



The Transformation of Rural Administration during the Colonial Period in Southern Morocco

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The Transformation of Rural Administration during the Colonial Period in Southern Morocco

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A Thesis in the Field of History

for the Degree of Master of Liberal Arts in Extension Studies

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Abstract

This thesis examines the effects of the colonial period on state administration in rural areas in southern Morocco. It argues that this period saw the emergence a new type of administration resulting from the interaction between French administrators, Moroccan officials and the rural population. The colonial state tried to superpose a colonial administrative structure upon the preexisting Moroccan state apparatus: the *Makhzan*. In theory, this approach was to gradually introduce the French administrative culture and norms into the country at minimal costs. In practice however, the dual French-Moroccan administration created a new situation that did not comply to either French norms or Moroccan history. In fact, the protracted process of military and administrative penetration upended the prevailing political structures in southern Morocco. Before the colonization, the region's fragmented political system was based on a constant renegotiation of the power equilibrium between governors and governed. Intermediary corps such as the tribe balanced or complemented the power of the state as well as that of local potentates. By contrast, the colonial state introduced a vertical approach to power through the technical improvements it brought to local administration. However, the paucity of colonial resources prevented a fully bureaucratic and hierarchical administration from emerging. In that context, the power equilibrium logic remained a key characteristic of Moroccan administration. Nonetheless, in the new vertical system, this equilibrium tilted towards the state and the notables associated with it at the expense of individuals and intermediary corps such as the tribe.

Frontpiece



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¹ *Skoura : Casbah : Des Officiers Français En Conversation Avec La Population Locale*, n.d., n.d., Bibliothèque Nationale Du Royaume du Maroc, <http://bnm.bnm.ma:86/phototheque.aspx?IDc=1366>. Copyright BNRM 2011

Dedication

To my grandfathers, whose stories about Morocco's colonial past raised my interest in the subject.

To my parents, whose attachment to southern Morocco taught me the love of the region.

To my wife and kids, who supported and indulged me throughout my thesis.

To southern Morocco, a land of history, and a land for the future.

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Chapter I.

Introduction




Figure 1. Southern Morocco.

Morocco's Administrative Map, French zone, 1940. Including a delineation of southern Morocco as discussed in the thesis.²

² Résidence Générale de la République Française au Maroc, *Maroc. Carte Administrative*, 1940, 1:1 500 000, 1940, Bibliothèque nationale de France, département Cartes et plans, GE C-15520, <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b531212453.r=MarocTanger%22Rio%20de%20Oro%22?rk=429186>.

In 1889, the French chronicler Pierre Loti related an exotic scene during his trip to the capital of Morocco. Three women snuck into the French camp to meet the new ambassador and plead for the release of their detained husband, a local potentate. To support their demand, they sacrificed a heifer on the ambassador's tent entrance and begged him to intercede with the Sultan to free the man. The ambassador neither discussed the man's innocence nor the nature of his misdeeds. Nevertheless, he acknowledged the women's request and promised to carry the matter before the Moroccan monarch without further formalities. Unusual as it may seem to modern observers, the whole process seemed to the chronicler to be rather a trivial procedure in the Moroccan society of the nineteenth century.³

Although the ceremonial form of this scene is no longer a common practice in modern Morocco, many aspects of the present power structure evoke parts of Loti's story. The patrimonial nature of the scene still permeates parts of the Moroccan administration inasmuch as applicants still plead in many instances for the governor's good dispositions, and the governor often responds by granting "favors" to applicants at his discretion. Also, the sacrificial heifer has been replaced with other "gifts" and "offerings" to coax the authority figure and obtain a positive response. Those practices have arguably more in common with the government structures of ancient Morocco than with the way we conceive modern governance today.⁴

Throughout the consecutive waves of modernization Morocco underwent during the last two centuries, how did the relationship of both governors and governed to state

³ Pierre Loti and Jean-Pierre Péroncel-Hugoz, *Au Maroc: précédé de journal marocain* (Casablanca: Retnani-EDDIF, 2005), 88–99.

⁴ For a discussion of traditional influences on the Moroccan current state, see : Rahma Bourqia, *Culture Politique Au Maroc: A l'épreuve Des Mutations*, Logiques Sociales (Harmattan, 2013), 41–50.

and administration evolve to accommodate new and old ideas about government? More specifically, the question of the synthesis between the domestic ways of administration and those imported from Europe is central to understanding the persistence of both influences in the present state apparatus. Arguably, this synthesis took form during the colonial period (1912-1956) when France and Spain were in effect ruling Morocco. In particular, France embarked during the colonial period on a journey to create a hybrid system combining preexisting indigenous institutions with a parallel but nonetheless far-reaching colonial administration.⁵ This hybrid system nevertheless failed to fully converge into a coherent and homogenous system. In fact, the colonial state constantly maneuvered to manage the constraints imposed by the complexities and difficulties it encountered in the field. Therefore, the implementation of the dual French-Moroccan administration was never a linear and deliberate process to make the transition from “traditional Morocco into modern Morocco.”⁶

Although the hybrid French-Moroccan system was imposed to the French zone as a whole, nowhere were its implications more salient than in the Moroccan countryside. For instance, its implementation in rural areas came through a military conquest that entailed a radical shift in the relationship of the region’s communities to central government and state in general.⁷ Rural Morocco presented the colonial state with a particular conundrum and tested its resourcefulness and resolve to overtake the political field in the colony. The policies and arrangements implemented by colonial authorities

⁵ Volkan Ipek, “Creation of Hybridity in Morocco: 1912–1925,” in *North Africa, Colonialism and the EU*, 2020, 14–16.

⁶ To borrow the name of Roger Gruner’s book. Roger Gruner, *Du Maroc Traditionnel Au Maroc Moderne* (Paris: Nouvelles Editions latines, 1984).

⁷ Jonathan Wyrzten, *Making Morocco: Colonial Intervention and the Politics of Identity*, 1st ed. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016), 17.

there give a valuable window into the mechanisms through which the interactions between Moroccan and French actors shaped the colonial experience in Morocco. Southern Morocco's case allows to retrace how the colonial administration blended in or conflicted with the prevailing cultural norms and practices in Morocco and how its interactions with local actors led to conflicts, compromises or new behaviors on the ground.

By studying the colonial period in Morocco, the present work aims to explore the origins of the country's present struggle to fully embrace principles of government such as democracy, rule of law, citizen rights, etc. Although Morocco has gone a long way towards adopting institutions in line with these principles,⁸ it remains far from fully enacting the latter in practice.⁹ By shedding light over the origins of such a struggle, the thesis intends to contribute to identifying the fundamental causes behind present institutions' inability to enforce such principles. Also, by studying the rural part of Morocco, it aims to bring the focus over a generally overlooked but nonetheless important segment of Moroccan society. Morocco has been until recently a predominantly rural society. Hence, the countryside by virtue of its sheer demographic size was – and still is – the backbone of the Moroccan electoral system. Thus, studying the dynamics of rural institutions is essential to understanding the dynamics of the Moroccan institutional framework as a whole.

The role of colonial rule in shaping the modern Moroccan state has been the object of shifting interpretations in the post-independence era. For instance, Edmund

⁸ Morocco is formally a constitutional monarchy with an elected legislative and executive apparatus.

⁹ See for instance the V-Dem database for details about Morocco's performance in the Electoral Democracy and Government Effectiveness indices. <http://www.v-dem.net>

Burke III argues that in the wake of independence both colonial and nationalist historians tended to view the country's colonial past in terms of oppositions and dichotomies between European and native spaces.¹⁰ The postcolonial turn in the 1970s issued a harsh critique of this separation and opened new venues for the study of Morocco's colonial past from different and more inclusive perspectives. For example, Burke contends that the notion of "Moroccan Islam" emerged in the early years of colonization due to French struggles abroad to stave off international rivalries and locally to establish a legitimate colonial regime.¹¹ Along similar lines, Jonathan Wyrzten identifies four major themes along which the colonial state interacted with local agents and reshaped the Moroccan state: religion, ethnicity, territory and the role of the monarchy.¹² These works and many others do a great job breaking through the division between colonial and indigenous spaces. They also stress both French and Moroccan agency in shaping the post-independence state. In that sense, the Moroccan contemporary state is not simply the result of European-induced reforms nor the sole product of the domestic dynamics that emerged with the nationalist movement. Moroccan and French influences both conditioned the construction of the post-independence state through their interactions and clashes.

For the most part, scholarly research dealing with Morocco's colonial past focuses on the central figure of the monarchy and the urban transformations prompted by the colonial episode. When it touches upon the rural manifestations of colonial rule, it

¹⁰ Edmund Burke III, "Theorizing the Histories of Colonialism and Nationalism in the Arab Maghrib," in *Beyond Colonialism and Nationalism in the Maghrib: History, Culture and Politics*, ed. Ali Abdullatif Ahmida, 1st ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 23.

¹¹ Edmund Burke III, *The Ethnographic State: France and the Invention of Moroccan Islam*, 1st ed., The Fletcher Jones Foundation Humanities Imprint (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), 4–5.

¹² Wyrzten, *Making Morocco*, 5.

generally tries to assess the influence of the colonial ethnographic, religious and territorial policies over the formation of Moroccan regional identities and divisions. Existing scholarly research seldom reflects on the power structures – real or imagined – that resulted from the superposition of the colonial apparatus with pre-existing local institutions. Beyond colonialism's impact on identity and national sentiment, rural populations had to apprehend new power networks, legal and administrative procedures and codes of conduct. By studying the tripartite relationship between colonial administrators, local officials, and the administered population, the present thesis aims to analyze how different and sometimes opposing conceptions of government were redefined through the colonial experience and continue to shape many aspects of the contemporary Moroccan institutions.

The present thesis focuses more precisely on studying the channels through which colonial administrators and administered interacted in southern Morocco. This geographical focus allows a thorough analysis of the specificities of colonial rule without getting entangled in the details of an otherwise differentiated approach to territorial administration. With that focus in mind, the thesis tries to shed light on the way both segments assimilated the new power structure imposed by the French military and administrative presence. How did the Moroccans position French civil and military administrators within their system of representing authority? How did French authorities adapt on the ground to the peculiarities of Moroccan society? How did both agents conciliate between the contradictions of the two competing government apparatuses – the native and the colonial? Answering those questions can pave the way for a new understanding of the Moroccan modern state.

The thesis contends that French presence strengthened the state apparatus while weakening the social intermediary corps that counterbalanced its authority. since the colonial state was unable – and perhaps unwilling – to make the hybrid colonial system converge into a unified and coherent one, the synthesis between French and Moroccan elements remained incomplete. In fact, each part of this system retained its distinctive rationality and ways of working. On the one hand, the Moroccan administration retained its penchant for loosely defined and flexible power arrangements reflecting shifts in the balance of power among political actors. On the other hand, the French administration retained its focus on codified and standardized bureaucratic procedures and hierarchy. Nevertheless, the division between the two sides did not preclude them from influencing and interacting with each the other. In particular, French intervention deeply upended the prevailing social equilibrium in southern Morocco thus creating new arrangements and new channels for power exercise and power negotiation.

The thesis builds upon postcolonial theory to evaluate the representations of colonial administration from the standpoint of both the colonizers and the colonized. Moreover, it analyzes how these representations interacted, clashed and ultimately formed the basis for the post-independence Moroccan state. This analysis goes through the study of colonial archives: administrative internal reports, memoirs, scientific reports aimed at rationalizing colonial rule, etc. Also, it uses the same analytical framework to reconstitute the reaction of Moroccan local authorities and elites to colonial presence. Additionally, the thesis borrows techniques from the subaltern studies current to give voice to the administered population representation of the dual native-colonial system. It

does so by using surviving fragments relating ordinary people behavior to unearth as much as possible of their thoughts and concerns about colonial rule.

Beyond the first three chapters dedicated to a broad discussion of the research methods, the historical events and the historiographical debates that underline the present work, the thesis main argument is expanded on through the three remaining chapters. First, chapter V describes the conditions under which the colonial system took shape. To do so, it discusses the political and social landscape prevailing in the wake of French colonization. Then, it focuses on the conditions under which the colonial state ventured to militarily conquer the South. There, it touches upon the policy choices dictated by the tribulations of the lengthy and turbulent conquest process. Finally, it describes the subsequent attempts to transition towards a more civilian approach to administering the South. There again, it expands on the failure of such attempts due to the constant tension dictated by the local and international context of the late 1930s and 1940s.

Chapter VI then turns into analyzing the disruptions introduced by the colonial experience to the social and political fabric of the South. First, it describes how French policies and arrangements upended the power equilibrium between Moroccan administrators and their constituents. It also describes how such policies somehow inserted colonial administrators into the preexisting political system rather than overhauled it. It goes on to analyze how the shift in the balance of power led to the emergence of a more distinctive and dominant notables' class in southern Morocco. Besides, it touches upon the role of the colonial divide between French and Moroccan administrations in preventing the two systems from converging and creating a more effective and less ambivalent duo.

Finally, Chapter VII analyzes the lasting effects of the colonial experience on the Moroccan administrative system. It argues that the colonial experience weakened the political role of precolonial institutions such as the tribe and relegated its functioning into more informal and less assertive channels. It also contends that the technical changes introduced by the colonial state led to a more authoritative approach to administration. In fact, these changes were not counterbalanced by political reforms aiming to provide local populations with the means to oppose state representatives' transgressions. The colonial state was reluctant to introduce such reforms under the pretext of preserving Moroccan traditions and institutions. It was also reluctant to commit the human and financial resources to establish a more effective control over the South. This reluctance led to a lasting pattern of under administration that the post-independence state perpetuated for decades after the end of colonization.

Chapter II.

Research Methods

The present thesis uses primary French textual sources related to the French administration of southern Morocco. These texts help sketch a broad picture of the nominal changes to power structures generated by French presence. Furthermore, they shed light on how each of the colonial administrators, local elites and indigenous people lived through and understood those changes. The ultimate goal is to go beyond the *de jure* colonial institutions and uncover the everlasting effects of colonial intervention on the Moroccan countryside's social and political landscape. To do so, it draws upon the methods of postcolonial studies to isolate the organizational and discursive elements that upended local government both as an administrative and cultural system. These methods envision to study colonial texts not necessarily for the truths they convey but rather for the windows they open on the mindset of the people that lived and interacted within the colonial space.¹³ In particular, the thesis uses these methods to infer how the administrators, the elites and the administered groups defined their role and position within the new system as well as perceived the role and position of the others.

These definitions and perceptions shall by all means avoid reproducing the colonial epistemological divide between colonizers and colonized. In fact, the thesis focuses on the changes in each group's representation of self and the others inasmuch as they resulted from these groups' interactions with each other. In so doing, it draws upon the "relationalist" theoretical framework rooted in the social sciences. This framework is

¹³ Burke, "Theorizing the Histories," 20.

based upon the premise that “rather than assuming social ‘substances’ and explaining the social world by reference to them, relationalism starts with interactions or relations and sees those interactions or relations as constitutive.”¹⁴ As far as the Moroccan case is concerned, this approach entails a deeper enquiry into the networks and channels through which each group tried to impose, resist or cope with the emerging colonial administrative system.

For the purposes of the present thesis, the focus is put on two major categories of primary sources. The first are the colonial archives and publications produced by the French and Moroccan governments. In effect, the available archives in Morocco are split between different institutions. First, the “Archive du Maroc” hosts part of the Native Affairs Department archives, the department in charge of the colonial local administration. Those archives open a window into this administration through the study of its codes, representations and concerns. They also open a window into its interaction with indigenous actors in the field. Furthermore, “Archive du Maroc” hosts part of the “Centre des Hautes Etudes sur l’Afrique et l’Asie Modernes” (C.H.E.A.M.) works. These studies and monographs carried out on the ground by French scientists and administrators open a valuable window into southern society during the colonial period as seen through colonial eyes. In addition, many reports and monographs are available in electronic form through the French “Bibliothèque Diplomatique Numérique” and the “Bibliothèque Francophone Numérique.” Those texts include – but are not restricted to – reports about the French administration, training courses for local administrators, colonial scholarly research about the Moroccan social structures and assessments of the French native

¹⁴ Julian Go, *Postcolonial Thought and Social Theory* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016), 118.

policies. By analyzing these texts, the present work intends to apply postcolonial theories to reconstruct the interactions that took place between both protagonists. This approach will help forge a critical and balanced assessment of their representation of and strategies in dealing with the colonial administrative organization.

To complement those rather official sources, the thesis uses more personal experiences of the period. Memoirs of French administrators provide a valuable source of information in that regard. They give access to differentiated narratives of colonialism through the eyes of the men in the field. Although they may have been distorted by post-independence experiences, these works give a good view of the inner thoughts and concerns of colonial administrators. They also allow us to evaluate their official work in light of their personal encounters with local officials and ordinary men. At the same time, the thesis tries to find hints on how rural ordinary men perceived and lived through the French presence in southern Morocco. Although such sources are sparse and hard to come by, a few textual materials relating the inner concerns and thoughts of ordinary southerners were preserved. For example, the French interest in the Berber language prompted an effort to transcribe and preserve Berber folklore in the form of poetry, popular stories and texts.¹⁵ Beyond its intrinsic sociological and linguistic value, this folklore was a way for southern Morocco's Berbers to reflect on political and social issues that were important for their communities.¹⁶

The ultimate challenge for the study of any colonial history is the balance between the standpoints of the colonizers and the colonized. In the case of Morocco, the

¹⁵ See for instance Arsène Roux, *Poésie Populaire Berbère : Maroc Du Sud-Ouest/Igedmiwen* (Paris: Editions du Centre national de la recherche scientifique, 1990).

¹⁶ See for instance Michael Peyron, "Amazigh Poetry of the Resistance Period (Central Morocco)," *The Journal of North African Studies* 5, no. 1 (2000): 109–20.

French administration produced and preserved a myriad of archival materials in the pure tradition of French bureaucracy. Furthermore, it showed a real interest in studying rural areas since controlling the countryside was of the utmost importance for economic and security reasons. Therefore, the bulk of the colonial period's surviving texts was either produced or compiled by colonial personnel. For example, the Berber texts transcribed during the colonial period were collected and edited by French authors. Assuming those texts are a genuine transcription of the original oral tradition, the fact that they were collected by a French could have prevented locals from sharing more sensitive materials or the collector from including texts that did not fit the colonial narrative. In any case, the colonial narrative's dominant position needs to be mitigated with an inquiry into the conditions and conventions under which these documents were produced in order to identify the distortions embedded in each textual source.¹⁷

Postcolonial theories also rise the challenge of isolating the contours of discursive elements that go beyond individual texts and identifying overarching themes that permeate both the colonial and indigenous narratives. In fact, the concept of discourse in its very origin applies to literature as a whole rather than to individual texts.¹⁸ Hence, identifying general themes about changes introduced by the French administration depends on the availability of a large number of textual sources and their internal coherence. The present work does by no means intend to cover a sizeable portion of the existing archival material. However, by using a diversified set of sources and critically

¹⁷ Francis X Blouin and William G Rosenberg, *Archives, Documentation, and Institutions of Social Memory : Essays from the Sawyer Seminar* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 273.

¹⁸ Burke, *The Ethnographic State*, 10.

analyzing them against the grain, it intends to paint a multifaceted interpretation of the colonial period.

Finally, French authorities tended to categorize the Moroccan society in terms of oppositions between social groups: Berbers vs Arabs, plains vs mountains, submissive vs unruly tribes, sedentary vs nomads. Those essentialized and somehow simplified categories resulted in different approaches to government in different regions.¹⁹ By focusing on southern Morocco, this work seeks to avoid being drowned in the details of each approach. First, this region presents the advantages of being fairly homogenous from an ethnic and linguistic perspective. The region was predominantly populated by Berber tribes sharing a common linguistic and cultural background. Also, it was mainly attached to the joint civil-military region of Marrakech and its later sub-divisions in terms of colonial administrative partition. Hence, the study of this region is a useful opportunity to enter the world of colonial local administration without getting lost within the intricacies and ambivalences of the colonial system. However, any generalization of the conclusions of the present work would require a comparable study of other parts of the Moroccan countryside.

¹⁹ Burke, "Theorizing the Histories," 20.

Chapter III.

Historical Background

August, 14th 1844. A day that could have been the day Morocco lost its independence. The French and Moroccan armies faced off at the Isly river, near the Moroccan-Algerian border. After a long period of protracted tensions between Morocco and France over the French occupation of Algeria in 1830, the latent conflict finally degenerated into an open military confrontation. However, the build-up into this moment did not live up to the actual battle and its immediate aftermaths. In effect, the French troops, led by General Bugeaud, routed the unprepared Moroccan army only after four hours of low intensity fights. The French lost only thirty men in the whole affair against 800 dead on the Moroccan side. Such a swift and decisive victory should have opened the doors of Morocco to French conquest as it did in Algeria before. However, the French victory did not immediately translate into territorial gains. It was not necessarily for lack of military fervor. General Bugeaud was in fact keen on exploiting his advantage and attacking the country's capital Fez. However, the incursion into Moroccan territory appalled the British government. Soon after the battle of Isly, Great Britain intervened to calm French ardors and – almost – reestablish the *status quo* at the Moroccan-Algerian borders at the treaty of Tangier in September, 10th 1844.²⁰

Although the British intervention prevented France from pushing forward its military advantage in Morocco, the debacle of Isly opened the dance of European

²⁰ Michel Abitbol, *Histoire du Maroc* (Paris: Perrin, 2014), 355–58.

rivalries in the country. The Sharifian empire nonetheless preserved its independence – at least in nominal terms – for an additional sixty-seven years. This prowess was less imputable to the country's ability to confront European ambitions than to the constant European fighting around the Moroccan question. In fact, the country's position at the junction of two pivotal maritime spaces – the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea – made the stakes for the control of Morocco far more consequential than for other potential colonial targets. Also, the northernmost shores of Morocco were a few miles away from Spanish shores and the valuable British possession in Gibraltar. This state of affairs meant that France and Great Britain – and to a lesser extent Spain – would face off for the remaining of the nineteenth century in a stalemate for supremacy in the Sharifian empire. Yet, the stalemate did not prevent European powers from advancing their agendas in the country. The Anglo-Moroccan treaty of 1856 consecrated British primacy in Morocco's international trade. Between 1830 and 1890, Morocco's maritime commerce was multiplied ten-fold with England controlling 70% of it until 1880.²¹ Meanwhile, Spain carved out a prominent – although limited – place in Moroccan affairs in the aftermaths of its victory in the Hispano-Moroccan war of 1859-1860.²² As for France, the nearby colonial power was able to secure a comfortable – although challenged – leadership position in Moroccan affairs as a consequence of the Madrid international conference of 1880.²³

The Moroccan monarchy tried to use the respite provided by European rivalries to reform the country's military and administrative apparatus. For instance, the two sultans

²¹ Abitbol, *Histoire*, 382.

²² C. R. Pennell, *Morocco since 1830: A History* (New York: New York University Press, 2000), 68–70.

²³ Pennell, *Morocco since 1830*, 85–87.

Sidi Mohammed bin ‘Abd al-Rahman (r. 1859-1873) and his son Mulay Hassan (r. 1873-1894) embarked on a resolute attempt to modernize the country’s traditional government: the *Makhzan*.²⁴ In so doing, they used European consultants and military experts to enhance the country’s financial and military capabilities. They also tried to consolidate the Sultan’s tenuous control over his overstretched territories. Nevertheless, these attempts remained timid when compared to other Middle Eastern and North African reforms. For instance, they never tried to overhaul the Sharifian Empire’s political system such as was the aim of Mehmet Ali’s reforms in Egypt, the Tanzimat reforms in the Ottoman empire or even the Khairuddin Pasha constitutional reforms in Tunisia.²⁵

At the root of this inability to deeply reform the Moroccan system lay the *Makhzan*’s inability to generate and effectively use the necessary resources for such reforms. First, European encroachment on the country’s internal affairs limited the Moroccan government’s ability to organize and mobilize the country’s resources. In effect, European powers slowly but inexorably extracted more and more concessions from the Sultan. These concessions restricted the monarch’s authority over his government primary source of revenues: maritime commerce. Moreover, European powers undermined the monarch’s authority as a consequence of their dealings with local potentates. For instance, European weapons were smuggled into the territory, thus heightening the climate of instability and insurgency within the Moroccan countryside.²⁶ Finally, the cost of such reforms put a strain on the country’s finances. The Sultan Mulay

²⁴ The *Makhzan* – literally the storehouse – refers to the pre-colonial government apparatus centered around the Sultan and his court. It also came to identify the native government apparatus during the colonial period as opposed to the colonial administration.

²⁵ Susan Gilson Miller, *A History of Modern Morocco* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 29–42.

²⁶ Edmund Burke III, *Prelude to Protectorate in Morocco: Pre-Colonial Protest and Resistance, 1860-1912* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 17.

Hasan spent his reign campaigning to collect the taxes needed to feed the reform machine through constant political persuasion or show of force.²⁷

The Sharifian Empire was also subject to recurring economic and demographic difficulties that escalated from the 1880s onward and upset its path towards reform. First, cholera epidemics severely hit the Maghrebi population in general and the Moroccan population in particular. During the nineteenth century, five cholera epidemics hit the already underpopulated Maghreb and thwarted any hope of demographic recovery.²⁸ Moreover, these epidemics were often coupled with acute periods of famine and droughts. For example, the cholera epidemic in 1878 happened against the backdrop of severe droughts and locust infestations. Morocco's economy suffered greatly from these events and Moroccan commerce halved in the wake of the 1878 crisis.²⁹ At the same time, the revolution in maritime trade introduced by logistic improvements due to new technologies and trade routes – the Suez Canal, the Niger railroad – deeply impacted the Moroccan economy. The traditional trans-Saharan trade that made Moroccan fortune for centuries diminished dramatically at the end of the nineteenth century due to the emergence of new trade routes.³⁰ Moreover, Moroccan export staples to European markets became less competitive than faraway goods from the Americas and even Oceania. In the meantime, European goods flooded the Moroccan markets, thus further weakening the country's economic and social tissue and its external trade balance.³¹ At

²⁷ Miller, *A History*, 41–42.

²⁸ John Iliffe, *Africans: The History of a Continent*. (Leiden: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 167.

²⁹ Abitbol, *Histoire*, 434–35.

³⁰ See Jean-Louis Miegé, “Le commerce transsaharien au XIX^e siècle,” *Revue de l'Occident musulman et de la Méditerranée* 32, no. 1 (1981): 93–119.

³¹ Pennell, *Morocco since 1830*, 88–89.

the end of the nineteenth century, only European rivalries continued to prevent the country from being overtaken by one of the colonial powers.

European intervention in Moroccan affairs deeply affected the Moroccan political and social landscape. Although the impact of administrative reforms was for the most part limited to the traditional imperial urban centers and the rising Atlantic port cities, the countryside was definitely impacted by European intervention and *Makhzan* reforms. In particular, southern Morocco became home to powerful *qaid*s³² that used European firearms and the *Makhzan* nominal authority to carve out large strongholds in the region. For instance, the rise of these “Lords of the Atlas” was facilitated – if not directly assisted – by the European intervention in the country. In effect, the Sultan Mulay Hassan tried to rally the region’s strong men to the *Makhzan* by bestowing titles and land upon them. He intended to use these strong men’s ambitions to control southern Morocco in the name of the *Makhzan* and prevent them from causing much trouble to its forces. However, these strong men used the *Makhzan* legitimacy and European new weapons to subdue local tribes and transform their strongholds into great sources of power and wealth.³³ Although they refrained from opposing the central authority during the late years of the nineteenth century, they soon became an integral part of the political crisis that engulfed Morocco in the early years of the twentieth century.

At the turn of the twentieth century, the Sharifian Empire was subject to an acute internal crisis that threatened to overthrow the ruling king. First, the state was unable to extract revenues from its hinterland due to the widespread state of dissidence in most of

³² *Qaid* – literally commander – refers to local governors in rural areas appointed by a decree by the Sultan to administer a tribe, group of tribes or a geographical space. City governors were for their part called *Pasha*.

³³ Daniel Rivet, *Histoire Du Maroc: De Moulay Idrîs à Mohammed VI* (Paris: Fayard, 2012), 284–85.

the Moroccan territories. The young Sultan Mulay ‘Abd al-‘Aziz exacerbated the dissident sentiments with his *Euromania* – an unwelcomed attitude for a figure whose primary task was to lead the war against the infidels. Second, the state custom revenues dwindled as a consequence of the aforementioned shift in the world economy. They also dwindled because the state had to concede its customs’ revenues to its European creditors to face the state’s mounting debt service bill. The economic hardships of the regime combined with its inability to militarily quell rebellious movements deeply weakened the *Makhzan*’s position and created the state of upheaval that ultimately paved the way for a European take-over of the country.

At the turn of the twentieth century, France went down a slow but steady path to swallow the Sharifian Empire into its already vast colonial empire. The Moroccan question lingered during the late nineteenth century as the French metropolitan authorities wanted to avoid any overt provocation that would prompt a British reaction. However, the conditions for French intervention in Morocco were in place and the fate of the country seemed to be sealed by the turn of the twentieth century.³⁴ In effect, French military intervention in Moroccan territory preceded the country’s colonization. In 1899, France and England reached an agreement over their extra-European disputes in the aftermaths of the Fashoda incident.³⁵ Subsequently, England agreed to let France have a free hand in Morocco provided that it respected Spanish interests in the region and it

³⁴ Miller, *A History*, 56-58.

³⁵ The Fashoda incident (Southern Sudan, Sept, 18th 1898) was the high point of a series of disputes between France and Great Britain over colonial possessions in Africa. The incident resulted in an agreement between the two powers over their respective spheres of influences in sub-Saharan Africa

guaranteed free navigation through the strategic Gibraltar straits.³⁶ Soon enough, France launched a real policy of territorial conquest in Morocco.

The first concrete infringement on Morocco's territorial integrity came in 1900 with the conquest of the Touat oases in current southwest Algeria. There, the French army in Algeria absorbed bit by bit the ill-defined southeastern territories advancing as much as two hundred miles from the Algerian border by 1911. These actions were not always to the liking of the metropole since the diplomatic corps deemed them too risky on the international scene. Nevertheless, this piecemeal conquest continued in earnest despite metropolitan reservations. In 1903 for example, a French officer by the name of Hubert Lyautey annexed the Bechar oasis inside Moroccan territories and deceitfully renamed it Colomb to thwart any objections by the metropolitan government or the European powers.³⁷ Nonetheless, the Sharifian Empire was meant to survive despite the military energetic campaigns in southeastern Morocco.

The Entente Cordiale between France and Great Britain and the Algeiras conference in 1906 reaffirmed the principle of Moroccan territorial integrity therefore eliminating the option of gradual annexation – at least on paper since the Moroccan “territory” was by no means well defined at the time. However, General Lyautey – the conqueror of Bechar and soon-to-be French proconsul in Morocco – devised a new strategy that in effect expanded French territories while preserving the Sultan's nominal authority. In 1907, he set off a military expedition to seize the lands of the *Bani Snassen* tribes near the Algerian border. This expedition was clearly in breach of Moroccan territorial integrity since these lands were clearly delineated in previous treaties.

³⁶ Abitbol, *Histoire*, 456.

³⁷ Miller, *A History*, 71.

However, he presented his expedition as a mere intervention on behalf of the *Makhzan* to subdue the region's unruly tribes and restore the Sultan's authority over the land. His clever strategy fended off criticism in the metropole and from the other European powers.³⁸ Moreover, his strategy's apparent successes warranted him to become the first and most famous French proconsul in the history of colonial Morocco. Thereafter, it became the backbone of his colonial policy once Morocco fell under French tutelage.

The events of 1907 in fact threw the Sharifian Empire into the mayhem of civil war. A dynastic conflict erupted between the Sultan Mulay 'Abd al-'Aziz and his brother Mulay 'Abd al-Hafiz. The latter took over the crown in 1908 by mobilizing a large conservative and anti-European coalition that deemed his brother unfit to defend the country against its European foes. As he was himself powerless in the face of European meddling in Moroccan affairs, he soon found himself under the mercy of a broad rebellion that threatened to overtake the capital in 1911. The stage was set for French intervention under the pretext of rescuing the sovereign and his government against their revolted subjects. And France did not shy away from the opportunity. Soon enough, French troops already stationed in the country relieved the besieged city.

However, this move quickly exacerbated tensions with Germany and Spain. As a consequence of these international factors, France had to concede – among other things – a lighter form of colonial intervention in Morocco: the Protectorate regime.³⁹ This form of colonial rule was initially experienced in Tunisia to accommodate European interests in the country. Then, it became the favorable form of colonial expansion in French

³⁸ Burke, *The Ethnographic State*, 77–78.

