



Points of No Return: The Eisenhower-Kennedy Transition and US-Japan Relations

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Points of No Return: The Eisenhower-Kennedy Transition and US-Japan Relations

Brandon McGowan

A Thesis in the Field of History
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Abstract

There is a considerable amount of focus among historians on both Dwight D. Eisenhower's and John F. Kennedy's approaches to foreign policy, including internal developments within the United States and Japan during the Cold War. However, I have noticed a lack of attention regarding the link between these important areas of historical focus, which in my view is crucial to a more complete understanding of the American international security posture at the height of the Cold War. Japan is typically underrepresented in the assessment of historians when considering the Cold War balance of power dynamic.

This thesis posits that the presidential transition from Eisenhower to Kennedy was the cornerstone of the special relationship between the US and Japan. It transformed perceptions of Japan as a geopolitical outlier to those of a critical bulwark against communist expansionism alongside the aegis of American strategy.

More broadly, the changing nature of the US-Japan relationship during the Eisenhower-Kennedy transition proves that the theory of containment evolved beyond the view of an overarching East-West divide to become more pragmatic, thus increasingly valuing the strategic importance of American influence in the East. Japan, dangerously close to the communist strongholds of China and the Soviet Union, survived its most violent political upheaval in a generation as a consequence of this evolution toward pragmatism.

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my mother, whose steadfast love and support has seen me confidently through my entire education to the completion of a graduate degree in the field to which all my passion and concentration belong. Nothing I have accomplished has been possible without her.

Acknowledgments

Over the course of many months and hundreds of pages of historical research, I have relied upon the influence of those great educators who have prepared me for the momentous task of writing this thesis. I firstly acknowledge the guidance and expertise of my thesis director, Dr. Erez Manela, with many thanks for taking on this important role.

I additionally acknowledge Dr. Jeffrey Fortney of Florida Gulf Coast University for empowering me to look beyond the popular history and ask the hard questions. I am indebted to Dr. Fortney for his commitment to my success during my undergraduate studies and beyond.

Finally, I acknowledge the profound impact of my mentor Michael Taylor, who in wit and wisdom challenged me to engage with opposing perspectives and find purpose in every stroke against the current. I hope, at least in some small way, that this thesis serves to verify my reciprocity for his ever-pertinent lessons.

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Chapter I.

The Mutuality of Security

As the first act of the global Cold War waned, the seeds of Japan's emergence as a critical geostrategic partner of the United States of America were planted in quiet, almost clandestine diplomacy. A presidential administration mired in accusations of malfeasance and mismanagement in foreign policy was making way for another by the clear choice of the American public, whose taste for communism and its associative ideologies had been soured at an almost exponential rate. The anointed successors, eyeing their newfound executive authority through the frigid December air, had over a month until, before the marble façade of the Capitol, General Dwight D. Eisenhower would take the oath of office as the 34th President of the United States.

Two miles north of the newly-renovated White House, the tenets of Japanese self-determination in American-led geostrategy for the next half-century would be laid out – not at the behest of the cabinet of incumbent president Harry S. Truman, but on the direction of Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, and in the presence of incoming State Secretary John Foster Dulles. This was December 4, 1952, and Dulles was just months removed from his role in effecting the US-Japan Security Treaty, which laid the groundwork for Japan as a bulwark against Soviet communism in the East under the aegis of the emergent American superpower.

Though pivotal in Japan's postwar and post-occupation trajectory from the ashes of nuclear fire, the Security Treaty served as a direct cause of riots which shook the grounds of the Imperial Palace in Tokyo and held grave implications for Japan's political

development. The treaty's maintenance of American military bases in the country, signaling to many Japanese citizens a continuation of the occupational authority of General Douglas MacArthur, had been a catalyst that brought Japan's military-industrial future into light. Would a nation so deeply impacted by military fanaticism since its last attempt at governmental reform pursue rearmament along American demands and American guidelines? This question hung in the air, only a few degrees above freezing, as Dulles stood ready to greet Yoshida's liaison at the Shoreham Hotel.

The tall, astute Jirō Shirasu, a Cambridge graduate fluent in English and well-acquainted with the politics of his native country's occupation, arrived in Washington keenly aware of Western impositions over the past seven years. Under MacArthur's tenure as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) during the occupation, the development and ratification of Japan's postwar constitution invoked an outright "renunciation of war."¹ This heading, in the document's blatant rejection of the means by which the atomic age had been inaugurated, was entirely pursuant to President Truman's public commitment in the immediate aftermath of Hiroshima's destruction on August 6, 1945 to "completely destroy Japan's power to make war."² To this end, Article 9 of the constitution explicitly "renounce[d] war as a sovereign right of the nation" in total forfeiture of the "right of belligerency of the state," thus rendering rearmament a virtual impossibility in Shirasu's assessment.³

¹ Prime Minister's Office of Japan, "The Constitution of Japan," May 3, 1947, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html.

² Harry S. Truman, "Statement by the President Announcing the Use of the A-Bomb at Hiroshima," transcript of speech delivered on August 6, 1945, <https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/august-6-1945-statement-president-announcing-use-bomb>.

³ Prime Minister's Office of Japan, "The Constitution of Japan."

According to a memorandum from Dulles, Shirasu expressed on this cold Washington morning that “the Prime Minister (Yoshida) was particularly concerned over the pressures to which the Japanese Government was being subjected in relation to rearmament” on the grounds that “the Japanese people had been educated... to the belief that it was wrong to have a military establishment” under the conditions set forth in Article 9.⁴ As such, the conditionality in the Security Treaty that “the right... to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about Japan” would be granted by the Japanese government exclusively to their American counterparts demonstrated a new form of military establishment.⁵ This agreement, however, was inherently contingent upon two important pillars of the dynamic relationship between the US and an independent post-occupation Japan: that “Japan... [would] increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression,” and that “the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East” was the sole purpose for the aforementioned disposal of US military assets, including the operation of military bases.⁶

Keeping these pillars in mind, I want to consider at this juncture the assessment of historian Nick Kapur that the Security Treaty’s ratification sparked a movement of Japanese citizens to “disengage from the United States and chart a more independent course on the international stage amid rising Cold War tensions” over the next eight

⁴ John Foster Dulles, *Memorandum of Conversation (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2, No. 619, 1952)*.

⁵ US Government Printing Office, “Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan,” September 8, 1951, https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/japan001.asp#1.

⁶ US Government Printing Office, “Security Treaty Between the United States and Japan.”

years.⁷ Certainly Yoshida's concerns about rearmament, portrayed by Shirasu in his role as a government insider and figure in the inception of the Security Treaty, took into consideration the very tangible prospect of social and political upheaval. Per Dulles, Shirasu even communicated that Yoshida had been extraordinarily careful to "avoid a political upheaval which might put the Socialists in power" in Japan, thus geostrategically alienating the US from Japan under the pillars of the Security Treaty.⁸

Kapur's assessment, then, fundamentally accepts the political reality of the Security Treaty. Nonetheless, Kapur concludes that the resulting diplomacy, through a "significant readjustment" in the US-Japan dialogue reaching forward into the presidential administration of John F. Kennedy, shows that "Japan strongly supported U.S. Cold War foreign policy throughout the world in exchange for protection of its economic prerogatives in U.S. markets."⁹ I will refer back to this conclusion in subsequent chapters, proving the validity of the 'significant readjustment' while disproving the economic impetus. I hold that the quiet diplomacy behind the postwar settlements, behind SCAP, and behind the occupation is best expressed in terms of geostrategy and international security, whether considering Dulles' and Shirasu's conversation at the Shoreham Hotel during the Truman-Eisenhower transition or the interdepartmental communications which long predated Dulles' memorandum.

In June of 1952, almost six months prior to Dulles' meeting with Shirasu and in the direct aftermath of the occupation, Truman directed the preparation of a National Security Council (NSC) policy paper regarding Japan and the situation in the Far East.

⁷ Nick Kapur, "Mending the 'Broken Dialogue': U.S.-Japan Alliance Diplomacy in the Aftermath of the 1960 Security Treaty Crisis," *Diplomatic History* 41, no. 3 (2017), 489.

⁸ John Foster Dulles, *Memorandum of Conversation*.

⁹ Kapur, "Mending the 'Broken Dialogue,'" 491.

During the paper's revisions, the Department of Defense highlighted in its first point that "the security of Japan is of such importance to the United States position in the Pacific area that the United States would not only fight to prevent hostile forces from gaining control of any part of the territory of Japan but also 'would take necessary steps to reduce Communist influence and infiltration in Japan's domestic affairs.'"¹⁰ Predicated upon the conditions of the Security Treaty, Defense remained highly committed to "the willingness of Japan to contribute effectively to United States security objectives in the Far East," going so far as to declare that "[i]t is impossible to envisage the creation of any effective security arrangement in the Pacific without United States participation."¹¹

To this end, Dulles remarked to Shirasu that the Japanese people "would have to bear some responsibility and fair share of the common burden of defense of the free world," though he remained cautious of providing an "estimate of the imminence of peril or the urgency of Japanese rearmament" due to the ongoing nature of the transition of power from Truman to Eisenhower.¹² Documents related to the Security Treaty's revision reveal that, by 1955, Dulles maintained that Japan had not yet "developed the capacity to defend itself" and believed that "anti-Communist elements" within Japan were not yet "strong enough to ensure passage of their programs and an attitude of cooperation with the United States."¹³

¹⁰ Kenneth T. Young, *Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison) (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2, No. 571, 1952).*

¹¹ Kenneth T. Young, *Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison).*

¹² John Foster Dulles, *Memorandum of Conversation.*

¹³ Walter S. Robinson, *Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to Secretary of State Dulles (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII, No. 5, 1958).*

Dulles' perspective on Japan throughout the 1950s, in many ways, echoed that of Eisenhower in the grand scheme of the 'falling domino principle' vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Kapur describes Eisenhower as a "consistent" supporter of "Japanese interests" throughout his presidential tenure, owing to a hardline belief that a potential inundation of Japan by communist elements would result in an escalation of conflict between the US and the Sino-Soviet bloc.¹⁴ Finding common ground with later Japanese Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi that "problems in Asia, for example Communist China, would remain" despite efforts to create "an atmosphere conducive to the relaxation of world tensions" from Europe outward, Eisenhower viewed the postwar establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) as the fall of a massive domino in the Pacific region.¹⁵

Concomitantly, the very existence of the PRC, as Eisenhower saw it, was a repudiation of the hard-fought preservation of democratic values exemplified during his wartime role as Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces in Europe. The PRC had symbolized a reinforcement of Soviet communism insofar as the establishment of satellite states had already demonstrated Soviet premier Joseph Stalin's goals for hegemonic consolidation in Europe. Japan, both geographically and politically, was effectively deadlocked.

Dulles, critical as to the extent of Japan's democratic maturity post-occupation, exercised the authority of his office to pinpoint Japan's strategic shortcomings in the emerging Cold War dynamic. This method was derived from both Eisenhower's particular view of the domino theory and the provisions of the Security Treaty itself.

¹⁴ Kapur, "Mending the 'Broken Dialogue,'" 491.

¹⁵ J. Graham Parsons, *Memorandum of Conversation (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII, No. 135, 1960)*.

Dulles embraced a “dismissive attitude” and an “occupation mindset” to spur Japan’s defensive capabilities both internally and externally.¹⁶ Internally, a meteoric rise in labor union membership and the political agitation of elements diametrically opposed to the Yoshida cabinet kept the Japanese government in a state of consternation. Externally, as previously mentioned, the Sino-Soviet bloc threatened to embolden these elements under the banner of international communism and effectively tear apart the very fabric of the Eisenhower administration’s foreign policy.

With these challenges to international security, Dulles’ demeanor as State Secretary thoroughly accepted the necessity of Japan as an American protectorate, though in anticipation that the nation would eventually overcome communist agitation and bolster the security prerogatives of the US. What economic provisions would follow were therefore, for Dulles as well as Eisenhower, contingent upon the need for Japan’s commitment to, and participation in, active strategy to counteract the Sino-Soviet bloc.

Consider the previously cited memoranda, particularly in relation to the NSC policy paper under Truman’s orders, wherein Japan was viewed as a requisite bulwark against communist expansionism in the Pacific. In contrast with the noninterference objectives of the State Department, the Defense Department advocated for “United States intervention” in Japan, which Dulles would come to adapt following Eisenhower’s 1953 inauguration.¹⁷ The result was a shift in trajectory for the State Department, which under Dulles more closely reflected the views expressed to Jirō Shirasu at the Shoreham Hotel in the month prior to the inauguration. The presidential transition effectively afforded

¹⁶ Kapur, “Mending the ‘Broken Dialogue,’” 492.

¹⁷ Kenneth T. Young, *Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison)*.

Dulles the agency to push for Japanese rearmament as well as the ambiguity of the incoming administration's foreign policy, thus allowing for the US-Japan relationship to conform to sudden changes in geostrategy. A far cry from economic planning, Dulles sought expedient means to shape the nature of American geostrategy in the Pacific by way of consistent diplomacy as State Secretary and, equally as important, the provisions of the Security Treaty.

