that occurred during the Partition (Talbot, 2007). But, in comparison to Sindh, and although *wadero* landlords held considerable power in Punjabi politics, the Punjab provincial government, I argue, sustained a deep motive of responsibility to the Punjabi people, and to do the most it could, within its executive power, to work on refugee integration and relief for those impacted by the Partition. This deep motive to reconstruct the Punjab around the crisis of Partition can be explicitly seen in the executive actions undertaken by the Punjab government to foster social development, through its positive, pro-social development response after the crisis of Partition.

In comparison to Sindh, there exists of wealth of such literature on the Punjab government and development during the Partition (Talbot, 2007, Bose and Jalal, 2011, Jalal, 2014, Talbot, 2015). Although this is most probably due to the fact that the Punjab witnessed, most intimately, the violence of migration as the

province itself was partitioned into West Punjab (Pakistan's Punjab) and East Punjab (India's Punjab), versus Sindh where immigrants and refugees came mostly to Karachi, the response from Punjab is clear: the Punjab provincial government used its institutional and executive power to far-reaching levels.

In Punjab, long-distance familial and tribal ties that originally spanned the unified pre-Partition, 'Indian Punjab,' made integration efforts in Punjab more cohesive (Talbot, 2007). Further, new development initiatives in response to the crisis of the Partition worked at every level of society: from relatives helping each other out with housing and food, to municipal authorities, across Punjabi cities like Lahore, Gujrunwala, and Multan, that undertook the construction of large housing projects and sanitation infrastructure for incoming refugees, to the provincial authorities who offered loans as credit to sponsor new businesses, offered tax-cuts to aspiring industrialists, and money grants for the training of refugees in electric work and machine handling (Talbot, 2007). In the Punjab of West Pakistan, social development—the improvement of peoples' capabilities, through affordable housing, economic benefits, and access to clean water—occurred at an unparalleled and rapid rate in the moments following the Partition.

This was entirely different than the absence of development initiatives that were happening in Sindh, where no studies or newsprints could be found on the Sindh government's development efforts following the Partition. The Sindh legislature was filled with land-lords, many of them ethnic Sindhis who felt little to no connection to the incoming refugees—no such tribal bonds, as had spanned across Punjab, which straddled India and Pakistan, existed for Sindh.

But like Sindh, the Punjab's provincial government was heavily filled with *wadero* interests, presenting a paradox: recall that, at the cusp of Independence, both the Sindh and Punjab provincial governments were overwhelming filled with *wadero* landlords (in 1951, 80% of Punjab's provincial government was composed by landlords, and in 1955, that same statistic was 90% for Sindh) (Alam, 1974). Even in 1948, it is important to note that many landlords in the Punjab provincial government expressed concerns over refugee resettlements and the impact of Partition on their province (Talbot, 2015).

A major reason for why such a vast array of development efforts, from the local to the provincial levels, still took off in Punjab, however, can be attributed to the fact that *civil society* seemed to be in a much better condition in this province.¹⁴ Because there were no direct economic contracts between the vast majority of Punjabis and the *wadero* lords that were represented or filled the provincial government—as contrasted with Sindh—Punjabi civil society was able to mobilize to pressure municipal and provincial governments to satisfy the needs of their populations across both urban and rural settings, without fear. Punjabis had more democratic clout and could demand more from their executive government: in one example, one resident of Lahore began his own welfare organization to pressure his local authorities to focus on improving refugee housing and sanitation projects, and later worked directly with the Lahore municipal authorities to construct a library, a girls' school, a welfare center, an

¹⁴ I define civil society, here, to be the organization of people that exist between the state and an individual's domestic life, and through collective action, ensure the preservation of the individual's integrity from state violence, and motivates the state to pursue more social ends.

industrial college for women, and a free hospital (Talbot, 2007). In the aid of rural settings, reformists politicians of the Pakistan-Punjab Refugee Council (established as part of the Punjab provincial government) even went so far as to explicitly counter Punjabi *wadero* interests in the desire to maintain *wadero*-like landholdings more generally, and through the Council's own bureaucratic and administrative power, worked to redistribute land to refugees and resettle refugees, albeit with internal contestation (Talbot, 2015).

The fact that a more egalitarian, “middle class” had emerged in the Punjab after Colonial rule—an economic ‘middle class’ in the urban centers, and the presence of smaller-property holders in the rural settings (a direct result of the colonial Tenancy Laws), both of which had the economic capital to protest social injustices—meant that there were more groups willing to politically pressure the *wadero* politicians into pursuing public service agendas, and to provide support for more reformist-oriented Punjabi politicians. The results of this, in the Punjab's response to the crisis of Partition, were expansive and incredible for social development.

It is important to note that, at the same (often-times *wadero*) politicians were in power in both Sindh and Punjab during this transition, the Punjab provincial government was actively transformed by reformist civil servants and by the pressures of civil society, versus the stagnation of the Sindh province, firm in the hands of *waderos* with little civil society-involvement.¹⁵ Provincial officials

¹⁵ It can be noted that the Pakistan state's take over of Karachi in many ways impeded civil society in Karachi, as the state's presence permeated the city, and little room was made for civil organizations that were supposed to separate domestic life from the government. Further, there existed few elements of civil society in Sindh's rural areas,

in Punjab, with the edging of their constituents, actively experimented with credit ideas and tax exemptions to foster the growth of small businesses and their industrial sectors, even when under the British they were given no real fiscal autonomy. Further, the actions of the Punjab province to foster municipal development projects—from funding for housing projects to improving water systems—went well beyond any prior executive development agenda the Punjab province had been responsible for under British rule. Here, it is clear that the crises of the Partition led to the transformation of this province, with its potential to undertake vast public service plans and projects that would offer housing, health, water, and financial security to its people: the deep motive of many in the Punjab provincial government, to work for the people at-large, is clear.

In comparison, the Sindh executive provincial administration really did not have to plan around or transform under the onus of refugee integration, and there exists little reason to suppose that those in power at the Sindh provincial government had any real interest in progressing the case of their most vulnerable, their tenants or the refugees, during this time of crisis. Further, there exists no examples during the transition period of the Partition of refugees or tenants ever mobilizing against the *wadero* system. The ability to mobilize, under democracy, would be the *second* test of Sindh's *wadero* system: would it be forced under radical change, finally, after the tenants and Sindh's newest migrants alike realized its despotism, and took to democracy to rid Sindh of an ancient practice

which had not witnessed any of the land reforms that Punjab's rural areas had witnessed—in other words, there were fewer small and independent property owners at this time in Sindh, who could actively demand from their government.

that had far outlived itself? This represents the final section of this chapter.

In conclusion to this section on the Partition, the initial story of how social development patterns emerge can be read from the two separate responses that the Partition elicited from the Sindh and Punjab provincial governments. One through this section can see the preservation of the *wadero-system* in Sindh, and the ramifications of this system's hold on the Sindh provincial government's response to the crisis of Partition, alongside the transformation of the Punjab province into a social development paradigm. In Sindh, the lack of institutional management expertise at the Provincial government, and the willingness to engage in development projects for the vulnerable persisted—under the grasp of the *wadero-system*, the Sindh province has been shown to be inept at serious development initiatives. Within these two examples, and as the research of Professor Ian Talbot, a major scholar in the field of South Asian history, makes clear, for social development efforts to materialize, they need the financial and managerial expertise of the provincial government in power—to allocate funds and adjust taxes, to build infrastructure and maintain safety, and to work actively with civil society to produce basic human necessities. In many ways, the province represents the locus of state power across Pakistan, and the incredible responsibility of social development lies in their hands. The moment of the Partition reveals Sindh's deep motives in favor of the *waderos*, and its failure in pursuits that would improve the condition of people of lower socio-economic backgrounds.

At the end—when Sindh finally did come around enough external pressure

by the Pakistani state to passing its first act to ensure the security of tenants (Sindh Tenancy Act of 1950) (versus Punjab Act of 1868 and its subsequent Act of 1887) it appeared too late and hesitant of an intervention, to remove power from those so entrenched in the *wadero-system* of Sindh's rural areas. On the topic of the Sindh Tenancy Act of 1950 and its efficacy, Malcolm Darling, a senior British official commissioned by the government of Pakistan to understand the plight of the tenants of Sindh, says, "The *hari* (tenant) is in the main too helpless to take advantage of it...If a landlord is annoyed with a *hari*, he turns him out...Formal eviction is not necessary, a landlord can always make things so uncomfortable for a tenant that he leaves of his own accord" (Sir Malcolm Darling through Ahmed, 1984, page 157).

Within this section, I have argued for two different responses that have changed the institutional experience of development agendas between these two provinces, and also has revealed deep motives that orient and push the provincial executive governments of Sindh and Punjab. It is from this point in the 1950s that one will continue to the next major event that can help us understand the growth and modernization of Sindh's *wadero* character. Now, I move to Pakistan's first democratic General Elections of 1970.

Pakistan's Turn to Democracy (1970), and the Rise of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP)

Among the tenants of rural Sindh, hopes were high—if the Tenancy Act of

1950 were to fail, at least they still had one thing within Pakistan's new political landscape: the right to vote. At 1970, Pakistan held its first general elections, and ambitions for equality and socialism ran high, especially with these tenants in Sindh (Ali, 2010).

Although no instance of tenant uprising has been documented in Sindh's modern history, a major movement of those from 'lower' classes against the condition and failures of Sindh's social state can be seen in the violent labor strikes that Karachi witnessed in 1972. By understanding how the Sindh Provincial Government, which was heavily influenced by feudal landlords, arbitrated these issues, one can gain an insight to the greater governance involved at the province-wide level—which is of great import if we are to understand why this province has failed so many people in the modern today.

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In the wake of the heavily privatized and unregulated economy of Karachi, nearly 200,000 workers organized a walk-out from their industrial jobs. On March 28th, 1972, these workers operated a strike against industrialist managers in Karachi, the capital of Sindh, after managers refused to improve wages and compensation benefits for their workers—costing the city an estimated 250 million dollars in lost productivity (Ali, 2010). Using the energetic socialism of the Pakistan's People Party (PPP)¹⁶, and the rhetoric of its reform-oriented leader

¹⁶ The Pakistan People's Party was the party that was overwhelmingly favored in West Pakistan, as opposed to the All Pakistan Awami Muslim League which was overwhelmingly favored in East Pakistan. Off of the heels of one decade of authoritarian rule in Pakistan (1958-1970)

and President (1970), Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (who happened to come from a *very* large-landholding family, who at one point in the early 1900s owned 250,000 acres across Sindh (Chitkara, 1996)), workers in Karachi demanded more rights from the vested political and social elites who dominated Karachi's modern industries, and unionized across ethnic lines to forcefully rally. Sometimes employing physical force—through coordinated tactics such as taking over textile mills or completely surrounding factories, trapping managers inside—thousands of workers, across the following days, pressured elites to concede their economic power and pressured the government to take notice of Karachi's current state, in light of widening socio-economic inequality within the city, and the deteriorating standard of social infrastructure (access to water and electricity) which was contributing to poorer living conditions for the working class (Ali, 2010). But by the end of 1972, at least twenty workers had been killed by the Sindh Province Rangers or the Sindh police, and the army was called into Karachi by Bhutto to forcibly end labor union confrontations.

I ask, in this final historical section, questions that lead from the previous discussions on Sindh under British colonial rule and during the crisis of Partition: how did the advent of a new democratic era in Pakistan work (or not work) towards the benefit of social development in Sindh? In what ways were the institutions in Sindh, like the *wadero* control of the Sindh provincial assembly, impacted by this turn to democracy? And how can we understand the evolving social development trajectories and political economies at work in Sindh as the province, within this concise history, approaches our current day? By

understanding how Pakistan's democracy manifested itself within Sindh, one is better equipped to understand the current condition of this province—and so it is with the events of 1972 that I continue.

Although Bhutto *did* concede, in delivering to workers better social security benefits and wages that were elastic with inflation, he also fiercely broke up labor unions and effectively removed the abilities for workers to strike, thereby actively preserving power in the hands of industrial elites.¹⁷ What had stood as PPP's winning slogan at the inception of Pakistan's democracy, "every human is asking for food, clothes, and shelter"¹⁸ had become, in the words of several workers after the 1972 events, "bullets instead of food, burial shrouds in place of clothing, and graves given to us as our shelter."¹⁹ (Ali, 2010, p. 238).

In the case of the aftermath of the labor union unrests in 1972, Bhutto's approach was clear: instead of honoring the populist and socialist rhetoric he once espoused to win over the citizens of Sindh (who had come to realize the immense poverty within their province, and the need for structural change by a strongman wielding the phrase "food, clothes, and shelter"), Bhutto as President sought to tame Sindh's working-class unionists via military force and political coercion, by nominally improving the lives of workers without shifting the power base of his elite supporters. By using his executive power to break up labor unions and by removing their right to strike, Bhutto forcefully maintained elite rule and

¹⁷ From a worker reflecting Bhutto's end to labor unrest: "We just have contractual jobs, if that, no unions and we are definitely worse off" (from Ali, 2010, p. 237).

¹⁸ "*mang raha hai har insan, roti, kapra aur makan*" (Urdu from Ali, 2010, p. 238)

¹⁹ "*roti ki jagah goli mili, kapre ki jagah kan aur makan ki jagah qabr*" (Urdu from Ali, 2010, p. 238)

undermined his campaign promise of creating a Pakistan that was imagined to be a “classless” society emerging from the struggle for economic justice and democracy—with the people’s voices being heard—over dictatorship (Ali, 2010). In fact, Bhutto failed to genuinely include other voices, and instead focused on consolidating his authority in 1972, first by dismissing PPP members that disagreed with him on social and political matters, and then by focusing his government on centralizing military and economic power, as opposed to pushing forward the welfare and social justice initiatives he had proposed, and which had won him the mass, public-based politics of the 1970 General Election.²⁰ This turn in executive power, especially for Sindh (the home province of the PPP), is important in the historical saga of social development, as the fruits of social democracy—the election of a socialist—seem in this instance to be producing little yield. A natural question exists: in the context of this nascent democracy, why would Bhutto side with elite interests, despite the overwhelming popular consensus on the side of workers and citizens in lower economic strata?

Considering Bhutto’s 1970 election by popular vote, specifically by many of the poor who had long suffered at the hands of landlords and urban elites, it seems contradictory that Bhutto in 1972 should prefer consolidating elite authority in Karachi, over appeasing the many workers through more socialist reform. But such collusion was possible, and seemed ‘democratically effective,’ as the World Bank has reported within a South Asia Working Paper, because of

²⁰ PPP’s turn to a more authoritarian party, under Bhutto’s leadership, at this moment in 1972 was met with many PPP senior officials resigning in protest (Ali, 2010).

the immense leverage that rural landlords could exert on their tenants and dependents (Hasnain, 2005). As I will explain, the PPP, under Bhutto, embarked on offering political favors to the *waderos* in rural areas of Sindh and the industrial elites in Karachi, in paradigmatic patronage politics that served to maintain power in the stable foundation of a few hands. This strategy affirmed, as I will explore, the coercive methods of feudal elites, that included threatening tenants with violence or the exclusion of benefits if they refused to vote for the feudal elite's party of favor, and gave little attention to the real needs of Sindh's urban populace.

