



From the Streets to the Party Lists: Electoral Advantages of Social Movement Activism

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From the Streets to the Party Lists: Electoral Advantages of Social Movement Activism

A dissertation presented

by

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to

The Department of Government

in partial fulfillment of the requirements
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in the subject of
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Abstract

Social movements form political parties, influence policy outcomes, and contribute to the renewal of political elites by supplying political candidates. Yet, we know little about the relationship between contentious and electoral politics. What are the electoral advantages of participation in social movement activism and under what conditions are those advantages the highest?

In this dissertation, I employ a mixed-methods design to argue that movement roots can provide activists with a reputational advantage, particularly useful in times of political crisis. When voters look for alternatives to the establishment, movement leaders can successfully play into the discourse of the society versus the state and establish credentials as authentic representatives of the people. Using the cases of post-transition Poland and Spain, I show that these credentials serve as particularly valuable heuristics in contexts with high uncertainty and low information such as new democracies. However, they can increase the chances of activists getting elected also in times of other political crises. Under conditions of party system volatility and decline of trust in government institutions, parties seek to energize their bases by developing closer ties to social movements. Attendance of established politicians at demonstrations, similarly to highlighting activist origins, can serve as a form of costly signaling of responsiveness to the concerns of constituents.

However, reputational benefits decline over time. Whereas uncertainty increases the value of activist reputation, the stability of the party system limits its appeal. First, when party labels are highly informative, voters are less reliant on activism as a heuristic for valence attributes. Second, when movements operate within an established party system, they are perceived along partisan lines. When protest participation signals an ideological position, it increases support only among voters in close proximity to candidate's inferred ideal point but at the cost of losing other voters.

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1 | The Interface Between Movement and Parties

1.1 Introduction

From Podemos in Spain through the Five Star Movement in Italy to En Marche in France, parties with origins in social movements have recently once again become important political actors in Western and Southern Europe, bringing activists into parliaments and local governments. In Eastern Europe, populist right parties have aligned with nationalist movements and their opponents with movements against democratic backsliding. Against a backdrop of gradual decline of traditional party politics and voters' discontent with the establishment, the boundary between social movements and parties has become more permeable as movements form party organizations and political parties adopt movement-like structures and tactics and recruit candidates with ties to civil society.

Leaders and numerous MPs of new parties on the left in Southern Europe – such as Podemos in Spain or Five Star Movement in Italy – have roots in social movements and maintain “multiple belongings” (Della Porta and Diani 2009) through activity both in the parliament and in the streets.¹ Some activists-turned-politicians see the distinction between activism and politics as artificial: their activism has always had an explicitly political character and their work within institutions is a pursuit of the same goals with other means,² while others refuse to call themselves politicians.³ Regardless of how they define themselves, politicians with movement backgrounds have expanded traditional party repertoires through extra-institutional mobilization by participat-

¹Author Interviews with Ana Marcello Santos, Pilar Lima, Sofia Castenon, Unidos Podemos parliamentarian. All interviewees were Podemos Senators or MPs at the time of the interview. Interviews were conducted in Madrid in 2016 and 2017.

²Author Interview with Nacho Margui, a councillor in the local government in Madrid and an activist in neighborhood associations. Interview was conducted in Madrid in November 2017. Ricardo Sixto, MP of Unidos Podemos put it this way: “a political party is never an end in itself. It is an instrument for the transformation of society.” Author Interview. Madrid, October, 2016.

³Author Interview with Vicente Jimenez, Unidos Podemos Senator, October 2016.

ing in street demonstrations and brought contentious tactics into the institutional sphere by staging occupations and sit-ins at government sites (Kitschelt 2006; Mosca 2015).

While movements have adopted organizational forms of political parties, changing the institutional environments within which they have become permanent fixtures, established parties have made tactical choices in the opposite direction by developing intersecting institutional and non-institutional facets (Tarrow 2011) in response to “movementization” of their electoral bases⁴ (Meyer and Tarrow 2018, p.6) or as a strategy following electoral defeat (Szabo 2015). Right-wing parties such as Freedom Party in Austria or Lega Nord in Italy have also sought to maintain a “movement character” through high levels of mobilization, low degree of institutionalization, and reliance on participatory and plebiscitary decision-making combined with a political style centered on emotions (especially fear), theatrics, and showmanship (Heinisch 2003). In Hungary, FIDESZ opened up to citizen initiatives and created a mobilization strategy based on civil society to become a “hybrid party” (Szabo 2015). Parties on the left have recruited activists with intersecting movement-party identities onto their party lists and adopted movement strategies in electoral campaigns (Heaney and Rojas 2013; Lisi 2018). The rise of a “movement society” (Meyer and Tarrow 1998) and decline in traditional party politics and organization (Mair 1994, 2013; Wolinetz and Zaslove 2017; Detterbeck 2018) have legitimated the use of nonconventional, disruptive tactics typically employed by social movements by establishment politicians and within an institutional sphere.

At the heart of these two macro-processes, which bring movements and parties closer together, are political actors who cross the boundaries between institutional and noninstitutional politics: movement activists who run for office and established politicians who join mass protests. And yet despite their practical and theoretical significance, we know little about them and the effect the hybrid character of their political activity has on their electoral prospects. Literatures on electoral and contentious politics are rarely in dialogue with each other (McAdam and Tarrow 2010). Most of the research on the influence of protest on politics focuses on the impact of movement’s tactical choices, framing strategies, and organizational characteristics on outcomes such as recognition,

⁴In the United States, this occurred in response to the Civil Rights movement and the corresponding countermovement (Meyer and Tarrow 2018). More recently, the Tea Party dramatically changed the character of the Republican Party (Skocpol and Williamson 2016) and Donald Trump’s electoral campaign “enlivened the extreme right-wing fringes of the American social movement scene” (Meyer and Tarrow 2018, p.4). On the Democratic side, 2018 midterm elections brought a crop of new Congresswomen who had been involved in women’s, labor, and environmental movements.

public opinion shifts, agenda-setting, and policy change (Gamson 1975; Clemens 1993; Tarrow 1993; Tarrow and Tollefson 1994; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Cress and Snow 2000; Andrews 2004; Giugni 2004b; Olzak and Soule 2009; Bosi, Giugni, and Uba 2016; Huff and Kruszewska 2016). However, similar to the formation of lasting political parties by social movements (Maguire 1995; Kitschelt 2006), the presence of activists inside state structures provides opportunities for impact through “continuing leverage over political processes” (Amenta et al. 2010) of actors who “straddle the borders between the state and the movement” (Banaszak 2005). Similarly, literature on political opportunity structures considers the importance of political parties as allies to social movements (Kriesi 1995; McAdam et al. 1996) but does not explore their intersection – individuals with membership in both organizations who serve as a link or a bridge more than an ally.

This manuscript explores the interface between social movements and political parties by asking the questions: what are the electoral advantages of participation in social movement activism and under what conditions are those advantages the highest? I argue that movement roots can provide activists with a reputational advantage by signaling integrity and potential for authentic representation. These credentials serve as particularly valuable heuristics in contexts with high uncertainty and low information such as early elections in new democracies. However, they can increase the chances of activists getting elected also in times of other political crises, which occur within democratic systems. When the ruling elite becomes discredited, voters look for alternatives to the establishment and movement leaders can successfully play into the discourse of the society versus the state, contributing to a renewal of political elites. Under conditions of party system volatility, fatigue with the establishment, and decline of trust in the government institutions, parties also seek to energize their bases by developing closer ties to social movements not only by recruiting activists for office but also through the presence of established politicians at marches and demonstrations, as well as bringing previously marginalized movements into the mainstream. Similarly to highlighting activist origins, participation in protest can serve as a form of costly signaling, allowing politicians to present themselves as “one of the people” and responsive to the concerns of the constituents. Yet, I show that reputational benefits, more ephemeral than material resources, have a short half-life and decline over time as the party system stabilizes. Moreover, when political parties are strong, even movements that position themselves above the ideological divide are perceived through a partisan lens, making it harder to build broad coalitions and limiting the beneficial effects of activist

background to a smaller segment of the electorate.

In the study, I focus on four cases by examining closely two moments of political crisis of incumbent regimes that created windows of opportunity for the entrance of activists into politics and closer ties between movements and parties in two countries: democratization and the current populist moment in Spain and Poland. The establishment of democracy and the moment of disillusionment with the post-transition regime both represent critical junctures in which the boundary between contentious and institutional politics became more permeable. Moreover, contrasting Spain in the 1970s and 2010s and Poland in 1990s and 2010s makes it possible to explore the electoral advantage of contentious activity under party systems that differ in their degree of institutionalization and analyze how partisanship shapes perceptions of protest involvement.

1.2 Research Question

At first glance, there is little reason to believe activists would thrive in institutional politics. In the words of a prominent Solidarity dissident, Adam Michnik, “it is very rare that those same people who had undeniable accomplishments in the fight against the dictatorship, in the fight for freedom, that those same people could be successful as professional politicians in a democratic country” because “as long as you are dealing with a dictatorship, you are simply to be unbroken. But the milk and wine of democracy is compromise.”⁵ Social science literature calls this “an inherent tension between the logic of movement activism and the logic of electoral politics” (McAdam and Tarrow 2010) – the logic of disruption versus the logic of compromise, which are seen as irreconcilable (Michels 1915; Piven and Cloward 1979). Political science characterizes activists as reluctant to invest in party structures and to accept hierarchies (Kitschelt 2006; Kruszewska 2016), suggesting they may be seen as uncooperative and ineffective in political roles. Activists are outsiders, used to bypassing official decision-making channels to which they don’t have access and challenging the powerholders through disruption and polarization of public opinion (Piven and Cloward 1979; McAdam 1983; Gamson 1990) – tactics that appear extreme when employed by insiders. Studies in social psychology show that activists from some movements such as feminist and environmental movements are indeed perceived as radical and militant (Bashir et al. 2013), making them seem less

⁵Interview with Author, Warsaw, December 20, 2016.

likable and likely ill-fitted for public office. They may also be perceived as inexperienced in governing and lacking policy expertise, especially if the movement goals they bring into the institutional sphere appear unrealistic.

Political candidates emergent out of movements, especially pro-democracy movements, might also face challenges in building political parties since protests are often based on “unruly alliances of groups which have divergent interests” beyond opposition to the regime or government policies. Converting a movement coalition into a party base can be challenging because “as movements become parties, these divisions and tendencies toward fragmentation are exacerbated” (LeBas 2011, p. 249). The tasks of party-building are distinct from mobilization for protest: whereas the latter focuses on a common goal and downplays differences to build a broad movement with cross-cutting cleavages, the former, even in the case of catch-all parties, requires a more defined ideological profile, articulation of specific policies, and ability to target voters to whom they appeal most effectively (Della Porta 2016). Activists well-positioned to create frames resonating with the dissident movement might be ill-equipped to outline specific programs required to compete in elections. Principled beliefs and integrity, helpful in movement mobilization, may become obstacles in governing. As one of the first post-communist Senators representing Solidarity put it, the initial electoral list of movement’s candidates was in some ways “a catastrophe” because it contained “only decent, good, honest people with good biographies. If this was an election for saints, half of them would be perfect. But this was an election for people, who were meant to build a new world, a new economy. Those people were completely unfit for it.”⁶

Moreover, relative to established party actors, activists are often resource-poor. In new democracies, parties emerging out of opposition movements are typically at a significant material disadvantage relative to authoritarian successor parties, which go into the democratic elections with a vast network of party activists, large membership, funding, and extensive party presence in many localities across the country (Grzymala-Busse 2002; Loxton 2015). In established democracies, movement parties face a daunting task of building a party from the ground as they try to break into a political scene where other parties have established brands, loyal supporters, ties to civil society, and robust organizational structures.

⁶Interview with Andrzej Machalski. Transition Archives, Warsaw 2009/10.

Yet, despite these challenges, dissidents have formed a large part – sometimes as high as 30% – of post-transition parliaments in places as distinct as Poland, South Korea, Portugal, Brazil, and Tunisia (Freire, Viegas, and Seiceira 2009; Shin and Chang 2011; Anria 2018; Grewal 2018) and many activists were elected to offices in post-crisis Europe, especially in Spain, Italy, and Portugal (Mosca 2015; Della Porta 2016; Lisi 2018). If it’s not due to material resources or political expertise, what are the sources of electoral advantage of social movement activists and how long do those benefits persist?

1.3 Theory

1.3.1 Reputational advantage

I argue that social movement activists have a reputational advantage, which increases their chances of winning elections. Specifically, they have a non-policy advantage on the *character valence* dimension, which captures “qualities that voters and candidates intrinsically value in office holders, including integrity” (Adams et al. 2011, p.17). In case of pro-democracy movements and new democracies, dissident credentials have important moral value: candidates with roots in the pro-democracy movement can portray themselves as principled and courageous. Not only are they untainted by collaboration with the authoritarian regime (Lust and Waldner 2016) but they have demonstrated an uncompromising commitment to democracy, often enduring persecution and imprisonment for the cause (Kim, Chang, and Shin 2013).

In case of the current political crisis, reputational advantage also stems from lack of ties to a discredited political elite but one, which – albeit democratic – is perceived as failing at representing its citizens or respecting democratic institutions. The demands from movement activists concern not the introduction of democracy but its *deepening*. In contexts, such as contemporary Spain, where established elites are perceived as co-opted by business interests and out of touch with the needs of ordinary people, activists’ roots in their communities signal honesty and potential for authentic representation. For example, Italian activists supported Five Star Movement’s (M5S) candidates in order to “bring a group of trusted people into the parliament” (Mosca 2015, p.163), a sentiment which, as I will show, was shared by activists and Podemos in Spain. I expect that activists will be considered more honest because of their lack of association with and opposition to the corrupt

establishment, as well as presumed values-based (as opposed to opportunistic) involvement. In places, such as contemporary Poland, where a sizable portion of society fears the government is introducing policies, which threaten democratic institutions, participation in mass mobilization against these actions should increase the perception of candidates as holding democratic values, willing to stand up for them, and in tune with concerns of the people.

Acting on those values should make them appear more trustworthy, a trait, which is an important determinant of vote choice (Funk 1996). Voters who attempt to select a “good type” most deserving of the “honor of political authority” (Fearon 1999; Dewan and Shepsle 2011), are often motivated by “warm feelings” for a candidate (Campbell 1980) more than past performance, and reward good character in elections (Bishin, Stevens, and Wilson 2006). Therefore, they should be sensitive to aspects of candidates’ biographies, which reveal them to be highly principled, such as a record of advocacy for the people, as opposed to elites. A candidate with a history of pro-democracy or anti-eviction activism should enjoy a valence advantage as someone who “possesses non-policy characteristics that are, in effect, universally desirable” (Dewan and Shepsle 2011, p.315).

Importantly, this reputational advantage refers to more than simply being new to politics and uncompromised by ties to the discredited political class. In an atmosphere of declining trust in institutions, parties, and professional politicians, voters might favor outsiders, regardless of the type of their non-political experience (Mudde 2004; Barr 2009). However, beyond being *outsiders*, activists are also *challengers* of the powerholders on behalf of society. Therefore, activism provides an additional signal of character as a form of active representation of issues that matter “in the streets” and demonstrated commitment to values for which they advocate. From this discussion, I derive the the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1A (reputational advantage of activist origins): Activists have a reputational advantage because of lack of ties to a discredited political elite *and* a track record of advocating for the people against the elites.

Establishment politicians can imitate this advantage and signal being close to the people through participation in protest and engagement in “representative contention” (Watts 2006). Elected politicians can employ protest tactics within institutions, join street protests, or encourage and embolden more radical movements either through more explicit statements of support or absence of condemn-

ing rhetoric. Political parties can rely on the “party in the street” – mobilized party activists willing to use contentious tactics (Heaney and Rojas 2013), MPs with civil society ties, or even institutional tools that open spaces for social movements such as demonstration permits, to improve the image of the party as responsive and connected to the people. All of these tactics can have electoral benefits among the party’s supporters.

Hypothesis 1B (reputational advantage of protest participation): Establishment politicians can gain an advantage among their electorate through participation in protest activities.

1.3.2 Activism as a useful heuristic under conditions of uncertainty

I argue that the reputational advantage of social movements origins and protest participation will be highest under conditions of political crisis. Following Capoccia and Kelemen (2007), I focus on two types political crisis: collapse of the ancien regime (transition to democracy) and major challenges to the existing order and party configurations. Conditions that characterize political crisis are 1) discrediting of the governing political elites, a decline of trust in established political parties, and a challenge to the party system 2) uncertainty and electoral volatility. In a political crisis, voters demand a renewal of political elites but the instability and uncertainty creates a low-information environment, in which it is more difficult to assess alternatives.

As previous research shows, in high uncertainty and low information environments, voters tend to rely on candidate cues in making decisions (Conover and Feldman 1982, 1989). They vote less ideologically because their own positions are re-aligning along new cleavages and because they cannot be certain of the parties’ positions or ability to deliver on electoral promises. Political crises are usually accompanied by societal mobilization, which either precipitates the crisis or arises in response to it. This mobilization brings to the fore new leaders, supplying fresh candidates, who can compellingly argue that citizens’ demands are not being represented in the institutions. Political candidates’ social movement background can provide a strong signal of character that serves as a valuable heuristic for voters looking for alternatives to the establishment. Movement origins or close ties with popular mobilization, particularly in times of alienation of voters from party politics, can establish new forms of linkages and allow politicians to appear in tune with the popular mood i.e.

as “one of the people” as opposed to a member of a distant and corrupt elite.

Hypothesis 2 (political context): Uncertainty and instability reduce voters’ ability to assess party positions and make them more likely to rely on heuristics such as candidates’ social movement participation.

In this manuscript, I focus on two moments, in which high political uncertainty intensified relationships between movements and parties: (re-)emergence of party systems after a transition to democracy and citizen mobilization in light of an economic and political crisis in Europe and the accompanying shocks to party systems.

New democracies and new party systems

In new democracies, especially in cases of new party system formation post-transition (e.g. in post-communist East and Central Europe), voters face conditions of low-information and high uncertainty. The electoral landscape is fragmented, with multiple new parties with poorly-defined programs (Tucker 2006). Voters, who often have little democratic experience, struggle with associating parties with specific policies and determining which actors best represent their interests. Additionally, most parties do not have governing experience and have not yet acquired reputations for (in)effectiveness (Tavits 2013, p.2). Political parties also have little information about the electorate and might not know which constituencies to target and which cleavages to emphasize. This is especially the case in contexts where the authoritarian regime suppressed traditional social divisions such as socioeconomic class in the case of communist countries (Tavits 2013), which made the left-right dimension less relevant (Tucker 2006; Jasiewicz 2009). Therefore, particularly in post-communist Europe, “leaders of new parties [were] competing for electoral support in uncertain conditions.” In such contexts, “as the literature on contentious politics suggests, leaders of new parties are likely to act like social movement entrepreneurs seeking to mobilize potential supporters in light of varying opportunities, resources, and ways of framing their claims” (Glenn 2003b, p.165). Given the salience of the regime/opposition divide, dissident reputation serves as one of the most accessible and compelling resources and history of opposition to communism provides one of the most effective frames.

Because parties do not yet have legislative records, party labels are not informative and acquiring

political information is costly, which makes voters more likely to rely on heuristics (McDermott 1998). Moreover, in contexts where party systems are weak and fragmented and information about policy positions and competence of political actors scarce, politics tends to be personalistic and valence issues play a critical role in voting decisions (Enelow and Hinich 1982; Stokes 1992). As outlined in Section 1.3.1, former dissidents, with a history of working – and often sacrificing – for democratic values and civil rights, have an advantage on the valence dimension and a history of pro-democratic opposition should serve as a useful character cue, increasing support for the candidate.

Hypothesis 2A (new democracies): Former dissidents have an electoral advantage in early post-transition elections, especially in the low-information environment of new party systems.

Legitimacy crisis of political elites

Activism also has a reputational value in moments of electoral volatility precipitated by changes to long-standing party systems and crisis of trust in political elites. The economic and political crisis, which de-legitimized many political parties in Europe (Detterbeck 2018), and the convergence of center-right and center-left parties around the economic program make the reputational signal sent by a record of social movement activism particularly advantageous at the current moment. The “repercussions of the recent economic crisis” were especially politically consequential because they “have tapped into ongoing process of parties losing touch with society” (Detterbeck 2018) and declining party loyalty (Dalton and Wattenberg 2002). This has created a political landscape similar to conditions, which increase the value of social movement credentials in a new democracy: high level of electoral volatility, uncertainty over party positions, personalized nature of politics, and low levels of partisan attachment, generating an immediate opportunity for social movement activists to enter institutional politics.

Specifically, the economic crisis has exposed or exacerbated two aspects of politics, which I argue created a moment of opportunity for movements to influence institutional politics through the supply of candidates with contentious origins. First, policy convergence of mainstream parties on neoliberal and austerity policies deprived voters of viable alternatives. This increased the perception that establishment parties are components of undifferentiated political class (Abedi 2002), a belief

strengthened by the behavior of both left-wing and right-wing governments equally constrained by international actors in their reaction to the crisis. It also created an environment of uncertainty, in which parties of the established left could no longer credibly claim to represent their constituents' preferences or deliver on electoral promises. In contrast, popular anti-austerity movements and activists from the traditionally left, radical social movement sectors such as anti-eviction activists could, through their contentious credentials, signal their ideological position and unwavering commitment to welfare issues.

Second, the economic and financial crisis in Europe escalated into a political crisis because it exposed the long-term hollowing out of politics (Mair 2013), alienation of the elites, and their inability (and/or unwillingness) to handle the crisis, further increasing political disaffection (Montero, Gunther, and Torcal 1997; Torcal and Montero 2006; Torcal 2014). One of the political consequences of the recession was the broadening of the gap between established parties and segments of society affected by the crisis (Bartels and Bermeo 2013). In times of “threat, urgency, and uncertainty,” which characterize post-crisis Europe (Coller, Cordero, and Jaime-Castillo 2018), “old relationships crumble and new ones have to be constructed,” making politics more fluid (Gourevitch 1986), and facilitating the entrance of new political actors. I argue that the current political crisis creates conditions under which heuristics other than party labels become important. Perception that elites do not represent the people, that they are corrupt, increases demand for candidates who are seen as *from the people* and honest. Activists with track records of advocating on behalf of their communities have an advantage on that dimension, creating an opportunity for them to enter into institutional politics, especially at times of high movement mobilization and popularity, which makes the boundary between the politics of the streets and the politics of institutions more permeable.

In Poland, which was not affected by the economic crisis, the discrediting of the political elites has nevertheless taken place on both sides of the political spectrum. First, the period of governance by Civic Platform (PO) ended amidst weakening support following dashed expectations, corruption scandals, and a half-hearted electoral campaign (Fomina and Kucharczyk 2016).⁷ Like in Spain, the electoral landscape changed dramatically because of a “widespread disillusionment with the

⁷The “tape affair” in particular, in which a newspaper published transcripts of secret tape recordings from a Warsaw restaurant showing high-level PO officials cynically and crudely discussing public affairs over an expensive, taxpayer funded meal, revealed the political elite as completely out of touch with the people (Szczerbiak 2017, p.408).

country’s political establishment and elite” (Szczurbiak 2017, p.405) with a stunning victory by opposition Law and Justice and entrance into the parliament of an anti-system party led by a former rock singer (Kukiz ’15).⁸ Second, the current government of Law and Justice, despite enjoying nearly unfaltering support from its electorate, has disapproval ratings as high as 75% and 90% among supporters of opposition parties. Similar proportions among that segment of society approve of the movement against democratic backsliding (KOD). The most frequent reason cited for opposing the government are their actions against democratic institutions, especially the justice system.⁹ Unlike in Spain, where ideological convergence of mainstream parties makes the movement signal informative, in Poland, the partisan polarization of the electorate creates a context in which participation in protests is a way to strongly signal membership in a political camp.

Hypothesis 2B (crisis): Social movement activism has a positive value in times of electoral volatility and crisis of trust in political elites.

1.3.3 Temporal dimension

Over time, however, we may expect parties with movement origins to institutionalize (Michels 1915), activists-in-office faced with institutional pressures to start behaving more like traditional politicians (Grodsky 2012), and the cycle of contention to subside (Koopmans 2004). Mutual benefits of party-movement relationships are usually short-lived. Movements fear co-optation and de-mobilization; parties fear radicalization that pulls them away from the median voter, instability, and lack of autonomy or capture by the movement’s agenda (Heaney and Rojas 2007). The relationship usually weakens or breaks down (Grodsky 2012) until another moment of change, when an alliance with a different movement might be more beneficial. With the decline of movements, which propelled activists into office, and the post-crisis routinization of politics, unless political conditions remain unstable, the electoral advantage of activists should diminish as well.

In new democracies, where regime change was precipitated by a successful social movement, amidst the uncertainty of the transitional moment, contention and policy are not yet being dis-

⁸According to a 2015 CBOS Study Report (Number 179), 25% of Law and Justice’s 2015 electorate voted for them because of discontent with PO’s politics, which they perceived as corrupt, out of touch, and only serving the rich. 72% of respondents declared dissatisfaction with Poland’s political system.

⁹CBOS Study Report 2016, Number 103.

tinguished. Over time, however, voters receive more information about candidates' and parties' priorities, policies, and behavior in office and rely less on initial values-based heuristics. Furthermore, despite low levels of partisan identification in new democracies (Huber, Kernell, and Leoni 2005; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007; Dalton and Weldon 2007), partisanship strengthens with the age of party system (Brader and Tucker 2001; Brader, Tucker, and Duell 2013) as more stable voter-party linkages develop. Politics becomes less personalistic and the focus shifts to policy considerations, which means that history of dissident activity declines in importance relative to interest representation and partisan identity. This has the following implications: in early elections, pro-democracy movement's popularity gets its leaders elected based on their dissident reputation but that popularity wanes as voters increasingly care about policy and develop partisan identifications. Similarly, in the moment of crisis, parties temporarily lose monopoly over political resources, allowing movements to enter political scene through individual candidates in established parties or new parties with movement origins. However, as parties regain their control over their electorates and representatives, candidates' movement roots will matter less than their partisan affiliation.

Hypothesis 3 (temporal dimension): The value of activist reputation diminishes over time.

1.3.4 Party systems and activist background

Finally, the perception of protest participation is also shaped by another feature of the political context, namely the age and stability of the party system. Where there is an established party system, the value of activist background is filtered through the lens of partisan considerations. This is because activism, in addition to signaling character qualities, might also serve as a cue of candidate's ideological position. This can be useful in contexts, where the mainstream parties have converged over policy such as austerity measures because it distinguishes a candidate among an undifferentiated political class through articulation of a clear, often more radical, policy position. It can also help a candidate stand out within their political party, especially in primary elections, which have become a popular participatory tool among left-wing populist parties in Southern Europe (e.g. Podemos, M5 Stelle) (Coller, Cordero, and Jaime-Castillo 2018). However, information about candidate's ideal point has polarizing effects on the electorate – whereas voters who believe the

candidate to be closer to their own ideal point will be more likely to support them, those that, based on the cue, update to perceive themselves as further away, will be less likely to vote for the candidate.

Thus, when movements operate within established party systems, where it is challenging for them to position themselves above preexisting ideological divides, the benefits of activist credentials will be limited to voters with an ideological profile similar to that of the movement. Pro-democracy movements are often cross-cutting, inclusive coalitions built around a common identity (e.g. a national one) or universal values (e.g. freedom of speech), extending the reputational effects beyond a narrow constituency or activists' personal network (Cammett and Luong 2014). However, in some cases, such as Spain (Collier and Mahoney 1997) or Chile (Boas 2016), where well-organized clandestine parties pre-dating the dictatorship played an important role in the mobilization for democracy, the regime / opposition movement divide overlaps with an ideological cleavage.

In such cases, dissident credentials still afford an electoral advantage, but one limited to the sympathizers of those parties. Moreover, “*partisan identification* tends to be stronger and longer-lasting than *movement identification*” because “partisan identities are consistently reinforced by periodic elections in a way that movement identities are not” (Heaney and Rojas 2013, p.5). Therefore, in cases of overlap, though still emphasized in political campaigns, origins in pro-democratic struggle are secondary to party identification for both candidates and voters. Finally, political candidates running on lists of parties, which may be newly legalized but have a long history can be immediately associated with well-known programs, platforms, and party brands, making voters less reliant on candidates' personal reputations as heuristics.