As in 1960, which was the fulcrum for US-Japan relations, 1952 presented multiple fronts for the concern of the respective nations' governments. These were an emboldening of the Sino-Soviet bloc; the permutation of left-wing political elements in Japan favoring acquiescence to the Soviets and, in other circles, neutrality in global affairs; agitation on the part of these elements against the Japanese government; the inherent value of Japan as a strategic US ally from the perspective of the federal government; and a presidential election and subsequent transition of power in the US.

To be clear, the Bloody May Day riots which came on the heels of the occupation's end in 1952 exemplified each of these concerns save for the presidential election, which found its foreign policy debacles dominated in public opinion by the ongoing conflict in Korea. In a contemporaneous assessment, Japanese-American scholar John M. Maki noted that demonstrations of "terroristic subversive activity," as defined by Japanese law in the wake of the occupation, were based upon distinctly "politically motivated" objectives.¹⁸ Maki continued, opining that the legal language connecting such demonstrations with political motivation had been "so broad that there [was] real danger

¹⁸ John M. Maki, "Japan's Subversive Activities Prevention Law," *The Western Political Quarterly* 6, no. 3 (1953), 493.

of possible abuse in interpretation; yet these become relevant only in connection with a specific crime of violence or act of terrorism” such as the riots themselves.¹⁹

Consequently, the government of Shigeru Yoshida utilized broad definitions of politically-motivated terrorism to halt the tide of communist agitation that concerned the stability of US-Japan relations. Further, this struggle led Shirasu to the conclusion that rearmament would be virtually impossible for Japan to embrace, given the political plurality ensured during the nation’s occupation and postwar reconstruction under SCAP. As such, at the close of 1952 and in the midst of the first point of no return for US-Japan relations, Dulles’ reaction to Shirasu’s statements had been an indication that the onset of a new global power dynamic necessitated a shift in the postwar perspective imposed upon Japan. Dulles, a cold warrior with intricate ties to the development of the Security Treaty and a point man for both Truman and Eisenhower vis-à-vis Japan, embodied in his response to Shirasu, and in later remarks throughout the 1950s, a clear interventional policy prerogative.

Disruptions at the Historical Crossroads

John Foster Dulles had carefully calculated Japanese self-determination, though incremental and dependent upon the capacity of the Eisenhower administration to further the tide of reform from the preceding occupation. Whereas constitutional revision had established the renunciation of Japan’s war powers, talk of the Security Treaty’s revision through the latter half of the 1950s reflected doubts which pointed to a potential renunciation of mutual security altogether.

¹⁹ Maki, “Japan’s Subversive Activities Prevention Law,” 493.

In 1957, with the ascendance of Nobusuke Kishi to the helm of prime minister, the political consolidation of pro-US, and by extension, pro-Security Treaty factions into the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was cemented. This provided wind for the sails of Dulles' design, both as a prospect against further domestic left-wing agitation in Japan and a stepping stone toward meaningful mutual security. In the same year, the establishment of a Japanese-American Committee on Security, according to Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter S. Robertson, served the purpose of "provid[ing] a greater degree of mutuality in connection with the Security Treaty," while Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II (General MacArthur's nephew) and Dulles himself ascertained the potential benefits of a revised Security Treaty.²⁰

Notably, through this process, President Eisenhower came to the understanding that, in the words of Dulles' successor Christian A. Herter, "Kishi ha[d] identified himself so much with this Treaty" that "the ambitious people in his own party" felt that the resulting political pressure was "making Kishi's life the most miserable."²¹ Nonetheless, the LDP sought to consolidate its political influence, both domestically and alongside the Eisenhower administration, through staunch support for the Security Treaty. In 1958, Defense Department officials concurred with Ambassador MacArthur that "by entering the proposed mutual security treaty [the US] would be putting... security relations with Japan on the same basis as that of all... other allies," including the

²⁰ Walter S. Robinson, *Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to Secretary of State Dulles*.

²¹ Christian A. Herter, *Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with the President* (Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Herter Papers, Box 10, Presidential Telephone Calls 1-6/60 (1), June 7, 1960).

basis of nuclear competition with the Soviet Union.²² Simultaneously, according to scholar Fuji Kamiya, the LDP's political goals under Kishi were aimed at "preserv[ing] an intimate relationship with the U.S. as the least costly and most effective means to insure Japan's national security and economic interests" in its "unyielding commitment" toward the Security Treaty and ultimate "pragmatic orientation."²³

To clarify, Kamiya is writing in this instance from the historical perspective of Japan in the early 1970s, during which the prior anti-communist crusade alongside the US had been put into question by the presidential administration of Richard Nixon in exacerbating the Sino-Soviet split via diplomacy with the PRC. Interestingly, Kamiya's analysis of the LDP's support for the Security Treaty through 1960 points to the confidence of MacArthur and Defense Department officials in relation to rearmament – a concept originally hesitantly approached by Jirō Shirasu in conversation with Dulles.

Of course, in light of the geopolitical situation arising from the Korean War and on the assumption that "the United States enjoyed clear, but qualified nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union," the nuclear addendum to rearmament was of critical concern to the Eisenhower administration.²⁴ MacArthur had been keen to relay to State and Defense Department officials that "the Japanese Foreign Office had a draft treaty calling for consultation and agreement on the introduction of nuclears," thus using nuclear cooperation as a further front to hasten mutual security between the US and Japan.²⁵

Eisenhower, for his part, was cognizant, by way of the rigid military structure of his

²² Department of State, *Memorandum of Conversation (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII, No. 24, 1958)*.

²³ Fuji Kamiya, "Japanese-U.S. Relations and the Security Treaty: A Japanese Perspective," *Asian Survey* 12, No. 9 (1972), 721.

²⁴ Roger Dingman, "Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War," *International Security* 13, No. 3 (1988), 51.

²⁵ Department of State, *Memorandum of Conversation*.

government, of the reality that nuclear weapons “still [remained] in Japan a matter of the utmost emotional intensity” from the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.²⁶

Though a “highly desirable military objective toward which to work,” noted the Joint Chiefs, the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan on the basis of intergovernmental consultation, despite MacArthur’s optimism, was considered a high risk by 1958.²⁷ Because the consensus reflected “maintain[ing] the status quo with respect to weapons in Japan,” Eisenhower would ultimately pursue mutual security by way of reasonably revising the Security Treaty.²⁸ The path forward, escalated by the upcoming expiration of Eisenhower’s second term in office and the continued political upheaval in Japan, established the vital importance of the eventual 1960-1961 presidential transition in American foreign policy.

With all the preceding elements of foreign policy and diplomacy geared so adamantly toward mutual security with Japan in the late 1950s, it is perhaps difficult to quantify, at the outset, the scope of discord and friction which threatened to wage chaos upon the US-Japan relationship headlong into the pivotal year of 1960. The domino theory at this point, thoroughly represented by Eisenhower and Dulles, was now the cornerstone of American foreign policy. Any perceivable threat to what would be in later decades termed the ‘Soviet-American condominium’ was summarily combatted, even to the extent of diplomatic strains, such as in the case of the 1956 Suez Crisis. In this instance, British collusion with French and Israeli counterparts to restore control over the Suez Canal from Egypt, where Soviet inroads had been drawn, challenged the

²⁶ H.L. Hillyard, *Report Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII, No. 25, 1958)*.

²⁷ H.L. Hillyard, *Report Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff*.

²⁸ H.L. Hillyard, *Report Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff*.

geopolitical balance between East and West upon which Eisenhower's theory was built. The resulting withdrawal from Egypt, which has been ascribed to the operational end of British imperialism, had irrevocable consequences on global perspectives about American and Soviet hegemony, which now extended beyond what had been termed their respective 'first' and 'second' worlds.

Importantly, this is where Japan finds itself in the historical crossroads of the Cold War. The inherent assumption at this crossroads, if we adhere to the position of Nick Kapur, is that American hegemony, in juxtaposition with that of the Soviets, required vast economic output for sustenance. In 1960, Kapur writes, "Japanese leaders... feared that hard feelings... would negatively impact Japan's economic interests in the United States, which... was Japan's single largest trading partner by a large margin."²⁹ Indeed, the economic impact of mutual security, not least including the aforementioned 'introduction of nuclears' as a provision of a revised Security Treaty, spelled out in large part the political trajectory of the LDP under Kishi. Additionally, it is not unreasonable to gauge the US' economic interest in promoting geopolitical stability, considering the Truman Doctrine's prior implementation in Europe with the stimulus of the postwar Marshall Plan. This provided billions of dollars in "financial and economic assistance" to European nations, noted purposefully by Truman as having existed under threat of "totalitarian regimes," and became critical in issues of hegemonic consolidation through the early Cold War.³⁰

²⁹ Nick Kapur, "Mending the 'Broken Dialogue,'" 495.

³⁰ Harry S. Truman, "Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey," transcript of speech delivered at Washington, DC, March 12, 1947. <https://voicesofdemocracy.umd.edu/truman-special-message-speech-text/>.

It follows, then, that Kapur's assumptions about the significance of the economic factor, particularly between the US and Japan, are founded upon sound interpretations of foreign policy. Nonetheless, the necessity of mutual security with Japan, as interpreted by Dulles, MacArthur, and ultimately, Eisenhower, shows time and again that the economic success of post-occupation Japan had been an afterthought in comparison to concerns of hegemony and international security. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had recognized "virtually no prospect of a solution which will satisfy both sides" despite the overwhelming economic benefits of rearmament, even to a nuclear extent.³¹ MacArthur, acknowledging that "[o]nly the steady and continued growth of Japan's economic and military capabilities... will accomplish... an increase in the military resources available to balance the threat from the mainland," argued conversely and in the same stream of consciousness that "our basic policy objective with respect to Japan... is the same as our objective with respect to Germany, namely, the firm alignment of Japan... with the United States and the free world."³²

So, in the context of the Cold War balance of power struggle by 1960, if the 'first world' encapsulated the US and its allies and the 'second world' encapsulated the Sino-Soviet bloc (in MacArthur's terminology as before, 'the mainland' in opposition to Japan), where, in the valuation of the Eisenhower administration, did Japan ultimately fall? As an economic protectorate under the aegis of American hegemony, if we take Kapur's meaning, Japan had been deeply seated in the 'third world' – the arena comprised of nonaligned nations from Asia to Africa which made the results of internal

³¹ H.L. Hillyard, *Report Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff*.

³² Douglas MacArthur II, *Letter From the Ambassador to Japan (MacArthur) to Secretary of State Dulles (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII, No. 11, 1958)*.

political upheaval, in Kapur's words, "so stubbornly ambiguous."³³ As Eisenhower and his government saw it, though, it was only Japan's wavering readiness to assume the responsibilities of mutual security with the US that, once solidified, would cement the archipelagic nation as an equal, first-world partner adjacent even to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Undeniably, though, Japan wavered violently. Domestic pressures, becoming insurmountable for Kishi and the LDP, were not initially apparent to the Eisenhower administration as a revision of the Security Treaty came to fruition.

Publicly, as well as in communication with Eisenhower, Kishi was confident that the "Liberal Democratic Party holds almost two-thirds of the Diet seats and the opposition is not a dominant or even great element."³⁴ Importantly, the 'opposition' referenced here applied not only to political opponents in the Japanese Diet, but more distinctly the "leftists and Communist subversive elements in Japan and the Sino-Soviet bloc," whose goal "to neutralize Japan and separate it from the United States" had been tangible since the end of the occupation.³⁵ In reality, Kishi's consternation over the Security Treaty, by the time he arrived in Washington to sign it in January of 1960, withstood prolonged social unrest resulting from the efforts of three ideologically-separated factions.

Firstly, perhaps the most vocal and disruptive of the Japanese citizens in relation to what would become known as the 'Security Treaty crisis' were the hardliners – communists and communist sympathizers who, to Kishi's point, sought the total

³³ Nick Kapur, *Japan at the Crossroads: Conflict and Compromise after Anpo* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018), 4.

³⁴ J. Graham Parsons, *Memorandum of Conversation (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII, No. 133, 1960)*.

³⁵ J. Graham Parsons, *Memorandum of Conversation*.

geopolitical separation of Japan from the US and, in some cases, reconciliation with the Soviet Union. During the Bloody May Day riots eight years prior, these hardliners, many of whom found their motivation against American policy impositions from within the halls of academia, engaged in fights with police officers and American servicemen while holding signs with slogans written in English such as ‘Go Home Yankee.’ Recalling the Japanese government’s characterization of these events as examples of “terroristic subversive activities,” John M. Maki’s interpretation that the Japanese Communist Party (JCP)’s connections to the Soviets “might lead to an actual military invasion of Japan” had, as we will see, curious applications toward the attitudes of hardliners in 1960.³⁶

Secondly, Kishi’s obsessiveness over the Security Treaty’s revision was derailed by what were characterized in the US as “the neutralist pressures on his government for recognition.”³⁷ In an article published following the Anpo protests of 1960 (so named for a Japanese colloquialism of the Security Treaty’s revision, the *Anpo jōyaku*), tenured Harvard professor of East Asian studies Dr. Edwin O. Reischauer remarked that “[n]eutralism, if not open pro-Communism, would be shown to be the obvious ‘wave of the future’” in Japan if social pressures against the Security Treaty manifested, in any form, a “Japanese repudiation of its alliance with the United States.”³⁸ Importantly, though Reischauer observed that “the gap in understanding between Americans and Japanese” over the social unrest in 1960 was wider than at any juncture since the end of World War II, he described a gap-bridging consensus stemming from the American perspective that “Japan [stood] irresolute at a way station between the Communist camp

³⁶ Maki, “Japan’s Subversive Activities Prevention Law,” 493.