Outside of the urban context discussed above, it is necessary to note that Sindh's rural population compose of around 57% percent of the Sindh province's total population (Ali, 2010). Instead of relying completely on the voter bank from urban contexts, the PPP under Bhutto was largely elected to power by those in agricultural settings. But, as 1972 began to show, Bhutto's lack of real effort in developing the socialist democracy of Pakistan, Bhutto began a different tactic of gaining "democratic" support.

Although primary source details of Sindh province between 1972 and 1977 are incredibly difficult to find (as a result of the lack of reports published by the Sindh provincial government on the condition of rural areas during this time period), many secondary sources exist which directly implicate the Bhutto government in signing mass contracts with feudal lords for their vote banks ahead of the 1977 elections (Haq, 1998, Husain, 1999, Husnain, 2005). In return for the promise of little government interference in their landholdings, the feudal lords of

rural Sindh made sure that their tenants would vote for the PPP through offering small money checks for tenant votes or through forcefully ‘suggesting’ tenants to vote for the PPP or to have their economic compensation damaged (Husain, 1999), the feudal lords were able to convert their tenants, who had few enshrined rights and were extraordinarily economic dependent (recall, tenants were given no tenancy legislations by the British, and the Sindh Tenancy Act of 1950 was described as a failure), into a stable vote bank for the PPP (Haq, 1998, Husain, 1999, Husnain, 2005).²¹

It was in this way, then, that Bhutto in 1972, and ahead of the 1977 general elections, began to consolidate his power over Sindh, independent of the needs of the poor—rural or urban (Husnain, 2005, and Ali, 2010). Un-impacted by the sway of the masses and the intense demands they aspired to achieve, Bhutto, by working with rural feudal lords, began to create a large enough voter-base through elite-sponsored coercive methods to support his own future political aspirations, without having to engage with the challenging process of bringing everyone “food, clothes, and shelter” (Easterly, 2012).²²

Because of the political disenfranchisement of the poor, and with the later readiness of future Sindhi leaders to strike such easy, favor-for-votes bargains

²¹ These insights were gained by many of these authors through interview work done in rural areas with tenants who had participated in the 1977 election, and through looking at discrepancies in the 1977 election results, which established the ‘extreme majority’ won by the PPP in rural settings, despite the little socio-economic change brought by the 1972 PPP government (Haq, 1998, and Husain, 1999).

²² It is important to note that such socialist populism was also employed during this time period by governments in India and Bangladesh. Slogans like Indira Gandhi’s “Gharibi Hitao!” (“End poverty!”) in India bear similarities to the social climates across the Subcontinent, which were ready to seize upon the technical advances of their modern day, to rid themselves of life-depriving and ‘backward’ poverty (Bose and Jalal, 2011).

with the feudal *waderos*, human development has continued to be systematically impeded in Sindh, a fact especially present in its rural areas (Easterly, 2012). In terms of literacy, educational attainment, and infant mortality rates, Sindh's rural areas do far worse than those of Punjab, with the latter demonstrating more rapid improvements of such human welfare indicators—despite the fact that Sindh has consistently had (1948 – 2017) the highest per capita income in all of Pakistan (Khan and Rehman, 2012, and Khan, 2002), largely due to Karachi's booming private economy.^{23,24} I specifically implicate Sindh's social development failures during the post-Partition era with the elision of PPP and *wadero* interests during the 1970s, because such a political and feudal agreement was specific to Sindh.

Although Bhutto was the Prime Minister of the entirety of Pakistan, his work with vested feudal elites in Sindh, during his nascent reign (1972), paved the path for his party's dominance in Sindh—specifically because there had been a long-existing feudal character already native to Sindh. When Bhutto's PPP won a super-majority in the elections of 1977, there existed widespread condemnation across the civil and military bureaucracy over extensive vote-rigging and illegal election practices, and it was at this moment that a general in the army, Zia ul Haq, launched a coup (Bose and Jalal, 2011).

It is important to note that Pakistan's Punjab province, after witnessing the PPP's rampant corruption and authoritarian character, and once democracy was

²³ It is important to note that there exists significant provincial autonomy in decisions regarding the expenditures on health, education, and sanitation areas, as part of the 'devolved' powers from Pakistan's federal center (Anjum, 2001, and Khan and Rehman, 2012).

restored in 1988, began to turn towards another political party, the Pakistan Muslim League, under which it has continued to elect its leaders from. It is important to note, however, that since 1972 and until this current moment the PPP have remained entrenched within the Sindh province—and the PPP have continued since 1972 to have strong turn-outs across Sindh’s rural areas. In this way, the domination of PPP in rural areas, and the assurance of a strong voter bank, have caused the provision of public services to have been largely ignored in Sindh’s modern history, and the persistence of under-development in Sindh has continued along with patronage politics and the *wadero*-domination of Sindh’s central government.^{25 26}

But this preservation of power in the hands of the *waderos* in the latter 1970s was not solely limited to preserving their economic interests and the interest of elites writ large, where they had previously been successful against working-class power in 1972, or in their withdrawal from the sphere of welfare service provision as commitments to the poor no longer had to be valued. With the Pakistani-state controlled by the Pakistan’s People Party (PPP) at 1972, the PPP Sindhi provincial government, and its elite allies, had full sway to enact several wider policies, specifically in relation to its economic center, Karachi, with a political ‘blank check.’ Beyond the fact that the PPP stronghold did not

²⁵ A key point to raise, however, were the Land Reforms of 1972 and 1977 that Bhutto introduced to the national stage—but as scholarship has presented, were ‘nominal’ acts meant to demonstrate a superficial commitment to social justice. In fact, these land reforms have done little to structurally transform agricultural relationships across rural Sindh (the percent of small landholdings did not increase as a result of these reforms, which indicates poor implementation) (Ahmed, 1984).

²⁶ Difference in size of civil society, ability to use democratic competition to yield results

necessarily need the city of Karachi for its votes to maintain power at this time, the collusion of political elites with landlords in the rural areas of Sindh gave new leeway for Sindhi nationals to begin to ‘reclaim’ Sindh from the immigrants who migrated to Karachi, post-Partition.²⁷ Efforts to further centralize Sindh to the benefit of those in power, in specific claims to Sindhi provincial autonomy that had been “colonized” after Partition, included the re-instatement in 1972 of Sindhi as the official language of the province, discriminating against the majority Urdu speaking Muhajirs of Karachi, and a system of quotas preferentially treating ethnic Sindhis over Muhajirs in the workplace and in the civil service bureaucracy (Jalal, 2014 and Khan, 2002).^{28, 29} Although the Sindh provincial government had justification to reinstate Sindhi as *the* language of operation in Sindh—even in British times, Sindhi was the official language of the Sindh province—its unwillingness to reconcile substantial Muhajir linguistic and economic interests—or the welfare interests of *any* citizen of Sindh—in 1972 is key (Haq, 1995, Khan, 2002). As one of the few successful executive initiatives pursued by the Sindh provincial government, it was language imposition and ethnic quotas—and not social development initiatives or implementable tenancy legislations— that characterized Sindh’s governance in its modern history.

²⁷ The Muhajirs of Karachi and other non-Sindhi immigrants, were estimated to be 40-50% of the population of Karachi in 1972 (Haq, 1995).

²⁸ Muhajirs are immigrants who had come to Karachi during Partition.

²⁹ One can also read the establishment of the quota system in the workplace in Karachi, not just as a way to appease ethnic Sindhis, but as a planned strategy by Bhutto to break apart the industrial working class along ethnic lines (Ali, 2010). Although this is in need of more research, the 1972 language riots between Sindhis and Muhajirs was clear in Bhutto’s conscience, and the shift towards ethnic-based politics, instead of class-based politics, rises at this point.

The 1970s Responses to the failures of the Sindh Provincial Management: MQM and Rising Resistance

But against the politically, economically, and linguistically centralizing forces of the Sindh provincial government during the 1970s—which seemed to only reproduce elite modes of political, economic and social existence—a movement from the Muhajirs arose from students in Karachi in the late 1970s. Described as a movement of the urban middle class to “challenge the feudal structure of Pakistani state and society,” students, and subsequently other members of Karachi’s nascent civil society, began protesting Muhajir marginalization at the hands of centralized Sindhi authority (Khan, 2006). In the demand for the economic rights and recognition of Muhajirs, the All Pakistan Muhajir Student Organization (APMSO) was founded in 1978, and became the official political party, the Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM), in 1984 (Haq, 1995).

As one commentator states, “To this day, [the] MQM remains the only party in Pakistan to include the abolition of the feudal system in its chief objectives” (Shahid, 2015). Although a complete account of the MQM’s rise to power against the PPP-dominated Sindh government is beyond the scope of this chapter, I hope to briefly present the way that the MQM significantly challenged PPP centralized power, specifically around the nexus of social services and welfare. This occurred through the establishment of the APMSO (and later MQM)

welfare and social service organization, the Khidmat e Khalq Foundation (KKF) in 1978. Through this example, I hope to demonstrate how the MQM viewed itself, in light of the severe condition of social infrastructure caused by the neglect of the Sindh provincial government.

In this thesis, discussions on social and welfare services is key to understanding Sindh's poor social development trajectory—and relevant to this discussion about Pakistan's nascent democracy, social service delivery was a major goal of the PPP. Although it was elected on the socialistic principles of “food, clothes, and shelter,” it quickly adopted feudal principles—with the impact of such a political transition seen in Sindh's historically lagging rural human development metrics. In Sindh's aspirations to ‘re-take’ Karachi, we have seen the examples of labor unions dispersions, language mandates, and quota systems as representative of Sindh's top-down approach. Coupled with these policies, the Sindh government's lagging public health expenditures within this specific time period support the hypothesis that the political elites controlling Sindh were less inclined towards improving the welfare of all peoples in rural Sindh and in its capital, Karachi, than they were to reclaiming their power and heritage and to isolating their power away from the unionists and immigrants in Karachi (Haq, 1995).

It is important also to note that the failures of social development by the Sindh provincial government were not completely veiled—in fact they were readily visible to politically active members of Karachi's civil society. In response, early politically-aspiring Muhajir students established the KKF in 1978,

in the clear absence of any sort of legitimate state-sponsored welfare program (Bano, 2009). The KKF is, and was, oriented towards providing debt-relief to the poor, free medical services and treatment to those in need, and aid to those affected by crises (KKF Constitution). Although there is no published report on the actual efficacy and extent of the KKF's services, providing welfare services—specifically in the vacuum created by the Sindh government's neglect of public sector provisions—is central to MQM's mission of establishing socialistic democracy against the authoritarian and feudal control of the PPP. In its further 'democratic agenda,' it is interesting to understand that the KKF's 1978 constitution explicitly states: "Not only Mohajir families are being aided by the KKF but the list also includes Sindhis, Baloch, Punjabis, Saraikis and Pakhtoons, in fact, people of all the nationalities of the country" (KKF Constitution). Although existing alongside deep political aspirations to uproot the entrenched PPP, the MQM's early efforts to address the vacuum in state services, not just for Muhajirs but for the many ethnic communities that exist in Karachi, is important to highlight (although the efficacy of the KKF in administering aid and welfare has not been established).

Beyond the KKF, the final way that the failures of Sindh's social development became visible and were debated was in the early political engagement of the MQM with the PPP (1985-1988) (Haq, 1995). In addition to continuing their independently organized KKF (it is important to know that PPP does not have any welfare organization branches), the MQM began discussing with PPP policy-changes centered around the reversal of the economic and civil

quota systems, the establishment of better democratic systems, and especially important to our discussion here, the overall improvement of urban welfare and social development, as outlined and signed by both parties in the Karachi Accords (1988). These Accords quickly failed, and by 1989, the MQM had to pursue alternate political methods to achieve their ideals of social development and a more fair democracy (Haq, 1995). In 1990, the MQM allied with specifically anti-PPP political parties, in the party block, Islami Jamhoori Ittehad (which included PPP's major rival, Punjab's Pakistani Muslim League), which sought to remove the PPP grip over the political life of Sindh, and at this time, its resurgence in Pakistani politics—and for the MQM, to remove power from the unjust feudal rulers of Sindh, who did little to improve the socio-economic conditions of their constituents (or for that matter, did little across Sindh's post-colonial history to advance socio-economic conditions in the province).

In this section's closing thoughts, the MQM's anti-PPP stance, and its vie for power in providing welfare and in successfully organizing with PPP-opposing political groups, significantly challenged the authority of Sindh's political elites. MQM had demonstrated that, through mass organizing and relief efforts, they could tip the political balance, as was shown in their significant contribution to the success of the IJI in beating the PPP in the 1990 General Elections (BBC, 2018). But such threats to the legitimacy of the PPP would not go unheeded. When PPP power was restored in the Sindh province and nationally in 1993, Operation Clean-Up was ordered by the PPP government, and state rangers and Sindh Police killed more than 3,000 individuals in Karachi, specifically targeting

MQM party members, supporters, sympathizers, and other citizens (Ahmar, 1996, and Zaidi 1997). The political contest of the MQM, that had recognized the failures of the PPP government, was nearly destroyed, and during Operation Clean-Up, it was evident that the PPP was solely attempting to violently wrest power from the MQM: absolutely no relief aid was provided by the PPP provincial government to the citizens of Karachi, and no efforts were made by the PPP government to reinstate law and order to the city (Ahmar, 1996, and Zaidi, 1997). The degradation of Karachi's state of law and order, in the wake of no provincial aid or the province's neglect in the maintenance of security in this city, quickly made Karachi into Asia's most dangerous city in the 1990s (Mustafa, 2007). Unfortunately, it seems that Karachi at 1994—although more economically developed—was no better socially than Karachi at 1970.

Within the exploration of Pakistan's first turn to democracy in 1970, one can use the locus of 'provisions of welfare services' to understand the socialist rise of PPP power in Sindh (1970), the neglect of the PPP-ruling elite coalition (1970 - onwards), and the ample space produced for MQM's welfare organization, KKF, alongside MQM's political presence (and persecution) in Karachi (1978 – 1993 and 1996 - onwards). Through this, I offer a way of understanding the forces that have worked throughout Sindh, in order for us to not only better understand human development trends as they have unfolded across this province's modern history but also to further investigate the future possibilities of this province, as I will further discuss in Chapter 3. In this thesis, I have hoped to understand the historical sources for the poor performance of

Sindh's social development trajectory. Now, I hope to turn to a final and brief section which will position us to enter the current moment of Sindh.

Modern Implications of Sindh's History

In the failure of the ability for the state (the Sindh provincial government, in this case) to meet the needs of its citizens, one also sees the rise of non-state actors trying to fill the gap in the provision of basic services. And the feudal *waderos*, that dominated the Sindh provincial government, weren't only problems for the MQM—they regularly and systematically impeded the World Bank's development efforts in Sindh during the 1980s. In this time period, The World Bank entered Pakistan, and specifically focused on the under-development it had evaluated in Pakistan's Sindh province—and especially in its rural areas, which had not been benefitted by the rise of private economic development that has taken root in the urban center of Karachi (Khan, 2002). But, as is often the curse of development, projects that work *in vitro* often do not live to their expectation upon meeting on-the-ground realities. In fact there exists a body of literature surrounding the failure of World Bank development projects in specifically the Sindh province *because* of the interference and administrative hindrance provided by vest landed elites (or the *waderos*) (Broich, 2007, Mustafa, 2007, and Memon and Mustafa, 2012). Within this literature, one finds incriminating evidence that the *waderos*—kept in tact from British Colonial Rule (1843), undergoing 'modern transformations,' through to the advent of multiparty democracy to Pakistan

(1970), still present a problem for the social development needs of the Sindh Province.