³⁹ Philippe Marchat, *Le Maroc et les puissances: un empire convoité de 711 à 1942* (Paris: l'Harmattan, 2013), 65–69.

diplomatic circles whenever outright military conquest was deemed too risky on the international stage. For instance, the “success” of the Tunisian experience was in part behind the French predilection for the Protectorate formula in Morocco.⁴⁰ In any case, the French Republic intervened on behalf of the endangered Moroccan monarch to stave off the rebellion and impose its tutelage over the Sharifian Empire. To that effect, the treaty of Fez in March 1912 endorsed French control over the country and established the Protectorate regime. Later in the same year, France and Spain agreed to partition the country into a French zone at its center and a Spanish zone in its northern and southern fringes.⁴¹

On paper, the Protectorate format and the treaty of Fez stipulated that the Moroccan state retained control over its internal affairs. The colonial powers were to assist the regime in reforming its institutions and introducing “modernity” into its traditional apparatus. In practice, French authorities quickly embarked on a journey to assert their control over Morocco’s political system and facilitate its exploitation and administration. This journey started with a protracted military campaign (1912-1934) to “pacify” the country and end the state of armed resistance in several regions. For instance, soon after the signing of the treaty of Fez, French authorities faced a general insurrection that threatened the newly established regime. France found itself entangled in a long and painful process of military subjugation of scattered – but nonetheless dangerous – rebellious tribes and forces. This process was further delayed by the context of the Great War and its immediate aftermaths. In southern Morocco, French authorities

⁴⁰ Mary Dewhurst Lewis, *Divided Rule: Sovereignty and Empire in French Tunisia, 1881-1938* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), 114–15.

⁴¹ Mohamed Kably et al., *History of Morocco a work of synthesis and update* (Rabat: Royal Institute for research on the history of Morocco, 2015), 539–44.

opted to use the *Great Quids* who rose to prominence during the tumultuous pre-colonial times as their proxies in the region. This policy aimed to minimize the cost of controlling the region especially in a context where French forces were already dangerously overstretched over the Moroccan territory. However, the *Great Quids* used French weapons and support to subdue rebellion in their respective fiefs but also to establish a tyrannical rule over its inhabitants.⁴²

In parallel to military operations, the French authorities created a new administrative structure based on a dual system: a Moroccan administration headed by the Sultan and a French administration headed by the *Résident-Général*.⁴³ At the local level, native affairs were initially managed by the “Service des Renseignements du Maroc”, an intelligence service created in 1907 to support the military operations in Morocco. This service was tasked with gathering intelligence about Morocco’s society and tribes and making contact with dissident groups to advance the conquest’s political agenda. They were also tasked with “counselling and controlling indigenous authorities.”⁴⁴ As the military conquest progressed, the “Services de Renseignements” gradually transformed into a real native policy vehicle tasked with managing the conquered territories and populations in line with the central administration’s directives.⁴⁵ As the service prerogatives were changing, its appellation kept changing also. First, the “Direction Chérifienne des Affaires Indigènes” was created in 1917 and put in charge of

⁴² Miller, *A History*, 94–99.

⁴³ The *Résident-Général* was the French government representative in Morocco. therefore, he was the head of the French administration and the highest French authority in the country.

⁴⁴ Marc Méraud, *Service des affaires indigènes du Maroc*, Histoire des goums marocains 3 (Paris Arcueil: la Koumia Public-réalisations, 1990), 60.

⁴⁵ Guillaume N. Wadia, “A Constellation of Outposts: French Intelligence Services and the Administration of the French Protectorate of Morocco, 1912-1937” (Doctoral dissertation, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University, Graduate School of Arts & Sciences, 2018), 23–24.

the intelligence services as well as the native policy. Nine years later, the “Services des Renseignements” was officially replaced by the “Service des Affaires Indigènes.” The corps of the I.A. officers or “Officiers des Affaires Indigènes” was formally constituted.⁴⁶ Meanwhile, the zones that were under firm French control were transferred to civilian administration starting from 1913: the *Contrôle Civil* corps was born.⁴⁷

On the Moroccan side, local administration retained for the most part its precolonial composition. Nonetheless, the preservation of the Moroccan apparatus did not mean that it continued to function in the same manner. Both administrations alternatively interacted, cooperated or clashed throughout the colonial period.⁴⁸ In particular, the initial idea of associating the Moroccan administration in managing the country’s affairs was soon replaced by a new system where the colonial administration was to “supervise” the action of the *Makhzan*. This formula on paper limited the action of French administrators to the control of their Moroccan counterparts. French administrators – especially outside of European settlement urban centers – were not to intervene directly in indigenous affairs. However, the reality of the dual system was far more complex and ambivalent than the simple “supervising” formula may suggest. For example, the *Great Qaids* policy – which epitomized the notion of “indirect rule” in Morocco and the “supervising” formula associated with it – did not prevent French officers and controllers from playing an active and direct role in administering these *qaids*’ fiefs. This constant interference in indigenous affairs resulted in a somewhat ambiguous hybrid system where the frontiers between the colonial and the indigenous administration were seldom well defined and

⁴⁶ Méraud, *Service des A.I.*, 57.

⁴⁷ Wyrzten, *Making Morocco*, 59.

⁴⁸ Volkan Ipek, “Creation of Hybridity in Morocco: 1912–1925,” 2019, 13–26.

assimilated. The apparent success of Marechal Lyautey's policy to create the colonial-native hybrid system should not overshadow the inherent contradictions, tensions and lasting effects of such a policy on the Moroccan society and its relationship to state and power.⁴⁹ In any case, the tension created by such a system set the stage for the nationalist struggle for independence that gathered steam in the post-WWII period. The clash between French authorities and Morocco's monarchy, its elites, and its urban working classes was at the heart of the nationalist movement. However, the Moroccan countryside did not remain on the sidelines during this period of great turmoil. The countryside – especially in southern Morocco – played an important role in the events of the last days of the Protectorate regime. Southern Morocco in particular became the theater of a violent internal struggle between the allies and representatives of the colonial regime on the one hand, and the resistance movements whether affiliated with the nationalist movement or acting on their own behalf.⁵⁰ Ultimately, the Protectorate regime ended in 1956 in a negotiated withdrawal of the two colonial powers from the country. Hence, the dual colonial system was replaced by a new and exclusively Moroccan administration.⁵¹ However, as the colonial episode drew to an end, the battle for colonial memory was only starting.

⁴⁹ Marshal Hubert Lyautey (1854-1934) was the first French Résident-Général in Morocco between 1912 and 1925. He oversaw most of the military conquest of Morocco and built the nucleus of the French colonial administration in the country.

⁵⁰ See for instance an example of that struggle in the Taliouine region in Rashīd Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan Ya'qūbī and Rashīd al-Ḥusayn Ya'qūbī, *Dhakhā'ir Min Kitābāt 'ulamā' Sūs: 'ayyīnāt Min A'māl al-Faqīh al-Adīb al-Maghfūr La-Hu Rashīd Muḥammad Ibn al-Ḥasan al-Ya'qūbī, 1916-2007 M*, al-Ṭab'ah al-ūlā (al-Rabāt: Idkal lil-Ṭibā'ah wa-al-Nashr, 2014), 123–39.

⁵¹ Miller, *A History*, 152–53.

Chapter IV.

Historiography

The French colonial legacy in Morocco has been the subject of moving and somewhat conflicting interpretations in the post-independence era. In the early days of independence, the historiographic debate took place against the backdrop of political struggles both in the old colony and the metropole to move past the legacies of empire and colonial subordination. At the heart of this debate was the question of French role in reinventing the Moroccan government along “modern” lines. Early on, Moroccan historians tried to minimize this role and deny as much as possible any affiliation of the post-independence regime to its colonial predecessor. On the other hand, Western historians were split between those who emphasized the role of the French Protectorate in strengthening the Moroccan state and those who stressed the extractive and oppressive nature of this regime. In any case, both groups consecrated the divide between the colonizer and the colonized inasmuch as they tended to separate the French and Moroccan spaces and marginalize their interconnectedness. The postcolonial turn prompted a revision of this dichotomy and inspired new works apprehending the colonial experience from a wider perspective combining the colonized as well as the colonizer’s standpoints.

Moroccan colonial history writing remained, however, prisoner to another bias as it mainly presented an urban centered view of the colonial experience. In fact, rural areas generally faded into the background in the historiographic narrative after the initial phase

of armed resistance to French penetration. Nonetheless, many historians recently have tried to rehabilitate the countryside by emphasizing the identity formation processes at play during the colonial period. Others also have revisited the role of rural agents in the Moroccan nationalist movement. Notwithstanding those works, the transformation of the political and administrative landscape in rural Morocco remains understudied within the historical discipline, although it has garnered some attention among scholars across the social sciences.

Early Historiographic Debates and the Perpetuation of the Colonial Divide

For early post-independence Moroccan historians, the colonial episode was only a pause in the long history of the Moroccan state. In fact, the early inquiries into the colonial legacy presented the nationalist struggle for independence as a struggle to regain Moroccan sovereignty and free the country from French tutelage. In the wake of Moroccan independence, Albert Ayache presented the colonial administration as a foreign transplant that stripped the Moroccan government from any effective authority over its people. It was soon enough rejected by the Moroccan society and the urban nationalist movement in particular.⁵² Other scholars such as Abdallah Laroui and Mohammed Lahbabi tried similarly to undermine the colonial narrative putting the French intervention at the center of the Moroccan national state building process. Their works stress the continuities in the Moroccan political system and insert the changes of the colonial period in the larger context of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries’

⁵² Albert Ayache, *Le Maroc; Bilan D'une Colonisation* (Paris: Éditions sociales, 1956), 79–84.

reforms.⁵³ Consequently, these works negate the central colonial thesis, presenting the French-led “modernization” process as the starting point for the consolidation of the Moroccan modern state.

To the North, the legacy of the French rule in Morocco continued to animate passionate debates among European historians for decades. At one end, some historians emphasized the positive impact of colonial rule over the genesis of the Moroccan modern state. At the heart of this defense lies the figure of Marechal Lyautey. Lyautey’s program is described as an attempt to preserve a distinct Moroccan government apparatus while strengthening the central state capabilities. These capabilities were enhanced both by extending the central government territorial outreach and by implementing a modern colonial administration. In so doing, Lyautey aimed to “gradually adapt the [traditional government] to modern forms of civilization.”⁵⁴ Conversely, other historians were more critical of French colonial policies and stressed their negative impact on the country. For example, Jacques Berque criticized a regime where the French colons and administration exerted themselves to take over the colony’s resources while marginalizing its local population.⁵⁵ Charles-André Julien for his part denies the fact that French authorities ever intended to establish a meaningful form of indirect rule over Morocco even during the tenure of Marechal Lyautey.⁵⁶ In any case, European historiography was more interested in evaluating the French legacy and approached the colonial experience from a predominantly European point of view.

⁵³ See for instance Abdallah Laroui, *Les Origines Sociales et Culturelles Du Nationalisme Marocain, 1830-1912*, Textes à l’appui (Paris: F. Maspero, 1977); M. Lahbabi, *Le Gouvernement Marocain à l’aube Du XXe Siècle*, Collection Des Centres d’études Juridiques (Editions techniques Nordafricaines, 1958).

⁵⁴ Marechal Hubert Lyautey. Cited in Gruner, *Du Maroc Traditionnel Au Maroc Moderne*, 2.

⁵⁵ Jacques Berque, *Le Maghreb entre deux guerres* (Paris: Seuil, 1979), 244-60.

⁵⁶ Ch.-A. (Charles-André) Julien, *Le Maroc Face Aux Impérialismes : 1415-1956* (Paris: Éditions J.A., 1978), 118.

The Postcolonial Turn: Towards an Integrated Colonial History

Two new currents of thought prompted new interpretations of the colonial legacy.

These currents initially originated outside of the history field but soon found an echo within the country's historiography. The first emerged in the late seventies of the last century with the advent of postcolonial studies. For instance, Edward Said's seminal book *Orientalism* paved the way for new interpretations of notions such as empire and modernity. His theory posits that the Orient – and by extension the colonies, the dominated third world – was not merely a neutral and pre-established object for intellectual inquiry. Instead, he claims the imperialist and colonialist experience created “Orientalism [as] a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and (most of the time) ‘the occident.’”⁵⁷

Although Said approached Orientalism mainly from a literary perspective, his theories soon reverberated within history departments and opened new avenues for studying colonialism. In fact, colonialism was no longer considered as a mere material phenomenon. It also took form through a system of knowledge production that crystalized the colonizer's domination over the colonized in the eyes of both. Subsequently, historians acknowledged the colonial episteme's “power to narrate, or to block other narratives from forming and emerging.”⁵⁸ Consequently, postcolonial historians tried to depart from the Eurocentric traditions and canons for thinking history when studying other regions and civilizations.⁵⁹ They were eager to unearth the

⁵⁷ Edward W. Said, *Orientalism*, 1st ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978), 2.

⁵⁸ Edward W. Said, *Culture and Imperialism*, 1st ed. (New York: Knopf : Distributed by Random House, 1993), xiii.

⁵⁹ Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe : Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference - New Edition*, Princeton Studies in Culture/Power/History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009), 3–6.

alternative narratives that were obscured by the dominant perspective: the indigenous experience of colonization and modernity shall be as important as the European's. Indian postcolonial historians such as Dipesh Chakrabarty and Ranjit Guha went even further and advocated for a history of colonialism that highlighted "the contributions by people, on their own, that is, independent of the elite."⁶⁰ Their works gave birth to the "Subaltern Studies," a current that privileges writing history from the standpoint of the subaltern groups in colonial societies: peasants, outcasts, minorities, women, etc.⁶¹ All in all, postcolonial theories opened the door to new interpretations of colonial history by overcoming the epistemological division between the dominated East and the dominant West.

Postcolonial theories provided a new analytical toolkit for the study of the Moroccan colonial past as well. For instance, Burke borrows some postcolonial methods to study the processes through which the French colonial discourse created a distinctive form of "Moroccan Islam." Instead of exerting the elements of continuity that underline the nationalist narrative of Moroccan colonial history, he contends that Moroccan Islam underwent a significant transformation in the early days of French presence (1900-1925) prompted by the works of French social scientists. More importantly, he contends that these scholars' representation of Moroccan Islam was not immune to the international context in which they operated nor isolated from political bargaining with local actors as the colonial administration tried to dominate and control this new territory.⁶²

⁶⁰ Ranajit Guha cited in Go, *Postcolonial Thought*, 45.

⁶¹ Go, *Postcolonial Thought*, 45–46.

⁶² Burke, *The Ethnographic State*, 11.

In a similar approach, Jonathan Wyrzten proposes an interactional framework to model the transformative impact of colonialism on Moroccan identities. He privileges an analytical approach centered on the exchanges between French and Moroccan actors and the changes they triggered within the country. He contends that these interactions redefined Moroccan identities along four major themes: religion, ethnicity, territory, and the role of the Moroccan monarchy.⁶³ Rather than addressing these themes through a top-down approach, he puts into contribution numerous factors shaping French policies and dictating the conditions for their success and failure. Metropolitan politics, international rivalries, colonial agendas, local resistance or cooperation all influenced – and were influenced by – the course of events within the Moroccan Protectorate.

In addition to the postcolonial challenge, a new impetus to reassessing the Moroccan colonial past came from the field of political sciences. The persistence of authoritarian regimes in the Arab world brought the attention to the potential role of historical factors in shielding these regimes from democratic aspirations. Morocco's colonial past was not immune to the inquiry into the origins of Middle Eastern authoritarian states. In particular, the development of a strong and overarching monarchical institution became increasingly linked to the changes it underwent as a result of colonial policies and discourse. There, political scientists tapped into the colonial period to account for the persistence of traditional aspects of the monarchy in conjunction with modern institutions and ideas. For example, Abdellah Hammoudi used the ancestral concept of *dar al-mulk* – literally the house of kingship – to underscore the continuities in the Moroccan monarchical system of representations. He also underscored the colonial

⁶³ Wyrzten, *Making Morocco*, 5.

period's role in expanding this concept and transposing it into a modern authoritative structure.⁶⁴ More recently, Mohamed Daadaoui contends that colonial authorities enhanced the Moroccan monarchy's legitimacy by augmenting and bureaucratizing traditional rituals of power. Religious symbols of legitimacy such as the monarch's position as the Commander of the Faithful were put to contribution by colonial authorities to cement the Moroccan traditional state – a theme that would be central to the consolidation of monarchical power in the post-independence period.⁶⁵

The Missing Link: Rural Morocco in the Historiographic Debate

Beyond the transformative effects of the French intervention over the central government and urban national elites, the Moroccan rural areas have been mainly studied from the angle of armed resistance and regional identities' formation. For example, Wyrzten explores the processes of identity negotiation within Berber communities. He demonstrates how the attempts to reframe the ethnic and religious factors behind group solidarities created new spaces for identity negotiation between local communities and French and Moroccan authorities.⁶⁶ Katherine Hoffman explores the effects of French linguistic policies in crystalizing linguistic differences as markers for regional identities. Furthermore, she underlines the ambivalence of colonial policies in that regard. The colonial authorities vowed to preserve Berber linguistic traits while paradoxically

⁶⁴ Abdellah Hammoudi, "The Reinvention of Dar Al-Mulk: The Moroccan Political System and Its Legitimation," in *In the Shadow of the Sultan : Culture, Power and Politics in Morocco*, ed. Rahma Bourqia and Susan Gilson Miller, Harvard Middle Eastern Monographs 31 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 129–75.

⁶⁵ Mohamed Daadaoui, *Moroccan Monarchy and the Islamist Challenge : Maintaining Makhzen Power*, 1st ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 53–59.

⁶⁶ Jonathan Wyrzten, "Colonial State-Building and the Negotiation of Arab and Berber Identity in Protectorate Morocco," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 43, no. 2 (2011): 227–49.

undermining them by introducing administrative procedures and educational systems dominated by the Arab and French languages.⁶⁷ Within the national academic landscape, the rural areas – and in particular the Berber areas – were generally dismissed from or subordinated to a nationalist narrative centered on the role of urban nationalist elites in opposing the colonial presence and building the backbone of the Moroccan nationalist movement.⁶⁸

The impact of colonization on the local state apparatus both as a system of representations and a vehicle for the exercise of state power have garnered little attention recently from historical circles in Morocco and abroad. In fact, historians have given little attention to developments in the Moroccan countryside beyond the initial phase of military conquest that ended with its “pacification” and the failure of French ethnic policies in the early thirties. From the thirties onward, Moroccan colonial historiography became prisoner to the “double cage of nationalism and monarchism.”⁶⁹ Scholarly research seldom reflects on the enduring effects of colonial rule over the traditional power structures within Moroccan rural societies. It is worth mentioning that many political and social scientists reflected on the colonial legacies when analyzing the state of Moroccan post-independence rural communities. However, their works did not amount to a full historical enquiry into the colonial period. Their primary focus was not on the historical transformation of rural communities during the colonial period. Nevertheless, they provide some promising hints into two major themes. The first theme is how rural

⁶⁷ Katherine E Hoffman, “Purity and Contamination: Language Ideologies in French Colonial Native Policy in Morocco,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 50, no. 3 (2008): 724–52.

⁶⁸ Mustapha El Qadéry, “Les Berbères Entre Le Mythe Colonial et La Négation Nationale. Le Cas Du Maroc,” *Revue d'histoire Moderne et Contemporaine (Paris, France : 1954)* 45, no. 2 (1998): 428–29.

⁶⁹ Susan Gilson Miller, “Filling a Historical Parenthesis: An Introduction to ‘Morocco from World War II to Independence,’” *The Journal of North African Studies* 19, no. 4 (2014): 466.

communities' social organization was transformed by French ethnic policies. The second is the ignored role of rural components in defending the monarchy and the nationalist movement during and after the colonial period.

In his study of Atlas Mountains tribes, Ernest Gellner hints at the fact that French native policies – and the Berber *dahir*⁷⁰ in particular – “plac[ed] tribal customs and institutions into a kind of ice box [which] did not, of course, preserve that custom exactly in the form in which it existed originally.”⁷¹ Alternatively, Mustapha El Qadéry contends in his broader study of “Berber justice” that the French administration, instead of preserving Berber particularism, undermined Berber tribal institutions by depriving these tribes from their relative political autonomy and allowing local potentates to yield unrestricted powers.⁷² In a different register, Hoffman conducted a thorough analysis of the specific question of customary law application within the Berber *dahir* framework. Her approach to customary law “as both policy and expressive practice, involving actors with conflicting interests, competing loyalties, and discursive styles, and multiple layers of spoken interpretation and written translation” echoes the kind of questions raised by postcolonial theories.⁷³

The Moroccan countryside's involvement in supporting the nationalist movement and the monarchical system gives also some hints into the transformative effects of colonization on rural areas. For instance, E.G.H. Joffé explores the role of local elites in

⁷⁰ A *dahir* is a Moroccan royal decree. The Berber *dahir* refers to a 1930 decree instigated by the French Protectorate establishing customary courts in predominantly Berber tribal regions. This law prompted protests in Moroccan urban centers which were considered by nationalists as the first manifestation of the Moroccan nationalist movement

⁷¹ Ernest Gellner, *Saints of the Atlas* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 19.

⁷² Mustapha El Qadéry, “La Justice Coloniale Des « Berbères » et l'État National Au Maroc,” *L'année Du Maghreb*, no. III (2007): 17–37.

⁷³ Katherine E Hoffman, “Berber Law by French Means: Customary Courts in the Moroccan Hinterlands, 1930–1956,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 52, no. 4 (2010): 852.

the success of the independence movement. He contends that the Protectorate regime accelerated the emergence of a rural landowning class whose political and economic influence increased as a consequence of French policies.⁷⁴ Many of these new “kulaks” joined and strengthened the independence movement once their interests came to be threatened by the post-WWII colonial policies.⁷⁵ In a different context, Rémy Leveau expands on the post-independence traditionalist alliance between the monarchy and rural elites against urban-based progressist and nationalist parties. He argues that the rural notables’ system emerged during the colonial period. In fact, French authorities sought to ensure political control with minimal expenses by promoting the political and economic domination of local potentates over the population. The monarchy exploited this preexisting network to control the countryside and counter the reformist aspirations of urban elites thus maintaining the state’s traditional base.⁷⁶

These works acknowledge the different transformative processes rural areas underwent during the colonial period. However, they generally use them as a preamble to the study of the post-independence political system or narrow their analysis to the study of regional identities and nationalist sentiments. Instead, it is possible to approach colonial legacy through the lens of power structures and networks’ adaptation and influence on the colonial experience. At the center of such focus are questions such as the integration of rural populations, elites and administrators into a dual and somewhat ambivalent administrative structure. How was this structure theorized and constructed by

⁷⁴ The Moroccan countryside in some regions was dominated by collective forms of land ownership prior to the emergence of this class.

⁷⁵ E. G. H Joffé, “The Moroccan Nationalist Movement: Istiqlal, the Sultan, and the Country,” *Journal of African History* 26, no. 4 (1985): 289–307.

⁷⁶ Rémy Leveau, *Le fellah marocain défenseur du trône*, 2e éd., Références (Presses de Sciences Po (P.F.N.S.P.), 1985), 7–9.

the architects of colonial Morocco? How did rural agents – both French and Moroccan – apprehend and assimilate it? How were they able to conciliate or otherwise do without the new structures of local administration according to the realities of the ground? To what extent did they manage to navigate through the contradictions and ambivalences of such a dual system? The aforementioned ideas of local elites’ empowerment, of the reformulation of ancestral legal codes and norms and the hierarchization and bureaucratization of fluid traditional networks are good starting points for a more comprehensive understanding of rural administration during the colonial era. The subsequent chapters therefore turn into exploring and answering in more details the aforementioned questions in the specific context of southern Morocco.

Chapter V.

Southern Morocco under Colonial Rule

The colonial experience started at a period of great turmoil in the Sharifian Empire. Through the nineteenth century, Morocco went through numerous crises caused by internal tensions and foreign encroachment. The establishment of the Protectorate regime was supposed to address these crises and stabilize the country's situation through "reforms." However, the colonial state found itself entangled in a series of crises that spanned the Protectorate period and framed the colonial experience. In southern Morocco, these crises started with a long and painful period of military operations aimed at "pacifying" southern tribes. These operations lasted for twenty-two years and strained the region's resources and social structures. They also conditioned the choices underlying the establishment of the French administration in the South. But as the military side of the colonial endeavor close to an end, these choices continued to define the colonial approach to the region. In fact, the post-conquest colonial regime in turn had to face many problems: droughts and famines, World War II, the rise of Moroccan nationalism. In that sense, the colonial administration was most of the time running on crisis management mode. It was never able to deploy a normalized version of the colonial state in southern Morocco – if it ever intended to do so. The following sections specifically explore the different stages of colonial administration's deployment in the South. But first, a broad view of the conditions prevailing in southern Morocco in precolonial times is warranted.

Southern Society in the Eve of Colonization

By the end of the nineteenth century, Moroccan society was deeply affected by the European penetration of the country. European presence was mainly felt in the Atlantic coastal cities and plains and within the Sharifian Empire central government. Nonetheless, European interference in Moroccan affairs – but also the reforms introduced by Moroccan monarchs – upended the balance of power within the Moroccan South. The most important manifestation of such upheavals was the simultaneous emergence of strongmen that carved out huge territories in the region through violent means. The latter used their military successes against rival factions – but also against *Makhzan* forces – to force the *Makhzan* into recognizing their authority and giving it an official mantle. Although these *Great Qaids* were not the only power brokers in the region at the onset of the Protectorate, they were able to further cement their grip – at least in the early days of colonization – by brokering cooperation deals with French authorities. However, the rise to power – and perhaps more importantly the longevity – of such strongmen was by no means disconnected from the colonial context of the late nineteenth century, nor was their presence the natural state of Moroccan politics in southern society.

But before addressing the rise of these historical figures, a discussion of the geographical and socio-economic conditions defining southern Morocco's political field is of utmost importance. First, southern Morocco refers here to the territories south of the imperial city of Marrakech that fell under French administration. As such, this space is dominated by two mountain ranges – the High and Anti-Atlas ranges – that stretch from East to West thus ensuring the junction between Morocco's fertile Atlantic plains and its southern Saharan depth. Besides, the High Atlas is the highest mountain range in North

Africa. Thus, it constituted a formidable rampart shielding southern society from outside interference. As a consequence, southern Morocco remained for the most part linguistically and ethnically homogenous. In fact, it is dominated by *Tashelhit*-speaking Berber groups that are present both in the mountainous areas and in the low lands straddled between the mountains or stretching south towards the Spanish colonial domain. Other linguistic groups – especially *Sahrawi* groups to the South and *Tamazight*-speaking transhumant people to the East – complete the linguistic panorama of the region. However, this apparent linguistic homogeneity did not necessarily result in a cohesive political system. For the most part, southern society was organized around a complex and fragmented tribal system.

In effect, the primary characteristic of the tribal political system lies in its fragmentary nature. For instance, Robert Montagne in his extensive study of Berber society during the Protectorate states that: “[The Berber rural population] is organized in political units (tribes or ‘cantons’) of extremely small dimensions. Several tens of square kilometres and a few hundred homesteads are enough to constitute an independent ‘republic.’”⁷⁷ This statement indicates the degree of fragmentation he observed in southern society. The basis for his Berber republics hypothesis comes from his analysis of High Atlas sedentary Berbers. In these lands, Montagne puts hamlets or villages at the lowest echelon of the political tribal construct. These units are generally constituted of a grouping of a few homesteads – generally less than thirty – in geographical proximity. They are constituted of more compact familial groups sharing common agnatic lineage commonly referred to as *ikhs* – literally bone. These hamlets or villages coalesce to create

⁷⁷ Robert Montagne and David Seddon, *The Berbers: Their Social and Political Organisation*, Routledge Revivals (Abingdon, Oxon New York, NY: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2018), 20.

a *moud'a* or sub-fraction that share common infrastructures such as mosques and granaries, contribute together to local works and share access to collective spaces such as forests and grazing lands. Here again, sub-fractions coalesce into a more politically active group, the *taqbilt* or 'cantons.' These fractions are characterized by the presence of local assemblies or *jema'a* that yield extensive administrative and judiciary powers within the community. In effect, these *jema'a*-s are in charge of upholding the interests of the community internally and defending it against any external threats. The *taqbilt* is at the heart of Montagne's concept of Berber republics. Above the canton level lies the tribe *per se*, a group of several 'cantons' that share a common sense of belonging to the same territory, tradition and 'fraternity' – although fraternity here does not necessarily have a genealogical connotation. Although these tribes do not necessarily have dedicated or active political institutions, the different fractions constituting the tribe demonstrate a common attachment to defending the tribe's territory and prestige. They for instance mobilize their military forces to face any substantial external threat. Finally, the tribes do adhere to tribal confederations whose origins and functioning vary from region to region and are generally loosely defined. Their primary objective seems to be the creation of a 'natural' framework for alliances in the case of large-scale confrontations either with other tribal confederations or with the *Makhzan* itself.⁷⁸

The tribal subdivisions within sedentary Berber communities in southwestern Morocco also find echoes within the transhumant tribes of the southeastern confines. Although the names and institutions of subdivisions in the nomadic context differ largely

⁷⁸ Robert Montagne, *Les Berbères et le makhzen dans le sud du Maroc ; essai sur la transformation politique des Berbères sédentaires (groupe chleuh)*, Travaux de l'Année sociologique; fondateur: Émile Durkheim; directeur: Marcel Mauss (Paris: F. Alcan, 1930), 151–69.

from their sedentary counterparts, they remain for the most part anchored on the logic set forth above. Two main differences however remain salient when comparing the two systems. First, the village subdivision is for obvious reasons not relevant to the transhumant or nomadic context. In that case, the agnatic lineage replaces geographical proximity within the village as the cement of community identity at the lower echelons of the tribal system. In fact, nomadic people confer a higher value to ancestry – real or imagined – in justifying group solidarities among the different social groupings.⁷⁹ Second, the role of tribe-level institutions is more effective in the case of transhumant tribes. Political institutions and offices existed at higher echelons of the tribal strata. For example, the *Ait 'Atta* tribe gathered each year to elect a rotating ‘supreme chief’ or *amghar n-uffila* to facilitate coordination and arbitration among the various factions within the tribe.⁸⁰ This difference is probably related to the fact that “nomad and transhumant tribes tended to engage in intertribal warfare, while among sedentary agricultural tribes’ feuds were generally intratribal in character.”⁸¹

In any case, transhumant or nomadic tribes retain the same multi-layered structure that their sedentary counterparts have. To illustrate this, let us discuss one example from each settlement category: the transhumant *Ait 'Atta* originating from *Jbel Saghru* in the Anti-Atlas and the sedentary *Ghoujdama* in the northern High Atlas.⁸² The *Ait 'Atta* were divided into five sections or *khums* – literally fifths. Those sections in turn were divided into subtribes or *taqbilt*. Again, *taqbilt* comprised a number of clans or *ighs amaggran*

⁷⁹ Gellner, *Saints*, 38.

⁸⁰ Ross E. Dunn, “Berber Imperialism: The Ait Atta Expansion in Southeast Morocco,” in *Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa*, ed. Ernest Gellner and Antoine Micaud (London: Duckworth, 1973), 87.

⁸¹ David M Hart, *Tribe and Society in Rural Morocco* (Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 2000), 12.

⁸² A map representation of the tribes discussed in the thesis is available in appendix I (**Erreur ! Source du renvoi introuvable.**)

which were in turn subdivided into lineages or *ighs ahzzan* constituted of more compact patriarchal sub-lineages.⁸³ As for the *Ghoujdama*, the tribe was composed of five sections or *khums*. These sections were then subdivided into two subsections or *leff, amqoun*. Each *amqoun* was comprised – or rather emerged from – several clans or *ighs* which encompass in turn several localities or *adghar* – the equivalent of the *moud'a* in Montagne's study (see Appendix 2a. for a Representation of Both Structures).⁸⁴

Here, we see apparent similarities between the two structures in terms of divisions. In part, these similarities stem from the fact that the divisions discussed above follow 'anthropological usage' in describing such structures.⁸⁵ However, this standardization should not obscure the diversity of meanings, practices and institutions that arise from those divisions among the two groups. Furthermore, this tree-like structure should not give the illusion of a hierarchical and organically organized structure. As Jacques Berque alludes to: "[T]he complexity of the *Chleuh* group is that of an inextricable thicket, made of tiny twigs and whose roots may extend bit by bit to cover all the points in the horizon. Not only is such a heterogeneity a fact, but it is the rule."⁸⁶ Indeed, the heterogeneity of structures and practices hint to flexible and evolving divisions originating from the same framework rather than to systematic and rigid categorization processes.