Hypothesis 4 (partisanship): Activist background will be perceived through a partisan lens in established party systems.

1.4 Case Selection

In this manuscript, as Table 1.1 illustrates, I focus on four cases, which differ in the type of political crisis and the degree of party system institutionalization in two countries: Poland and Spain. The two cases have largely similar electoral systems: multiparty, parliamentary systems (Poland is a semipresidential system but the position of the president is not as strong as in presidential systems

and more power is vested in the prime minister) with proportional representation elections for the Lower House and more personalistic elections for the Senate. The selection of these cases makes it possible to test hypotheses outlined in Section 1.3 in the following ways.

Table 1.1: Case Selection		
	New/Volatile Party System	Established Party System
Regime Change	Poland 1990s	Spain 1970s
Democratic Crisis	Spain 2010s	Poland 2010s

First, the two historical cases – Spain in the 1970s and Poland in the early 1990s – share some key similarities: both represent cases of successful democratization precipitated by labor movements aligned with the intelligentsia, which limited their demands in the service of the larger democratic project (Fishman 1990; Staniszkis 2019). Both are also cases of a pacted transition to democracy. However, although the type of regime crisis was similar, the degree of institutionalization of the party system within which the pro-democracy movements operated was distinct. The pro-democracy movement in Spain emerged in the context of hegemony of party politics. Despite the clandestine nature of Socialist and Communist parties, the movement formed and aligned along partisan lines, without challenging the ideological configuration of the Spanish political scene. In contrast, the mass movement in Poland coincided with the emergence of a brand new party system post-transition, allowing it to play a decisive role in the formation of political elites across the party spectrum, whereas in Spain its influence was concentrated on the far left. The similarity of the cases on the crisis dimension allows for testing Hypotheses 1 and 2 about reputational advantage of dissident roots under conditions of uncertainty common in new democracies, which – according to the predictions – we should observe in both cases, while the contrast on the political party dimension makes it possible to test Hypothesis 4 that in older party systems (Spain), partisanship

will moderate the perception of pro-democracy activism, while in new party systems, it will have a broader appeal across the political spectrum (Poland). Finally, the selection of historical cases allows for a long-term perspective and makes it possible to, where such data is available, test a hypothesis about a decline of reputational benefits over time (H3), which may not yet be observed for newer movements.

Second, the two contemporary cases focus on a crisis, which unlike democratization, does not represent a regime crisis but takes place within a democratic system. In both countries, the contemporary movements mobilized around the issue of democratic quality in response to a perceived threat: a populist challenge to horizontal accountability (Poland) and elite challenge to vertical accountability (Spain) (Slater 2013). In Poland, the populist right government has sought to diminish the ability of the judicial branch to constrain the popularly elected legislature, claiming that the legislative majority has given the party the main mandate to represent the people. In Spain, political and economic elites have constrained voters' power at the ballot box by restricting the policy space around austerity measures such that voters felt deprived of any real alternatives. This, again, provides an opportunity to test Hypotheses 1 and 2, this time in a context of contemporary cases. However, the cases differ on the party system dimension: in Spain, the rise of new movements and parties challenged the de-facto bipartisan system, whereas in Poland, strong social movements are reinforcing the partisan divide by supporting or opposing the populist policies of the current government, again providing a contrast for testing Hypothesis 4.

Third, the variation on the temporal dimension within each country case allows to further test the importance of partisanship (H4) over time (H3). The Spanish pro-democracy movement faced a different partisan landscape in the 1970s not just compared to Poland in the 1990s but also to Spain of the 2010s. Spanish democratization took place in an era of mass parties but since then, across Europe, traditional party politics has declined amidst falling electoral turnout, disengagement from the electoral process, increasing electoral volatility (Mair 2013), and declining party loyalty (Dalton and Wattenberg 2002) and membership (Mair and Van Biezen 2001; Scarrow 2014). These changes undoubtedly facilitated the rise of Podemos, a movement party, and entrance into politics of activists from anti-austerity movements energized by the economic crisis in Spain. However, as I show, despite changes to the party systems, even when new actors break through, partisan considerations remain dominant. Movements that frame their position as the society against the

elites are nevertheless seen through the traditional lens of the left against the right, an aspect which is useful in terms of information (signaling of ideology in times of uncertainty) but which limits the value of contentious credentials to constituencies with ideological affinity for the movement's goals. The variation on this dimension in the Polish case illustrates that, despite the weakness of East European party systems (Enyedi and Bertoa 2018), the Polish electorate has become polarized over time and movements against democratic backsliding face a different partisan landscape than the pro-democracy movement, which formed prior to the emergence of the party system, and therefore do not enjoy the same breadth of support across the ideological spectrum.

In sum, all of the cases illustrate reputational benefits of protest participation under different circumstances (Hypothesis 1), showing that movements' influence on politics via activist candidates is not a new or geographically limited phenomenon and that similar dynamics operate at distinct moments in time. As long as there are conditions of uncertainty and a crisis of legitimacy of the political establishment, which creates a demand for renewal of political elites (Hypothesis 2), activists may be expected to enjoy an electoral advantage. Pro-democracy movements, like contemporary populist movements, establish a simple and powerful dichotomy of "civil society versus the state" (Linz and Stepan 1996). The ability of social movement activists to present themselves as representing the people against the governing (authoritarian) elites gives them a reputational advantage both in times of regime change and in moments of disillusionment with the democratic regime. Moreover, the political landscape during a political crisis is similar to the one, which increases the value of dissident credentials in a new democracy: personalized nature of politics, high level of electoral volatility, uncertainty over party positions, and low levels of partisan attachment. This suggests that, much like in democratization cases, reliance on reputational benefits afforded by movement roots can contribute to initial electoral success but – absent organizational investments – is unlikely to be a successful long-term strategy (Hypothesis 3). Finally, the party system dimension – new party system or party system change versus established party system – generates a contrast between cases where the movement is ideologically aligned with a political party and where a movement organizes prior to the formation of the party system to provide insight into when perception of the movement is partisan and when its candidates can appeal to broader audiences (Hypothesis 4).

1.5 Level of Analysis

This study takes a micro-level perspective by focusing on individuals at the heart of macro-level processes that bring movements and parties into an overlapping field. It does so for several reasons. First, activists in office are the mechanism through which movements gain power in institutional politics. Second, when voters demand change, the supply of new politicians often comes from movements, which mobilized in response to this discontent, with consequences not just for the composition of political elites but also the nature and policy output of institutions. Third, the trends in personalization of politics even in parliamentary systems in Europe mean that to understand electoral dynamics, we should pay attention to political actors below the party level.

Electoral advantage of activists leads to changes in the social structures of parliamentary bodies, which is an important development considering that activism is a formative experience, with enduring and powerful effects on the political and personal lives of participants, shaping their identities, ideologies, and biographies (Fendrich 1977; Jennings 1987; McAdam 1989; Polletta and Jasper 2001; Giugni 2004a; Bosi, Giugni, and Uba 2016). For instance, Civil Rights activists who participated in the Freedom Summer became more radical politically, remained active in movement politics, showed more leftist political attitudes, and drew on tactical and ideological lessons from their time as volunteers (McAdam 1988). This has implications for the behavior of politicians with roots in social movements: activists elected to political offices – “institutional activists” (Santoro and McGuire 1997; Pettinicchio 2012), “insider activists” (Banaszak 2010a) or “activists in office” (Watts 2006) – often pursue movement goals within the state institutions (Santoro and McGuire 1997; Rootes 2003; Banaszak 2005, 2010a; Böhm 2015a; Gibson 2017). Overlapping membership in movements and institutions or “multiple belongings” can build informal networks, facilitating cooperation between civil society sectors and the political class through the spread of information and mutual trust (Della Porta and Diani 2009; Böhm 2015b). Therefore, the increased presence of social movement activists within institutions has implications not just for the socio-political profile of the elite but also for the content of political debates, issues put on the agenda, and adopted policies. These consequences for agenda setting and policy-making, in turn, have implications for the quality of democracy because demands “from the streets” are brought into the institutions through activists

who maintain a dual identification.¹⁰ In democracies facing a crisis, it can improve the quality of representation inside the state structures. In new democracies, it increases political pluralism and provides a check on former authoritarian elites who, converted into players in the democratic game, attempt to write rules preserving their initial advantages (Albertus and Menaldo 2018).

In the context of pro-democracy movements and new democracies, in addition to *behavior within* the institutions, the composition of the new elite has consequences for the *design* of those institutions. Democratic transitions are founding moments, “influencing the relations between elites and challengers.” They provide “turning points that pave way for changes, which then tend to become resilient” (della Porta 2017). Political actors who gain power in the early post-transition years shape the nature of political competition in new democracies by establishing institutions, writing electoral rules, and enacting legislation governing political parties such as for example, laws about party finances (Elster, Offe, and Preuss 1998). Since institutions are sticky, resistant to change, and path-dependent (Douglass 1990; Pierson 2000; Stark et al. 1998), a victory by dissidents can ensure that the former opposition has a voice in this trajectory-setting process. Mass mobilization during the transition provides legitimation, through “recognition of some actors and forms of action,” which in turn affects civil, political, and social rights – with implications for the quality of democracy (della Porta 2017). Yet in order to affect change from within the institutions of government, activists have to compete for public offices in elections, and their past experience in contentious politics may prove an asset or a liability in the terrain of formal politics. Whether or not they can advocate for the movement’s goals through institutional channels depends on whether their activism translates into political capital in the eyes of the voters.

Finally, research on the political crisis in Europe has focused on explaining the *demand* for renewal of political elites (Inglehart and Norris 2017; Gidron and Hall 2017; Foster and Frieden 2017). By paying attention to the movements that precipitate the crisis or emerge in response to it, this study illuminates the *supply* of new entrants into politics for whom social movements provide a training ground and a springboard into the institutions. The micro-focus on individuals is justified even in parliamentary, proportional representation systems such as Poland and Spain because of long-term changes in the political landscape. The “presidentialization” of parliamentary politics

¹⁰Author Interview with Irene Montero, Unidos Podemos MP and spokeswoman, Madrid, July 2015. Author Interview with Francisco Perez Ramos, Ahora Madrid Councillor in Madrid Vallecas, October 2017.

(Poguntke and Webb 2007) has taken place in part due to increasing role of media in politics: media-oriented campaigns and televised debates (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999) emphasize party leaders and candidates’ personal attributes over party programs (Reinemann and Wilke 2007). The evolution of party forms has also contributed to personalization of politics since “electors of mass-based parties are less sensitive to leaders than electors of catch-all parties at the ballot box” (Costa Lobo 2008). And, more recently, new media has allowed for unmediated communication between leaders and supporters, which bypasses organizational and institutional channels (Waisbord and Amado 2017). All of these trends have increased the importance of personal reputations of individual candidates.

1.6 Data and Methods

This study uses mixed-methods, combining observational analyses with survey experiments and archival data and elite interviews. The observational analyses rely on three original datasets. The first leverages existing data about nearly 50,000 political candidates across 9 elections in post-transition Poland (EAST PaC)¹¹ and merges it with new biographical data on about 5,000 Solidarity activists to examine the electoral prospects of former dissidents over time. The second combines text data from candidate profiles (source of information about candidates’ activist background) scraped from the party website during Podemos primary elections in Spain with electoral results (vote share in primaries). These two analyses provide evidence for activists’ electoral advantage in real-life elections in two different countries and in two distinct time periods. The historical case of Poland offers an additional possibility to test the hypothesis about the decline of this advantage over time, which suggests we might see similar trajectories in contemporary cases. Finally, a dataset based on an archival compilation of biographies of MPs in Spain’s first post-transition parliament is used to provide descriptive statistics on former dissidents in early democratic institutions in the second historical case.

The experimental component consists of two survey experiments conducted in August of 2016 and January 2017 on online samples of Spanish and Polish respondents respectively. The advantage of using survey experiments in addition to the observational analyses is the ability to disentangle effects of attributes of interest which might be correlated such as, in the Spanish case, being a

¹¹East European Parliamentarian and Candidate Data.

candidate of a left-wing party and having an activist background (pro-democracy or anti-austerity) or in the case of Poland, belonging to the Civic Platform and participating in protests against the Law and Justice government. In addition, it addresses selection issues: observed attributes of political candidates reflect what type of individuals run for office and are placed on the ballot by political parties. Although characteristics correlated with running for office, such as university education, are included as controls in the observational analyses in both Polish and Spanish cases, activists who participate in elections may differ from those who did not run or those who dropped out early on a number of other observable and unobservable or difficult to measure dimensions such as for example, political instinct and ambition.

Moreover, conjoint experiments, in which respondents are presented with two profiles of candidates with several varying characteristics and asked to select one of them are a particularly useful tool for understanding preferences over multidimensional alternatives (Meyer and Rosenzweig 2016). Such “bundled” treatments (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014) are a more realistic representation of the electoral context, where candidates differ on a number of attributes. Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Yamamoto (2015) provide empirical evidence that candidate choice designs similar to the ones used here capture the effects of attributes that drive voting behavior remarkably well and are comparable to behavioral benchmarks. Survey experiments are also particularly well-suited for estimating reputational benefits since they directly measure the outcome of interest – public perception of dissidents – in a context where candidate names are not provided, guarding against the effects being driven by fame of specific individuals.

Finally, I supplement these analysis with archival and interview evidence to provide more information on the historical and political conditions in each case and to address questions, which cannot be answered with quantitative data such as activists’ perception of the advantages they bring into the institutional sphere and challenges they face, parties’ strategies following the transition to democracy, and importance of highlighting dissident roots in electoral campaigns. Elite interviews were conducted by the author with a selection of former Solidarity activists who transitioned into politics in Warsaw, Gdansk, and Wroclaw in Poland in the summer of 2016, December 2016 and summer of 2017 and with MPs and Senators affiliated with Unidos Podemos and local politicians from the municipal group Ahora Madrid in Madrid in the fall of 2016 and fall of 2017. Historical cases, particularly in the Spanish case, due to a limited number of living witnesses of events, rely

on transcripts of interviews conducted by other researchers in the late 1970s in Spain and available in the Gunther Archive at the Juan March Foundation in Madrid and in the early 2000s in Poland housed in the Transition Archive, which forms part of the Senate Archive in Warsaw. Finally, most of the primary documents referred to in the study were obtained from the PCE Archive in Madrid or the Political Parties Archive in Warsaw.¹²

In sum, the use of mixed-methods has several advantages: 1) identifying the effect of activist background through rigorous methods and isolating it from potential confounders 2) providing evidence that the effect can be observed outside of artificial survey settings, in real-world elections across multiple contexts 3) showing the magnitude of the effect over time, beyond a one-time snapshot offered by a survey and 4) enriching the analysis by first-hand accounts from protagonists in the events and primary party materials.

1.7 Structure of This Manuscript

The remainder of the manuscript is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, I use the case of Solidarity in Poland to argue that the history of pro-democratic struggle in a broad, inclusive movement gives activists a reputational advantage, which translates into an electoral advantage under conditions of uncertainty common in post-transition elections. This electoral advantage diminishes over time as voters and parties crystallize their positions and more stable linkages form between voters and parties. I test the reputational mechanism with an original survey experiment and show that voters across the political spectrum continue – though to a lesser extent – to reward political candidates for costly Solidarity activism, indicating the importance of public perceptions of dissidents as an explanation.

Chapter 3 focuses on contemporary Poland: the mass mobilization against the Law and Justice government and the use of historical memory by the ruling party to discredit opponents and to revive and bring nationalist movements into the mainstream. I first show that the contemporary movement against democratic backsliding, despite claiming the legacy of Solidarity and positioning itself above partisan divides, does not have a universal appeal of the historical pro-democracy movement. The protests are seen as polarizing and politicians who participate in demonstrations are *more* likely to

¹²Archiwum Partii Politycznych. Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN.

be elected by government opponents but *less* likely to be elected by government supporters. I also discuss how Law and Justice has embraced nationalist movements, empowering its more radical fringes and opening spaces for their participation in the civic sphere.

In Chapter 4, I contrast the Polish case with Spain, where the pro-democracy movement was organized by underground Communist and Socialist parties and their supporting organizations such as trade unions and, unlike in Poland, the regime/opposition divide overlapped with an ideological cleavage. This made activist capital unlikely to extend past the movement's ideological base and secondary to partisan affiliation. Following the legalization of left-wing parties, the political landscape provided voters with a choice of parties with clear identities, programs, constituencies, and organizations, reducing the uncertainty and providing useful partisan and ideological cues in addition to reputational ones. Despite these differences between the Polish and Spanish post-transitional contexts, dissidents still enjoyed an electoral advantage but it was limited to politicians and voters on the left of the ideological spectrum.

In Chapter 5, I focus on contemporary Spain and anti-austerity and anti-eviction movements, which emerged in response to the recent economic crisis. Using evidence from a survey experiment, I show that background in these movements not only serves as an informative signal of candidate's ideological position, but also makes the candidate more likely to be perceived as honest and better at representing voters' interests. This is not the case for political outsiders in general, indicating that activism is associated with political capital independent of detachment from the establishment. I demonstrate the relevance of these findings for political competition in Spain by focusing on Podemos – a new movement party, which transformed the Spanish party scene. Using a novel dataset, I show that candidates with social movement backgrounds received more voters in the party primaries.

In short, Chapter 2 tests hypotheses about the reputational advantage of dissident roots (H1a), its importance in times of uncertainty in a new party system (H2a), and its decline over time (H3) by using the case of Poland in the early 1990s. Chapter 3 tests the reputational advantage of protest participation by established politicians (H1b) in times of crisis of legitimacy of political elites (H2b) and the way it gets filtered by partisanship in more stable party systems (H4) through the example of Poland in 2010s. Chapter 4 provides additional evidence for H1a and a contrast for post-transition Poland in terms of party system formation (H4) using Spain in the 1970s. Finally, Chapter 5 provides support for reputational benefits of movement origins (H1a) in yet another

context of discrediting of political elites (H2b) – Spain in the 2010s, discusses partisanship-movement interactions in times of party system change (H2), and includes additional tests to distinguish activist advantage from outsider advantage and highlight the importance of authentic representation and honesty in explaining activists’ reputational advantage. In short, the cases – despite the temporal and spatial differences – all show an electoral advantage of protest participation but also illustrate how features of the political context such as the strength of party system shape how activism is perceived by the voters. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the argument, discusses the generalizability of the findings beyond the included cases, and considers implications of the influence of movements on the contemporary political party landscape.

1.8 Conclusion

This manuscript makes several contributions to field: first, whereas most literature on the economic and political crisis has provided explanations for the emergence of social movements and increased demand for renewal of political elites, I focus on the supply side – the origins of some of those new elites in social movements – and the mechanism through which movements influence electoral politics. Second, I bring together literatures – on social movements and party and electoral politics – that are typically studied in isolation to provide new insights into the changing nature of politics in Europe, which increasingly draws on a movement toolkit both in terms of discourse and tactical choices. Third, the historical cases in the study contribute to the literature on party-building in new democracies, which has so far focused on authoritarian successor parties but has paid far less attention to parties emergent out of dissident movements. Fourth, it brings in a long perspective on the current moment, drawing attention to the reoccurrence of the phenomenon of activists-turned-politicians in European politics and using lessons from the past to better understand the present. Finally, the project makes use of historical data in new ways – archival information about dissidents is analyzed using automated text analysis methods to rigorously test arguments about effects of dissident past on electoral chances.

2 | From Protesters to Parliamentarians: Dissidents and Electoral Competition in Post-transition Poland

2.1 Introduction

In post-transition elections, voters often face a confusing landscape of many new parties without clearly formulated platforms, and – lacking experience with democratic politics – can neither articulate their own interests nor identify parties likely to represent them. New political parties struggle with facilitating this process: uncertain about voter preferences, they may not know around which cleavages to structure political competition, which constituencies to target, and how to establish more permanent bases of support. Until both voters and parties crystallize their positions and durable party-voter linkages are formed, politics is likely to remain highly personalistic and voters will rely on heuristics to make their decisions. The regime/opposition divide is often the only readily identifiable cleavage, making activism in the democratic opposition a potentially powerful cue. Do former dissidents have an electoral advantage in new democracies and if so, what are its sources and how long does it persist?

In this chapter, I use the case of Solidarity in Poland to argue that the history of pro-democratic struggle gives activists a reputational advantage under conditions of uncertainty common in post-transition elections, increasing their chances of winning political office. This electoral advantage diminishes over time as politics becomes more routinized but is substantively meaningful in the first few elections, allowing those who precipitated the transition to shape the subsequent nature of political competition. I show support for these arguments using a dataset that combines information about over 46,000 political candidates across 9 elections with new data on about 5,000 Solidarity activists. I provide evidence for a reputational advantage conferred by dissident past as the mechanism using a survey experiment, in which I show that voters across the political spectrum

continue to reward political candidates for costly Solidarity activism although, over 25 years after the transition, these effects are now small.

These findings contribute to the literature on democratization and democratic consolidation by providing insight into who shapes the nature of democratic institutions after the transition. Political actors elected in early post-transition years write the rules of electoral competition, decide which pre-existing cleavages to (de-)emphasize, set up new institutions, and create opportunity structures for both parties and movements (Elster, Offe, and Preuss 1998). All of those decisions have a profound impact on political competition in new democracies. For example, in Poland in January 1990, members of parliament elected in the transitional elections passed legislation about financing political parties, which influenced party system formation and consolidation.

As Albertus and Menaldo (2018) argue, when former authoritarians remain in power following the transition, they write the rules of the game that preserve their advantage in the system. Research on social movements shows that participation transforms activists and has an enduring effect on their identities, ideologies, and biographies (McAdam 1988; Polletta and Jasper 2001; Giugni 2004a). Activists elected to political offices often pursue movement goals within the state institutions (Banaszak 2010b; Böhm 2015b). The presence of dissidents in the positions of power in a new democracy can ensure that the pro-democracy movement has a voice in the institution-building process. It is therefore important to know whether they can succeed at translating their movement origins into an electoral strength. Authoritarian successor parties have a “usable past” (Grzymala-Busse 2002), which allows them to transform into competitive democratic actors (Pop-Eleches 2008; Loxton 2015). This chapter argues that dissident past can initially be a powerful advantage as well but – rooted in reputation instead of resources – it is less durable.

This study also puts in dialogue literatures on contentious and electoral politics – two fields that are too often studied in isolation (McAdam and Tarrow 2010) – by claiming that in “open moments” (Gourevitch 1986), in which actors re-negotiate and re-configure political arrangements, activists who emerge from social movements can form part of the new political elite. Thus, institutional politics may become intertwined with movement politics through actors whose biographies bridge the two forms of political activity.

2.2 Theory

2.2.1 Reputational Advantage of Dissident Roots

In countries, where a successful social movement precipitated the transition, history of pro-democracy activism should have a positive effect on candidate’s electoral prospects. However, this is not the case because of the movement’s organizational capacity. Although mobilization for protest requires a creation of movement structures and a network of committed activists on the ground (McCarthy and Zald 1977; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2003), the resources political candidates of opposition movements have at their disposal often pale in comparison to those of former regime officials. Communist successor parties, like authoritarian successor parties around the world, went into the post-transition elections with strong party organizations, sizable membership, widespread local presence and politically experienced cadres (Grzymala-Busse 2002; Kostelecký 2002; Van Biezen 2003; Lewis 1994; Loxton 2015). Organizationally, post-Solidarity parties in Poland were at a disadvantage (see Tables A.2 and A.3). The peak of movement’s activity was in 1980 and around the 1989 transition, Solidarity forces were emerging from years of underground activity, without any prior access to state resources.

I argue that instead, the source of electoral advantage enjoyed by pro-democracy activists is reputation. This is because dissident credentials have important moral value,¹ increasing the perception of a candidate as a respectable, courageous person with high integrity. Opposition activists are not only untainted by collaboration with the authoritarian regime (Lust and Waldner 2016) but also have a record of mobilizing for democracy, which often includes sacrifices such as enduring persecution and imprisonment (Kim, Chang, and Shin 2013). This past serves as a strong signal of commitment to democratic values. Voters who rely on information about candidate’s character to select a “good type” and choose a representative that is the most deserving of the “honor of political authority” should be sensitive to aspects of candidate’s past, which reveal them to be principled (Fearon 1999; Dewan and Shepsle 2011).

In cases, where a cross-cutting, inclusive coalition for democracy, built around a common identity

¹However, this might not be the case for violent pro-democracy or pro-independence movements. Previous research has shown that nonviolent movements, like Solidarity, are more effective in garnering public support (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Huff and Kruszewska 2016).

(e.g. a national one) or a set of values or rights (e.g. freedom of speech) was formed, the electoral advantage of pro-democracy activism is not limited to those with particular ideological beliefs.² Poland’s “Solidarity” was a broad-based movement, which brought together left-wing intellectuals and conservative Catholics. Reputational effects allow candidates to garner public support beyond their direct networks and their ideological constituency (Cammatt and Luong 2014). Thus, a history of pro-democracy activism becomes a valence advantage as one of possible “non-policy characteristics that are, in effect, universally desirable” (Dewan and Shepsle 2011, p.315). Based on this discussion, I expect that:

Hypothesis 1: Dissidents have a reputational advantage, which increases their probability of getting elected in post-transition elections.

2.2.2 Voting in New Democracies

However, I posit that there is a temporal dimension to the value of this candidate attribute. In new democracies, especially those with brand new party systems such as post-communist countries in East and Central Europe, voters face conditions of high uncertainty, where it is “unclear where new parties stand on the relevant issues” (Tucker 2006, p.40). In such low information environments with many new actors, voters are often unable to associate parties with specific policies. Since parties do not yet have governing experience or reputations for (in)competence, voters cannot have confidence that parties will not shift their alignments or succeed at implementing programs. The opposition often has very little time to organize since outgoing authoritarian governments tend to insist on quick elections to take advantage of their privileged access to resources and media. Classical cleavage-based party competition might also not emerge automatically if the authoritarian regime attempted to suppress traditional social divisions (Tavits 2013). For example, this was the case with socioeconomic class in communist societies, making the left-right dimension to this day less relevant in the post-communist world (Tucker 2006; Jasiewicz 2009). Moreover, voters themselves, having been deprived of political agency and vote choice for decades, might not have well crystalized positions and a “poor understanding of the democratic process” (Tavits 2013, p.2).

²However, where the pro-democracy movement had a clear ideological profile and where background in former democratic opposition is an informative signal of candidate’s ideological position i.e. where the regime/opposition divide overlaps with an ideological cleavage such as for example, in Spain (see Chapter 4) or in Chile (Boas 2016), the benefits of dissident credentials will be limited to voters with an ideological profile similar to that of the movement.

As previous research shows, in low information environments, voters are likely to rely on informational shortcuts, which often take a form of candidate cues, in making decisions (Conover and Feldman 1982, 1989). Since acquiring political information is costly, voters “economize by making political judgments according to knowledge they already have about politics and the world in general” (McDermott 1998). In post-transitional contexts, that knowledge is based largely on who supported or formed part of the regime and who opposed it.³ Until voters figure out their positions and parties decide which cleavages to emphasize/de-emphasize, the most salient and readily identifiable cleavage is around the transition to democracy: between the former regime and former democratic opposition. But party names are new, brands unknown,⁴ so voters look to the faces they recognize from the authoritarian period – faces of the authoritarian government and faces of the protest leaders.

Politics is likely to be highly personalistic at this time and a history of involvement in the democratic opposition is likely to provide one of few reliable cues. When policy positions of political actors are uncertain, valence issues play a critical role in voting decisions (Enelow and Hinich 1982; Stokes 1992) and as I argued in Section 2.2.1, former dissidents have an advantage on this dimension. Over time, however, the public acquires new information about candidates’ and parties’ issue positions and performance in office and becomes less reliant on initial values-based heuristics. Even though voters in new democracies and countries with younger party systems show lower levels of partisan identification (Huber, Kernell, and Leoni 2005; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007; Dalton and Weldon 2007), partisanship tends to strengthen with age and stability of a party system (Brader and Tucker 2001; Brader, Tucker, and Duell 2013). As it does, the focus shifts to policy considerations and interest representation and both candidate’s personal characteristics and the regime/opposition cleavage should decline in importance, decreasing the effect of dissident credentials. From this discussion, I expect that:

Hypothesis 2: The positive effect of dissident past declines over time.