From one study (Memon and Mustafa, 2012), we have the following:

“Over the last 15 years, the SIDA (institutional reform mechanism) could not establish any mechanism to ensure the democratic election of the members of AWB (Area Water Boards)...The operations of these AWBs were in the hands of **politically installed feudal lords** without having any representation of the farmers at large.” The study continues, “Evidences suggest the **large landholders**, who were one of the reasons for the failure of the state-managed irrigation system in the province, had already captured the management committees of FOs (Farmer Organizations) by implanting either themselves or their proxies on the key positions of MCs (management committees)... such a tendency on the part of the **large landholders** could have its roots in the skewed power distribution in rural Sindh.” Finally, the corruption of the *waderos* and their age-old grip on rural Sindhi society, is made clear: “found it unrealistic to assume that **the large farmers**, for whom control over irrigation was the key to remain advantageous in the local power structure, could relinquish it in favour of the marginalised farmer.” They conclude by stating that a major factor in the failure of World Bank irrigation projects was “**the possibility of feudal lords and politicians capture**”

- Memon and Mustafa, 2012 (p. 278-279, parentheses and bold added by author, “Emerging Issues in the Implementation of Irrigation and Drainage Sector Reforms in Sindh, Pakistan”)

Another study states that the failure of World Bank water projects can be explained by: “the importance of local-level water management to the patron-client relationship that the British Empire had developed with the local elites and the importance they attached to that relationship” (Mustafa, 2007, p. 489). It is in this way that development initiatives by non-state actors have been hindered in Sindh, and their subsequent obstruction and destruction by Sindh’s *wadero* landlords (Broich, 2007, Mustafa, 2007, and Memon and Mustafa, 2012).

Important to note, as well, is that the neglect the modern-day Sindh provincial

government assumes towards its province—in letting *waderos* continue their rule—is perhaps most evident in the difference between Sindh and Punjab in their abilities, as ‘states,’ to extract taxes from land within their provincial jurisdiction. Punjab has a much higher ability to tax land within its province (at an index of 1.356) than compared to Sindh (0.226) across the 1989-1995 period (Khan and Ghaus, 1996).

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I have aimed, in this chapter, to offer a historical view into how the *wadero*-system was preserved and transformed across Sindh’s history. The question that we are left with is—does feudalism still exist in Sindh today?—is surprisingly easy to address: beyond the data presented in this chapter, a number of contemporary newspapers and reports, both within and outside of Pakistan, have noticed the modern ‘feudal’ character of Sindh (U.S. Congressional Research Service, 2015, and Dawn, 2004); the Dawn report states:

“Now we don't find feudals who maintain private armies or collect taxes, but what we definitely find is large landholdings, bonded labour as well as total allegiance of peasants in return for economic support and personal protection. As a result there is a very strong control of ‘feudals’ and ‘waderas’ (sic)” – Dawn, 2004

Other reports have found that Sindh is home to an estimated one million bonded agricultural laborers (Zaidi, 1997, Congressional Research Service, 2015). Further, on the website of the Sindh Provincial Government, 42 officials have occupations listed as “landlord” out of a total number of 166 officials (25%) (Sindh Provincial Government). Although there exists no occupational listing under the Punjab Provincial Government’s website, it is important to know that

Punjab still has feudal lords—they are just less prevalent than in Sindh (as I will demonstrate in chapter 3, because, as I argue, of early British land reforms that were un-evenly imposed). Further, one must note that although data on all government officials, like was present for Sindh, was not available for Pakistan’s Punjab, the Economist has reported that more than half of Punjab’s assembly seats have been ‘inherited,’ a sign the publication has established as representing modern-day ‘feudalism.’ But the Economist also implicates, as I hope to begin in my next chapter to establish, that there exists *differences* in the overall distribution of modern-day feudalism in Pakistan: they state that “drawn mainly from rural areas in south Punjab and the province of Sindh” (Economist, 2018). In many ways, although Punjab and Sindh have similar economic productivities (per capita), their different histories have produced two different societies with two sorts of institutional legacies.

In the social development of the Sindh province, the preservation and transformation of the wadero system was a severe setback. I argue that this was because of deep interactions of *wadero* influence and state power, which yielded: little interest in advancing social development agendas, stymied institutional experience in actually carrying out development initiatives or motivating social reform movements, and encouraged corruption and little accountability. This is why the *wadero*-system has been negative for social development, and this particular history, I argue, has shaped and configured the realities one sees within the Sindh province today.

Chapter 3:

The Subjects of History: A Modern Day Ethnography of Public Service

Delivery (Public Healthcare) in Karachi

Introduction

Now that we have explored the ways in which the *wadero* system has continued and transformed into the modern era, a question remains unanswered: is there a clear relationship, today, between Sindh's feudalism and the modern state of social development in the province? What has not yet been established in the literature is the strong relationship I argue between Sindh's feudalism, as I have described in Chapter 2, and Sindh's comparatively poor human capital trajectory, as described in Chapter 1. How do we account for this, and what have been its impacts on the lives and circumstances of the people of Sindh in the present and on their prospects for the future?

The specific history discussed in Chapter 2 offers a new, causal explanation for the continuation and transformations of *wadero* power in Sindh. In explaining 'how' the modern and acknowledged system of 'feudalism' came about, the discussion in Chapter 2 has also shed light on the negative implications of the feudal or *wadero* system on Sindh's social development—from the capture of the Sindh provincial government by *wadero* elites and their subsequent engagements during the Partition to the corruption of democracy in 1970 and the dismal fate of such development programs like the World Bank's irrigation

projects. Chapter 2 has also shown the history leading up today and has tried to explain the interaction between the *wadero* system and social development.

In Chapter 3, I aim to present a proof that the *wadero* system, today, is implicated in the poor social development of Sindh, and to investigate in what ways the *wadero* system is currently implicated in the lived realities of people today. This chapter will be divided into two sections: 1) a modern, quantitative discussion of the ramifications of Sindh's feudalism on such metrics of human development (such as access to healthcare, education, and credit by the poorest of Sindh's province), and 2) a qualitative discussion of the implications of Sindh's mode of governance for people living in the province today.

In the first section, I argue that 'feudalism' and its relative severity in Sindh is significantly correlated with poverty, and that the 'feudal' character of this province is a significant predictor for its divergence from the positive social development trajectory of Punjab—in other words, keeping in mind the historical trends established in Chapter 2, Sindh's *wadero* system can be directly and quantitatively implicated in Sindh's poor social development trends. In the second section, I will argue first that Sindh's 'feudalism' is readily visible within the metropolis of Karachi, my field site, via the capture of the Sindh provincial government by large landlords and the subsequent production of a mode of governance rife with inefficiencies; second, I argue that the neglect of social welfare (as historically shown in my Chapter 2), can be seen currently in government-sponsored public services. I focus here on the Sindh province's government hospitals in Karachi, where the poor from both rural *and* urban

communities come to seek care, and where one can see severe neglect in the condition and management of these public facilities. Further, I argue that Sindh's 'feudalism' and its influence on the Sindh province's mode of governance works to corrode Karachi's civil society and its ability to respond to social development failures, with detriment to Karachi's democratic impulse. This thesis will conclude with a look at how modern-day democratic mobilization occurs against this feudal force.

Section 1: A Quantitative Look at Feudalism and its Consequences for Social Development

To begin, I intend to make a *concrete* link between Sindh's enduring feudalism and its poor social development from 2004 to 2015. Building upon the work of other scholars in the field of land-ownership and land laws in South Asia (Alam, 1974, Ahmed, 1984 and Gill, 1989), I follow the common method for assessing land ownership-tenant dynamics and private property ownership patterns by looking at breakdowns by acreage of private property within a given province, where the percent of total land ownership at or above the 50 acre level has been established as a direct proxy for quantitatively gauging the 'feudal' character of a given region (Ahmed, 1984). In other words, there is a consensus amongst scholars that private land held at or above the 50 acre level is a decent proxy for the *wadero*- or feudal character of a district, given the fact that, at Partition, 80% of Sindh's land was owned by middle-to-large scale landholders

(Alam, 1974, Ahmed, 1984, Zaidi, 2000, U.S. Congressional Research Service, 2015).³⁰

What is not shown in the literature is the effective difference in the *current-day* ‘feudal’ character of provinces like Punjab and Sindh—in fact, no modern-day study has compared the percentage of *wadero* land-holdings across the districts of Punjab with the same metric in Sindh. Further, although one study has quantitatively assessed the ‘feudal’ character of the Sindh province (Ahmed, 1984) via looking at land ownership of at least 50 acres, the research was based on data from 1972, and lacks data relating to conditions after major modern land-reform legislations in Sindh (occurring in 1972, 1977, and 1990).³¹ Although chapter 2 has established the legal and social responses to the *wadero* character of each province, the question guiding the first part of this chapter is: in the decade of this publication, is there be a difference in ‘feudal’ character, given the measures I am using, between Punjab and Sindh? A far subtler question, connected to my ethnography, is: how do the testimonies of the presence of deeply entrenched land-holding structures in rural Sindh, which were repeated across my subjects in rural and urban areas, speak to my quantified measurements?

³⁰ For perspective, one football field is 1.3 acres of land.

³¹ F. Ahmed has demonstrated that 100-acres had been a colonial British limit, but that in Pakistan’s history of ‘land reforms’ many of such land-holding elites often times subdivided or falsely reported their property to be under the 100 acre threshold. In the way that it can capture under-reporting, the 50-acres and above metric can better quantify feudal character (Ahmed, 1984).

Assessing the Difference in Modern-day Feudalism between Sindh and Punjab

To answer these questions, I have used Pakistan's Agricultural Census data from 2010 and analyzed data across all 22 districts of Sindh and data across all 37 districts of Punjab. Because feudal private property is owned most clearly through private farm holdings (Ahmed, 1984), I used data from the 2010 Agricultural Census on private farms within each district of each province to construct the graphs below.^{32,33} Specifically, I employ a previously established proxy for 'feudal' character (Ahmed, 1984), which is the percent of private farms owned at or above the 50 acre level within a district. This percentage was calculated by evaluating, across each district in each province, the total number of private farm land held at or above the 50 acre level in each district over the total number of all private farm land-holdings within a specific district.³⁴ Figure 3.1 shows these results, between Punjab and Sindh, and offers strong support for the

³² F. Ahmed has also demonstrated in his work (1984) that Agricultural census data cannot be used legally against land-owners. Because of the lack of legal implication in reporting, and because field visits by census-workers tend to be done with a standard of vigor, the Agricultural census data is a valid source for reliable data.

³³ Traditional agriculture still consumes 45% of Pakistan's labor force, and agricultural production predominantly happens under private organizations (Pakistan Survey on Agriculture, Ministry of Finance, 2010).

³⁴ The percent of land above 50 acres basically states: in what proportion does 'feudal character' exist? Are smaller land-holdings vastly more prevalent (a lower percent of land above 50 acres), or are large landholdings more prevalent (a higher percent of land above 50 acres), as a share of the total land in a district, or more broadly, in a province? In other words, a smaller percent of 'feudal' character means that there exists a smaller proportion of feudal land holdings to all land holdings within a district.

argument that despite the modernizing efforts of the last 40 years, ‘feudal’ character in Sindh remains largely unchanged (Ahmed, 1984).³⁵




Figure 3.1: Visualizing the Difference in ‘feudal’ character between Punjab and Sindh (y-axis represents percent of land at or above 50 acres) ($p=1.208E-9$).

Figure 3.2 represents another visualization of this same trend, broken down among districts, and the relative severity of Sindh’s feudalism can be seen in the significantly higher percent of land held at or above 50 acres, across Sindh’s districts when compared to that of Punjab’s. The first part of this chapter’s argument—that feudal character is more prevalent and severe in the

³⁵ With the y-axis representing percent of land held at or above the 50-acre level, it becomes clear that Sindh, in the present day, has a ‘feudal’ character that is 460% that of Punjab’s. Further, when one looks at the data of land-holdings above the 100-acre line, Sindh continues to dominate the sphere of large land-holdings (Agriculture Census of 2010, Pakistan)—despite the series of regulations in 1972 and 1977 signed into law by the Sindh provincial executive to curb the presence of land-holdings above the 100 acre-level.

Sindh province is clear—and the probability that the difference in feudal character between Sindh and Punjab, as shown in Figure 3.1, is due to chance alone is improbable (or a one in one billion chance that the observed results above are due to random chance alone).³⁶ Given that modern land reforms (Pakistan’s land reforms of 1972 and 1977) have been lukewarm in their efficacy in breaking up large *wadero* landholdings (Ahmed, 1984, Ahmed, 1996), the only truly transformative land reform legislations to impact Punjab and Sindh, I argue, were the laws that the British Colonial rule established only in the Punjab (via Tenancy Legislations of 1868 and 1887)—and it is this legacy as seen above in Figures 3.1 and 3.2, and in the astounding statistical significance of this difference.




Figure 3.2: Cluster-graph Visual of the Difference in ‘feudal’ character between Punjab and Sindh (y-axis the districts across the provinces, the x-axis represents percent of land held at or above 50 acres).

³⁶ A fuller discussion of these statistics is:

Given the null hypothesis: Average Feudal character between Sindh and Punjab would not be different.

With this p-value, which is less than p-value=0.05, (our p-value= 0.000000001208), assuming heteroscedasticity, calculated via a two-tailed t-test, we can reject the null hypothesis, and establish that there is a statistically significant difference between the feudal character in Sindh and the feudal character in Punjab.

Beyond assessing this difference, and central to this thesis, is assessing in what ways has Sindh's 'feudalism' intersected with Sindh's social development and human capital levels. Again, my objective is to provide an answer for the divergences in social development one sees across Pakistan which have puzzled scholars and the public alike for decades—and I directly implicate 'feudalism' as a key factor in this field of study.

Quantitatively Implicating Sindh's Feudalism with Sindh's Social Development Failures

Here, I move to understanding how landholdings intersect with an individual's access to healthcare, education, et cetera in our modern day. Currently, there exists no study within the literature that has articulated the comparative difference in 'feudal' character across Sindh and Punjab, and beyond this, no study has sought to quantitatively assess the impact of 'feudal' character on the lives of people living within the provinces. Although multiple qualitative assessments have been generated concerning the harms of modern-day feudalism on the livelihoods and security of tenants in Sindh (Alam, 1974, Ahmed, 1984, Khan, 2002, Cheesman, 2013, and Talbot, 2015), no direct correlation has been struck in the literature between 'feudal' character and poor social development metrics within the provinces of Pakistan. Here, I hope to bring together the officials who puzzled over infant mortality differences between Sindh and Punjab

(see Figure 1.4 in Chapter 1) with the scholars and journalists who have worked to uncover Pakistan's modern-day feudalism (encountered in Chapter 2).