⁸³ Dunn, "Berber Imperialism," 86–87.

⁸⁴ Ali Amahan, *Mutations Sociales Dans Le Haut Atlas: Les Ghoujdama*, Méditerranée-Sud 2 (Paris : Rabat: Maison des sciences de l'homme ; La Porte, 1998), 50–66.

⁸⁵ Hart, *Tribe and Society*, 8.

⁸⁶ Jacques Berque, "Qu'est-Ce Qu'une 'Tribu' Nord-Africaine ?," in *Opera Minora*, vol. II (Saint-Denis: Bouchène, 2001), 162.

In any case, the fragmentary nature of tribal society in southern Morocco gave rise to the segmentary explanation of its working. This sociological framework was favored among Anglo-Saxon anthropologists dealing with Moroccan tribes such as Ernest Gellner and David M. Hart. In its premises, the segmentary system is built upon a ‘tree-like’ structure where each member of the community can specify his place without ambiguity. Furthermore, the system maintains order and internal cohesion through “the balancing and opposition of constituent groups.”⁸⁷ In essence, if conflict arises from within or without the tribe, a system of counterbalancing alliances kicks in to preserve the overall structure and uphold the *status quo*. Therefore, the group’s social cohesion and control does not depend on the existence of a dedicated coercive apparatus – a government. In that sense, “segmentary societies employ [a ‘divide that ye need not be ruled’] technique for doing without government altogether.”⁸⁸

The segmentary explanation however does not apply to the Moroccan case – and to southern tribes in particular – in its neatest form. First, segmentation based on clearly defined lineages is seldom fully used within Moroccan tribes. As we have seen above, common ancestry plays a minor role if any in defining the boundaries of segmentary layers within sedentary tribes in the High Atlas. Although it plays a bigger role within transhumant tribes such as the *Ait ‘Atta*, lineages remain vaguely traceable above the lower levels of *ighs*.⁸⁹ More importantly, the system of balances and oppositions does not seem to operate consistently within the social framework of southern Morocco – at least that is what could be inferred from the anthropological work conducted in contemporary

⁸⁷ Gellner, *Saints*, 42.

⁸⁸ Gellner, *Saints*, 41.

⁸⁹ David M. Hart, “Segmentary Models in Morocco,” *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 2, no. 4 (1996): 721.

tribal Morocco.⁹⁰ In effect, segmentary lineages are far from being the only model shaping southern Moroccan social structures and relations.

Other social groups existed outside of the pure tribal structure outlined by the segmentary model. Most prominent among them were religious figures or groups embedded within the tribal society but generally enjoying special status within the social fabric of southern Morocco. First, most of southern tribes were home to ‘resident holy men’ that were often an integral part of the tribal segmentation although they had a place apart in the system.⁹¹ In southern Morocco, as was the case elsewhere in the country, these holy men were to be found in the descendance of local saints – the *igurramen* or *mrabtín* – or that of the prophet Muhammed – the *shurfa*. The two groups were by no means mutually exclusive nor did they have clearly distinctive attributes and prerogatives. In effect, they were the recipients and guardians of a form of popular Islam that originated in the sharifian and maraboutic turn in the fifteenth and sixteenth century.⁹² They derived their religious authority from *baraka* – or divine blessing – and piety and were therefore held in high esteem by all segments of the local community and beyond.⁹³ As such, they played a central role in arbitrating feuds between opposed factions within the tribe or locality and in advising the local community in individual or communal matters. Their judgement and advice were generally upheld by local communities since their blessing was reputed to bring fortune and divine sanction to lay enterprises. In that manner, their presence amongst local communities dispensed the

⁹⁰ David M. Hart, “Making Sense of Moroccan Tribal Sociology and History,” *The Journal of North African Studies* 6, no. 2 (2001): 17.

⁹¹ Hart, *Tribe and Society*, 12.

⁹² C.R. Pennell, “Lineage, Genealogy and Practical Politics: Thoughts on David Hart’s Last Work,” *The Journal of North African Studies* 6, no. 2 (June 2001): 8.

⁹³ Gellner, *Saints*, 74.

different factions from devastating armed violence or the costly and generally inaccessible *makhzanian* justice.

At the institutional level, holy shrines – *zawiya-s* – and Sufi brotherhoods – *tariqa-s* – played a similar role although with a broader outreach in southern rural society. In fact, these institutions also mediated conflicts and maintained peace at a larger scale commensurate with the outreach of their fame and prestige. In that sense, they played an important political role inasmuch they were able to mobilize or neutralize large – and often violent – social or political movements. Moreover, these institutions were able to mobilize important resources derived from gifts and endowments from local communities. Given their prestige and wealth, they were often able to assume a position of leadership around which the tribes could rally. In general, the most influential *tariqa-s* were kept in check by the central state through the grant of economic privileges.⁹⁴ Nevertheless, a few *zawiya-s* exploited their remote position from central power and European penetration in southern Morocco to assert a more proactive political role. In some cases – such as the case of the *zawiya* of Illigh and the Bayruks in Goulimine in southwestern Morocco, these religious orders were posing a serious threat to *Makhzan* authority.⁹⁵

The *Makhzan* for its part was still a major player in the political and social life of southern Morocco although its influence on local affairs was dwindling in the late nineteenth century. Indeed, the Moroccan central state had for centuries shaped and reshaped tribal settlements in the region. In effect, many of the tribes that constitute the Moroccan chessboard were either created or destroyed, assembled or dismembered,

⁹⁴ Burke, *Prelude to Protectorate*, 10.

⁹⁵ Abitbol, *Histoire*, 443–46.

displaced or implanted due to central state intervention or for administrative reasons at different points in time.⁹⁶ The most prominent example of such intervention in the tribal fabric are the *jaysh* tribes – literally army tribes. Those tribes were in fact enrolled within the Sultan’s army in exchange for land grants and tax exemptions.⁹⁷ Moreover, these reconfigurations of the tribal map had deep and lasting effects on the social fabric of southern Morocco. Although tribal institutions and representations were widely spread in the region, the vigor, the functioning, and even the geographical distribution of tribal life were more or less affected by centuries of interactions with the central state and its representatives.

The central state representatives were by no means absent from the landscape in southern Morocco by the late nineteenth century. Although large swaths of the region escaped *Makhzan* control for extended periods at the time, it remains true that the central state – at least before the crisis of the early 1900s – was still able to appoint or at least coopt local *qaid*s or chieftains. For instance, Mulay Hassan did not shy away from asserting *Makhzan* authority through multiplying military campaigns in the fringes of his stretched empire. In the region under study, he campaigned in the Sous valley and in the southeastern pre-Saharan spaces three times during his long reign. He proactively increased the number of *qaid*s in his local administration either by appointing new ones in subdued regions or by incorporating hard-to-subdue local chiefs into his government apparatus. At his death, the *Makhzan* brought into submission a good chunk of southern territories.⁹⁸

⁹⁶ George Joff , “Traditions of Governance in North Africa,” *The Journal of North African Studies* 20, no. 5 (October 20, 2015): 728.

⁹⁷ Burke, *Prelude to Protectorate*, 8.

⁹⁸ Pennell, *Morocco since 1830*, 103–5.

Beyond the territories formally submitting to *Makhzan* authority – commonly called *Blad al-Makhzan*, the *Makhzan* was still influential in lands lying outside of his administration's reach and commonly called *Blad es-Siba*. First, these lands were connected to their neighboring localities and cities through trade and movements of people. There were few instances where rural localities in southern Morocco were completely cut off from any interaction with the Sultan administration or his justice. Although it did not assert direct control over these localities, the *Makhzan*'s presence and actions elsewhere influenced these localities through the ripple effects of trade and people flows. Also, the Moroccan administrators – whether at the central or local level – mastered the art of playing the tribal divisions to remain an active actor in local affairs even in non-submissive lands. *Makhzan* representatives – or the Sultan himself – were often involved in arbitrating quarrels among fighting factions even those lying outside of their immediate administration.⁹⁹ And for a reason, the cord linking the central state to the dissident tribes was never completely severed. In effect, tribal dissidence rarely challenged the spiritual or temporal authority of the sovereign or his position as the leader of the land. Hence, the tenuous border between submission and dissidence was crossed over frequently by southern tribes as part of the political game rather than a challenge to the political game itself.¹⁰⁰ Armed rebellion, negotiations, religious symbols, gift exchanges, tribal feuds and many other techniques were all parts of the fabric of politics within Morocco and within the South in particular.

⁹⁹ Germain Ayache, "La Fonction d'Arbitrage Du Makhzen," *Bulletin Economique et Social Du Maroc*, no. 138–139 (1978): 5–21.

¹⁰⁰ Wyrzten, *Making Morocco*, 37.

The rise of the “Lords of the Atlas” gives a great example of the political fabric of southern Morocco in the pre-colonial period. In particular, the rise of the house of Goundafa in the High Atlas Mountains illustrates the fluid and complex nature of rebellion and submission in the Moroccan context. Initially, Mohammed El Goundafi, the chief of the family, was the *amghar*¹⁰¹ of the faction – *leff* – of Ait Iraten in the *N’fis* river valley. He was under the authority of the *qaïd* Jraoui, the commander of the *Ahl-Souss jaysh* tribes. When the latter died, his successor started harassing El Goundafi who did not abide to his authority. Subsequently, El Goundafi rebelled against the *qaïd*’s authority while paradoxically protesting of his loyalty to the Sultan. Nonetheless, conflict ensued. He successfully fended off two military expeditions sanctioned by the Sultan to bring him back into the fold by entrenching himself in his fortress perched in the heights of the Atlas Mountains. Oddly enough, he spared the lives of the *Makhzan* soldiers he captured while executing the members of the rival faction – *leff* – that accompanied the expedition. While still entrenched in his position in the Atlas Mountains, he sent his son loaded with gifts to the capital Fez to negotiate the terms of his submission with the Sultan under the auspices of the *zawiya* of *Timgilcht*.¹⁰² At the end of these negotiations, the Sultan granted the rebel the title of *qaïd* over the whole *N’fis* river valley.¹⁰³ The house of Goundafa was growing more powerful under the *Makhzan*’s umbrella, but was it really under *Makhzan* authority?

¹⁰¹ *Amghar* in Berber, *sheikh* in Arabic is a local dignitary who holds administrative and judicial powers within a given community. These dignitaries are either elected by their peers or appointed by the *qaïds* or their deputies (*khalifas*)

¹⁰² The *zawiya* of *Timgilcht* is a local shrine in the Anti-Atlas (172 km to the south-east of Agadir) built in the seventeenth century whose influence spread up the *N’fis* valley (around 300 km to the north) in the nineteenth century.

¹⁰³ Léopold Justinard and Alphonse Juin, *Un grand chef berbère: le Caïd goundafi* (Rabat: Dar Al Amane, 2015), 36–45; Ahmad b. Kalid al-Nasiri Nasiri, Ga`far b. Ahmad al-, Nasiri, Muhammad b. Ahmad al-, *Kitab al-Istiqsa li-akbar duwal al-Magrib al-aqsa*, vol. IX (al-Dar al-Bayda: Dar al-Kitab, 1954), 146–47.

The story of the *qaid* El Goundafi's rise to power brings to the forefront several aspects of southern Morocco's politics at the time. First, the competition between the two factions within the *Goundafa* tribe – the El Goundafi's own *Ait Iraten* and his rivals the *Ait Athman* – played an important role in the origins and unfolding of the conflict. All started when El Goundafi freed himself from the tutelage of the rival faction chief *qaid* Guergouri. Besides, he relied on his own faction's support to defend his district against rival attacks. Also, the goal of the whole conflict seems to be the supremacy over the *N'fis* valley tribes which El Goundafi achieved eventually in the end. Second, the religious institution of the *zawiya* of *Timgilcht* played a central role in brokering peace between the rebellious chief and the *Makhzan*. The *zawiya* was in fact involved in the initial cease-fire between the two sides and the subsequent talks with the Sultan. Although the *zawiya* was geographically remote from the center of rebellion, it used its prestige among the *N'fis* valley population and its connections with the *Makhzan* to play its traditional role of peace broker and asylum giver in this affair. Finally, the *Makhzan* used alternatively menace, armed force, negotiations and finally cooptation to bring the rebel under its authority. However, El Goundafi's submission did not mean he was completely under the control of the *Makhzan* nor that the latter was resigned to coopt him because it could not break him. For instance, the newly appointed *qaid* continued to expand his domain through his own individual initiative. Nevertheless, his position as a *Makhzan* servant made him refrain from undermining *Makhzan* interests and participate to its military campaigns.¹⁰⁴ Therefore, the *Makhzan* gained in the affair as well inasmuch

¹⁰⁴ Justinard and Juin, *Un grand chef*, 47.

it defused a serious cause of trouble in a strategic trading route and directed its energy towards bringing more tribes into submission.

This account illustrates the nature of the Moroccan political system at the turn of the twentieth century. Several political forces – tribes, religious institutions, state – all interacted within a social equilibrium that was often violent and chaotic yet remained sustainable and legible for the competing forces. Political players were able to draw upon different cultural models embedded in southern society – tribal institutions and alliances, *zawiya-s* and *tariqa-s*’ networks and privileges, the *Makhzan* government tradition – to navigate the segmented political field and find a precarious yet viable political and social equilibrium. Although attaining absolute power was possible within this system, it was generally short lived as the factors that made such power possible were quick to dissolve in this fragmented and ever-shifting system. As the French scholar Edmond Doutté noticed when first encountering Moroccan politics at the eve of the twentieth century:

All this is not disorder, but a kind of order; in this apparent chaos all the living forces end up by finding an equilibrium: the play of sectional interests and coalitions of all kinds results in a kind of social equilibrium which constitutes a durable state, as much in the tribes as in the cities.¹⁰⁵

This apparent chaos was further exacerbated by European intervention and the tremendous quantity of firearms the European dealers smuggled into Moroccan territory.¹⁰⁶ The flow of weapons turned already bellicose tribes into militarized factions and heightened the sense of instability in the country. On top of that, foreign-induced reforms and rebellions threatened to lead the country beyond the breaking point, which it ultimately did. The crisis of the turn of the twentieth century transformed the latent

¹⁰⁵ Edmond Doutté cited in Montagne and Seddon, *The Berbers*, xxv.

¹⁰⁶ See for instance Mohammed Kenbib, “Contrebande d’armes et Anarchie Dans Le Maroc Précolonial : 1844-1912,” *Revue Dar Al-Niaba: Etudes d’histoire Du Maroc*, 1985.

instability into outright civil war. In itself, this civil war was not necessarily a fatal threat to the Moroccan state and society since both were able to fend off many other civil wars during the long reign of the Alawite dynasty. However, Moroccan society had soon to face a far greater challenge with the advent of the Protectorate. The French state entered the Moroccan internal scene with the resolve to put an end to what it perceived as an endemic state of chaos and anarchy. With its might and resources, it deeply upended the balance of power within Moroccan society as a whole. Southern society in particular was deeply changed by the French experience.

The Military Origins of Colonial Administration (1912-1934)

From the beginning of French military intervention in Morocco, two competing solutions for Morocco's colonization were opposed in French political spheres. First, a tribes' policy, spearheaded by the Algerian military establishment, was predicated on winning over Morocco's tribes one by one, therefore expanding French-controlled territories at the expense of the Sultan. This policy advocated for a piecemeal military conquest of Moroccan territories coupled with political efforts to rally Moroccan tribes and subtract them bit by bit to *Makhzan* authority. Alternatively, the *Makhzan* policy, favored by the French diplomatic corps, advocated for organizing French intervention around *Makhzan* institutions and supporting the Moroccan central state in its efforts to assert control over dissident tribes.¹⁰⁷ In the end, both methods remained at play during the Protectorate according to the dictates of the ground and the international situation. Nonetheless, the *Makhzan* policy formally prevailed as the ultimate solution to the

¹⁰⁷ Burke, *The Ethnographic State*, 76–77.

Moroccan question despite the military energetic campaigns in southeastern Morocco in the early 1900s. In fact, the Protectorate regime was predicated on the principle of Moroccan territorial integrity. Therefore, colonial authorities had to adopt a pro-*Makhzan* policy – at least formally – and refrain from a piecemeal conquest of the country. However, the early events of colonial presence in Morocco blurred the lines between the two currents.

Soon after the signing of the Treaty of Fez, the Protectorate of Morocco fell under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. And for good reason, the Treaty stipulated that the aim of the Protectorate was to introduce a set of reforms intended to organize a “reformed Sharifian *Makhzan*.”¹⁰⁸ Hence, the French Protectorate was to be modeled on the Tunisian case with civil servants being at the helm of the country and the army taking responsibility for securing the country whenever needed. The relative ease with which French troops were able to quell the 1911 rebellion and the subsequent lack of resistance comforted the metropolitan leaders in this choice.¹⁰⁹ However, these plans were soon put to shambles with the eruption of Moroccan armed resistance. General Lyautey was quickly dispatched to replace the career diplomat Henri Regnault as *Résident-Général* and relieve French forces from the dire situation they were in.

The newly appointed *Résident-Général* swiftly restored the French positions and secured the corridor between the Atlantic coast and the capital Fez.¹¹⁰ However, the threat of the rebellious tribes was all but gone. Therefore, civil administration had to give

¹⁰⁸ “Traité Relatif à l’organisation Du Protectorat Français Dans l’empire Chérifien” (March 30, 1912), TRA19120019/001, Traités et accords de la France, http://basedoc.diplomatie.gouv.fr/exl-php/vue-consult/mae_internet__traites/TRA19120019.

¹⁰⁹ Burke, *The Ethnographic State*, 105.

¹¹⁰ Wyrzten, *Making Morocco*, 49.

way for military operations as the priority was clearly given to securing the country's territory. The initial *Makhzan* policy that intended to use *Makhzan* forces and resources to combat the state of rebellion in the country was proved impractical. Colonial authorities found themselves bogged down in a long and protracted war for the "pacification" of Morocco. The piecemeal conquest of Morocco advocated by the tribal policy proponents was again on the agendas. However, this conquest was conducted in the name of the *Makhzan* by French officers and with the support of French troops. These new developments in effect meant that French officers were at the heart of French native policy in the early days of the Protectorate. More importantly, civilian rule outside the secured coastal regions had to wait as long as security concerns persisted – and they persisted for much of the Protectorate period.

Lyautey's appointment as *Résident-Général* in the chaotic context 1912 deeply influenced the unfolding military operations as well as the formation of colonial administration. From a military standpoint, Lyautey introduced two major concepts that set the tone for military intervention in the country. First, Lyautey imported and perfected the method of *tâche d'huile* – oil stain – he inherited from his mentor Gallieni.¹¹¹ This tactic consisted in a slow and careful penetration within unsubdued territories. Colonial troops conquered the land through the creation of advanced outposts secured from the rear by a well-established network of military outposts. These outposts were to monitor resistance activities within their action radius, make contact and negotiate with local leaders and communities, control local market, provide health services to win over the population and secure communication lines with the rear. Outposts were only put in place

¹¹¹ Moshe Gershovich, *French Military Rule in Morocco: Colonialism and Its Consequences*, Cass Series--History and Society in the Islamic World (London ; Portland, OR: F. Cass, 2000), 30.

when their immediate vicinity was firmly within French troops' hands hence reducing the logistical and material risks of "pacification." They also combined intelligence, military and diplomatic tactics to weaken the resistance within their radius of activity. Along with military presence, French authorities established markets, dispensaries and other services to win the hearts and minds of indigenous people. Morocco's conquest was to be a political endeavor before being a military affair.¹¹²

Even though this tactic implied a slow and cautious approach to territorial conquest, it proved to be adapted to the nature of Moroccan resistance and the composition of colonial troops. For instance, Moroccan resistance remained fragmented for the most part throughout the "pacification" period. The colonial army was therefore able to implement the *tâche d'huile* method without allowing the formation of large-scale and coordinated resistance entities. The early setbacks of French troops in the battles of Ksiba and El Herri comforted Lyautey in his cautious approach: the guerrilla-like warfare tactics used by dissident tribes were hard to tame through aggressive and swift military actions.¹¹³

The second strategy Lyautey introduced was dictated by the outbreak of the Great War. In that context, the bulk of experienced combat troops were to be redeployed to metropolitan France. Therefore, Lyautey was forced to halt his offensive and adopt what he named an "active defense" strategy. The objective was to defend the core of French controlled territories and thwart any challenges coming from unsubdued territories by preemptive of retaliatory actions.¹¹⁴ Offensive operations were only to resume after the

¹¹² Wyrzten, *Making Morocco*, 54–55; Wadia, "A Constellation of Outposts," 5–6.

¹¹³ Gershovich, *French Military Rule*, 99–103.

¹¹⁴ Gershovich, *French Military Rule*, 107.

end of the Great War once more troops become available to carry on the “pacification” groundwork. However, except during the Rif war in 1925-1926, the relative paucity of metropolitan military resources remained a constant theme during the remainder of the “pacification” process. For the bulk of the “pacification” groundwork, the colonial army had to rely on indigenous troops to be at the forefront of the operations. These troops were either recruited into the colonial army – the *Goum* – or constituted from partisans levied from subdued tribes (see Appendix 3.).

In that context, a complete conquest of Moroccan territories was deemed unpractical and costly. Hence, Lyautey devised the political pendant of the military concept of “active defense”: the notion of *Maroc utile* / *Maroc inutile* – useful Morocco / useless Morocco. In December 1921, he claimed that “the establishment of French control [over *Maroc inutile* regions] would necessitate military and financial efforts disproportional to the results sought.”¹¹⁵ Consequently, Morocco’s conquest turned into a protracted – and yet bloody – attrition war. The fringe territories that fell under the label of *Maroc inutile* remained for extended periods at the margins of French plans for the country. However, this state of affairs did not prevent French officers from taking the initiative there and perpetuating the state of war in frontier territories. In that regard, southern Morocco was no stranger to the torments of the “pacification” process since large swaths of its territories fell under the category of *Maroc inutile* and were among the last territories pacified by the French army (Appendix 4.

Phases of Military Conquest in Morocco).

¹¹⁵ Gershovich, *French Military Rule*, 113.

In southern Morocco, resistance to French presence took shape at the beginning of the colonial episode and only dissolved – at least on the surface – after twenty-two years of intermittent struggle. Soon after the signing of the treaty of Fez, a large insurrection took form in southern Morocco under the banner of a local religious figure – Ahmed El Hiba. He rallied a large following under the banner of *jihad* against the French and marched on the city of Marrakech through the Atlas Mountains. Being no match individually to this army, the Atlas *Great Qaids* preferred to make deals with the newcomer individually instead of defending together the *Makhzan* authority – a new testimony to their vague attachment to the central state. Subsequently, the pretender took the city without a fight and prepared to push his advance further north. However, he was decisively defeated at the battle of Sidi Bou Othman north of Marrakech in September 1912.¹¹⁶ Although this battle resulted in a complete victory for French troops, the French army was not able to push its advantage further south as such a push would have dangerously outstretched its logistical lines. In the immediate aftermaths of the battle, Lyautey and his generals laid the ground for French conquest around two main policies: the reliance on the *Great Qaids* and the policy of active defense.

First, the French proconsul was quick to reach an agreement with southern Morocco's *qaids*, most prominent among which were the "Lords of the Atlas": the *pasha* of Marrakech Thami Glawi to the east, the *qaid* Tayeb Goundafi at the center and *qaid* 'Abd al-Malik Mtuggi to the west. Associated to these lords was *qaid* Haïda ou Mouis of the *Menabha* tribe in the Sous valley. Together, they turned against el-Hiba and chased him in his flight towards the Sous valley and his base in Taroudant. Thereafter, they

¹¹⁶ William A. Hoisington, *Lyautey and the French Conquest of Morocco*, 1. publ (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), 94.

carried the blunt of military operations against the *Hibist* movement and succeeded in neutralizing the residual threat posed by el-Hiba and his ability to rally southern tribes in resistance against French occupation. Although French troops had to intervene sporadically to reaffirm *Makhzan* authority in the region, the bulk of “pacification” operations were carried out by the *Great Qaids*’ contingents throughout the Great War and beyond.¹¹⁷

The *Great Qaids* were initially given extensive autonomy in governing their respective domains in exchange for their support to the colonial administration. In these *qaids*, Lyautey found powerful allies that could spare his army the costs of premature intervention in the remote and hard to access South. Lyautey was therefore able to concentrate his military efforts on facing the more immediate threats in northern Morocco with the little troops he had at his disposal. After his first encounter with the Lords, he wrote that:

I am living here for the past ten days in total fairyland: there is no orientalist painting which reaches the brilliance of my arrival in Marrakech ... One must remark that in the persons of the grand *qaids* of the South, we are dealing with true feudal barons, masters and lords of their lands, having at their disposition warriors, citadels, and prisons.¹¹⁸

However, the French authorities overestimated these *qaids*’ actual degree of control over their nominal domains. Their rule remained contested and unstable in many areas. Their *Makhzan* accreditations were all but a stable and perennial source of power: they were always under the threat of falling out of favor in *Makhzan* circles or losing their tribal supporting base.

¹¹⁷ Hoisington, *Lyautey*, 94–108.

¹¹⁸ Hubert Lyautey cited in Burke, *The Ethnographic State*, 136–37.

By cooperating with the Protectorate authorities, the *qaid*s intended to tighten their grip over their domains and crush any potential opposition to their rule. In effect, the *Great Qaid*s used French support to embark on a real military campaign to subdue the large areas that still lied outside of their nominal authority under the pretext of dealing with rebellion against *Makhzan* authority.¹¹⁹ This state of affairs is illustrated by Montagne's vivid critic of the "Lords of the Atlas":

We are dealing with warlords emerging from within the tribes, who rally their fraction's men and their *leff* allies in order to be able to defeat rival leaders, confiscate their lands and build a castle and a prison upon the lands of the vanquished. Once they put to flight peasants from the opposing lineages, they seized the latter's fields and confiscated incidentally their rights to water sources.¹²⁰

In effect, the *Great Qaid*s' authority rested primarily upon the use of force and the oppression of subdued foes. As they expanded their territories, their tactics became a factor of destabilization to the South. Vanquished chiefs and elites were put to flight. Local infrastructures such as collective granaries were destroyed. New recruits were levied from subdued tribes to fuel the *qaid*s' war machine.¹²¹ The *Great Qaid*s' policy did not dispense the Protectorate from warring in southern Morocco. It only reduced the costs and risks of such a war to the French colonial state.

The situation was even more dire for the territories that remained outside of *Makhzan* control. These territories remained in a constant state of insecurity and economic strife. First, the French policy of "active defense" cut off the inhabitants of these lands from the rest of the country. Transhumant people in particular were hardly hit

¹¹⁹ Daniel Rivet, *Lyautey et l'institution Du Protectorat Français Au Maroc, 1912-1925*, vol. I (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1988), 189–90.

¹²⁰ Robert Montagne, *Révolution au Maroc* (Rabat: Faculté des lettres et des sciences humaines, 2015), 53.

¹²¹ Robin Leonard Bidwell, *Morocco under Colonial Rule: French Administration of Tribal Areas 1912-1956* (London: Cass, 1973), 107–9.

by the fact that they were no longer able to access the more hospitable grazing lands now under colonial control. On top of that, colonial officers alternated between the use of diplomatic and political means and the use of brute force to pacify their respective districts. Therefore, military operations under the “active defense” method often turned into *razzias* into enemy territories to retaliate against the guerrilla tactics used by the insurgents.¹²² In fact, large encounters between colonial forces and insurgents were few and far between. Most of the time, insurgents used to raid and plunder submissive territories. In retaliation, colonial troops raided and devastated insurgent territories as they were seldom able to attack the actual insurgent groups. This state of affairs exacerbated the state of insecurity and endemic violence southern Morocco had endured in precolonial times. Furthermore, colonial authorities installed a quasi-martial regime in fringe territories to control insurgent activities. Mobility and exchanges were tightly controlled by colonial officers thus hurting economic dynamism even within controlled territories.¹²³

The “pacification” of the Moroccan south ultimately accelerated in 1930. On the domestic scene, fringe territories witnessed a surge in insecurity. This surge was caused by a significant increase in tribal armament. From 1927 onward, this surge in armament – in part encouraged by French officers – prompted a surge in insecurity both in controlled and dissident areas.¹²⁴ By 1930, French authorities were grudgingly embarked on a new round of “pacification” operations in southern and eastern Morocco. At the same time, the rise of political polarization in Germany prompted a revision of French military plans

¹²² Douglas Porch, “Bugeaud, Gallieni, Lyautey: The Development of French Colonial Warfare,” in *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019, 393.

¹²³ Wadia, “A Constellation of Outposts,” 85–88.

¹²⁴ Wadia, “A Constellation of Outposts,” 100–104.

to prepare for a regain of tension in Europe. In that context, the French military command planned for a redeployment of readily available colonial troops to the metropole to prop up the size of the French army. Therefore, the Moroccan command was given a deadline for winter 1933-1934 to bring “pacification” operations to an end and redeploy part of their effectives to the metropole. In 1933, one of the last strongholds of Moroccan resistance in Bou Gafer fell to a swift and coordinated attack of French colonial troops. The following year, the remnants of the *Hibist* movement surrendered to the converging French army columns.¹²⁵ The process of “pacification” came at last to a conclusion.

To illustrate the ebbs and flows of the “pacification” process, the case of the high Draa valley gives a good example of the evolution of military conquest. This region was initially coveted by the *pasha* Glawi who was able to secure supremacy in the region in 1919 with a *harka*¹²⁶ of 15 000 men. His actions and those of his representative *Qaid* Si Hammou ensured the region’s submission between 1919 and 1925. However, the *Ait ‘Atta* tribe only accepted the Glawi authority under the threat of brute force. As his authority there was weakening by 1925, the tribe rebelled against its new masters and joined dissidence against the *Makhzan* in a new demonstration of the tenuous frontier between submission and dissidence. In precolonial times, this state of affairs would have resulted in the tribe regaining their autonomy from the weakened *qaid*. However, French authorities came to the rescue of their ally – or more precisely came to replace the flagellant authority of their ally. Between 1927 and 1930, they embarked on a careful plan to build up their military and political presence in the region and ensure appropriate logistical connections to the rest of the territory. Meanwhile, a long period of uproar and

¹²⁵ Gershovich, *French Military Rule*, 153–61.

¹²⁶ A *harka* is an army of irregular troops raised by a political or religious authority.

continuous struggle against French penetration took place in the region.¹²⁷ Tribal alliances desegregated as a result of French continuous pressure and political actions targeting the region's different factions. Also, as the French cut dissident tribes' access to markets and subdued tribes – at least on the surface – the economic conditions of dissident tribes deteriorated continuously.¹²⁸ Indeed, political and economic actions seemed to be the main reason for different factions' defections to the *Makhzan*. However, military actions were also necessary to assert French control over refractory tribes. For instance, the bloody operations of the 1933-1934 campaign in the central High Atlas that ended with the Bou Gafer battle left southeastern Morocco in a dire situation. For example, the *Ait Yahia* tribe surrendered to the French army in 1932 after being decimated by famine and a smallpox epidemic that raged as a result of French siege during the summer.¹²⁹ The *Ait 'Atta* faced the same hardships the following year as they were being besieged by the colonial army. Their casualties ranged between 1 300 and 2 000 – most of which were non-combatant. Their livestock was almost eradicated. Even on the other side, the blunt of colonial casualties were among irregular troops – mainly Moroccan troops comprising already subdued *Ait 'Atta* fractions.¹³⁰ The French “peaceful penetration” was by no means a quite river of peace and prosperity.

¹²⁷ Lieutenant G. Spillmann, *Villes et tribus du Maroc: documents et renseignements : publiés sous les auspices de la Résidence générale, par la Mission scientifique du Maroc.*, vol. IX (Casablanca: Editions Frontispice, 2002), 77–91.

¹²⁸ See for instance the *Oussikis bureau* Monthly reports describe how access to markets was used to pressure dissident tribes in 1930. Service des Affaires Indigènes, “Rapports Politiques et Economiques Mensuels: Régions de Marrakech et Agadir” (1932 1933), Fonds de la Direction des Affaires Indigènes (B12), Archives du Maroc.

¹²⁹ Daniel Rivet, *Lyautey et l'institution Du Protectorat Français Au Maroc, 1912-1925*, vol. II (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1988), 68.

¹³⁰ Gershovich, *French Military Rule*, 157; David M Hart, “The Tribe in Modern Morocco: Two Case Studies,” in *Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa*, ed. Ernest Gellner and Charles A. Micaud (London: Duckworth, 1973), 54.