³⁷ J. Graham Parsons, *Memorandum of Conversation (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII, No. 136, 1960)*.

³⁸ Edwin O. Reischauer, “The Broken Dialogue with Japan,” *Foreign Affairs* 39, no. 1 (1960), 11-12.

and the free world.”³⁹ This phenomenon was the very lack of democratic maturity in Japan expounded upon by Dulles in years prior, which made the all-important mutual security policy of Japanese rearmament virtually unattainable in the eyes of the LDP.

To this end, perhaps even more than the blatant disruption of communist sympathizers in direct repudiation of the Security Treaty’s revision, “a frustration with present trends and a strong sense of alienation from the existing order” on the part of Japan’s populace, as Reischauer put it, produced the most uncertainty for Kishi in his political pursuits.⁴⁰ The public disillusionment within Japan’s borders regarding falling under a foreign flag, be it Soviet or American, had been broad enough to embolden more radical agents for change.

Thirdly, the most reactionary vehicle for change took shape in the faction that Kishi and his party found *themselves* managing throughout the sociopolitical turmoil. By 1960, MacArthur had expressed to Eisenhower that, in light of the previous “disturbances” dating back to 1958 which in turn were reminiscent of Bloody May Day, “the leadership in Japan [had] been inclined to brush these matters under the rug,” often with minimal impact on US-Japan relations.⁴¹ For instance, the nuclear-conscious prospects of rearmament were foregone on the advice and consent of Eisenhower’s Joint Chiefs given their sensitive nature in Japan, yet the conditions Dulles deemed necessary for eventual rearmament, as a key condition for mutual security, remained firmly in place as part of the status quo. Additionally, consider again Maki’s post-Bloody May Day perspective on the Japanese government’s immediate portrayal of communist agitation as

³⁹ Reischauer, “The Broken Dialogue with Japan,” 11.

⁴⁰ Reischauer, “The Broken Dialogue with Japan,” 13.

⁴¹ John Eisenhower, *Memorandum of Conference with President Eisenhower (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII, No. 201, 1960)*.

‘terroristic subversive activities.’ The subsequent passage of laws imposing the “severest penalty” of “a maximum of seven years’ imprisonment with or without hard labor” upon those acting in accordance with an overtly political motive points to the Japanese government’s clear stance in favor of, or at least in line with, the American anti-communist doctrine.⁴²

Yet, MacArthur’s point was clear: Kishi had “failed to understand public opinion” in stating continually that the LDP’s opposition, whether communist or neutralist, was not dominant or great.⁴³ The course of events leading directly to the Anpo protests in the summer of 1960, including a diplomatic disaster for Eisenhower which strengthened public opinion for his eventual successor, was seen as influenced primarily by the interaction of all three factions determined to point Japan along a new national trajectory. On the premise of mutual security, MacArthur had fervently hoped that “developments in Japan would not be made into domestic political issues” in the US.⁴⁴ This, in light of coming developments, was not the case.

⁴² Maki, “Japan’s Subversive Activities Prevention Law,” 501.

⁴³ Eisenhower, *Memorandum of Conference with President Eisenhower*.

⁴⁴ Eisenhower, *Memorandum of Conference with President Eisenhower*.

Chapter II.

Dialogue Broken

“[W]e started off in Japan at least in the right direction,” wrote Edwin O. Reischauer, “even if we did not have an accurate idea of what the future held in store for us.”⁴⁵ In the period directly following the Japanese surrender in 1945, the implications of American occupation were predicated upon the ultimatum of the Allies: democratization and stabilization of the vanquished Axis. Now, however, fifteen years removed from the “rosy” projections of the victors, the multifaceted turmoil amidst Japan’s still-nascent postwar political plurality was violently testing the resolve developed in favor of the status quo under Eisenhower and Dulles.⁴⁶

Japan, in the summer of 1960, was no longer a projection of that Axis, but had, in the assessment of Ambassador MacArthur, become the focal point of multiple axes. From communist agitators to the neutralists and the pro-American hardliners in the Japanese government, Prime Minister Kishi sought refuge from the strife by advocating for a state visit from Eisenhower, which MacArthur reported to the State Department would, according to Kishi, “be extremely useful in terms of Japanese public opinion at this time when there is considerable confusion.”⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Edwin O. Reischauer, *The United States and Japan*, 3d ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 30.

⁴⁶ Reischauer, *The United States and Japan*, 30.

⁴⁷ Douglas MacArthur II, *Presidential Visit* (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Office of Staff Sec. Records, Box 13, Japan [Proposed Presidential Trip] (2), 1960).

Further, MacArthur remained cognizant of “countering [a] massive communist and leftist propaganda campaign in Japan to [the] effect that [the] US is bellicose and war-minded,” which presented a precarious situation with respect to ensuring the security of Eisenhower and other administration officials during a potential visit.⁴⁸ Kishi, MacArthur remarked in subsequent days, was advised by confidants to “neither show weakness nor act in such [a] way as to aggravate [an] already tense and delicate situation.”⁴⁹ Effectively, doing either had the potential to “quickly [inflare]” public opinion and beget “left-wing demonstrations” which “might be very serious.”⁵⁰

The demonstrations, to come in mid-June, were as with other threats of political violence downplayed to the perceived benefit of Kishi, who “in pushing through ratification of the security treaty,” according to Reischauer, “greatly fanned the excitement, since the leftists regarded his actions as undemocratic and unconstitutional.”⁵¹ Though this reality would soon manifest across Tokyo and much of Japan, by as late as June 8 MacArthur was told that recent “efforts to persuade people in the streets to join demonstrations” had “failed miserably” and that “agitation today does not compare with the situation at times in Japan’s past,” a reference to the civil unrest following the 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth which ended the Russo-Japanese War and subjected Japan to massive war debt, and a reference which also conjured images of Bloody May Day eight years prior.⁵²

⁴⁸ MacArthur, *Presidential Visit*.

⁴⁹ Douglas MacArthur II, *4077, June 8, 8 P.M., from Tokyo* (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Office of Staff Sec. Records, Box 13, Japan [Proposed Presidential Trip] (3), 1960).

⁵⁰ MacArthur, *4077, June 8, 8 P.M., from Tokyo*.

⁵¹ Reischauer, *The United States and Japan*, 318.

⁵² MacArthur, *4077, June 8, 8 P.M., from Tokyo*.

On June 7, 1960, Eisenhower had expressed to State Secretary Herter that he was particularly worried about “this thing building up in Japan” and “disturbed as to whether Kishi may be making a mistake in using the President for an internal thing.”⁵³ Notably, Herter replied in acknowledgment that “he didn’t think Kishi has much of a chance of hanging on,” alluding to concerns from the Japanese end that cancellation of the planned state visit would force Kishi to resign from office.⁵⁴ Nonetheless, Eisenhower remained committed to following through with the visit, troubled more by its significance being attributed to the Security Treaty’s renewal than to a broader mission of democratic solidarity. This mission was Eisenhower’s intention, especially given the mixed dialogue surrounding the potency of activist elements throughout early June. From the diplomatic end, via MacArthur, came a stream of assurances from Kishi and his cabinet that communist agitation was not significant enough to warrant the visit’s cancellation.

During this critical period of ambiguity, the Associated Press reported that Akira Iwai, the secretary-general of Japan’s General Council of Trade Unions (Sōhyō), called for a “giant demonstration” during the upcoming preliminary visit to the country by James Hagerty, Eisenhower’s press secretary, who was to act as the barometer for the effectiveness of the state visit alongside MacArthur.⁵⁵ Further pressing for demonstrations to last until Eisenhower’s mid-month arrival, Iwai alluded, albeit apprehensively, to the possibility of “physical violence.”⁵⁶ This itself came on the heels of previous statements that a “central rally in Tokyo sometime around June 11,” alike in

⁵³ Herter, *Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with the President* (June 7, 1960).

⁵⁴ Herter, *Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with the President* (June 7, 1960).

⁵⁵ Department of State, *AmEmbassy Manila for Mr. Hagerty* (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Office of Staff Sec. Records, Box 13, Japan [Proposed Presidential Trip] (3), 1960).

⁵⁶ Department of State, *AmEmbassy Manila for Mr. Hagerty*.

nature to Bloody May Day, was not being ruled out in accordance with the organization's plans.

Indeed, on June 10, upon Hagerty's arrival at Haneda airport in Tokyo, he and MacArthur "encountered a crowd of more than 6,000 protesters blocking their way just outside the airport gates" who "rained blows on [their] car with... placards and flagpoles, rocked it back and forth, cracked its windows, and smashed its tail lights."⁵⁷ The so-called 'Hagerty incident,' which culminated in clashes between protesters and Japanese police, as well as Hagerty's and MacArthur's extraction via military helicopter, was rife with anti-American sentiment pointed directly at the Security Treaty and Eisenhower's involvement in its renewal. The downplaying tactics employed by Kishi's government had failed, and MacArthur, who had been their primary recipient, had been an eyewitness to the event that Kapur acknowledges as a "profound shock" and, crucially, a "turning point."⁵⁸

The next day, Herter phoned MacArthur, who was now awaiting a "departure statement" that would be routed through the Oval Office.⁵⁹ MacArthur, who "sounded completely calm," told Herter that "the demonstrators were trying to give the impression of force in order to make their will prevail on the Japanese Government and ourselves... they were not as violent or sensational as the reports would be" in the coming days.⁶⁰ Essentially, if the incident were to amount to as equal a shock to the Japanese people as to the Eisenhower administration, MacArthur remained confident that sympathy for

⁵⁷ Kapur, *Japan at the Crossroads*, 27.

⁵⁸ Kapur, *Japan at the Crossroads*, 29.

⁵⁹ Department of State, *Memorandum of Telephone Conversation* (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Box 12, CAH Telephone Calls 3/28/60-6/30/60 (1), 1960).

⁶⁰ Department of State, *Memorandum of Telephone Conversation*.

Kishi, and for the incoming American delegation, would be generated “to the effect that a trend was setting in ‘the other way’” and potentially confirmed following a subsequent phone call between MacArthur and Kishi.⁶¹

However, public sentiment in Japan regarding the upcoming visit from Eisenhower quickly eroded. On June 12, a translated letter to Eisenhower from an anonymous Japanese student conveyed deep regrets that the American president “is coming to Japan at this time when democracy and parliamentarianism in Japan are faced with a serious crisis.”⁶² The message continued in fear of “the danger that these people (protesters)... may commit an act of [discourtesy] on Mr. Ike (Eisenhower),” and urged a postponement of the visit until domestic political tensions over the Security Treaty eased.⁶³ Regardless of public opinion, at least from the time of the Hagerty incident until June 15, Eisenhower still remained determined to follow through with his visit in order to assuage concerns that communist elements in Japan were not influential enough to drive a wedge into the broadening scope of US-Japan relations. “Should such an untoward incident occur,” wrote the student, “it would lead to grave consequences.”⁶⁴

On June 15, Sōhyō, in accordance with the warnings of its leader Iwai, began a general strike which is estimated to have involved over six million workers nationwide. Throughout the day, mass protests took place on the grounds of Japan’s National Diet building, which was “guarded by a detachment of 5,000 police officers,” who themselves

⁶¹ Department of State, *Memorandum of Telephone Conversation*.

⁶² Anonymous, *To Mr. Ike, with heartfelt affection and respect* (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Papers as President, Int’l Series, Box 34, Japan Far East Trip – Cancelled (3), 1960).

⁶³ Anonymous, *To Mr. Ike, with heartfelt affection and respect*.

⁶⁴ Anonymous, *To Mr. Ike, with heartfelt affection and respect*.

were supported by “right-wing counterprotesters.”⁶⁵ Beginning in the early evening, “students affiliated with the Zengakuren student federation forced their way into the grounds of the Diet Building [and] the police attacked them with batons and water cannons,” leading to injuries numbering in the thousands.⁶⁶ It was at this point in the day that the trampling of student demonstrator Michiko Kanba, whose death sent further shockwaves throughout subsequent protests against Kishi’s government for its staunch support of the Security Treaty, led “[f]eelings of sadness and disillusion [to] a tragic focal point.”⁶⁷

Notably, given Iwai’s warnings just days prior to the June 15 riots, Sōhyō’s initial commitment to demonstrations against the Security Treaty were instrumental in a broader union movement whose politics rivaled the Japanese government and spurred subversive groups, previously unable to enact meaningful mass protests alone, to take further action. The postwar and post-occupation spike in labor union membership cemented itself as the primary springboard for left-wing political upheaval, whether it entailed loosening the existing bonds between Japan and the US, smiting Kishi for a perceived capitulation to American hegemony, or leading Japan on a trajectory toward Soviet-style communism.