To make this connection, I plotted the 'feudal' character for each district (with the same metric of private land holding at or above the 50 acre, as was used in Figures 1 and 2) with the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) of that district, for both Punjab and Sindh. The MPI is defined as a scalar unit that "captures the severe deprivations that each person experiences with respect to education, health, and standard of living" ("Multidimensional Poverty in Pakistan"). By specifically including both the 'headcount' of the number of people living in conditions, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has established as at or within the multidimensional poverty level, and the 'intensity' of deprivation in the education, health, and a decent standard of living of these people, the MPI is able to provide deeper insights into how poverty manifests itself within a region than can be provided by the classical money-metric of poverty (percent of population living at or below US\$1.90/ day).^{37,38} In other words, the MPI offers more advantages than the money-metric of poverty in

³⁷ Within the MPI, the largest components of the index are deprivations across multiple categories that impact the livelihood and abilities of the individual: the MPI for Pakistan is an aggregate of deprivations in 'years of schooling' (29.7%), 'access to health facilities' (19.8%), 'child school attendance' (10.5%), 'use of cooking fuel' (8.5%), 'financial assets' (6.3%), 'level of sanitation' (5.3%), to name the largest contributors to the index. Central to this thesis's project of understanding how social development has occurred and has lagged in Sindh, the MPI³⁷ offers a more comprehensive tool, in line with using the 'human capabilities' approach towards development, than consumption and spending metrics of poverty, which naturally lead to a more 'economy-focused' approach towards development (Dreze and Sen, 2002).

³⁸ The MPI report for Pakistan (2004-2015) was generated by the Pakistan Ministry of Planning, Development, and Reform, the Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative, and the UNDP, Pakistan.

understanding the relative deprivation of a region with respect to its human capital levels: a higher MPI value for a district is directly related with a greater intensity of deprivation in social development within that district, and vice versa.

By pairing each district's MPI value (which was averaged for each district from its 2004-2015 MPI values) with that same district's percent of private land-holdings held at or above the 50 acre level (data from 2010), I have generated a linear regression to assess whether or not a modern-day correlation is present between the multi-dimensional poverty—or the extreme lack of access to education, health services, and a baseline standard of living as determined—and the 'feudal character' of a particular district. Figures 3 and Figures 4 show this linear regression, for the provinces of Punjab and Sindh, respectively.³⁹

³⁹ Minus three major urban districts in each province, as 'feudal' character operates in predominantly agricultural districts (Ahmed, 1984). (19 districts used out of 21 districts in Sindh, and 34 districts used out of 37 districts in Punjab).




Figure 3.3: A linear regression between the MPI (y-axis) and the 'feudal' character (x-axis) of 34 out of 37 districts in Punjab. Correlation for Punjab between these two metrics: 0.2602, p-value: 0.137




Figure 3.4: A linear regression between the MPI (y-axis) and the 'feudal' character (x-axis) of 19 out of 22 districts in Sindh. Correlation for Sindh between these two metrics: 0.5327, p-value: 0.019

From the data, it is evident that although many data points exist in the Punjab under the 0.3 MPI level, no data points are found under the 0.3 MPI level in Sindh—a confirmation of the fact presented by scholars of human capital which have placed Punjab and its rural districts within a better level of social development, and a lower multidimensional poverty level, than that of Sindh's.⁴⁰

Further, the linear regression between MPI and 'feudal' character is a weaker model for Punjab ($r^2 = 0.0677$) than it is for Sindh ($r^2 = 0.2838$). When comparing the linear regression of Punjab to that of Sindh, there is a clear difference one sees in the correlation and its associated statistical significance (via p-values): Punjab has a correlation of 0.2602 between multi-dimensional poverty and 'feudal' character with a p-value of 0.137, and Sindh has a correlation of 0.5327 with a p-value of 0.019. There exists a stronger and more significant correlation (Sindh's linear regression has a p-value of less than 0.05) in Sindh between 'feudal' character and social development metrics (access to health facilities, education services, and sanitation networks) than there exists in Punjab. In other words, there is a stronger and more significant (p-value<0.05) interdependence in Sindh between 'feudal' character and multidimensional poverty—where 'feudal' character is a better predictor of multi-dimensional poverty (and the vice versa) in Sindh—than it is in Punjab.⁴¹ Further research into

⁴⁰ To be clear, an MPI value of 0.3 states that across that district, people are 30% deprived in their level of access to health, education, sanitation, and financial assets. A higher MPI value, of 0.5, means that people within a district are 50% deprived in their level of access across these metrics of social development.

⁴¹ A more fuller discussion of these statistics is:

Given:

Null hypothesis 1: There exists no direct relationship between feudal character and multidimensional poverty in Punjab

other variables, via a multivariable regression, could be productive in identifying other factors interacting with the multidimensional poverty one sees today in Pakistan's provinces, but the strength and significance of Sindh's feudal character with its multidimensional poverty has been established above.⁴²

Across the literature on Pakistan's human capital divergences along provincial lines, the closest analysis I found to a causal argument (as I have noted) was that significant social development differences between the Sindh and Punjab provinces "may reflect historical differences in the level of public allocations per capita to the social sectors" (Ghaus and Pasha, 1996).⁴³ With both the historical discussion (Chapter 2) and this statistically-significant linear regression, my thesis has argued that the relative presence and severity of the *wadero*-system of landownership has been a major driver of the historical and current differences one sees in social development between the Sindh and Punjab provinces of Pakistan.

Null hypothesis 2: There exists no direct relationship between feudal character and multidimensional poverty in Sindh (continued on next page)

Through this linear regression, p-values were calculated by Excel's "Regression Analysis," and relate to how significant the relationships are between our lines of best-fit in the two data sets (Punjab and Sindh). Establishing one can reject the null hypothesis if the p-value is less than 0.05 ($p=0.05$), we can accept the null hypothesis 1 for Punjab, because its p-value ($0.137>0.05$), and we can reject the null hypothesis 2 for Sindh, because its p-value ($0.019<0.05$). Through this, we can establish that there exists no direct relationship between feudal character and MPI in Punjab, and that there exists a significant and direct relationship between feudal character and MPI in Sindh.

⁴² Please see **Appendix A** for the full regression tables of this analysis, for Sindh and for Punjab.

⁴³ Another of the few causal arguments suggested: "[the fact] that these feudal elites were particularly powerful in Sindh...is one possible explanation for [its] particularly severe service delivery problems" (Husnain, 2005).




Figure 3.5: Proposed Causal Mechanism for the failure of social development in Sindh, between the ‘feudal’ character of Sindh and the multi-dimensional poverty of the people living within Sindh

But beyond presenting a causal framework to understand social development divergences, this thesis intends to contribute to the existing literature on human capital levels in Pakistan in a further respect: absent in the discourse on human capital levels are voices from the ground—from those whose bodies and lives bear the trauma of these statistics. Although this study has provided a causal framework, I argue that the current state of literature on Pakistan’s social development needs a further and radical expansion of focus to embrace multiple methodologies. Such an expansion must include: in what ways has poor social development influenced the subjectivities of individuals living in poor conditions? How has the experience of negative social development trends impacted popular patterns of assessments of the current condition, trust, and civic aspirations? And

where might one begin, on the ground, to start shifting these macroscopic trajectories that have shaped the current conditions of social existence?

One must investigate these questions in order to build a new scholarship actively aimed at moving poor social development trajectories towards healthier ones. Instead of being solely backward-looking, human development research must begin to shift its orientation towards the future. In acknowledging the many important studies that have historically traced human development divergences, I present, in the remainder of this chapter, a qualitative study of how poor human development conditions operate within the lived experiences of people, and I begin to pursue steps where advances can be made in human development on the ground. In recalling the project of human capital scholarship—that is to improve the right to life and capabilities of people by offering insights into the ways healthcare, education, financial security, and sanitation infrastructure can be made more accessible—and establishing that our current globalized era is the most pressing and effective time for social development (OECD, 2015), I begin the final section of this thesis.

In the laying out the final part of my argument, I will first investigate how the *wadero*-system, in its deep implications for social development, manifests itself on the ground in Sindh today. Then, in pointing towards a future-oriented perspective towards Sindh's social development trajectory, I will focus on understanding the emerging possibilities for Sindh's ground-up democracy as a way to politically and materially change current conditions, and Sindh's wider and negative social development trajectory.

Section 2: Qualitative Assessment of Present-day Feudal Character

In presenting a qualitative assessment of the impacts of the *wadero*-system, I intend to depart from current anthropological studies. Whereas multiple qualitative assessments have been generated on detailing the harms of modern-day feudalism on the livelihoods and security of tenants in Sindh (Alam, 1974, Ahmed, 1984, Khan, 2002, Cheesman, 2013, and Talbot, 2015), such analyses are limited to understanding how feudal systems are implicated only within the rural setting. Although this is important, and more current data is needed within this field, I argue that one can also pull this another way, to ask: how does feudalism impact larger social settings—including the urban context? Or, in other words, how has feudalism impacted governmental institutions and civil society across the province, writ large? Currently there exists no such qualitative analysis.

Although I was not able, for security reasons, to spend extended time in the rural areas of Sindh, the interaction between the *wadero*-system and social development in the province can readily be seen, I argue, in Karachi through investigating public services (e.g. public hospitals) in the city, many of which draw in rural populations and which are under the purview and responsibility of the provincial government. As I will establish, one does not need to venture into rural areas to see governmental neglect and abdication. The failing state of Sindh's public services extends from Sindh's urban centers to rural outposts, because these public services are under the jurisdiction and command of the Sindh

provincial government. Here, I look at government hospitals in Karachi to see how people engage with and perceive one key facet of the Sindh provincial government's responsibility—that of government-sponsored public healthcare. After this, I will discuss the ways in which mis-governance at the provincial level, and the failure of such public services not only hurts the poor but also fractures civil society into two groups.⁴⁴ There exists one group of individuals from lower economic backgrounds who understand the provincial level mis-governance of public services, because they must actively rely on such public services, and another group that are unable to see governmental failures clearly in Karachi because they are able to rely fully on private services. Especially for those who are economically privileged, there exists widely agreed upon theories of poverty that point away from structural issues and towards individual actions and personal attitudes. This division in lived realities and conceptions, I argue, wedges a deep divide into the civil society of Karachi, and serves as a significant challenge for mass mobilization as a democratic tool for expressing discontent in the situation of this city. Finally, I look to seeds for change in the potential of democratic mobilization amongst those most directly harmed by provincial mis-governance, in the project of shifting power at the provincial government away from its current stagnation and towards a more reformist and welfare-oriented state. In all of this, my argument stands: the Sindh provincial government, held in the grasp by the *waderos*, has failed in its provision of public services, but also that this

⁴⁴ Again, I hope to define civil society as the collection of citizen-organized groups or movements that exist between the individual and the state, and that within social democracies, actively advocate for the needs of the individual.

‘invisible feudalism’ (government neglect in the city, as opposed to feudal neglect in rural areas) actively works against the poor, not only in terms of the Sindh provincial government’s lethargy to advancing public service agendas, but also by making their struggle for basic services unintelligible by the rest of Karachi’s society, which is largely able to easily access high-quality social services through the private sphere.⁴⁵

The Lens of Public Healthcare

Having stressed the relationship between the level of feudalism in Sindh and its relative social underdevelopment, and given that Sindh is failing in its legal responsibility as a province to provide an adequate level of public services to its citizens (as seen through its poor MPI metrics), I begin this section with an analysis of the lived experiences of people in Sindh today.⁴⁶ I hope to focus in on one aspect of the MPI metric—that is access to healthcare. Poor levels of “access to healthcare” are the second largest cause of multidimensional poverty, contributing to 16.7% of the MPI in Sindh (the first being “access to education” at 28.1%). Public healthcare in Sindh is this thesis’s metric-of-choice, however, because of the deeper insights the scene of public healthcare offers into the ways

⁴⁵ Recall too, from Chapter 2, that this elision of *wadero* influence in state power means that’s there is little interest in advancing social development agendas, little interest in reform movements, and corruption and little accountability by the state.

⁴⁶ The provincial government is directly responsible for the establishing and running public hospitals, public education systems, public development initiatives (housing, sanitation, credit and agricultural efficiency programs, et cetera) (Anjum 2001, UNDP, Pakistan, 2013).

in which the neglectful governance of a province impacts the overall well-being of its citizens. Unlike other sectors within the provision of public services, like education or sanitation systems, where there exist some adequate solutions via informal means (using inexpensive private schools or cheap private contracting for connecting one's home to an existing sewage system), the public healthcare sector is devoid of inexpensive, decent, *and* comprehensive solutions within the market of informal services in Sindh (Zaidi, 1997).




Figure 3.6: Proposed Relationship between feudalism and poor public healthcare

In other words, the current informal sector in Sindh's healthcare, composed of private pharmacies and dispensaries, is incapable of treating serious infectious diseases or cardiovascular issues, and cannot compete against fully-functional primary and/or tertiary care centers in terms of providing safe, high-quality healthcare. Thus, in Sindh, the only way to achieve a decent level of care is through the formal sector, either through the government-run public healthcare system or through accredited private healthcare systems. And given the fact that accredited private healthcare is often prohibitively expensive for those from lower-economic backgrounds, the government-run public healthcare system is the main place people who *must* rely on the government go to receive health care (Karim and Zaidi, 1999). Understanding the realities of those who need to rely on

government services—for medical issues which cannot be simply treated by the medicine bags sold by various ‘health’ purveyors within the informal market⁴⁷—will be the first step one takes, to begin to understand the lived implications of the Sindh province’s social development failures.

Ethnography of Public Hospitals on the Ground

Rural Setting (Rehri Goth Village):

“I am afraid to go to government hospitals.”

- Patient 10

Urban Setting (Karachi Proper):

“Doctors take a lot of payment, and sometimes without results. For this project, please understand that the poor have no place to go, the costs are too high. So where should the poor and *garib* (impoverished) go? Should we die? Where should we go? There is no heart here. Isn’t this the government’s responsibility? But they are the ones who are asking for *dher lakh* (175,000 rupees)? Where should the poor get this money for cardiovascular treatment? These people who have small, small children and who are working hard, who work and then are sick, where should they get this much money from?”

- Patient

Health and hospitals, represent our most vulnerable sides: these places are where many of us enter the world, and where we often depart the world. This intimacy, between structure and individual, makes the ‘public hospital’ an important source for study in answering how the government upholds its

⁴⁷ For a further discussion on the informal healthcare market, please see Karim and Zaidi, 1999, p. 665-666

commitment to its citizens. Such answers become audible through my informants who live in a nation-state that, in its modern history, has spoken the language of ‘reform’ and inclusion to the degree that citizens have some expectations of basic public services—like public healthcare. The following is their story.

Responses from the Rural Setting



En Route to Rehri Goth, the rural location I had access to (Photo by Author).

To begin, I move us to a health-care setting in one of the few rural contexts to which I had access: a village on the farthest outskirts of Karachi, Rehri Goth—where *wadero* politics and neglect can be readily seen. Here, vehement Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) signs dominate, and yet little development has occurred in this village, which exists as a rural economy, with trade in fish and camels being the major source of income. The medical students I accompany

come to Rehri Goth once a month to offer free medical services, as part of their mandatory ‘Community Health Services’ medical school requirement, for their education at the Aga Khan University.⁴⁸ As we leave downtown Karachi, I am informed by these medical students that this village, Rehri Goth, closely resembles the sorts of societies and structures found in rural Sindh—and the first thing one notices in this village is that few people here speak Urdu, the *de facto* language of Karachi. Instead they all speak Sindhi, Sindh’s native language. And although there is no single *wadero* here who rules over this village—as *is* the case across rural areas in Sindh—there is significant land-holdings here by absentee landlords

When I had visited Rehri Goth, I was eager to talk with local informants about their perceptions of the government and its public hospitals. But, as we entered the village—passing dilapidated walls completely covered in graffiti of large PPP symbols (one slogan read “Sindh for Sindhis”)—the medical students directed me: “do not ask questions about politics here.” It was deemed simply too dangerous and contentious. And so, immediately, questions about the government as the provider of care became inaccessible—and at many points during this field visit, my translators would not even translate direct questions I had about an individual’s perceptions of the Sindh provincial government. Immediately, one notices that such conditions do not connote the kind of openness conducive to democratic citizenship—or to the ability to simply discuss political parties and

⁴⁸ The Aga Khan University (AKU) is Karachi’s most famous private medical institution, that is both a teaching and a private hospital: Stadium Road, Karachi 74800, Pakistan

their effectiveness, despite the overwhelming presence of one political party, the PPP, in this village.