To sum up, French policy in Morocco – and especially in the South – quickly had to adapt to Moroccan resistance and to metropolitan politics in the Great War period. The initial plans to “reform” the Moroccan *Makhzan* and install a civilian regime à la *tunisienne* were quickly scraped as it became apparent that Morocco was on the verge of a “revolution” to borrow Marechal Lyautey’s word.¹³¹ French authorities had to commit sizeable military and economic resources to the “pacification” of the Moroccan countryside. It also had to compromise with local strong men as it did with the *Great Qaids* of the Atlas Mountains.

Although the initial thrust of “pacification” efforts brought most of *Maroc utile* under colonial rule by 1924, large swaths of the South remained outside of French control. Therefore, the military establishment became the spearhead of French penetration of the South. For about two decades, French officers and colonial troops gradually established what became the nucleus of colonial administration in the region. This administration was for the most part a wartime administration as security considerations remained the top priority for French officers. For instance, French officers’ monthly reports to the central command put a particular emphasis on describing the political and military situation in their respective districts.¹³² Furthermore, investments were mainly geared towards military infrastructure. Outside from the creation of roads, markets and dispensaries necessary to the penetration, colonial authorities for the most part crystalized the *Maroc inutile* vision of southern Morocco.

¹³¹ Burke, *The Ethnographic State*, 107.

¹³² See for instance the difference in the content and length of monthly reports between frontier and secure outposts Service des Affaires Indigènes, “Rapports Politiques et Economiques Mensuels: Régions de Marrakech et Agadir” (1927 1932), Fonds de la Direction des Affaires Indigènes (B14), Archives du Maroc.

What mattered the most was to keep the local population in check and crash any agitation that may threaten security. Up until 1934, colonial administration in southern Morocco was for the most part a military affair. But as the “pacification” process came to an end, the transition towards a civilian rule was supposed to resume in earnest. In the words of a French general: “It was an obligation for us to put an end to dissidence so as the Protectorate can devote all its capabilities to the great economic and social work that Morocco claims.”¹³³ However, the end of “pacification” didn’t warrant a smooth and rapid transition towards civilian rule. The military establishment remained for the most part at the helm of French administration in southern Morocco.

The Unfinished Transition from Military to Civilian Rule (1934-1956)

Initially, colonial authorities saw military and civilian administration as part of the same apparatus. Marechal Lyautey epitomized this idea in a 1917 directive: “in terms of control, there is no civilian administration or military administration. There is only one administration, based on the same principles.”¹³⁴ In fact, Lyautey advocated for a close collaboration between civil and military administrators. What mattered most was not the status of the administrators but their ability to implement the right colonial rule.¹³⁵ In practice though, the military administration remained preponderant in frontier territories – chief among which was southern Morocco. As dissident activities remained a constant concern for colonial authorities, I.A. officers were primarily tasked with maintaining order within their respective districts and keeping insurgent activities in check.

¹³³ H. Simon, “La Pacification Du Maroc,” *Journal of the Royal African Society* 33, no. 133 (1934): 336.

¹³⁴ Cited in Méraud, *Service des A.I.*, 60.

¹³⁵ Hoisington, *Lyautey*, 51.

Notwithstanding their role in the “pacification” process, I.A. officers were also more and more involved in supervising the indigenous government’s representatives and introducing the colonial administration into conquered territories. For instance, as the “pacification” operations close to an end, I.A. officers found themselves involved in the peaceful administration of “pacified” territories. Nonetheless, administration in peaceful times did not necessarily translate into civilian administration. Although large military operations were no longer necessary, the transition towards a purely civilian administration had to wait indefinitely.

For instance, soon after the end of the “pacification” process, the French proconsul – a military general for that matter – devised a new territorial organization for the Protectorate. In 1936, General Nogues announced a new division for Protectorate territories. Morocco was divided into six regions: Casablanca, Rabat, Oujda, Fez, Meknes and Marrakech. No distinction was made between military and civilian regions.¹³⁶ However, the military components of French administration remained in place until the end of the Protectorate. First, four out of the seven regions in the French zone were headed by high-ranking army officers as late as 1949.¹³⁷ These officers retained in many instances their military functions. For example, the head of the Marrakech region was also commander of the troops stationed in the region.¹³⁸ Second, the French authorities maintained numerous “insecurity zones” within the administrative mapping of the country. These zones were essentially managed in a martial-like manner: free movement

¹³⁶ Méraud, *Service des A.I.*, 60.

¹³⁷ Frédéric Brémard and Mohamed Berriane, *L’organisation régionale du Maroc*, Rééd. de l’ouvrage publ. en 1949, Publications de la Faculté des Lettres et des Sciences Humaines de Rabat Série les trésors de la bibliothèque 1 (Rabat: Inst. des Hautes Etudes Marocaines, 2010), 152.

¹³⁸ Brémard and Berriane, *L’organisation*, 138.

was restricted; European settlement was prohibited and military presence was paramount.¹³⁹ Although the geographic extension of such zones diminished continuously through the 1940s, they remained in place throughout the Protectorate period. In particular, the areas south of Marrakech were almost exclusively under military rule for the bulk of the colonial period. Most districts of the Marrakech region remained under military rule until the late 1940s. Further south, the Agadir and Ouarzazate territories remained almost exclusively under military control till the end of the protectorate regime.¹⁴⁰ In fact, the rise of the nationalist movement and the subsequent rise in agitation led to a revival of the concept of “insecurity zones”.¹⁴¹ Moreover, the civil administration corps was not necessarily immune to military influences. In 1926, only 4 out of the 95 *contrôleurs civils* did not serve in the military. Also, detached officers constituted a sizeable portion among the civilian administrators.¹⁴² As late as 1953, the *contrôleur civil* for the Marrakech civilian territory – André Hardy – relates that his “civilian” staff was almost exclusively constituted by army officers. Besides, the head of the region of Marrakech was always chosen among high-ranking officers throughout the Protectorate period.¹⁴³ Jacques Berque relates a similar experience during his tenure as *contrôleur civil* in the recently “civilized” Imi-n-Tanout district between 1947 and 1953. His three deputies were initially all army officers. Although civilian administrators came

¹³⁹ Wadia, “A Constellation of Outposts,” 75–76.

¹⁴⁰ Gruner, *Du Maroc Traditionnel Au Maroc Moderne*, 235.

¹⁴¹ Méraud, *Service des A.I.*, 62–63.

¹⁴² Stève Bessac-Vaure, “Étude comparative des administrations française et espagnole dans le Maroc colonial, 1912-1936,” *Monde(s)* 9, no. 1 (2016): 197.

¹⁴³ André Hardy, *Sidi El Hakem : Mémoires d'un Contrôleur Civil Au Maroc, 1931-1956* (Rabat: Editions La Porte, 2003), 145.

to replace two out of the three, the tension with the military command in Marrakech and with his remaining military deputy remained high throughout his tenure.¹⁴⁴

On paper, both I.A. officers and civilian administrators were to be associated to indigenous administrators in managing native affairs. This principle was rooted in Lyautey's colonial thought and his vision of colonial officers as a vector for France's *mission civilisatrice* in the colonies.¹⁴⁵ However, the reality of colonial administration was far from espousing the "Lyautey method", even during the latter's tenure. In fact, it was arguably more the result of a constant struggle between different approaches to colonial administration than the product of a shared vision of the Protectorate regime. On the one hand, the French Foreign Affairs Ministry – which was still in charge of the Protectorate regime – favored the Tunisian *contrôle civil* model. This system was based on a civilian administrative corps that was *de facto* in charge of administering the colony – although a native apparatus remained in place to assist in governing local districts under the Protectorate regime.¹⁴⁶ On the other hand, the Algerian faction – which gained traction in Morocco after Lyautey's appointment as *Résident-Général* – considered I.A. officers as the worthy heirs of military rule derived from the *Bureaux Arabes* tradition in Algeria.¹⁴⁷ As for Lyautey himself, his Moroccan experience was to profit from the accumulation of European colonial experiences and capitalize on their best practices. Chief among these experiences was the Indian Civil Service that Lyautey tried to emulate in Morocco with a careful system for selecting and training civil and military officers.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁴ Jacques Berque, *Mémoires des deux rives*, Éd. complétée (Paris: Éd. du Seuil, 1999), 126,137.

¹⁴⁵ Wyrzten, *Making Morocco*, 59.

¹⁴⁶ Burke, *The Ethnographic State*, 106.

¹⁴⁷ Méraud, *Service des A.I.*, 57.

¹⁴⁸ Burke, *The Ethnographic State*, 110–11.

In the end, these contradictory approaches to ruling Morocco ebbed and flowed – and frequently clashed – through the colonial period according to the character of the men in charge centrally and locally and the circumstances of their tenure. For instance, the *Résidence-Générale*¹⁴⁹ constantly clashed with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs over native policy and officials' appointments during Lyautey's tenure. In particular, it rejected the latter's plans in 1913 to create and train a "Political Agents of the Protectorate" corps based on the Indian and Dutch experience. Burke explains this refusal by the Ministry wariness of losing control of the Protectorate to the military.¹⁵⁰ More than thirty years later, Jacques Berque – then a *contrôleur civil* in the Imi-n-Tanout district – was in constant disagreement with his superiors – the military command of the Marrakech region – over his civilian administrative methods. Berque identified the cause at the heart of this disagreement in the commander's disdain for the processes introduced by the extension of the civilian zone in his region.¹⁵¹ It is clear that the harmonious coexistence of military and civilian administrations was far from being a shared value as Lyautey wished for.

In terms of administrative doctrine, Lyautey advocated for a strategy based on associating the *Makhzan* apparatus in running the country. This formula seemed to uphold the spirit of the Protectorate and ensure *Makhzan*'s cooperation during the critical period of French implantation in the country. However, this association concept remained too vague to be upheld in a consistent manner throughout the "pacified" territories.

¹⁴⁹ The *Résidence-Générale* was the office of the French proconsul in Morocco and referred to the central organs of the colonial political and administrative apparatus

¹⁵⁰ Burke, *The Ethnographic State*, 115–16.

¹⁵¹ Berque, *Mémoires*, 135.

Therefore, Lyautey specified – or perhaps modified – his thought on the matter as he theorized the concept of “supervision” in his “*coup de barre*” directive of 1920:

The Protectorate conception is that of a country retaining its institutions, administering and governing itself through its own bodies, under the simple “supervision” of a European power ... what dominates and characterizes this conception is the “supervision” formula as opposed to the “direct rule” formula.¹⁵²

In theory, the colonial administration was to avoid at all costs substituting itself to the *Makhzan* apparatus. Its main task was to guide the latter’s actions and control their conformity to colonial policies and directives. In practice however, the supervision exercise often turned into direct involvement in indigenous affairs. This state of affairs prompted this harsh judgment of colonial politics by Charles-André Julien – an eyewitness of the Protectorate policies – in his history of Morocco:

Neither Indigenous Affairs officers, true to the tradition of the *Bureaux Arabes* of Algeria, nor the *contrôleurs civils*, inclined to regard themselves as *gobernadorcillos*, were able to undertake their task with the patience and long-suffering essential to the functioning of the “supervision” [policy] that neither their temperament nor their obligations allowed in practice.¹⁵³

In effect, colonial administrators’ involvement in local affairs went beyond exercising oversight over the *Makhzan*. Far from being mere observers of *Makhzan* proceedings, they actively intervened in running the administrative machine: they run the tax collection process, controlled markets and prices, planned and supervised the execution of public works, etc. Moreover, colonial administrators had in theory a say in every decision made by *Makhzan* officials – either directly or through the actions of their superiors.¹⁵⁴ The “supervision” formula did not translate into an autonomous and empowered Moroccan administration subjected to French inspection. It rather led to

¹⁵² Louis Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey, “Politique de Protectorat,” *Hommes et Mondes*, no. 116 (1956): 464.

¹⁵³ Julien, *Le Maroc*, 117.

¹⁵⁴ Méraud, *Service des A.I.*, 177.

French authorities dictating – at least on paper – the actions of the *Makhzan* administration.

In southern Morocco, the end of the pacification process resulted in the marginalization of the *Great Qaids* policy and the transition towards a more direct rule approach. Initially, the *Great Qaids* enjoyed a high degree of autonomy with regards to central authority – French and Moroccan alike. However, as the colonial authorities started to establish new Indigenous Affairs *bureaux* or *cercles* throughout southern Morocco, they tightened their control of indigenous administrators' activities. This movement started in 1922 with an administrative reorganization introducing French supervision into the plain territories under the *Great Qaids* control.¹⁵⁵ The apparent mission of such a reorganization was to “tame indigenous chiefs and put across the population the need to proceed only progressively to the improvements inherent to [French] supervision.”¹⁵⁶ As a consequence of this progressive takeover, the fiefs of the *Great Qaids* were dismantled one by one to give place to smaller and more malleable constituencies.¹⁵⁷ For example, the Goundafi commandment was divided in 1924 into three districts after his fall out of grace. It is true that the *qaid* retained overall nominal command over his fief with the title of honorific *qaid*. However, his effective power was greatly diminished by this reshuffling and by the more assertive intervention of French administrators in his domain's affairs. His son retained control over a sizeable part of his

¹⁵⁵ Résidence Générale de la République Française au Maroc, “Rapport Mensuel d'ensemble Du Protectorat 1922” (Direction des Affaires Indigènes et du Service des renseignements, January 1922), 10, MAEDI013, Bibliothèque Diplomatique Numérique, <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k9105661c>.

¹⁵⁶ Résidence Générale de la République Française au Maroc, “Rapport Mensuel d'ensemble Du Protectorat 1922” (Direction des Affaires Indigènes et du Service des renseignements, February 1922), 9, MAEDI013, Bibliothèque Diplomatique Numérique, <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k9105661c>.

¹⁵⁷ Montagne, *Révolution au Maroc*, 52.

fief after his death in 1928. However, the prestige and outreach of the house of Goundafa was greatly diminished afterwards.¹⁵⁸

In the Glawi's fief in the central and eastern High Atlas, the *Great Qaid* was able to retain and expand his huge domain thanks to his close ties to the French establishment in Morocco and the metropole. Nevertheless, French support did come at the cost of his autonomy in administering his fief. It is true that his representatives – or *khalifas* – remained effectively in charge of administering the different districts under his command. Nevertheless, the establishment of French military and administrative outposts in his territories meant that these representatives had to share and gradually cede effective control to their French counterparts. For example, in the *Ait Waouzguet* tribe's territories, the establishment of the Telouat *cercle* in 1925 created continuous tensions between I.A. officers and the region's governor *qaid* Si Hammou. I.A. officers ultimately used their chain of command to push the *qaid* into complying with their demands and authority. Of course, *qaid* Si Hammou tried to maneuver his way out of French tutelage. However, French authorities adopted a more assertive stance in the Glawi fiefs now that it was about to tackle the last armed resistance to its presence in southeastern Morocco.¹⁵⁹ The colonial administrative machine was set in motion and was intending to dominate the political field in southern Morocco.

As the colonial administration was expanding its administrative control to southern Morocco, the Protectorate regime propped up its investment in the welfare of southern populations. The “pacification” process introduced an important set of colonial

¹⁵⁸ Justinard and Juin, *Un grand chef*, 148–56.

¹⁵⁹ Ibrāhīm Yāsīn, *Janūb Atlas Marrākush Taḥta Ḥukm Al-Faransīyīn Wa-al-Qādah al-Galāwīyīn: Āthār al-Iḥtilāl al-Faransī Li-Bilād Ayt Wa-Ūzgūt*, al-Ṭab‘ah 1 (al-Rabāt: Dār Abī Raqrāq lil-Ṭībā‘ah wa-al-Nashr, 2003), 174–79.

infrastructures into the region. Roads were built to facilitate military movements and were used subsequently in peaceful times. Dispensaries were built alongside the administrative outposts to attend to the indigenous population's health. Public schools were erected here and there to host indigenous students. Mining companies invested in extraction sites in the ore-rich southern mountains.¹⁶⁰ More gradually, the colonial authorities introduced financial and technical institutions to support its actions in rural Morocco. First, it expanded the outreach of its "Sociétés Indigènes de Prevoyance" (S.I.P.). These companies were created in the early days of the protectorate to financially support agriculture by providing indigenous people access to cheap credit and insurance against bad years. Beyond the apparent aim to enhance agricultural activities, these institutions were also an instrument for controlling surges in agitation that resulted from the volatility of agricultural outputs. In fact, they did little to improve the productivity of indigenous agriculture.¹⁶¹ To be sure, all these infrastructures were implemented to help the colonial state tame southern society. Nevertheless, these infrastructures were instrumental in reviving economic activities in southern Morocco after the devastation of the "pacification" period.

This revival proved to be short lived. Indeed, the 1937-1947 period in southern Morocco witnessed a series of economic crises that deeply affected southern society and its relation to the state – both the native and the colonial. In 1937, serious droughts hit various parts of Morocco. In particular, the southern region witnessed acute drops in rainfalls. More than a million people were directly affected by these droughts and were

¹⁶⁰ For a discussion of mining activities in Morocco under the Protectorate see Léon Moret, "Les ressources minérales et les mines du Maroc français," *Revue de géographie alpine* 18, no. 2 (1930): 261–302.

¹⁶¹ Wadia, "A Constellation of Outposts," 134–44.

expected to experience acute shortages in subsistence staples.¹⁶² In that context, the *Résidence-Générale* under the auspices of General Nogues embarked on an ambitious plan to address the effects of this climatic disaster. At the heart of this plan was a genuine attempt to address the humanitarian crisis especially in the South. In addition, General Noguès – and the Popular Front government behind him in metropolitan France – saw in improving native living standards a way to win over new friends to the French cause and counter the rise of nationalist sentiments in urban centers.¹⁶³ With the help of the metropole, French authorities allocated special funds to distributing food and seeds, extending loans to bankrupt peasants and combating epidemiologic surges caused by the famine. More importantly, these measures went through an organized effort put in place by the colonial administration. Indeed, the latter called upon methods and procedures mastered by the colonial state but unheard of in Moroccan society. To be sure, colonial authorities experienced with similar approaches in dealing with previous episodes of droughts and famine. However, these previous rescue efforts were limited in scope and aimed to deal specifically with the agitation created by the waves of rural emigrants flooding the cities.¹⁶⁴ By contrast, the scale and scope of the 1937 campaign signified a shift in colonial authorities' approach to the crisis. The Front Populaire government in metropolitan France intended to concentrate its efforts in Morocco on the welfare of the native population. In so doing, it intended to nip the nascent nationalist movement in the bud by addressing a major source of discontent within native population: poverty.¹⁶⁵

¹⁶² Résidence Générale de la République Française au Maroc, “Mesures Prises Pour Lutter Contre La Famine et La Maladie,” Note présentée au conseil du gouvernement, June 25, 1937, (BNRM).

¹⁶³ William A. Hoisington, *The Casablanca Connection French Colonial Policy, 1936-1943.*, 2019, 75.

¹⁶⁴ Wadia, “A Constellation of Outposts,” 119–24.

¹⁶⁵ Hoisington, *The Casablanca Connection*, 75.

In that context, General Nogues used metropolitan support to implement an important rescue package in response to the 1937 droughts. The colonial and *Makhzan* authorities managed with a strict hand food supplies and handouts. They tightly controlled local markets of grains and livestock. They run large-scale vaccination campaigns against Typhus and other diseases. Also, they tried to stop the southern exodus towards the coastal plains and urban centers to avoid cascading the effects of the famine into these regions. Shelters and “stoppage centers” were put in place to host and take care of candidates for immigration and repatriate them to their territories of origin.¹⁶⁶ After testing the French capacity to wage war, southern society was discovering its capacity to administer large welfare programs. Of course, Morocco was no stranger to abrupt famines and epidemics prior to that episode. The old *Makhzan* was also no stranger to providing aid to affected populations.¹⁶⁷ However, the scale and scope of the 1937 rescue package showcased the colonial state capacity to take over relief efforts with the organizational capacities of modern bureaucracy. A poem of the time in the *Guedmiwa* region near Marrakech provides a vivid testimony of indigenous sentiment at the time:

[The king] is fighting for Muslims with all his resources, he lifts us up
 Their agent helps them, which are their allied race
 French is their name, we remain optimist thanks to them
 I will never forget the good they have done, it was no small deed
 Without them Marrakech would sting with death
 The Christians’ office is overwhelmed and weary
 The power is devising solutions for the *Hawz* yet unable to find any
 It tried barley loans but it is not enough
 the *Hakem*¹⁶⁸ has visited the *Hawz* in his car and seen it all ...
 the *Hakem* announced that prices should remain stable

¹⁶⁶ Résidence Générale de la République Française au Maroc, “Mesures Contre La Famine et La Maladie,” 7–10.

¹⁶⁷ Ayache, “La Fonction d’Arbitrage,” 9.

¹⁶⁸ *Hakem*: Literally governor, is the Moroccan name for I.A. officers and *contrôleurs civils*.

Barley is rare, the *bureau* is tasked to distribute it
People are in front of the *bureau*, waiting for news
Everyone who went there was granted a little.¹⁶⁹

It is true that the 1937 package did not prevent the local population from suffering from the effects of food crisis as the above verses hint to. In fact, episodes of urban riots and massive rural exodus were still part of the 1937 crisis.¹⁷⁰ Indigenous complaints destined to the colonial administration surged during that year.¹⁷¹ However, the colonial state was improving on his previous tepid attempts to deal with famine episodes. More importantly, these efforts garnered attention and mobilized resources both in the metropole and in the colony. It signified a shift in the political mood towards addressing the social and economic roots of instability rather than dealing with their security implications. Under these conditions, the transition towards a socio-economic approach to governing Morocco may have seemed possible.

A not-so-climatic catastrophe made the positive effects of this relief efforts short-lived. The break out of the Second World War compelled the convalescing Moroccan economy to support the war efforts in the metropole. Although war in France ended in the summer of 1940 with the disastrous defeat to Germany, Moroccan resources continued to support the war efforts both under the Vichy regime and the Free French provisional government. Under the Vichy regime, Morocco's colonial administration first used the country's resources to uplift the Free Zone economics. Subsequently, the German consular staff planned on 'cleaning up' the country's resources in favor of the German

¹⁶⁹ Roux, *Poésie Populaire*, 122–23.

¹⁷⁰ See for instance Adam Guerin, “‘Not a Drop for the Settlers’: Reimagining Popular Protest and Anti-Colonial Nationalism in the Moroccan Protectorate,” *The Journal of North African Studies* 20, no. 2 (March 15, 2015): 225–46.

¹⁷¹ Capitaine De La Porte Des Vaux, “Les Aït Waouzguit de La Vallée de Zagmouzen” (1946), sec. VII.C. Statut juridique, C.H.E.A.M., Archives du Maroc.

war effort.¹⁷² Nonetheless, the Allied landing in Casablanca in 1942 alleviated the economic pressure on the coastal cities as American troops in particular were pouring aid packages and money into the economy. However, the remote regions of southern Morocco were little affected by such largesse. In any case, as the Allied troops moved away from the Moroccan and North African theatre, the dire economic conditions resumed in earnest.¹⁷³ As a consequence, southern Morocco along the rest of the country went through an exhausting period of rationing and economic distress that lasted until 1948. As the French authorities' priority was to extract as much as possible from the colonies to support the war and recovery efforts in Europe, the indigenous people found themselves in poor conditions. Foodstuff and basic materials shortages became widespread during that period.¹⁷⁴ Subsequently, famine and diseases crept into the scene and fully struck an already embittered Moroccan population.¹⁷⁵ This period of desolation culminated with a new episode of severe droughts in 1944-1945. The continued scourge caused by the war years was compounded to the effects of meagre harvests during the period to produce one of the most acute drought episodes in twentieth-century Morocco.¹⁷⁶ Of course, southern populations were familiar to the hardships of frugal life. However, they were able to put a face against their hardships as the rationing and

¹⁷² Martin Thomas, "Resource War, Civil War, Rights War: Factoring Empire into French North Africa's Second World War," *War in History* 18, no. 2 (April 2011): 238.

¹⁷³ Thomas, "Resource War," 242–43.

¹⁷⁴ Joffé, "The Moroccan Nationalist Movement," 304.

¹⁷⁵ For a discussion of the epidemiologic situation in Morocco during the war see Daniel Rivet, "La Recrudescence Des Épidémies Au Maroc Durant La Deuxième Guerre Mondiale: Essai de Mesure et d'interprétation," *Hespéris, Tamuda* 30, no. 1 (1992): 93–109.

¹⁷⁶ See for instance Résidence Générale de la République Française au Maroc, "Conseil Du Gouvernement : Séances" (July 10, 1945), 110–11, Bibliothèque Francophone Numérique, <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k97708785>.

requisitioning of the previous years deprived local populations from the means to smooth the effects of such calamity.

To make things worse, the burden of rationing was not equally supported by the colonizers and the colonized. Moroccans were more likely to fall victim to poverty, famine and epidemics than their European counterparts. These perceived inequalities led to a widespread discontent with French administration not only within urban centers, but also in rural areas.¹⁷⁷ For southern Morocco's population in particular, the recent memory of armed resistance, the effects of the prolonged years of economic distress and the concomitant massive rural exodus sow the seeds for a new episode in their relation to colonial administration. The nationalist movement and the call for independence was gathering steam among the disaffected populations throughout Morocco. Once the south started to recover from the rationing years, the nationalist sentiment started to take hold in the region.

This movement was further exacerbated by the monarch's alignment with the nationalist movement in favor of emancipation from French tutelage. Although the nationalist movement was slow to materialize, agitation was building up ostensibly in the region. In the meanwhile, a sizeable part of *Makhzan* officials in southern Morocco became dissatisfied with the monarch's alignment with the urban nationalist movement and the threat it represented to their status and interests. Led by the *pasha* Glawi, these officials collided with French authorities to dethrone the reigning Sultan Sidi Mohammed in 1953. These events prompted a strong reaction in southern Morocco. In the last moments of the protectorate, armed resistance was brewing again in the region under the

¹⁷⁷ Joffé, "The Moroccan Nationalist Movement," 304.

banner of the Liberation Army. The Moroccan south was on the brink of resuming the fight where it stopped in 1934. However, France negotiated its withdrawal from the Fez Treaty hence putting a halt to the looming insurrection in rural Morocco.¹⁷⁸

We have seen in this chapter how France found itself from the start entangled in the Moroccan complex and fragmented political and social system. Its plans to assert its control over Morocco through reforming the *Makhzan* apparatus were shattered by the stiff resistance it had to face everywhere. The Protectorate regime had to contend with the myriad of forces in the ground. Tribes, *zawiya-s*, *qajids*, central *Makhzan*, *ulema-s*, urban elites all were actors that the protecting nation had to contend with in order to rule Morocco. Southern Morocco presented the colonizers with a particular conundrum. Political and military campaigns to bring the region into submission lingered in time. As a consequence, French administration took hold in the rural South in a slow although steady manner. Subsequently, the transition from military administrative practices adapted to the conquest period into a civilian administration geared towards “reforms” was never fully achieved in southern Morocco. Moreover, French officials had to grapple with existing structures and power centers in order to minimize the cost of colonial administration and enhance its capacity to exploit the economic potential of the colony. Edouard Michaux-Bellaire illustrates this state of affairs in a conference addressed to I.A. officers in 1926:

We can say that under current complications, native policy is the line of conduct that should allow to conciliate many contradictory interests ... Whether we like it or not, there are indigenous people. There are tribes with their traditions, their interests and the complications of their alliances and *soffs*; the *zawiya-s*’ intrigues,

¹⁷⁸ Louis-Jean Duclos, “The Berbers and the Rise of Moroccan Nationalism,” in *Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa*, ed. Ernest Gellner and Antoine Micaud (London: Duckworth, 1973), 224–29.

the big families' competitions. All these elements live, possess, speculate and look to profit from the new state of things each to the extent of their forces.¹⁷⁹

Although the colonial state achieved a prominent position within the Moroccan political field, it remained unable to impose a coherent and proactive approach to local administration. In fact, it had to deal with crisis after crisis from the onset of the Protectorate regime. The French native policy in Morocco was far from emerging from premeditated and constant choices. It rather was shaped and reshaped by the ebbs and flows of the domestic context and the shocks and dictates of international events. In southern Morocco in particular, French policy was predicated on the principle of containment: what was important was to contain indigenous people capacity to destabilize the colonial regime. This principle in turn conditioned the interaction between French and Moroccan administrators. It also conditioned the way both perceived and dealt with their constituents. Far from being a mere space for the application of French policies, southern Morocco was a space for a genuine encounter between the French and the Moroccans. To that effect, the next chapter revisits the ways in which all these elements interacted, cooperated and collided during the colonial episode.

¹⁷⁹ Edouard Michaux-Bellaire, *Conférences faites au cours préparatoire du Service des affaires indigènes*, Archives marocaines 27 (Paris: Librairie ancienne H. Champion, 1927), 251–52. *Soff* is another word that referred to the *leff* discussed in the section about southern society in the eve of colonization

Chapter VI.

Administrator and Administered under Colonial Rule

The “supervision” formula superposed a colonial administrative apparatus to the Moroccan local administrative framework. In many places throughout southern Morocco, both systems were a novelty insofar these places did not experience central state direct administration – at least for extended periods. Therefore, these newcomers created new administrative patterns and reshaped the local population’s relationship to administration and state in general. the colonial episode led to the consolidation of the fragmented power base prevailing in the South. This consolidation resulted in turn in a more authoritative regime since the power equilibrium between governors and governed tilted heavily towards the former. It also resulted in the emergence of a distinct class of notables that provided the colonial state with indispensable vectors for its native policy. In essence, both the colonial and indigenous administration contributed to these changes. However, they did so in different manners and for different reasons. Although both administrations interacted and influenced each the other, the colonial divide prevented them from converging towards a homogenous and consistent administrative apparatus.

Colonial Officers, Local Chiefs and the People: Negotiating the Political Field

As French administrative outposts progressed gradually into southern territories, colonial administrators found themselves more and more involved with indigenous officials and indigenous populations. As discussed previously, the goal of such outposts

was presumably to improve the quality of local administration through supervising the conduct of native administrators and implementing the *Résidence-Générale*'s directives. In that context, the balance of power between *Makhzan* representatives and their French supervisors shifted towards the latter as the French administration transitioned from “controlling [*Makhzan*] authority” to becoming an “authority of control.”¹⁸⁰ Although indigenous administrators were the direct authority figures within their communities, ultimate authority lay with the French administrators that supervised and often dictated their actions.

French administrators' authority stemmed primarily from their control over officials' appointment and removal, their veto rights over the latter's decisions and their capacity to impose disciplinary measures upon indigenous administrators. For instance, French administrators were involved in the process of *Makhzan* officials' appointments. Lower ranking officials (*amghar* or *sheikh*) were appointed by the *qaid* and his deputies (*khalifa*) in areas under *qaidal* authority or by the *jema'a* in areas under tribal councils' authority. However, these choices had to be sanctioned by the French administrators to become effective.¹⁸¹ Therefore, accessing such positions needed French recognition or at least neutrality. In particular, the perceived necessities of “pacification” led French authorities to coopt local figures that were able to maintain security and order within their faction and provide the colonial army with necessary recruits to carry on the “pacification” effort. The *Great Qaid* policy used in southern Morocco crystalized this cooptation approach to local administration within the south.¹⁸² Thereafter, colonial

¹⁸⁰ These qualifications were used by Jacque Berque cited in Julien, *Le Maroc*, 117.

¹⁸¹ Méraud, *Service des A.I.*, 177.

¹⁸² Rivet, *Lyautey et l'institution Du Protectorat*, I:189–94.

authorities tried to strike deals by accommodating local leaders or notables wherever French authority was confronted to tribal resistance. French officers negotiated with prominent local figures the dissident tribes' submission to the *Makhzan*. Thus, notables who were able to help cement French authority were confirmed or at least preferred to less cooperative rivals. The pattern of selecting obedient officials continued after the "pacification" inasmuch as deference to French authority remained the key attribute sought in local administrators.¹⁸³

Such benediction was not always shared by the community – or at least by its leading figures. I.A. officers' reports frequently invoke instances where local officials' appointments were not well received by their peers. The candidates were maintained in their position provided that they were "energetic" enough to carry on *Makhzan* and colonial policies in the field and keep agitation at bay.¹⁸⁴ More importantly, staying in place required the acting *amghar* or *sheikh* to comply with colonial administrators' directives lest they demand his removal or impose harsh disciplinary measures on him if his behavior proved to be unsatisfactory. Colonial administrators constantly corresponded with their superiors to report native chiefs' misbehaviors and deviations from the rules of conduct set in place by colonial authorities.¹⁸⁵ This approach to local administration may have seemed normal and trivial from the point of view of colonial administrators. Indeed, the colonial methods in Morocco were rooted in the rule-based and hierarchical tradition

¹⁸³ I.A. officers' monthly reports from the D.A.I. archives frequently refer to a normal indigenous chiefs' attitude as "deferent." See Service des Affaires Indigènes, "Rapports Politiques et Economiques Mensuels," 1927 1932.