³Which can be compared to relying on incumbent/challenger status as a heuristic in an established democracy.

⁴In a 1991 poll conducted by CBOS, the Public Opinion Research Center, when asked which of the 23 party organizations they would vote for if parliamentary elections were to take place next Sunday, nearly half of respondents marked organizations with a word “Solidarity” in the name (Chimiak 2010, p.123). General party recognition or familiarity with programs – which were often poorly articulated by the parties – was low; the word “Solidarity” served as a valuable heuristic.

To summarize, the observable implications of the theory are the following: first, dissident past should have a positive effect on candidate’s probability of getting elected in early post-transition elections conducted under conditions of uncertainty. Second, the source of this advantage is reputation rather than resources. Third, following the foundational elections, as politics becomes less personalistic and parties develop platforms and performance records, this effect should decline.

2.3 Data

In order to test these hypotheses, I leverage the East European Parliamentary and Candidate Data (EAST PaC) and combine it with newly collected data on about 5,000 Solidarity activists. The EAST PaC dataset covers 9 elections between 1985 and 2011 to both the lower (Sejm) and upper (Senate) houses of the Polish Parliament and includes 46,426 unique political candidates.⁵ I combine this dataset with new text data from the Encyclopedia of Solidarity, a project led by Poland’s Institute for National Remembrance (IPN). To this end, I scraped the biographies of 4,888 opposition activists included in the Encyclopedia to create a corpus of documents. Next, I matched the names of candidates from the EAST PaC dataset to the activist database from IPN’s Solidarity Encyclopedia using both first and last names⁶ and year of birth and created a new variable, `activist`, which took on a value of 1 if this person appeared in the IPN’s database and 0 otherwise. Figure 2.1 shows the percentage of dissident candidates and dissident MPs in both Houses of Parliament for each election year since the transition. In early years of Polish democracy, as much as 20-25% of each House was made up of Solidarity activists.

I focus on the Sejm, the Lower House, because it is the more influential chamber in Polish politics (Sadowski 2017). Moreover, on average, only about 500 candidates competed for 100 Senate seats in each election since transition. In contrast, across the 7 elections I include, on average, around 8,000 candidates ran for the 460 Sejm seats each year. The results of analysis for the Senate are shown in Section A.3.4 in the Appendix and are comparable to those in the Sejm. Elections to the Sejm have a proportional representation format but they are open list: in each constituency, parties

⁵The main source of the data is the National Electoral Commission in Poland. The data collection in the EAST PaC project was funded by Poland’s National Science Centre (decision number 2012/05/E/HS6/03556).

⁶Middle names were excluded because their use is inconsistent between the two databases, leading to false negatives.

allocate seats obtained based on aggregate votes for their list to candidates with highest vote totals. This increases the value of candidates' personal reputations (Carey and Shugart 1995). Poland's candidate-centered electoral system (Carroll and Nalepa 2018) and personalistic flavor to politics – most new party formation has occurred through elite defections and voters often follow party leaders as much as programs (Jasiewicz 2007) – underlines the importance of studying individual political candidates. This is the case especially in the early years of Polish democracy when the party system was not yet institutionalized.

For all of the analyses, I use data starting from the 1991 election, which was the first fully free and thus foundational election in Poland, through the 2011 election for a total of 7 elections. However, I use data from two earlier elections (1985, 1989) to create additional control variables included in the robustness checks (see Table A.6 in the Appendix). First, I incorporate data from the 1989 transitional, partially-free, election to create an incumbency measure for the 1991 electoral competition to control for effects of office-holding and political experience. Using the data for the 1985 (pre-transition) election, I also create a variable `communist`, which takes a value of 1 if a political candidate competed in 1985 elections, before the transition to democracy. Although not all candidates ran on the lists of PZPR, the communist party,⁷ and they might have been members of e.g. the Catholic Caucus, which at times sympathized with the opposition, it serves as an indicator of political experience under communism and co-optation by the regime. The resulting dataset contains 42,457 unique candidates who competed for a Sejm seat at least once between 1991 and 2011 and 53,588 candidate-election units across seven elections, about 3% of which are former dissidents and approximately 2% former political prisoners.

2.4 Transitional Elections

As a result of the negotiated transition – the Roundtable Agreement, the June 1989 election in Poland was a compromise: the opposition was allowed to compete for 35% of mandates or 161 seats in the Lower House of Parliament (Sejm). The compromise also established the Upper House (Senate) with one hundred senators elected in completely free elections. In order to win a mandate, candidates had to receive over half of the votes in the first round or a plurality in the

⁷This information is unfortunately unavailable in the data.




Figure 2.1: Percentage of Dissident Candidates and Parliamentarians Across Elections

second round. The negotiations concluded in April, leaving the opposition only about two months to organize (Elster 1996). The electoral rules were complicated – there were no party labels next to candidates’ names and voters indicated their choice not by marking the selected candidate but by crossing out all the others. To do so, voters had to remember the name(s) of candidates supported by Solidarity’s Citizens’ Committee (KO) and endorsed by movement’s leader, Lech Wałęsa, who posed for a campaign poster photograph with nearly every Solidarity candidate, making it a very personalistic election.

The elections were a landslide victory for Solidarity: candidates backed by the movement secured all of the seats for which they were allowed to compete in the Sejm and 99 of the 100 seats in the Senate, with an independent local entrepreneur winning one mandate. As Figure 2.1 shows, following this election, 18% of new parliamentarians in the Lower House were dissidents and 13.5% former political prisoners.⁸ In the Senate, 46% were dissidents and 29% had been imprisoned for opposition

⁸To obtain these numbers, I use the corpus of dissident biographies to generate a term-document-matrix (TDM) and create a variable, *imprisoned*, that takes a value of 1 if the activist is described as having been jailed at least once, and 0 if not. This is a crude method but it is effective for the following reasons: first, the word “internowany” or interned is used in Polish almost exclusively to describe politically-motivated arrests under the martial law intended to demobilize Solidarity. Second, I also include words such as “arrested,” “convicted,” “held” in male and female forms to account for different phrases used in biographies to describe political imprisonment. This method accounts even for influential activists, for instance Władysław Frasyniuk or Zbigniew Bujak, who were able to hide underground, avoiding internment under the martial law but came in contact with the repressive apparatus at some point during dissident activity. Over 65% of candidates identified as activists in the dataset were also described as having been interned under the martial law or imprisoned during communism in their biographies, probably because those were

activity.⁹ Henryk Wujec, a prominent Solidarity activist, expressed how surreal the victory felt to the dissidents by saying: “Virtually straight from prison, we find ourselves in the ‘palaces of power’” (Ost 2010, p.218). The 1989-1991 transitional parliament, with a large presence of former dissidents, passed a series of legislation critical for the new democracy ranging from economic reforms, through welfare, to electoral rules and political party regulations.

2.5 Elections in a New Democracy

To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, I analyze the effect of dissident past on the likelihood of getting elected to the Sejm from the first completely free elections in 1991 to 2011. This provides a harder test than beginning with the transitional elections in 1989, which could be considered a plebiscite for or against the communist regime (Jasiewicz 2007). By 1991, political parties emerged on the opposition side, differentiating themselves from both post-communist and post-Solidarity competition, designed programs, and built party organizations. Dissident candidates ran under the labels of different political parties (See Table A.1 in the Appendix). However, the party system was not consolidated and voters still operated in a low-information environment, dominated by the regime/opposition cleavage, and with little information on actors’ policy positions or performance in office. Under these conditions, as laid out in Section 1.3.2, we would expect the reputation of Solidarity activists to translate into an electoral advantage.

Figure 2.2 illustrates the relationship between winning a Sejm seat and passage of time (elections since transition) conditional on activist background. Predicted probabilities are estimated based on a logistic regression model regressing *Winning* on the interaction between *Activist* and *Time* and presented in Table A.6 (Model 1). The time variable is coded “1” for the first election since transition (1991), “2” for the second, and so on. Shaded areas represent 95 percent confidence intervals. The model controls for electoral district, political party, position on the electoral list, and imprisonment for movement activity – for which candidates should have acquired a stronger

the prominent dissidents in the movement – both more likely to be detained and to be included in the Encyclopedia.

⁹All of the candidates endorsed by Solidarity in the transitional elections belonged to Solidarity – at the peak of movement’s popularity in 1980, Solidarity’s membership was around 10 million people – but not all were activists with a role in the movement central enough to be included in the IPN’s Solidarity Encyclopedia. This means that not all of them are classified as dissidents in my data. Some, like for example, Andrzej Wajda, a film director elected Senator, were well-known for other reasons.

dissident reputation. As Table A.6 (Model 1) shows, imprisonment has a positive effect on the likelihood of getting elected, providing additional support for reputation as the mechanism. The results are robust to inclusion of additional control variables such as candidate’s political experience under communism (running for office in 1985), incumbency status, participation in the negotiations over pacted transition, socioeconomic status, movement leadership,¹⁰ gender, and age (Models 2-3). This accounts for the possibility that over time, Solidarity activists became older than other candidates and thus less likely to be elected.¹¹ Models 2-3 also include controls for observable characteristics, which, as I show in Section A.2, made dissidents more likely to run for office such as higher education, leadership in the movement, and a seat at the Roundtable talks. The positive effect of activism, even after controlling for movement leadership, provides evidence against activism as solely a proxy for mobilizational skills or name recognition.

As Figure 2.2 illustrates, dissident candidates performed better for the first few elections following the transition than candidates without activist history but their advantage declined over time. During the foundational election, the difference between expected values for dissident candidates and candidates without roots in the pro-democracy movement was very high – about 28%. However, subsequently, it diminished to about 21% in the second election and 15% in the third election since transition. By the seventh election (in 2011), the expected values for activist candidates are only 3% higher than for non-activist candidates. Yet the initial electoral advantage of activists shaped the composition of the parliament between 1991 and 1993: as Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show, nearly 27% of all MPs in the Sejm were dissidents and 19% former political prisoners elected under a range of party labels.

In contrast to history of activism, over time, party affiliation became more important. Figure 2.5 shows the increase in the predicted probability of being elected conditional on running on an electoral list from a party in one of the post-Solidarity “blocks” of political forces identified by Kitschelt et al. (1999) to which the current main political parties in Poland – Civic Platform (PO) and Law and Justice (PiS) – can be traced: liberal democrats or Christian nationals.¹² This can likely be

¹⁰Unsurprisingly, protest leadership and imprisonment are highly correlated: Pearson correlation ≈ 0.8 .

¹¹This is important since research shows that at least in some contexts, voters prefer younger candidates (Horiuchi, Smith, and Yamamoto 2018a).

¹²Liberal Democratic Parties: Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD), Democratic Union (UD), Freedom Union (UW),




Figure 2.2: Predicted probability of winning a Sejm seat for activist v. non-activist candidates at each election after the transition.




Figure 2.3: Former Dissidents in Parliament (1991-1993).




Figure 2.4: Former Political Prisoners in Parliament (1991-1993).

attributed to the decline of uncertainty over time, institutionalization of the party system, and thus better voter coordination.

In a 1991 January poll conducted by CBOS, the Public Opinion Research Center, 98% of respondents recognized organizations affiliated with Solidarity (the trade union and the Citizens' Committees) but party recognition was much lower: only 55% heard of Democratic Union (UD) and only 48% of the Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD), with Center Alliance most recognizable at 86%. Those parties were the winners of the parliamentary election that Fall and formed a coalition government. Meanwhile, 90% heard of the communist successor party and 95% of the agrarian party, which existed prior to the transition (PSL). In contrast, from the beginning, voters recognized the most important dissidents on the political scene: in a nationally representative study conducted in December 1990, 99% of respondents recognized Jacek Kuroń, 94% Adam Michnik, and 88% Bronisław Geremek.¹³ However, by 1997 only about 2-3% of respondents in CBOS polls

Civic Platform (PO); Christian National Parties: Center Alliance (PC), Solidarity trade union (NSZZ), Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS), Law and Justice (PiS).

¹³Study numbers reported based on an electoral leaflet from ROAD (Ruch Obywatelski Akcja Demokratyczna). ROAD 1991. 322. Archiwum Partii Politycznych ISP PAN [Political Parties Archive], Warsaw.




Figure 2.5: Predicted probability of winning a Sejm seat for candidates affiliated with parties in Christian national and liberal democratic party blocks.

reported not knowing the important parties on the political scene – both on the post-communist (SLD) and post-Solidarity (AWS, UW) side.

Over time, the Polish party system institutionalized, though it remains weaker than party systems in Western Europe. As Table 2.5 shows, by the sixth and seventh election since the transition, the effective number of parties declined from about 14 to about 4 and the percentage of seats occupied by two largest parties increased from about 27% to about 80% (Casal Bértoa and Guerra 2018). Between 1991 and 1997, the aggregate voters volatility declined from 22.7 to 15 (Lewis 2002).¹⁴ With the reduction of uncertainty and stabilization of parties as organizers of collective interests, “the average Polish voter was able to identify more clearly his or her interests with a particular ideological orientation” (Lewis 2002) and became less reliant on heuristics such candidate’s political involvement prior to the transition.

Therefore, I find support for Hypotheses 1 and 2 that dissident past had a positive effect on candidate’s likelihood of getting elected in early post-transition elections but that this effect declined

¹⁴See Section A.1.3 in the Appendix for details and description of the measure.

Table 2.1: Polish Party System Indicators (Casal Bértoa and Guerra 2018)

Election	ENEP	% of seats of 2 biggest parties
1	13.8	26.5
2	9.8	65.9
3	4.6	79.3
4	4.5	61.1
5	5.9	62.6
6	3.3	81.5
7	3.7	79.1

in magnitude over time.

2.6 Sources of Dissidents’ Electoral Advantage

In this section, I test the mechanism behind the electoral advantage enjoyed by pro-democracy activists. First, I provide evidence for a reputational advantage in support of Hypothesis 1. Then, I rule out potential alternative explanations based on access to resources. Specifically, I show that activists do not hold more power within their parties or at the national stage and that they do not benefit from stronger party organizations.

2.6.1 Reputation

To test whether a reputational advantage explains why voters are more likely to elect former dissidents, I use an original survey experiment conducted in Poland in January 2017. The experiment allows me to test the public opinion mechanism posited by my theory by measuring public perceptions of pro-democracy activists and to address selection issues, which may affect the observational results presented above.¹⁵

In his research on Solidarity, Grodsky (2012) finds that individuals who “left the social-movement organizations for the state (...) were not inherently different,” neither “older or younger, more or less educated, or – worth emphasizing – more radical or more moderate than their former peers” (p. 12). However, as I show in Section A.2 in the Appendix using the biographies from Encyclopedia of Solidarity, dissidents with university education, former political prisoners, and participants in the

¹⁵I also try to address selection issues and balance over time in Sections A.3.2 and A.3.3 in the Appendix.

transitional talks (Roundtable Agreement)¹⁶ were more likely to run for office in the partially-free, transitional 1989 election. Men, incumbents of the transitional parliament, leaders in the movement, and again highly educated dissidents and Roundtable participants were more likely to run in the fully free elections of 1991 contested by political parties.

All of those characteristics are included as controls in the main and/or supplementary analyses in Section 2.5. However, dissidents who ran for office may differ from those who did not run or those who dropped out early on a number of other observable and unobservable dimensions such as for example, political instinct and ambition. For example, Adam Michnik, after serving in the transitional parliament, decided to leave politics early. As he described, after activists enter politics, “natural selection happens. I was a man completely ill-suited for politics. So I cleverly, quickly, ran away from it (...) I would rather be a bad newspaper editor than a bad minister.”¹⁷

On the other hand, there is also evidence that many Solidarity activists had a leadership advantage, organizing abilities, and political skills. In a country, where the party attempts to exert control over all spheres of life, “anything, which wrests any activity from its control immediately takes on a directly political character” (Touraine 1983, p.53). Solidarity, as the only sphere of activity outside of the state structures, “naturally attracted people with a political instinct.”¹⁸ Labor leaders, such as Zbigniew Bujak or Bogdan Borusewicz, felt they were needed in labor union structures and did not initially enter politics but by 1991, they both were running (and winning) in parliamentary elections. For instance, now Senator Borusewicz explained his decision not to run in 1989:

The role of the trade union for us was very big, which is why I did not move to the parliament, because I thought the union had such a political capital that it was important for some politicians to stay. People who had experience, the ability to analyze which direction we wanted to go and who were leaders. We could not leave it to the second or

¹⁶Why this is the case is an interesting question. It is possible that a pacted transition creates a “buy-in” into the terms of transition on both sides and the representatives of the opposition with a seat at the table are also more likely to seek a position of power within the new regime. It could also be that they are perceived as having taken on a leadership role and thus well-suited to continue in it after the transition. Finally, dissidents who select into negotiating with the communist regime are likely 1) more committed to the democratization process 2) equipped with a political instinct and ambition 3) closer to the center of power in the movement or at least within its soft-liners camp.

¹⁷Interview with Author, Warsaw, December 20, 2016.

¹⁸Author Interview with Ludwik Turko, August 4, 2017. Ludwik Turko is a physics professor and a former Solidarity activist imprisoned for opposition activity. He is also one of the founders of ROAD, an early political formation emergent out of the movement.

third tier.¹⁹

Once this task was done, however, he entered and remained in politics to the current day. Moreover, many intellectuals in the movement such as the Gdańsk liberals Janusz Lewandowski and Donald Tusk, currently both politicians in EU structures, “wanted to do politics from the beginning” and made it into a career.²⁰

Given the aforementioned selection issues and hard to capture individual attributes such as political instinct and ambition, a survey experiment provides a useful tool to assess public perceptions of former dissidents running for office independent of their other characteristics. Randomly assigning candidate’s background in Solidarity, without specifying the candidate’s name, makes it possible to disentangle the effects of activism from other potential attributes such as name-recognition, quality as a politician, ties to constituents, expertise etc.

Experimental Design

To test whether candidate’s past influences vote choice through public opinion, I use a conjoint experiment, in which voters were asked to choose between two hypothetical candidates.²¹ Certain aspects of candidate’s background were randomized to identify the causal effect of candidate’s past and position on the transition to democracy on voters’ willingness to vote for them (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014). In this candidate choice experiment, survey respondents were presented with short bios of two hypothetical candidates running for a political office displayed side-by-side and asked which one they’d be more likely to vote for.²² Within each candidate’s biography, I randomly varied six characteristics: candidate’s political party, occupation/profession, Solidarity experience, accusations of collaboration with the communist regime’s security apparatus, assessment of the pacted transition, and involvement in current protests against policies introduced by the Law and Justice (PiS) government. Table 5.1 lists all attributes and levels. Sample profiles

¹⁹Interview with Author, Warsaw, July 22, 2016.

²⁰Author Interview with Janusz Lewandowski, Gdansk, 2017.

²¹Pre-registered hypotheses are listed in Section A.5.1 of the Appendix.

²²Prior to seeing the profiles, respondents were asked standard background questions. At the end of the survey, in order to avoid priming effects, respondents were asked about their own experience under communism and their assessment of both the democratic transition and the current situation in the country.

and a task example are provided in Section A.5.3 of the Appendix. I explore attitudes towards involvement in the recent mass mobilization against actions of the PiS government and the politics of memory surrounding the transition and allegations of collaboration in Chapter 3.

An important advantage of a conjoint experimental design is that it allows the researcher to vary many candidate attributes simultaneously, instead of limiting the analysis to one or two factors. This makes it possible to evaluate which aspects of candidate’s biography make them more likely to be elected and by extension, to compare the relative explanatory power of distinct hypotheses, from those highlighting the importance of partisanship to those which privilege candidate’s past. Moreover, such a set-up more accurately reflects the multidimensional choice faced by voters who express preferences over combinations of partisanship, occupation, and experience of potential candidates for public office (Meyer and Rosenzweig 2016).

Each of the six attributes of each candidate was independently randomly assigned.²³ Each respondent saw five pairs of profiles presented side-by-side, with each pair of profiles on a separate screen.²⁴ On the same screen as each candidate pairing, respondents were asked to choose between the two candidates, a question which resembles real-world voter decision making. After the last pair of profiles, respondents were asked to assign importance to considerations behind their choices throughout the tasks such as candidate’s trustworthiness, moral integrity, ability to represent interests of people like them, candidate’s service to the country, and candidate’s qualifications or competence.²⁵ They were also asked to write a few sentences explaining their choice in the final round. These questions were intended to provide some descriptive information about what was driving respondents’ decisions.

I focused on two parties – Civic Platform (PO) and Law and Justice (PiS) – even though Poland is a multi-party system for two reasons. First, they have dominated Polish politics for at least the last decade and together their electorates encompass nearly half of Polish voters, making them most

²³A constraint was placed on randomization in one case: a PiS politician who participated in KOD demonstrations. This was necessary because there are no known examples of such behavior and it would be seen as highly unusual. Such an unrealistic combination could elicit bizarre reactions from respondents. Other attribute levels were carefully specified so that they are plausible in each combination. While some combinations such as for example PiS politicians who oppose decommunization or former SB collaborators who support lustration are not typical, they are not completely implausible.

²⁴This is a conventional number of tasks in conjoint experiments (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014), low enough to alleviate concerns about respondent fatigue.

²⁵Results are presented in Figure A.8 in the Appendix.

Table 2.2: Conjoint Study Attributes and Levels. Baseline levels italicized.

Attributes	Attribute Levels
Party	<i>Candidate of Law and Justice (PiS)</i> Candidate of Civic Platform (PO)
Occupation	<i>Worker</i> Lawyer
Solidarity	<i>Not politically involved prior to transition</i> Solidarity activist under communism Imprisoned for activism in Solidarity during martial law
Collaborator	<i>Never accused of collaboration with the communist security apparatus</i> Accused of collaboration with the communist security apparatus
Roundtable Position	<i>Compromise necessary; opposes lustration and decommunization</i> Too much of a compromise; supports lustration and decommunization
KOD	<i>Criticizes KOD and recent protests</i> Criticizes current government but does not participate in protests Has participated in protests organized by KOD and actively supports it

important parties in terms of vote concentration and media salience. Even voters who prefer other, smaller, parties are familiar with a choice between a PO and a PiS candidate – for instance, in a run-off in a presidential election. Second, they both derive from post-Solidarity political formations. For this reason, most of the levels of the attributes are plausible for candidates from both of these parties. Both parties have had prominent dissidents, but also politicians accused of collaboration with the communist security apparatus, in their ranks. I excluded SLD, the communist successor party, because of a central interest in candidates’ Solidarity background, an existing possibility to explore the relative costs of association with the communist regime even within the post-Solidarity camp, and growing irrelevance of the left on the Polish political scene.²⁶ I also excluded new political formations such as liberal Nowoczesna, left-wing Razem, or a populist party founded by a rock singer (Kukiz ’15), because most of their politicians are too young to have been politically involved on either side under communism and because these parties are only a few years-old and mostly unlikely to survive.²⁷

I included occupation to benchmark the effects of contentious experience against objective qualifications for office. I used a worker and a lawyer for a simplified distinction between the working

²⁶SLD-led coalition did not meet the 8 percent electoral threshold required for coalitions and failed to gain seats in the last parliamentary election.

²⁷Additionally, Razem did not clear the electoral threshold of 5% in the 2015 parliamentary elections and failed to gain representatives in the legislature.

class and intelligentsia, which also signals level of education. I presented voters solely with male candidates because – despite women’s critical involvement in the opposition movement – politicians who came out of Solidarity were predominately male,²⁸ as well as for a more mundane reason: the rules of Polish grammar enforce a declination and conjugation based on gender, making it too complex to vary attributes and levels while maintaining the match between randomly assigned gender and other elements of the biography.

I included different levels of involvement in Solidarity to explore the importance of the extent of engagement. Thus, I varied dissident activity from no involvement prior to transition (as a baseline) through “activist” to a sacrifice for the democratic movement – arrest and internment under the Martial Law in the 1980s when many Solidarity activists were imprisoned or driven underground. As one of the most famous Solidarity activists, Bronisław Geremek, put it: “Solidarity’s’ people, before they got to parliament, typically went through a prison education” (Geremek 1990). In my data, over 3,000 out of 4,888 Solidarity activists are described as having been arrested for opposition activity in their biographies. Imprisonment signals both sacrifice for the democratic cause and an important role in the movement structures as the state targeted central opposition figures for arrest to de-mobilize the movement.

The survey was fielded on a sample of about 800 Polish adults²⁹ recruited from Qualtrics partner panels. The survey was implemented online via Qualtrics in January 2017.³⁰ The sample is not a probability sample, but its characteristics make it particularly well suited to analyze the theoretical questions of interest. As Table C.1 in the Appendix shows, the sample is roughly representative of the general population in terms of observed demographic characteristics of age and gender. Yet it is both more educated and more politically active. This is because the type of respondents who are likely to self-select into an online survey, educated and urban, with higher levels of political

²⁸Only one woman took part in Roundtable negotiations on the opposition’s side (Grabowska and Szawiel 1993). In my dataset, only about 7% of activist candidates are female, even though women make up about a quarter of all candidates between 1991 and 2011.

²⁹N=807 after participants who declined to consent (n=28), under 18 (n=3), and those who failed a pre-treatment attention check (n=30) were screened out or excluded. Dropping respondents who were not paying attention prior to experimental treatment alleviates concerns that experimental uptake differed between individuals, for example by educational level.

³⁰I used software by Strehnev et al. (2013) to design and implement the survey in Qualtrics.

interest and knowledge (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012),³¹ are also more likely to turn out to vote (Sondheimer and Green 2010; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995; Powell Jr 1986; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Deutsch 1961), including in Poland (Markowski and Tucker 2005; Pacek 1994; Wade, Groth, and Lavelle 1993).

Nearly 81% of the sample said they had voted in the last parliamentary election, compared to about 51% actual turnout in 2015, typical for Poland, where turnout has ranged from about 41% to about 54% since the first democratic election.³² Even though respondents tend to overreport voting (Belli, Traugott, and Beckmann 2001), it is well established that self-administered online questionnaires are much less vulnerable to social desirability bias (Berrens et al. 2003; Kreuter, Presser, and Tourangeau 2008; White et al. 2018). By focusing on how likely *voters*, as opposed to all adults eligible for voting, choose political representatives, this study sheds light on the effects of cues provided by candidate’s past on decisions made at the voting booth. Although within the limits of this study, I am unable to determine whether candidates’ past or their views affect turnout itself, the analysis provides insights into what drives political choices among those individuals who are most likely to have an effect on political outcomes in Poland – the voters.

Analysis and Results

The quantity of interest is the Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE), or the treatment effect of any one of the profile characteristics. The AMCE represents the average difference in the probability of being the selected candidate when comparing two different attribute values – for example, a candidate who was a pro-democracy activist to a candidate who was not involved in politics – where the average is taken over all possible combinations of the other candidate attributes. Due to random assignment of attributes, on average, profiles with a pro-democracy activist have the same distribution for all other attributes as profiles with a non-activist, allowing for a straightforward comparison of means.

³¹Citizens with low levels of education are often underrepresented also in international online samples, see for example (Anduiza, Gallego, and Muñoz 2013).

³²The first free election had a turnout of nearly 64% (Heyns and Bialecki 1991), presidential elections also typically have slightly higher turnout than parliamentary elections. Turnout data come from PKW (National Electoral Committee).




Figure 2.6: Effects of Candidate Attribute Values on Probability of Being the Preferred Vote Choice. Estimates are based on OLS model with standard errors clustered by respondent. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Levels described as baselines are the reference category for each attribute. Number of observations=8,070. Number of Respondents=807.

Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto (2014) show that the AMCE is non parametrically identified given the conditionally independent randomization of the attributes and can be estimated by regressing the binary outcome variable, *Candidate Selected*, on sets of indicator variables measuring the levels of each attribute. The unit of analysis is the rated candidate profile. Because each of 807 respondents rated five pairings, with two candidate profiles per pairing, there are up to 8,070 observations in some models. Because observed choice outcomes are not independent across the profiles rated by a single respondent, standard errors were clustered by respondent to obtain accurate variance estimates.