Although I was not able to ask about the government directly, I was able to ask individuals about their perceptions of government *services*. In fact, asking my informants about their experiences with government *hospitals* in Karachi yielded to a wave of responses. After sitting down with a few of the people seeking primary healthcare check-ups, one also realizes how high infant mortality is in this setting—beyond the national data that has shown Sindh to be lagging behind Punjab in infant mortality (UNICEF, 2014), it is clear that in rural areas, infant mortality still presents a challenge: many women here for their primary check-ups have lost at least one child either at birth or shortly thereafter

All of those I spoke with were incredibly thankful to the Aga Khan University (AKU) for this clinic, as they say that there really are no other options for affordable or public health care—there is one government hospital close by, the “RHC,” but the medical students I am with tell me that this has been dilapidated for quite some time. Almost overwhelming, the people in this clinic (mostly pregnant mothers seeking health check-ups) are not content with their level of care. In a group discussion with mothers after their check-ups, I sit in a circle with pregnant mothers, aged 14, 20, and 25 (Patients 7, 8, and 9).⁴⁹ One woman, aged 20, has already lost one child within the first three days of his birth; previous to her delivery, she had gone to a major government hospital in Karachi (Civil Hospital) and, she said, she had been made to wait too long and was not

⁴⁹ All interviews done in Rehri Goth were done on June 8th, 2017

cared for quickly. She came back to the village, without her pre-natal check-up and deeply feels that the public hospitals did not treat her well (Patient 8).

Another mother, age 25, corroborates: “We aren’t given good medicines there (government hospitals). Here, AKU gives us the right medication” (Patient 9).

Further, the experiences of government hospitals have led to some deeply rooted fears and mistrusts over government-run healthcare more generally. One Sindhi woman, who came to the free clinic for her checkup, says that she’s afraid of government hospitals: she last went to one when her child was diagnosed with Chikungunya (a mosquito-transmitted infectious disease) and needed medical attention after subsequent fevers, tremors, and headaches caused by the virus had become unbearable (Patient 10). Although recovery time is usually around a few weeks, this child had Chikungunya symptoms for three months (what one might consider a significantly dangerous situation for a child).⁵⁰

When they went to the government hospital, administrators only allowed one parent to enter the examination room with their child—the other had to remain in the waiting area of the hospital.⁵¹ This Sindhi lady (white shawl) did not want to be separated from her family, or to be isolated in the waiting spaces. The ‘power’ in the government hospitals is not vested in the effective and systemic

⁵⁰ Chikungunya, being a mosquito-transmitted disease, is often traced to poor sanitation infrastructure and stagnant water (government failures).

⁵¹ The waiting areas of hospitals has been cited by my informants (across urban and rural settings) as a significant failure of government hospitals. These waiting areas are basically the ground outside of the actual treatment building, which inside has at most 15 seats. Without seats, people must wait outside the building, either sitting on the ground, standing, walking around, et cetera, before being called by the doctor. Such waiting areas are often not monitored by security personnel, and are very informal (no further chairs outside for people to properly sit on).

care for medical issues—for this woman, the ‘power’ vested in government hospitals was one of forcing the separation of families and of creating anxiety. “I will not go there again,” she tells me (Patient 10).⁵²

So bad are the public, government-run hospitals in Karachi in the experiences of many, that they maintain a mythology for those living in rural areas. One woman, who works as an employee for an NGO development organization in this rural village and visited the AKU for a primary check-up, says that in government hospitals, there exists no good management of the waiting areas: waiting areas, where patients must stand, roam, or sit on the floor before seeing a doctor and after the few *real* seats have been taken—have become the sites of fear and trauma (Patient 11). This development worker recounts how she sat down on the ground, unable to find a chair in this roaming waiting space, as she waited to see the doctor. While sitting, she was approached by a few men who told her to rest—who had convinced her that she was tired. She then recalls that her eyes felt heavy, and that she felt like she was under some kind of “spell.” The space of government hospital waiting areas was not secure, comforting, or stable—but was informal, instable, and filled with insecurity. Instead of the order, regularity, and treatment effective hospitals usually provide, government hospitals represent an inverse. When she woke up from her trance, all of her gold bangles

⁵² It is interesting to bring Foucault into this conversation, and his concept of biopower. How do systems exert power on their subject, and how are systems designed to meet certain ends. The design and function of this system of government hospitals is clear: it doesn’t ‘want’ any outcome for these patients, and so is disorganized, un-systematic, and diffuse in its productive power. Whatever power it does have, it uses to separate this family from the rural areas. Further, this is a non-Western setting for his model.

were gone. She also commented that she will never go to public hospitals again (Patient 11).

Although these testaments range from fear of separation to a mythological-element of insecurity in government hospitals, they reveal a deep consensus among those I interviewed in this village: government hospitals are not to be trusted. Rather, government hospitals represent a system and a locus of power centered around neglect and abuse instead of around attention and care. Further, government hospitals are places of extraction (of ‘taking away a child from his mother’, or of bangles) and not sites of receiving thorough and kind care. This further reveals an underlying—if not acknowledged—point: the government’s duty in providing public services is failing, and the government in Sindh is responsible.

Responses from the Urban Settings

This lack of trust in the government hospitals was corroborated beyond the rural setting. In the urban context, my friend Ricky recounts of his own difficulties gaining treatment at a government health facility:

“I came to the hospital (Civil Hospital) with a 104 degree fever, and I was expedited past the waiting line in the ER because I had worked at this hospital, and I knew some of the nurses. Although I didn’t have to wait the usual 1-2 hours to be seen, even if you have a life-threatening condition, once I came to the doctor, I was seen for 5 seconds, given no diagnosis, and given ibuprofen. I had to come back home, and my sister who is also a nurse, had to place an intravenous (IV) drip into me for an entire week—no one gives sound medical advice or care in government hospitals.”



The Entrance to Karachi's Civil Hospital (Photo by Author).

In order to further understand the urban experiences and perception of government-run hospitals, I went to Civil Hospital, the largest government facility in Karachi.⁵³ Specifically, I went to their cardiovascular treatment department—I had understood the struggles associated with receiving care for infectious diseases; what would the response be from those who had to receive high-level treatment of a completely different kind of morbidity, that of cardiovascular treatment? Further cardiovascular medical treatment cannot be accessed through any informal means at all—beyond the incredibly costly private hospitals that cater to Karachi's well-off.⁵⁴ Looking at cardiovascular medical treatment, in the setting of a public hospital, can reveal both the experiences of those who *must*

⁵³ Civil Hospital is Karachi's largest provincial government-run hospital, and there exists many Civil Hospitals across the Sindh province. The Karachi hospital can be located at: Baba-E-Urdu Road, Karachi 74200, Pakistan

⁵⁴ I define 'well-off' here in a rather loose sense: any one who does not *need* to rely on government infrastructure I define to be 'well-off'—or perhaps more concretely, middle-class and above.

rely on the government of Sindh, and their perceptions of the services provided to them by the government.

Within the Civil hospital's cardiovascular treatment department, I found individuals who had come to seek care in Karachi from across Sindh, and from urban *and* rural areas. From Lyari (27 miles away from Karachi) to Hyderabad (90 miles away) to Larkana (273 mile away), these individuals had come to Karachi's Civil because of its relatively better reputation as an affordable center for cardiovascular treatment. One young man said, "Larkana's hospitals are worse than Civil: the doctors don't sit in their designated seats, they don't look at patients with dedication. Here in Civil, they look well" (Patient 2).⁵⁵ Another man corroborated: "They had gone to a Civil in Hyderabad, but those people in the Civil hospital of Hyderabad were asking for additional fees that they could not produce, their diagnostic and final reports were also known to take a long time. Karachi was known to have the best Civil hospital" (Patient 3). Even closer to Karachi, the woman from Lyari informs, "Over there, there are no facilities that are any good at treating heart conditions. In Lyari, we have been waiting 10 months for a single operation because payments were really high and there's no one to get money from. These hospitals in the interior of Sindh, they are not good, and they ask us to go to the private sector" (Patient 4).

It must be noted that people by and large appreciated Karachi's Civil hospital the most (Patients 2, 3, 4, 5, 6).⁵⁶ This Civil Hospital was not their first

⁵⁵ All interviews at Karachi's Civil Hospital presented here were done on June 7th, 2017

⁵⁶ Karachi's Civil Hospital was, most likely, considered to be the best out of other government hospitals across Sindh because Karachi has a significant number of medical universities which require students to do rotations through public government hospitals—

contact with medical treatment: my interviewees had tried the Civil Hospitals of Larkana, Hyderabad, and Lyari, all before coming to Karachi (Patients 2, 3, and 4, respectively). Although people found the best-quality public cardiovascular treatment in Karachi's Civil Hospital, they were still very dissatisfied with the lengths taken to receive this care. 'Accessibility' to healthcare in this context does not simply mean the presence or absence of a hospital, but whether or not inexpensive, timely, and high-quality care can be received there. As these informants make clear: the failure of public healthcare is even more severe in other parts of Sindh.

Those from Karachi proper, however, are less satisfied with the care they have received by government-run hospitals. One man, a member of the Karachi police department, recounts his experience with government hospitals, as we waited for his annual check-up in the cardiovascular department (Patient 6). While on duty, he had been shot in the shoulder, and had to roam around for three hours at a nearby government hospital, which even required him to pay 1800 rupees before receiving surgery. He asks: "If the government doesn't help a police officer, who will they help—the average person?"

I ventured to other healthcare centers in Karachi, to some private and for 'paying-patients', and to some that were private but free of charge (such as NGOs doing public service work), where I continued to hear other perceptions of government services. One affluent lady, who I spoke to within a private

and Karachi has the most number of medical universities than any other Sindhi city. This most likely allowed for doctors with greater skills to see patients, than in cities with fewer medical institutions (Pakistan Today, 2017).

cardiovascular hospital,⁵⁷ when asked if she would ever seek care in a government hospital like Civil, says, “Definitely not. Government hospitals are full of bad practices over there--they save and re-use previously used needles without cleaning them, and because I have good money, I will never depend on government care” (Patient 14). As this discussion shows, distrust manifests itself throughout the public-hospital system, to the point that the idea of going to a public hospital for more well-off people is unthinkable.

And the litany against Karachi’s government hospitals goes on—the patients I interviewed made clear: there is no organization in waiting spaces and too much ‘roaming within waiting spaces’ for an individual, abusive language is often used by doctors, and medicines are not usually offered to poor patients (Patient 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25). Discrimination happened to patients by doctors based on their class and social status, and “government hospitals didn’t give medications but just drips and random injections, taking money without care (Patients 23, 21, 25, 4, and 6).⁵⁸ Among a few of the patients I independently interviewed across Karachi, there also existed a consensus that government hospitals were selling the free

⁵⁷ Tabba Heart Institute, a largely private and top-tiered cardiovascular hospital, which I visited on June 10th, 2017: Rabia Manzil, ST. 01, Karachi 75950, Pakistan

⁵⁸ It is important to note my conversations with doctors. From the doctors I surveyed across Civil Hospital, they cited being overwhelmed with far too many duties (a result of the lack of adequate staff), far too many patients to see, and not enough time within the day to see them all. As well, public-sector work is rife with corruption, and doctors do not receive comparable pay to that offered by the private market. Citing poor management of public hospitals in general, in specifically that money “dries up” at the administrator levels at the top of the hospital before even reaching medical personnel, many of these doctors are seeking to leave the public sphere of social service delivery.

medication, given to them by NGOs to treat poor patients, to outdoor pharmacies (Ricky and Patient 22). Although I was not able to corroborate this, many of the patients I interviewed said that a lack of free medication by government hospitals—and the fact that one must pay additional expenses to buy medication from outdoor pharmacies just in front of the hospital—was a leading cause of their dissatisfaction with government hospitals. One man said that in seeking public healthcare, “We just want to be treated with care and respect” (Patient 21).

In consensus with the interviews from rural settings, many of those I had interviewed in urban settings also cited the lack of proper waiting spaces in government hospitals—the fact that there exists no proper waiting spaces, but that one must roam around, sit on the ground, or simply stand—shows exactly how mis-managed and ineffective this system is. Instead of providing order, regulation, and high-quality treatment, this public hospital system seems to reproduce disorder and neglect in waiting areas, and market cursory treatments as ‘care.’ Further, citizens in Sindh don’t feel like they have a right to or communal ownership of government-provided public services; whereas public hospitals ‘should be’ for their benefit and well-being, public hospitals, although providing necessary and needed care, cannot even offer these people the dignity of a decent place to sit before being medically examined.

This section has outlined the conditions of public hospitals as they exist today, and the struggles people go through to receive adequate healthcare. Beyond statistics, these testimonies shed new light on the ways that the current Sindh government is failing in its role as a public service provider, and, in the process,

how it is failing to show respect to its subjects while breeding fear and a lack of trust.

The neglect perpetuated by Sindh's leaders is felt not only by the one million laborers who are bonded in *wadero*-system engagements in the rural areas of Sindh, but across the province (U.S. Congressional Research Service, 2015). Because of the significant political power Sindh's feudal lords have established at the level of provincial government, their general neglect or lack of assumption of responsibility for the public healthcare system is clear. A sustained history of neglect at the state-level directly manifests itself across rural and urban spaces in the public hospitals the government runs, and the absence of governance responsibility in the current public healthcare system is most acutely felt by those who are poor and who must rely on such a system.

In building off of an evolving scholarship on human capital divergences—which, although focused here within Pakistan, extend to studies across the world—one would not only wish to know how trends are implicated in the lives of people on the ground, but also, perhaps fundamentally, how trends can be improved. Do citizens, dissatisfied by the failures of public services, feel motivated to vocalize their frustrations of this breach on their bodily integrity and dignity (the poor treatment they receive at public hospitals) and to push for a higher quality of services that they are entitled to, as the citizens of a 'democratic' Sindh?

For this, one needs to look at the possibilities of political transformation—if the locus of social development is in the political governance of each province,

which manages and controls the delivery of public services its executive body to its smallest localities, then the political transformation of the provincial government is where a scholar of human capital levels would naturally start in the case of Pakistan, with the goal of making an impact on structural and deep change. If these macroscopic social development agendas are under the control and direction of the Sindh provincial government, then it is at the Sindh provincial government that one must begin a process of change in the project of systematic transformation.