¹⁸⁴ I.A. officers frequently complain about the lack of « energetic » action on the part of their Moroccan counterparts. See Service des Affaires Indigènes, "Rapports Politiques et Economiques Mensuels," 1932 1933.

¹⁸⁵ Monthly reports of I.A. officers refer to such reports and such sanctions frequently. See for instance Service des Affaires Indigènes, "Rapports Politiques et Economiques Mensuels," 1927 1932; Service des Affaires Indigènes, "Rapports Politiques et Economiques Mensuels," 1932 1933.

of French bureaucracy and army. To Moroccan governors and governed populations however, they bore a different meaning since it was far from their own experience of the political field.

The *Makhzan* model was in fact based on a different kind of rationality than the model imported by the French – a model later theorized by Max Weber as the ideal-type bureaucracy. The *Makhzan* order was predicated on maintaining the equilibrium between the different forces on the ground with the sole purpose of ensuring the continuity of the system.¹⁸⁶ As discussed in the previous chapter, administrators and administered were able to draw upon different symbolic, military and social sources of power to maintain this state of equilibrium. In a landscape where fortunes were easy to reverse and total hegemony hard to achieve, the *Makhzan* system was able to perdure by creating a permanent tension between political actors. For example, Edmond Doutté relates an incident with the *qaid* Tayeb Goundafi in 1914. At that time, the mighty *qaid* of the house of Goundafa was anxiously waiting for two years in Marrakech to receive the Sultan's authorization to regain his domain in the High Atlas. In the meantime, his political rivals were maneuvering to "buy" his deposition with central authorities. For his part, the *qaid* had to compose with this situation and diffuse such attempts with *hadiyas*¹⁸⁷ and signs of obedience to the Sultan. Being cut off from his base in the High Atlas, he had to maneuver his way out of this situation until he was able to regain the security of his stronghold in the mountains.¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁶ Rahma Bourqia, *Culture Politique Au Maroc: A l'épreuve Des Mutations*, Logiques Sociales (Harmattan, 2013), 33.

¹⁸⁷ Official gifts presented to the authority figure (*sultan*, *qaid*) as a sign of obedience. These gifts aim to "buy" or maintain the bidder's position within the *makhzan* apparatus.

¹⁸⁸ Edmond Doutté, *Missions Au Maroc. En Tribu* (Paris: P. Geuthner, 1914), 96–104.

The precarious relationship the *qaids* – and in the same manner their subordinate *amghars* and *sheikhs* – maintained with their superiors imposed an ambivalent attitude toward the population under their command. On the one hand, they had to pressure their constituents to extract the wealth necessary to maintain their position with their superiors and patrons. Local chiefs were quick to expand their holdings and grab their rivals' lands to increase their own wealth. They also pressured their subjects with taxation and forced labor to enhance their capacity to face their superiors' demands and enrich themselves at the same time.¹⁸⁹ In effect, *Makhzan* representatives yielded extensive powers that they often used to their own benefits and to the detriment of their subjects. They were able to draw upon a myriad of exceptional taxes, fines, and forced labor pretexts to extract more and more.¹⁹⁰ Moreover, they held judicial authority in penal affairs hence prevented judicial challenges to their exactions. Finally, they generally maintained armed groups to ascertain their authority through violent means whenever needed. In the absence of any meaningful control authority, their power seemed to be absolute.

Makhzan representatives had nevertheless to retain the support or at least the obedience of prominent figures in their districts in order to cement their authority and thwart any attempts to challenge it. For example, the *qaid* of the *Oultana* tribe in the late nineteenth century maintained his prestige and authority through shows of hospitality, generosity and magnanimity to his community and guests. He also bestowed important privileges such as exemptions from forced labor and certain taxes upon the tribe's notables to buy their loyalty. Besides, he invested in shared herding or cropping with

¹⁸⁹ Montagne, *Les Berbères*, 345.

¹⁹⁰ Ahmad Tawfiq, *al-Mujtama' al-Maghribi fi al-qarn al-tasi' `ashar : (Inulatan, 1850-1912)* (al-Rabat: Kuliyat al-Adab wa-al-'Ulum al-Insaniyah, 1983), 495–539.

these notables to tie them economically to his authority.¹⁹¹ In addition to creating these patronage networks, the *qaid* or the *amghar* had to master the politics of rival factions to make sure they remained rivals and did not coalesce to overthrow him through political or military maneuvers. Indeed, a coalition could undertake actions with the central state to undermine the *qaid*'s position. More importantly, oppressed tribes had always the option of armed insurrection to counter perceived injustices and to reestablish the balance of power between governors and governed. The local chief needed to prevent the tribe from coalescing against him mainly through diplomacy and intrigue. In fact, without securing a sufficiently solid tribal base, a *qaid* – even if invested with *Makhzan* authority – was unlikely to retain his position. In the nineteenth-century *Seksawa* tribe for example, a local notable was able to “buy” *Makhzan* investiture as *qaid* of the *Ait H'adduyws* fraction. However, upon return to his home valley, his fellow tribesmen refused to abide to his authority. Lacking supporters to back his claim, he thought it would be wiser to cede his claim to another contender and return to his mountain to live a modest life among his fellow tribesmen.¹⁹²

In effect, patronage networks coupled with the existing tribal and religious solidarity or rival networks, worked to somehow balance out the authoritative and arbitrary nature of politics in rural southern Morocco. In that sense, Moroccan “feudalism” differed greatly from the hereditary and serfdom-based feudal system of Europe. *Makhzan* representatives were real potentates that yielded extensive powers over their districts. However, their authority was far from being as stable as was the case in

¹⁹¹ Tawfiq, *al-Mujtama`*, 361–62.

¹⁹² Jacques Berque and Paul Pascon, *Structures Sociales Du Haut-Atlas*, 2. éd. rev. et augm, Sociologie d'aujourd'hui (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1978), 91–92.

feudal Europe. They had to maintain a precarious equilibrium with their superiors and their subjects, as any weakness in their relation towards one or the other generally proved fatal to their position. Even the powerful “Lords of the Atlas” had to abide to some extent to this rule. For example, Jacques Berque describes the authority of *qaid* Mtuggi in the following terms:

In his original *khoms*, the *Idaw Talilt*, the great ‘Abd el-Malek Mtuggi was only an *amghar*, a *primus inter pares*. At the *Mtugga* level, he is a patriarchal centralizer. At the level of all his depending tribes, an authoritarian and curvy exploiter. His appetites had nevertheless to deal with the local transactional necessities of the petty *amghars*, his vassals.¹⁹³

We see here how maintaining a solid base in the tribal alliances’ system was a constant necessity for southern Lords. As the latter’s position rested first and foremost on their ability to mobilize their allies, they had to accommodate these allies and listen to their interests and concerns.

With the introduction of the French supervision authority, *Makhzan* representatives found themselves face to face with a new kind of state rationality. In fact, French administrators intended to reform the *Makhzan* system and shape it in the rule-based, hierarchical and bureaucratic form of the European state. First, colonial administrators – both civilian and military – acted as part of a well-oiled administrative organization that had its own standards and rules of conduct. Of course, each administrator exercised his command in line with his personal style. Nevertheless, the limits and prerogatives of his office were delineated according to a standardized and codified set of rules put in place by the hierarchical structure of colonial administration. Moreover, the predominantly military nature of colonial administration in the South

¹⁹³ Berque and Pascon. *Structures*, 422.

contributed to creating a disciplined – and therefore predictable – administration. On top of that, colonial authorities created a set of infrastructures to comb Moroccan society and make it legible to colonial rule. Censuses, topographic works, communication and road networks, scientific research and many other tools were put to contribution to rationalize and codify the French native policy.¹⁹⁴ These efforts led ultimately to the emergence of what Burke calls the Moroccan Vulgate. This vulgate consisted in a set of binary categories that were meant to make Moroccan society simpler, more predictable and therefore more governable.¹⁹⁵ The complex and fluid nature of Moroccan society was to be reshaped in the new mold created by the colonial state.

The Protectorate regime was able to impose its logic and method at the top of the *Makhzan* apparatus. The *Résidence-Générale* organs tightly controlled the Sultan and his central government's actions. In many respects, the colonial administration replaced its native counterpart in managing government affairs. The Sultan and his government were often instrumentalized to endorse colonial policies and execute the dictates of French authorities.¹⁹⁶ In that context, the central *Makhzan* was cut off from its traditional political networks and its connection to its local organs. Although the Sultan retained nominal authority in appointing or dismissing local governors – *qajids* and *pashas*, he generally acted based on French directives. In any case, the *Résidence-Générale* retained the right to veto any unilateral decision the Sultan might attempt. In effect, the central *Makhzan* lost its capacity to exert any meaningful power on its local representatives. To

¹⁹⁴ Jonathan Wyrzten, "Colonial Legitimization-Legibility Linkages and the Politics of Identity in Algeria and Morocco," *Archives Européennes de Sociologie. European Journal of Sociology*. 58, no. 2 (2017): 205–35.

¹⁹⁵ Burke, *The Ethnographic State*, 79–82.

¹⁹⁶ Julien, *Le Maroc*, 110.

understand the nature of this disconnection, let us turn to a period where the central *Makhzan* was able to extract itself from French supervision. After the French defeat in 1940, the *Résidence-Générale* relaxed its control over the Palace to ease tensions in the country. In that context, Robert Montagne deplored the *Makhzan* conduct:

Under the régime which ensued, respect for authority again had to be expressed by rich gifts. Power over the tribes was used to levy irregular and exorbitant tribute. At the same time, the ruling family favored its friends and evened old scores with its enemies.¹⁹⁷

This attitude does not necessarily point to a regressive political behavior from the central *Makhzan* as Montagne deplores. It rather indicates the central *Makhzan*'s eagerness to reactivate its old political networks and reestablish its position at the heart of the political chessboard. Although these practices may seem corrupt and regressive to French observers, they offered nonetheless a powerful framework for action to central *Makhzan* officials. However, outside of this short episode, colonial authorities were able to tame the central *Makhzan* and neutralize its traditional ways of dealing with local representatives.

At the local level too, colonial authorities tried to introduce new administrative methods and principles. The *qajids*, *amghars* and *sheikhs* were subject to French civilian and military administrators' scrutiny. First, the colonial administration tried to keep local chiefs constant quarreling at bay. Local chiefs had to comply with the administrative organization in place and work within the framework of this organization's rules and procedures. The old habits of independent behavior and constant – and often violent – power struggles had to be tamed in favor of a more systematic approach to administration. Colonial administrators for instance imposed harsh punishments on local

¹⁹⁷ Robert Montagne, "Morocco between East and West," *Foreign Affairs* 26, no. 2 (1948): 364.

chiefs that stirred “agitation” in their communities. For example, a local chief was punished with one month in jail and pay 500 francs in fines for “intriguing” during the delineation of his district boundaries.¹⁹⁸ Moreover, the French administration constantly punished *amghars* and *sheikhs* who did not comply with colonial directives. For example, some *sheikhs* were fined for “not showing war weapons for the semestrial verification.”¹⁹⁹ In fact, this kind of disciplinary measure against indigenous administrators were a common place in southern Morocco during the early years of colonial administration.

Local chiefs were able for the most part to fend off French scrutiny, however, and continued to exercise their command in line with the tradition of *Makhzan* authority. In many respects, they viewed the colonial administrators as part of the same political games they used to play before the advent of the French administration. First, the frequency of cases of power abuse related in French reports hints to the widespread persistence of such practices. *Qaids* and their subordinates continued to extort lands, levy exceptional taxes, and impose forced labor and chores on local communities. In essence, they were entitled to extract these levies as a means to finance the indigenous local administration. But local chiefs continued to determine the quantity and use of these financial resources at their discretion as they were accustomed to.²⁰⁰ Although French authorities tried to rationalize the local chiefs’ conduct in that field, the latter continued to operate according to the equilibrium rationality proper to the *Makhzan*. They were ready

¹⁹⁸ Service des Affaires Indigènes, “Annexe de Marrakech-Banlieue: Rapport Mensuel” (December 1931), Fonds de la Direction des Affaires Indigènes (B14), Archives du Maroc.

¹⁹⁹ Service des Affaires Indigènes, “Bureau Des Ait Ourir: Rapport Mensuel” (May 1932), Fonds de la Direction des Affaires Indigènes (B12), Archives du Maroc.

²⁰⁰ Rivet, *Lyautey et l’institution Du Protectorat*, II:171.

to extract as much as possible from their subjects as long as their exactions did not jeopardize their position. But as they continued to use their old ways, their dependence on the French supervision upended the equilibrium they had with their subjects.

With the establishment of the supervision system, local *Makhzan* representatives found themselves freed from the precarity of their situation. Whereas *Makhzan* representatives under the precolonial regime were constantly maneuvering to remain in place, they became with the advent of the Protectorate part of a more stable apparatus. Of course, they were still subordinated to the *Makhzan* hierarchy and therefore still subject to its proceedings. However, the presence of the supervisory authority toned down the kind of outcomes they could face in their dealings with the *Makhzan*. Old *Makhzan* officials falling out of grace risked being stripped out of their titles, wealth and liberty.²⁰¹ Their counterparts under colonial rule were less subject to such misfortunes. When French authorities cracked down on misbehaving indigenous administrators, it generally implied fines, short-term jail sentences or revocation. Obviously, the stakes were much higher when dealing with the *Makhzan* hierarchy. More importantly, French punishments were more predictable and therefore more manageable by contravening administrators than *Makhzan* punishments.

By contrast, local communities' ability to coalesce and take action against their oppressors was decisively crushed by the "pacification" process. First, tribal armament was reduced to a minimum by colonial authorities to prevent any insurgent activities. Furthermore, tribal warriors were generally incorporated into the colonial army to carry on the "pacification" efforts. Therefore, tribes' ability to resist *Makhzan* exactions by

²⁰¹ See for instance the example of two high dignitaries in Walter Harris et al., *Le Maroc disparu: anecdotes sur la vie intime de Moulay Hafid, de Moulay Abd el Aziz, et de Raïssouli*, 2012, 32–33.

violent means was considerably reduced. More importantly, invoking the concept of *es-Siba* to escape *Makhzan* authority was no longer an option. Colonial authorities were eager to crush any armed challenge to state authority. By the end of the “pacification”, the monopoly of legitimate violence was reasonably within the hands of the *Makhzan* and colonial state. Since local administrators once incorporated into the colonial space were no longer wary of being dispossessed by the *Makhzan* or challenged by their communities, they were able to extract more from their subjects and accumulate more wealth without risking a sudden break up. This state of fact was eloquently illustrated by a popular song of the time in the Middle Atlas:

We are cows that the *qaid*s are milking,
In times past we butted them,
But now, the French are holding our horns²⁰²

These verses outline the shift in the balance of power between the *qaid*s and their constituents. For better or worse, the colonial state became part of the power dynamics in southern Morocco. Nevertheless, colonial officials seem to have been more able to tame indigenous tribes than to tame the behavior of their Moroccan counterparts.

Makhzan officials’ ability to act with impunity was heightened by the lack of French resources and their eagerness to maintain order and security in the South. For instance, the *Great Qaid*s policy granted southern *qaid*s substantial autonomy in administering their commandments in exchange for their services in fighting insurgency and maintaining order in the region. Although the need for such arrangements faded as the French administrative apparatus advanced south and east of Marrakech over the course of the 1920s and early 1930s, local chiefs remained necessary allies in managing

²⁰² A song reported by Captain Ayard, cited in Méraud, *Service des A.I.*, 176.

these turbulent areas. For example, the establishment of an I.A. bureau in Tata in 1931 did not prevent the acting *qaid* Mohammed Bou N'aylat from accumulating wealth. The *bureau* in fact received many complaints about the *qaid*'s exactions. However, the *bureau* chief was worried that if he acted upon these complaints and undermined the *qaid*'s authority his actions could jeopardize the *bureau*'s security itself. Although armed resistance subsided by that time in the region, the *bureau* remained surrounded by turbulent and hostile elements. These elements could seize any sign of weakness to stir up troubles that the *bureau* could not manage with the meagre resources it had. It was better to contend with a local potentate that knew how to run the district and was inclined to collaborate with French authorities than risk creating an explosive situation by undermining his authority or using less reliable chiefs.²⁰³ What French authorities were expecting the most from indigenous administrators was to keep order within their districts, lead a timely and orderly tax collection process, and source the manpower necessary for infrastructure works.²⁰⁴ They were willing to turn a blind eye to potential transgressions as long as those tasks were duly fulfilled and as long as no better alternative was available.

The local population also had to cope with the new balance of power imposed by the French presence. Since the territorial outreach of the *Makhzan* encompassed the entirety of Moroccan lands, it became more difficult to escape *Makhzan* clout. In fact, outright dissidence was no longer an option since the cost of opposing the colonial military machine generally outweighed the prospects of achieving relative autonomy

²⁰³ Capitaine Méric, "Etude Sur Le Bureau Des Affaires Indigènes de Tatta" (January 1935), C.H.E.A.M., Archives du Maroc.

²⁰⁴ Hoffman, "Berber Law by French Means," 858.

from the state. Local communities had to resort to more political means to counterbalance the power of local chiefs. There again, French presence weakened the traditional channels through which local populations attenuated local chiefs' power. The mediating institutions – central *Makhzan*, religious orders, holy figures – became less effective in curbing local chiefs' tyrannical tendencies. For instance, local *zawiya*-s and Sufi brotherhoods lost part of their role as sanctuaries to laymen from the tyranny of local chiefs. As colonial authorities were more inclined to subordinate the religious authority of these *zawiya*-s to the temporal authority of the *Makhzan*, the political role of such institutions faded quickly during the first two decades of the colonial period.²⁰⁵ In that context, the local population turned into the only remaining power that was able to counterbalance – and effectively trump – the power of indigenous administrators: the French supervising authority.

The local population – through the actions of its leading figures – continued to appeal to the same practices it was accustomed to using in precolonial times. Like the local chiefs, indigenous people viewed the French authorities as a new player in the ancestral political field of southern Morocco. First, they called upon colonial administrators to arbitrate their feuds with their administrators whenever they deemed such arbitrage opportune. Alternatively, they maneuvered to destabilize the chief's authority thus undermining his position with the French “supervisors.” For instance, local elites continued to play on the old factional disputes to create problems for local chiefs with their colonial supervisors. I.A. Monthly reports hint to constant occurrences where

²⁰⁵ See the example of the *Ait Waouzquit* in Yāsīn, *Janūb Aṭlas Marrākush*, 423–25.

different factions resorted to such procedures.²⁰⁶ Besides, local elites continued to use their old rituals and methods in dealing with colonial authorities. For example, the *Guedmiwa* tribe, sensing the fall out of grace of the *qaid* Goundafi, made a sacrificial offering at the porch of the French officer to plead for removing themselves from the *qaid*'s authority.²⁰⁷

This offering is reminiscent of the Loti story in the introduction. It points to two main characteristics of precolonial politics. First, the local elites viewed the political game in terms of balance of power rather than in terms of political or administrative rules and procedures. The elites in that case only manifested themselves once they sensed the old *qaid* was probably not powerful enough to retaliate. Therefore, they acted quickly to create a new situation that would most probably fall in their favor. We can see the same process taking place in the old fiefs of the fallen *Great Qaids*. As the latter's clout was vanishing, the local population acted to revive its local customs and reclaim its lost lands.²⁰⁸ Second, the symbolism of power figures was still intact within local populations. For instance, the sacrificial offering relates to the symbolic relationship between the governed and the governor embedded in precolonial Moroccan culture. The sacrificial nature of the demand reflects on the '*Ar*' concept in precolonial Morocco.²⁰⁹ The practice of sacrifice was meant to constrain governors' power by appealing to this religiously sanctioned form of request. It was a bad omen for any governor to overlook such

²⁰⁶ See for example how local opposition led to the replacement of an amghar in the Ahl Dades tribe in Service des Affaires Indigènes, "Bureau de Bou-Malen: Rapport Mensuel" (March 1932), Fonds de la Direction des Affaires Indigènes (B14), Archives du Maroc. or how wars of influence sought to diminish the authority of an amghar in the Imeghane tribe in Service des Affaires Indigènes, "Bureau de Skoura: Rapport Mensuel" (May 1933), Fonds de la Direction des Affaires Indigènes (B12), Archives du Maroc.

²⁰⁷ Justinard and Juin, *Un grand chef*, 147.

²⁰⁸ Montagne, *Révolution au Maroc*, 54.

²⁰⁹ Burke, *Prelude to Protectorate*, 10; Pennell, "Lineage, Genealogy and Practical Politics," 7–8.

sacrifices. Hence, the governors generally acquiesced to the pleading party's demand. Although the approach was somehow effective in curbing power abuses in Moroccan society, they were in stark opposition to the impersonal, procedure-based nature of French administration.

The local population also learned to use colonial procedures and institutions to balance out local chiefs' authority. In particular, the introduction of the *shikaya*²¹⁰ system presented a new venue for local elites and laymen to use French power against *Makhzan* power. For instance, French authorities created an administrative framework for local populations to denounce local chiefs' abuses and resort to colonial administrators to judge such abuses. This system constituted a substitute to the obviously biased *qaidal* justice in place within the *Makhzan* framework. Although the local population was slow to embrace such a framework at the beginning, the *shikaya* system managed to become a solid venue for contesting local chiefs' authority. For example, the Taliouine bureau in the Anti-Atlas registered 8 complaints in 1934, peaked at 194 in 1937 – a year of famine, dropped to 3 in 1942 due in part to the war context before resuming its progress to reach 46 in 1945. In 1945, the number of judgements issued through the *shikaya* system far exceeded the same number issued by the local judge (9 judgements).²¹¹ This evolution shows how the *shikaya* system became more and more popular with the local population. This popularity culminated with the rise of nationalist sentiments in the region. In the late 1940s, nationalist elements in the Taliouine region used the *shikaya* system to bombard the colonial administration with complaints against the *amghars*' abuses. Although the

²¹⁰ Literally complaint. It refers to administrative complaints the local population was able to address to the native affairs *bureau*.

²¹¹ De La Porte Des Vaux, "Les Aït Waouzguet," sec. VII.C. Statut juridique.

pasha Glawi – to which the district was attached – was reluctant to access to these complaints, he was ultimately forced to replace most of the acting *amghars* in the region.²¹² The local population was learning to use the new colonial institutions against the old *Makhzan* ones. Nonetheless, this adaptation was not only the apanage of ordinary people or elites trying to find a new equilibrium in their relationship to the state. Part of rural elites also adapted to the new situation by learning how to use colonial presence to their own benefits.

The Notables' System: A New Class of Local Administrators

Prior to colonial penetration, southern society was able to preserve the dynamism of its specific political institutions despite centuries of central state intervention in the region. As discussed in the previous chapter, tribal institutions, religious sanctuaries and Sufi brotherhoods were still thriving in southern Morocco as colonization advanced into the South. In particular, communal and tribal councils continued to govern local communities' lives at all echelons of tribal divisions both among sedentary and transhumant people. These elected councils – or *jema'a* – constituted an administrative body in charge of managing common economic and religious institutions, mediating conflicts within the community, punishing transgressions and representing the community *vis-à-vis* adjacent communities and the *Makhzan*.²¹³ Although the *Makhzan* administration was already well entrenched in many parts of southern Morocco in the wake of the Protectorate, such councils remained the predominant form of administration in the region – at least at the village level. For instance, the fragmentary nature of

²¹² Ya'qūbī and Ya'qūbī, *Dhakhā'ir*, 125–26.

²¹³ For a discussion of the role of the *jema'a* in southern Morocco, see Montagne, *Les Berbères*, 241–93.

southern society privileged the survival of power sharing arrangements within the tribal framework. Local potentates who were able to concentrate power – either by their own enterprise or through *Makhzan* intervention – were rarely able to transform a tyrannical power base into a hereditary right.²¹⁴ In that regard, the rise of the “Lords of the Atlas” in the second half of the nineteenth century was not necessarily an exception to that rule. Although these lords were able to carve out large fiefdoms, their grip remained nonetheless precarious as we have seen with the example of *qaïd* Goundafi in 1914. Therefore, the power base of southern society remained for the most part distributed among different actors.

Power sharing did not necessarily lead to democratic government. Although tribal and communal councils’ members were chosen by their community members, they were not necessarily democratic institutions embodying the will of the ‘people.’ For instance, the councils were primarily composed of leading figures within the community. Their position reflected the wealth and power of their respective family, clan or fraction rather than the result of popular deliberation. The “Berber republics” represented a form of oligarchical rule where each clan or faction held a position commensurate with its manpower and wealth. The council composition preserved the balance of power between the leading lineages and clans. Also, it imposed a consensual form of government where no single person or clan concentrated all the power.²¹⁵ As for the council members themselves, they were generally chosen for their intrinsic personal valor: their bravery in combat, their orating skills, their charisma, their wisdom, etc. However, they generally

²¹⁴ Burke, *The Ethnographic State*, 106.

²¹⁵ Victorien Loubignac, “Le monde Berbère et ses institutions,” in *Introduction à la connaissance du Maroc: Regards sur l’Islam, Histoire et géographie de l’Afrique du nord, Institutions et sociologie musulmanes*, ed. Maurice Raymond Alexandre Sagnes, Alphonse Juin, and Jean Hainaut, 2013, 284–85.

needed to possess enough wealth to sustain the expenses related to such office.²¹⁶ In that sense, only a small group of notables were eligible to representing the community in decision-making instances.

The fact that a few notables were able to monopolize decision-making did not result in significant inequalities within the community. In the precolonial period, the notables of a given village or ‘canton’ were indeed better off than most of their fellow tribesmen. However, they were generally unable to accumulate massive wealth or achieve a dominant political and economic position. In fact, the agrarian economy of southern Morocco presented few opportunities for enrichment. Capital accumulation was only possible through land or livestock accumulation which was an improbable outcome in the agrarian system of southern Morocco. For example, in the *Seksawa* tribe in the western High Atlas, land ownership was highly fragmented through space and lineages. Each lineage staunchly defended its rights to water use and land ownership thus preventing the other lineages from accumulating agrarian capital. The complex nature of land ownership laws prevented any meaningful and lasting accumulation of lands.²¹⁷ In the *Oultana* tribe too, the notion of notables seemed to refer to the community members that were able to generate a production surplus in normal years. A tax record in a *Oultana* fraction – the *Guetiwa* – hints to the fact that the wealthiest members of the community only owned a few land parcels and a small herd of sheep.²¹⁸ In that fragmented system, the notables were indeed a privileged minority within the community. However, their

²¹⁶ Brémard and Berriane, *L'organisation*, 309.

²¹⁷ For a discussion of the land system in the *Seksawa* tribe see Berque and Pascon. *Structures*, 354–68; Jacques Berque, “Les Sociétés Nord-Africaines Vues Du Haut-Atlas,” in *Opera Minora*, vol. II (Saint-Denis: Bouchène, 2001), 177–82.

²¹⁸ Tawfiq, *al-Mujtama'*, 353–60.

privileged position did not allow them access to extravagantly better economic opportunities or political hegemony. In effect, tribal institutions tended to spread economic and political power among a large array of notables to prevent any single person or lineage from monopolizing these powers. And for good reasons, in the absence of a strong central state that can guarantee private property and citizens' rights, any accumulation of such powers is susceptible to lead the dominant party to grab the dominated parties' lands and wealth.

The advent of colonial administration upended the notables' system that existed in precolonial southern society. It is true that prior to French intervention, the *Great Qaids* of southern Morocco were already remodeling the *jema'a* institutions within their respective domains. Nonetheless, the French conquest accelerated the process and expanded it to territories beyond the initial reach of these *qaids*. First, the *Great Qaids* were able to expand their domains to new territories that initially escaped their control. As *Makhzan* authority expanded and strengthened in southern territories due to French intervention, power sharing arrangements were no longer able to prevent power accumulation. Even in territories where tribal communities were allowed to preserve their institutions, the power of the *Makhzan* manifested itself through the appointment of permanent chiefs thus neutralizing the capacity of such institutions to maintain the balance of power within the tribe.²¹⁹ For example, Assou Ou Baslam – the *Ait 'Atta* chief who confronted the colonial army in the Bou Gafer battle in 1933 – was appointed *qaid* over his tribe where he retained his command throughout the colonial period and beyond. In a transhumant tribe such as the *Ait 'Atta*, such a permanent appointment was in stark

²¹⁹ Brémard and Berriane, *L'organisation*, 316.

contrast with the acephalous nature of the tribe's political institutions and with its long-standing tradition of rotating chiefdom.²²⁰ As the colonial state helped the *Makhzan* strengthen its authority in the South during the first two decades of the colonial period, the notables' group shrunk in size and expanded in wealth and power. Robert Montagne illustrates this fact in his assessment of the Moroccan crisis of the 1950s:

The [tribal] chiefs managed to constitute a rich class of sorts, with aristocratic allures. [this class had] closer ties to the colonizers and administrators. [It] was weary of preserving its benefits by putting its hopes in a prolonged understanding with the French.²²¹

In fact, tribal elites became more and more defined through their proximity to the new political and economic order that arose from French presence. Only those who were able to profit from the political and economic opportunities introduced by the colonial experience – mainly through their proximity to the *Makhzan* – were able to retain their status. A portion of the notables who were mainly *primus inter pares* in their communities were starting to emerge as a distinct and powerful class.

Two concomitant factors contributed to the concentration process that led to the emergence of a distinctive local notables' class. First, the colonial administration privileged power concentration within local communities to facilitate its supervision mission. For instance, colonial administrators had a hard time supervising the actions of local *amghars* or *sheikhs* due to the important number of these officials. In effect, this number reflected the aforementioned fragmentary nature of southern society and power arrangements between the different factions within the district. As colonial authorities expanded the supervision system into the South, they were keen to solve the conundrum

²²⁰ Hart, "The Tribe," 54.

²²¹ Montagne, *Révolution au Maroc*, 334–35.

posed by the apparent inconsistency of such administrative divisions. They tried to impose a new rationale that simultaneously meant to respect local peculiarities and adapt the divisions to the French administrative system and the resources available on the ground. For example, colonial authorities reviewed the administrative division of the *qaid* El ‘Ayadi district in the *Rehamna* region north of Marrakech in 1924. The number of *sheikhs* was reduced from 87 to 29 to “allow the supervision authority to take more efficient actions.”²²² This reduction apparently aimed to facilitate the work of the understaffed colonial administration. In fact, French administrators had seemingly a hard time following the actions of so many *sheikhs* while upholding the bureaucratic processes related to such supervision. In doing so, colonial authorities hoped to put an end to the predatory and independent behavior of these *sheikhs* and their *qaid*. However, this reduction also meant that many factions and lineages found themselves out of power positions. Political power, even framed by French supervision, was being concentrated in the hands of fewer and fewer people.

This tendency to reorganize local districts was generalized to southern Morocco as well. For instance, a surge of recruits in the Moroccan army from the region of Demnat in 1924 prompted an enquiry into its origins by colonial authorities. The region’s *khalifas* and *sheikhs*’ exactions seemed to be responsible for these recruits’ engagement in the army to flee such injustice. French authorities responded to such findings by contemplating the establishment of an I.A. *annex* in Demnat and a reorganization of local districts to facilitate monitoring local chiefs’ actions. In order to do so, French officials

²²² Résidence Générale de la République Française au Maroc, “Rapport Mensuel d’ensemble Du Protectorat 1924” (Direction des Affaires Indigènes et du Service des renseignements, 1924), pt. February Report, Bibliothèque Diplomatique Numérique, <https://bibliotheque-numerique.diplomatie.gouv.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k9105662s/f2.texteImage>.

thought again of reducing the number of indigenous chiefs.²²³ In the *Skoura* region under Glawi control, the establishment of an I.A. post in 1931 prompted a reduction of the number of *amghars* in the tribe. This step was judged necessary for establishing an efficient administrative framework. There again, the reshuffling did not initially go without protests from other local elites since it upended power dynamics between rival factions and concentrated power in the hands of a few.²²⁴ In fact, although reducing the number of local chiefs facilitated the colonial administration's work in terms of administrative expediency, it did not prevent acting *amghars* and *sheikhs* and their clans from monopolizing wealth and power. For instance, *Makhzan* representatives were still able to some extent to fend off French scrutiny and use their position to extract sizeable services from their communities and prop up their possessions.