As Figure 2.6 shows, over 25 years after the transition, on average, respondents do still reward activism in Solidarity, but only when it was costly – in the case of imprisonment. Candidates with a




Figure 2.7: Number of observations=1,920. Number of Respondents=192.

history of imprisonment for Solidarity activism are over 4% more likely to be selected ($p < 0.001$).³³ These effects hold across the political spectrum: for Law and Justice (PiS) supporters (Figure 3.2) and opposition supporters³⁴ (Figure 3.3). The one exception are sympathizers of the post-communist left (Figure A.3).³⁵ These results suggest that the source of the electoral advantage documented in previous sections may be reputation and public opinion broadly favorable to Solidarity activists. Moreover, the magnitude of party effects – for example, a 20% decrease in the likelihood of voting for a Civic Platform (PO) candidate among Law Justice (PiS) sympathizers – relative to activism effects indicates that once party systems institutionalize, partisan considerations tend to dominate

³³The effect for activism is positive but small - under 1% - and not statistically significant.

³⁴This groups all parties that are not in government except the post-communist SLD.

³⁵However, it's possible any existing effect was not detected due to the small size of this group in the sample.




Figure 2.8: Number of observations=5,580. Number of Respondents=558.

voting behavior.

2.6.2 Alternative explanations: power and resources

To address the possibility that the observed electoral advantage can instead be explained by access to resources, I first explore whether dissidents hold more power within their parties. I leverage the information in the EAST PaC dataset on candidate's position on the ballot in the Sejm elections to test whether Solidarity activists were more likely to be placed higher on party lists in post-transition elections. As Table 2.3 shows, on average between 1991 and 2011, Solidarity activists were in fact positioned almost 2 spots higher on party lists, indicating that they are central figures in their parties though their advantage pales in comparison to that of incumbents (over 7 spots higher on average). However, analyses in section 2.5 control for list placement, suggesting this

explanation is not sufficient.

Next, I use a dataset constructed by Tavits (2011) on members of parliament in Poland between 1997 and 2007 and combine it with information on politicians' activist backgrounds to test other resource-centered explanations. Specifically, I test 1) whether dissidents-turned-politicians are more likely to hold national offices and 2) whether they invest more heavily in party-building efforts or are supported by more robust organizational structures i.e. whether party organization is stronger in areas where activists hold office. Unfortunately, the timeframe of the dataset does not include the first two post-transitional elections in 1991 and 1993 but it does encompass four subsequent elections, when as Figure 2.2 shows, activists still enjoyed an advantage. Moreover, in this timeframe, parties formed on the opposition side should have even more robust party organizations than they did shortly after the transition.

The variables that serve as dependent variables on which the activist past is regressed are national politician (cabinet position, parliamentary secretary or speaker of the lower house, currently or previously held), local politician (mayor or councilor), and subunit organizational strength ("the share of local governments in a given national electoral district where a party runs its candidates in the local government election under the party label" (Tavits 2011, p.927)), which ranges from 0 to 1. I find that dissidents are no more likely to hold national or local offices (see Table A.13 in the Appendix).³⁶ As Table 2.4 shows, parties are also not stronger in those subunits where dissidents are in office. This provides some suggestive evidence that the advantages enjoyed by dissidents running for office are not based on resources but are likely reputational and driven by public opinion.

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter argues that in the low-information environment of post-transition elections, former dissidents enjoy an electoral advantage that helps them gain access to political influence in the new democracy by becoming part of its nascent political elite. Yet the reputational advantage enjoyed by pro-democracy activists declines over time as voters gain democratic experience required to form ideological positions and political parties become more predictable and permanent organizers of

³⁶The positive effect of activism on the likelihood of holding national office is comparable in size to having served an additional term in office but is only significant at $\alpha = 0.1$ level.

Table 2.3: Solidarity activism and placement on party list. OLS model with party, district, and election year fixed effects.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Position on the party list
Solidarity activist	−1.950*** (0.408)
Incumbent	−7.594*** (0.119)
Woman	0.519*** (0.059)
District fixed effects	✓
Party fixed effects	✓
Election year fixed effects	✓
Constant	3.481*** (0.453)
Observations	53,588
R ²	0.324
Adjusted R ²	0.321
Residual Std. Error	5.437 (df = 53370)
F Statistic	117.951*** (df = 217; 53370)
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

collective interests.

Poland is a paradigmatic case of a successful democratic transition in the Fourth Wave of democratization. Yet the argument laid out in this chapter should apply more broadly in cases, in which a successful mass movement precipitated a democratic transition. The conditions of uncertainty about voters' ideological positions and party platforms and the salience of the regime/opposition divide in early post-transition elections are common in new democracies. Dissidents were initially overwhelmingly voted into political offices in countries as distinct as South Korea, South Africa, Tunisia, and Czechoslovakia.

Highlighting dissident credentials can be a central part of electoral campaigns, especially around the transition, when movement and party politics intersect. For example, in post-transition South Korea candidates with roots in the opposition movement frequently discussed the sacrifices (e.g. number of times arrested) they made during the contentious phase in the electoral campaign preceding the first democratic election (Kim, Chang, and Shin 2013; Shin and Chang 2011). In many countries in post-communist Europe, including Poland (Chimiak 2010), Czech Republic (Raimundo 2013a), Slovakia (Leff, Deegan-Krause, and Wolchik 2014), and more recently Croatia (Rupnik 2016), political and cultural elites have engaged in biographical battles over moral credentials; in

Table 2.4: Solidarity activism and strength of party organization

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Party subunit organizational strength
Activist	−0.008 (0.016)
Party voteshare	0.484*** (0.050)
AWS	−0.305*** (0.017)
KPN	−0.035 (0.060)
LPR	−0.368*** (0.031)
PiS	−0.765*** (0.022)
PO	−0.721*** (0.023)
PSL	0.119*** (0.019)
SO	−0.266*** (0.020)
UP	−0.017 (0.037)
UW	−0.213*** (0.023)
Committee leadership	0.027*** (0.010)
Defection rate	0.355*** (0.107)
National office	−0.007 (0.015)
Number of competitors	−0.002 (0.003)
Local office	−0.011 (0.010)
Parliamentary term 2001-2005	0.052*** (0.017)
Parliamentary term 2005-2007	0.440*** (0.021)
Parliamentary terms served	−0.003 (0.005)
District fixed effects	✓
Constant	0.102 (0.074)
Observations	1,242
R ²	0.731
Adjusted R ²	0.712
Residual Std. Error	0.145 (df = 1159)
F Statistic	38.344*** (df = 82; 1159)
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

“political credentialing and de-credentialing of politicians because of their relationship – biographical or attitudinal – to the past” (Larson 2010, p.107). Dissident past can also be commemorated. For example, in Portugal members of left-wing parties with origins in the Carnation Revolution to this day wear red carnations on its anniversary to celebrate their dissident roots (Fishman 2011).

This chapter also shows that the intersection between social movements and political parties, particularly pronounced at a moment of party system fluidity, can become a fixture of the political landscape when activists benefit from the legitimacy of social movements inside the political sphere. In this way, it synthesizes the fields of contentious and electoral politics, which are typically studied in isolation but often overlap in practice. Finally, the finding that the primary source of dissidents’ electoral advantage is reputation, not resources, has important implications for new democracies. An advantage based on reputation is less robust than one rooted in organizational capacity. As a result, parties emergent out of pro-democracy movements cannot solely rely on the dissident credentials of their leaders but need to invest in party structures lest they start losing to better organized authoritarian successor parties and political newcomers.

3 | Patriots or Partisans? Movements and Parties in Contemporary Poland

3.1 Introduction

In the classic social movement theory, protests serve as the “weapons of the weak” (Scott 1983) and social movements mobilize citizens to challenge the state (Tilly, Tarrow, and McAdam 2001; Tarrow 2011). However, this dichotomy of the society against the state overlooks the possibility of protest as a tool in elite conflict and competition.¹ Yet “parties and movements are proximate fields that are interdependent through shared social relationships” and many political actors, including those occupying positions within the state, have intersecting movement-party identities and use both institutional and contentious tactics to pursue their goals (Heaney and Rojas 2013). In times of “movement society,” with protest routinized and normalized as a form of political participation (Meyer and Tarrow 1998), it is not unusual for politicians to join street demonstrations and benefit electorally from expressing solidarity with protesters’ cause (Cho and Kruszewska 2018). Political parties and social movements “interact with one another, and strategize vis-a-vis one another” and “a party may benefit from working with a movement because the movement may be closely networked with a particular demographic or issue group in the mass electorate” to which the party wants to appeal. Moreover, partisan actors can “attempt to harness the grassroots energy of social movements to promote the electoral success of the party” (Heaney and Rojas 2013).

In this chapter, I argue that in Poland, both opposition parties and the ruling party have sought reputational advantages from relationships with social movements to increase their perception as representatives of the people and the Polish nation. The opposition has developed close ties with the movement against democratic backsliding and the ruling party has emboldened right-wing na-

¹But see Ekiert, Perry, and Yan (Forthcoming) or Radnitz (2010) for exceptions.

tionalist movements, bringing fringe actors into the mainstream. By participating in protests and adopting contentious tactics within the institutions (such as occupying the Parliament) in the case of the opposition and by opening up spaces for participation to movements friendly to their agenda in the case of the ruling party, they have each tried to legitimate their position via popular mobilization.

I also show that legacies of past social movements, even a nonpartisan pro-democracy movement, can be used in contemporary partisan fights. The memory of Solidarity – Poland’s largest and most successful social movement – has become a political battleground. Whereas the opposition uses the politics of memory to mobilize support under Solidarity’s symbols, for the ruling party, the “politicization and instrumentalization of history” serves as a tool for discrediting opponents as unpatriotic, as well as for “promoting those aspects of the past that provide reference points and models for contemporary Poles” (Machcewicz 2012, p.182-193, 172).

3.2 Experiment

To support these arguments, I draw on results of the experimental study described in detail in Chapter 2. In the experimental portion of the survey, respondents were presented with five pairs of political candidates, each on a separate page. In each of the five rounds, respondents were asked to read brief descriptions of the candidates displayed side-by-side and indicate for which candidate they’d be more likely to vote. Within candidate biographies, I randomly varied a number of candidate characteristics. Table 3.1 lists all the attributes and their possible values.

The focus in this chapter is on 1) the effect of involvement in the current protests against the Law and Justice government and 2) the political influence of the past: whether or not a candidate has been accused of collaborating with the communist security service and candidate’s views on the transitional pact. Assessment of the Roundtable Agreement combines two elements: whether it was a necessary compromise or whether it went too far in accommodating the communists and whether lustration² should have been implemented to keep former collaborators away from public offices. Although grouping these elements makes it impossible to separate their individual effects,

²Appel (2005) defines lustration as: “the process of screening groups of people for previous acts of collaboration under the communist regime (especially acts of collaboration with the secret police) and in turn disqualifying members of these groups from holding high-level positions in the public sector” (p. 383).

it represents a coherent stance for or against de-communization.

To explore attitudes towards involvement in the recent mass mobilization against actions of PiS government towards the Constitutional Tribunal and public media, I included support for or condemnation of activities of the Committee for the Defense of Democracy, which was one of the main protest organizers. Because there is no sizable counter-mobilization to KOD in favor of PiS (at least not in the streets), the opposition was expressed as simple condemnation of KOD activity. However, to distinguish between the importance of protest as an act of demonstrating in the streets and protest as a signal of discontent with government's policies that may be communicated just as effectively via other means, this attribute took on three levels: condemnation of KOD, criticism of the government *without* protest participation, and protest participation. Comparing verbal criticism to criticism through street demonstrations makes it possible to assess the value of extra-parliamentary protest activity in increasing politician's appeal or – among those who disagree with the movement's goals – decreasing it as a stronger stance against the government. Each of the six attributes of each candidate was independently randomly assigned but a constraint was placed on randomization in one case: a PiS politician who participated in KOD demonstrations. This was necessary because there are no known examples of such behavior and it would be seen as highly unusual. Such an unrealistic combination could elicit bizarre reactions from respondents.³

As discussed in more detail in the previous chapter, the survey was fielded on a sample of about 800 Polish adults recruited from Qualtrics partner panels.⁴ The survey was implemented online via Qualtrics in January 2017.⁵ The quantity of interest is the Average Marginal Component Effect (AMCE), or the treatment effect of any one of the profile characteristics. The unit of analysis is the rated candidate profile. Because each of 807 respondents rated five pairings, with two candidate profiles per pairing, there are up to 8,070 observations in some models. Because observed choice outcomes are not independent across the profiles rated by a single respondent, standard errors were

³Other attribute levels were carefully specified so that they are plausible in each combination. While some combinations such as for example PiS politicians who oppose decommunization or former SB collaborators who support lustration are not typical, they are not completely implausible.

⁴N=807 after participants who declined to consent (n=28), under 18 (n=3), and those who failed a pre-treatment attention check (n=30) were screened out or excluded. Dropping respondents who were not paying attention prior to experimental treatment alleviates concerns that experimental uptake differed between individuals for example by education level.

⁵I used software by Strezhnev et al. (2013) to design and implement the survey in Qualtrics.

Table 3.1: Conjoint Study Attributes and Levels. Baseline levels italicized.

Attributes	Attribute Levels
Party	<i>Candidate of Law and Justice (PiS)</i> Candidate of Civic Platform (PO)
Occupation	<i>Worker</i> Lawyer
Solidarity	<i>Not politically involved prior to transition</i> Solidarity activist under communism Imprisoned for activism in Solidarity during martial law
Collaborator	<i>Never accused of collaboration with the communist security apparatus</i> Accused of collaboration with the communist security apparatus
Roundtable Position	<i>Compromise necessary; opposes lustration and decommunization</i> Too much of a compromise; supports lustration and decommunization
KOD	<i>Criticizes KOD and recent protests</i> Criticizes current government but does not participate in protests Has participated in protests organized by KOD and actively supports it

clustered by respondent to obtain accurate variance estimates.

3.3 Social Movements and Opposition Parties

In the case of the opposition parties in Poland, the boundary between institutional and contentious politics has become more permeable through two main ways. First, opposition politicians have participated, spoken at, and even co-organized street demonstrations against policies of the government, lending them their support and receiving reputational benefits among their co-partisans for this involvement. Second, they have brought protest tactics such as occupation into the parliament. In this Section, I explore each of those two strategies in turn.

3.3.1 Protest in the Streets

In the recent years, scholars have argued that the rise of “illiberal democracy” in Central and Eastern Europe has threatened the democratic legacy of the 1989 revolution in both the democratic laggards and most successful democratization cases. Bulgaria and Romania have struggled with corruption and weak rule of law, Slovakia with ethnic nationalism (Dawson and Hanley 2016; Krastev 2016), and most of the countries in the region with weak civil society (Howard 2003). In Hungary and Poland, the ruling governments have been accused of undermining the independence of the judiciary and public media (Kornai 2015; Rupnik 2016). In both cases, these actions sparked mass

demonstrations in defense of checks and balances and liberal institutions (Kornai 2015; Fomina and Kucharczyk 2016). According to a 2016 poll conducted by the Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS), Law and Justice's disapproval ratings among supporters of the opposition parties were as high as 75% and 90% with actions against democratic institutions, and courts in particular, the most frequently cited justification for disapproval.⁶ As outlined in Section 1.3.2, in an environment of low trust in the government, the value of activist credentials is expected to be high.

In Poland, KOD, the Committee for the Defense of Democracy, a mass grassroots movement in opposition to the government of Law and Justice (PiS), fashioned its name after KOR, the Committee for the Defense of the Workers, one of key Solidarity organizations. KOD has taken to the streets to protest government's moves to limit and control the Constitutional Tribunal and the media, which it argues threaten Polish democracy. References to Solidarity abound in movement's posters and slogans, and key Solidarity figures have attended their demonstrations (Fomina and Kucharczyk 2016). As Bogdan Borusewicz, one of the leaders of "Solidarity" and current Senator, put it: "At demonstrations of the Committee for the Defense of Democracy, I know 60%, let's say 40% of the people (...) Under the martial law, about half a million people were active in the underground opposition, a very large number of people from the first Solidarity, of whom there were nine million. And now the activity of these people has been revived."⁷

However, the legacy of dissidence is a contested one and the leader of Law and Justice against whose party KOD regularly takes to the streets was himself a member of Solidarity.⁸ Key figures in both the government and the opposition's main party, Civic Platform (PO), have dissident biographies, and both parties can claim roots in post-Solidarity political formations. Now, former members of the democratic opposition, who worked side-by-side against communism find themselves divided, this time over the actions of Law and Justice (PiS), the party in power, which occupies an absolute majority in the lower house of the Polish Parliament. Many former activists both inside and outside the parliament have accused it of threatening democracy. Some have joined or publicly supported mass protests against government's attempts to constrain the Constitutional Tribunal

⁶CBOS Study Report 2016, Number 103.

⁷Interview with the Author, Warsaw, July 22, 2016.

⁸He was also a founder of one of the first political formations emergent out of Solidarity, Center Agreement (PC), a predecessor to Law and Justice.

and control the media. Although KOD, one of the main grass-roots protest organizers, so far has insisted on its nonpartisan character and is not officially affiliated with a political party, opposition politicians, most notably from Civic Platform (PO) and Modern (Nowoczesna) such as Bronisław Komorowski (former president), Grzegorz Schetyna (leader of Civic Platform) and Ryszard Petru (leader of Nowoczesna) have attended and given speeches at KOD demonstrations, some of which were co-organized and publicized by opposition parties.⁹ According to Mateusz Kijowski, leader of KOD, the movement has developed “strong relations with opposition parties,” which started “fighting for [its] support” once the movement gained popularity but the leadership felt strongly that the movement “cannot be seen as a youth organization for Civic Platform.”¹⁰

Yet, despite KOD’s attempts to portray itself as modern-day Solidarity, unlike historical activists for democracy who possess universally recognized moral credentials, activists against the erosion of democracy are more polarizing figures. In places where the opposition currently sees democratic institutions as threatened by actions of the incumbent government, protesting individuals challenge democratically elected politicians who often enjoy strong and unfaltering support from their co-partisans. Although voters in new democracies tend to show lower levels of partisan identification (Huber, Kernell, and Leoni 2005; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007; Dalton and Weldon 2007), partisanship strengthens with age and stability of party systems and party cues influence citizen preferences even in weakly institutionalized contexts (Brader, Tucker, and Duell 2013; Carlson 2016). Moreover, since “voters are willing to trade off democratic principles for their partisan interests” (Svolik 2018) and perceive electoral reforms through a partisan lens (Ahlquist et al. 2018), even framing the opposition as a defense of democratic values and institutions – and therefore above partisan divide – is unlikely to be successful. Based on this logic and the discussion outlined in Sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.4 about the reputational advantage of protest participation but the limits of its appeal in established party systems, I expect that involvement in KOD protests against democratic backsliding will be rewarded among opposition voters but perceived through a partisan lens.

The survey experiment described in Section 3.2 tests this hypothesis. Figure 3.1 displays the results for all respondents. Figures 3.2 and 3.3 present results when the baseline model is replicated

⁹“Wielka demonstracja KOD i opozycji w Warszawie.” [Large demonstration of KOD and the opposition in Warsaw] *Gazeta Wyborcza*, May 9, 2016.

¹⁰Lecture at Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University, April 6, 2016.

for subgroups of respondents divided by their partisan sympathies – between those who support the governing party (PiS) and those who feel closest to one of the other parties which competed in the last parliamentary election.¹¹ I find that a political candidate’s activism in KOD increases support among opponents of government but decreases it among its supporters. PiS supporters are 22% ($p < 0.001$) less likely to vote for a politician who participated in KOD protests compared to being 19% ($p < 0.001$) less likely to vote for a politician from PO, the main opposition party. The act of protest is important here: criticizing the government, but not participating in protests decreases support among PiS voters by only about 11 percentage points ($p < 0.001$). Among the electorate of the opposition, this distinction is not so clearly made: although both critics of the government and politicians who came out in KOD demonstrations are more likely to be rewarded at the voting booth, these effects are statistically indistinguishable from one another:¹² + 12% ($p < 0.001$) and +11% ($p < 0.001$) respectively.¹³ Again, these effects are comparable in size to the politician belonging to the main opposition party (PO): + 15% ($p < 0.001$).

Therefore, in spite of KOD’s efforts to present itself as defending nonpartisan issues of democracy such as freedom of the press and independence of the judiciary and multiple references to Solidarity’s symbols meant to brand it as the new pro-democracy movement, it is nonetheless seen as a partisan movement and has a polarizing effect. Even attempts to tie contemporary protests with the legacy of previous pro-democratic struggle through participation of well-known former dissidents and use of the language and imagery of the anti-authoritarian opposition fail to convince supporters of the incumbent government. “Partisan actors deploying competing visions of democratic accountability” (Slater 2013, p.731) generate intense conflict, in which the movement may itself be perceived as an assault on a democratically elected government, which represents the people instead of liberal but

¹¹As shown in the Appendix, results are similar if we define the two relevant groups as PiS sympathizers and PO and Nowoczesna sympathizers (main opposition parties currently represented in the parliament) or as those who have a positive v. negative assessment of the government’s actions so far.

¹²As Figure B.5 in the Appendix shows, these differences are not driven by the restriction imposed on randomization and are present also when only profiles which could take on all possible values of the KOD attribute – those of PO politicians – are included.

¹³It should be noted that the study was fielded in Poland after it was revealed that Mateusz Kijowski, the founder and leader of KOD, embezzled some of the movement’s funds, heating up controversy over whether KOD is the appropriate organization to lead the opposition to the government. Thus, the positive effects of KOD among the opposition are likely smaller than they would have been prior to January 2017. In open-ended responses, some respondents expressed that, though they disagreed with the government’s actions, they either did not like or did not trust KOD or its leader or they did not think protesting in the streets was the appropriate solution.




Figure 3.1: Effects of Candidate Attribute Values on Probability of Being the Preferred Vote Choice. Estimates are based on the benchmark OLS model with clustered standard errors. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Levels described as baselines are the reference category for each attribute. Number of observations=8,070. Number of Respondents=807.




Figure 3.2: PiS voters (N=192)

undemocratic institutions such as the courts. In fact, both Victor Orban in Hungary and Jarosław Kaczyński in Poland see checks and balances as “imposing undue constraints on the sovereignty of the people” (Rupnik 2016) and defend vertical accountability against horizontal accountability (Slater 2013) as a more pure expression of the will of the people. In a context of partisan polarization, activists seen as partisan may therefore struggle to build broad coalitions needed to achieve their goals (Heaney 2017).

Surprisingly given the large literature that connects young people and protest participation (Schussman and Soule 2005; Wiltfang and McAdam 1991; McAdam 1986), as Figures 3.4 through 3.7 show, it is the oldest generation (65 and over) that is most likely to favor a political candidate who participated in KOD protests. Among this group (N=111), on average, respondents were 20% more likely to prefer a candidate who actively supports KOD ($p < 0.001$). Although this might be




Figure 3.3: Opposition voters (N=615)

related to stronger support for PO in this age group in the sample, it is also possible that the experience of communism and the memory of numerous waves of protest against the communist regime (1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, 1980) prior to the transition makes them more concerned about policies that appear to dismantle democratic institutions.

This interpretation is supported by descriptive statistics collected in the survey and analysis on the subset of respondents who belonged to Solidarity. First, the mean age of respondents in the sample who declared having participated in KOD protests is 51 and the median 56, indicating that demonstrators tend to be older, especially considering that online samples, like the one used in this study, are typically younger than nationally representative samples. Second, as shown in the Appendix, respondents who were themselves members of Solidarity prior to 1989 ($N=121$)¹⁴ are 19% more likely to choose a politicians who attended KOD demonstrations, while politicians only criticizing the government enjoy an average premium of 11% among this group. This provides suggestive evidence that personal experience of communism and transition to democracy, as well as previous participation in a pro-democratic movement, might encourage involvement in protests against democratic erosion decades after the transition.

As the previous chapter argues, Solidarity, which was part of the foundational myth for Poland as a post-communist democracy, is positively evaluated by most respondents, even if its symbolic capital has diminished over time. KOD, on the other hand, by criticizing the ruling party, albeit for actions threatening democratic institutions, came to be seen as a movement of the partisan, not pro-democratic, opposition. Crucially, Poland, with a weakly institutionalized party system (Bértoa 2014), high levels of electoral volatility (Powell and Tucker 2014), and low levels of party identification (Jasiewicz 2007) is a hard test, showing polarizing views on protests against democratic erosion in a context where they are least likely to be strongly colored by partisan affiliations. The difference between perceptions of Solidarity discussed in the previous chapter and the views on KOD highlight the importance of the type of movement and the maturity of the party system in considering whether contention might translate into political capital for social movement activists.

¹⁴Solidarity still exists as a trade union so the question explicitly asked about the period prior to the transition. Respondents who declared that they were members in Solidarity before 1989, but were born after 1971 were excluded because they misunderstood the question. It's possible that membership in Solidarity was over-reported due to social desirability, but as with voting history, this is less of a concern in an online, self-administered survey (White et al. 2018).

Depending on a movement’s legacy, the divisiveness of its goals, and the historical and contemporary context, politicians will enjoy the electoral benefits from their involvement in contentious politics either among the population at large or only among their co-partisans.




Figure 3.4: Respondents 28 years old and younger.

3.3.2 Protest in Parliament

The boundary between movement and party on the opposition side in Poland became more permeable not only through the participation of politicians in the street demonstrations but also adoption of contentious tactics within institutions. In December 2016, the opposition MPs staged a sit-in in the plenary hall to protest the ruling party’s attempts to limit media’s access to Parliament. The opposition occupied the parliamentary chamber for nearly a month, only suspending the protest after getting concessions from the government.¹⁵ In my study, conducted shortly after the protest ended, almost two thirds of respondents sympathizing with PO or Nowoczesna said they had supported the protest of opposition parliamentarians inside the chamber (compared to about 9% of government sympathizers). Over three quarters of them were in favor of KOD’s demonstrations and about half declared they would vote for KOD if it formed a political party. Thus, among opposition

¹⁵“Opposition Party in Poland Ends Monthlong Occupation of Parliament” *New York Times*. Jan. 12, 2017.




Figure 3.5: Respondents 29-45 years old.




Figure 3.6: Respondents 46 to 65 years old.

voters, there is support not only for street demonstrations but also for use of extra-institutional tactics by establishment politicians: participation in demonstrations and protest actions inside the parliament, as well as the potential transition of the movement into the institutional sphere through




Figure 3.7: Respondents 65 years old and older.

party formation.

3.4 Social Movements and the Ruling Party

Whereas the opposition movement has attempted to use Solidarity's legacy as a unifying strategy to build a nonpartisan coalition, Law and Justice has turned the most *divisive* elements of the movement's history – compromise during the pacted transition and accusations of collaboration with the communist security service – into a tool in partisan competition. The politics of memory of a historical movement has served to discredit a challenge from the contemporary movement (KOD). Law and Justice has also embraced other social movements, most notably religious and nationalist movements, empowering their more radical fringes and opening spaces for their participation in the civic sphere.

3.4.1 Contested Solidarity

Literature on transitional justice has shown that the approach to the legacy of repression at the moment of transition has implications for the lingering effects of the past on politics (Nalepa

2010; De Brito, Enríquez, and Aguilar 2001; Elster 2004). Like many Central and East European nations, Poland is a country with an incomplete and delayed transitional justice process (Appel 2005; Nalepa 2010) and powerful politics of memory (Bernhard and Kubik 2014). In contrast to East Germany, where after the unsealing of the political police records, thousands of civil servants were dismissed for collaboration (De Brito, Enríquez, and Aguilar 2001) or Portugal, where former political police officers and collaborators were prosecuted during the first two years after transition (Raimundo 2015), in Poland, de-communization laws allowed them to maintain their role in public life (Nalepa 2010).

Many scholars have recognized attitudes towards decommunization as one of the most important dimensions structuring Polish political space¹⁶ (Jasiewicz 1993; Gebethner 1992). The elites and the public divided on the issue in early 1990s (Bernhard and Kubik 2014) and this cleavage was institutionalized and politicized by main political actors, especially the populist right currently in government in Poland (Millard 2006; Raimundo 2013b). Center Agreement (PC) formed after the transition and then its successor Law and Justice (PiS), both founded by Jarosław Kaczyński (currently Law and Justice leader), have made the compromise of the Roundtable and insufficient decommunization at the time of transition part of their critique of political opponents, claiming that allowing former communists to continue participating in political and economic life has contributed to maintenance of corrupt networks.¹⁷ For example, in the 1991 electoral competition, the electoral manifesto of the Center Agreement (PC) stated: “We shall have no justice and democracy unless we totally dissociate ourselves from the communist past. The Alliance is of the opinion that Poland needs decommunization” (Benoit, Bräuninger, and Debus 2009).¹⁸

¹⁶In public opinion surveys conducted by CBOS, both in 2009 and 2014, about a quarter of respondents selected insufficient lustration and lack of decommunization when asked about mistakes committed by the government in the aftermath of the 1989 transition.