The Ramifications of Poor Public Hospitals on Civil Society and “The Invisible System”

In what ways can Sindh’s democracy uproot the fundamentally undemocratic nature of feudalism and the present provincial government’s neglect, which, as has been outlined above, has been structurally violent to the poor (Farmer, 2004)?⁵⁹ The current moment is an especially ripe time to understand how entrenched and undemocratic institutions can change, as the potential for democracy in Pakistan has never been greater. Unlike Sindh’s tragedy of 1970—where the first materialized impulse of democracy led to the

⁵⁹ Defined by Professor Paul Farmer as the ways in which systems—like the national state or a public hospital, inflict violence upon a certain group of people (Farmer, 2004). In the case of Sindh and public healthcare, I have shown, through my informants, the various ways public hospitals are sources of direct violence (harassment and robbery of the development worker from Rehri Goth) and of indirect violence (the lack of care, attention, diagnosis, or treatment received by my informants, which allows their illnesses to progress).

widespread deals being made between the PPP and Sindh's feudal lords, and the crisis of PPP crackdown on MQM political activity in the late 1980s—the 2013 democratic elections marked a momentous turning point. It is the first time, in Pakistan's history, that governmental power has been transferred between two civilian and democratically-elected governments (BBC, 2018). As democracy begins to take more sure footing in Pakistan, the potential for this democracy to enhance the expression of the needs of the most vulnerable and the ability for civil society to enact political change through mass mobilization and voting, is at its greatest. To begin to understand how Sindh's civil society is responding to the sorts of social development failures I have previously quantitatively and qualitatively described, I will now explore the interviews I conducted across regular citizens of Karachi, doctors, and the insights I received from Karachi's media.

Karachi's Civil Society: United or Fragmented?

“Why are you trying to study public health in Karachi?” asked one doctor to me, point-blank. “Most of the poor people here are suffering from non-communicable diseases—hypertension, diabetes, all those things related to diet. There's really nothing you can do about that, they need to help themselves.”

Although it is true that Karachi's morbidity profile across urban and rural populations is significantly composed of non-communicable diseases (Bhutta et al., 2013)—and it is also true that traditional ‘global health’ diseases like Human Immuno-deficiency Virus (HIV) and malaria are not the leading causes of

morbidity here—people are being killed and are dying prematurely in other ways by the current public health system. With people living in substandard living conditions, and the fact that out-of-pocket expenditures for basic survival is a major cause for poverty in Pakistan (of the total number of impoverished people in Pakistan, 19% of them slipped into poverty because of expenses related to health, “MPI Report”), the fact that non-communicable diseases are significant does not absolve the public health system from its responsibility: to provide low-cost and effective healthcare.

In Karachi, the failures of the public health system—and more generally the system of public service provision—are invisible to those who are well-off, and as I argue, are largely part of an “invisible system” that most of the urban civil society cannot see.⁶⁰

A clear way in which one can test the differentiation of Karachi’s civil society is through looking at infant mortalities across the urban center. The poor, in Karachi, seem to be treated as a different class: many of them find jobs as live-in house attendants and servants, and within the homes of the affluent that they work in, they must use completely different cutlery, dishes, and glasses during their meals—these things being kept completely separate and well-defined against the ‘family’s ware.’⁶¹ Although they are, in many situations, paid well, their

⁶⁰ I define well-off rather broadly, but I hope to connote that one who is ‘well-off’ does not need to rely on government services (as one with a disposable income can pay for private healthcare, private education, et cetera). In other words, middle class and above.

⁶¹ I remember, in one instance, a family member telling me it was ‘unclean’ to use one of the maids’ cups, even though both their cups and the ‘family-ware’ were just washed, and were drying on a dish rack (separately).

economic dependency and their lack of available and accessible public services remain largely invisible to the affluent they serve.

During this past summer, I would go to the homes of family friends in Karachi, who are well-off, to break the fast after another hot day of the summer's Ramadan. I would come to realize that those servants—a majority of them women—who would serve us at evenings the delights of *pakor*as and ripe mangoes, lived vastly separate realities from our own. At least one maid, in every single household I had visited across the city, had had their child die either at birth or shortly afterwards. Sometimes, one home would employ two maids who suffered in this way, and sometimes maids had witnessed more than a single child dying. I came to realize that while infant mortality was so incredibly high amongst these maid-servants, no one really batted an eye; their conditions and suffering were made invisible to elites, who at the same time viewed the prospect of losing one of *their* own children as infinitely tragic. And although infant mortality has remained at a high level for the past decade in Sindh, few who are well-off seemed perceptive or receptive to this fact (Dawn, 2014, UNICEF, 2014).

In the urban environment, it seems as though quasi-feudal relationships take hold—or at least relationships that reinforce hierarchy and division. From my experiences within the city, there is often times no acknowledgement, by those who are 'well-off' of the equal 'citizenship' of those who are poor, or in other words, the ideal that the entire populace of Karachi, across social lines, represents

‘like members’ of a political community.⁶² Any notion of generic citizenship, as defined as a condition where everyone is treated equally despite social, economic, or political variations within the state, which is key for democracy (Walzer, 1989), is completely erased in Karachi. Instead, civil society in Karachi seems, I argue, more aligned to a hierarchical caste, with few acknowledgements by those well-off of the poor’s equal social, economic, or political potential.⁶³

The class distinctions between people in Karachi—if I might push, the borderline ‘caste’ distinctions⁶⁴—are firm, and only those who *must* rely on public provisions realize how sub-par they are. But the minds of many well-off have been socialized in a particular way—to take poverty, for example, as a given—“just the way things are around here” (Doctor 12).

Another vignette, I hope, can prove useful to this larger point that civil society remains, in Karachi, highly divided between those who are well-off and those who are poor, in a civil society which overall believes in more individualistic versus structuralist roots for poverty. While sitting around the television for our evening news, there was a special report airing on “fake beggars

⁶² For greater depth in a term I use within this ethnography, see “Citizenship” (Walzer, 1989).

⁶³ It is no wonder then, too, that domestic servants compose a significant part of the current labor force of Pakistan’s modern-day slavery: Pakistan is ranked 6th in the world by the Global Slavery Index for the prevalence of slavery, of agricultural and industrial laborers and of domestic workers (Global Slavery Index 2016, U.S. Department of State, 2017).

⁶⁴ ‘Caste’ not in the literal caste as is part of a religious, Hindu worldview, implicated in a hierarchy (Madan, 2016). ‘Caste’ here to mean a firm, entrenched hierarchy that aligns with the division of labor, and the lack of social and physical contact with maidservants and a lack of civil engagement—as well as the fact that, within urban settings, modern-day slavery of domestic workers can be found in Pakistan (U.S. Department of State, 2017).

in Karachi.” The TV show proceeded to follow the anchor going to the side of roads, and asking questions of beggars who were asking for money to cover the high medical costs of treating their ailments—two girls had severe burn marks on their faces, in another location, an older man was on crutches. The anchor of this show proceeded to wipe off the paint that had been made to look like burn marks on the girls, and forced the older man to walk without crutches—the point of this special program being to make clear: that beggars will fake their illnesses to receive money. Although the credibility of this news channel must be doubted, the responses that arose from those I was sitting with were shocking. No one was asking what, sociologically, produced these sorts of subjects and encounters, where people fabricated their own physical illnesses for economic purposes. Important to this discussion is how the inability to access healthcare is a widespread and socially understood index of poverty, as assessed through this T.V. show. Perhaps, even further, it is only through *externally*-presented and *severe* morbidities that one’s poverty is made visible. But against such theories, the position of those I sat with was clear: there was a general agreement with the anchor’s point, that poverty is the result between a choice of ‘lazy’ and fraudulent beggary or a choice of economic ‘hard work.’ Within this conception of poverty, located in the individual, the poor are cut-off and marginalized from the rest of society. Thus the visibility of government failures—the failures of the Sindh provincial government in providing basic public services, like decent public healthcare—becomes forced onto only the poor.

Doctors and the ‘Attitude of Poverty’

In understanding how civil society was perceived and advanced by the doctors I engaged with, I interviewed over 30 doctors at the Civil Hospital. Many doctors I spoke to at the Civil Hospital had very lukewarm ideas of civil society and participation—most of the doctors in Civil were offering their services as part of their medical school trainings. In fact, many of these doctors vocalized to me that they feel little public ownership (or responsibility) as citizens of this city: most of these doctors are preparing to enter the more lucrative and secure public sphere—where there are less stressors on the doctor than there exists in the public sphere.⁶⁵ In fact, there exists data that states that many of these doctors will not stay in Karachi: doctors working in Civil Hospital are part of the Dow Medical College (Civil Hospital is the affiliated teaching hospital of the Dow Medical College), and within the 5% of Pakistani doctors in America, 1 in 4 come from Dow Medical College, in Karachi (OECD, 2015, Pakistan Alumni Worldwide, 2016). They, literally, do not have ‘ownership’ of their status as citizens of Karachi—and have little incentive to work to improve the material and social conditions of this society. In their desires to move to other countries or at the least, into the private sphere, they have abandoned the project of public service delivery and strengthening Karachi’s civil society, even as they recognize “public hospitals need more trained doctors” (Personal Interview, June 14th, 2017).

⁶⁵ Many doctors vocalized to me that in the public sphere, hospitals are usually under-funded, which means that doctors must often times assume the responsibilities of nurses, technicians, and clean-up staff—something they cite as draining and demoralizing.

In another hospital, The Indus Hospital, another view of doctors and healthcare within Karachi's greater society exists.⁶⁶ The Indus Hospital is a private, NGO and tertiary care hospital—which means that all of its healthcare services are provided completely free-of-charge. Calling itself “the Robin-hood of Karachi,” TIH has a social justice mission to use the private sector to assume the duties of the failing public sector (Interview with CEO of TIH, June 17th, 2017). Especially in the TIH hospital, doctors are able to see, clearly, the people directly impacted by a lack of proper public healthcare—and often times interact with and treat some of Karachi's poorest individuals. They are able to see their role more clearly, in civil society, I argue because they are there within the greater mission of TIH—to stand up to the injustice of government neglect, and these doctors are actively part of this mission—to fill a desperate moral need, and not a medical requirement. But as they interact with such conditions of deprivations, there exists modern trends in trying interpret what is going on and why this system is failing.

I will present a final anecdote about the deep divisions in civil society within Karachi, particularly in the absence of a shared structuralist view of poverty as a socio-historical phenomena. It comes from a document forwarded to me by a team of doctors from The Indus Hospital (TIH, which is a private, non-

⁶⁶ TIH is run through a non-profit model via donors, and now, slow amounts of government funding. An innovative model for delivering tertiary-hospital level care to patients free-of-charge, TIH is a model in Karachi for private solutions to public problems:

Plot C-76, Sector 31/5, Opposite, Korangi Crossing Road, Karachi, Pakistan

governmental and philanthropically-funded tertiary care hospital)⁶⁷ working in a public healthcare setting. These physicians were all trying to understand why their lived setting—Karachi, Sindh, and Pakistan—were lagging behind the curve as developing countries. They circulated amongst themselves this manifesto:

“Kind long but worth pondering :The difference between the poor and rich nations is not the age of the Nation.

This can be demonstrated by countries like India and Egypt, which are more than

2000 years old and are still poor countries.

On the other hand, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, which 150 years back were insignificant, today are developed and rich countries.

...

What then is the difference?

The difference is the attitude of the people, moulded for many years by education and culture.

When we analyse the conduct of the people from the rich and developed countries, it is observed that a majority abide by the following principles of life:

1. Ethics, as basic principles.
2. Integrity.
3. Responsibility.
4. The respect for Laws and Regulations.
5. The respect from majority of citizens by right.
6. The love for work.
7. The effort to save and invest.
8. The will to be productive.
9. Punctuality.

In the poor countries a small minority follow these basic principles in their daily life.

We are not poor because we lack natural resources or because nature was cruel towards us.

We are poor because we lack attitude. We lack the will to follow and teach these principles of working of rich and developed societies.

WE ARE IN THIS STATE BECAUSE
WE WANT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OVER
EVERYTHING AND EVERYONE.

WE ARE IN THIS STATE BECAUSE
WE SEE SOMETHING DONE WRONG

⁶⁷ Tertiary care hospitals are able to deal with patient cases across surgery, family medicine, and infectious diseases

AND SAY - “LET IT BE”
 WE SHOULD HAVE A SPIRITED MEMORY
 AND ATTITUDE...
 ONLY THEN WILL WE BE ABLE TO CHANGE OUR PRESENT
 STATE.”

- Circulated to me by TIH Doctors (June 11th, 2017)

Because there exists no single, public narrative of why poor social development is happening in Sindh, those with a vantage point in society, like these doctors, are applying ‘social theories of progress’—or explanations driven by an attempt to understand current and systemic failings, without looking at structural roots. As these physicians struggle to try and understand Sindh’s poor social development, and the widespread poverty they see in the lives of the patients they interact with on a daily basis, such a turn to such a ‘development manifesto’ yields to them a just world, or an intelligible worldview.

Within this ‘manifesto,’ the location of responsibility for poverty and the deprivations of many poor nations is located almost entirely on the behaviors and attitudes of the citizen—in summary of their main point, people are lazy when they wish to be lazy, and poor when they wish to be poor. Instead of upholding the general consensus by scholars of development, which frequently locate the difference between developed and developing countries often times in terms of the legacy of colonialism, the governance of the state, rule of law, and security of these countries, this manifesto circulated between doctors locates differences in the productivities of countries to the individual, and their attitude: development, within this circulated ‘social theory of progress,’ is a result of “1. Ethics, as basic

principles, 2. Integrity, 3. Responsibility,” et cetera and the ability for the individual to “follow these basic principles in their daily life.”

One doctor at TIH, who was part of the group that circulated this memo, brought up the critical fact that—in the treatment of Hepatitis C—governmental policies can only do so much as to provide cheaper medicines. The only way of halting Hepatitis C re-infection is through changing behaviors of patients. She further notes, “This is coming down to the principle of taking ownership at individual level (of course, backed up with education) or "apni madad aap" (translated: help yourself).” (E-mail correspondence, July 3rd, 2017). Although agency is always located within a system configured by history and by deep and unequal power relations (Comaroff and Comaroff, 1991), it is clear that the education of patients in preventing re-infection for an infectious disease is different in nature than the education of individuals on their ‘attitudes’ and their current states of poverty.

As my data thus far have suggested, committing oneself to such a ‘social theory of progress’ as outlined in the ‘development’ manifesto cannot be justified on the basis of behavioral determinants of health outcomes. Unlike preventing re-infection, poverty presents a much greater and multidimensional problem, where the agency one has becomes more compromised, as it is deeply situated within a systematic, cultural, political, and economic relationships. If poverty was an individual decision, an “act on attitude,” why would we see such a strong interdependence of poverty with a structural force like modern-day feudalism (in

Figure 3.4)? And, are people impoverished within feudal systems because they actively choose to not “help themselves”?

The danger here is when doctors, who are concerned about flagging levels of development and the continuous presence of poverty, commit themselves to such social theories of progress: recall, too that this document was circulated between doctors working within the leading for-the-public free hospital in Karachi currently, The Indus Hospital (privately run, non-governmental organization, tertiary care hospital).

The main point that I’m advocating, and in my overall analysis, is a structuralist one. Building off of the correlation demonstrated in Figure 3.4, there are severe and intense institutions impacting poverty via the governance of public services, and we have seen a history of political oppression and un-freedom. The above series of anecdotes have served to illustrate the central point: urban dwellers, and even doctors, can’t really see the problem. The problem of poverty in Karachi is unclear for people on the ground—from the incredible inequality that is taken as a given by those that are well-off (“poverty just exists,” or that there is *not* something abnormal with such high infant mortality rates confined to one segment of the population (maid-servants), to a consensus among people that poverty represents a choice, and finally that the failure of the poor can be attributed to their attitudes, these differences in belief drive a deep wedge in civil society.