The second factor that accelerated the emergence of a powerful notables' system was the transformation of southern Morocco's economic system. French economic novelties in terms of property rights, access to markets and security of exchanges opened new venues for Moroccan capital to thrive. Although the economic changes were more palpable in urban centers, rural areas in southern Morocco were also impacted by the colonial economic policies. For instance, the introduction of the French system of land registration – or *immatriculation* – altered the traditional agrarian system that prevented landownership concentration.²²⁵ It became easier to acquire extensive lands through commercial transactions. But only those who were wealthy enough or powerful enough were able to use that system to their benefit. To be sure, prior to colonial intervention,

²²³ Résidence Générale, "Rapport Mensuel 1924", pt. April Report.

²²⁴ See the monthly reports starting from May 1932 in Service des Affaires Indigènes, "Bureau de Skoura: Rapport Mensuel" (1932), Fonds de la Direction des Affaires Indigènes (B14), Archives du Maroc.

²²⁵ Joffé, "The Moroccan Nationalist Movement," 298.

powerful chiefs were able to acquire sizeable lands through coercion. However, these acquisitions generally did not survive the chief's misfortunes. With the advent of the colonial land system, local chiefs as well as wealthy notables were able to use their money and influence to buy lands from oppressed or broken peasants. The constant fluctuations in agricultural output accelerated the process since the impoverished population was forced to sell or abandon its lands and look for new economic venues either in the colonial army or in the urban centers of the colony or the metropole.²²⁶ More importantly, the *immatriculation* system shielded the buyers from future litigations. Once a notable registered his acquisitions regardless of their origin, it became harder for the former owners to get their lands back. In fact, the provisions in local customs that allowed an owner or his descendants to claim back their lost lands were not recognized by the colonial registration system.²²⁷ In that context, lands that were acquired through predatory behaviors was harder to retrieve by those who fell victim to such predation. The colonial system in effect strengthened the notables' ability to acquire new lands through normal or predatory means.

The introduction of a monetary economy also contributed to the accumulation of wealth and power. In the nineteenth century, a proto-monetary economy was already emerging in the coastal cities' hinterland. This phenomenon resulted from the integration of the Moroccan economy in the world trade system of the late nineteenth century.²²⁸ However, southern Morocco was not necessarily affected by this economic transformation. For instance, its state of endemic insecurity and its remoteness from

²²⁶ See for instance M. Montjean, "L'Emigration Berbère Dans l'Anti Atlas" (November 1942), C.H.E.A.M., Archives du Maroc.

²²⁷ Leveau, *Le fellah*, 11.

²²⁸ Pennell, *Morocco since 1830*, 88–91.

maritime trade centers prevented such integration. However, as French troops progressed in the region between 1912 and 1934, southern Morocco became more and more connected to the monetary economy that was emerging in Morocco's modern cities. This expansion allowed local notables to transform their potential production surpluses into monetary wealth, an option that was seldom available prior to the colonial period. Indeed, the monetary economy had hitherto been generally limited to small daily transactions in the absence of a system to secure large ones.²²⁹ Besides, the limited access to external markets had hindered the potential for wealth accumulation through surplus production. In a system where most goods had to be consumed locally, a surplus was generally hard to monetize and served mainly to face lean years or prop up the notable's standing through hospitality and shows of prestige.²³⁰ By contrast, these opportunities continued to elude most of rural populations. Their ability to generate surpluses potentially declined due to *Makhzan* predation and agricultural output stagnation. The gap between the wealthy and the poor was arguably expanding during the colonial period.

No figure other than that of the *pasha* Glawi illustrates more the extent to which *Makhzan* rural officials and notables thrived under colonial rule. To be sure, the house of Glawa was already a wealthy and prominent family before the colonial era. The then head of the family El Madani Glawi was able to access the ultimate position of *as-sadr al-a'dham* – the equivalent of prime minister in the Sharifian government – for his help to Mulay 'Abd al-Hafiz revolution in 1908. His successor, the *pasha* Glawi was also the governor of Marrakech, one of the most important urban centers in Morocco.

Nonetheless, the wealth and power of the house of Glawa stemmed first and foremost

²²⁹ Joffé, "The Moroccan Nationalist Movement," 298.

²³⁰ Tawfiq, *al-Mujtama'*, 353–60.

from its rural basis in southern Morocco. The *pasha* controlled a large domain through the action of his deputies – or *khalifas* – which were mostly recruited among his own sons and siblings.²³¹ the *pasha* was able to sustain a sumptuous lifestyle in his *kasbahs*.²³² Colonel Spillman, an I.A. officer during the “pacification” period, described the fastuous lifestyle of the *pasha* in these lines:

According to some people in the *pasha* entourage, their master fed each day more than a thousand people, at Marrakech itself. Not only this evaluation does not seem exaggerated, but I consider it to be an understatement.²³³

He continues by specifying the means by which such expenses were sustained:

Every coin having its other side, the very rhythm of his existence, the lifestyle he led required tremendous sums of money... Hence the ceaseless treasury difficulties that rendered more and more heavy and frequent all sorts of taxation and exactions from which the population of his vast domain suffered deeply.²³⁴

The *pasha*’s financial situation had nevertheless its ups and downs throughout the colonial period. For instance, the protectorate regime had to intervene to bail out their protege as he was facing financial difficulties, a help that would have been highly unlikely under the old *Makhzan* regime.²³⁵ All in all, the *pasha* Glawi was able to carve out an immense economic and political empire whose fruits he shared with his family members and close collaborators. His economic empire ranged from large land estates – some rented from the colonial authorities, to participations in mining exploitation companies in his region, to important real estate belongings throughout southern Morocco.²³⁶

²³¹ Hardy, *Sidi El Hakem*, 149.

²³² A *kasbah* is a castle in the North African vocabulary.

²³³ Georges. Spillman, *Souvenirs d’un colonialiste*. (Paris: Les Presses de la Cité, 1968), 73.

²³⁴ Spillman, *Souvenirs*, 73–74.

²³⁵ Hardy, *Sidi El Hakem*, 148.

²³⁶ Bidwell, *Morocco under Colonial Rule*, 121.

At the district level, the emergence of a new notables' system was also palpable. To illustrate this process, the example of the *Ait Atman* fraction in the *Ait Waouzguit* tribe is illuminating. The *Ait Atman* were subjugated by Si Hammou, the *pasha* Glawi's nephew, in 1916 and appended to his large jurisdiction. Thereafter, a local notable became the ruling *amghar* of the fraction. He used his position and his favor with the house of Glawa to increase his prestige and wealth. His new fortune was apparent from the feudal appearance of his embellished house as described by Robert Montagne in 1925. Twenty years later, his son and successor continued expanding the family's wealth and prestige. He expanded the familial house and added a beautiful *riad*²³⁷ to the compound. He was also buying all available lands to increase his wealth and strengthen his status. We see there the mechanisms of wealth accumulation playing out at the 'canton' level for *Makhzan* officials. However, not all the *amghars* of the *Ait Waouzguit* were able to acquire such prestige. By the testimony of the officer of the Taliouine *bureau* in charge of controlling the tribe, the *Ait Atman*'s *amghar* was one of the rare *amghars* to acquire such prestige in his tribe. Nonetheless, it remains true that the other officials became prominent figures within their respective communities with regards to their power and wealth.²³⁸ It is also true that many enterprising *amghars* were able to acquire comparable status in other places provided that their districts presented the necessary resources to such expansion.

²³⁷ A traditional urban Moroccan house built around an interior patio or garden. This form of housing was generally used by wealthy urban elites.

²³⁸ The *Ait Atman* case is described in De La Porte Des Vaux, "Les Aït Waouzguit," sec. VII.B-Organisation Politique (Jmaa).

Other notables likely profited from the new political and economic order. In the *Ait Atman* faction for example, the *amghar* was able to replace deceased *imezwaren*²³⁹ with his own men – or at least those who were more likely to collaborate with him in the different lineages of the *Ait Atman*. He also associated these members to his affairs, thus creating an economic patronage network to complement his political authority over the *jema'a* institution. This patrimonial arrangement is not foreign to *Makhzan* proceedings as we have seen in the previous section. However, with the stability of the *amghar*'s tenure and the new opportunities opened by colonial legislation and economy, the notables were more likely to expand the fruits of such collaboration beyond the meagre profits their predecessors made in precolonial Morocco. For instance, three out of the thirteen *imezwaren* were presented as “very rich”, seven as “rich” and the remaining three as “simply well-to-do.”²⁴⁰ This example does not necessarily translate in the same manner to the other fractions of the *Ait Waouzguit*. Nonetheless, the general trend points to a decisive change in the composition and weight of the *jema'a* institution. The *jema'a*-s were becoming more and more oligarchic and less and less deliberative.

By the end of the Protectorate period, colonial authorities were more and more aware of the tension the notables' system created within the Moroccan society. as the nationalist movement gained traction in rural Morocco, French authorities tried to reform the system and tackle the inequalities and injustices it was responsible for. In the last years of the Protectorate, French authorities devised a set of laws aimed at introducing democratic institutions at the local level in an effort to cut off the Moroccan countryside from the nationalist movement. The colonial administration tried to revive the traditional

²³⁹ Members of the tribal council

²⁴⁰ De La Porte Des Vaux, “Les Aït Waouzguit,” sec. VII.B-Organisation Politique (Jmaa).

jema'a through an administrative reform introduced in 1951. The *qaid*s, *amghars* and *sheikhs* were to be replaced by elected chiefs in an ultimate attempt to rescind the notables' system that supported the colonial endeavor so far. However, the escalating conflict with the nationalist movement cut short such initiatives. The Protectorate regime would ally itself again with its rural notables – chief among which were southern notables – to counter the nationalist party and the Sultan.²⁴¹ This collaboration culminated with the deposition of the Sultan Sidi Mohammed in 1953 as a consequence of the coalition between French authorities and local *qaid*s spearheaded by the pasha Glawi.²⁴²

Although the colonial regime relied heavily on local notables to effectively rule rural southern Morocco, the relationship between the two allies was never fully that of trust and loyalty. For instance, the *Résident-Général* Eirik Labonne resumed this state of affairs in 1947 through an official circular stating that “[the colonial administration] was frankly unable to attack this *qaidal fiefdom* whose behavior frequently offends our sentiments and which did not even know how to remain loyal to us.”²⁴³ The discussion will hence turn to studying the ambivalent and somewhat tenuous relationship between the two parts of the colonial system: the colonial administration and the indigenous administration.

The Dual Indigenous-colonial System: Trust Lost in Translation

Despite the mutual benefits both the French administrators and the *qaid*s were to derive from their collaboration, their relationship remained fraught with mistrust and

²⁴¹ Leveau, *Le fellah*, 15–17.

²⁴² Hardy, *Sidi El Hakem*, 161–62.

²⁴³ Eric Labonne cited in Julien, *Le Maroc*, 111.

misunderstandings. It is true that throughout the colonial period, the native and colonial administrations operated in tandem. Nevertheless, each administration continued to work separately according to its own internal rationality and with its own apprehensions of its counterpart. On the French side for instance, the policy of reliance on local *qaid*s was only a convenient and unexpensive mean to control southern territories. The *Résidence-Générale* was not necessarily assured of the *qaid*s' loyalty. It was aware of the fact that they could reverse course and defect from the French camp if need be.²⁴⁴ In fact, they have already shown their propensity to such turn-arounds by allowing the *Hibist* movement to take over Marrakech without a fight.

This initial mistrust in the loyalty and effectiveness of the indigenous administration framed the colonial administration attitude towards the latter. In fact, the supervision system itself was predicated upon the premise that indigenous administrators needed constant and tight framing by the more disciplined and effective colonial administrators. As previously discussed, the role of the supervising authority was to tame indigenous chiefs and bring them into acting according to French directives. However, since the French administrators did not trust local chiefs to act according to French ways by their own volition, they had to exert a firm and dominant presence. Hence, in the militarized southern Morocco, the act of "taming" *Makhzan* officials was mainly achieved through a demonstration of force and decisiveness. Often when the supervision system was established, French colonial troops patrolled the territory to assert their domination and bring both local chiefs and indigenous population into the fold. For example, the presence of a *Goum* column in the Taroudant region was seemingly behind

²⁴⁴ Rivet, *Lyautéy et l'institution Du Protectorat*, I:199.

the good behavior of local chiefs in 1925.²⁴⁵ The administrative reshuffling of the Amizmiz district in 1924 was accompanied by the presence of patrolling troops in the region in 1924.²⁴⁶ For regions that have been “pacified” more than a decade earlier, such procedures denote the colonial state’s constant wariness of local chiefs maneuvering. In the colonial imagination, only military discipline was able to control the rebellious but simple nature of the locals. In fact, I.A. officers were taught that “military discipline, made for the simple minds of the soldiers, also suits that, rough but straight, of the tribesmen ... it brings them without clashes to the stage of administration.”²⁴⁷

From the *Makhzan* apparatus perspective too, the dominant position of their French counterparts is the main factor they had to contend with. In fact, the local chiefs saw in the French administrators a factor that could jeopardize their position or at best undermine their authority. In the precolonial system, local chiefs’ authority stemmed mainly from their capacity to mobilize enough forces or exert enough charisma to maintain order and peace within their domains. As colonial penetration gradually framed the use of force and created a new source of leadership, the local chiefs resorted to different tactics to attenuate the impact of the French dominant position. In French officers, they were facing a new type of administration that did not yield easily to the power games they used to play. Nonetheless, they constantly maneuvered to preserve their position from French domination and even use the French dominant position to their advantage.

²⁴⁵ Résidence Générale de la République Française au Maroc, “Rapport Mensuel d’ensemble Du Protectorat 1925” (Direction des Affaires Indigènes et du Service des renseignements, February 1925), Bibliothèque Diplomatique Numérique, <https://bibliotheque-numerique.diplomatie.gouv.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k91056636>.

²⁴⁶ Résidence Générale de la République Française au Maroc, “Rapport Mensuel d’ensemble Du Protectorat 1924.”

²⁴⁷ Colonel Materne in his last councils for Indigenous Affairs Courses student cited in Méraud, *Service des A.I.*, 170.

First, local chiefs tried to cut off the French supervisors from interacting with their constituencies. For example, the *qaïd* Si Hammou in Telouat constantly maneuvered to prevent I.A. officers from making contact with his subordinates and with the local population in the late 1920s.²⁴⁸ In the Sous region also, the colonial officers complained about the lack of contact with the region's tribal base in the early 1920s.²⁴⁹ Although colonial administrators were able to somehow break through that wall of ignorance, it remained a complicated and hazardous task throughout the colonial period. For instance, the I.A. officer of the Taliouine *bureau* noted in 1946 that “no [notable] could dare having direct relationships with the *bureau* without having more or less probable affairs instantly being raised against him, or without him being exposed to often very costly reprisals.”²⁵⁰

As effective as these tactics were in separating the colonial administrators from their constituencies, they were not enough to suppress all threat to local officials' position. In effect, local chiefs also needed to ingratiate themselves with their supervisors through outward manifestations of deference and loyalty. For instance, local chiefs often used the long-standing tradition of Moroccan hospitality – or *diafa* – to showcase their loyalty to the French cause and win the hearts of the young and inexperienced I.A. officers.²⁵¹ They were also eager to show their loyalty to the new *Makhzan* by zealously showcasing their efficiency in collecting taxes and mobilizing resources while maintaining order within their district – all that French authorities needed from them. By

²⁴⁸ Yāsīn, *Janūb Aṭlas Marrākush*, 176–77.

²⁴⁹ Rivet, *Lyautey et l'institution Du Protectorat*, II:180.

²⁵⁰ De La Porte Des Vaux, “Les Aït Waouzguīt,” sec. VII.B-Notables.

²⁵¹ Méraud, *Service des A.I.*, 176.

satisfying his supervisors' demands, the local chief hoped they would refrain from taking a closer look into his management of the district.

But what really cemented the arrangement between the local chiefs and the colonial administrators was their common interest in keeping agitation within their districts at bay. For instance, colonial administrators refrained from overtly admonishing contravening *qaid*s or *amghars* for fear of undermining their authority within their communities.²⁵² As colonial administrators were wary of giving rise to the usual factional fighting within their districts, they were somehow compelled to support their appointed indigenous counterparts. Unless they had material and concrete reasons to revoke an *amghar* or a *qaid*, the colonial authorities refrained from doing so to avoid destabilizing the *status quo* in the tribe or faction. Conversely, local chiefs used the colonial repressive apparatus to prop up their prestige and complement their limited repressive apparatus with that of the more compelling colonial one. In fact, local populations were imprisoned in colonial jails for contravening to the authority of the local chief or that of the supervision authority.²⁵³ The martial discipline imposed by the colonial state served the authority of *Makhzan* administrators. Unless they were unable to keep large scale agitation in check and comply with colonial directives, they were able to profit from the coercive power of the new administrative system.

Colonial administrators indeed remained for the most part foreign to the dealings of their constituencies. Although I.A. officers had in principle to go through a nine months training program to perfect their knowledge of native culture, this program

²⁵² Rivet, *Lyautey et l'institution Du Protectorat*, I :189–199.

²⁵³ Hoffman, "Berber Law by French Means," 863.

seldom prepared them for the peculiarities of each district.²⁵⁴ In the fragmented southern society in particular, each tribe had its own customs, quarrels, alliances and references. Of course, these peculiarities did not preclude the theoretical courses from providing useful observations about southern society. However, colonial administrators needed to come to terms with these nuances if they were to effectively administer their districts. The colonial officers were not sure of who and what to trust in this very unfamiliar environment. Because of their limited contact with local populations, they were unable to come to grips with the intricacies of local politics and sort out genuine complaints from political intrigues. For example, the chief of the Tatta *bureau* was unable to assess the trustworthiness of complaints against his Moroccan counterpart the *qaid* Bou N'aylat. Although the complaints concurred to condemn the predatory behavior of the *qaid*, he remained unsure of the scope and scale of such predation. He contends that:

This atmosphere of denunciation and hatred, where everyone distorts the facts, is sometimes depressing. You are tempted by a struggle to lead and wrongs to redress. But then it is about knowing what you want. Whether to control the land with the collaboration of the *qaid*, or to be decided to ruin his authority.²⁵⁵

As each faction maneuvered through all available means to advance its interests, colonial administrators needed a thorough understanding of local politics to effectively manage local affairs. Absent that understanding, they tended to side with local chiefs since the latter's authority was considered in many instances as an extension of the colonial administrator's authority.²⁵⁶

Moreover, the colonial divide was heightened by the linguistic barrier in southern Morocco in particular. In fact, southern populations – including local chiefs – seldom

²⁵⁴ Hoffman, "Purity and Contamination," 745–48.

²⁵⁵ Méric, "Etude Sur Le Bureau Des Affaires Indigènes de Tatta."

²⁵⁶ Méraud, *Service des A.I.*, 177.

spoke other languages than their native Berber. Of course, this observation does not hold for Arabic speaking groups. However, the bulk of southern population spoke either the *Tashelhit* or the *Tamazight* Berber dialect. Conversely, colonial administrators seldom spoke either dialect. Therefore, colonial interactions with the local population usually went through the lengthy and unreliable translation process.²⁵⁷

Only through a prolonged and deep immersion into local communities were colonial administrators able to bridge the colonial gap between the colonial administrator, his indigenous counterpart and his constituents. For instance, Captain Ayard, a dean of I.A. officers in Morocco, urged his colleagues to constantly leave the comfort of their *bureau* and go and discover by themselves the realities of their districts.²⁵⁸ He also urged them to create a relation of constant dialogue and confidence with their Moroccan counterparts if they were to influence their behavior and bring them to the French administrative ideal.²⁵⁹ In another context, Catherine Hoffman in her study of Anti-Atlas customary courts contends that “officers were better positioned to assess a case’s validity if they had spent years in their rural posts, spoke Berber, and knew family genealogies and alliances.”²⁶⁰

To be sure, many colonial administrators were able to do so. Many more became genuinely attached to their respective constituents and created indelible bonds with the indigenous population. Many others produced a valuable knowledge about local communities’ customs and culture. For instance, prominent scholars such as Jacques Berque and Robert Montagne went through the ranks of colonial rural administration –

²⁵⁷ Hoffman, “Purity and Contamination,” 744.

²⁵⁸ Méraud, *Service des A.I.*, 406.

²⁵⁹ Méraud, *Service des A.I.*, 177.

²⁶⁰ Hoffman, “Berber Law by French Means,” 869.

although their background was not necessarily that of the average colonial administrator. A French officer in the Bou Izakern *bureau* refused promotion for fear of being mutated and dedicated himself to developing his district for many years. He dedicated his work to improving the lives of his constituents.²⁶¹ However, the bureaucratic and impersonal nature of colonial administration prevented such bonds from strengthening whenever colonial administrators were willing to do so. In fact, the bureaucratic duties monopolized much of the colonial administrators' time. The colonial administration's emphasis on procedures and paperwork limited its room for creating informal and personal relationships with their constituents if they have the cultural knowledge and desire to do so.²⁶² Furthermore, the rotating nature of administrative assignments limited the scope of colonial officials' acquaintance with their constituents.²⁶³ These rotations were adapted to the standardized and impersonal French metropolitan administration. To the contrary, they only added confusion to the loosely defined southern political context.

The indigenous administrators and constituents were aware that colonial administrators were rarely there to last, but that their *quids*, internal quarrels and grievances were.²⁶⁴ It is true that the colonial administration ensured continuity through the myriad of reports and assessments passed down by officials to their successors.²⁶⁵ However, the continuity of the administrative framework did not weigh much against the discontinuity of personal contacts in a context where networks were more important than administrative rules. It was perhaps a hazardous choice for the local population to rely

²⁶¹ Bidwell, *Morocco under Colonial Rule*, 231.

²⁶² Méraud, *Service des A.I.*, 207.

²⁶³ See André Hardy on that point for the Marrakech civil region in Hardy, *Sidi El Hakem*, 159.

²⁶⁴ See Capitaine Ayard remarks cited in Méraud, *Service des A.I.*, 176.

²⁶⁵ See an example of such a handover in Berque, *Mémoires*, 129.

heavily upon the judgement or protection of an official that may be replaced at any moment and open a window for the *qaid* or opposing factions to retaliate. Therefore, indigenous people and officials needed to remain cautious in their dealings with colonial administrators.

The starkest and perhaps most obvious manifestation of the colonial divide remains indeed the complete separation between the indigenous and the colonial administrations' personnel. In fact, the colonial administration was exclusively staffed with French personnel. Of course, it also relied on a myriad of auxiliary Moroccan personnel: irregular troops, interpreters, servants. However, not until the very end did colonial authorities consider the option of associating Moroccan administrators in running the machine of the native policy department. In an assessment of the roots of the Moroccan problem in the 1950s, the *Résident-Général* General Augustin Guillaume made the following observation:

All quality men staying in Morocco realize that one of the causes of the political discomfort stems from the lack of personal contact between French and Moroccans. These contacts, which were frequent and easy at the beginning of the Protectorate, have subsequently loosened due to a different orientation to their activity or the unsatisfying quality of authority agents ... Nothing should be done anymore in Morocco in any order of idea if not in a mixed Franco-Moroccan form, since the solution to the political problem is to employ (or distract) along us all valuable Moroccans who consent to do so.²⁶⁶

By restricting Moroccans' access to colonial administration, the colonial state signified that "modern" administration was exclusively the prerogative of the protecting nation. The colonial administration considered the native population and administration as mere subjects to "modernization." Indeed, the latter had never been granted agency over the fabric of their national policy by colonial authorities. The Protectorate regime was built

²⁶⁶ Cited in Gruner, *Du Maroc Traditionnel Au Maroc Moderne*, 244.

upon the promise of reforming the Moroccan old *Makhzan* government. However, reforms were to arise more from the “civilizing” intervention of the protecting nation than from the intrinsic evolution of the protected nation’s government.

This segregation was exacerbated in southern Morocco by the difficult nature of French penetration in the region. There, the *Makhzan* was relegated to a status of stasis after the initial upheavals created by the phase of military conquest. For instance, after the colonial administration was able to consecutively incorporate both the resisting tribes and the collaborating notables into its regime, it rarely ventured to review the *modus operandi* inherited from the “pacification” period for fear of reviving the “anarchic” nature of southern society. A division of labor was instituted between the two branches of Moroccan administration. The indigenous administration had to uphold colonial authority in the field through the ancestral mechanisms of tribal and *Makhzan* politics. The colonial one had to introduce “modernity” through technical advances and through its oversight of *Makhzan* officials’ work.

Despite the persistence of this colonial divide throughout the colonial period, the fact remains that the social and administrative fabric of southern Morocco was profoundly upended by the colonial experience. The colonial state was not a mere foreign body that could be easily rejected once its masters left the scene. It is true that colonial reforms lacked the depth and consistency to effectively blend the native and colonial administrations rationalities together. It also remains true that these reforms – despite their contradictions and shortcomings – deeply affected the way southern society conceived state administration and how such administration impacted its daily life and its norms and values.

Chapter VII.

The Transformation of Rural Administration under Colonial Rule

The colonial experience created in many respects a new system that largely differed from both Moroccan and French administrative traditions. Consequently, southern society – intentionally or unintentionally – underwent a series of major transformations that remolded the political fabric of the South. First, the role of traditional tribal and religious institutions was deeply affected by colonial policies. They became less and less effective in playing the intermediaries between the individual and the state. Second, the colonial technical innovations redefined state power and proceedings. They improved the state's ability to frame the life of its subjects even in remote and inaccessible places. Third, colonial policy choices conditioned the country's administrative divisions, infrastructure and orientations. In particular, they were at the origins of a persistent pattern of under administration in southern territories. In many respects, the colonial venture reshaped Moroccan administration in the hierarchical and vertical mold of European bureaucracy. However, the colonial state was neither able nor willing to completely uproot the Moroccan administrative culture. From that encounter emerged an administration that retained both Moroccan and French logics in its proceedings without creating a coherent and homogenous amalgamation of the two. The following sections revisit the lasting effects the colonial experience had on each of these elements.

Intermediaries between the Individual and the State: The Demise of the Tribe

Prior to the colonial experience, the Moroccan central state shared power with a myriad of actors in southern Morocco. Chief among those actors were tribal formations and religious orders and lineages. In fact, the Moroccan state did not have monopoly over legitimate violence nor even over spiritual leadership in southern territories. Hence, the *Makhzan* constantly maneuvered to maintain the balance of power with these competitors. *Makhzan* methods included coercion, factional games, cooptation, patronage, and even toleration. It was ready to collaborate with autonomous centers of power as long as they did not challenge the sovereign's nominal leadership – both spiritual and temporal – of the land.

The complex and somehow messy fabric of *Makhzan* politics aimed at one ultimate goal: the perpetuation of the system itself.²⁶⁷ In fact, as the *Makhzan* became less and less able to project its power into southern territories, it used alternative methods to perpetuate its presence in the South. In that sense, the Moroccan legal and administrative tradition relied more upon a long experience of compromise and political maneuvering than on a codified set of rules of conduct and procedures. When faced with the same problems, the *Makhzan* was able to draw interchangeably upon a variety of references: Islamic law, *Makhzan* tradition, tribal politics, spiritual authority, patronage networks, etc. In doing so, it seldom bothered itself with consistency or conformity. As discussed in the case of the rise of the house of Goundafa, the Sultan alternatively used force, diplomacy and finally cooptation to eliminate the threat this house posed to *Makhzan* authority. In effect, the *Makhzan* manipulated rather than dominated the political field.

²⁶⁷ Bourqia, *Culture Politique*, 30.

Southern society also drew upon a variety of institutions to elude *Makhzan* domination and do without the need for an external administration. For instance, tribal institutions and politics provided the main framework for local administration in precolonial Morocco. Tribal and communal councils were able to manage local communities' public services and organize its social life. First, they maintained order and justice within the community by assuming policing functions and arbitrating litigations. Also, they managed the local public spaces: local markets, communal granaries, religious sanctuaries and schools, etc. Moreover, they were able to mobilize the community for collective works: irrigation works, communal granaries work, showing hospitality to visitors.²⁶⁸ Finally, and most importantly, they were able to call upon the tribal or communal military force to defend the community against external threats or expand its territorial space. In that sense, the tribal structure in southern Morocco provided a comprehensive and self-standing framework for local administration.

The tribal system nonetheless needed other institutions to mitigate the risks related to such a fragmented system. For instance, the system was prone to surges in violent conflicts due to the fragmented and militarized nature of tribal society. It was also not conducive to large scale enterprises such as long-distance trade that outstripped tribal boundaries. In that context, holy lineages and religious orders provided a somehow neutral and respected framework outside the tribal system to mitigate such risks. In fact, these spiritual centers attenuated the risk of conflict through negotiating peaceful settlements with a holy sanction. They also provided a sanctuary for persecuted populations in times of conflict or famine. By using their religious prestige – or *baraka* –

²⁶⁸ Montagne, *Les Berbères*, 245–58.

they brought together local communities and limited the need for central government intervention to maintain peace and fight scourge.²⁶⁹

The existence of such institutions was at the same time complementing and counterbalancing *Makhzan* presence in southern Morocco. They were counterbalancing it inasmuch they were alternative centers of power that could preserve the individual from *Makhzan* predation and injustice. For example, the representatives of the fraction council – the *Ait Arb'in* – in the *Ghoujdama* were responsible in the name of the community to negotiate with *Makhzan* representatives the charges and duties that the fraction owed the *Makhzan*.²⁷⁰ More importantly, the fraction council combatted *Makhzan* officials' potential predations by calling upon different contestation methods. First, they appealed to the usual sacrificial complaint method – called *tarouakt* there – to demand the removal of undesirable officials. Alternatively, they took refuge in the local holy sanctuary and organized a sit-in – called *azouag* – to compel *Makhzan* authorities to acquiesce to their demands. Finally, they were able to call upon armed insurgency to fight *Makhzan* exactions if none of the aforementioned methods were satisfactory.²⁷¹ We see in this example how both tribal and religious institutions played an important role in counterbalancing *Makhzan* power and providing the individual with intermediary corps to confront the latter's predations.

Tribal and religious institutions complemented *Makhzan* authority inasmuch they attenuated the need for an important administrative presence in southern rural areas. For instance, these institutions were financially and organizationally self-sustained and did

²⁶⁹ Hart, *Tribe and Society*, 12.

²⁷⁰ Amahan, *Mutations Sociales*, 65.

²⁷¹ Amahan, *Mutations Sociales*, 58.

not need any *Makhzan* contribution to run communities' affairs. In times of *Makhzan* weakness, they were able to administer local affairs in complete autonomy from the center. However, this autonomy did not translate into complete independence. For example, southeastern Morocco's tribes remained in the orbit of the *Makhzan* although they were completely autonomous from an administrative standpoint. In the late nineteenth century, they received the Sultan Mulay Hassan's *harka* with shows of submission to his authority. They provided his *harka* with contingents to carry on with his military campaign and agreed to pay their share of taxes to the sovereign.²⁷² Although these tribes escaped any kind of *Makhzan* administration, they nonetheless acknowledged the sovereign temporal and spiritual suzerainty over the land. The same tribes were among the staunchest resisters to French conquest during the "pacification" era. In that sense, their submission to the Sultan's authority was not a mere result of their fear of his military forces. Therefore, tribal institutions represented a more or less loose extension of the Moroccan state – at least at a symbolic level – rather than a completely separate polity.

The southern rural political system was therefore predicated upon the existence of intermediary tribal and religious corps that mediated the relationship between the *Makhzan* and its subjects. Nevertheless, these mediation channels did not manifest themselves in a uniform or even homogenous manner throughout space and time. Depending on the relative strength of the state, the latter was able to modulate the dynamism and influence of local institutions. For instance, when despotic rule – directly or indirectly sanctioned by the central state – was able to take root in southern

²⁷² Nasiri, *al-istiqa*, IX:202–5.

communities, tribal and communal councils generally faded to the background. However, *Makhzan* or autonomous despots were seldom able to completely do without tribal or religious structures. For instance, as discussed in the previous chapter, local chiefs needed the force of the tribe – at least that of their own tribal fraction – and the support or at least neutrality of religious figures to maintain the precarious equilibrium upon which their position rested. From that situation emerged a fluid and diverse spectrum of arrangements that determined the forms and strength of local institutions and their relationship to the Moroccan state.