¹⁷Deklaracja Porozumienia Centrum [Programmatic Declaration of Center Agreement]. May 12, 1990. PC 90-91. Archiwum Partii Politycznych [Political Parties Archive] ISP PAN, Warsaw.

¹⁸The manifesto explained decommunization as a “profound reconstruction of the institutions, economic mechanisms and social relations that are a communist legacy and a dismissal from top positions in the state administration, police, banks and state control agencies all the former functionaries and activists of the communist party and the allied parties (...) The Polish Republic that we want to build cannot be a follow-up of the Polish People’s Republic – it will break with the enforced compromise of the Roundtable and with the policy of a ‘thick line,’ it will free itself from the communist burden and restrictions, it will combat chaos, corruption and the prevailing feeling of hopelessness (...) the so called policy of the ‘thick line’ has also caused a great deal of moral harm by exempting from legal responsibility all those who are guilty of injustice, crime and wrongdoing. In effect people no longer believe in justice and have been deprived of the sense of security – and this is a major social problem” (Benoit, Bräuninger, and Debus 2009).

In a policy space constrained on the economic dimension by the transition to market economy, politicizing the transitional pact and taking on the issue of decommunization offered a possibility of brand differentiation for the Center Agreement, generating a social dynamic and distinguishing them from other new parties competing for the Solidarity label. This stance was shared by PiS, which replaced PC after the dissolutions of Solidarity's Electoral Action (AWS).¹⁹ Law and Justice's project and vision for Poland is based on an "explicit rejection of the compromises of the transition settlement agreed between regime and opposition in 1989" (Dawson and Hanley 2016, p.15) and denial of Poland's accomplishments over the last few decades, especially under Civic Platform's (PO) government.²⁰ Although the question of decommunization primed the opposition/regime cleavage, it also created a division within the post-Solidarity camp, especially by putting in question the Foundational Pact negotiated by part of the Solidarity elite.²¹

Due to divergent interpretations of events surrounding transition to democracy by political formations originating from Solidarity, "political culture [in Poland] was torn apart by an intense symbolic and rhetorical war." The main division within the post-Solidarity camp was over whether the pacted transition, the Roundtable Agreement, was a "Corrupt Bargain" – a position taken by many politicians in the ruling Law and Justice (PiS) party²² or whether it provided a "Foundation for Reconciliation" – a position taken by leaders and activists from Mazowiecki's camp who supported the prime minister during his run against Wałęsa in the presidential campaign in 1990. While the former pushed for acceleration of reforms and far-reaching decommunization, the latter called for

¹⁹For example, the 2005 PiS electoral manifesto states: "We will eliminate post-communist institutions and the privileges of communist functionaries" (Benoit, Bräuninger, and Debus 2009).

²⁰Law and Justice has created a "Poland in ruins" narrative, which combines grievances of various social groups to portray Poland as destroyed and in need of major reforms (Fomina and Kucharczyk 2016).

²¹Law and Justice has used these historical narratives to gain political support since the emergence of the party, including during their first term in government between 2005-2007. However, the rhetoric of political memory has arguably become more polarizing since the 2015 election, when the post-communist left collapsed, failing to gain representation in parliament, and was not replaced by a new left. Competition with post-communist SLD has in the past served as a unifying force for post-Solidarity parties, for instance with last successful, albeit short-lived, attempt to create one dissident successor party, AWS, in 1996. With the collapse of the regime side of the regime/opposition divide, PiS went after its dissident competition with renewed vigor, successfully increasing the salience of the pre-existing division (Author Interview with Tadeusz Syryjczyk, former Solidarity activist and cabinet member in the first democratic government, Krakow, August 24, 2017.)

²²Antoni Macierewicz, deputy leader of PiS at the time of the Roundtable Commemoration in 2014 and currently a Minister of National Defense went as far as to call the Roundtable Agreement a "national betrayal" (Bernhard and Kubik 2014).

reform, compromise, and forgiveness of the past.²³ As Adam Michnik, Solidarity activist, Senator in the transitional Senate, and currently the editor of *Gazeta Wyborcza*, put it:

In Poland, the Roundtable was a shock for many people. For years I was attacked for defending communists. I was not defending communists. I was defending a certain logic of a democratic order. One cannot say, we suddenly introduce apartheid for the communists, they don't have the same rights we do. (...) I was an enemy of lustration, de-communization, because I considered them an anti-democratic mechanism (...) I looked at Spain as a model.²⁴

The results of the experiment reveal that the question of completeness or incompleteness of the democratic transition is still debated in Poland. As Figures 3.2 and 3.3 show, the rhetoric of “unfinished revolution,” which portrays the Roundtable Agreement as a compromise too favorable to communists and calls for more lustration and de-communization, resonates only with Law and Justice's electorate. A candidate who takes this stance is about 7% more likely to be selected by PiS supporters ($p < 0.01$) but this issue does not move sympathizers of other political parties. Whether Law and Justice tapped into pre-existing sentiment to successfully turn it into a political issue or whether PiS voters are responding because it's a discourse promoted by their party is hard to tell, but only the populist right's supporters react to this historical rhetoric.

Perhaps because lustration policies were implemented late and on a small scale, accusations of collaboration with the secret police have haunted many Polish politicians. Already in 1990s, when the first political formations emerged out of Solidarity's camp, “a biography fight began: who is the real hero, and who is a crypto-communist? And also: who better deserves the name of the inheritor of the grand movement?” (Chimiak 2010, p.67). Even Solidarity legend, Lech Wałęsa, has been accused of working with the communist security apparatus (SB), sparking a social debate about his past and his role in Poland's history.²⁵

²³It should be noted that while the former position can be associated with PiS, the latter is not as clearly tied to the main opposition party, Civic Platform (PO), which as Bernhard and Kubik (2014) show has often preferred to keep silent on the controversy about the historical memory of the Roundtable. Nevertheless, in order to experimentally test the relative importance of politicians' position on the post-communist transfer of power for voting choices made by contemporary Poles, the project juxtaposes these two most clearly-articulated interpretations.

²⁴Interview with Author, Warsaw, December 20, 2016.

²⁵According to a CBOS poll from 2008, the year in which a book claiming Wałęsa worked with the communist security apparatus (SB) was published, nearly half (45%) of respondents thought that even if Wałęsa had collaborated with the Security Service in the 1970s, the former Solidarity leader more than made up for it with all that he had done for Poland. Three quarters of respondents declared in the survey that the allegations did not change their opinion of Wałęsa, but this statement varied between the electorate of PiS (65%) and PO (88%).




Figure 3.8: Respondents’ motivations for choosing the candidates.

As Figure 3.1 shows, even a few decades after the end of communism, an accusation of collaboration decreases the likelihood that a candidate will be selected by almost 17% ($p < 0.001$) for candidates of parties that trace their origins to Solidarity. A mere shadow of doubt about candidate’s loyalties under communism carries four times as large of a penalty as a reward for one of the highest sacrifices in the pro-democracy struggle (imprisonment for Solidarity activism). Dark chapters in politicians’ biographies continue to hurt their electoral chances across the political spectrum – a shadow of accusation is enough to decrease the probability of being selected about as much as belonging to a different (and opposing) party than the respondent. This suggests that unresolved questions of transitional justice might strengthen the influence of the past in contemporary politics. The transitional compromise in Poland did not exclude former collaborators with the security service from positions of power in the new regime. Almost three decades later, voters still seem determined to use the ballot box to do so themselves.

This likely can be explained by voters attempting to select a “good type,” deserving of the “honor of political authority” (Dewan and Shepsle 2011), a representative whom they can trust and thus punishing politicians who betrayed their (and national) principles in the past. This betrayal is also a lot more salient than activists’ sacrifices. Descriptive evidence from a question asking respondents to check what they considered important as they made their choices throughout the tasks also suggests that selections were driven by a presence or absence of “warm feelings” for a candidate

(Campbell 1980). Faced with options like candidate's trustworthiness, ability to represent interests of people like them, candidate's service to the country, and candidate's qualifications or competence (respondents were asked to check all that apply), as Figure 3.8 shows, respondents were significantly more likely to select "trustworthiness" than any other explanation, with "sacrifices for the country" in the last place, significantly less important than all other considerations.²⁶

These conflicts over the legacy of Solidarity, the transitional compromise, and accusations of collaboration have become tools in contemporary partisan fights. Specifically, Law and Justice has used the politics of memory to symbolically exclude political opponents from the national community and to paint the mass mobilization against its government's policies as organized by "morally contemptible 'reds' or 'pinks' who enjoy power and privileges because of their prior association with, or complicity in, the communist system" (Kotwas and Kubik Forthcoming, p.11). At a PiS rally in 2016, Jarosław Kaczyński portrayed KOD activists as unpatriotic, saying that they "despise Poland."²⁷ Attempts to discredit the movement have also frequently taken a historical form, especially that Adam Michnik, Lech Wałęsa, and Władysław Frasyniuk, all important Solidarity figures, have supported the movement. Bringing up their participation in the Roundtable negotiations and the resulting compromise with the communists, referring to accusations about Lech Wałęsa's collaboration with the communist security apparatus, and implying that the ranks of KOD are filled with former collaborators all play into those historical conflicts to address a contemporary challenge from an opposition movement.

For example, in 2016, referring to a KOD-organized demonstration honoring Lech Wałęsa, PiS MP Jacek Żalek accused KOD activists of having "a shameful past in SB and UB" (communist security service) and said they were not a part of the Polish nation.^{28,29} In December 2016, amidst a massive public protest against regulation restricting media's access to parliament, PiS passed

²⁶Open-ended responses were not classified into categories because the vast majority of respondents who provided a meaningful answer simply mentioned one or a few elements of the profile as an explanation e.g. "because he didn't collaborate with SB" or "Solidarity activist" or "I (do not) support PiS/PO" etc. without detailing *why* that mattered to them – information already obtained in a more rigorous way through estimates of the effects of different attributes.

²⁷"Jarosław Kaczyński o KOD: 'Oni Polska gardza, oni chcą być kimś innym.'" *Gazeta Wyborcza.*, March 7, 2016.

²⁸"Znieważające słowa posła Żalka. Przed procesem w obronie działaczy KOD." [Insulting words of MP Żalek. Before the judicial proceedings in defense of KOD activists] *Gazeta Wyborcza. Białystok*, July 5, 2017.

²⁹"Trela do Kaczyńskiego: Nie pozwolimy się obrażać." [Trela to Kaczyński: We will tolerate being insulted] *Gazeta Wyborcza. Łódź.*, January 22, 2017.

the law together with another bill cutting retirement benefits of ex-employees of the communist law enforcement agencies. Weaponizing politics of the past, the ruling party used this timing to condemn the protesters as defending not the free press but the privileges of the former communist security apparatus.³⁰ “History, which was meant to build citizen solidarity, turned out to be a tool to condemn and exclude from the national community” (Machcewicz 2012, p.185) political opponents who are portrayed as having given in to the communist agenda in the past (during the foundational compromise) and whose judgment therefore cannot be trusted when it comes to democracy in Poland now. As the results of the experiment show, whereas the Roundtable rhetoric only resonates with Law and Justice supporters, accusations about activists’ ties to the communist security apparatus, even if untrue, could negatively impact their political chances across the political spectrum.

3.4.2 Nationalist Movements

As part of its program of employing politics of memory to defend the national values against perceived domestic and foreign enemies, the ruling party has also reached further into the past than the now-divisive parts of the legacy of Solidarity. Historical narratives have been revived to justify Polish exceptionalism, emboldening the resurgence of nationalist movements. For example, by glorifying the Cursed Soldiers, an underground movement, which resisted the imposition of communism after World War II, nationalist organizations such as the far-right All-Polish Youth Movement “link the modern radical right to historical opposition to communism and resonate with voters who feel left behind and mistrust mainstream politicians” (Charnysh 2017), especially those who advocate a multicultural, secular vision of Poland.

Much like President Trump “enlivened the extreme right-wing fringes of the American social movements scene” (Meyer and Tarrow 2018, p.4), the ruling party in Poland has emboldened the far right, nationalist movements in Poland marginalized under the Civic Platform (PO) government (Kotwas and Kubik Forthcoming). First, new legislation on public gatherings favors assemblies organized by the government, the Church, and religious organizations (in Poland, the national identity is closely tied to a Catholic identity) over citizen initiatives. It also gives priority to commemorations of the victims of the Smoleńsk plane crash, which include then-President Lech

³⁰“Poland’s right-wing government is rewriting history – with itself as hero.” *The Washington Post*, February 27, 2018.

Kaczyński, Jarosław Kaczyński's twin brother, and Independence Marches.³¹

Second, officials from the ruling party condone or remain silent³² on controversies surrounding the Independence March, which has been criticized for increasingly taking on xenophobic, anti-Muslim, and anti-Semitic tones (Kotwas and Kubik Forthcoming).³³ In November 2017, the Interior Minister at first called the demonstration, widely condemned in Europe as contradicting EU values, “a beautiful sight” and despite criticizing extremist slogans and posters, the Foreign Ministry defended it as patriotic and “a great celebration of Poles.” All-Polish Youth movement, one of the organizers of the Independence March in 2017, had ties to Law and Justice also in the past. When the party was first in government between 2005 and 2007, the former chairman of the movement served as Poland's vice prime minister, but now “the Polish far right feels increasingly emboldened by what it perceives as governmental recognition”³⁴ In November 2018, on the 100th anniversary of Polish independence, the President and the PiS government co-organized the March, which achieved an exceptionally high attendance and a boost in legitimacy (Kotwas and Kubik Forthcoming).

3.5 Conclusion

In times of “movement society” (Meyer and Tarrow 1998), when protest has been routinized and institutionalized as a form of political participation, politicians often appear at demonstrations to address their supporters and express solidarity with movement's goals. They also form partnerships with previously marginalized social movements, which “promise to give vibrancy to political parties” (Heaney and Rojas 2013, p.243) and which share their vision for the country. This chapter provides new insights into connections between protest and institutional politics by exploring the electoral effect of contentious experience for politicians involved in polarizing social movements and the role of re-interpretation of the legacy of past movements in the context of contemporary mobilization. The recent popular mobilization in Poland is seen as a partisan movement and the assessment of

³¹“Sejm przyjął ustawę o zgromadzeniach. Bedzie pierwszenstwo wladzy nad obywatelami?” [Congress passed legislation about public assemblies. Will there be priority of government over citizens?'] *Gazeta Wyborcza*, December 2, 2016.

³²President Andrzej Duda was the exception in November 2017.

³³“Poland's Leaders March With Far-Right Groups on Independence Day.” *The New York Times*, November 11, 2018.

³⁴“How Poland Became a Breeding Ground for Europe's Far Right.” *The Washington Post*, November 13, 2017.

politicians' involvement in protests depends on the respondent's party identification and their views on the current government, helping opposition politicians build political capital among their co-partisans, but at the cost of decreasing support among sympathizers of the ruling party. This is the case despite the fact that, in a country with a long tradition of dissent, the opposition engaged in contention also draws on historical memory – of the pro-democracy movement – to mobilize against the government.

These findings suggest limits to the effectiveness of mass mobilization against a democratically-elected government threatening liberal institutions – like demonstrations that have recently taken place in countries as varied as Turkey, Hungary, and the United States – if such protests are dismissed as partisan critiques instead of being perceived as expressions of universalistic concerns over violations of democratic norms. Such protests challenge an incumbent government beyond particular issues and policies and, as this paper shows, despite their universalistic appeals to democratic values intended to position them above partisan divides, may have polarizing effects even in countries with historically weak partisan attachments.

The results also shed light on the role of the past and re-interpretation of the past in shaping political preferences in new democracies. While this question is explored in Poland, it has implications for other new democracies that have faced issues of transitional justice and incorporation into politics of both pro-democracy activists and their former oppressors. The phenomenon of politicians whose biographies include both heroic and dark pages is relevant outside of East and Central Europe, and the question of how democratic or patriotic merits are weighed against collaboration with a nondemocratic regime or external enemy, is relevant in many countries with complicated history. France, for instance, is still suffering from a “Vichy Syndrome” (De Brito, Enríquez, and Aguilar 2001). The so-called “torturer problem” (Huntington 1993) has presented a dilemma for new regimes as varied as Chile after Pinochet (Benomar 1993), post-authoritarian South Korea (Lee 2003), and Romania after the fall of Ceausescu (Appel 2005). This study suggests that the persistence of negative effects for politicians implicated with the security apparatus of the authoritarian regime might be particularly pronounced in places that, like Poland, had incomplete transitional justice processes. In countries where former collaborators were not excluded from competition for public offices by law, voters themselves may take on the task of keeping them away from positions of power through their electoral choices. Furthermore, politics of memory can be used in partisan

fighters to discredit opposition against erosion of democracy.

Finally, the findings from this study provide insights into how politics surrounding the transition to democracy and the “founding myth” of democracy may shape political attitudes even after democratic consolidation. Research on democratization has emphasized the positive effects of pacted transitions on democratic consolidation such as stability and low risk of reversal. Moderation of radical forces minimizes the “threat from below” and allays the fears of authoritarian elites (Huntington 1984; Levine 1988; Valenzuela 1989; Karl 1990). Yet the short-term focus of this literature has, despite recognizing the implications of the pact for the institutional framework of new democracies, mostly overlooked the possibility that pacted transitions may have unintended consequences decades later. More specifically, in countries with a history of negotiated transition, political entrepreneurs may seek electoral gains from criticizing the foundational bargain to connect opposition groups who participated in the negotiations with the authoritarian elites. This chapter shows that in places with an “unfinished revolution” or a pacted transition, populists can effectively revive the past to mobilize political support by questioning the post-transition political order. Populist parties can also draw on a nation’s particular historical legacy, including that of the pro-democracy movement, to channel resentment, re-cast democratic accomplishments as flawed, build support, and symbolically exclude their opponents from the national community. In doing so, it contributes to the democratization literature, which has long discussed the importance of the type of transition for many political outcomes including regime stability, party formation, and quality of governance.

4 | From Contention to Congress: The Pro-Democracy Movement and the Left in Spain

4.1 Introduction

The Spanish transition to democracy, like the Polish transition, was precipitated by a labor movement in coalition with the intelligentsia and negotiated by the opposition and regime elites. The central role of unions and strikes in exerting the pressure on the regime and the importance of the compromise made by dissidents to achieve democracy make these cases comparable in a number of aspects. However, the Spanish transition took place over a decade earlier than the Polish one, still in an era of European mass parties. Unlike in Poland, where the first democratic elections were held in the context of an emerging party system and the European parties which served as models were no longer firmly rooted in societies, parties competing in the Spanish foundational elections were organizations with long traditions, preexisting structures, and well-defined electorates. As soon as they were legalized, they could adopt an electoral strategy previously negotiated during party congresses in exile, and rely on their strong ties to labor unions for organizational muscle. Moreover, in contrast to Poland, the pro-democracy movement was not a broad ideological coalition, but was aligned with and organized by the parties of the left – underground Communist (PCE) and Socialist (PSOE) parties – and affiliated labor unions, student and neighborhood associations (Collier and Mahoney 1997).

In short, the movement operated within an established – if illegal – party system pre-dating the dictatorship and was clearly associated with the left. This overlap between the regime/opposition divide and an ideological cleavage made the reputational advantage of activist roots unlikely to extend past the movement’s ideological base and secondary to partisan affiliation. Left-wing political parties re-emerged from the clandestine period with clear identities, programs, constituencies, and

organizations. Although, as in other new democracies, political actors and citizens operated in a fluid political environment,¹ there was less uncertainty than in Poland since voters could identify PCE and PSOE as clear alternatives to the regime options (UCD and further on the right, AP) and were familiar with their history and platforms. In fact, in the first elections, parties on the left performed the best in their historical bases of support and were able to activate partisan identities pre-dating the dictatorship. Access to resources such as clandestine structures, previously underground and exiled militants, and labor unions allowed the parties to mobilize for campaigns faster and more efficiently. This made both voters and parties less reliant on the leaders' reputation in decision-making and electoral strategy. At the same time, initially, a substantial portion of the MPs in the first democratic Congress had roots in the pro-democracy movement, indicating an importance of this background in the foundational elections and the movement's role in the formation of the post-transition political elite. Unlike in Poland, however, this background was limited to one end of the political spectrum.

In this chapter, I use archival materials and evidence from an original survey experiment to argue that in Spain, former dissidents still enjoyed a reputational advantage but, because they ran for office in a context of preexisting parties that played an active role in the opposition movement, this advantage was limited to left-wing MPs and left-wing voters. Moreover, the availability of party organization and well-defined party brands meant that candidates could focus on platforms rather than dissident roots, target specific constituencies, and rely on party and union structures instead of substituting reputation for resources.

4.2 Data

In addition to secondary sources, this chapter draws on historical materials from the PCE Archive in Madrid, the Gunther Archive, which is a collection of transcripts of interviews conducted by Richard Gunther in 1978 and housed by the Juan March Foundation in Madrid, and biographies of the MPs in the 1977 Congress compiled by Equipo de Documentacion Politica (Díaz Nosty

¹Over 150 political parties positioned all along the ideological spectrum emerged to contest the 1977 elections but unlike in Poland, where the 1991-1993 parliament was very fragmented, following the first democratic election, "the Spanish party system moved from a fluid and magmatic stage to a more definite configuration" (Gunther, Sani, and Shabad 1988, p.37).

1977) at the time of the transition. Biographical information in the last source was provided by candidates themselves close to the first elections, which suggests there may be bias in both *which* information is included and *how* the information is presented. Nevertheless, what MPs chose to include might also indicate which aspects of their biography they saw as important and thus possibly emphasized in the electoral campaign as well. This is possible considering that electoral materials from the PCE Archive suggest that showcasing the presence of many former political dissidents and prisoners formed a part of the party’s branding strategy. I use these biographies to compile a new dataset of the MPs in post-transition Congress to calculate the proportion of the new political elite with dissident and labor union backgrounds. Finally, to test the reputational advantage of dissident roots, I use an original survey experiment on a sample of Spanish respondents, in which participants expressed preferences over political candidates. The findings of the experiment supplement the descriptive analysis by showing that former pro-democracy activists 1) are perceived to be more left-leaning and 2) still have an electoral advantage among voters who place themselves farther on the left of ideological spectrum.

4.3 Importance of the Preexisting Party System

The history of the Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) dates back to the 19th century and the Communist Party (PCE) to the early 20th century. Both parties played a role in the Second Spanish Republic (1931-1939) and were forced underground following the defeat of the Republic by the forces of General Francisco Franco in 1939. In 1956, the first industrial disputes and student protest took place, followed by a series of strikes in 1962 and creation of underground student organization (FUDE) and union (SDE, in 1965). In 1965, Workers’ Commissions (CCOO), illegal workers’ committees, formed as an alternative to official, co-opted trade unions. Under the dictatorship, “the underground leftist parties were the backbone of the two movements from 1956” – the working-class and student movements, serving as a crucial link between them (Maravall 1978, p.12). Leaders of both the student and labor movements occupied important positions in the clandestine Socialist and Communist parties: nearly 75% of the national executive members of the Workers’ Commissions had representative posts in the Communist Party and the General Secretary and the majority of the executives of UGT, another independent, clandestine labor union, were also important members

of the PSOE. Ties were strong also between the parties and the student movement: many students belonged to the underground left parties and FUDE, the student organization, was a creation of a pact between communists, socialists, and FLP (Popular Liberation Front) (Maravall 1978, p.12). The Communist Party in particular had strong connections to labor and student movements, as well as neighborhood associations (Powell 2015).

Therefore, the main challenge faced by the left during the transition was a transformation from clandestine organizations operating domestically under conditions of repression or in exile to vote maximizing parties and contenders in open and competitive democratic elections. Although the political environment was fluid, uncertain, and even marked by potentially destabilizing violence perpetrated by ETA terrorists, political parties did not have to start from a blank slate. They had at their disposal: 1) organizational resources from the underground phase, which could be repurposed and leveraged in the post-transition elections 2) a clear party brand, well-defined constituencies, and programs.

First, the parties – especially the Communist party – went into the democratic period with larger organizational resources than parties in Poland. At the time of the 1977 election, PCE had about 200,000 members, 42,000 of which were located in Madrid.² This is ten times as many as Freedom Union (UW), one of the main Solidarity successor parties (a few elections and mergers post-transition) and three times as many as Poland’s communist successor party, the best organized party on the Polish post-transition political scene (Grzymala-Busse 2002; Lewis 2002).³ PCE was initially the most organizationally robust opposition party in Spain, with extensive structures, branches in all provinces, large party membership, and dominant presence in neighborhood associations, which during Franco years engaged in dissident activity (Gunther, Sani, and Shabad 1988, p.148). PSOE, which did not have the same advantage of early infiltration of civil society still had 50,000 members at the time of the foundational elections (Encarnación 2014).

Many of those members acted as important bridges between unions and parties even if the organizations were formally independent. For example, coordination between CCOO and PCE often

²Interview 11, p. 55. Interview with a provincial-level PCE official. All interviews cited in the chapter, unless otherwise noted, were undertaken by Richard Gunther in 1978. Transcripts were generously shared by the Juan March Foundation in Madrid.

³The countries’ populations at the time of their respective transitions were similar, around 36 million people.

occurred through individuals with dual membership, “those leaders which the two organizations share in common. Through a mutual confidence between Party and trade union.”⁴ Similarly, all of the directors of the UGT belonged to PSOE and the unions provided the main source of working class support. A syndical secretary in PSOE served in an official role as a liaison with the unions but the overlap between the leadership of the two organizations was substantial, strengthening the relationship⁵ and making the study of individuals involved both in the labor movement and politics key to understanding electoral dynamics and party-building post-transition.

The organizational resources at the disposal of the left-wing parties were employed from the start. For example, the central piece of PCE’s finances were dues but in addition, extraordinary collections were conducted during electoral campaigns.⁶ In many places, large numbers of militants worked for the party during the elections. For example, in Granada over 4,500 people were involved in the campaign, about 65%-70% of party members in the province.⁷ This gave the party organizational muscle and human capital to mobilize quickly and efficiently even though it was legalized only about two months before the June 1977 elections.

Furthermore, the electorate of the left-wing parties was well-defined from the start because of a preexisting historical base. Parties knew exactly which socioeconomic groups to target and had a clear idea of where and how to attract additional voters. Both Socialist and Communist parties focused on their working class electorate and courted the rural vote to expand the bases of support.⁸ As expressed by a one PSOE Congressman: “We have done an analysis of this province’s voting patterns and have found that this Party is strongest in precisely those pueblos and districts that had supported the PSOE in the 1936 elections.”⁹ Thus, the results of the foundational elections tracked closely onto the outcomes from the last democratic election before the Civil War and the dictatorship, suggesting that parties could re-activate preexisting partisan identities.

Similarly, “the vote for the Communist party was a vote that had already been decided before the

⁴Interview 11, p.56. National-level low ranked official of the PCE.

⁵Interview 55, p.309. A provincial-level PSOE official.

⁶Interview 11, p.55. National-level low ranked official of the PCE.

⁷Interview 29. A provincial-level PCE official.

⁸Interview 29, Interview 13, Interview 34, Interview 55, Interview 74, Interview 75.

⁹Interview 35, p.80. National-level PSOE official, provincial level PSOE official, and PSOE MP.

electoral campaign” based on demographic and historical characteristics of the districts.¹⁰ Leaders in both the Communist and Socialist parties had a good grasp of sentiments in different groups in society, knew where the middle class could be a possible target and where it was too reactionary,¹¹ where it might be useful to expend efforts on mobilizing neighborhood associations and where they were already locked-in with no need for additional resources.¹² These historical electoral bases and partisan attachments dating back at least to the Second Republic meant that the main tasks consisted of mobilizing the electorate, allaying fears of radicalism in the rural, more conservative areas, and competing with other left-wing forces. Thanks to those deep roots and inherited public image, combined with years of party congresses at home and abroad, the electoral strategy – though hotly contested on ideological points such as abandonment of Marxism (Carrillo 1983) – was well-defined, reducing uncertainty around the electoral competition for both elites and voters. As a result, unlike in Poland, Spanish voters were provided with a lot of information about political alternatives in the first democratic election. Parties like PCE and PSOE had an established brand and their ideological and issue positions were well-known, making it easier for voters to determine who is most likely to represent their interests and therefore, less reliant on candidate’s dissident reputation as a heuristic.