This has created two castes, the well-off and the damned.⁶⁸ With few even looking at the historic structural roots for poverty or poor health, few who are well-off actually realize the severe deprivations that characterize the public institutions that are supposed to form the safety net of Karachi—and no one ‘well-off’ in my interviews even cited the failure of public institutions in Karachi as a source of deprivation for those who are poor. Only the poor, who I interviewed, and who must actively rely on these failing public institutions—public hospitals—realize the poor state of public facilities and government-sponsored care. Further, no one seems to explicitly see the relationship between poverty and Sindh’s rural feudal lords—in a context void of structuralist ‘social theories of progress,’ this historical saga of feudalism and its influence on Sindh’s governance remains largely invisible, and the poor, today in Karachi, are blamed for their poverty.

The privatized economy and success of Karachi as Pakistan’s economic capital, and in its ability to provide high-level development conditions for those who can afford it, successfully masks the devastating state public services are in—because those who are ‘well-off’ never have to rely on these services. Economically fragmented, and with no broader sense of community or a broader sense of citizenship in Karachi, one finds security by identity, or by ethnic sectarianism. This creates a civil society where the only ‘thing’ connecting people together is not the democratic ideal towards holding institutions accountable, but simply put, money and the paternalistic (or ‘caste’-like) relationship between

⁶⁸ Fanon in his “Wretched of the Earth” (1961) provides an analysis of the ways structural forces can completely destroy notions of agency, progress, and hope for those who live within them.

those well-off and the poor. As Ricky tells me, “We do not see each other as equals—we all are here to make money. The Afghanis take their share of the city, the Patans another, the Muhajirs, the Christians, the Memons, the Sindhis, all take from Karachi and pocket what they can” (Personal interview, June 12th, 2017). Clearly, sectarian, group identities rather than a collective membership as ‘citizens’ is what defines civil society here.

Recall, from Chapter 1, that *urban* human capital levels have been the highest in Sindh, where Karachi’s private market for such services as health, education, and sanitation, have allowed the well-off to thrive (Table 1.1). This makes poverty, amidst so much metropolitan economic growth and such a high level of human development, seem like a choice. And, under the veil of democracy, the *wadero* system physically lurks in rural areas and in the state-power at the Sindh provincial government, to the detriment of the poor but naturalized to the eyes of the urban dwellers. Beyond the fact that few democratic ideals seem to underpin Karachi’s civil society, I argue that the lack of concern and ‘invisibility’ of public service failure leaves the poor alone and cut-off from the rest of society, and forces the visibility of government social security failures largely onto the poor.⁶⁹

⁶⁹ To be sure, the well-off in Karachi *do* see aspects of government failures—like a lack of regulation of electricity that often is implicated in load-shedding, or historically, in the degradation of Karachi’s security during Operation Clean-Up in the 1990s. But in this current moment, although the well-off are concerned generally about crime in the city, they are not actively concerned for, or aware of, the condition of the public services by the government. “Government failures” in this context is focused on the provision of public services, as central to this thesis’ discussion of social development in the provinces of Pakistan.

But those who are poor in Karachi—even if they are not under the direct yoke of the *wadero*-system—bear in their bodies the traumas of governmental neglect, and the decay of public services under the control of the Sindh provincial government. The impacts of feudalism now extend across rural and urban lines, if one is poor and part of a subjugated class, whether one lives on land owned by a feudal lord or not, the feudal lords control the government structures that, in many respects, control everyone. And such failures in government services has created such a wide divergence in socio-economic conditions in the urban city, to the point that pseudo-feudal, ‘caste’-like distinctions are made within Karachi’s civil society. Only those who are poor, however, must actively rely on such violent government structures. The final question of this thesis is: to motivate structural change in their material conditions, do people who must rely on government structures—often the poorer individuals in Karachi—use their vote as a tool to rally behind?

Seeds for change, Democratic Movements among those who are poor

“The vote is our right (*vote haq hai*), it’s the only thing we have” – Lyari

Lady (Patient 4)

The final point of this chapter is: how does democracy operate, specifically for those most disenfranchised?⁷⁰ If we see the project of civil society failing across the well-off, and even across doctors who are aware of governmental failures, are those who are poor doing anything to mobilize themselves and other elements of their civil society against those forces that continue to maintain violent structures? If this arrow mechanism, below in Figure 3.7, underpins the current arrangement today, then let us ask: are there any ways that people who are direct witnesses to public health failures responding politically?




Figure 3.7: Proposed Mechanism for the Potential of Democracy

⁷⁰ For those ‘well-off,’ including doctors, I wasn’t able to get as rigorous data on voting, as I spent most of my time speaking with patients. In the conversations I did have with doctors, they were mostly apolitical and not concerned with current day political events.




Figure 3.8: Breakdown of the Vote in Karachi across those Utilizing Public Healthcare

1) Feudalism, Identity-based Voting, and Political Agnosticism

Because of the lack of good public services and a social safety net, there is a lack of cohesion in this society, and a grasp on individual identities over collective identities. In an environment where individuals must stay afloat individually, against poverty, private capitalist economy, on the bottom wrung, the identity they cling to can often be their special interest group (Islamiat, PPP (not forced), MQM). Further, no public narrative exists in continuity that really *politicizes* the problem of public service provision in Karachi. In other words, many people don't really see their vote as a tool to change their system, these people above see it as an identity-marker, without realizing that they could change

this, and use it as a tool for political violence against those perpetuating inequity from above. Why don't they realize this vote as a tool for change? One would guess it is because they've never seen it work as a method for change: Sindh has been PPP since democracy arrived in Pakistan in 1970, and the stagnation of its social development has been clearly explored. One anecdote from the field can prove illustrative.

A lady arrived to TIH because her son had had malaria (Patient 23). When I asked her about why she didn't go to government hospitals, she said, "I have heard mixed things about public hospitals (Civil), and whenever anyone in my family is sick, we just immediately come to Indus." When I asked her if she was content about the current state of public hospitals and how the Sindh government was running them, she said, "No, but what are poor people supposed to do about this?" When I also asked her about whether or not she votes, she said "I don't think it does anything, and I don't really have the time to vote." Although recognizing that healthcare should be a public thing, and also being dissatisfied with things as they operate currently by the Sindh government, this lady does not view her vote as an *actual* tool for change. Her vote to MQM is based on her Muhajir identity, and her vote is not associated with the political power to, in reality, make one's views clear and to have material impact in the world.

Another example can be found in a young man from Larkana (273 miles from Karachi), ethnically Sindhi, does vote for PPP although he acknowledges that things in his village are not going to improve, even though the main reason he is voting is because he wants to see an improvement in the health and education

of his village (Patient 2).

But for the village of Rehri Goth, everyone engages in communal voting for the PPP, where the citizens' allegiance to the PPP is an unspoken agreement.

Among the few people willing to speak with me about politics was the Rehri Goth Union Council Leader—analogous to the central leader and representative of this rural village.

In our conversations he had made it clear how poorly the PPP has treated his village, and the complete failure of the PPP to materially deliver on its socialist platform. Recalling how electricity and clean water are 'turned on' by the government specifically during the months of an election cycle, which occurs every four years, to motivate voting in this village, this leader is frustrated with the government he continues to elect. "They only send us doctors at election time" he recounts, gesturing to the failed state of a nearby government hospital, the "RHC." When asked why he still supports the PPP, the council leader is resigned: "we *must* vote for the PPP because the PPP represents *Sindhi* interests, against the powerful Punjab which will take over the entire country if we do not support the PPP" (Personal Interview, June 8th, 2017). Across these examples, people do not view their vote as a method of changing the structures in place at the provincial government.

Feudalism and the Compromising of Agency, Forced Voting:

Within the Rehri Goth village, it is important to note the significance of ‘communal’ voting, which took on valences of being forced to vote. Initially, it was clear that questions about politics were discouraged within this setting, despite the heavy political symbolism of the PPP throughout this context. Further, a key moment in a conversation with the NGO development worker, who had come to the clinic for her primary check-up, occurred when I asked her about her perceptions of the government (Patient 11). Initially, she did not respond, and she immediately seemed more uncomfortable—she shifted in her seat, and her eye contact with us (me and my translator) became less direct. When I followed up with this question, she stated, “The government is working really well, it can improve, but it is doing a lot here for child and maternal health in the RHC.”

When I spoke with my translator afterwards, she was confused: “I am not too sure why this development worker would make false statements about the RHC—it has clearly been dilapidated for quite some time now.” Although there must be more vigorous qualitative studies on democratic politics as they exist within the rural areas of Sindh, it appears in this context that an unwillingness to speak about politics, and such fabrications of the government, work against the democratic process.

Feudalism and the Abandonment of the Vote, No Voting

Another branch of how voting operates, as I have studied it across people directly involved with its failing public health system, is the group of people who

have abandoned voting completely. Some do it because of the severe and perceived divide in civil society: one woman says, “I am not educated or literate—politics is for more educated people” as justification for why she does not submit her ballot (Patient 20). But there are other individuals who have clearly understood their current system, its failings, and the nominal presence of ‘democracy’ in Sindh, but they have been become so distressed by this system that they have stopped voting entirely—by large structural issues in Sindh, these people have been de-politicized.

The key example I would like to bring up is of Ricky, who joined the MQM party ahead of the 2013 elections due to its reformist (not ethnic) character. Having witnessed first-hand the failing public healthcare systems—recall his 104 degree fever and the failure of a public hospital to actually *treat* him—Ricky realized the complete neglect that has characterized the Sindh government’s engagements with the city of Karachi. On the basis of the MQM’s welfare platform, Ricky became active MQM organizer, and revealed that he purposefully engaged in corruption by submitting 400 votes to his party, using false identities, to help the MQM receive election to the Sindh provincial assembly. Despite the fact that the MQM did achieve a minority delegation to the Sindh provincial assembly, there seems to have existed too many political and structural hindrances within the Sindh provincial government during the 2013-2017 cycle for any change to have been achieved by the minority coalition. “The system will never work—even working through democracy, nothing can change,” Ricky tells me, as he resigned to never voting again.

Another individual, who I sat down with on the few seats within the Civil cardiovascular department's waiting area, tells me (Patient 4):

“I used to vote when I thought words were powerful and things could change. The vote is our right, it's the only thing we have. But I will not believe or vote again--this system is so corrupt and there is nothing to believe in. The PPP is so steeped in corruption and lies that we can't do anything. I will never have confidence--they have many tongues inside outside. But they lie, they are not Muslims, they let us die--we are taught better than these lies and corruption.”

For the very people that can see this system, hope in structural change is flagging, and some of them have given up on democracy completely. But there exists one final group that has chosen to persist and engage in democratic activities.

Political Hope and Transformation via the Vote, Reform Voting

Along the eve of the reformist-oriented Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party of Pakistan,⁷¹ I have found a significant proportion of patients who have shifted their voting within the past decade to support this party. It is important to note that voting across party lines is readily a possibility in the urban setting (as opposed to the rural setting, which I will explore below), and that present a symbol of hope for those currently constrained by the Sindh government, to be realized in the upcoming elections of 2018.

⁷¹ PTI is a relatively new political party (founded in 1996) by former Pakistani cricket champion, Imran Khan. It's platform is anti-corruption and welfare-oriented, although it has been embroiled in controversies since its founding (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2018).

One man, who recently began voting for the PTI , “I vote for welfare, although nothing happens after we vote, the vote is still our right and we will continue to use it” (Patient 5). Another said: "Last year, I changed my vote because those people in power in Sindh have done nothing for us. God has made us that we are all one. We are all Urdu speaking. He wanted change, so voted for Imran Khan” (Patient 22). Whether or not the PTI can win enough votes from a vote bank in Karachi already so factionalized will be the test of 2018. But in this section, one can see the remaining possibility of democratic potential within those most impacted by public service failures.

A Glimpse of Rural Settings

Although I was not able to receive direct inputs about the current *wadero*-system and how it impacts people in rural areas today (an important area, no doubt, for future scholarship), the condition of rural peoples kept on coming to the forefront. Independently, and across the city of Karachi, a few people I interviewed said that people in rural areas are purposefully kept under-educated because their landlords need their votes to maintain in ‘democratic power’ (Ricky and Patient 13). In a conversation with a student from Pakistan at Harvard, he mentioned the same thing, even though I had not mentioned any of my patient testimonies: he distinctly remembered a conversation from when he was 7, at the villa of a feudal lord, when after his father asked why there were no schools built on the vast acres of this feudal lord, the feudal lord responded, “If we build

schools, people are going to become educated. If they are educated, who is going to vote for us?” (Personal Interview with K. M., March 1st, 2017).⁷² Recall here that since 1970, many rural areas of Sindh (during democratic elections) have overwhelmingly elected PPP officials (Khan, 2002).

Other reports have found that Sindh is home to an estimated one million bonded agricultural laborers in its rural areas (Congressional Research Service, 2015). In addition to this, Pakistan is ranked 6th on the Global Slavery Index, for both its forms of bonded agricultural labor in rural areas and of domestic servants in urban areas (The Global Slavery Index, 2016), that present severe hindrances to the project of democracy in Sindh, and Pakistan more broadly. Further qualitative and quantitative research must be done to document the condition of tenants within the interior areas of Sindh and domestic servants within the urban areas of Sindh—as these present significant gaps in the current literature.

Although the current moment in Pakistan’s national history—given the landmark, peaceful transition between two civilian, democratically-elected governments in 2013—provides encouragement for the larger project of democracy in Pakistan, the discussion on Karachi’s civil society proves less than encouraging. Instead of presenting a unified, democratic civil society—a community of *equal* members who stand between domestic life and the state—to keep the Sindh provincial government accountable for its failures in its duty to

⁷² This is almost the same as: “the ruling elites found it convenient to perpetuate low literacy rates. The lower the proportion of literate people, the lower the probability that the ruling elite could be displaced.” (Husain, 1999, p. 359).

deliver decent public services to its public (failures clearly heard by my informants who actively relied on such services), the civil society present in Karachi is divided and dissipated. Some, like many of the well-off I interviewed, do not engage with the poor beyond economic relationships. Amongst doctors, there exists little ownership of Karachi—many of them will not even live there. Others, like doctors in TIH are trying to explain the poverty they see manifested in the lives of those who are poor who rely on free services, and interpret ‘development manifestos’ that place ‘attitude’-explanations above structural ones, absolving the entirety of civil society for being accomplice in the neglect of the state. And those most impacted by the failures of the Sindh provincial government are not organized and often do not see ‘the vote’ as an effective tool for structural change.

Having established the failure of Karachi’s civil society, as a unified citizenship actively fighting government failures and the larger problems of the Sindh province, we have exhausted this specific democratic option for structural change.

The scars of feudalism are visible in urban Sindh today—and the ancient system preserved in place by the British in 1843 can be seen today in modern guise. Feudalism has ruined the potential of democracy in rural areas, where scholars have pointed to mass coercion practices of forced voting. This has led to a poor mode of governance that is not responsive or held accountable to the democratic public—and we see the neglect of public services, running from Partition through today. Such a failure of democracy—even for those trying to

enact democratic change through the urban setting alone—has caused deep resignation and despair, as the capabilities and opportunities of life afforded to people are compromised, or as people have been forced into poverty. And the presence of poverty, with no central and public narrative of why poverty levels are much higher in the Sindh province, has caused fragmentation in a society where many people can't readily see structural failures. This all, without executive oversight, serves to allow the cycle of feudalism to continue as no political action is taken. It has been the goal of this thesis to demonstrate, clearly: feudalism is inhibiting the flourishing of social development and democracy in Sindh.