French presence in southern Morocco introduced a different approach to territorial administration based on the colonial state's craftsmanship. To be sure, the colonial state differed largely from the Weberian form encountered in metropolitan France. Nonetheless, the Moroccan colonial state inherited many of the French metropolitan and colonial traditions. First, the colonial administration inherited the French penchant for centralized state, codified and standardized rules and procedures, and bureaucratic and technocratic administration. It also perpetuated the colonial conceptions – or misconceptions – about its civilizing mission, its native policy approaches, and its dominant position *vis-à-vis* the indigenous people. But, as previously discussed, it also had to improvise and adapt to the local and international context in which it operated. Therefore, the colonial administration – despite its centralizing tendencies – failed to impose a standard and coherent administrative model over space and time. What really characterized the colonial state in Morocco – as was the case in many others around the world – was its inherent ambivalence and prevarications.²⁷³ With that being said, the

²⁷³ Go, *Postcolonial Thought*, 43.

colonial administration managed – intentionally or unintentionally – to produce an indelible impact in the social and political fabric of southern Morocco.

The most notable impact of French presence on the South arguably came through military conquest itself. In fact, the colonial discourse emphasized the role of French “pacification” in expanding and strengthening *Makhzan* authority over southern Morocco. It also praised its role in ending the state of endemic anarchy that characterized the South prior to French intervention. In effect, these two outcomes served as a pretext for the “pacification” as much as they were a consequence of it. Colonial authorities found in the dichotomy between *Blad es-Siba* and *Blad al-Makhzan* a convenient expedient to legitimize military conquest both in the eyes of the local population and metropolitan politicians. French troops were there to uphold the Sultan’s authority and bring his unruly subjects under *Makhzan* administration. What characterized the *Blad es-Siba* was not its conflictual relationship to the state but the absence of state altogether. In that sense, the “pacification” process was to be seen as the crown jewel in the state building efforts of the French Protectorate.²⁷⁴

Notwithstanding the aforementioned discursive elements, “pacification” had the undeniable result of granting the monopoly of large-scale organized violence to the colonial state. As a result of the conquest, the submitting tribes were disarmed and their movements and behavior were tightly monitored. Any attempt to stir trouble in the tribes were met with swift and decisive interventions to thwart any escalation in violence.²⁷⁵ As a consequence, the intermediary corps discussed above lost one of their major attributes: the management of organized violence. In particular, the tribe lost a sizeable portion of its

²⁷⁴ Bidwell, *Morocco under Colonial Rule*, 307.

²⁷⁵ Bidwell, *Morocco under Colonial Rule*, 44.

social and political salience. Since its military power was curtailed, the tribe appeared to no longer be the rampart protecting the individual from state depredation nor his anchor in tumultuous times. Therefore, the imbricated system of tribal and factional alliances lost of its importance in a context where intratribal and intertribal warfare gradually disappeared under French control.²⁷⁶ Indeed, the *Ait Arb'in* councils that represented the tribe *vis-à-vis* the *Makhzan* and organized its military forces vanished to the background in many places throughout the south. For instance, these councils disappeared from the *Ghoujdama* and the *Ait Waouzguet* collective memory gradually after they were subjected to the rule of the house of *Glaw*.²⁷⁷

The tribe became also less and less important in supporting *Makhzan* officials' position within the *Makhzan* political arena. Local chiefs no longer needed to maintain tribal or factional alliances to defend their own position against *Makhzan* depredation and opposing alliances. Since their position and power depended more and more on their association with the colonial regime, they were able to do without the unconditional support of their own faction. Instead of the broad tribal alliances needed in times of chaos, local chiefs became more interested in building patrimonial and clientelist networks encompassing the emerging notables' groups. Local chiefs were then more interested in weakening tribal opposition to their authoritarian rule both in allied and opposing factions. In that sense, even the "winning" tribes whose leaders initially rose to prominence thanks to tribal support were not immune to misfortune and decrepitude under the colonial regime. For example, the rise to prominence of the *qaid* Bou N'aylat in

²⁷⁶ Bidwell, *Morocco under Colonial Rule*, 44.

²⁷⁷ See Amahan, *Mutations Sociales*, 59; De La Porte Des Vaux, "Les Aït Waouzguet," sec. VII.B Organisation Politique-Jmaa-.

the Tatta region did not necessarily bring good fortune to his fellow tribesmen the *Ida ou Blal* nor to his allies the *Oulad Jellal*. In 1935, some thirteen years after the *qaid*'s submission to the *Makhzan*, "the *Ida ou Blal* privileges [did] not extend beyond Bou N'aylat's family and some of his close relations. The influence of the two nomadic tribes, the *Oulad Jellal* and *Ida ou Blal*, [kept] declining steadily."²⁷⁸ In effect, tribal prestige was no longer a requirement in southern Morocco for sustainable administration. To be sure, tribal support remained a good recipe for a smooth and seamless administration. Nonetheless, it was no longer vital to local chiefs' survival – their standing with their superiors and supervisors was.

To be sure, the process of tribal institutions' disaggregation was not uniform throughout the South. In many instances, these institutions started disaggregating before the colonial period. In fact, the vigor and scope of tribal structures prior to French intervention depended deeply on the local context of each tribe and its relation to the *Makhzan* and neighboring tribes. For example, the *Seksawa* tribe did not exhibit any particular interest for *leff* alliances and tribal-wide arrangements well before French arrival in part due to the predominance of despotic chiefs in the tribe.²⁷⁹ Conversely, the vigor and scope of tribal structures following French conquest depended on the *ad hoc* arrangements that underpinned submission negotiations. For example, the *Ait 'Atta* tribe retained much of its tribal institutions and customs after its submission to *Makhzan* authority.²⁸⁰ Nonetheless, the role of such institutions in running the tribal life were deeply reduced by French and *Makhzan* presence. It is therefore safe to say that the

²⁷⁸ Méric, "Etude Sur Le Bureau Des Affaires Indigènes de Tatta."

²⁷⁹ Berque and Pascon. *Structures*, 427–30.

²⁸⁰ Hart, "The Tribe," 56.

“pacification” process led to a general weakening of the role of the tribe as a political agent.

The tribe did not disappear from the political and social landscape of southern Morocco for that matter. Although administrative divisions did not always respect tribal and factional boundaries, the colonial authorities were willing to take those boundaries into account in their division plans.²⁸¹ Besides, colonial administrators produced a large body of research on tribal life to inform their management of the rural South. Colonial authorities remained conscious of the potential of tribal solidarity in steering the population’s reaction to colonial policies for better and worse. Indeed, although the tribe lost its military power, it remained an important cultural and identity marker for southern populations. Twenty years after the end of the “pacification” process, Robert Montagne acknowledged that “the [tribes’] political institutions were profoundly affected. But the patriarchal families that constituted the fractions and the tribes remain[ed] intact except in the regions close to the cities.”²⁸² And for good reasons, most of southern villages and fractions continued to reject indigenous administrators from outside their boundaries. The *amghars* and *sheikhs* remained for the most part a result of the factional system of tribal politics even if they no longer relied on it to remain in position. Furthermore, the communal assemblies remained operative at the village or fraction level. These assemblies continued to effectively manage the daily life disputes and tasks that fell upon these institutions.²⁸³ To sum up, with “pacification”, the individual started to conceive of

²⁸¹ See for example a discussion of the administrative division of the High Sous tribes in Capitaine De La Porte Des Vaux, “Les Tribus Berbères Du Haut Sous” (1946), C.H.E.A.M., Archives du Maroc.

²⁸² Montagne, *Révolution au Maroc*, 61.

²⁸³ See for example for the case of the Ait Waouzguet De La Porte Des Vaux, “Les Aït Waouzguet,” sec. VII.B-Organisation Politique (Jmaa).

a secure and prosperous life outside of the tribal umbrella. Nevertheless, the tribe was still alive and working throughout the colonial period.

The tribe remained operative in part due to – or perhaps in spite of – colonial policies. For instance, the colonial native policy transformed the tribe from an autonomous and self-standing political unit into a vehicle for colonial native policy. Again, this policy was neither homogenous nor uniform throughout southern territories. Nevertheless, the colonial state used the tribal framework to affirm its authority whenever it deemed it useful to do so. The foundations of this tribal policy started to emerge as colonial troops faced the resistance of Middle Atlas transhumant tribes. There, relying on *Makhzan* authority or local strongmen proved impossible due to the acephalous nature of such tribes. Therefore, the colonial administration came to the conclusion that these tribes' resistance stemmed from their repulsion to *Makhzan* authority and their attachment to their customs and institutions. Hence, the solution there was to preserve these tribes' institutions and customs while integrating them into the state apparatus.²⁸⁴ This framework expanded into southern territories as part of what became known as the colonial "Berber policy." Subsequently, many Berber tribes throughout southern Morocco were subjected to such institutions. A *dahir* in 1914 put in place the legal framework for integrating tribal institutions into the state fabric. In 1916, another *dahir* established and regulated the concept of the *jema'a administrative*.²⁸⁵ In 1915, the judicial pendant of these institutions, the *jema'a judiciaire*, was being tested in 46 Berber

²⁸⁴ Burke, *Prelude to Protectorate*, 138–41.

²⁸⁵ M. De Falguerolles, "La Jemaa Au Maroc et En Milieu Rural Dans l'annexe de Demnate (Région de Marrakech)" (November 1952), 3, C.H.E.A.M., Archives du Maroc.

tribes.²⁸⁶ In effect, these steps intended to formalize the existence of tribal *jema'a*-s and incorporate them into the state administration. The tribe and its institutions were to rejuvenate under the colonial state's watch and administration.

Although these administrative and judicial institutions intended to preserve tribal institutions and culture, they did not necessarily act on behalf of the tribe and its constituents. First, the *jema'a administrative* failed to fulfill its role of tribal representation in local administration. Effectively, a study of these *jema'a*-s in the Demnat region in 1952 comes to the conclusion that “administratively, since the ‘pacification’, [they only] existed on *bureau* ledgers.”²⁸⁷ And for a good reason, administrative powers were in the hands of the *Makhzan* hierarchy – *qaid*s, *khalif*as and *sheikh*s – and their supervisors – civilian and military colonial administrators. Therefore, the official *jema'a*-s remained for decades a decorum that emanated from the central state directives but never took root in the terrain. It was not until the 1950s and the acute crisis with the palace and nationalist movement that French authorities tried to double down on these institutions in order to win back the rural population's support. As we have seen, this flight forward strategy did not last long. Here again, the ambivalence of the colonial state prevented a coherent strategy from forming. In fact, colonial administrators – and local *qaid*s – hindered the work of such *jema'a*-s for fear again of creation trouble by upsetting the *status quo*.²⁸⁸

As for the *jema'a judiciaire*, colonial authorities were more effective in formalizing this institution. In fact, these assemblies were incorporated into the *tribunaux*

²⁸⁶ Adam Guerin, “Racial Myth, Colonial Reform, and the Invention of Customary Law in Morocco, 1912-1930,” *The Journal of North African Studies* 16, no. 3 (2011): 370.

²⁸⁷ M. De Falguerolles, “La Jemaa Au Maroc et En Milieu Rural,” 3.

²⁸⁸ Leveau, *Le fellah*, 17.

coutumiers – or customary courts – created by a *dahir* in 1924. These courts adjudicated cases related to personal status, successions and real estate affairs.²⁸⁹ Despite the turmoil and nationalist opposition created by the reorganization of 1930 – known under the name of “Berber *dahir*”, these structures remained in place and operated throughout southern Morocco for the rest of the colonial period.²⁹⁰ However, they were far from representing the tribes in the manner their traditional models were. In fact, the composition of such *jema'a-s* was subject to French approval or selection. Moreover, their proceedings and judgements were tightly framed by the colonial officers who in effect presided these customary courts.²⁹¹ More importantly, these courts did not necessarily uphold tribal divisions. For example, the Iggherm district in the Anti-Atlas hosted four customary courts each adjudicating cases for one to four tribes.²⁹² Also, in the Sous region, these assemblies seemed to incorporate many religious scholars – a stark contrast with the traditional rotating assemblies encountered in southern Morocco.²⁹³ In essence, the French administration gradually transformed these assemblies into an indigenous emanation of French authority rather than the manifestation of tribal power.

In parallel to these formal attempts to incorporate tribal structures into the colonial state, the local population also used informal ways to preserve its tribal customs and institutions. In fact, the longevity of tribal institutions throughout Moroccan history stems from their capacity to adapt to different power configurations. Whenever the central state is strong or insecurity is low, tribal institutions shrink to the management of

²⁸⁹ Qadéry, “Les Berbères,” 437.

²⁹⁰ Qadéry, “La Justice Coloniale,” 856.

²⁹¹ Hoffman, “Berber Law by French Means,” 860.

²⁹² Hoffman, “Berber Law by French Means,” 857.

²⁹³ Hoffman, “Berber Law by French Means,” 866.

small communities' daily activities and disputes. In fact, these institutions remain efficient in managing irrigation systems, village mosques and schools, disputes over land, personal status affairs and other practical affairs without the need for the costly and arbitrary *Makhzan* intervention. However, once the circumstances call for a more important involvement in political life, the memory of tribal solidarities and ancestral norms and practices revives these institutions from the ashes of state intervention.

The colonial period did not depart from the rule of tribal institutions' resiliency in many respects. Southern Morocco continued to carry the memory of tribal political life throughout the colonial period. For example, shadow *jema'a*-s continued to exist in the Demnat region among the *Oultana* and *Ftwaka* tribes in spite of the failure of their official counterparts. In fact, the local populations continued to hold assemblies to discuss specific public affairs, designate spokesmen or to oppose undesirable local chiefs.²⁹⁴ The *Ait Waouzquit* also were able to maintain their tribal legal framework outside of the official framework created by the *Makhzan* and colonial administration. For instance, the *Ait Azilal* and *Ikhazamen* fractions continued to use their written and oral laws in settling pasture lands, irrigation and collective granaries litigations.²⁹⁵ In effect, the tribal framework continued to operate in unofficial and subtle ways throughout the colonial period. Nevertheless, the colonial episode imposed a permanent shift in the tribe's posture as a political actor. There was arguably no turning back to the powerful tribal political entities of old since the Moroccan state was establishing a permanent presence in tribal areas thanks to advanced European military and administrative technics. In such a

²⁹⁴ M. De Falguerolles, "La Jemaa Au Maroc et En Milieu Rural," 6–7.

²⁹⁵ Yāsīn, *Janūb Aṭlas Marrākush*, 454.

system, tribal power was dwarfed by the political and administrative machine of the state. But was Morocco really transforming into a European-style state?

The Colonial Conundrum: Introducing Modernity while Preserving Tradition

In an allocution to Moroccan notables around a dinner in 1917, Marechal Lyautey reiterated his vision for the Protectorate's action in the country:

I represent, at [the Sultan's] side, the French Republic's Government which ... brought to this country, on the one hand the necessary force to bring down the anarchy that desolated it ... and on the other hand the financial resources, the personnel and the modern material means destined to enrich its natural endowments and provide it with a hitherto unknown prosperity.

But it is of course true that this pacification and development cannot and shall not be accomplished except through the collaboration of the two races and by ensuring the Moroccan People of ... the integral retention of its status, its customs and its daily life habits.²⁹⁶

This excerpt presents the three pillars of the French plan to reform the Sharifian Empire: pacification, economic modernization, and the preservation of Moroccan traditions. In theory, these pillars presented the colonial state with a clear and comprehensive vision for what "modern" Morocco should look like. Morocco should transform into a secure country with a thriving modern economy and a distinctive cultural tradition. The first of the three pillars, pacification, came to fruition through the long and tough process of military and political penetration. As we have seen previously, this process was full of prevarications, setbacks, compromises and maneuvering. In southern Morocco in particular, the costs and risks inherent to military operations outweighed for a long period the potential benefits of pacifying the whole territory. In the end, the colonial state found

²⁹⁶ Louis Hubert Gonzalve Lyautey et al., *Paroles d'action: Madagascar -- Sud-Oranais, Oran-Maroc (1900-1926)*, 2011, 242–43.

the resolve and resources to fulfill its long-standing objective of “pacification.” However, the remaining parts of the Lyautey program proved to be a trickier affair. An affair that tested colonial state resolve and resourcefulness to solve the conundrum posed by the Lyautey formula: how to introduce modernity without affecting the country’s long-standing traditions?

A tentative answer to that dilemma is implied in Lyautey’s program itself. Potentially, the answer lay in compartmentalizing the areas in which modernity was to be introduced and those in which tradition was to prevail. In Lyautey’s program, the modernization efforts of the colonial state had to focus first and foremost on economic development. On the other hand, tradition was to prevail in all affairs related to the religious and daily life of Moroccans. Therefore, modernity was to be an economic and technical affair rather than a political or cultural endeavor. For the most part, the colonial administration was a technocratic administration that was focused on “managing” rather than “governing” the Moroccan population. For instance, a great emphasis was put on providing the country with modern infrastructure – roads, hospitals, schools, ports. Emphasis was also put on creating a modern economic sector: modern farming, mining, manufacturing.²⁹⁷ At the same time, the institutional framework of the colonial enterprise remained astonishingly poor.²⁹⁸ It is true that the colonial state introduced European-style bureaucracy and government practices. Nonetheless, these changes remained technical in nature and did not intend to alter the political fabric of the *Makhzan* apparatus.

The colonial state also tried to compartmentalize its “modernizing” action throughout the national space. On the economic front, modern economic and political

²⁹⁷ Wyrzten, *Making Morocco*, 85–92.

²⁹⁸ Montagne, *Révolution au Maroc*, 332.

institutions were for the most part reserved for the European population. In fact, the colonizers benefitted the most from the introduction of the modern economic sector. Moreover, European capital controlled much of the newly created economic tissue. Modern farms, banks, mining and manufacturing companies were mostly in the hands of colonizers or metropolitan economic interests.²⁹⁹ To be sure, Moroccan elites also benefitted to some extent from the economic boom introduced by the colonial reforms. Nonetheless, the majority of Moroccans only contributed to the modernization dynamic by providing a cheap workforce for the nascent sector. On the administrative front, the colonial administration controlled the “modern” part of state administration. The *Makhzan* administration, in rural southern Morocco more than anywhere else, remained alien to the European administrative techniques and methods. Besides, Only the European population enjoyed access to representative bodies that mediated their relation with the *Résidence-Générale*. Municipalities were created in cities with sizable European populations. For the most part, “modern” administration and political representation were the preserve of French administrators and European populations.

A third compartmentalization took place as the colonial state tried to categorize Moroccan society and traditions. Initially, this effort stemmed from French authorities’ need to make the Moroccan society legible to colonial rule. Thereafter, it intended to provide colonial policymakers with a scientific toolkit to easily implement its design for Moroccan society: preserving what needs to be preserved and reforming what needs to be changed. In doing so, a set of simplified groups emerged in an effort to schematize Moroccan society and account for its workings. These categories were encompassed in

²⁹⁹ See for instance “L’économie Du Maroc: Des Faits, Des Chiffres” (Délégation économique du Maroc à Paris, April 1952), Centre National de Documentation.

what Burke describes as the Moroccan Vulgate. This Vulgate explains Moroccan society in terms of binary categories that shape Moroccan politics through their interactions and antagonism. The *Blad al-Makhzan* was opposed to the *Blad es-Siba*. The Berbers were opposed to the Arabs. The *'urf* was opposed to the *shra'a*.³⁰⁰ The sedentary were opposed to the nomadic people.³⁰¹ Colonial authorities were to pick and choose which categories were to be strengthened and preserved and which needed to be combatted or reformed. The *Blad es-Siba* was to be removed everywhere and replaced by *Blad al-Makhzan* in order to ensure security. The Berbers were to be preserved from Arabization in order to ensure their loyalty to France. The tribal customs were to be preserved from the fanatic and xenophobic effects of religious influences. Sedentary life was to facilitate administrative control and tone down the bellicose nature of nomadic and transhumant tribes. Far from being a mere theoretical framework for understanding Moroccan society, this Vulgate dictated in many respects the ways in which the colonial state dealt with the latter.

However, neither the Moroccan society nor the colonial administration yielded easily to such a simplification and compartmentalization. It was one thing to theorize such a dichotomy between social actors. It was a whole different endeavor to materialize such separations in the complex and intermingled realities of colonial Morocco. In effect, the colonial state was never able to compartmentalize so clearly in the ground. For instance, the boundaries between Arabs and Berbers, customary and Islamic law, the economic and the social, and even between the European sphere and the Moroccan

³⁰⁰ *'urf/ izerf*: customary law. *Shra'a*: islamic law

³⁰¹ Edmund Burke III, "The Image of Morocco in French Colonial Scholarship," in *Arabs and Berbers: From Tribe to Nation in North Africa*, ed. Ernest Gellner and Charles A. Micaud (London: Duckworth, 1973), 175-199.

sphere were generally blurry and hard to define. Therefore, the colonial state needed to create artificial and somehow arbitrary boundaries in order to manage the whole system. But creating such boundaries did not prevent these categories from interacting, colliding and mutually influencing each other. In many instances, these influences did not go in the directions intended by colonial policies – if the latter maintained any common direction at all. Therefore, instead of simplifying colonial reforms, this compartmentalization strategy exacerbated colonial policies' contradictions and prevarications. It also created numerous fault lines between colonial categories that led to a tense and instable social dynamic. However, instable as it may be, the social, economic and political dynamic put in motion by the colonial experience changed forever the face of Morocco.

The socio-political dynamics created by the colonial experience had to varying degrees manifested themselves within rural southern society. Throughout the colonial period, French authorities tried different formulas to manage the vast southern territories and communities. Far from forming a constant and consistent strategy, these formulas evolved according to the circumstances and to the personality of both French and Moroccan actors. Nevertheless, they remained true to the law of compartmentalization throughout the period. To illustrate this fact, the following paragraphs discuss examples of how the compartmentalization approach transformed southern society and its relationship to state administration.

First, colonial authorities implemented a type of administration allying technical progress and political conservatism. Indeed, as colonial outposts advanced into southern territories from the 1920s onward, the colonial administration introduced European-style technical innovations and standards in terms of territorial administration. These

techniques resulted in a more precise and methodical framing of the local population. Formal taxes were collected regularly. Order and security were maintained efficiently. Local resources were mobilized readily. Communication lines and hierarchical structures were established to coordinate the administration work. The technical infrastructure in terms of roads, population censuses, paper work and rural planning was put in place to facilitate the work of the administration. In essence, the colonial state propped up the Moroccan state capacity to administer its subjects and frame their lives in a more assertive way.

The same colonial administration preserved the *Makhzan* apparatus and its taste for power-based and patrimonial government and its distaste of precise and systematic rules. In precolonial southern Morocco, the *Makhzan* ways of working were counterbalanced by the existence of opposing power centers. They were also limited by the *Makhzan*'s technical and material incapacity to closely frame the local population. Therefore, the southern population was able to varying degrees to elude or confront *Makhzan* clout. Life outside of *Makhzan* control was still possible before the arrival of the colonial state. However, the colonial technical improvements made the *Makhzan*'s authoritarian and patrimonial nature to grow out of proportion, as it simultaneously increased its own resources and weakened its counterbalancing powers. In essence, French intervention and its technical improvements destroyed the prevailing social equilibrium in southern Morocco.

By combatting *es-Siba* on behalf of the *Makhzan*, the colonial experience upended the Moroccan government's precolonial practice of negotiated and loose arrangements with local power holders (the tribes, the religious orders, the local potentates). In so

doing, it transformed the state relationship to its constituents into a hierarchical and pervasive one. To the contrary, it did not introduce the political reforms that were the corollary of such vertical states in Europe. The separation of powers was not upheld in rural areas since the *qaid* and the colonial administrator generally presided over the local administration and local justice. Civil society did not emerge in rural southern Morocco to replace tribes and religious orders as intermediaries between the state and the individual. Popular oversight over state representatives was unheard of. In that sense, the compartmentalization of colonial policies (technical improvement vs. political immobilism, combatting the *es-Siba* vs. upholding the *Makhzan*) completed the transformation of the Moroccan state in southern Morocco into an authoritarian and patrimonial regime. Authoritarian because of the absence of political reforms to create counterbalancing powers. Patrimonial because of the absence of administrative reforms to install a clear and transparent framework for appointments, remuneration and advancement.

Colonial attempts to preserve Berber traditions also had undeniable effects on the administrative patterns in southern Morocco. As we have seen in the previous section, colonial authorities tried to preserve Berber particularism through the implementation of tradition-inspired institutions. In particular, colonial authorities tried to integrate the Berber judicial tradition into its administrative framework. In doing so, colonial authorities sought to preserve Berber society in general from salafist and nationalist influences. In fact, the expansion of *Makhzan* authority into southern Morocco created the conditions for the religious influence of urban Salafism to grow in the countryside. As colonial authorities were wary of the surge in European xenophobia these movements

may prompt, they were eager to preserve Berber southern society from falling into the hands of educated Muslims and the *Makhzan* Arabic influence.³⁰² To do so, the Berber population was to “play the role of a sequoia: a landscape ornament, an archeological fixer.”³⁰³ This preservation was to come through the customary assemblies already implemented in the Middle Atlas Mountains in the early days of the protectorate. However, the case of southern Morocco proved to be more complex and less manageable than the Middle Atlas case.

The use of customary law in southern Morocco – as was the case for many other institutions in the region – came as a part of a complex and intertwined system of norms and practices. The complexity of these practices is exemplified by this assessment of the political and judicial organization of a nomadic tribe of the Sahara fringes:

At the end of the dissidence era, the political and judicial organization of the *Ait Oussa* was at the same time flexible and complex.

Flexible, for it tried to palliate the difficulties the dispersion of a great nomadic tribe brings to the exercise of command and the action of justice.

Complex, since authority was shared among many hands. The sources of such authority were diverse. Custom, the Sultan Mulay Hassan’s action, religion, or simply wealth [accumulated] due to lucky inheritances and combats.³⁰⁴

In fact, what characterized Berber customs and institutions was constant adaptation to circumstances and outside influences. They were a set of practical solutions devised and upheld by the community for the community. Their power was based less in their intrinsic strength as a legal framework than in their embeddedness in communities and their fit to the latter’s problems and conditions. However, the colonial scheme for

³⁰² Guerin, “The Invention of Customary Law in Morocco,” 368.

³⁰³ Berque, *Mémoires*, 133.

³⁰⁴ Le capitaine De Furst, *Etude sur la tribu des Ait Oussa Assa le 5 Août 1939* (Assa: Centre d’Etudes et de recherche Entreprendre : Association des Jeunes Chercheurs pour les Etudes et les recherches sur le Sahara, 2011), 21.

preserving Berber customs did not intend to preserve their flexible and practical nature nor their embeddedness in local communities and openness to other sources of legislation.

First, colonial authorities tried to compartmentalize and standardize its approach to implementing customary law. In 1914, colonial authorities distributed a questionnaire to French administrators about the tribes under their jurisdiction. That questionnaire intended to provide a good knowledge of each tribe specificities and to pinpoint tribal difference in terms of norms and practices.³⁰⁵ The desired outcome of such a broad survey was to categorize tribes according to the preestablished binaries of Berber/Arab, 'urf/shra'a, sedentary/nomadic. However, these preconceived categories were not easily applicable in southern Morocco. In 1924, a study was commissioned to address the question of whether to establish the customary law framework in the Agadir region as was the case already in the Middle Atlas. The conclusions of this work established the fact that to varying degrees both custom and Islamic law were practiced at the same time in the region. Therefore, there was no clear-cut distinction between the custom-abiding and Islamic law-abiding tribes.³⁰⁶

Faced with this conundrum, the ambivalent nature of the colonial system erupted to the forefront. For instance, the chief of the Agadir region decided in light of the report to implement Islamic law courts in his region. The French commander in Marrakech upheld this decision under the pretext that "these customary institutions should not hinder the development of our progress and civilization work. A society that we leave

³⁰⁵ Comité d'études berbères de Rabat, "Questionnaire Sur La Société Berbère," *Les Archives Berbères : Publication Du Comité d'études Berbères de Rabat* I, no. 1 (1915): 11–20.

³⁰⁶ Morel Francoz, "Organisation Judiciaire Des Tribus Berbères de l'Antis-Atlas" (January 1939), 37–39, C.H.E.A.M., Archives du Maroc.

systematically fixated in its ancestral customs is no longer susceptible of improvement and progress.”³⁰⁷ This statement illustrates the ambivalence of the French native policy and its inner contradictions. Here, Berber customs were the conservative force hindering progress. Elsewhere, Islamic influences were the source of resistance to change. Notwithstanding this decision, the question of the judiciary reorganization of southern Morocco under colonial authority remained contentious for much of the Protectorate period. Colonial authorities went through a long period of experimentation and groping in the Anti-Atlas region in particular.

This experimentation period was exploited by local chiefs to advance their own agendas and influence the course of action in their own tribes. In fact, the establishment of customary courts deprived the *qaid*s of a valuable source of power over their subjects. The *qaid*s privileged the *shra'a* courts since they were more conducive to their authority and interests. Customary courts covered a large panel of infractions that were usually under *qaidal* jurisdiction in *shra'a* tribes. Therefore, it was of interest for these *qaid*s to obtain the classification of their tribes under Islamic law. *Qaid*s tried to influence the judiciary organization of their tribes in different manners. Powerful *qaid*s such as the Glawi adamantly opposed the implementation of customary courts in their territories. In doing so, they also relied on the *fait accompli* since their territories were already placed under the jurisdiction of *qaidal* and Islamic courts in the years that preceded the implementation of French outposts in southern Morocco.³⁰⁸

In other places, the *qaid*s used more subtle tactics to oppose customary courts. In the Igheem region for example, the local *qaid*s tried to prevent such courts through

³⁰⁷ Francoz, “Organisation Judiciaire,” 40.

³⁰⁸ Guerin, “The Invention of Customary Law in Morocco,” 861.

manipulating the public opinion by appealing to the Islamic sentiment of tribesmen to reject customary courts. They also insinuated that French authorities preferred the Islamic law option in order to convince their constituents to comply with that choice. Finally, they tried to stir agitation in the tribe to demand the establishment of Islamic courts.³⁰⁹ Far from being idle observers of colonial reorganization, the local chiefs tried in many instances to influence the colonial plans for their district, especially in a policy area that was ambiguous and indecisive. The establishment of customary courts in southern Morocco was the result of compromise rather than principle. Nonetheless, customary courts were established at last in the late 1930s in many places throughout southern Morocco.

Beyond the problem of judiciary organization, colonial authorities confined customary law to the bureaucratic framework of customary courts. Under that framework, they embarked on a journey to codify the different customs they encountered and discard the elements they deemed unacceptable.³¹⁰ In that sense, what was to be preserved was not the Berber customs as they were practiced and conceived by Berber people, but a sanitized version adapted to French conception of law and justice. In subordinating customary law to French interpretation, the colonial state detached the former from its community roots. First, the courts themselves were no longer held within the community. Litigants had to travel to the administrative center – the *bureau* – to get justice. Also, the court was under the authority of colonial administrators and *Makhzan* officials. Therefore, customary law became ultimately subordinated to the administrative apparatus. This subordination was accentuated by the fact that the rest of the magistrates

³⁰⁹ Francoz, “Organisation Judiciaire,” 54–55.

³¹⁰ Hoffman, “Berber Law by French Means,” 852.

were appointed – or at least sanctioned – for the most part by colonial officers. Moreover, French authorities did not uphold the rule of rotating membership in the judiciary councils. Hence, they created a rift between the councils and their fellow tribesmen.³¹¹

As a result of the institutionalization of customary law, local communities were no longer responsible for running the latter – at least in its official form, the administrative apparatus and its notables were. Therefore, the local communities' relationship to justice was transformed into a bureaucratized and hierarchical one. In the non-institutionalized form, the community (tribe, fraction, village) generally mobilized its resources to ensure the smooth running of justice.³¹² In that sense, customary judgements derived their authority from the community support to these ruling and their consent to abide by them. With French intervention, the state substituted its resources to those of the community. Hence, the authority of customary courts emanated from the state itself as was the case in European states. In so doing, these courts created a distance between litigants and courts. For instance, litigants resorted to customary courts in many cases because they had to. Land related litigations resolutions were not enforceable unless sanctioned by the customary courts' verdicts. In other cases, litigants resorted to customary courts only when informal arbitration attempts failed.³¹³ Also, customary courts – as were *shra'a* courts for that matter – became fraught with corruption. In fact, the colonial administration had neither the personnel nor the knowledge to tightly control the proceedings of customary courts.³¹⁴ Furthermore, the very nature of customs was prone to changing interpretations. The local notables exploited that fact to extract as

³¹¹ Hoffman, "Berber Law by French Means," 876.

³¹² Montagne, *Les Berbères*, 229.

³¹³ Hoffman, "Berber Law by French Means," 876.

³¹⁴ Guerin, "The Invention of Customary Law in Morocco," 371–72.

much as possible from the litigants. Also, because these notables were no longer rotating, they have less incentives to uphold the law lest they suffer the consequences of potential misconduct in the future.