4.4 Reputational Advantage

4.4.1 Dissidents in the Post-transition Institutions

Nevertheless, there is some evidence that suggests that dissident roots did play a role in the initial electoral campaign even in a party-dominated environment. First, parties discussed their history of anti-Franco resistance in the electoral campaign of 1977 even though the “pact of silence” and a transition marked by escalating extremist violence and fears of a potential military coup (Encarnación 2014) made this rhetoric less pronounced than in Poland. This was particularly important for the Communist party because after the Civil War, unlike PSOE politicians who operated mostly in exile, PCE activists “stayed underground in Spain and fought the old regime

¹⁰Interview A6, p.60. A provincial-level PCE official.

¹¹Interview 35. National-level PSOE officials and representative.

¹²Interview 13. National-level PSOE officials.

from within by organizing civil society (especially workers and students)” (Encarnación 2014, p.60). Many leaflets in PCE’s 1977 electoral campaign materials highlighted their struggle against the dictatorship by including slogans such as “A vote for communists is a vote for democracy” and “There can be no democracy without the Communist Party.” The party program made clear references to its dissident history when describing a vote for PCE as a vote for:

people who have steadfastly **defended liberty, bearing testament to it not just with words, but with deeds.** For this reason, a vote for candidates of PCE is an unequivocally democratic vote. It is a **vote for a party, which in its long struggle for liberty lost lives of thousands of its activists and leaders; which has accumulated prison sentences for tens of thousands of years (...)** Who votes for PCE will not be disappointed; **a long track record of sacrifices and selflessness,** synchronization between words and actions, it is the best guarantee that a vote for the communists is a vote for democracy [emphasis added].¹³

Moreover, even though in the elite interviews conducted by Richard Gunther, none of the interviewees in either PCE or PSOE directly brought up a role in the pro-democracy movement as one of the party’s candidate selection criteria, both parties considered their candidates’ past. For example, individuals who had collaborated with the Francoist regime were expelled from PSOE.¹⁴ PCE focused on presenting candidates who were well-known and recognized in their communities, which in some cases meant leaders of neighborhood associations¹⁵ and likely also activists from labor or student movements – people with good reputations in their areas.¹⁶

Second, as Figure 4.1 shows, a substantial portion of the Spanish post-transition political elites had roots in the dissident movement. Former political prisoners made up around 12% of MPs in Congress (Cortes) in 1977.¹⁷ This is a nontrivial proportion considering that about 13% of MPs elected in 1977 had served in legislature under Franco and enjoyed resource advantages associated with authoritarian successor parties (Loxton 2015). This number is also not much smaller than for

¹³Program for the 1977 Election. Archivo Historico del PCE, Madrid. Documentos PCE. 1977 IV-XII.

¹⁴Interview 11, p.55. National-level low ranked official of the PCE.

¹⁵Interview A6, p.60. A provincial-level PCE official.

¹⁶Although at times this strategy was simply focused on the right demographic characteristics such as presenting farmers as candidates to attract the rural vote.

¹⁷These numbers are calculated using a dataset compiled based on a study of the 1977 Congress by Equipo de Documentacion Politica. Biographies included in the study were written based on documents requested (with multiple follow-ups) and received from MPs and political parties. The missing information was filled in using data obtained from the parliamentary offices (Díaz Nosty 1977).

1977 Congress
Former political prisoners circled.




Figure 4.1: Former Political Prisoners in Parliament (1977-1979)

the first democratic Congress (Sejm) in Poland (19%) but, unlike in Poland, in Spain, dissidents were concentrated entirely on the left: over two thirds (70%) of PCE MPs¹⁸ and about one fifth of PSOE MPs¹⁹ but virtually no other MPs had been arrested for political activity.

Of course cross-country comparisons of proportions of new elites with history of political imprisonment (or even dissident activity) are imperfect given the differences in the risk borne by activists facing distinct levels of repression. Probability of arrest can vary based on tactical choices and capacity of the regime's repressive apparatus, as well as the strength of the opposition movement.²⁰ However, the presence of dissidents in the post-transition parliaments in both countries provides

¹⁸14 people out of 20, 3 of whom had participated in the Civil war so war-time activity could have been a reason for their imprisonment.

¹⁹24 out of 118, 7 of the arrested had participated in the Civil War.

²⁰For example, according to Fishman (1990)'s labor survey, in Spain "opposition labor activists stood roughly one chance in three of being arrested" (p. 124) for activities such as strike participation, attendance at demonstrations, and clandestine meetings. In contrast, nearly two thirds of dissidents included in the Encyclopedia of Solidarity had been arrested. However, the studies use different samples – plant-level workers who participated in opposition activity v. most well-known Solidarity activists likely to be in leadership positions and therefore individuals with highest probability of arrest.

suggestive evidence that voters at the time of transitional elections show a preference for individuals with a democratic track record. Even though some prominent dissidents might have evaded arrest, political imprisonment signals commitment to the movement, integrity, and willingness to take a risk for democratic values, as well as activist's position in the movement, central enough to make them a threat to the regime.

Although I focus on imprisonment, much like in the Polish case, the biographies of dissidents-turned-parliamentarians tell a story of broader repression for pro-democratic activism: expulsion from university, loss of employment, multiple arrests and many years in jail (e.g. Dolores Ibarruri and Fernando Soto from PCE, Carlos Zayas and Justo Martinez from PSOE), exile and refugee status abroad (e.g. Francisco Bustelo Garcia del Real from PSOE), even torture and death sentences (e.g. Marcelino Camacho from PCE). Similarly, in their interviews, Gunther, Sani, and Shabad (1988) found that among the PCE elites there were "several individuals who had been imprisoned, one who had been sentenced to death, and one who had been tortured so severely by the police that he was physically deformed" (p.146).

Dissident activity alone is hard to measure: over 80% of MPs in each of the left parties joined the organization before it was legalized. Clandestine membership, however, speaks not just to political opposition but also political experience and tenure in party structures, which likely also influenced the ability to advance in ranks and thus high placement on the electoral lists.²¹ Unsurprisingly, length of party service was one of the criteria for candidate selection²² and considering the brief window between the legalization of Socialist and Communist parties in the spring of 1977²³ and the summer 1977 election, anyone senior in the party necessarily belonged to clandestine structures inside Spain or to the party in exile.

Importantly for the ties with labor movement, the analysis of the characteristics of the new Spanish political elite shows that dual membership in the party and the trade union was also incredibly common on the left. As Figure 4.2 illustrates, nearly one third of PCE MPs were also members and/or officials in CCOO whereas about half of PSOE Congressmen belonged to (mostly)

²¹As I show in Chapter 2, dissidents were placed higher on party lists in Poland.

²²Interview 55, p.309. A provincial-level PSOE official.

²³Although PSOE held its first legal Congress inside Spain already in 1976 (Gonzalez 1978).

1977 Congress
Union members circled.




Figure 4.2: Union Members in Parliament (1977-1979)

UGT or other unions autonomous from the Francoist regime such as Union Sindical Obrera (USO).²⁴ Even though party and union organizations were independent, the personal overlap was substantial. Unions, especially the Workers' Commissions, were heavily involved in the opposition movement. The secretaries general of CCOO and UGT, Marcelino Camacho and Nicolas Redondo, were elected to parliament from the PCE and PSOE lists respectively both in 1977 and 1979 and executive committees of both unions were dominated by members of those parties (Fishman 1990).

Data available for later time periods (2009), which captures pro-democracy activism indicates that pro-democracy activists continued to remain part of the Spanish political class many years after the transition. Among 498 MPs, Senators, and parliamentarians from autonomous assemblies surveyed by CIS, out of 230 who studied before or during the transition, 135 (over 58%) reported involvement in student movements during their university days (Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas 2009). This phenomenon is also not unique to Spain. For example, in the 1980 Congress in Portugal (the earliest year following the 1975 post-transition elections for which this data is avail-

²⁴PSOE statutes actually require party members to join UGT so these numbers are likely much higher (Fishman 1990). Data on which this analysis is based counts only explicit mentions in the biographies.

able), 8% of MPs had been active in the opposition movement to the Estado Novo authoritarian regime and 8.4% held a leadership position in labor unions, which, as in Spain, were illegal under the dictatorship.²⁵

Although the focus of party elites, as expressed in party documents and interviews from the Gunther archive, was on building the party organization, strengthening the finances, developing the program, and reaching the target constituencies instead of campaigning on dissident reputation, a substantial portion of the new political elite still had roots in the democratic opposition. However, the dominance of the party organization over the movement for the activists-turned-politicians was very clear. First, the presence of dissidents in institutions likely had a lot to do with their power within parties – belonging to clandestine organizations (labor and party) or party activity in exile were the only available ways to gain political experience and earn tenure within the party structures. This means that dissidents, taking the risks of operating in organizations banned in Spain, advanced in party ranks during the dictatorship and following the transition, found themselves in top positions on party lists. Thus dissident reputation had electoral benefits but they likely operated mostly through a career within the party, although, as I will show in the subsequent section, there are reasons to believe they also increased support within the electorate. Second, because of the role of preexisting parties with a clear ideological profile, unlike in Poland, the opposition movement had a decisively left-wing profile, and dissidents in parliament were concentrated in the Socialist and Communist parties. As the next Section will show, their electoral appeal is also limited to far left voters.

4.4.2 Public Perception of Dissidents

The main shortcoming of taking the sizable proportion of dissidents or union activists in the first democratic parliament as evidence that candidates with this type of background do well in post-transition elections is that it selects on the dependent variable. Unfortunately, because the type of information about candidates for the 1977 Congress and their dissident background as the one collected in the Polish case is not available, I do not observe candidates with a history of pro-democracy activism who did not win parliamentary elections. Moreover, based on this descriptive

²⁵ Author calculations based on data from Freire, Viegas, and Seiceira (2009).

data, I cannot determine whether former dissidents succeeded electorally because they had a reputational advantage among their electorate (as hypothesized in Section 1.3.1) or whether they won positions in parliament solely because prior to the transition, the opposition movement was the only path for career advancement inside the party. To address these issues, I test the reputational benefit of roots in the pro-democracy movement with a conjoint survey experiment. In the experiment, Spanish respondents were presented with profiles of hypothetical political candidates with randomly assigned attributes and asked to evaluate and choose between them (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014). The random assignment of candidate characteristics makes it possible to identify the causal effect of attributes – such as candidate’s history of pro-democracy activism – on the probability that the respondent will vote for them.

This candidate choice experiment had four rounds: survey respondents saw four pairs of short bios of hypothetical candidates running for political office presented side-by-side and each time asked to select for which one they would be more likely to vote. Biographies were written to resemble typical candidate biographies posted on party websites prior to elections. Within each candidate’s biography, I randomly varied six candidate characteristics: gender, education, experience in politics, type of non-political experience, political party, and costly signal (leadership or arrest for movement activity). Gender and education were included to increase internal validity and make the profiles more realistic since they are typically provided in candidate’s campaign materials, and because previous studies found them to influence voter choice (Dolan 1998; Franchino and Zucchini 2015). The order of attributes was randomized to avoid primacy and recency effects. Only gender “candidate[female/male]” and political party, and then experience and signal, were restricted to always appear consecutively to ensure a logical structuring of the biographies. Each of the six attributes of each candidate was randomly assigned but a few constraints were placed on randomization because of the implausibility of some combinations. Specifically, profiles with PP and Ciudadanos candidates who are anti-eviction activists or who were pro-democracy activists, and candidates with business experience arrested during protest (since no protest was mentioned in their case) were restricted from appearing i.e. had a zero probability of being displayed. Table 5.1 lists all attributes and levels. Reference levels are italicized. Sample profiles are shown below.

Table 4.1: Conjoint Study Attributes and Levels

Gender	Education	Party	Politician	Experience	Costly Signal
<i>Man</i>	<i>High School</i>	<i>PP</i>	<i>Politician</i>	<i>SME Manager</i>	<i>Time commitment</i>
Woman	University	PSOE	Outsider	Labor unionist	Movement leader
	Doctorate	Ciudadanos		Indignados/15-M	Arrested during protest
		Podemos		Pro-Democracy	Party leader
				Anti-eviction	

Candidate A

Candidate [female] of Partido Popular. Received a PhD degree. Has long political experience. A manager of a small firm. Leader of the party at the local level.

Candidate B

Candidate [male] of Podemos. Completed a university education. Never before active in a political party.²⁶ Activist against evictions. Dedicated a lot of time to this activity.

Candidate A

Candidate [male] of PSOE. Completed a secondary education. Has long political experience. Activist against the Franco dictatorship. Arrested during a protest.

Candidate B

Candidate [female] of PSOE. Completed a secondary education. Has long political experience. Labor unionist. Leader of the organization at the local level.

The survey was fielded on a sample of about 1,000 Spanish adults²⁷ recruited by Survey Sampling International from SSI’s proprietary panels and from online communities, social networks, and different websites to improve quality and representativeness of the sample. The survey was fielded in August 2016 and administered online using software by Strehznev et al. (2013). The sample is comparable to recent nationally representative samples of the population in Spain though somewhat younger and better educated.²⁸ The unit of analysis is a rated candidate profile, meaning that some

²⁶The Spanish word used is *militar*, which in the context of political groups and parties translates to “be active in, be a member of.”

²⁷1,037 initiated the survey, 22 opted out after reading the consent form, 2 were screened out after the age question in the beginning of the survey. The remaining 1,013 respondents who consented to participate and completed the survey are included in the sample.

²⁸Respondents were quota sampled to nationally representative targets for age and gender but due to difficulties

models include over 8,000 units.

In this chapter, I focus exclusively on the results for the pro-democracy movement. The remaining results are presented and discussed in detail in the following chapter. Because of restrictions on randomization, I present results for a subset of profiles of left-wing (PSOE or Podemos) candidates for whom the non-political background could take all the possible values i.e. candidates who could be described as having been pro-democracy activists. I estimate the effects using difference-in-means between the baseline level for the attribute and pro-democracy activism (see Table 4.1).

Figure 4.3 shows the effect of activism on the perception of candidate's ideological position on a scale from 1(left) to 10(right) for a subset of candidates from left-wing parties (Podemos and PSOE) by all respondents (number of units/profiles=5,106). Even now, candidates who are described as dissidents during the Francoist period are seen as further to the left, similar to politicians who belong to labor unions. This shows that the movement is perceived to have had a clear ideological profile, limiting the appeal of this type of background to voters who see themselves as close to the candidate's inferred ideal point.

Figure 4.4 shows that in fact, among their electorate – left-wing respondents – candidates from left wing parties with dissident history are preferred to the baseline (small business owners) but only among those respondents who place themselves on the far left of the ideological spectrum (1-2).²⁹ This is the electorate of United Left (IU, the successor of PCE) and Podemos, where the mean self-reported ideology among respondents in sample is 2.9 (again, on a scale where 1 is “left” and 10 is “right”) rather than PSOE, where the mean ideology is 3.6. Among far left respondents, pro-democracy activists against Franco are over 10 percentage points more likely to be elected ($p < 0.01$)³⁰ despite the fact that history of anti-Franco activism signals that a candidate is older and voters generally prefer younger candidates (Horiuchi, Smith, and Yamamoto 2018b). The effects are null among the PSOE electorate, which includes more centrist voters. This indicates that this type of

in recruiting respondents above the age of 65, quota was relaxed for that age group.

²⁹I classify respondents as “left-wing” if they self-identify between 1 and 4 ($n=477$) and “far left” 1 or 2 on an ideological scale of 1-10 where 1 is left and 10 right. I classify them as “right-wing” if they place themselves between 6 and 10 ($n=323$) and as “centrist” if they placed themselves at 5 ($n=213$). This is the mean and median ideology in both the study sample and the nationally representative sample and follows the approach in Fernández-Albertos (2015).

³⁰However, among dissident candidates, there is no difference between those that were arrested for activism and those who are just described as having committed a lot of time to the activity (baseline).

activism is now only rewarded further on the left of the ideological spectrum. Yet the presence of this effect a few decades after the transition, especially considering the unfavorable signal about the age of the candidate, suggests that among the left, there is a persistent reputational benefit of dissident roots. These effects were likely stronger and perhaps more widespread among the left (including the more moderate left) closer in time to the transition. However, unsurprisingly, as Figure 4.5 shows, these effects are much smaller than party effects. Left-wing voters, on average, were about 40 percentage points more likely to choose candidates from PSOE or Podemos than candidates from PP, indicating that partisanship is the most important determinant of candidate preferences.




Figure 4.3: Effect on perception of candidate ideology. Subset of profiles with left-wing candidates (number profiles=5,106).




Figure 4.4: Effect on candidate selection. Subset of profiles with left-wing candidates and left voters (bottom, number of profiles=2,394) or far-left voters (top, number of profiles=1,704).

4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, using a combination of qualitative and survey evidence, I show that former dissidents likely enjoyed a reputational advantage in Spain as well but, because the pro-democracy movement emerged in a context of party hegemony, their contentious background was less important than the party brand and organization. Moreover, because of the close ties between the preexisting clandestine left-wing parties and the opposition movements, especially the labor movement, in Spain, dissident background has been clearly associated with a left-wing political ideology. This meant that in the post-transition parliament, MPs with dissident roots were concentrated in the left-wing parties both because this is where the Socialist and Communist party elites gained their political experience and because, as the results of the survey experiment illustrate, the (far) left electorate tends to show a preference for individuals with this type of background.




Figure 4.5: Effect on candidate selection. All profiles and left-wing voters (number of profiles=3,816).

5 | Rewarding Contention: Social Activism and Political Capital in Contemporary Spain

5.1 Introduction

From Lech Wałęsa, leader of “Solidarity,” who became president after Poland’s transition to democracy, through Greens like Joshka Fischer and Petra Kelly whose activism in new social movements took them into the halls of the German parliament, to Ada Colau, a Spanish activist against housing evictions elected mayor of Barcelona, historically, activists have often moved from the spaces of contention into institutions of power. In this chapter, I examine the relationship between contentious and electoral politics by investigating the effect of a candidate’s social movements background on support for their candidacy for public office, perceptions of their ideological position, competence, and personality. Using a candidate choice experiment in Spain, I test whether voters reward prior involvement in contentious politics and if so, whether they do so for some social movements but not others. By asking a range of questions in addition to candidate choice, I unpack the signal that activist experience sends to voters to improve our understanding of what drives voters’ (dis)approval of activists-turned-politicians. Finally, I show the relevance of the experiment’s findings by using an original dataset to provide evidence that candidates with social movements’ background received more votes in the 2015 primary elections organized by Podemos, a new movement party in Spain. In doing so, I build on the literature that explores connections between social movements and elections,¹ the “two major forms of political conflict in democratic systems” (McAdam and Tarrow 2010, p.532) but shift the focus from links between movement actors and routine political actors to movement actors who become insiders themselves.

The findings presented in this chapter are three-fold. First, I find that activist background in

¹See for instance Zald and Berger (1978); Meyer and Tarrow (1998); Goldstone (2003); Kriesi (2004); Banaszak (2005).

anti-austerity and housing movements increases support among left-wing voters, but decreases it among right-wing voters. Second, the advantage of activist experience cannot be explained by the perception of activists as political outsiders – newcomers to politics are viewed more negatively, particularly in terms of competence and interest representation. Rather, activist experience serves as an informative signal of candidates’ ideological position: respondents are more likely to place activists further to the left than other candidates, similarly to, but more strongly than candidates with a conventional left-wing experience such as trade union membership. Third, for activists of some movements, electoral support is also driven by perceptions of their personality traits such as honesty and a belief that activists will better represent the needs and interests of the people.

5.2 Theory

It is well established in political science that voters use candidate characteristics, such as gender, race, religion, occupation, age, or education as cues in voting decisions (McDermott 1998; Sigelman et al. 1995; McDermott 2005) and to draw inferences about candidate’s ideological position and goals in office (Conover and Feldman 1989; Koch 2002). Some characteristics, for example occupation, influence voters’ perceptions of candidate’s experience or qualifications but are not rewarded when it comes to vote choice (Campbell and Cowley 2014). Based on this literature, I expect that voters will infer beliefs and policy goals, but also personality traits such as honesty and likability, from candidates’ involvement in social movements.

In this chapter, I focus on left-wing political movements in Spain: a movement against austerity (15-M) and an anti-eviction movement. This reflects the current political reality in Spain, where anti-immigrant and nativist movements have been marginal, especially relative to the cross-European trends. However, it is also motivated by arguments in the literature that left-wing and right-wing activism are qualitatively different (Blee 2016), which suggest that their perceptions by the public are likely to be distinct.² I hypothesize that there are two ways in which candidate’s

²The expectations presented below particularly in regard to the character channel, may not apply to right-wing activists. Moreover, in this chapter, I only focus on non-violent movements since social movement’s decision to employ violent tactics associated with terrorist organizations has been shown to decrease public support for the movement (Huff and Kruszewska 2016) and would likely also shape perceptions of activists associated with such movements. I expect that activists from far-right movements but also from more radical groups on the left such as for example alter-globalization or environmental movements that have used violence in the past would be perceived differently and probably more negatively by the public. I see these questions as exciting venues for future research.

social movement background might influence vote choice: through an informational cue, which should have different effects depending on respondents' ideological position and through a character cue, which should increase support for candidates with activist background beyond their ideological constituency.

First, activism reduces uncertainty around the candidate's ideal point. More specifically, voters receive better information about where the candidate falls on the ideological spectrum than if relying on party cues alone. This is because activism is a costly (time commitment, risk of arrest etc.) and thus credible signal of ideological beliefs. Because left-wing voters will believe activist candidates involved in left-leaning movements to be proximate to their own ideal point, they will prefer them to candidates with other types of experience. Because right-wing voters will believe them to be further away from their own ideal point, they will be less likely to select them. This leads me to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: Respondents on the left side of the political spectrum will be more likely to support candidates involved in social movements than candidates with a small business experience. These effects will be larger for activism than for more conventional left-wing experience such as labor union experience. In contrast, respondents on the right side of the political spectrum will be less likely to vote for a candidate with a social movements experience than a candidate with a small business experience.

This is the case because activism in left-wing social movements serves as an informative cue of candidate's left-wing position:

Hypothesis 2A: Respondents will place candidates with contentious experience further on the left than candidates from the same party without the social movement experience, including candidates with labor union experience.

Hypothesis 2B: Respondents will be more certain about the ideological placement of activist candidates than other candidates.

Second, in addition to an informational channel, I expect there to be a character or integrity component, which, unlike the informational channel, should increase support for social movement

candidates across the political spectrum. This, as Section 1.3.2 argues, is particularly important in contexts, such as Spain, where politicians are perceived as corrupt and unresponsive and trust in the political establishment is low. These negative perceptions and distrust were already present prior to the economic crisis but the elite's handling of the crisis further increased political disaffection (Montero, Gunther, and Torcal 1997; Torcal and Montero 2006; Torcal 2014). I hypothesize that activists will be considered more honest not only because they have no ties to the discredited political class but also because of their uncompromising, values-based involvement in activism for social issues.

Hypothesis 3: All respondents, regardless of their ideology, will consider activist candidates to be more honest.

However, it is important to distinguish between activism and being new to politics. Amidst decreasing trust in political institutions, parties, and professional politicians, voters might simply favor political outsiders (Mudde 2004; Barr 2009). This would suggest that social movements background provides no additional advantage or carries no additional penalty than not being part of the establishment. In this case, we would observe no difference in support for candidates with small business experience or social movement activism, only between political insiders and outsiders.

Hypothesis 4: Candidates will be rewarded for being a political outsider more than experience, be it political, trade union, business, or activist.

Spain is an analytically useful case for testing these hypotheses for several reasons. First, with the rise of new parties following a wave of anti-austerity protests and one party emergent out of the indignados (15-M) movement, candidacies of prominent activists for political office are currently a salient issue in Spanish politics. This makes the topic relevant and the hypothetical candidate profiles presented to the respondents believable enough to elicit realistic answers, especially that profiles are modeled after biographies of candidates who ran in the 2015 and 2016 national elections. Spain provides a context with a robust social movements sector, both historically and in recent years, making it possible to compare the importance of involvement in different types of movements. In Spain, many candidates, particularly in Podemos, the new party with origins in 15-M and protests against budget cuts (Lobera and Rogero-García 2017; Mosca and Quaranta 2017), emphasize their

involvement in anti-austerity, housing, feminist, and other social movements, and PSOE has historically incorporated many pro-democracy activists from labor and student movements against the Franco dictatorship (Bell 1983; Heywood 1987).

Second, the situation of choosing candidates, not just parties, is realistic in Spain unlike in many closed-PR electoral systems. This means that the study has implications for vote choice, not just general perceptions of political candidates. Although Lower House elections are PR closed list, in Senate elections, citizens cast their votes for candidates, rather than parties. Voters might choose up to three candidates, who can be from the same or from different parties.

In practice, in a party dominated system like Spain, voters still tend to vote for parties rather than candidates, often choosing all candidates from the same party list (Penadés and Urquizu 2007) and party reputations likely shape perceptions of candidates who run under their labels. However, studies have shown a trend towards personalization of politics also in European party systems (McAllister et al. 2007), which have experienced the “presidentialization” of parliamentary politics (Poguntke and Webb 2007). Media-oriented campaigns and televised debates (Mazzoleni and Schulz 1999) contribute to increased attention to candidates’ personal characteristics over party programs (Reinemann and Wilke 2007). Moreover, the discourse of political renewal adopted by new political parties in Spain has increased emphasis on intra-party democracy and participatory candidate selection (Coller, Cordero, and Jaime-Castillo 2018). Two of the top four parties (Podemos and Ciudadanos) organized primary elections prior to the December 2015 elections, in which voters could decide who should be placed on party lists – a competition in which individual candidate characteristics were particularly important.

5.3 Experimental Design

I test the hypotheses outlined in Section 5.2 with a conjoint experiment, in which respondents were presented with profiles of hypothetical political candidates with randomly assigned attributes and asked to evaluate and choose between them (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014). The random assignment of candidate characteristics makes it possible to identify the causal effect of attributes – such as candidate’s contentious experience – on the probability that the respondent will vote for them, as well as to compare the influence of social movement background with for

example, the impact of being a political outsider.

The advantage of this approach over analysis of observational data is also the ability to disentangle effects of attributes of interest which might be correlated – for example being a candidate of Podemos and having an activist background. In addition, it addresses the issue that observed attributes of political candidates reflect what type of individuals run for office and are placed on the ballot by political parties. Moreover, conjoint analysis is a particularly useful tool for understanding preferences over multidimensional alternatives (Meyer and Rosenzweig 2016) and presents respondents with more realistic “bundled” treatments (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014). Finally, Hainmueller, Hangartner, and Yamamoto (2015) demonstrate that paired conjoint designs similar to the one applied here perform remarkably well in capturing the effects of attributes that drive voting behavior and come very close to behavioral benchmarks.

In this candidate choice experiment, survey respondents were presented with four pairs of short bios of hypothetical candidates running for political office. Biographies were modeled after candidate biographies available on party websites.³ Within each candidate’s biography, I randomly varied six characteristics: the candidate’s gender, education, new entry into politics, type of non-political experience, political party, and costly signal. Gender and education were included to make the profiles more realistic, resembling candidate descriptions with which voters are familiar, and because previous studies found them to influence voter choice (Dolan 1998; Franchino and Zucchini 2015). Table 5.1 lists all attributes and levels. Reference levels are italicized. Sample profiles are provided in the Appendix.

I picked the social movements: anti-eviction and 15-M or indignados movement for the following reasons.⁴ First, an anti-eviction movement provides an example of a clearly left-wing social movement, which has been very active, relatively successful, and advocates for an issue, which has affected thousands of Spaniards (Romanos 2014). Evictions have been one of the most widespread, enduring consequences of the financial crisis in Spain and I expect that housing rights activists will

³For example, Podemos ran an online primary in July 2015. Candidate bios were listed on the party website, allowing voters to learn about the candidates prior to voting. Among the Congress and Senate candidates, about 40% mentioned their involvement in social movements in their biographies. I focus on social movements activism as a signal because, like labor union membership, it is biographical information frequently publicly discussed by left-wing politicians. It is possible that other, including less costly, signals of commitment to social issues such as making a statement or signing a petition could be just as effective. I view this as an exciting area for future research.