With the National Diet stormed, Michiko Kanba made a political martyr, and Kishi’s leadership rendered inert, the Japanese government issued a formal request to the Eisenhower administration that the visit be postponed. The anonymous student whose letter to Eisenhower three days prior had been penned in hopes of this outcome was granted their request.

⁶⁵ Kapur, *Japan at the Crossroads*, 29.

⁶⁶ Vera Mackie, “Embodied Memories, Emotional Geographies: Nakamoto Takako’s Diary of the Anpo Struggle,” *Japanese Studies* 31, No. 3 (2011), 320.

⁶⁷ Mackie, “Embodied Memories, Emotional Geographies,” 320.

On June 16, Eisenhower wrote Kishi in reception of “the news of your [government’s] decision to request postponement of my projected visit to Japan,” stating that “I share your sadness that a violent minority could disrupt the proper and orderly processes of democratic government” despite Kishi’s continual downplaying of the political situation, MacArthur’s concurrence, and Herter’s hesitation.⁶⁸

The following day, Kishi reiterated in a response delivered to Eisenhower via MacArthur that “the overwhelming majority of the Japanese people eagerly awaited your visit... with high expectations,” further noting that “[i]t is my strong belief that our urgent task today is to continue to fight with unrelenting resolve the forces of subversion and violence which seek to undermine our freedom and democratic way of life.”⁶⁹ In this letter, Kishi had effectively acknowledged what he and his government had previously denied: that the politically-motivated agitation of communists and neutralists was concentrated enough, in tandem with Sōhyō’s general strike, to derail US-Japan diplomacy.

The tenets of the revised Security Treaty thus remained unthreatened by the Anpo protests. Article VI, perhaps the most controversial in the document, continued the policy that “the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan” upon its adoption just days after Kishi’s letter to Eisenhower.⁷⁰ To this end, Article VI ensured a continuing US presence, supported by the

⁶⁸ Department of State, *Presidential Handling* (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Papers as President, Int’l Series, Box 34, Japan 1960 (3), 1960).

⁶⁹ Nobusuke Kishi, *MR 82-40 #1* (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Papers as President, Int’l Series, Box 34, Japan 1960 (3), 1960).

⁷⁰ Wikisource contributors, "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America," *Wikisource*, https://en.wikisource.org/w/index.php?title=Treaty_of_Mutual_Cooperation_and_Security_between_Japan_and_the_United_States_of_America&oldid=9554721.

LDP, that had the authority alongside Japan to counteract tangible threats to the country's national security. Further, the Security Treaty's corollary that "[t]he Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened" ensured a continuing, legally-binding dialogue between the US and Japanese governments.⁷¹ Given this, what Sōhyō and the Security Treaty's opponents were able to accomplish in their mobilization was a major setback in diplomacy with a global power, the US, whose hegemony was not universally accepted in Japan. This mobilization conformed to Kishi's downplaying of its severity, but only in the sense that it was unable to shake the foundations of the Security Treaty he had championed. The political ramifications, not least among them being Kishi's resignation from office in July of 1960, confirmed Reischauer's evaluation that "[a]fter 15 years of massive contact, Americans and Japanese seem to have less real communication than ever."⁷²

The 'Atmosphere of Disasters'

At home, Americans who were made aware of the Anpo protests by means of television news were, according to Reischauer, generally of the mindset that the Anpo protests "were an undemocratic effort by minority elements... to force their will by non-parliamentary agitation on the duly elected representatives of the people."⁷³ The perception was that "Kishi is to be praised for having withstood this sort of pressure and

⁷¹ Wikisource contributors, "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America."

⁷² Reischauer, "The Broken Dialogue with Japan," 11.

⁷³ Reischauer, "The Broken Dialogue with Japan," 15.

for having seen to it that the views of the majority prevailed in this matter of vital importance for the future safety of Japan,” owing to a broader domino theory-based view that “Japan is an industrially important country located dangerously close to the borders of both the Soviet Union and Communist China” which “would give overwhelming strength to the Communist movement throughout Asia” if not for American influence.⁷⁴ Reischauer’s unique, double-ended perspective on US-Japan relations in light of the Anpo protests and the renewal of the Security Treaty, due to the Harvard professor having been born and raised in Japan, demonstrated the American public’s divergence from the Japanese public’s violent political pluralism during the early Cold War period.

Eisenhower ultimately received congressional backlash for his pursuit of maintaining the status quo in Far East policy, the gulf between his Republican administration and its Democratic opposition in Congress being subjected to the fallout resulting from Japan’s post-Anpo woes. On June 21, Eisenhower and Herter conversed on the subject of Herter having testified to Congress regarding “the distinction between... goodwill trips vs. personal diplomacy,” to which Democratic Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson, according to Herter, “was trying to build up a whole atmosphere of disasters from a diplomatic point of view” and “harping on... Japan and Cuba.”⁷⁵ Eisenhower, stating that “Lyndon Johnson is getting to be one of those smart alecks,” subsequently remarked that “the only place which worries him (Eisenhower) is Japan.”⁷⁶ Aiming to “[put] out something to set the matter straight” in reference to the cancelled trip to Japan, Eisenhower was aware that criticism of his handling of the diplomatic

⁷⁴ Reischauer, “The Broken Dialogue with Japan,” 14-15.

⁷⁵ Christian A. Herter, *Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with the President* (Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Herter Papers, Box 10, Presidential Telephone Calls 1-6/60 (1), June 21, 1960).

⁷⁶ Herter, *Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with the President* (June 21, 1960).

situation would provide further opportunities for the Democrats, including Johnson, to make a stronger case in the realm of foreign policy to the voting public as the primary season in the 1960 presidential election drew to a close.⁷⁷

Johnson, for his part, speaking in the Senate on June 21, was adamant about “consider[ing] the [Security] treaty with great care and thoroughness” despite Herter having “advised [the Senate] that the State Department considers ratification to be of extreme importance.”⁷⁸ In this light, the political discourse surrounding the ratification of the revised Security Treaty had remained tangible in the US, as Johnson railed against any push from the Eisenhower administration to hasten its passage through Congress. To be fair, Johnson regarded the treaty as “well drawn in the mutual interest of both nations,” but in light of the Hagerty incident, Anpo protests, and indefinite postponement of Eisenhower’s state visit, he pointed out that the Senate should not “accelerate nor delay the treaty because of events which have taken place in Japan.”⁷⁹

In consideration of the treaty, Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman J. William Fulbright, a fellow Democrat, framed the diplomatic efforts toward ratification as “an issue of barely manageable proportions in Japan and a source of deep concern in this country and elsewhere.”⁸⁰ “The Sino-Soviet bloc,” Fulbright continued, “in whipping up opposition to the treaty, has unleashed a torrent of slander and abuse that is interesting, both for its intensity and its volume.”⁸¹ Particularly, Fulbright’s consternation

⁷⁷ Herter, *Memorandum of Telephone Conversation with the President* (June 21, 1960).

⁷⁸ Senator Johnson, speaking on Legislative Program, on June 21, 1960, 86th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 106, pt. 10:13518.

⁷⁹ Senator Johnson, speaking on Legislative Program, Congressional Record 106, pt. 10:13518.

⁸⁰ Senator Fulbright, speaking on Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan, on June 21, 1960, 86th Cong., 2nd sess., Congressional Record 106, pt. 10:13544.

⁸¹ Senator Fulbright, speaking on Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan, Congressional Record 106, pt. 10:13544.

in this regard over the cancellation of the state visit, which he characterized with Johnson's backing as "a regrettable and unfortunate development," highlighted the common ground of anti-communism he and congressional Democrats maintained with Eisenhower's Republican administration despite the political climate of the ongoing presidential election.⁸² The aforementioned 'atmosphere of disasters' to which Herter had been referring when discussing the day's Senate session with Eisenhower was, importantly, without consideration to Johnson's and Fulbright's agreement on the necessity of the Security Treaty for international security. Still, Herter's and Eisenhower's speculative assessment of Johnson's ability to control the timing of the Senate's consideration of the treaty demonstrated Herter's comparative inability to convince the chamber of the treaty's pressing nature.

Two days later, in relatively short order apart from this rift in Herter's and Johnson's perspectives, the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan came into effect on the clear premise that Japan's geopolitical destiny was in mutual alliance with the US. Fulbright remarked that "Japan has become a factor in the struggle for freedom which has become the central struggle in our lives and which will dominate our future," cementing the idea that the incoming presidential administration would have a primarily geopolitical, rather than economic, obligation to forge a special relationship with Japan on par with NATO allies explicitly for the purpose of offsetting Sino-Soviet hegemony.⁸³

⁸² Senator Fulbright, speaking on Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan, Congressional Record 106, pt. 10:13544.

⁸³ Senator Fulbright, speaking on Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security with Japan, Congressional Record 106, pt. 10:13545.

Within a month of the treaty's ratification, Johnson found himself supporting another fellow senator, John F. Kennedy of Massachusetts, as his running mate for the Democratic presidential nomination. In the same timeframe, the anticipated resignation of Nobusuke Kishi as prime minister was effected, resulting in the elevation of reconciliationist Hayato Ikeda to the post in Japan. Ikeda, the incumbent Minister of International Trade and Industry, had vowed to supplant Japan's present political dilemma with a commitment to grow the Japanese economy via a synthesis of conservative and social-democratic policies. On either side of the Pacific, the revision of the Security Treaty, for which the outgoing US president and Japanese prime minister each engaged in bitter political turmoil and diplomatic fallout, would be tested under the guise of international security and in the realm of public opinion during critical upcoming elections.

Between late June and November of 1960, the Ikeda cabinet significantly restructured its policy toward mutual security with the US, which was concomitant with a resurgence of hawkish Eisenhower administration diplomacy. "[T]he [Eisenhower] administration as a whole," Kapur writes, "clearly believed that blame for the crisis rested almost entirely with the Japanese, and that no significant alteration in U.S. policies was necessary... the use of pressure tactics continued."⁸⁴ Japanese liaisons close to Ikeda were routed through Eisenhower's undersecretaries in a stream of diplomatic and foreign policy not unlike the dismissive sort pursued by John Foster Dulles in the immediate post-occupation years. The only concrete pillar of US-Japan relations that remained was the tumultuous success of the Security Treaty, which continued to face backlash in Japan.

⁸⁴ Kapur, "Mending the 'Broken Dialogue,'" 497.

Further, “Ikeda had to take concrete steps to repudiate neutralism and affirm Japan’s ties to the free world” amidst a climate of renewed distrust, while the next US president would, in Reischauer’s assessment, have to “understand what is in their minds” in order to atone for the “shocking misestimate of the situation in May and June on the part of the American Government” and circumvent the potential for “rising tension and violence that can only end in a leftist revolution or a Fascistic suppression.”⁸⁵⁸⁶

Perpendicular to public opinion and the Eisenhower administration’s perspective on Japan through the course of recent events, Vice President Richard Nixon remarked during the final presidential debate between himself and Kennedy on October 21, 1960 that “[i]f we are going to have the initiative in the world, we must remember that the people of Africa and Asia and Latin America don’t want to be pawns simply in a struggle between two great powers – the Soviet Union and the United States.”⁸⁷ Reischauer’s view of American public opinion since the Anpo protests had been that Japan, due to the occupation, was viewed as a predominantly democratically-aligned nation facing unwarranted political turmoil. However, Nixon portrayed Japan as far more contested and archetypal of the third world where, in a previous debate, he explained that “we’re not doing as well as we should.”⁸⁸ Nixon’s view was that, as long as the US permitted the expansion of international communism, key regions of the world would be caught in the

⁸⁵ Kapur, “Mending the ‘Broken Dialogue,’” 498.

⁸⁶ Reischauer, “The Broken Dialogue with Japan,” 25-26.

⁸⁷ Richard M. Nixon, “The Fourth Kennedy-Nixon Presidential Debate,” transcript of remarks delivered at New York City, October 21, 1960. <https://www.debates.org/voter-education/debate-transcripts/october-21-1960-debate-transcript/>.

⁸⁸ Richard M. Nixon, “The Second Kennedy-Nixon Presidential Debate,” transcript of remarks delivered at Washington, DC, October 7, 1960. <https://www.debates.org/voter-education/debate-transcripts/october-7-1960-debate-transcript/>.

ideological crossfire while “economic assistance... technical assistance... exchange... [and] programs of diplomatic and other character” from the US would be lacking.⁸⁹

Similarly, Kennedy portrayed the Far East as a region of “underdeveloped countries” during the debates, but departed from Nixon on the premise of self-determination.⁹⁰ Notably, Kennedy sought to “persuade them to assume some of the responsibilities that up till now we’ve maintained” while aiding these countries to make “an economic breakthrough on their own.”⁹¹ Simultaneously, Ikeda, newly minted as prime minister in Japan, shifted the domestic discourse to streamline industrial production and promote economic growth, largely in response to the recent political upheaval.