The French response to the corruption that plagued these new courts was a flight forward towards French-style law and courts. In essence, the French solution to such a problem was two-fold. First, the French intended to gradually transform customary laws into a codified corpus of laws similar to the French Napoleonic code. This form of law, they contended, was much less conducive to personal interpretation and less prone to corruption. This movement led to further paperwork and procedures for the courts thus intensifying the bureaucratic nature of colonial justice. Second, customary courts were to become French courts run by French magistrates. That transformation was to eliminate the root of the problem: the presumably corrupt nature of Moroccan magistrates.³¹⁵ These tendencies culminated in the promulgation of the “Berber *dahir*” in 1930. However, a staunch nationalist opposition erupted against what was perceived as an infringement on the Sultan’s jurisdiction over his Berber subjects. As a consequence, colonial authorities retracted from attaching customary courts to French justice – although customary courts remained under colonial supervision until the late stages of the Protectorate.³¹⁶ Although colonial authorities refrained from fully taking over customary courts, the tension between the currents advocating for direct rule and those advocating for indirect rule permeated colonial administration throughout the Protectorate.

A Reluctant Administration: Direct Rule with Indirect Means

³¹⁵ Guerin, “The Invention of Customary Law in Morocco,” 371.

³¹⁶ Hoffman, “Berber Law by French Means,” 855–56.

The Protectorate regime, as conceived by its builder Marechal Lyautey, was predicated upon the concept of indirect rule. As discussed previously, the first French proconsul was keen on preserving the Moroccan government and its structures. French intervention was to be primarily focused on “supervising” the proceedings of the Moroccan state and guiding reform initiatives. The Marechal was aware nonetheless of the difficulties that such a framework would inevitably entail. In his *coup de barre* directive in 1920, he enumerates the obstacles lying ahead of his design for French action:

First, we have direct administration in our veins ... we do not speak Arabic. We are not patient. And to establish service relationships with the natives, we need from the start and for a long time a lot of patience. It is a thankless task, exhausting because of the difference of mentalities and work habits, because of the difficulty of compelling [the natives] to treat public affairs with precision and speed.³¹⁷

However, patience was not a luxury that either the colonial administration or the local population had. In fact, many contradictory influences and considerations shaped and reshaped the colonial experience in Morocco in general, and the South in particular, during the forty-four years of the Protectorate. From the start, the Protectorate regime created an unprecedented situation in the country that both the colonized and the colonizers had to navigate through and adapt to. Ultimately, the shifting local and international conditions dictated colonial and national perception and dealing with the Protectorate regime. Initially, the Protectorate regime was but a vague formula that granted the protecting nation wide powers to reform the protected government while preserving the latter’s existence and integrity. Through the actions and reactions of both colonial and local political actors, the Protectorate regime was in a constant search for a

³¹⁷ Lyautey, “Politique de Protectorat,” 465–66.

stable and durable strategy. The tensions between military and civilian rule, centralization and decentralization, personal initiative and bureaucratic control, direct rule and indirect rule, French colonial experience and Moroccan government traditions permeated the colonial experience in Morocco. In particular, the indirect rule formula did survive formally throughout the colonial period. Nonetheless, it entailed different meanings and practices through space and time. Far from being a constant and consistent policy, indirect rule became the glaring example of the difficulties and tribulations colonial rule had to go through in Morocco.

The difficulties surrounding the implementation of indirect rule soon arose after the signing of the Treaty of Fez. The general insurrection that erupted in May 1912 and threatened the very existence of the Protectorate put down the French initial plans. In fact, the Protectorate regime planned on restoring *Makhzan* authority after the severe precolonial crisis of the early twentieth century. That restoration was to dispense the French from mobilizing sizeable resources for the Moroccan adventure – especially in a time of heightened tension in continental Europe. However, it soon became obvious that *Makhzan* authority was not able to forestall or ease the general insubordination movement in the country.³¹⁸ Soon enough, colonial authorities concluded that the origins of such failure were the extreme state of decay of *Makhzan* power. The apparent resilience shown during the reign of Mulay Hassan was only a facade that crumbled at the first shock.³¹⁹

The colonial state had therefore to completely take over the system in order to preserve itself in the short term. The defections of Moroccan elites and soldiers to the

³¹⁸ Burke, *The Ethnographic State*, 107.

³¹⁹ Michaux-Bellaire, *Conférences*, 254.

insurrection compelled colonial authorities to rely on its own resources to counter the insurgent movement. The time was no longer for a strategy where French authorities would use *Makhzan* authority from behind the scenes to affirm its interests. With the help of metropolitan reinforcements, the colonial state acted on behalf of rather than with the *Makhzan* in dealing with the insurrection. They took over the mutinous Moroccan army, substituted the non-cooperative Sultan Mulay ‘Abd al-‘Hafiz, and took charge of military and political operations. Furthermore, while fighting the tribal resistance in the Middle Atlas Mountains, colonial officers negotiated surrender terms directly with the tribes in the name of the *Makhzan* but without the *Makhzan* being represented.³²⁰ Patient and didactic reform had to wait for another day.

In southern Morocco, the colonial state faced a different dilemma. The rise of the *Hibist* movement urged colonial authorities to intervene grudgingly in the region. If left unchecked, the nascent threat could have transformed into a coordinated large-scale resistance to French presence – a nightmare to the already stretched French army.³²¹ Although the bold actions of the French army won the day in Marrakech, the threat of El-Hiba and his brothers remained alive until the last pacification operations in 1934. However, the lack of military resources and the logistical constraints made risky a direct intervention of French troops beyond the city. This situation led to the genesis of the *Great Qaids* policy in the South. There, indirect rule was the solution to the urgent problems posed by southern resistance.

French colonial authorities were not necessarily contempt with the *Great Qaids* policy in southern Morocco. From the start, many French officials vehemently opposed

³²⁰ Burke, *The Ethnographic State*, 139.

³²¹ Burke, *Prelude to Protectorate*, 199–207.

this policy. They feared the *Great Qaids* were not reliable allies and that they were using French authorities to further their own agendas. They also were not at ease with the feudal nature of their rule. They feared such rule would alienate southern populations and hinder French peaceful penetration southward.³²² However, the context of the Great War postponed any reconsideration of this policy. The *Great Qaids* proved to be valuable allies in keeping southern resistance at bay at a time where the colonial state was unable to mobilize its own resources to do so.³²³ Furthermore, the *Résidence-Générale* remained confident in its capacity to play the *Great Qaids* rivalries in order to keep the latter within the fold and impose French will.³²⁴ This strategy perdured throughout the Great War and its immediate aftermaths. However, cracks were already showing in the edifice.

By 1924, problems started to pile up in southern territories. In fact, the despotic rule of the *Great Qaids* was the source of more and more problems. In the *pasha* Glawi's domain for example, discontent was brewing everywhere. In the Demnat region, the local population was fleeing *Makhzan* officials' exaction by enrolling in masse in the colonial army. To the southeast, the Dades valley tribes were complaining about *Makhzan* exactions and demanded French protection against the house of Glawa.³²⁵ Dissidence was brewing in the air. A prospect that was not to the liking of the colonial state especially at a time where the Rif resistance was veering out of control. As a consequence, some tribes went as far as demanding that French *hakems* take over to put an end to the *Great Qaids*' actions.³²⁶ The *Great Qaids* formula that served the French well during the war years was

³²² Rivet, *Lyautey et l'institution Du Protectorat*, I:190.

³²³ Hoisington, *Lyautey*, 92–95.

³²⁴ Rivet, *Lyautey et l'institution Du Protectorat*, I:191–92.

³²⁵ Résidence Générale de la République Française au Maroc, "Rapport Mensuel d'ensemble Du Protectorat 1924," sec. May Report.

³²⁶ Rivet, *Lyautey et l'institution Du Protectorat*, II:183.

now becoming cumbersome. Apart from the pasha Glawi who retained his vast domain, the other *Great Qaids*’ fiefs were gradually but surely dismantled.³²⁷ More importantly, French authorities started to assert their administrative presence in the *Great Qaids*’ territories. Direct rule was gradually but surely creeping into southern territories.

The implementation of French supervision did not result at first in a complete takeover of southern administration. In fact, French outposts were gradually implemented in southern Morocco. This careful strategy stemmed from the fact that many parts of the South still resisted colonial penetration. Only through gradual and methodical political and military actions were French outposts able to secure their position within the deep South. French administrative posts creation was slow throughout the 1920s and the early 1930s. The Amizmiz outposts came into being in 1922. The Imi-n-Tanout outpost was created in 1925. The Telouat *bureau* was operational in 1926, The Ida-ou-Tanane post was erected in 1927. The Tatta and Taliouine *bureaux* came into play as late as 1931. However, French I.A. officers were absent from the rest of the territory – a territory that was for the most part in the hands of the resistance. Although the French administration was willing to incorporate southern Morocco into its administrative framework, it did so carefully because of the unstable nature of the political situation there. Any sudden change in the *status quo*, French authorities feared, might cause more trouble than desirable. A colonial officer summarized the slow and patient transitional process this approach entailed:

In the beginning, it is not a question of dictating regulations and creating rights. One should grope, arbitrate demands and propositions, find temporary solutions,

³²⁷ Bidwell, *Morocco under Colonial Rule*, 115–16.

encourage habits. And all that should become slowly normalized, take legal forms, with inscriptions in ‘numbered and signed’ registers.³²⁸

Although patience was not necessary a virtue of colonial administration, a rush and stubborn attachment to the rules of French administrations was not welcome either. Compromise was often a key ingredient of the colonial administrative machine.

As the “pacification” operations were finally coming to grips with armed resistance, the colonial state tried to consolidate its authority in southern territories. However, although French administrators’ authority was real and well established by the end of the process of military conquest, it remained anything but pervasive. For instance, French civilian and military administrations alike suffered from a constant lack in qualified resources to manage the newly pacified territories. As the *tâche d’huile* progressed in southern Morocco, the *Résidence-Générale* needed constantly to reshuffle the administrative districts to incorporate the recently subdued populations. However, the *Résidence* was reluctant to allocate budgetary or administrative resources to these new territories. For instance, the rural areas had little to offer in terms of economic opportunities to the colonizers. Outside of the fertile lands of the Sous valley owned by European colons and the mining licenses granted to French companies, the majority of southern territories were poor in comparison to the burgeoning coastal cities and plains. Tax revenues derived from newly subdued territories were limited and did not warrant the use of extensive administrative resources. In essence, colonial authorities only ventured into the deep South to put an end to the state of insecurity caused by armed resistance.

³²⁸ Pierre Azam cited in Méraud, *Service des A.I.*, 196.

In that context, the main concern of central colonial authorities was to minimize the costs of administering such vast and inhospitable lands. For example, a reorganization project for the creation of a *Territoire* in the Ouarzazate region was requested in 1932 as French military operations were expanding rapidly in southeastern Morocco.³²⁹ However, the funds requested to create the proposed new posts were not readily available. In fact, the *Résidence-Générale* did not commit to such expenses pretexting the important number of outposts creation demands it had to face at the time. Besides, the limited budgets it agreed to allocate to the territory were contingent to the approval of new loans from the metropole.³³⁰ In essence, the colonial army had to expand *Makhzan* authority into the dissident lands of southern Morocco without overexpanding the administrative budget necessary for running these lands.

Human resources were also a scarce commodity in southern Morocco. The lack of personnel and the extension of territories to administer created a constant conundrum for colonial resource planners. For example, the Taliouine *bureau* in 1932/33 was composed of two officers – one of whom was constantly absent – and a clerk. Yet, these personnel had to administer a territory stretching from the High Atlas peaks to the Sahara Desert fringes.³³¹ This situation was not exceptional in the region. At the same period, the commander of the Marrakech region General Catroux complained to the central administration about the lack of personnel in the Ouarzazate *cercle*. Most I.A. outposts were manned by single officers with few resources or substitutes. Moreover, the new

³²⁹ Général de Brigade Catroux, “Réorganisation Territoriale: Création d’un Territoire à Ouarzazat,” February 13, 1932, Fonds de la Direction des Affaires Indigènes (B65), Archives du Maroc.

³³⁰ Directeur des Affaires Indigènes, “Réorganisation Territoriale: Création d’un Territoire à Ouarzazat,” February 13, 1932, Fonds de la Direction des Affaires Indigènes (B65), Archives du Maroc.

³³¹ The Bureau of Taliouine issued the exact same complaint about the lack of resources in its monthly reports in the 1932/1933 period. See for instance Service des Affaires Indigènes, “Rapports Politiques et Economiques Mensuels,” 1932 1933.

outposts created to accompany French troops' progression were staffed by puncturing the already understaffed existing outposts.³³² This situation remained in place well after the “pacification” process ended. In 1937, the Marrakech region's *bureaux* and *cercles* were rarely manned by more than four officers and generally manned by no more than two.³³³ In 1949, the rural districts in the same region comprised nine civilian districts and sixteen I.A. districts controlling seventy tribes and around two million people.³³⁴

The lack of financial and human resources resulted in the creation of overstretched administrative districts. French civilian and military administrators had to control – and effectively administer – large territories spanning over multiple geographical and tribal settings. For example, the civilian district of Imi-n-Tanout in the late 1940s was in charge of more than ninety thousand Moroccans.³³⁵ Around the same time, the Taliouine military district had an indigenous population in excess of sixty thousand souls.³³⁶ In essence, civilian and military administrators did have extensive powers in their respective districts. However, it was difficult to translate their nominal authority into effective rule over indigenous people without the collaboration of their *Makhzan* counterparts. It was also difficult to monitor and control the actions of *Makhzan* officials in a context where direct access to local people was sparse and far between due to the large distances and populations colonial administrators had to deal with.

³³² Général de Brigade Catroux, “Affectations d’Officiers Des Affaires Indigènes,” March 5, 1932, Fonds de la Direction des Affaires Indigènes (B65), Archives du Maroc.

³³³ *Annuaire Des Fonctionnaires et de l’armée : Tout Le Protectorat de La République Française Au Maroc* (Casablanca: Casablanca, 1937), <https://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k6216345f>.

³³⁴ Brémard and Berriane, *L’organisation*, 134–36.

³³⁵ Jacques Berque, “Le Problème Démographique En Pays Berbère: Études Sur Les Tribus de La Région d’Imintanout,” in *Opera Minora*, vol. II (Saint-Denis: Bouchène, 2001), 155–60.

³³⁶ Capitaine De la Porte des Vaux, “Quelques Aspects Demographiques Des Tribus Berberes Du Haut-Sous,” *Population (French Edition)* 2, no. 4 (October 1947): 801.

On the ground, *Makhzan* officials were far more autonomous than what the reality and intent of the “supervision” formula might suggest. Colonial administrators lacked the resources to exert direct control over their district. At the same time, the very nature of the “supervision” system required them to verify and sanction all the decisions and actions of their Moroccan counterparts. In fact, colonial administrators were involved in all aspects of local administration. they controlled prices and markets, oversaw the work of justice, steered the tax collection process, etc. On top of that, they were to coordinate the work of Protectorate technical services and provide timely and accurate reports to their hierarchical structures. In that context, the weight of bureaucracy reduced drastically the amount of time these administrators were able to devote to other administrative tasks.³³⁷ After the adventurous period of French penetration, I.A. officers were now tasked with the monotonous work of bureaucratic administration.

The weight of bureaucracy and lack of resources resulted in a persistent pattern of under administration in southern Morocco. In effect, colonial officers were forced either to clog the administrative machine if they wanted to obtain real oversight over Moroccan officials, or to loosen up their control on local affairs and free the hands of their Moroccan counterparts. On the ground, both dynamics were at play at the same time. The bureaucratic nature and geographical dispersion of colonial administration made it inaccessible in many instances to the local population. In fact, local populations had to travel to the administrative center and comply with practices and procedures that were alien to their culture and experience. As discussed in the previous chapter, colonial authorities had for the most part contact with the local notables and seldom had access to

³³⁷ Méraud, *Service des A.I.*, 207.

laymen concerns and problems.³³⁸ Therefore, French administrators did not necessarily have access to the realities of their local communities nor had local communities access to the administrative framework of their colonial masters. On the other hand, the colonial emphasis on due process and administrative precision contrasted to the more flexible and vague administrative culture in Morocco. This misalignment frustrated the colonial administrative machine and hindered its good working. When the colonial administration was able to avoid the inconvenience of administrative slowness, it was at the expense of administrative precision and due process.³³⁹

The lack of resources also dictated the extent to which the colonial administration was able to remold the Moroccan administration in its image. The patient process of bringing Moroccan administrators to assimilate French methods and rules necessitated mobilizing more resources than the colonial state was willing to in the South. Hence, French administrators had to compromise and adapt their methods to the realities of the field. In so doing, the colonial system was a marriage of convenience between colonial methods and Moroccan traditions. Although the two systems were at first glance in total contradiction, both Moroccan and French administrators had to adapt and tolerate their counterparts' methods. They did so first and foremost because they were compelled to. Therefore, the colonial state ruled southern Morocco not only according to its principle and discourse, but mainly according to the arrangements it found convenient for consolidating and perpetuating its presence. A French administrator summarized that

³³⁸ Captain De La porte Des Vaux raises this problem when he speaks about the Ait Waouzguet tribe: "The sheik needs to respect "public opinion" to avoid attracting too much trouble, and it should be a good enough of a rampart for liberty. Unless – sure of the notables' complicity through associating them to his profits – he does create with regards to *bureau* investigations two public opinions, that of the rich and that of the poor." De La Porte Des Vaux, "Les Aït Waouzguet," sec. VII.B Organisation Politique-Jmaa-.

³³⁹ See for instance the difficulties facing the census work made in the High Sous Vally in De la Porte des Vaux, "Quelques Aspects."

state of fact in the following statement: “The *Great Quids* policy is unfortunately a policy of economy of personnel and means. It is hence a policy where truly efficient supervision is often replaced by methods of flexible diplomacy and concession.”³⁴⁰ All in all, colonial administration in southern Morocco took neither the form of fully direct nor that of indirect rule. After many tribulations and experiments, the colonial administration settled for a hybrid system between the two approaches. On the one hand, *Makhzan* officials and local notables carried the load of the day-to-day management of the local population. On the other hand, colonial administrators carried the load of inserting administrative work into a more formal framework with specific rules and methods. On the one hand, *Makhzan* officials carried over the country’s longstanding administrative tradition of searching for practical arrangements and political maneuvering. On the other hand, the colonial administration introduced the notion of public service and bureaucratic procedure. Although the colonial administration was able to nominally dominate its Moroccan counterpart, it was never able to create a synthesis between the two sides of Moroccan administration.

³⁴⁰ General Fougères, head of the Marrakech region in 1938, cited in Bidwell, *Morocco under Colonial Rule*, 122.

Conclusion: The Colonial Legacy

In precolonial times, Moroccan diplomats referred to their state by the name “Sharifian Empire.” The notion of empire nowadays evokes a large territorial entity controlling diverse ethnic groups and nationalities. Within that framework, it is difficult to imagine how the Moroccan state in the turn of the twentieth century could retain its imperial dignity. In effect, the long agony of independent Morocco in the face of European penetration during the nineteenth century deeply affected the state’s ability to project its power and directly manage its territories. At the turn of the twentieth century, the Sharifian Empire was described as a “vague federation, encompassing a great number of tribes and fractions, often minute. Each of these organisms had its own constitution. Each, above all, was jealous of its own independence, and wished in order to preserve it to maintain a fortuitous state of anarchy.”³⁴¹ But in effect, the Sharifian Empire retained part of its imperial or at least regal attributes. If we define an empire as a political system based on a diversified set of relations between the center and the periphery, the *Makhzan* apparatus was indeed able to maintain a lively and operating network with the different constituents of the Moroccan political landscape.³⁴² It is true that the relationship between the center and the periphery became extremely loose at the turn of the century. The state of *es-Siba* had engulfed much of the country to the point of threatening the capital Fez itself. Nevertheless, the political ties between the periphery and the center were not

³⁴¹ Eugène Aubin, *Le Maroc d'aujourd'hui* (Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1904), 238.

³⁴² See empire definition in O'Neill, D. I. "empire." Encyclopedia Britannica, October 21, 2021. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/empire-political-science>.

completely severed during the period. The political and spiritual leadership of the Moroccan Sultan was accepted through much of the Moroccan territory.

The *Makhzan* tradition was based on a constant adaption to and renegotiation of the power equilibrium between power centers that emerged within the national space. By making sure that power remained disseminated among different antagonistic actors, it maintained its central position as the most prestigious – if not the most powerful – of these actors. In that sense, the Moroccan state was a decentralized state where local entities – local potentates, tribes, religious orders – retained a large autonomy in terms of organization and practices. However, these entities were bound together in a constantly shifting political game where the *Makhzan* played an important but not necessarily omnipotent role. In southern Morocco in particular, the *Makhzan* was able to maintain itself through a combination of military, diplomatic and political means. Military because the *Makhzan* used its own forces and the forces of its representatives to fight dissident tribes. Diplomatic because it was eager to contend and deal with autonomous centers of power provided that these centers accept its political and spiritual primacy. Political because it played these autonomous centers against each other by privileging and coopting certain groups against the others. Political also because it retained its capacity to arbitrate between the ever-fighting actors of the Moroccan political field. These ever-shifting and inconsistent proceedings may seem corrupt and arbitrary to the current observer. They nonetheless maintained the political equilibrium within the country. As precarious and inefficient this equilibrium might have been, it nevertheless remained a sustainable one.

With the establishment of the French Protectorate, this equilibrium ceased to operate. The already destabilized Moroccan state crumbled in the early months of the Protectorate. The looming “revolution” against French intervention urged the colonial authorities to invest the political field and reinvent the political game in Morocco. Therefore, the colonial state embarked on a journey to redefine the Moroccan state through three main axes: pacification, the preservation of Moroccan traditions, and economic development. To be sure, none of these axes was implemented in a consistent and linear way throughout the colonial period. However, the way they each were implemented deeply reshaped Moroccan society and government. Far from being a mere parenthesis in Moroccan state’s history, the colonial period was a period of deep and lasting political and social change. In southern Morocco in particular, the colonial presence profoundly upended southern society’s representation in and interaction with state administration. More importantly, the changes introduced by the colonial experience conditioned the transition towards the Moroccan independent state.

First, the precolonial centers of power in southern Morocco were severely weakened by the “pacification” process. As the colonial army and its supplementary Moroccan contingents subdued armed resistance in the South, the balance of power undeniably shifted towards the colonial state and its Moroccan counterpart – the *Makhzan*. To be sure, southern “pacification” came also through political deals with the *Great Qaids* and political negotiations with resisting tribes or groups. However, these political arrangements were nothing like their precolonial analogs. In fact, they consecrated the domination of the colonial state and the *Makhzan* over all other centers of political power. In that context, the intermediary corps that mediated the individual’s

relationship to the state – and to other power centers – lost much of their political salience. The colonial state transformed the fragmented system of Moroccan politics into a vertical system where the Moroccan state – with its two branches, the colonial and the native – dominated the political field.

The colonial state did not create alternative corps to mediate the individual relationship to the state. The “pacification” campaign lingered in southern Morocco due to the international context of World War I and the stiff and stubborn resistance of southern tribes. Even after the end of the “pacification” process, the political and military context remained tense in southern Morocco throughout the Second World War and the postwar era. Therefore, the colonial state was for the most part subordinated to military considerations in southern Morocco. Keeping dissidence at bay and maintaining order remained the primary concerns of colonial administrators in the region. A form of authoritative government was put in place for fear that the local population would perceive any kind of liberalism as a sign of weakness.³⁴³ Southern Morocco remained predominantly under military rule throughout the colonial period, a situation that did not privilege the emergence of representative bodies or civil society movements able to counterbalance the power of the colonial state.

More importantly, the *Makhzan* apparatus itself – or more precisely *Makhzan* officials, since the *Makhzan* was not a cohesive and homogenous administrative corps – profited from the situation created by colonial domination. In fact, the colonial emphasis on preserving *Makhzan* institutions paradoxically reshaped its inner proceedings but maintained its distinctive rationality. In fact, the *Makhzan* rationality at the local level

³⁴³ Brémard and Berriane, *L'organisation*, 154.

relied on maintaining a delicate equilibrium between the requirements of the central state and the governed groups' capacity to harm. Being liberated from the unpredictable whims of the central state and the necessity of coping with potential dissidence within their administered groups, local *Makhzan* officials became more and more assertive and predatory in their relationship to their subjects. In theory, the disciplined and public-service oriented colonial administrators were supposed under the supervision system to tame *Makhzan* officials' predatory tendencies and converge the *Makhzan* apparatus towards a colonial style administration. However, these colonial administrators often lacked the resources – and perhaps the will and patience – to accomplish such a convergence. Thus, the *Makhzan* patrimonial nature was accentuated as both French and Moroccan administrations relied on local notables to create an unexpensive and loyal class of servants at the local level.

The local population did not remain mere objects of the unfolding colonial policies in southern Morocco. First, they tried to maintain their ancestral institutions whenever they could in informal ways – assuming that these institutions were ever formalized. For instance, the *jema'a* remained active at the village level and handled problems related to everyday life: irrigation works, factional disputes, etc. Besides, local solidarity networks remained in place throughout the colonial period. Local communities often rejected any *amghar* or *sheikh* from the outside. Moreover, local communities continued to use their customs in addressing litigation whenever possible. At the same time, they started to use the colonial administrative framework to counter the predation of rival groups, advance their own agendas or address issues they could no longer address outside of the colonial framework. In effect, the colonial experience led to the formation

of two spheres of formal and informal local affairs' management. The local population was learning how and when to use each framework in dealing with their own affairs.

The question then remains: how did such changes condition the formation of the Moroccan post-independence administration?

In effect, the post-independence administration constituted at the same time a continuation of the late administrative reforms of the colonial state and a rupture with the colonial administrative framework. First, the post-independence administration used the colonial administrative infrastructure to support the transition process. This infrastructure in turn conditioned the possible post-independence administrative divisions and perpetuated the same outstretched districts created by the colonial state. Moreover, the newly appointed administrators – mainly from the ranks of the Nationalist party and the Liberation Army – perpetuated the symbols of their colonial predecessors. They governed from the same *bureau*, used the same irregular troops, drove the same jeeps.³⁴⁴ Finally, the Moroccan democratic experience initially built upon the communal councils' reforms introduced by the colonial state in 1951. Therefore, the first communal elections in Moroccan history were held in 1960 before a constitution or an elected legislative body was voted.³⁴⁵

Notwithstanding these elements of continuity, Moroccan independence constituted a rupture with colonial administrative patterns. First, the distinction between the colonial and the native administration was abolished. There remained only one Moroccan administration with one hierarchical line and one rationality. This abolition

³⁴⁴ Leveau, *Le fellah*, 21–22.

³⁴⁵ Paul Chambergeat, "Les élections communales marocaines du 29 mai 1960," *Revue française de science politique* 11, no. 1 (1961): 89–117.

suppressed the dual and conflictual nature of Moroccan administration. However, it failed to suppress the dual nature of Moroccan administrative references. Since the convergence between *Makhzan* and French administrative rationalities was not fully completed in rural southern Morocco, both rationalities reincarnated into the nascent Moroccan administration. The total revamping of administrative personnel in the region did not preclude this transition. For instance, colonial administrators were replaced by Moroccans short after the independence although the Moroccan auxiliary troops and staff of French outposts remained in place. At the same time, the bulk of the region's *qaid*s and their subordinates were removed – sometimes in violent circumstances – because of their collusion with colonial authorities.³⁴⁶ Therefore, the officials and notables of the colonial period were completely absent – at least initially – from the post-independence landscape.

Perhaps the biggest legacy of the colonial experience in southern Morocco remains the dominance of the central state in the political field. In fact, the post-independence state took over the colonial state's position as the dominant factor in local politics. The post-independence administration inherited the vertical and authoritative nature of its colonial predecessor. The democratic experience in Morocco failed initially to counterbalance the power of the central state in rural southern Morocco. It is somehow odd to note that the southern population that was praised for its “democratic” institutions failed to fully embrace the democratic experience of post-independence Morocco. The origins of such a failure may be traced back to the changes the colonial experience brought to these institutions. A story from the *Skoura* district in southeastern Morocco

³⁴⁶ Ernest Gellner, “Independence in the Central High Atlas,” *The Middle East Journal* 11, no. 3 (1957): 241–42.

gives a good example of these changes. In 1932, the establishment of the *Skoura bureau* prompted a reshuffling of local chiefs – *amghars* – to reduce the number of Moroccan officials. The process of reshuffling goes as follows: the *qaid* of the region designated three candidates among the fraction's notables for each vacant position. Then, a popular assembly was to elect one of the proposed candidates to serve as its *amghar*. The candidates then needed French approval to be confirmed in their position. However, in the *Ahl Skoura* tribe, the popular vote evicted the candidates proposed by the *qaid*. Despite this popular disavowal, the candidates clung to their claim to the title. They tried to acquire popular assent through acts of public generosity. This strategy was finally sufficient to get them elected as some were able to pass the popular vote test and were confirmed in their position.³⁴⁷

The electoral system in post-independence southern Morocco resembled in many aspects the practice described above. After an initial period of disgrace, the local notables invested the political arena with the backing of the monarchy.³⁴⁸ In essence, these notables sought administrative accreditation and cooptation through political parties close to the state apparatus or as independent candidates. Therefore, the Moroccan administration – through the Ministry of Interior – played an active role in the political arena as did its colonial predecessor. Whether the similarities between the two processes stem from a direct filiation or are a result of coincidence remains to be proven. However, the presence of such proceedings in colonial times hints to a predisposition within local communities to accept such behaviors.


³⁴⁷ See for instance the June, July and August reports for the « Bureau de Skoura » in Service des Affaires Indigènes, “Rapports Politiques et Economiques Mensuels,” 1932 1933.

³⁴⁸ Leveau, *Le fellah*, 24–25.

To conclude, the colonial experience modified the administrative set-up in southern Morocco and created the conditions for the emergence of the post-independence administrative bureaucracy. However, the French double mandate to reform and preserve created the conditions for a distinctive Moroccan administrative set-up. This set-up might be characterized by the cohabitation of a vertical and hierarchized framework and a patrimonial network of political actors. It is also characterized by the cohabitation of a formal bureaucracy with its rules and procedures and informal local and national networks to regulate the provision of public service. In essence, the modern Moroccan administration derived many of its current attributes from the initial encounter between the Moroccan *Makhzan* and the French colonial administrative traditions. Although the post-independence administration differs in many respects from its colonial predecessor, it owes much of its prowess and limitations to that initial encounter.

Appendix 1.

Map of Tribes and Outposts




A : Ait 'Atta	G : Aït Waouzguït	M : Ida ou Zekri
B : Oultana	H : Goundafa	N : Ida ou Kensous
C : Ftwaka	I : Guedmiwa	O : Ida ou Nadif
D : Ghoujdama	J : Seksawa	P : Ouled Jellal
E : Glawa	K : Mtugga	Q : Ida ou Blal
F : Ahl Skoura	L : Ida ou Zeddout	

List of tribes and Outposts discussed in the thesis. Derived from Rabat : Service géographique du Maroc, Carte Des Tribus. 1935. <https://1886.u-bordeaux-montaigne.fr/s/1886/item/203733#?c=&m=&s=&cv=&xywh=-288%2C-701%2C9774%2C8753> Base map extracted from ArcGIS.

Appendix 2a.


The Ait 'Atta Tribal Structure



Example of the Ait Kabbash taqbilt, extracted from Dunn, "Berber Imperialism: The Ait Atta Expansion in Southeast Morocco," 87.

Appendix 2b.

The Ghoujdama Tribal Structure



Example of the Ait Saâdelli khums, extracted from Amahan, Mutations sociales dans le Haut Atlas, 49-57.

Appendix 3.

French Troops in Morocco, 1911-1934

Year	Total	Officers	Europeans	North Africans	Africans
1911	27 652	922			
1912	54 943	1 819			
1914	66 626	2 004	28 752	35 510	
1916	86 598	2 016	49 514	35 068	
1918	88 219	2 474	45 972	39 873	
1919	102 289	2 517	38 899	60 873	
1920	90 449	2 565	22 137	39 164	10 257
1922	88 103	2 658	31 808	43 256	10 381
1924	62 107	2 195	26 386	28 966	4 470
1927	97 904	3 063	35 831	59 010	
1928	86 017	2 877	35 831	49 711	
1930	75 326	2 650	28 083	44 593	
1932	76 147	2 709	26 885	46 553	

1934	69 294	2 539	23 725	43 030
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French troops in Morocco between 1911 and 1934. Extracted from Gershovich, French Military Rule in Morocco, 80.

Appendix 4.

Phases of Military Conquest in Morocco



Stages of colonial pacification in Morocco, 1907–1934, derived from Wyrzten, Making Morocco, 47.

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