⁴The pro-democracy movement was discussed in detail in the previous chapter.

likely be rewarded for their involvement by most left-wing voters. However, considering actions that PAH, one of the most active anti-eviction groups, organized against Partido Popular, this background will likely be considered a liability by right-wing voters.

15-M or indignados movement, on the other hand, is a case of a broad movement, which emerged in response to the economic crisis, protesting austerity measures, and calling for more participatory democracy. Nearly 80% of the population agreed with the movements' claims during the peak of its activity in 2011, though support was highest among the sympathizers of the left and the young (Calvo, Gómez-Pastrana, and Mena 2011). Participation in the movement was widespread but varied in cost – from peaceful demonstrations to occupations that lasted for months. Moreover, involvement in the movement was cross-sectional: protesters came from all age, socioeconomic, educational, and even ideological groups (Sampedro and Lobera 2014; Lobera and Rogero-García 2017). I expect that this experience is ambiguous enough and has been normalized to an extent, where it does not send as strong of a signal.

For non-political experience, management of a small firm (SME) is used as a baseline for the following reasons. First, although it is important to compare activism in new social movements to traditional forms of left-wing involvement, union members are often also labor activists, making the distinction more between old and new forms of activism, rather than no involvement and activism. Moreover, many dissidents in the pro-democracy movement belonged to trade unions and labor was at the center of the opposition (Collier and Mahoney 1997). Second, although it may communicate entrepreneurship and management skills and have implications for perceptions of competence, the Spanish phrase used in the survey, “PYME,” clearly indicates a small or medium-sized enterprise. Unlike work for a multinational corporation or a financial institution, it does not signal big business or the banking sector, which may be seen as part of the corrupt establishment (“la casta”). Even some candidates in left-wing, anti-establishment Podemos have this background. In Carnes and Lupu (2016), business ownership, potentially indicating more wealth than business management, is used as a middle class background and contrasted with a working class background. Across three surveys in Argentina, the UK, and the US, only in the UK are candidates with this occupation perceived as more right-wing than factory workers and authors find no evidence for differences in perceptions of competence.

Each of the six attributes of each candidate was randomly assigned but a few implausible com-

Table 5.1: Conjoint Study Attributes and Levels

Gender	Education	Party	Politician	Experience	Costly Signal
<i>Man</i>	<i>High School</i>	<i>PP</i>	<i>Politician</i>	<i>SME Manager</i>	<i>Time committment</i>
Woman	University	PSOE	Outsider	Labor unionist	Movement leader
	Doctorate	Ciudadanos		Indignados/15-M	Arrested during protest
		Podemos		Pro-Democracy	Party leader
				Anti-eviction	

binations such as profiles with PP and Ciudadanos candidates who are anti-eviction activists or were pro-democracy activists or candidates with business experience arrested during protest (no protest was mentioned in their case) were restricted from appearing i.e. had a zero probability of being displayed. Non-uniform profile assignment schemes were specified and used in AMCE estimation to account for the restrictions. Order of attributes was randomized to avoid primacy and recency effects.⁵ Each respondent saw four pairs of profiles,⁶ presented side-by-side, with each pair of profiles on a separate screen. On the same screen as each candidate pairing, respondents were asked questions, which serve as dependent variables. First, in a question that resembles real-world voter decision-making, they were asked to choose between the two candidates. Second, respondents were asked to rate each candidate on a 7-point scale. Third, respondents were asked to place each candidate on an ideological scale and asked about their certainty about this placement. Fourth, they were asked to select a candidate they thought was 1) more competent 2) more honest 3) more likable 4) a person who would better represent interests and ideas of someone like them. A list of all questions is provided in the Appendix.

The survey was fielded on a sample of about 1,000 Spanish adults⁷ recruited by Survey Sampling International from SSI’s proprietary panels and from online communities, social networks, and different websites to improve quality and representativeness of the sample.⁸ Participants were

⁵With two exceptions: party affiliation always followed gender for syntax reasons: “Candidate” (male/female) and “of PP/PSOE etc.” and leadership in the organization always followed the type of non-political experience such as labor union or movement.

⁶This is a conventional number of tasks in conjoint experiments (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014), low enough to alleviate concerns about respondent fatigue.

⁷1,037 initiated the survey, 22 opted out after reading the consent form, 2 were screened out after the age question in the beginning of the survey. The remaining 1,013 respondents who consented to participate and completed the survey are included in the sample.

⁸Respondents were quota sampled to nationally representative targets for age and gender but due to difficulties

invited via banners, invitations, and various types of messaging and then screened for quality before being included in the sample. The survey was offered on PCs, laptops, tablets, and mobile phones. The survey was fielded in August 2016, over a month after the June 26th national election, and administered online.⁹

The sociodemographic characteristics indicate that the sample is comparable to recent nationally representative samples of the population in Spain though as is often the case with online samples, younger and better educated. Importantly for testing the argument outlined above, the mean ideological self-placement is comparable to that in a nationally representative sample as is the percentage of respondents who reported voting in the last election. Summary statistics with a comparison to a nationally representative sample are reported in the Appendix. In the Appendix, I also provide results of main analyses, in which I correct for the observed imbalance between my sample and the target population of voting-age adults in Spain in terms of key demographic characteristics (age, gender, educational background) using weights obtained via entropy balancing¹⁰ (Hainmueller 2012). Results are substantively similar whether or not weights are used.

However, individuals willing to participate in online studies such as this one might also systematically vary on unobservable dimensions, including attitudes towards technology (Barreiro 2017). Studies on generalizability of results from survey experiments conducted on convenience samples show that treatment effects are typically comparable to those obtained from national samples (Mullinix et al. 2015; Coppock 2018). But as far as the sample differs with respect to potential treatment effect moderators, its characteristics make it particularly well suited to analyze the theoretical question of interest. The type of respondents who are likely to self-select into an online survey – young, educated and urban, with higher levels of political interest and knowledge (Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz 2012) are also the ones behind the recent political change in Spain. Those “who had been more critical of the political elites: young, urban and/or politically sophisticated citizens” were also the most disillusioned with “old politics” (Orriols and Cordero 2016). Ciudadanos and Podemos – the newcomers, which disrupted the Spanish two-party system – were especially popular among the young electorate and digital media users (Mosca and Quaranta 2017).

in recruiting respondents above the age of 65, quota was relaxed for that age group.

⁹I used software by Strehnev et al. (2013) to design and implement the survey in Qualtrics.

¹⁰The targets are calculated based on the most recent Census in Spain which was conducted in 2011.

5.4 Results

Following Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto (2014), I estimate average marginal component effects (AMCEs). The AMCE represents the average difference in the probability of being the selected candidate when comparing two different attribute values – for example, a candidate who is an anti-eviction activist to a candidate who is a manager of a small firm – where the average is taken over all possible combinations of the other candidate attributes. Because attributes are randomly assigned, on average, profiles with an anti-eviction activist have the same distribution for all other attributes as profiles with the small firm manager, allowing for a straightforward comparison of means.

Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto (2014) show that the AMCE is non-parametrically identified given the conditionally independent randomization of the attributes¹¹ and can be estimated by regressing the binary outcome variable, Candidate Selected, on sets of indicator variables measuring the levels of each attribute. The unit of analysis is the rated candidate profile. Since each of 1,013 respondents rated four pairings, with two candidate profiles per pairing, there are up to 8,104 observations in some models. Since observed choice outcomes are not independent across the profiles rated by a single respondent, in order to obtain accurate variance estimates, standard errors are clustered by respondent.

5.4.1 Vote Choice

Figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3 display the effects of candidate attribute values on the probability of being the preferred vote choice based on respondents’ self-reported ideology. I classify respondents as “left-wing” if they self-identify between 1 and 4 on an ideological scale of 1-10 where 1 is left and 10 right (n=477). I classify them as “right-wing” if they place themselves between 6 and 10 (n=323) and as “centrist” if they placed themselves at 5 (n=213).¹² Estimates from an OLS model with clustered standard errors are shown with 95% confidence intervals.

¹¹Because the estimator for the AMCEs is fully nonparametric, it does not require functional form assumptions about the choice probabilities (Hainmueller, Hopkins, and Yamamoto 2014).

¹²This is the mean and median ideology in both the study sample and the nationally representative sample and follows the approach in Fernández-Albertos (2015). The results are similar if respondents in the center are classified as those who positioned themselves at 5 or at 6 or if respondents on the left are classified as 1-5 following Balcells (2012). They also mirror those divided by partisan identity as shown in Section E.5 of the Appendix.




Figure 5.1: Left-wing respondents (N=477).

As hypothesized in Section 5.2, contentious experience in left-wing social movements is rewarded on the left but may be a liability on the right. Among left-wing respondents, protest background is definitely an asset – anti-eviction activists are nearly 18 percentage points more likely to be elected ($p < 0.001$) and active participants in 15-M, the anti-austerity mobilization of the so-called indignados, enjoy a boost of over 8 percentage points ($p < 0.001$). In contrast, union membership increases the probability of being elected by only about 3 percentage points, an effect not statistically significant at conventional levels. These effects – particularly for anti-eviction activists – are quite big considering that candidates running on the ticket of left-wing parties, Podemos and PSOE, are about 39 and 41 percentage points more likely to be elected on the left than candidates of right-wing Partido Popular ($p < 0.001$).

Among right-wing respondents, on the other hand, candidates active in 15-M are nearly 9 percentage points less likely to be elected ($p < 0.01$). This penalty is almost half of the effect of running on the ticket of PSOE, the mainstream left-wing party ($p < 0.001$) and larger than the penalty for union membership, which is about 7 percentage points ($p < 0.05$). The effects for housing




Figure 5.2: Right-wing respondents (N=323).

activists are negative as expected, but not statistically significant. As Figure 5.3 shows, centrist voters prefer Ciudadanos to PP by about 13 percentage points ($p < 0.05$) but neither punish nor reward activist candidates.

In short, I find support for Hypothesis 1 that left-wing voters reward candidates for contentious experience – in more radical social movements like the housing movement and in more broad-based movements like 15-M – but right-wing voters are less likely to select candidates involved in those movements. The results for the pro-democracy movement are discussed in detail in the previous chapter. In the following Sections, I test the two hypothesized mechanisms behind these vote preferences: the informational and the character channel.

5.4.2 Information: Does Activism Signal an Ideological Position?

In this experiment, I find evidence for the informational channel described in Section 5.2: activism acts as a signal of ideological position. As Figure 5.4 shows, political candidates with an activist background – be it a housing movement or an anti-austerity movement – are more likely




Figure 5.3: Centrist respondents (N=213).




Figure 5.4: Perception of Ideological Position.

to be to be placed on the left-side of the ideological spectrum. The dependent variable is measured on a scale from 1-left to 10-right, therefore positive estimates, or estimates to the right, indicate a candidate perceived to be more conservative. The effect of activism: a shift of about 0.4 to left on the scale for all of the movements is similar in magnitude to the effect of labor union activism, which decreases the perception of a candidate as conservative by about 0.25 ($p < 0.01$).

Unsurprisingly, perceptions of candidates' ideological position are also – and more strongly – shaped by their partisan identities. Candidates running on a ticket of Podemos, a new left-wing anti-austerity party are on average seen as 4 points more to the left on the ideological scale ($p < 0.001$) relative to the benchmark (PP candidate). Similarly, PSOE candidates are perceived as 3 points to the left of PP candidates ($p < 0.001$). In addition to finding support for Hypothesis 2A that activist background serves as a credible signal of candidate's ideological position, as Figure 5.5 shows, I find partial support for Hypothesis H2B that contentious experience makes respondents more *certain* about a candidate's ideological position: history of activism against Franco dictatorship and contemporary activism against evictions both increase certainty by about 0.2 on a 1-7 scale




Figure 5.5: Certainty of Ideological Position.

($p < 0.05$). Activism in 15-M does not have this effect, perhaps because – as I discuss in Section 5.2 – it was a broad and cross-cutting movement.

5.4.3 Character: Are Activists Considered More Honest?

I find partial support for the character explanation of the advantage enjoyed by activists-turned-politicians as presented in Hypothesis 3. Figures 5.6 through 5.14 display results from a question posed after each pair of candidates, in which respondents were asked to select a candidate that they thought was more likable, more honest, more competent, and a person that would better represent ideas and interests of someone like them. Results are shown by respondents' self-reported ideology. Against expectations laid out in Hypothesis 3, these effects are limited to constituencies ideologically close to movement goals. Left-wing respondents were more likely to select candidates with social movements background when asked about integrity (honesty): about 20 percentage points in the case of anti-eviction activists ($p < 0.001$) and 8 percentage points in the case of 15-M ($p < 0.001$). The effects of social movement background were statistically indistinguishable from zero for right-




Figure 5.6: Honesty: left

wing and centrist respondents. Results for likability are similar to honesty and are presented in the Appendix.

What might also provide insight into *why* an activist background, particularly in the housing movement, is an asset is the expressed belief that activists will better represent interests of the people. Among left-wing respondents, housing activists are seen as 16 percentage points more likely to better represent respondents' interests than firm managers ($p < 0.01$). This advantage might stem from activists being strongly associated with a committed advocacy of a cause or believed to be less likely to compromise their goals once in office. Activists are also likely to be perceived as authentic representatives of the people – both because of their familiarity with the issues on the ground and because they resemble the voters in terms of their background.

This resonates with Podemos politicians' own beliefs about why people voted for them – because they know them from their neighborhood associations and local movements, not from TV, because activists understand the issues on a “street-level” and have ideas for solutions that come from years




Figure 5.7: Honesty: right




Figure 5.8: Honesty: center




Figure 5.9: Representation: left




Figure 5.10: Representation: center




Figure 5.11: Representation: right

of experience in the civil society arena.¹³ Activists, especially those from the housing movement, who were on the frontlines of the response to the crisis, are perceived as aware of the problems and likely to defend the interests of the people, also within the institutions. As Marcelo Exposito, one of Podemos representatives in Congress for Barcelona, an artist and long-time activist, put it: “if anyone has understood quickly what was happening with the housing bubble and if anyone has quickly provided answers, not just contentious answers, but also technical, specialized solutions, for

¹³ Author Interviews with Sergio Pascual, a Podemos Congressman for Sevilla, Madrid, October 18, 2016; Yolanda Ramirez, councilwoman for Ahora Madrid and a long-time activist in neighborhood movements, also involved in 15M, Madrid, October 20, 2017; Irene Montero, Unidos Podemos Congresswoman and spokesperson, Madrid, July 21, 2015. All translations are author’s own.

how to fight the housing crisis, it was Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca.”¹⁴ PAH is one of the main grassroots organizations in the anti-eviction movement and many current politicians affiliated with Podemos were involved in the PAH and the housing movement prior to running for office. Many of my interviewees expressed a sentiment that their involvement has benefitted their work as parliamentarians through a deeper understanding of social reality and technical knowledge of issues such as education, housing, or healthcare. Close to the people and intimately familiar with their struggles, activists-turned-politicians see themselves as a response to the indignados’ slogan “No nos representan” (They do not represent us) directed at the establishment.

5.4.4 Political Outsiders

In this experiment, I do not find any support for Hypothesis 4 that voters – distrustful of the political establishment – prefer political outsiders. As Figures 5.1 through 5.3 show, candidates who are new to politics are no more likely to be chosen than experienced politicians. On the contrary, as Figures 5.12 through 5.14 show, they are less likely to be chosen as the more competent candidate than a candidate with political experience. They also do not compensate for this on the character dimension (see Figures 5.6 through 5.11). These findings suggest that Spanish voters on the left show preference for activist candidates not as political outsiders but specifically because of their contentious background and that social activism communicates more than simply lack of ties to the establishment.

5.5 Application: Podemos 2015 primary elections

In this Section, I use a new dataset to show that preferences expressed in the experiment can be observed in real-world electoral contexts by demonstrating that candidates in primary elections held by Podemos – a new movement party in Spain – received more votes from the party members if they had an activist background.

¹⁴ Author Interview, Madrid, October 6, 2016.




Figure 5.12: Competent: left




Figure 5.13: Competent: center




Figure 5.14: Competent: right

5.5.1 Data and Method

Between July 17 and July 22, 2015, Podemos allowed anyone registered on their website (with their government ID and after a mobile phone authentication process) to cast a vote in an online primary to determine which candidates would be placed on party lists. Over 50,000 valid votes were cast.¹⁵ Candidate profiles containing a short biography and motivation for running were available

¹⁵59,280 votes in total, 7,629 blank votes for the PM, 2,604 blank votes for other Congressmen, were cast. It is worth noting that this means that only about 0.15% of the Spanish voting age population voted in this online

on the party website for everyone running for office, allowing voters to familiarize themselves with the candidates' background prior to voting.¹⁶ I scraped all of those profiles in December 2015 to create an original dataset consisting of 1,388 candidate bios. The corpus includes all of the 962 Congress candidates and 426 Senate candidates presented on the website. For each text file in the corpus, I extracted metadata, which includes candidate name, whether they ran for Congress or Senate, and the region in which they ran for Senate candidates (this information was not provided for candidates for Congress).

Then, by creating an index based on partial string matching of candidate names, I merged this data with the primary election results data posted on the Podemos website after the election. This dataset was subsequently merged with the data generated by dictionary analysis described below to construct education, activism, political and labor union experience variables for each candidate. The result is an original dataset with information about candidates, their biography, and their electoral performance (percentage of the vote received) in the party primary. It includes 1,369 (951 Congress and 418 Senate) candidates as some rows were dropped when name matches could not be found.¹⁷

To obtain the relevant variables, I conducted automated content analysis on the corpus of all candidate biographies presented to voters in the Podemos online primary. I measured involvement in social movements, labor unions, and politics, as well as higher education, using a dictionary based classification. Since no off-the-shelf dictionaries exist for this purpose, I created a problem-specific dictionary based on knowledge of the case and a reading of a random selection of texts from the corpus. The full dictionary used is provided in the Appendix. The dictionary included four categories: social movements – the main category of interest, labor union involvement, political experience, and education, which covers most of the personal background provided by candidates. I included

primary. This also constitutes only about 1.2% of votes subsequently cast for Podemos in their first general election in December 2015, which guaranteed the party the third place. As such, it is important to keep in mind that the primary results are not indicative of preferences of the Podemos electorate at large but likely of the most committed party activists who might be ideologically further on the left.

¹⁶See podemos.info/primarias-generales/.

¹⁷Spanish names have multiple parts and reporting differed across datasets – biographies and electoral results – e.g. by misspellings and name completeness and sequence (first, first last name, second last name etc. or omission/inclusion of middle names), making matching challenging even after data cleaning. Although all the Spanish characters were substituted out, names converted to lower case, white spaces stripped etc., even partial string matching failed to find all matches.

labor unions as type of involvement, which signals ideology and skills but not contention and likely not incorruptibility since unions are mostly considered part of the establishment. However, if what left-wing voters reward is a signal of commitment to issues associated with the left, regardless of institutional or contentious activity, we should see no difference between a labor union and a movement background. The political experience category included potential previously held government positions mentioned by candidates, as well as Izquierda Unida (IU) or United Left – a party that some candidates were involved with prior to joining Podemos. Finally, I constructed a category for education since university education often serves as a signal of skills and leadership quality¹⁸ and is almost always mentioned by candidates in their biographies.

Following prior work summarized in Grimmer and Stewart (2013), I constructed measures for each category by assigning a score of one to each word from the dictionary, which falls into that category, summing across the document, and dividing by the total number of words in the document. I used Yoshikoder (Lowe 2009), a content analysis program, to write the dictionary and apply the dictionary analysis to the corpus. I classified candidates as activists i.e. the activist variables took on a value of 1 if the proportion of activist words to the word total was larger than zero (or in other words, if a candidate had at least one activism-related word in their profile) and as non-activists (activist variable value of 0) if the proportion was zero (i.e. there were no words from the activist category in the dictionary in their profile).

This approach might plausibly overcount activists if some candidates mention a social movement for other reasons than personal engagement: for example, as a motivation for running or to refer to related social issues. I argue, however, that this is unlikely and that discussion of a social movement within a one- or two-paragraph long profile is a signal of commitment to, and very likely, involvement in a movement.¹⁹ The issue-related words such as vivienda (housing) are most frequently used in connection to social movements: plataforma por una vivienda digna (platform for dignified housing) or movimiento por una vivienda digna (movement for dignified housing) and were

¹⁸For a discussion and critique of university education as a proxy for leader quality, see Carnes and Lupu (2015).

¹⁹In fact, this dictionary might be actually be undercounting activists since only most common movements were included and movements related to for example, immigrant rights or ecology are not present in this version of the dictionary but could be added in future iterations. Moreover, due to difficulties in counting n-grams, most of the movements were included as abbreviations e.g. PAH or PAB and the dictionary analysis likely misses a number of mentions in which the name of the movement organization is spelled out, undercounting activists.

included due to difficulties in counting entire phrases. Finally, it is highly unlikely that any of those terms are being used in a negative way given the ideological profile of Podemos as an anti-austerity party.

This approach is more appropriate than using a count of words in each category or words in each category over the total number of words since involvement or leadership in one organization might be just as meaningful as listing out different movements in the profile i.e. there are no theoretical reasons to believe that it is the number of social movements, in which a candidate is active that should be of interest and no substantive justification for a cut-off other than zero. This is to say that profiles are less about the amount of space devoted to an issue (the way one would want to analyze for instance transcripts from parliamentary debates) than about marking someone as having one type of experience or not i.e. about classifying them as an activist or not. I follow this approach for the other categories as well in line with the same logic – one mention of a doctorate degree is enough to distinguish a candidate as highly educated and just as informative as also mentioning one’s undergraduate degree. All results are robust to different specifications such as word counts and relative frequency of words associated with a certain category (words in that category as a percentage of word total).

Dictionary methods are difficult to validate so I conducted validation by reading a random selection of texts (Grimmer and Stewart 2013) to check whether appearance of words from each category justified classification of the candidate as an activist, labor union member etc. After applying the dictionary to the corpus, I used OLS models to estimate the effect of membership in each category on percentage of the vote obtained in the primary election. For Senate, I control for the region in which the candidates ran but this information was unfortunately not available as metadata for biographies of Congress candidates.

5.5.2 Results

About 40% of candidates, for both Congress and Senate, can be classified as activists based on the “at least one term” criterion (above 0% of total terms): nearly 42% of Congress candidates and about 39% of Senate candidates. I examine the effect of being an activist on the percentage of the vote obtained in the primary election using OLS regression. For candidates for Congress, as Table 5.2 shows, an activist background increases the percentage of the vote by nearly 4%. There is also a

benefit to education and political experience – about 3% increase in each case, indicating that voters are considering skills and competence in their decisions. Table 5.3 shows the results for candidates for Senate. In this case, the increase is about 6% for activism and about 7% for education. Here, political experience goes in the opposite direction, which, together with a negative effect for labor unions, might suggest that voters are punishing members of the establishment. However, neither of the latter two effects is significant and the null of no effect cannot be rejected.

The positive direction of the effect of activism background provides additional support for the argument outlined in Section 5.2. The electorate of Podemos, which participated in the online party primary – the most involved party members and activists or militants (Duverger, North, and North 1954) – is almost certainly left-wing given the party platform. Therefore, we would expect primary voters to support activists if their involvement in social movements reduces uncertainty around their ideological position, which in this case should be close to the voters’ ideal points. Moreover, the signal of commitment to social issues and incorruptibility should resonate with voters who favor a party with an anti-austerity agenda and a newcomer party without links to the establishment.

Table 5.2: Congress: Activist Background and Percentage of the Vote in the Primary Election (OLS)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Percentage of the Vote in the Primary
Activist	3.841*** (1.043)
Education	2.954*** (1.029)
Labor union	−0.283 (1.437)
Political experience	2.934* (1.632)
Constant	2.335*** (0.851)
Observations	951
R ²	0.028
Adjusted R ²	0.024
Residual Std. Error	15.696 (df = 946)
F Statistic	6.908*** (df = 4; 946)
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

5.6 Conclusion

In this chapter, I use a survey experiment to explore how political candidates’ contentious background affects their probability of being elected. The results show that activist background in

Table 5.3: Senate: Activist Background and Percentage of the Vote in the Primary Election (OLS)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>
	Percentage of the Vote in the Primary
Activist	6.075*** (1.901)
Education	7.153*** (1.826)
Labor Union	-3.492 (2.440)
Political Experience	-0.086 (2.976)
District controls	Yes
Constant	20.181*** (2.788)
Observations	418
R ²	0.223
Adjusted R ²	0.182
Residual Std. Error	18.025 (df = 396)
F Statistic	5.420*** (df = 21; 396)
<i>Note:</i>	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

left-wing social movements decreases support for candidates among right-leaning voters but increases it among left-leaning voters. The advantage of social movements experience cannot be explained by activists' perception as political outsiders – newcomers to politics are viewed more negatively, particularly in terms of competence. Rather, activism acts as an informative signal of candidates' ideological position: respondents are more likely to place activists further to the left than candidates with other types of experience. Moreover, activist candidates in some social movements are also perceived to be more honest and better at representing the interests of the people.

Spain has recently seen large waves of protest and movements like the anti-eviction movement have been salient in the media and popular discourse. Therefore, the findings might not generalize to places where protests have been rare, negligible, or occurred too far in the past. The effects for distinct types of activism are generally comparable in size and go in the same direction in all analyses, but the effects are stronger for the housing movement, especially when it comes to the perception of candidate's character. Since the two movements – 15-M and anti-eviction – vary on a few dimensions as described in Section 5.3, the question of why this might be the case merits further investigation, including in other contexts.

At the same time, this chapter provides new insights into questions about the relationship between contentious and electoral politics by exploring how voters interpret candidate's involvement in social movements and the (dis)advantages of contentious experience for candidacy for political office. These issues are particularly salient in contemporary Spain but have been critical in European

politics for the Green parties of the 1960s and 1970s, candidates coming into office from women's movements, and more recently anti-austerity activists across Southern Europe. They also resonate in American politics, where some activists of the Black Lives Matter Movement have ran in local elections and where past activism in the Civil Rights Movement recently became a subject of debate over a presidential candidate's liberal credentials. The results presented in this chapter suggest that left-leaning politicians with a history of social movement activism can benefit from emphasizing that part of their biography unless they run in conservative districts. They also demonstrate that in party primaries such as those held by left-wing Podemos – where the participants tend to be ideologically more extreme – candidates with activist backgrounds are likely to do well, with consequences for the composition of new regional- and national-level political elites.

Finally, this study also contributes to the literature on the influence of protest on politics since “institutional activists,” (Santoro and McGuire 1997) advocating for movement goals from within the decision-making bodies, can effectively influence formulation and adoption of policies (Rootes 2003; Banaszak 2005, 2010a; Böhm 2015b). However, for activists to operate in an institutional context, they first need to become insiders by getting elected for political offices. The finding that their activist background does not lower their chances of electoral success among their likely constituents and that in some cases it might actually be an asset shows that they do have an opportunity to impact political change from within the institutions of power.

6 | Conclusion

6.1 Summary of the Argument

This project explores the interface between social movements and parties by focusing on movement actors who become insiders after crossing the boundary into institutionalized politics. I argue that movement roots can provide activists with a reputational advantage, particularly useful in times of uncertainty and party system fluidity. When the ruling elite becomes discredited, voters look for alternatives to the establishment. Protest leaders can successfully play into the discourse of the society versus the state and leverage their credentials as authentic representatives of the people. Under conditions of high anti-party sentiments and fatigue with political institutions, which accompany political crises, parties also seek to energize their bases by developing closer ties to social movements not only by recruiting social movements activists for office but also through the presence of established politicians at marches and demonstrations, as well as bringing previously marginalized movements into the mainstream. Participation in protest can serve as a form of costly signaling, allowing politicians to create a perception of being responsive to the concerns of their constituents. Whereas contextual features such as uncertainty increase the value of activist reputation, the age and stability of the party system limit its appeal. First, when party labels are highly informative, voters are less reliant on activism as a heuristic for valence attributes (such as honesty, authentic representation etc.). Second, when movements operate within a well-established party system, they are often perceived along ideological, if not partisan, lines. When protest participation signals an ideological position, it increases support only among voters in close proximity to candidate's inferred ideal point but decreases it among those who place themselves further away on the political spectrum. Thus, movement origins or involvement can help politicians with their own electorates but at the cost of losing ideologically more distant supporters.