To this effect, both Kennedy and Nixon, as presidential candidates, understood that the impact of communist agitation in the Far East meant that the region’s alignment in the geopolitics of the early Cold War had not been solidified. Kennedy had associated himself with the earlier perspective of Dulles when, in conversation with Jirō Shirasu in 1952, the incoming Secretary of State acknowledged that Japan would have to assume more responsibilities to achieve full mutual security. Though Kennedy did not share the same view on the dismissal of Japanese dignitaries as the Eisenhower administration was currently reviving due to the cancellation of the state visit, he began in his series of debates with Nixon to develop a foreign policy approach quite different from Nixon’s doctrinal view of the communist sphere of influence.

⁸⁹ Richard M. Nixon, “The Second Kennedy-Nixon Presidential Debate.”

⁹⁰ John F. Kennedy, ““The Third Kennedy-Nixon Presidential Debate,” transcript of remarks delivered at New York City, October 13, 1960. <https://www.debates.org/voter-education/debate-transcripts/october-13-1960-debate-transcript/>.

⁹¹ John F. Kennedy, ““The Third Kennedy-Nixon Presidential Debate.”

Given the rhetoric in the 1960 debates, where Nixon sought the further involvement of the US in the economic and political sustenance of contested regions in the Cold War balance of power, Kennedy sought a consultative and diplomatic approach that would draw nonaligned nations toward democracy. Nixon had endeavored to continue the policy of broad intervention that Eisenhower had inaugurated through his militant organization of the executive structure of government, while Kennedy was intent on reassessing spheres of power in the early Cold War arena. This meant, by individually assessing nations in these spheres, “moving in the direction of peace and security” and developing “relative strength” to the growing influence of the Soviet Union.⁹²

Of course, many factors apart from the candidates’ positions on foreign policy contributed to the decisions of the voting public. The consensus between Nixon and Kennedy on the needed improvement of American efficiency in achieving supremacy against the Soviets pointed to change in the new administration’s executive structure. Kennedy’s victory in the 1960 presidential election demonstrated that new efforts would be made to bolster the concept of mutual security with critically important nations against Soviet hegemony, and in tandem with Lyndon Johnson’s drawn-out approach to the Security Treaty in the Senate despite Japan’s political woes, combat the dividing “barrier of unspoken assumptions” between the US and Japan that Reischauer observed in the dark mire of bilateral relations at the close of the Eisenhower years.⁹³

⁹² John F. Kennedy, “The Fourth Kennedy-Nixon Presidential Debate,” transcript of remarks delivered at New York City, October 21, 1960. <https://www.debates.org/voter-education/debate-transcripts/october-21-1960-debate-transcript/>.

⁹³ Reischauer, “The Broken Dialogue with Japan,” 25.

Chapter III.

Countering the Interregnum

The topic of presidential transitions and their impacts upon the continuity of government was hardly one of merely contemporaneous importance, especially along the path toward the 1960 election. From 1959, University of Chicago scholar Laurin L. Henry assessed the effectiveness of key transitions dating back to 1912, when Woodrow Wilson defeated his Republican opponent, the incumbent William H. Taft. Crucially, the Brookings Institution, the independent Washington, DC policy center with whom Henry had been affiliated as a research associate since 1955, was the well from which he siphoned the requisite information and expertise to apply to the Eisenhower-Kennedy dynamic.

In 1912, the electoral landslide Wilson achieved by carrying 40 states had been supported in part by the Republican schism effected by Theodore Roosevelt's pursuit of a non-consecutive third term on the Progressive Party platform. Confidence in Taft's leadership had eroded from multiple fronts – a political situation hardly analogous to the White House race between Kennedy and Nixon. The implications of the Cold War had strengthened both the Democratic and Republican bases in their respective approaches to anti-communism, and, consequently, the reality of November 8, 1960 was that of a razor-thin election: Kennedy had won the presidency with less states in his column than Nixon, and by a margin of less than 90 electoral votes.

Across the Pacific, there was no Brookings-adjacent study to assess the precedent of Anpo, from the plurality of charged opinions regarding the revision of the Security Treaty to the resignation of Nobusuke Kishi and his replacement by Hayato Ikeda. Within the LDP itself, there was no overarching political dichotomy to assure the Japanese public of a guaranteed shift in the national trajectory. Instead, “[LDP] factions that had openly taken sides against Kishi in the final stages of the treaty crisis were now threatening to break away and form their own party” while Ikeda faced the arduous task of restoring confidence in government, as well as his own public image.⁹⁴ The first indication of progress in this regard was a snap election – a contingency of Ikeda’s election as party head – nearly two weeks after Kennedy’s victory in the US. The result of this election was a gain of nine seats in the National Diet for the LDP, expanding its already sizable majority, while the Japanese Communist Party increased its representation to three seats from a single one held since the previous general election of 1958.

Henry, aware of the emerging Cold War perils which threatened to erode at US hegemony, and by association, mutual security with Japan, wrote blatantly for the *New York Times* in late July of 1960 that “[t]he American people cannot afford an interregnum.”⁹⁵ He opined that “we face a long period involving some indecision and the possible impairment of governmental functioning” which “[b]oth Soviet Russia and Red China have already demonstrated their ability to take advantage of.”⁹⁶ With respect to Japan, this included the opposition of the Sino-Soviet bloc to the maintenance of the

⁹⁴ Kapur, *Japan at the Crossroads*, 75.

⁹⁵ Laurin Henry, *Keeping Vital Governmental Machinery Rolling* (Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Laurin Henry Papers, Box 20, Memoranda, 1960-1961, 1960), 2.

⁹⁶ Henry, *Keeping Vital Government Machinery Rolling*, 2.

Security Treaty, which J. William Fulbright had outlined during the Senate's consideration of the treaty in the previous month. Further, though Kishi's government strongly moderated its communication to Washington of the threat posed to mutual security by Japanese communists and neutralists, the consensus between the two nations, despite some disagreements over the extent of communist agitation, was that such agitation had been a driving force for the Anpo protests.

Henry's dismay over government impairment during the transition period likely worsened considering that, with Kennedy's election victory, the transition would occur between opposing political parties. Just as with Taft-Wilson in 1912, and more recently with Truman-Eisenhower in 1952, the swing of the political pendulum was a signal of an upheaval in the policy apparatus of the outgoing administration. Historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., who had advised Kennedy during his campaign, wrote retrospectively that "Kennedy was a political man, accustomed to a far more flexible, informal, and untidy system" than what had been established under Eisenhower, and "did not act lightly in dismantling Ike's heavily-layered national security advisory apparatus."⁹⁷ Importantly, per Schlesinger, former Truman White House Counsel Clark Clifford (who was in charge of Kennedy's transition team) advised the president-elect to "have no highly visible major domo standing between him and his staff."⁹⁸ This would eliminate the presence of a White House Chief of Staff in the incoming Kennedy administration – just one of the changes that would outline a departure from Eisenhower's structure of executive organization.

⁹⁷ Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Effective National Security Advising: A Most Dubious Precedent," *Political Science Quarterly* 115, no. 3 (2000), 347.

⁹⁸ Schlesinger, Jr., "Effective National Security Advising," 348.

Beyond this, Kennedy's plans for executive restructuring were informed even along the campaign trail. Henry's research into presidential transitions "supplemented... the work of a Transition Advisory Committee of 13 men assembled by Brookings President Robert Calkins" which was assigned liaisons by the Eisenhower administration, as well as both the Nixon and Kennedy campaigns, with Clifford representing the latter.⁹⁹ A series of nine memoranda was prepared in the lead-up to the election under the direction of the committee, ranging from executive priorities to the structure of the cabinet and foreign affairs.

The first memorandum produced, entitled "Priorities for the President-Elect," clearly broadcasted Henry's previous sentiments to the committee's liaisons in its warning that "[t]he period of changeover of [e]xecutive authority is a dangerous one which the enemies of the United States may seek to exploit."¹⁰⁰ The president-elect's "most urgent task," noted the memorandum, was "to pick out the relatively few matters of the highest priority on which he and his closest aides are to focus their attention" and "to identify them, to justify them, and to point out available alternatives that should be weighed before final decisions are made."¹⁰¹ To this end, Georgetown scholar and US Army liaison Donovan Yeuell, Jr. identified, among "specific topics for immediate attention" for the incoming administration, the "air and missile defenses of... Western

⁹⁹ Fred Dews, "What Brookings did for the 1960 presidential transition," Brookings Now, November 9, 2016, <https://www.brookings.edu/articles/what-brookings-did-for-the-1960-presidential-transition/>.

¹⁰⁰ Brookings Institution Governmental Studies, *Priorities for the President-Elect* (Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Laurin Henry Papers, Box 17, Staff Paper No. 1, *Priorities for the President-Elect*, 1960), 1.

¹⁰¹ Brookings Institution Governmental Studies, *Priorities for the President-Elect*, 2.

Europe [and] Japan” alongside “contingency plans for pressures or hostilities” ranging from Taiwan to Cuba.¹⁰²

Also familiar in Yeuell’s recommendations for the committee’s memoranda was the topic of “Soviet and Red China truculence” – a revival of “threats and blackmail” due to the “quasi-stalemate at the strategic or intercontinental level” which, in Yeuell’s terms, had been “developing for over a year.”¹⁰³ As shown before, outright displays of Sino-Soviet intransigence through 1960 had been a topic of clear concern for the Senate in its consideration and ratification of the Security Treaty, precisely due to the ramifications of the cancelled state visit, the Anpo protests, and Kishi’s resignation. Where Fulbright had shown the concerns of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to be directly related to the situation in Japan, Yeuell had prescribed for Henry and the Transition Advisory Committee to counteract a mounting trend in projections of Sino-Soviet hegemony.

In addition to advising the incoming administration to weigh the importance of European and Japanese missile defense, Yeuell recognized the Sino-Soviet bloc’s “rapidly improving position to exercise politico-military influence not only on the Eurasian landmass, but increasingly by overt and paramilitary and subversive activities elsewhere.”¹⁰⁴ The implications of this geopolitical threat were prioritized by the Eisenhower administration in relation to Japan, notably with the same usage of the phrase ‘subversive activities’ as it applied to Kishi’s understanding of communist influence upon the Anpo protests, as well as to previous dialogues between the US and Japan following the Bloody May Day riots in 1952.

¹⁰² Donovan Yeuell, Jr., *Notes for Transition Study* (Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Laurin Henry Papers, Box 17, Staff Paper No. 6, Foreign Affairs, 1960), 5.

¹⁰³ Donovan Yeuell, Jr., *Notes for Transition Study*, 3.

¹⁰⁴ Donovan Yeuell, Jr., *Notes for Transition Study*, 1-2.

I identify three overtures in the avoidance of a 1960 interregnum: Laurin Henry's ongoing work to assess the importance of presidential transitions; Brookings' support for the project and application of the committee to ensuring a smooth transition of power; and Yeuell's recommendations both underscoring the critical nature of contingency and echoing key sentiments about the importance of international security. Japan, on its path to mutual security with the US, remained crucial for the development of each of these overtures from November of 1960 to January of 1961 on the two premises ascertained by Yeuell: missile defense and countersubversion.

Missile Defense

During the previous presidential transition in 1952, Jirō Shirasu had, for his part in representing the interests of the government of Shigeru Yoshida, expressed the complications of establishing missile defense (the 'introduction of nuclears') in light of the goals of American occupation. By 1960, Eisenhower sought the expedient ratification of the Security Treaty along a diplomatic trajectory so as not to inflame the already precarious situation in the realm of Japanese public opinion. From the cold diplomacy of John Foster Dulles to the openness of Douglas MacArthur II regarding the Japanese government's reports of communist agitation, the subject of introducing nuclear arms to Japan for the purpose of hastening mutual security waxed and waned throughout the Eisenhower years. It had again come to the forefront on the advice of Yeuell as Kennedy prepared to take the presidential oath.

"The Soviets have now such an aggregate of nuclear delivery weapons in their forces confronting NATO," Yeuell wrote, "that our previous advantage therein is all but

equalized.”¹⁰⁵ Recall that the executive assumption of American nuclear superiority was a driving factor in Korean War involvement, which influenced the whole of the Eisenhower administration’s early perspective on the defense of East Asia. If Yeuell’s exposition of the clear geostrategic threat posed by the Soviet Union’s nuclear proliferation was any indication to Kennedy’s transition team of policy change, the new administration would have to entirely reanalyze the way geostrategy was approached by the executive branch.

At present, American geostrategy was predicated upon both Truman-era containment and Eisenhower’s bolstering of what has been called the ‘espionage establishment’ for the purpose of pro-American regime change. A memorandum developed for Kennedy’s December 6, 1960 transition meeting with Eisenhower, during which geopolitical concerns in Southeast Asia and Africa were discussed, summarized Eisenhower’s employment of this establishment. In order to “protect the interests of those who have identified themselves with a pro-Western policy,” the memorandum suggested that, based upon precedent, Eisenhower would attempt “through diplomatic and covert channels, to conciliate the situation among the contending groups.”¹⁰⁶ Though this description related in this case to closely-monitored developments in Laos, the understanding of Kennedy’s transition team regarding Eisenhower’s anticipated course of action speaks volumes about the administration’s implementation of policy.