Conclusion

As I have outlined throughout this thesis, the social development trajectory of the Sindh province in Pakistan has been heavily influenced by a particular institution that was ‘preserved’ by the British colonists when they arrived at Sindh—large, *wadero* landholders. Across the history of Pakistan’s nascent birth at Partition (1947) and its first General Election (1970) through to our current day, Sindh’s feudal *waderos*, have adapted themselves to remain in power—whether that was through preventing INC mass mobilization efforts from reaching their landholding, consolidating political control via their tools of mass voter coercion, or through capturing the executive control of the Sindh provincial government (recall that today, 25% of Sindh’s political leaders are landholders). In contrast to Sindh and its particular legacy, the Punjab, which still had landholders but in *much* smaller proportions, has been able to progress social development initiatives without the political hassle of such a large and powerful elite class.

I spoke this past November with the former Secretary of Health under the Sindh Provincial Government, who on the condition of anonymity, described similar differences between the provinces:

“When I did my rotation within the health department of the Punjab government, no one disturbed me. I was able to focus on improving public healthcare. When I came to the Sindh health department, I found myself spending 80% of my time appeasing powerful stakeholders and supporters of the government who wanted political favors—nothing got done.” (Personal Interview, via Whatsapp, December 1st, 2017).

It is clear then that the influence of the *waderos* has led not only to failures of non-state actors, like the World Bank, in their development efforts, but to failures of the development efforts of Sindh government personnel, some of whom want to achieve important social development milestones. If there is anything almost each piece of data points towards, it is that the *wadero* system represents the antithesis to modern-day democracy and development. What's worse is that their abuse does not end with tenants—through the *wadero* control over the Sindh provincial government and the failures of governance it has produced—public services across the province have failed, and has generated the poverty that has come to represent a large share of Sindh's populations.

But all hope should not be lost. A natural question one can ask is: 1) if feudalism presents the strongest opposition to the development of a more 'ideal' social democracy in Pakistan, how has it been curbed and negated *before*? And, as well: 2) how can we improve urban civil society as a democratic force for change in provincial politics?

An encouraging answer to the first question exists in Gandhi's 1917 campaign against feudalism in Bihar, a province of Colonial India (Global Nonviolent Action Database, 2010). Here Gandhi demonstrated: land reforms do not always need to come from British economic and imperial interests within a territory. Instead, one could use the techniques of mass-mobilization politics to allow, in many ways, the people to disintegrate feudal structures.

Bihar was an agricultural province under the British—and with no significant military interests—was allowed to maintain its oppressive feudal

systems. So severe were the conditions of feudalism in Bihar that one tenant-farmer, after being arbitrarily detained by his feudal landlord, escaped his landlord's property and went to see Gandhi, who was a key member of the INC and mass mobilizer against the Indian peoples' oppression. In 1917, Gandhi came to Bihar to assess the situation for himself, and in only three months (between April 9th till June 12th, 1917), gained 8,000 personal statements from Bihari tenants about the atrocities committed by feudal landlords. Gandhi was able to assemble these into a report, and with the backing of the INC, pushed it through the British government in October, 2017.

By the end of March of 1918, tenants rights and agricultural reform were signed into law and overseen by the British government in Bihar (Global Nonviolent Action Database). This example from history shows how, even if feudal land-holdings were not immediately disintegrated by powerful executive authority, such executive actions can be elicited through the techniques of mass mobilization. Although it is true that Gandhi needed a 'higher-up' to bring the issue of feudal landlords to (the British)—the 'higher-up' of Sindh's feudal landlords is, today, the state of Pakistan. This option presents a great progressive path to reform in the Sindh province: to compile data and testimonies about Sindh's feudal landlords and their abuses, and submit this to the supreme court of Pakistan and to the Prime Minister of Pakistan—and perhaps, also, to international news agencies and governments—in order to pressure executive action on this matter which is severely implicated in the quality of life and democracy of peoples on the ground.

Another path for reform exists in Sindh's civil societies. Given that the potential for Pakistan's democracy is at its historical greatest, many people, although disenfranchised, realize that their votes contain some power. By introducing a coherent and structuralist public narrative of how political participation can improve material conditions, urban locales can be re-politicized, and one can get closer to Sindh's—and Pakistan's—potential for 'social' and transformative democracy. With the project of social democracy being in both improving the material conditions of people (especially those most marginalized) and by equipping people with a sense of agency, purpose, and common-goal, these two initial steps, of working to further catalogue feudalism and its atrocities, and to provide a public narrative to civil society, can offer a new path towards re-envisioning Sindh, and Pakistan. Against the idea that "this is just the way things are," I believe these initial steps can help transform the current deprivations seen across the Sindh province into sources of hope and positive change.

Appendix A (Regression Tables)

Punjab Province Linear Regression between Feudal Character and Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI)

Regression Statistics	
Multiple R	0.260250378
R Square	0.067730259
Adjusted R Square	0.03859683
Standard Error	0.097077794
Observations	34

ANOVA				
	df	SS	MS	F
Regression	1	0.021909422	0.021909422	2.3248296
Residual	32	0.30157114	0.009424098	
Total	33	0.323480562		

	Coefficients		Standard Error		t Stat	P-value	Lower 95%		Upper 95%	
Intercept	0.183630215		0.032876595		5.585439019	3.616E-06	0.116662783		0.250597647	
% Acres Above 50 acres	6.704299173		4.397013738		1.524739192	0.13714755	-2.252124722		15.66072307	

	Significance F	Lower 95.0%		Upper 95.0%	
	0.13714755				

Sindh Province Linear Regression between Feudal Character and Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI)

Regression Statistics	
Multiple R	0.53274023
R Square	0.283812153
Adjusted R Square	0.241683456
Standard Error	0.051554742
Observations	19

ANOVA				
	df	SS	MS	F
Regression	1	0.017905654	0.01790565	6.736789262
Residual	17	0.045184154	0.00265789	
Total	18	0.063089809		

	Significance F
	0.0188534198523732 *

	Coefficients		Standard Error		t Stat	P-value	Lower 95%		Upper 95%	
Intercept	0.334576202		0.023102707		14.4821214	5.39984E-11	0.285833751		0.383318652	
% Acres Above 50 acres	1.866109649		0.718969848		2.59553256	0.0188534198523732 *	0.349215864		3.383003434	

	Significance F	Lower 95.0%		Upper 95.0%	
	0.0188534198523732 *				

Appendix B (Patient Interview Method)

Patient Interview Method:

1. I received Human Subjects Training from the Harvard University Institutional Review Board (IRB)
2. After having made contacts with local hospitals in Karachi, I arrived in Karachi in early June and completed the rest of my IRB protocols in-person in order to have access to patients. I went through the IRB Board of the Aga Khan University (to gain access to the Rehri Goth village), through the IRB Board of Civil Hospital (to gain access to speak to cardiovascular treatment outpatients), the IRB Board of the Tabba Heart Institute (to gain access to speak to cardiovascular treatment outpatients), and the IRB Board of The Indus Hospital.
3. The questionnaires, in English and in Urdu (see Appendix C), were approved by these IRB boards, and I was made to receive signed consent for interviews.
4. I choose these patient types specifically because of how healthcare works in Pakistan, and the intense needs demanded by infectious diseases and cardiovascular issues, I believed, would allow one to greater see the rifts and abysses in Sindh's public healthcare system.

Appendix C (Patient Questionnaires)

Example of English Question Form, After Signed Consent

Kamran Jamil

The Indus Hospital: IRD_IRB_2017_04_005

English Questionnaire Form:

Questionnaire For Healthy Out-Patients:

Present *Informed Consent Form* Introduction: Hello, my name is Kamran Jamil, and I'm currently a pre-medical student studying development in the context of Pakistan. I hope to ask you a few questions about your experiences within the hospital you have attended, and your experience with healthcare in the past. Receive signed *Informed Consent Form* (if not signed terminate interview).

Interview Questions

Questions about the hospital

1. How would you generally describe your experiences at the hospital?
2. Are there certain things that the hospital does well, or does poorly in?
3. Are you satisfied with the care you received at the hospital?
4. Where can the hospital improve in?

Questions about access to healthcare

5. How often would you say you come to the hospital per year?
6. Is this for a single reason or for a variety of reasons?
7. Are there any other hospitals, or other health-care centers you go to? [If so]
Which ones, and do you visit them for any reasons that may be different from coming to this hospital?
8. How far is the closest health center? [And if this hospital is not the closest], were there any reasons you chose this hospital?
9. How easy is it to get to a hospital from where you live? How far is this hospital?

Questions about experiences

10. Based on your experiences, how has the quality of health care you receive at the hospital changed? Is there a significant difference between hospitals now and 10 years ago, or no? And is that difference for the better or for the worse?
11. Do you feel comfortable going to the hospital when you are sick?
12. How comfortable do you feel telling your family that you are sick? How comfortable do you feel telling your neighbor that you are sick?
13. What do you think about the Sindh government and their involvement with health?
14. Did you vote in this last election? Do you have any feelings related to the last election?
15. Are you content with the current state of things in Sindh?

16. Should health be a public, government-sponsored thing, or a privately run organization, or neither or both?

(Urdu Questionnaire Form)

Taleem ley rahay heyn Harvard University mey

Mareez key sawaalat:

Mareez sey Ijazaat ley na ka Taaruf:

Salam-alakum, mera naam Kamran Jamil hey aur mey parhai kar raha hoon Pakistan ki tarraqi key liey. Mojhay Aap se kush sawal karne haayn, jo mojhay aap key tajrabay ke bara me batti ga. Aap ke ijazat chaheyay ye sawaal carne key liey. Agar Aap ijazaat deyn to me kush sawaal karna shorro karoon.

Sawalaat:

1. Aap apne haspital ke tajarbay ke bara me kuch batayen?
2. Aasi kon se cheesay hey jo haspital me achi heyn or kon see cheesay hey jo haspital me buri heyn
3. Aap haspital ke service se mutmaeen heyn?
4. *Yeh haspital kin cheesoon see behter ho sakta hey?*
5. Aap kitne dafa haspital aate heyn aek saal me?
6. Aap kiss waja sey haspital aate heyn: koey aek wajah he ya aek sey ziyada wajah hey
7. Aap kissy aur haspital ya clinic me jatay heyn? Agar aasa hey to:
Agar jatay heyn to kon see heyn?
- Aur kiss waja se aap dosray haspital jatay heyn
8. Aap ka haspital kitni door hey? Agar ye haspital kareeb nahi hay to aap kyoon is haspital mey aatay heyn?
9. Aap ko asaani hey haspital mey aaney ki? Aap ka haspital kitni door hay?
10. Aap ke tajarbe ke lihaaz se, kis tra se ye haspital tabdili kar reha hay aap ko achi sahat danay ke leyaa?
11. Jab aap beemar hotay heyn to aap aaram se is haspital me ja sakhtey heyn?
12. Aap asaani say appney khandan to bata sakte heyn ke aap beemar heyn?
13. Aap ka kiya khayal hey Sindh ke Government ke baray meyn aur woh aap ke sahat ke baray meyn kiya kar rahi haay?
14. Aap ne election me vote diya that? Aap kiya sochtay heyn aakhri election ke baray meyn?
15. Aap Sindh key halat sey koosh heyn?
16. Aap keya samachtay heyn key Sahat kis kee zimadari hey?

Appendix D (Patient Profiles)

Hospital	Patient Identifier	Sex	Age	Self-Described Income Level	Morbidity
The Indus Hospital (TIH)	1	F	30	poor	Hepatitis C
Civil Hospital	Ricky	M	28	middle	Chikungunya
Civil Hospital	2	M	21	poor	heart condition
Civil Hospital	3	M+F but M answering	30	poor	heart condition
Civil Hospital	4	F	30	poor	heart condition
Civil Hospital	5	M + F	60+25	poor	heart condition
Civil Hospital	6	M	55	poor	heart condition
Aga Khan University (AKU) Village Hospital	7, 8, and 9	F	14, 20, 25	poor	1) pregnancies child mortality really high, 8 has first child died 3 days, now second child she is 6 month pregnant and had diarrhea, so she came here immediately, came from Vital NGO
AKU Village Hospital	10	F	45	poor	pregnant + son with Chikungya since the last 3 months and not really improving
AKU Village Hospital	11	F	38	poor	hypertension
AKU Village Hospital	12	F	28	poor	pregnant + blood imbalance (perhaps nutrient deficiency?) Iron deficiency + mental health issues
AKU Village Hospital	President of Rehri Goth Union Council	M	65	poor	N/A
Tabba Hospital	14	F	65	well-off	heart condition
Tabba Hospital	15	M	43 + 74	N/A	heart condition, bypass
Tabba Hospital	16	M	71	middle	heart condition, angioplasty
Tabba Hospital	17	M	65	middle	heart condition
Tabba Hospital	18	M	41+65	middle	heart condition
TIH	19	M	50	poor	Hepatitis C
TIH	20	F	45	poor	Hepatitis C
TIH	21	M	60	poor	Hepatitis C
TIH	22	M	52	poor	digestive problems: could not digest and talk
TIH	23	F	20+45	poor	1) hip bone fracture + gall bladder stones + Malaria for son
TIH	24	M	38	poor	Child has congestion and fever, flu, infectious diseases
TIH	25	M	32	poor	hemorrhoids
TIH	26 and 27	F	40+25 daughter	poor	1) TB, son had dengue 2) Chikungunya

Appendix C (TIH Circulated ‘Social Theory of Progress’)

Development Manifesto (Full):

“Kind long but worth pondering :The difference between the poor and rich nations is not the age of the Nation.

This can be demonstrated by countries like India and Egypt, which are more than 2000 years old and are still poor countries.

On the other hand, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, which 150 years back were insignificant, today are developed and rich countries.

The difference between the poor and rich nation does not also depend on the available natural resources.

Japan has limited territory, 80% mountainous, unsuitable for agriculture or farming, but is the third in worlds economy. The country is like an immense floating factory, importing raw material from the whole world and exporting manufactured products.

Second example is Switzerland, it does not grow cocoa but produces the best chocolates in the world. In her small territory she rears animals and cultivates the land only for four month in a year, nevertheless manufactures the best milk products. A small country which is an image of security which has made it the strongest world bank.

Executives from rich countries who interact with their counterparts from poor countries show no significant intellectual differences.

The racial or colour factors also do not evince importance: migrants heavy in laziness in their country of origin are forcefully productive in rich European countries.

What then is the difference?

The difference is the attitude of the people, moulded for many years by education and culture.

When we analyse the conduct of the people from the rich and developed countries, it is observed that a majority abide by the following principles of life:

1. Ethics, as basic principles.
2. Integrity.
3. Responsibility.
4. The respect for Laws and Regulations.
5. The respect from majority of citizens by right.
6. The love for work.
7. The effort to save and invest.
8. The will to be productive.
9. Punctuality.

In the poor countries a small minority follow these basic principles in their daily life.

We are not poor because we lack natural resources or because nature was cruel towards us.

We are poor because we lack attitude. We lack the will to follow and teach these principles of working of rich and developed societies.

**WE ARE IN THIS STATE BECAUSE
WE WANT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OVER
EVERYTHING AND EVERYONE.
WE ARE IN THIS STATE BECAUSE**

WE SEE SOMETHING DONE WRONG
AND SAY - "LET IT BE"
WE SHOULD HAVE A SPIRITED MEMORY
AND ATTITUDE...
ONLY THEN WILL WE BE ABLE TO CHANGE OUR PRESENT STATE."
- Circulated by TIH Doctors.

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