Further, the questions posed in this case underscore the gulf between the outgoing policy apparatus and that which was actively being constructed during the transition.

¹⁰⁵ Donovan Yeuell, Jr., *Notes for Transition Study*, 2.

¹⁰⁶ Clark Clifford, *Eisenhower-Kennedy meeting, 6 December 1960* (John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Clark Clifford Personal Papers, Presidential Transition Files, 1950-1961, Box MF03, 1960), 41.

Kennedy was advised in the same memorandum that “the rightists [in Laos], possibly backed by the United States, have overplayed their hand and triggered a reaction temporarily uniting Communists and nationalists-neutralists in pursuit of the common goal of reducing Western influence” in a course of events similar to the consensus on Anpo in Japan.¹⁰⁷ “If a neutralist government can be established without Communist participation,” Clifford inquired, “may not this now be the best the West can hope for?”¹⁰⁸ In addition, he asked, “may not Laos make its best contribution to the peace of Southeast Asia, as well as to its own security, by carrying on as a neutral buffer state?”¹⁰⁹

In the wake of the American occupation of Japan, the original iteration of the Security Treaty stipulated that the path to mutual security would be aided by American military intervention – a policy heavily railed against by the communists and neutralists from Bloody May Day to Anpo. The brand of diplomacy exercised by Dulles (and, later, Christian Herter) further built upon this foundation. Still, without similar pretext to Japan’s imperialism, Axis alliance, and defeat in World War II, the Kennedy team approached Laos from a perspective that would have been unheard of in relation to post-occupation Japan. The geopolitical ‘quasi-stalemate’ identified by Yeuell in his transitionary recommendations had rendered the prospect of self-determination precarious. A global map previously demarcated by spheres of influence now, due to Yeuell’s exposition on Sino-Soviet blackmail and even Edwin O. Reischauer’s warnings about the state of decay in US-Japan relations, had to be approached on a case-by-case basis. The degree to which intervention for the purpose of maintaining an upper hand for

¹⁰⁷ Clifford, *Eisenhower-Kennedy meeting*, 41.

¹⁰⁸ Clifford, *Eisenhower-Kennedy meeting*, 41.

¹⁰⁹ Clifford, *Eisenhower-Kennedy meeting*, 42.

the US and its NATO allies in the Cold War would vary based upon the individual circumstances of contested nations.

For Laos, the Eisenhower-Kennedy transition begged the question of the necessity of intervention in relation to nations, like Japan, with greater weight upon the foreign policy success of the incumbent administration. The distribution of American-manufactured nuclear weapons to facilitate mutual security across continents returned to the forefront, despite its sensitivity for Japanese unity and Eisenhower's late-term diplomatic goals, precisely due to this fact. Apart from Yeuell's recommendation to inquire about the renewed possibility of Japanese missile defense, Kennedy's transition team was skeptical about Eisenhower's willingness to divulge information about the sharing of nuclear weapons with US allies.

With Laurin Henry's backing, the Brookings team speculated in its sixth pre-election memorandum, entitled "Transition in the Conduct of Foreign Affairs," that "President Eisenhower... presumably will include full intelligence briefings on the diplomatic and military situations... and plans for any contingencies that can be anticipated."¹¹⁰ However, by the eve of Kennedy's December 6 meeting with Eisenhower, Clifford assisted in outlining that "President Eisenhower should be asked to elaborate his views on the significance he attaches to nuclear sharing through NATO."¹¹¹ The operative word in this recommendation to Kennedy is 'through,' as an individualistic assessment of the security needs of pro-American (or *potentially* pro-American) governments could require, as in the cases of both Laos and Japan as non-NATO

¹¹⁰ Brookings Institution Governmental Studies, *Transition in the Conduct of Foreign Affairs* (Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Laurin Henry Papers, Box 18, Staff Paper No. 6, Foreign Affairs, October 28, 1960), 2.

¹¹¹ Clifford, *Eisenhower-Kennedy meeting*, 37.

members, extraneous avenues for nuclear armament. Considering Yeuell's and Henry's concerns, the geopolitical climate was such that expedient means to this end, while perceived as necessary to counter communist expansionism, remained in a state of flux.

Countersubversion

Eisenhower was not only ambiguous on the question of nuclear sharing through NATO. He also refused to disclose to Kennedy the involvement of his espionage establishment in Japan, which since 1958 had engaged in covert political operations that added a new layer of interaction to the already precarious atmosphere for nuclear sharing and threatened to undo the diplomatic status quo if exposed. Beyond the political impact of American intervention to support 'rightists' in Laos, the State Department confirmed that "the [US] Government approved... covert programs to try to influence the direction of Japanese political life" through until the presidential administration of Lyndon Johnson.¹¹² These included "modest financial support to key politicians" for campaigns including the November 1960 snap election called following Ikeda's ascendance to LDP leadership, as well as a covert Central Intelligence Agency [CIA] program "to try to split off the moderate wing of the leftist opposition in the hope that a more pro-American... opposition party would emerge."¹¹³ When Ikeda replied to Eisenhower's congratulatory letter for the LDP's victory in the recent election, stating that "[i]t is indeed most reassuring to know that the majority of the Japanese people endorsed our consistent policy to cooperate closely with the United States," it is likely that the prime minister was

¹¹² Department of State, *Editorial Note (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXIX, Part 2, Japan, No. 1)*.

¹¹³ Department of State, *Editorial Note*.

unaware of the extent of the covert financing of LDP candidates.¹¹⁴ According to the State Department, “[t]he recipient Japanese candidates were told only that they were getting support from American businessmen,” thus casting some doubt as to the true scope of LDP support (though the party did remain in the firm majority) during this critical period in US-Japan relations.¹¹⁵

With Kennedy’s transition team more overtly considering the prospect of allowing nations under some level of communist subversion to remain neutral, the fact that Kennedy sustained the soft power of Eisenhower’s establishment in Japan shows a clear commitment to the nation as a bastion of democracy in the East. Laos being a primary example of the gulf between Eisenhower’s and Kennedy’s approaches to countersubversion in Asia, it should be noted in no uncertain terms that Eisenhower remained far more hawkish in his approach through the transition.

Historians Fred Greenstein and Richard Immerman, aided by the commentary of Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. (who outlined Kennedy’s administrative departure from Eisenhower’s apparatus), write of the likelihood that “Eisenhower had advised Kennedy to take unilateral military action in Laos if that were the only alternative to losing that nation to the Communists.”¹¹⁶ To Kennedy’s dictated recollection of this exchange, which took place just one day before assuming the office of the presidency, Eisenhower had seemingly ascribed almost as much importance to countersubversion in Laos as he did for the same in Japan. Where a potential Laotian communist regime would signal the

¹¹⁴ Hayato Ikeda, *Hayato Ikeda to Dwight D. Eisenhower, November 28, 1960*. Letter. (Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Papers as President, Int’l Series, Box 34, Japan 1960 (2), 1960).

¹¹⁵ Department of State, *Editorial Note*.

¹¹⁶ Fred I. Greenstein and Richard H. Immerman, “What Did Eisenhower Tell Kennedy About Indochina? The Politics of Misperception,” *The Journal of American History* 79, no. 2 (1992), 571.

Philippines and South Vietnam as the next dominoes to fall, a potential Japanese communist regime would signal the fall of the entirety of East Asia.

Of course, this was a thought process which, due in part to the influence of Kennedy's transition team, was on its way out the door at the same pace as Eisenhower himself. Greenstein and Immerman emphasize that "with equal frequency Eisenhower weighed the costs and benefits of intervention against other possibilities," pointing to a more nuanced approach against the brand of subversion advertised by Henry and Yeuell during the transition.¹¹⁷ However, the countersubversive actions taken by the CIA in Japan under Eisenhower, as well as the understanding of Kennedy and his advisors in relation to Eisenhower's expected implementations of foreign policy, demonstrate that the domino theory, time and again, was paramount for the operation of Eisenhower's executive framework. Conversely, Greenstein and Immerman remark that, given the precedent of the Korean War, "it was not clear that the United States could prevent particular dominoes from falling, at least not without paying unacceptable costs."¹¹⁸ To this end, the question of supporting neutrality was feasible for Kennedy's advisors to the extent that American intervention should not, in their opinion, be employed on too many fronts for the nation to handle.

Further, Kennedy's approach to the ambassadorial relationship with Japan was another key departure from that of Eisenhower. MacArthur, who had endeavored to facilitate Eisenhower's planned visit by generating sympathy for Prime Minister Kishi in his downplaying of communist agitation in Japan, enjoyed the prestige of his connection to his uncle, as well as his own career as an officer in the US Army and as a staunch ally

¹¹⁷ Greenstein and Immerman, "What Did Eisenhower Tell Kennedy About Indochina?," 579.

¹¹⁸ Greenstein and Immerman, "What Did Eisenhower Tell Kennedy About Indochina?," 584.

of Eisenhower as World War II drew to a close. With Eisenhower's choice in late 1956 to appoint MacArthur as Ambassador to Japan, a clear link to American occupation and the authoritative American presence in Japan (as codified in the Security Treaty) was established.

Alternatively, upon taking office on January 20, 1961, Kennedy sought a new avenue in demonstrating the value of mutual security with Japan for his administration. MacArthur remained at his post for roughly the first two months of Kennedy's term, after which he was replaced not with a military mind nor a holdover from the Eisenhower apparatus, but with someone whose academic insights into the US-Japan dialogue had demonstrably influenced US policy dating back to the occupation itself.

Edwin O. Reischauer, according to Nick Kapur, "had unprecedented access to the US president for an ambassador to Japan" and "made the idea of an 'equal partnership' between Japan and the United States his personal catchphrase."¹¹⁹ Importantly, Reischauer's unorthodox appointment and appeal to the Japanese public with an almost innate understanding of the challenges to mutual security influenced Kennedy to "[begin] speaking publicly of 'equal partnership' with Japan." Unlike MacArthur or Dulles, Reischauer was by all accounts a "diplomatic neophyte" whose connections with the Eisenhower administration amounted virtually to criticism.¹²⁰ Still, despite protracted congressional opposition (predominantly among members of Eisenhower's Republican Party), Reischauer ascended to MacArthur's previous post in a welcome sight for Japanese citizens still disillusioned by their perception of Japan being treated as an American subordinate under the conditions of the Security Treaty.

¹¹⁹ Kapur, *Japan at the Crossroads*, 53.

¹²⁰ Kapur, *Japan at the Crossroads*, 51.

An academic authority born and raised in Japan by Presbyterian missionaries, Reischauer, in spite of his diplomatic inexperience, not only understood the challenges to mutual security but also the customs and language of the nation from which he had established his views of the world. Late in Reischauer's life, the *New York Times* opined on his reputation as "America's foremost expert on Japan," noting that "his life aim... was to draw attention to Asia" in the US.¹²¹ In accordance with this aim, Reischauer's contributions through previous scholarship to the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations' perception of the 'broken dialogue' were cognizant of a bilateral relationship wherein "an American failure... to reach out to the Japanese people and understand their legitimate concerns" superseded ideas, similar to those of Nixon during the 1960 campaign, of "communist success" in the stead of American hegemony.¹²²

Conversely, though Japan had also been MacArthur's first ambassadorial appointment, his relationship with the Kishi cabinet and the Security Treaty's revision displayed a strong commitment to bilateral relations, albeit on American impositions. The idea suggested by Clifford that recognizing the neutrality of key polities like Laos in the balance of power dynamic could help to alleviate "any future conflict involving the Communist states" was summarily rejected by MacArthur's diplomatic style and support for strategic armament.¹²³ For instance, though MacArthur's support for Japanese rearmament along the trajectory paved by Dulles extended only as far as the status quo would allow, MacArthur nonetheless pursued peripheral avenues to assuring mutual security. Alongside Herter and in line with Eisenhower's countersubversion methods,

¹²¹ Special to the New York Times, "Reischauer is Feted in Capital," *The New York Times*, October 16, 1985, <https://www.nytimes.com/1985/10/16/world/reischauer-is-feted-in-capital.html>.

¹²² Kapur, *Japan at the Crossroads*, 46.

¹²³ Clifford, *Eisenhower-Kennedy meeting*, 42.

MacArthur coordinated the permissibility of “U-2 equipment” to “fly... intelligence missions over non-Japanese territories from US facilities in Japan” on the basis of “prior consultation” with the Japanese government.¹²⁴ This consultation, which in the final days of the Eisenhower administration still reflected the lack of substantive connection highlighted by Reischauer, had been another vague concept amidst the transition. What form such consultation should take was viewed at great contrast between the outgoing and incoming ambassadors.

For MacArthur, consultation with Japan was a process which valued, above all, the diplomatic goals of the Eisenhower administration. With respect to Anpo, continuing to accept Kishi’s adamant perspective regarding the ratification of the revised Security Treaty despite the disturbance of left-wing subversive elements was key to upholding the ultimately ill-fated prospect of a state visit to Japan. In light of the rearmament issue, pushing the envelope to establish further bilateral cooperation relating to the American military-industrial framework (in this case, the deployment of surveillance aircraft) was a step toward a more extensive security dialogue beyond the provisions of the Security Treaty.

On Reischauer’s part, the act of consulting Japan and ensuring an equitable dialogue was hardly covert. By way of his published works, Reischauer criticized the existing system, seeking an accessible dialogue to garner the potential benefits of synthesizing not only governmental relations, but also public opinion in both the US and Japan. Kennedy’s ambassadorial appointment of Reischauer, much like his decision to tap systems analysis pioneer and Ford Motor Company president Robert McNamara for

¹²⁴ Christian A. Herter, *Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Japan (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Japan; Korea, Volume XVIII, No. 153, 1960)*.

Secretary of Defense, relied upon the transitional dialogue surrounding executive restructuring.

To this end, Laurin Henry and Donovan Yeuell, Jr. had, at the outset of the presidential transition, correctly identified a geopolitical atmosphere that challenged the structural integrity of the executive foreign policy apparatus. They further advised, in avoidance of a lapse in projections of American executive authority, that the president-elect place the existing Sino-Soviet sphere at the top of his list of priorities via scrupulous policy analysis.

Upon Kennedy's election, he and his transition team identified Asia, from Laos to Japan, as a region which required the utmost consideration for the employment of mutual security. The situation of communist subversion in Laos, for Kennedy's team, provided a springboard from which to question the applicability of Eisenhower's perspective on both military intervention and the espionage establishment. Additionally, Kennedy's disconnect with Eisenhower on Yeuell's advice left nuclear sharing, as well as previously employed countersubversive initiatives in Japan, out in the cold.

With these considerations, had there been an interregnum in American leadership during the Eisenhower-Kennedy transition? Did foreign policy lapse in such a manner as to embolden Sino-Soviet advances in Asia, and more pointedly, upon Japan itself? Clearly, in the realm of countersubversion, the espionage establishment had been allowed to continue influencing the course of Japanese development during a Japanese election which took place in the midst of the American transition period. Still, Eisenhower-era quandaries in relation to the spread of communism in Asia extended into transitional meetings, forcing questions about the necessity of foreign intervention. The subject of

nuclear sharing with Japan returned to prominence with the recommendations of the Brookings team, albeit to no avail by the time Kennedy took office. As such, the only merit amidst the consultation and confusion was the continued strength of the Security Treaty, as decisive foreign policy measures would not be taken until 1961.

The measure which perhaps best answers the question of the true effectiveness of the presidential transition is the state visit of Hayato Ikeda to Washington in June of 1961. In a reversal of what Eisenhower had attempted to effect with Kishi the previous summer, diplomacy between the American and Japanese leaders took place far outside the scope of the communist subversion that impacted both Eisenhower's cancellation and Kishi's resignation.

For Kennedy, the issue of "collective defense" dominated the international security-related deliberations of the state visit, which primarily dealt with the export of Chinese communism over projections of Soviet hegemony.¹²⁵ Maintaining the spirit of the presidential transition with respect to foreign intervention, concurrence with Japan on "strong hopes that a genuinely independent and neutral Laos will come into being" was "imperative and indispensable for the stability of the Far East" to the same degree that South Korea and South Vietnam were concerned.¹²⁶ On this point, Kennedy followed Clifford's recommendations to the letter. He had, in the early days of his administration, divorced himself from Eisenhower's perceived view that military intervention was a necessary consideration, even as a last resort, given communist intransigence in Southeast Asia. The Kennedy administration remained committed, just as with its

¹²⁵ *Japanese Talking Paper on the Situation in the Far East* (John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers, President's Office Files, Countries, Japan: Security: Ikeda visit briefing book, June 1961), 2.

¹²⁶ *Japanese Talking Paper on the Situation in the Far East*, 2.

predecessor, to “helping to establish... regimes friendly to the democracies which can effectively carry out political and economic progress on a long-range basis.”¹²⁷

Under Eisenhower, Dulles worked to gradually pressure Japan into mutual security, owing to a general assessment that the country was not ready to provide for its own self-defense. The tough and often dismissive diplomacy exercised by Dulles had unwarranted consequences. Namely, in the frustration of the postwar Japanese governments in attempts to more equitably negotiate the terms of international collaboration, a reciprocal pressure existed via “threats of Japanese noncooperation” which extended from mutual security to trade liberalization.¹²⁸ By the time the troubled Eisenhower-Kishi dynamic had been replaced in the parallel rise of Kennedy and Ikeda, though, Japan sought to encourage cooperation on mutually agreeable terms. The agreement between Kennedy’s and Ikeda’s sides on collective defense and self-determination via measured support for neutrality (as in the case of Laos) demonstrated that Japan had achieved the democratic maturity, in a different Cold War atmosphere than during the immediate postwar years, to offset Sino-Soviet hegemony.

What Eisenhower’s international security framework had achieved in valuing Japan’s Western alignment over economic development, Kennedy was able to build upon given Japan’s resulting successes. In a public statement released by the White House on the occasion of the Kennedy-Ikeda summit, the leaders’ agreement “to hold close consultations... with a view to discovering the ways and means by which stability and well-being might be achieved in [the situation in Asia]” and “to establish a Joint United States-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs... in achieving the objectives of

¹²⁷ *Japanese Talking Paper on the Situation in the Far East*, 2.

¹²⁸ Kapur, *Japan at the Crossroads*, 58.

Article II of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security” took high precedence.¹²⁹ On one end, Ikeda displayed the sentiments of an emboldened Japan seeking to chart its own course from the tumultuous period of the ‘broken dialogue.’ On the other, Kennedy, supported by Laurin Henry and the Brookings team as well as Clark Clifford and his own transitional advisors, transcended tangible fears of a full lapse in executive authority. In short, the grounding halt of an interregnum, per Henry’s estimation, had been avoided. It had been, through the reconstruction of the ‘broken dialogue’ and the highs and lows of communication between two US presidents, the primary point from which US-Japan relations could not return.

¹²⁹ Office of the White House Press Secretary, *Joint Communique Issued by the President and Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda of Japan, Following Discussions Held in Washington, D.C., June 20-21, 1961* (John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Papers of John F. Kennedy, Presidential Papers, President's Office Files, Countries, Japan: General, 1961), 1.

Chapter IV.

Paradigms

Japan, for all the fears ascribed it after nearly seven years of occupation and the following eight years of political upheaval, was the catalyst in the avoidance of an American power lapse in 1960. Both the outgoing and incoming administrations, despite their differences on executive structure and international security, viewed Japan as a critical bastion of American hegemony and considered its fall to communism unthinkable. The extent of resources funneled into the success of US-Japan relations between 1945 and 1960 had been so vast as to influence the entire American approach to foreign policy. It had been vast enough to endure political subversion from the Sino-Soviet bloc that contributed to nationwide protests on multiple occasions and threatened to cut a cord of East-West diplomacy stretching back to the mid-19th century. Yet, for all its lasting impact upon US-Japan relations and despite the prevalence of each president in the popular memory of the Cold War, the Eisenhower-Kennedy transition remains a relatively obscure historical topic.

On January 11, 1968, a national intelligence estimate published by the State Department for President Johnson concluded that “Japan is acquiring an increasingly important position in the international economic community” and “becoming progressively more assertive in world and regional affairs.”¹³⁰ Japan’s political influence was expected to grow alongside its “remarkable economic growth,” being applied

¹³⁰ Department of State, *National Intelligence Estimate (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXIX, Part 2, Japan, No. 111, 1968)*.

strongly “in support of stability and regional cooperation.”¹³¹ Not only had this assessment been produced in approximately the same amount of time since the Eisenhower-Kennedy transition as had transpired between the end of the occupation and Kennedy’s election, but it also came with a unique addendum. The State Department’s Director of Intelligence and Research, Thomas L. Hughes, noted that the preceding remarks on Japan’s importance in global affairs “greatly underestimate[d] the probable significance of the political role Japan will play in the next decade.”¹³² Hughes continued, “the chances are better than even that Japan’s international political importance will catch up to its powerful economic position within the next decade... it will be at least as important in world affairs as those countries on its own economic level, Britain, France, and West Germany, and will play a major role in Asia.”¹³³

Hughes’ predictions of what the global chessboard might look like in 1978 amounted to an overwhelmingly apparent understanding of the American impact on the national trajectory of Japan up to 1968. The Kennedy-Ikeda summit in June of 1961, which solidified the advisory efforts of Clark Clifford with respect to collective defense and demonstrated the transcendence of an interregnum during the 1960 presidential transition, resulted in new projections of mutual security with Japan. In October of 1961, the State Department circulated a guidelines paper that stated in no uncertain terms: “[W]e see Japan as our principal ally in East Asia,” whose “prerogatives and sensibilities” must be minimally infringed upon in the realm of “defense links.”¹³⁴ The

¹³¹ Department of State, *National Intelligence Estimate*.

¹³² Department of State, *National Intelligence Estimate*.

¹³³ Department of State, *National Intelligence Estimate*.

¹³⁴ Department of State, *Department of State Guidelines Paper (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XXII, Northeast Asia, No. 354, 1961)*.

Eisenhower-Kennedy transition, to the meticulously curated perspective of the State Department once led by John Foster Dulles, thus resulted in foreign policy analysis predicated concisely upon consultative values that were long sought after.

The transmission of a widely-accepted belief within the executive branch of government that “Japan stands today as a fully independent and influential member of international society,” as such a belief had been during the Kennedy administration, was an achievement which Dulles did not live to witness, but for which he strenuously endeavored.¹³⁵ The Security Treaty’s goal of gradual Japanese acceptance of responsibilities crucial for the maintenance of international security stood upon a backdrop of Sino-Soviet intransigence later expounded upon by Donovan Yeuell, Jr. and Laurin L. Henry during the Eisenhower-Kennedy transition. Hughes’ addendum to the State Department’s 1968 national intelligence estimate and his subsequent predictions confirm that such a goal, despite the broader circumstances of the international balance of power, had not been established in vain.

The Paradigm of Influence

In equating Japan with NATO partners, Hughes contributed to a paradigm which persists in contemporary international affairs through partnerships like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad) and the strategy of maintaining a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) first introduced by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2016. The responsibility of Japan, Abe declared, was to “[foster] the confluence of the Pacific and Indian Oceans... into a place that values freedom, the rule of law, and the market economy, free

¹³⁵ Department of State, *Department of State Guidelines Paper*.

from force or coercion, and [make] it prosperous.”¹³⁶ In building upon the guidelines of US-Japan relations set forth via the Security Treaty and the 1960 presidential transition, Japan was enabled in its independence and influence, as described by the State Department under Kennedy, to externally pursue the objectives initially set in place for its own development in the wake of the American occupation.

Such a paradigm follows a calculation made by Edwin O. Reischauer during the Johnson administration that the “policy of promoting a stronger Japan is succeeding remarkably well... mainly because the Japanese themselves are able and intend to grow more powerful.”¹³⁷ The acknowledgment here is of an underlying motive on the part of the Japanese government to engage in international affairs on the premise of the mutual security achieved as a consequence of American policy – an understanding on the part of Japan in examining its geopolitical position amidst the Cold War balance of power dynamic and charting a path for its improvement. This can be seen across multiple instances: Shigeru Yoshida’s qualms with respect to rearmament in the immediate aftermath of the occupation; Nobusuke Kishi’s stance regarding the renewal of the Security Treaty; and Hayato Ikeda’s commitment to reconciliation and restructuring with the US following the Anpo protests. Each step along this path was a complement to the foreign policy shift that occurred under the auspices of the Eisenhower-Kennedy transition, particularly via changes in executive reorganization and collective security.

¹³⁶ Shinzo Abe, “Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Opening Session of the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI),” transcript of remarks delivered at Nairobi, Kenya, August 27, 2016. https://www.mofa.go.jp/af/af2/page4e_000496.html.

¹³⁷ Edwin O. Reischauer, *Airgram From the Embassy in Japan to the Department of State (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXIX, Part 2, Japan, No. 35, 1964)*.

On Kennedy's consultative approach to Japan alone, which drew a clear distinction between his and Eisenhower's diplomacy, the Ikeda government capitalized on the benefits of mutual security with the US. In the year following the 1961 summit, Ikeda represented Japan's stake in the Cold War balance of power dynamic by issuing "a sharply worded open letter to Nikita Khrushchev urging a comprehensive [nuclear] test ban treaty" based upon a personal conviction that the Soviet Union had "in complete defiance of the hopes of mankind, unilaterally broke[n] the moratorium on nuclear weapons testing."¹³⁸ Further, Ikeda's government followed the trend of its predecessors by holding the US government to account with respect to consultation in accordance with the provisions of the Security Treaty. Whereas the Dulles State Department's critical tendencies caused diplomatic friction during the years leading to Anpo, the Japanese government stressed that "although the 1960 treaty did not mandate prior consultation," unilateral American action in East Asia without prior notice "violated the spirit of the promise of consultation Kennedy had given Ikeda."¹³⁹ This is not to suggest that there had been a role reversal in terms of diplomatic treatment between the US and Japan under Kennedy, but rather that, due to Kennedy's new approach, mutual security afforded Japan agency in the Cold War.

Kapur's conclusion that the restoration of the 'broken dialogue' had "placed the U.S.-Japan partnership on a much more equal footing, and thus marked a fundamental shift from how it had stood in the Eisenhower years" is resoundingly accurate.¹⁴⁰ However, in noting that Kennedy and Ikeda had facilitated a "foundational compromise"

¹³⁸ Kapur, "Mending the 'Broken Dialogue,'" 509.

¹³⁹ Kapur, "Mending the 'Broken Dialogue,'" 509.

¹⁴⁰ Kapur, "Mending the 'Broken Dialogue,'" 491.

predicated upon “balancing U.S. Cold War aims with Japanese economic objectives,” the essence of the American pursuit of mutual security with Japan from 1952 through the 1960 transition is lost.¹⁴¹ From the precarious subject of nuclear sharing to intergovernmental consultation on the prospect of certain nations’ neutrality in order to reassess the state of affairs upon the global chessboard, nothing in the Eisenhower-Kennedy transition suggests the primacy of Japan’s economic objectives. If the period from November of 1960 to January of 1961 represents as fundamental a shift as Kapur suggests, particularly in light of the political ramifications dating back to the occupation years and the inception of the Eisenhower administration, it is a shift which does not disregard Japan’s capacity for economic success, but which nonetheless values to a far greater extent Japan’s ability to contribute to the emergence of a broadly democratic world.

From Yoshida to Ikeda, Japan itself emerged from the post-occupation mindset, fostering its own economic destiny, let alone a national trajectory that made its Cold War preeminence obvious to the State Department through subsequent presidential administrations. The turmoil from Bloody May Day to Anpo and the resignation of Kishi, in his staunch support for the Security Treaty, was the impetus for Ikeda to announce a shift in internal focus from political divisions to economic recovery. The result was an ‘Income-Doubling Plan’ so vast in its implementation that the concept of Japanization, or a wholesale assimilation to Japanese customs and culture, was viewed as a tangible possibility in the modernizing Western world of the 1970s and 1980s.

¹⁴¹ Kapur, “Mending the ‘Broken Dialogue,’” 491.

Such a result falls directly in line with Hughes' 1968 predictions, which, just as with official US policy through the transition of almost eight years prior, primarily acknowledged Japan's self-determination and increased assertiveness in global affairs. The State Department at that time had indeed outlined a continuing Japanese reliance upon the US "for its strategic security" through 1970, but emphasized that Japan would "also improve its conventional military capabilities, particularly its air and sea defense forces" in light of the pressing geopolitical challenges of the time.¹⁴² This was the signal for another paradigm: that Japan, though emergent in the 1960s from its post-occupation political malaise, was obliged to remain connected to the US for strategic security.

The Paradigm of Reliance

On the preceding premise, any internal development on the part of Japan related to defense could conceivably be overlooked *by* the US as a development occurring due to the influence *of* the US, while Japan clearly forged a new economic path forward under Ikeda's 'Income-Doubling Plan.' Of course, US influence in Japan's postwar geostrategic development was a product of both the occupation and the quandary of rearmament, which defined the dialogue between Dulles and Jirō Shirasu during the Truman-Eisenhower transition in 1952. However, the State Department under Johnson had its projections regarding the extent of Japanese involvement in the Cold War balance of power dynamic amended by Hughes' own predictions, signaling optimism about Japan on the basis of mutual security and consultation that had been effected during the Eisenhower-Kennedy transition.

¹⁴² Department of State, *National Intelligence Estimate*.

These impacts are certainly underscored by subsequent US-Japan cooperative efforts, especially in the 21st century, given the geostrategic importance ascribed to the Quad and the FOIP framework. Regardless, perhaps the most notable challenge to the mutual security commitment enjoyed between Kennedy and Ikeda came within the timeframe of Hughes' expectations for Japan's national development.

On October 25, 1971, the United Nations General Assembly, without the support of either the US or Japan, voted to “recogniz[e] that the representatives of the Government of the People's Republic of China are the only lawful representatives of China to the United Nations,” effectively removing Taiwanese representation from the UN.¹⁴³ Up to this point, the shared understanding between the US and Japan regarding Sino-Soviet intransigence had bolstered cooperation, though National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger was apt to conduct diplomacy with both the PRC and Japan for the administration of now-President Richard Nixon, which culminated in the “Nixon shocks of 1971.”¹⁴⁴ Concurrent to the UN resolution, Nixon announced a state visit to China that he later dubbed the ‘week that changed the world’ in February of 1972, a phrase that owed to the visit's impact upon the already precarious Sino-Soviet split. It was not long after that scholar Fuji Kamiya, reflecting upon the key developments in US-Japan relations up to 1972, argued that the LDP under Kishi had been primarily concerned with using the Security Treaty as a means to strengthen Japan's national security in close ties with the US under Eisenhower. However, Kamiya wrote, subsequent developments

¹⁴³ United Nations General Assembly resolution 2758, Restoration of the lawful rights of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations, A/RES/2758 (October 25, 1971), available from <https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/327/74/PDF/NR032774.pdf?OpenElement>.

¹⁴⁴ Kapur, *Japan at the Crossroads*, 66.

beyond this effort had proven that “the Japanese-U.S. partnership of the 1960s disappeared for good with the changes that brought relations between the two countries to a new turning point in the early 1970s.”¹⁴⁵ Notably, between 1970 and 1972 Nixon transitioned from defining US-Japan relations “as a simple ‘partnership’” to calling for a “more mature and reciprocal partnership” in light of “a wide range of new developments and policy changes” on both sides of the US-Japan dialogue beyond the Kennedy years.¹⁴⁶

Further, Kapur expounds upon the pivotal reality that “Reischauer was so deeply angered by Nixon’s actions” because of the pursuit of diplomatic ties with the PRC to effectively offset Soviet hegemony beyond that which had been discussed with Japan in previous years.¹⁴⁷ In nearly a decade, Japan had gone from making demands of the Soviets to being unilaterally excluded from one of the most impactful foreign policy decisions of the entire Cold War.

Though this development represented a new series of strains upon a dialogue broken and restored, I hold that the Nixon shocks and the UN recognition of the PRC as the legitimate Chinese government do not negate either Japan’s important place in the Cold War balance of power dynamic or its primacy in US foreign policy upon geostrategic rather than economic grounds. Though the Japanese government was not party to the foreign policy shift vis-à-vis the PRC, there still exists sufficient evidence to suggest that American interests were sharply concentrated toward mutual security due to the influences of the Eisenhower-Kennedy transition.

¹⁴⁵ Kamiya, “Japanese-U.S. Relations and the Security Treaty,” 718.

¹⁴⁶ Kamiya, “Japanese-U.S. Relations and the Security Treaty,” 718.

¹⁴⁷ Kapur, *Japan at the Crossroads*, 67.

On one hand, Kissinger, alongside officials from the State and Defense Departments, the CIA, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, asked around the time of Nixon's initial announcement of the China trip if "we want the Japanese to... depend entirely upon us, or [if] we want them to take a more autonomous stance."¹⁴⁸ On the other, this question came with the understanding that Japan, regardless of the current state of diplomacy, had solidly achieved a clear "development and security role" and a "great power status" which Kissinger acknowledged on a basis which remained, in the tradition of Kennedy, far more consultative than what had existed under Eisenhower.¹⁴⁹

For instance, during a late August 1971 meeting with Japanese ambassador Nobuhiko Ushiba, Kissinger mentioned repeatedly that "[w]e consider our friendship with Japan the keystone of our Pacific policy" and that "U.S./Japanese friendship is a key element in our foreign policy."¹⁵⁰ Still, Kissinger pointed out succinctly that "our relationship must be redefined" and that "[w]e and [Japan] have to raise our sights above the purely economic matters of the post-war period," which had been marked by a troubling Japanese emergence into the Cold War which Kissinger argued was still foremost in the consciousness of the American public.¹⁵¹ If this perspective holds any weight, it is likely that the paradigm of reliance transcends Japan's clear Cold War contributions due to its convenience.

Beyond this, developments stretching beyond the Kennedy administration and into the Johnson and Nixon years warrant Kamiya's contemporaneous skepticism that the

¹⁴⁸ National Security Council, *Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XIX, Part 2, Japan, 1969-1972, No. 87, 1971)*.

¹⁴⁹ National Security Council, *Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting*.

¹⁵⁰ National Security Council, *Memorandum of Conversation (Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XIX, Part 2, Japan, 1969-1972, No. 90, 1971)*.

¹⁵¹ National Security Council, *Memorandum of Conversation*.

Kennedy-Ikeda dynamic, deemed a resounding success in light of the 1961 summit, may very well have dissolved, particularly as a result of the changing American attitude toward China in a gambit to hasten the broader dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Nixon administration's well-documented pursuit of *realpolitik*, as portrayed through the Nixon shocks and the Japanese government's subsequent feelings over the lack of prior consultation, surely prove the far-reaching impacts of such a gambit.

In contrast, I offer that even this change in the American attitude toward foreign policy proves the resilience of the security framework adopted during the Eisenhower-Kennedy changeover, precisely because of its proclivity to avoid an interregnum, as well as its place in the nucleus of the US-Japan special relationship. From the UN resolution granting the PRC's diplomatic legitimacy to the present liberal democratic geopolitical stasis supported by the Quad and FOIP, the paradigm of reliance is transcended by the accomplishments of the Security Treaty and the 1960 transition.

Reliance by any measure upon hegemonies, particularly on the part of a defeated nation in the aftermath of a vast and sweeping international conflict, is necessary for the sake of national or cultural preservation. Japan, having been afforded the prospect of its own cultural preservation in 1945, was also subject to the greatest political tensions in a generation. In light of hitherto unseen political pluralism, the open influence of the first communist nations, widespread protest and violence, a cancelled state visit, and the resignation of a prime minister, Japan proceeded with the conditions set forth in a binding agreement with its former enemy. The result, though still marked by upheaval, was a consultative dialogue heralded to the brink and back which, through the threshold of the

Eisenhower-Kennedy transition, established Japan's global precedence beyond the fall of the Soviet Union.

Despite their antithesis to one another, within the paradigms of both influence and reliance is the clear confidence of the American foreign policy apparatus in the perseverance of the Japanese democratic experiment. For the former paradigm stands the work of Laurin L. Henry, Donovan Yeuell, Jr., Clark Clifford, and Edwin O. Reischauer, whose governmental influence provided the pillars for the consultative US-Japan relationship forged through the mire of the 1960 transition. For the latter are John Foster Dulles, Christian A. Herter, Douglas MacArthur II, and Henry Kissinger, whose hesitance toward mutual security due to the broader developments of the Cold War over the course of approximately two decades was nonetheless as apparent as their belief in a strong, NATO-adjacent Japan.

Above the paradigms are Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy themselves – the heads of state whose relationships with Nobusuke Kishi and Hayato Ikeda respectively showed unique commitments to the policy views and recommendations of those who served in their presidential administrations. For his spartan organization of the executive branch in pushing for the most security-conscious renewal of the Security Treaty, Eisenhower favored *consolidation*, opting to approach Japan as a fallible mega-domino in a bipolar world thrust into an uncertain nuclear age. From the campaign trail to the White House itself, Kennedy sought *consultation*, recognizing the danger of a communist Japan as vividly as his predecessor, though with the precepts of measured diplomacy in mind following the internal Japanese malaise exemplified by the Anpo protests. For Kennedy and his advisors, the two poles which have come to define the

modern conceptualization of the Cold War balance of power dynamic were not unilaterally defined but segmented, and just as well could not be assessed on a unilateral basis.

With Japan as its crux and in its many foreign policy preoccupations, the presidential transition of 1960 cemented a fundamental change on the Cold War map from a game of dominoes to a game of chess. The question of mutual security – its principles, methods of execution, and implementation via separate paradigms – turned a ‘broken dialogue’ into a persisting special relationship of multigenerational consequence in the realm of foreign policy. Through the lens of mutual security, the intricacy of the process between presidential administrations and projections of executive power ranged significantly. It ranged from the initial presidential ascendance of Dwight D. Eisenhower, amidst the backdrop of an occupation’s end and the Bloody May Day riots, to the near-shattering of diplomacy through Anpo and the reconstruction of US-Japan relations under John F. Kennedy and his transition team. The process continued well past mid-century, culminating in new concepts of Japanese assertiveness in geopolitics and demonstrating the success of the post-1960 dialogue amidst challenges under Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard Nixon. It persists now, almost a quarter of the way into the 21st century, all but verifying Japan’s role as America’s critical – and perpetual – geostrategic partner.

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