The importance of the stability of party systems for the appeal of activist reputation has implications for the electoral advantage former dissidents enjoy in new democracies. Since party systems and partisanship typically stabilize and strengthen over time (Brader and Tucker 2001; Brader, Tucker, and Duell 2013), instead of using personal characteristics of political candidates – including movement background – as cues in making decisions, voters can increasingly depend on party labels as short-cuts, especially in parliamentary systems. Moreover, voters receive more information not just about the parties but also about the candidates themselves: their behavior and effectiveness in office, their policy positions etc. all of which become more relevant criteria for candidate evaluation as the cleavage between the regime and the opposition fades in salience.

6.2 Significance of Findings

The results of this project have implications for parties emergent out of pro-democracy movements, activists-turned-politicians at different historical moments, and contemporary movements against democratic backsliding. First, the presence of a powerful initial electoral advantage for pro-democracy activists has the potential to improve democratic quality because it allows former dissidents to participate in writing the rules of the game and shape the institutions of the new democracy. However, the finding that this benefit stems from reputation rather than resources has consequences for the survival of parties with roots in opposition movements. Since the value of dissident credentials declines as the party system stabilizes, unless such parties invest in organizational structures and build a party brand around policy issues rather than personalities, they are likely to lose out to their old (authoritarian successor) and new (entrepreneurial) competitors.

Second, the results suggest that in cases with more established party systems, left-wing politicians with a history of left-wing social movement activism can benefit from emphasizing that part of their biography unless they run in conservative districts. These results hold for opposition politicians and movements and likely extend to right-wing politicians and conservative movements. Moreover, the case of Spain shows that inclusive candidate selection methods such as party primaries – particularly online primaries where the electorate is likely to be younger and more radical ideologically – may contribute to changes in the socio-political profile of candidates and the renewal of political elites.

Finally, the results from Poland suggest that contemporary movements against democratic backsliding are unlikely to succeed in building broad coalitions in opposition to a democratically-elected government threatening liberal institutions. Such protests have recently taken place in countries as distinct as Turkey, Hungary, and the United States but if – as this study argues – they not perceived as voicing universalistic concerns over violations of democratic norms but instead are dismissed as partisan critiques, their effectiveness will be limited. In fact, the case of Poland, with historically weak partisan attachments, is a hard case, suggesting that involvement in this type of protests might be even more polarizing in countries with stronger partisanship.

6.3 Generalizability of Findings

In this project, I focus on Spain and Poland in two distinct historical moments. However, the phenomenon of social movement activists entering institutions is widespread both geographically and historically. Former dissidents entered post-transition parliaments in great numbers in many new democracies across different waves of democratization: in South Korea, Portugal, Brazil, and Tunisia (Freire, Viegas, and Seiceira 2009; Shin and Chang 2011; Anria 2018; Grewal 2018). In South Korea, the so-called 3-8-6 generation activists from the pro-democracy movement constituted 30% of National Assembly. Participants in the democracy movement discovered that their activist pasts translated into political capital, providing moral legitimacy, and the “activist past” rhetoric – such as “1 star,” “2 star” etc. for the number of times arrested – constituted a central campaign theme for pro-democracy activists (Shin and Chang 2011). In the 1980 Congress in Portugal (the earliest year following the 1975 post-transition elections for which this data is available), 8% of MPs had been active in the opposition movement to the Estado Novo authoritarian regime and 8.4% held a leadership position in labor unions, which, as in Spain, were illegal under the dictatorship – numbers that were likely higher shortly after the transition.¹ To this day, members of left-wing parties with origins in the Carnation Revolution wear red carnations on its anniversary to celebrate their dissident roots (Fishman 2011).

Moreover, many activists were elected to offices in post-crisis Europe (Mosca 2015; Della Porta 2016; Lisi 2018). For example, numerous politicians in the Italian movement party, the Five Star

¹ Author calculations based on data from Freire, Viegas, and Seiceira (2009).

Movement (M5S), have roots in local initiatives and the global justice movement. In 2012, more than one-third of M5S MPs declared, either in the primary campaign materials or on their personal pages, that they had either engaged in contentious activity such as social movement demonstrations, sit-ins etc. (11%) or belong to specific social movements or civil society associations (about 16%) or both (about 9%). This might be in part an outcome of the adoption of primaries by M5S (Mosca 2015), suggesting a potentially similar pattern of preference for movement candidates as the one documented in this study for the case of Spain. The party's leader, Beppe Grillo, even before his entrance into national Italian politics, had been engaged in environmental protest campaigns, resulting in charges for trespassing, and in the peace and transparency movements. He continued his involvement after winning elections, joining workers' demonstrations and coming out in support of student movements (Mosca 2015).

Not only new parties with origins in social movements (such as M5 Stelle in Italy or Podemos in Spain) but also established parties embraced candidates with activist backgrounds. In Portugal, the renewal of the elites took place without shocks to the party system when mainstream parties responded to the demands for change and better representation by putting more candidates with civil society ties on their lists. Following the crisis, between 2009 and 2015, the number of MPs with membership in civic organization increased in all political parties. Half of Left Bloc (BE)'s MPs belonged to civic associations in 2011 (compared to just about 12% two years earlier). The proportion also increased from 13.3% (2009) to 35.3% (2015) in the Communist Party. But these changes were not limited to the left: percentage of civically engaged MPs grew from 14.3% to 33.3% also in the Christian Democratic CDS-PP. Interestingly, this was not coupled with an increase in a proportion of MPs new to politics; on the contrary, political experience of MPs increased in all parties (Lisi 2018). Thus, in Portugal, recruitment happened within the parties' candidate pools and was not open to new candidates with relevant backgrounds. Unlike in cases where a movement party broke onto the political stage, this has allowed established parties to use the legitimization advantage of civil society ties without giving up partisan control.

Poland's contemporary political crisis and the role social movements play is also not unique. In Hungary, FIDESZ, a populist right party with roots in the student anticommunist movement, following an electoral defeat in 2002, developed a new image and organizational structure, opening up to citizen initiatives, and creating a mobilization strategy reliant on accommodating civil society,

in many ways returning to its mobilizing roots and becoming a “hybrid party” with a movement facet (Szabo 2015). Much like in Poland, the FIDESZ government has embraced nationalist movements and attempted to discredit the opposition by tying it to the communist past (Grzymala-Busse 2017). Unlike Poland, Hungary has not seen a massive mobilization in the streets but research on partisan perceptions of recent electoral reforms (Ahlquist et al. 2018) suggests that participation in protests, even if portrayed as pro-democracy and above partisan divides, would be similarly polarizing.

6.4 The Age of Movement Democracy?

As I have shown in the democratization cases (Chapters 2 and 4), when party positions are crystallized and party systems mature, contention (and history of contention) matters less than partisanship and policy. The short half-life of the reputational advantage of dissident roots suggests that we might expect similar outcomes in contemporary cases of activist reputation. However, if post-crisis party systems remain volatile, perpetuating the conditions of uncertainty, movements may continue to play an important role in institutional politics. If as Mair (2013) wrote “the age of party democracy” has passed, we might now be witnessing the age of movement democracy.

Robert Michels’ (1915) classic argument posits that, because democracy requires organization, mass movements face pressure to create formal organizations to successfully advance their goals. Similarly, Panebianco and Silver (1988) argues that electoral competition induces politicians in movement parties to opt for organizational forms that maximize votes. However, Anria (2018) has challenged these views, arguing that movement-based parties can resist oligarchic pressure (Michels’ iron law) if civil society is strong and autonomous. Unless mobilization withers or is controlled from the top, they can maintain their founding organizational characteristics.

Similarly, in a volume, which puts into question the distinction between social movements and institutional politics (Goldstone 2003), Glenn (2003a) uses the cases of Slovakia and Czech Republic to argue that in post-communist Eastern Europe, “parties that emerge[d] out of social movements do not necessarily conform to standard notions of political parties” because they formed around political cleavages (regime/opposition divide) rather than socioeconomic interests. East and Central European party systems were never strongly anchored in civil society. Now long-term trends in European party systems (Mair 2013) such as the loss of traditional bases in society like labor unions

and churches (Wolinetz and Zaslove 2017), indicate that – against expectations – instead of East European party systems consolidating to resemble West European party systems, there has been some convergence in the opposite direction (Enyedi and Bertoa 2018). Party systems in Western Europe have also become more fluid, volatile, and fragmented as new parties have gained support at the expense of established parties (Wolinetz and Zaslove 2017; Detterbeck 2018), creating levels of uncertainty previously more common in new democracies.

Moreover, the current strong anti-party and anti-establishment sentiment in Europe might reward novel organizational forms and emphasis on activism and achievements outside of institutions that the publics in many countries no longer trust. What kind of hybrid organizational forms emerged during the crisis and what accounts for their success or failure? Did they incentivize the established party actors to reach for some of the innovative tactics from the protest realm or open up to civic initiatives to improve their electoral chances when faced with new competition? Changes in technology and communications might have also created conditions in which parties no longer need to make costly organizational investments to solve collective action and social choice problems. Can successful electoral mobilization and a coherent program be created through reliance on online deliberation, crowdfunding, and crowdsourcing? Can parties be run more like horizontal, internally democratic, movements? These and many other questions could be asked to deepen our understanding of social and political change through mobilization at the boundary of institutional and non-institutional politics.

The literature on the interface between movements and parties, mostly inspired by the environmental parties in Western Europe, has generated a number of insights into the process of institutionalization and moderation, as well as the choices of organizational forms, and challenges faced by the so-called movement parties. However, too often the literature has assumed the processes to be linear, inevitably in the oligarchic direction, instead of contingent on structural and strategic incentives. Under what conditions are parties incentivized to return to organizational patterns of a movement party or the movement itself? Are protest tactics and contentious rhetoric effective as electoral tools? Future research could focus on investigating why movement parties sometimes return to their mobilizing roots, take an anti-institutional stance, and recall traditions from their extra-institutional phase, as well as incentives that might keep new movement parties from institutionalizing fully.

This study takes one step in this direction by focusing on the micro level and studying social movement activists – individuals at the heart of the two-way processes of movements becoming parties and parties adopting movement tactics. Social movements supply potential new political elites at a time when the public demands change. Unlike political outsiders, social movement activists bring an understanding of issues “in the streets” into the halls of power. Their unique type of experience often comes with a promise to restore public trust by creating new channels for communication with the constituents and activists-turned-parliamentarians themselves serving as a bridge between the society and the institutions. This project shows that their activist past does not disadvantage them and in fact, can be an asset in securing representation in the institutions. Their presence in the institutions opens up another research area, focused on the duration and impact of their political careers, which is likely to have important theoretical and policy consequences.

A | Appendix to Chapter 2

A.1 Supplementary context information

A.1.1 Party fragmentation on the opposition side

See Table A.1

A.1.2 Party organizational strength

See Tables A.2 and A.3.

A.1.3 Aggregate voters volatility in Poland 1991-1997

See Table A.4. TV=Total volatility. FTV=“family” total volatility. General volatility accounts for both party-system / “structural” volatility (splits, merges, dissolution) and personal choice volatility. Citizens volatility excludes volatility determined by party system changes. Calculated following formula in Pedersen (1979): half the sum of the absolute value of differences between the vote shares of each party in two consecutive elections.

Table A.1: Percentage of Activists in Each Party: Candidates for Sejm

	1991	1993	1997	2001	2005	2007	2011
UD	14.9%	27.7%					
KLD	7.4%	10%					
PC	16.3%	23.6%					
ZChN	10.3%	11.6%					
NSZZ	26.1%	41.7%					
AWS			26.5%				
UW			28.4%	27.6%			
PO				17.5%	33.3%	27.5%	21.7%
PiS				20.3%	21.2%	28.6%	29.4%

Table A.2: Party resources, 1992-1999. Drawn from Grzymala-Busse (2002).

Party	Members	Local Cells
Communist successor (Democratic Left Alliance)	60,000	2,400
Solidarity successor (Freedom Union)	20,000	375

Table A.3: Party Membership, 1997. Drawn from Lewis (2002).

Party	Members
Communist successor (Democratic Left Alliance)	60,000-80,000
Solidarity successor (Freedom Union)	22,000
Solidarity successor (Solidarity Electoral Action)	30,000

A.2 Who runs for office?

See Table A.5. Variables are coded from the corpus of dissident biographies from Encyclopedia of Solidarity using automated text analysis by identifying occurrences of key words/stems (“Round” for Roundtable participation; “University” or “Academy” for higher education, “Founder” or “Organizer” or “Creator” for movement leaders), leveraging Polish grammatical rules to classify dissidents based on gender (female Polish first names end with “a”), and using meta data to code the geographic region of dissident’s activity. The key words or stems were chosen after a close reading of a selection of biographies. Results are robust to using a logistic regression instead of OLS.

A.3 Observational analysis

A.3.1 Logit Models

Models in Table A.6 use logistic regression to analyze the relationship between dissident background and candidate success in Sejm elections between 1991 and 2011. Candidate controls used in Model 2 are the following: gender, class, age, having competed under communist elections in 1985

Table A.4: Aggregate voters volatility in Poland 1991-1997. Drawn from Lewis (2002).

	1991/1993	1993/1997
TV (general)	34.9	22.1
TV (citizens)	22.7	15
FTV (general)	18.52	12.49
FTV (citizens)	16.01	12.16

Table A.5: Dissident Characteristics and Entrance into Electoral Politics. OLS Model.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Ran for Sejm in 1989	Ran for Sejm in 1991
	(1)	(2)
Woman	−0.006 (0.006)	−0.049*** (0.011)
Year of birth	−0.0003* (0.0002)	0.0004 (0.0004)
Imprisoned	0.009** (0.004)	0.002 (0.008)
Roundtable participant	0.094*** (0.010)	0.140*** (0.020)
Movement leader	0.007 (0.006)	0.042*** (0.011)
University education	0.014*** (0.004)	0.027*** (0.008)
Warsaw-based dissident	0.013 (0.008)	0.007 (0.015)
Incumbent in transitional Sejm		0.634*** (0.030)
Constant	0.674* (0.367)	−0.828 (0.697)
Observations	4,773	4,773
R ²	0.025	0.119
Adjusted R ²	0.024	0.117
Residual Std. Error	0.140 (df = 4765)	0.266 (df = 4764)
F Statistic	17.587*** (df = 7; 4765)	80.275*** (df = 8; 4764)
<i>Note:</i>		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

(i.e. political experience prior to transition), incumbency status, leadership in the movement, and Roundtable participation. Models 1-2 include dummy variables for main parties: PO, PiS, AWS, PC, UD/UW, PSL, SLD, NSZZ, LPR, Samoobrona. Model 3 controls for all parties, which fielded more than 500 candidates between 1991 and 2011 (above the mean). Results are robust to including all 111 parties, which fielded lists over those 7 elections but some parties ran as few as 3 candidates. In all models, effects of activism decline in subsequent elections. Predicted probabilities in Section 2.5 are based on Model 1. Results with robust standard errors clustered at electoral district are similar.

A.3.2 Balance tables for observable characteristics

See Tables A.7 through A.11.

A.3.3 Subset of candidates who entered politics in 1991 (first fully free election)

To address the question of entrance of new candidates from election to election, Figure A.1 plots the predicted probabilities for the initial cohort of candidates – the subset of candidates who ran

Table A.6: Logistic regressions: Sejm 1991-2011

	<i>Outcome: Won an Election</i>		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Activist	2.134*** (0.173)	1.459*** (0.322)	1.492*** (0.324)
Time	−0.272*** (0.014)	−0.320*** (0.018)	−0.339*** (0.019)
Imprisoned	0.287** (0.136)	0.085 (0.165)	0.138 (0.169)
List position	−0.030*** (0.001)	−0.025*** (0.002)	−0.026*** (0.002)
Activist*time	−0.127*** (0.039)	−0.176*** (0.047)	−0.170*** (0.047)
Protest leader		0.200 (0.289)	0.142 (0.291)
Candidate controls	No	Yes	Yes
Party controls	Main	Main parties	All > 500 cand.
District controls	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	53,588	52,863	52,863
Log Likelihood	−9,884.153	−8,220.963	−7,997.630
Akaike Inf. Crit.	19,914.310	16,613.930	16,201.260

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.7: Prop. Male

Election	Activist=1	Activist=0	p-value	Activist candidates as % of all candidates
1	0.93	0.87	0.00	6%
2	0.91	0.87	0.00	4.4%
3	0.94	0.84	0.00	4%
4	0.96	0.76	0.00	2.5%
5	0.93	0.75	0.00	1.3%
6	0.97	0.77	0.00	1.5%
7	0.94	0.56	0.00	1%

for the Sejm in 1991. This way, Solidarity activists are compared over time to other candidates who entered politics at the same time and who, as demonstrated in Section A.3.2 were comparable in terms of age and socioeconomic background. This does not address the issue of exit of candidates over time but activist- and non-activist candidates should be exiting political competition for similar reasons (age, losing previous election etc.).

A.3.4 Analysis for Senate

See Table A.12.

Table A.8: Year of birth			
Election	Activist=1	Activist=0	p-value
1	1947	1948	0.53
2	1948	1949	0.14
3	1949	1950	0.01
4	1950	1956	0.00
5	1951	1961	0.00
6	1952	1962	0.00
7	1954	1967	0.00

Table A.9: Prop. intelligentsia (technical/engineers and non-technical)

Election	Activist=1	Activist=0	p-value
1	0.64	0.63	0.72
2	0.66	0.61	0.03
3	0.75	0.62	0.00
4	0.73	0.57	0.00
5	0.66	0.50	0.00
6	0.70	0.53	0.00
7	0.81	0.54	0.00

A.4 Testing the resource mechanism: activism and office holding

See Table A.13.

Table A.10: Prop. business owners				
Election	Activist=1	Activist=0	p-value	
1	0.04	0.06	0.07	
2	0.02	0.06	0.00	
3	0.04	0.07	0.03	
4	0.02	0.07	0.00	
5	0.05	0.09	0.07	
6	0.04	0.09	0.06	
7	0.04	0.09	0.08	

Table A.11: Parliamentary (Sejm) terms served prior to election. Term served prior to 1st election refers to the transitional Sejm (1989-1991).

Election	Activist=1	Activist=0	p-value	
1	0.15	0.02	0.00	
2	0.37	0.04	0.00	
3	0.53	0.09	0.00	
4	0.87	0.09	0.00	
5	0.58	0.06	0.00	
6	1.02	0.13	0.00	
7	1.43	0.13	0.00	

Table A.12: Logistic regressions: Senate 1991-2011

<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
elected	
Activist	0.722** (0.299)
Time	-0.223*** (0.035)
Activist*time	-0.024 (0.072)
Main parties controls	Yes
District controls	Yes
Observations	3,753
Log Likelihood	-1,478.010
Akaike Inf. Crit.	3,106.019

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

A.5 Experimental design

A.5.1 Hypotheses pre-registered on EGAP for the experiment

Hypothesis 1A (activism): Candidates will be rewarded for activism in the pro-democracy movement and sacrifices they made (imprisonment).

Table A.13: Solidarity activism and office-holding

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	National office	local office
	(1)	(2)
Activist	0.651* (0.365)	−0.167 (0.286)
Party voteshare	−2.138 (1.372)	1.422 (0.976)
AWS	−0.027 (0.516)	−0.005 (0.333)
KPN	−18.329 (3,955.606)	−14.583 (850.260)
LPR	−17.499 (1,640.580)	−1.756*** (0.577)
PiS	−1.254 (0.857)	−2.185*** (0.598)
PO	−2.014** (0.925)	−1.673*** (0.589)
PSL	−0.014 (0.433)	−0.206 (0.362)
SO	−2.304** (1.097)	−1.776*** (0.397)
UP	0.198 (0.837)	−1.367* (0.822)
UW	0.159 (0.536)	0.996** (0.437)
Committee leadership	−0.326 (0.259)	−0.260 (0.177)
Defection rate	−0.836 (3.857)	1.304 (1.694)
Party subunit organizational strength	0.159 (0.717)	−0.811 (0.571)
Number of competitors	0.082 (0.072)	0.124** (0.052)
Local office	−2.393*** (0.535)	
National office		−2.333*** (0.531)
Parliamentary term 2001-2005	0.076 (0.380)	1.260*** (0.316)
Parliamentary term 2005-2007	−0.063 (0.590)	2.391*** (0.485)
Parliamentary terms served	0.541*** (0.103)	−0.537*** (0.089)
District fixed effects	✓	✓
Constant	−20.432 (5,114.539)	−15.942 (1,144.790)
Observations	1,242	1,242
Log Likelihood	−282.260	−618.846
Akaike Inf. Crit.	730.520	1,403.693

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01




Figure A.1: Predicted probability of being elected over time for candidates who entered political competition in the first fully free election (1991).

Hypothesis 1B (collaboration): Allegations of collaboration with the communist security service will decrease support, especially among supporters of populist right parties.

Hypothesis 1C (collaboration and activism): Activism in the pro-democracy movement will have a negative, not positive, effect when appearing *in combination with* accusations of collaboration with the communist security apparatus.

Hypothesis 2 (transition): Denouncing the pacted transition and advocating for decommunization and lustration will increase support among populist right's supporters, but will not have an effect among other respondents.

Hypothesis 3 (partisanship): Partisanship identities are strong; candidate's party will be more important than any aspect of their biography or stance taken on the past.

Hypothesis 4 (recent protests): Participation in protests against erosion of democratic institutions and criticism of the government will decrease support for a candidate

among ruling party's supporters, but increase it for respondents who identify with opposition parties or disapprove of the government's actions.

Table A.14: Characteristics of the Sample: Comparison of the Study Sample to Poland's Adult Population.

	Study Sample (N=807)	2011 Census
Gender		
Man	48%	48%
Woman	52%	52%
Education		
Primary	0.6%	19.7%
Secondary 1st / Middle school	2%	0.9%
Vocational education	8.6%	23.7%
Secondary 2nd / High school	45%	34%
University / Higher Education	43.9%	18.8%
Age		
18-44	48.7%	49%
45-64	37.5 %	34%%
65 and up	13.8%	17%
Voted in 2015 Election	81%	Turnout: 51%

A.5.2 Sample Characteristics

As Table C.1 shows, the sample is roughly representative of Poland's adult population in terms of observable characteristics of gender and age although it is more educated and more politically active.

A.5.3 Sample Profiles

Profiles were modeled after different biographies of current and former Polish politicians. Order of attributes was randomized to avoid primacy and recency effects.

Candidate A	Candidate B
Candidate of Civic Platform. Lawyer. Solidarity activist under communism. Never accused of collaboration with the communist security apparatus. Considers the Roundtable Agreement to be a necessary compromise and opposes lustration and decommunization. Has participated in protests organized by the Committee in Defense of Democracy and actively supports it.	Candidate of Law and Justice. Worker. Imprisoned for activism in Solidarity during martial law. Accused of collaboration with the communist security apparatus. Considers the Roundtable Agreement as too much of a compromise and favors lustration and decommunization. Criticizes KOD and recent protests.

A.5.4 Task Example (in Polish)

See Figure A.2.

A.6 Additional Experimental Results

A.6.1 SLD supporters

See Figure A.3.

#4

Gdyby miał(a)by Pan(i) podjąć decyzję tylko na podstawie tych informacji, na którego z tych dwóch kandydatów by Pan(i) zagłosował(a)?

Kandydat A	Kandydat B
Oskarżony o współpracę ze służbami bezpieczeństwa PRL.	Oskarżony o współpracę ze służbami bezpieczeństwa PRL.
Krytykuje działania obecnego rządu, ale nie bierze udziału w protestach.	Krytykuje działania obecnego rządu, ale nie bierze udziału w protestach.
Uważa obrady Okrągłego Stołu za zbyt wielki kompromis i opowiada się za lustracją oraz dekomunizacją.	Uważa obrady Okrągłego Stołu za zbyt wielki kompromis i opowiada się za lustracją oraz dekomunizacją.
Kandydat PiS.	Kandydat PO.
Prawnik.	Prawnik.
Przed przełomem niezwiązany z polityką.	Działacz Solidarności w czasach komunizmu.

A

☐

B

☐

Figure A.2: Sample Task

A.6.2 Generational cohort effects

An alternative explanation for findings in Section 2.5 is the role of historical memory and generational turnover in the electorate. Voters who did not personally experience or who do not remember the transition to democracy, might place less value on a candidate’s Solidarity background. I leverage the results of the experiment to test this possibility. If this were the case, we would expect older voters to show a preference for Solidarity candidates but not younger voters. As Figures A.4 through A.7 show, I find that this is not the case. Young voters, including those born after 1989 (Figure 3.4), with no memory of the transition, still prefer Solidarity candidates imprisoned for their pro-democracy activism.

A.6.3 Reasons for choosing candidates

Descriptive evidence from a question asking respondents to check what they considered important as they made their choices throughout the tasks also suggests selections were driven by a presence or absence of “warm feelings” for a candidate (Campbell 1980). Faced with options like candidate’s trustworthiness, ability to represent interests of people like them, candidate’s service to the country, and candidate’s qualifications or competence (respondents were asked to check all that




Figure A.3: Number of Respondents=57




Figure A.4: Respondents 28 years old and younger.




Figure A.5: Respondents 29-45 years old.




Figure A.6: Respondents 46 to 65 years old. Figure A.7: Respondents 65 years old and older.




Figure A.8: Respondents' motivations for choosing the candidates.

apply), as Figure A.8 shows, respondents were significantly more likely to select “trustworthiness” than any other explanation.¹

¹Open-ended responses were not classified into categories as described in the pre-analysis plan since the vast majority of respondents who provided a meaningful answer simply mentioned one or a few elements of the profile as an explanation e.g. “because he didn’t collaborate with SB” or “Solidarity activist” or “I (do not) support PiS/PO” etc. without detailing *why* that mattered to them - information already obtained in a more rigorous way through estimates of the effects of different attributes.

B | Appendix to Chapter 3

B.1 Results by support for current government

See Figures B.1, B.2, and B.3.




Figure B.1: Supporters (N=191).

Figure B.2: Opponents (N=437).

B.2 Electorate of main opposition parties

See Figure B.4.




Figure B.3: Respondents who answered “Hard to say” when asked to evaluate government’s actions (N=179).




Figure B.4: Supporters of PO and Nowoczesna (N=311).

B.3 Protest v. criticism

In order to verify that the observed differences in effects for criticism without protest and protest are not driven by the restriction imposed on randomization, which prevented profiles with PiS candidates participating in protest from appearing (as an unrealistic combination), I check whether the difference between criticism level and protest level within KOD attribute is also present when analysis is replicated on a subset of profiles with PO candidates only (these profiles could have all possible combinations). The top panel of Figure B.5 shows the effects of engaging in protest relative to criticism among PiS supporters when only profiles with PO candidates are included. The act of protest significantly decreases the support for candidates relative to criticism. This indicates that the difference in the effects of levels in Figure 2 in the paper is not driven by criticism being employed by both PiS and PO candidates, while protest is limited to PO candidates. Likewise, we observe the same patterns as in Figure 3 in the middle and bottom panel of Figure B.5. Among supporters of all other parties (middle), protest has a small, negative, but statistically insignificant effect and among supporters of main opposition parties – PO and Nowoczesna (bottom) – a positive but insignificant effect, when only profiles with PO candidates, which could take on all values for the KOD attribute, are included.

B.4 Solidarity




Figure B.5: Effects of protest v. criticism on support.




Figure B.6: Subset of respondents who were members of Solidarity prior to 1989 (N=121).

C | Appendix to Chapter 5

C.1 Sample Characteristics

As Table C.1 shows, the sample is generally comparable to a nationally representative sample. Respondents were quota sampled to nationally representative targets for age and gender. However, due to online administration of the survey, it was difficult to recruit respondents above the age of 65 and quota was relaxed for that age group. On the issue of party identification, it is worth mentioning that for the purposes of the experiment, the survey forced respondents to choose one of the four main parties in Spain, whereas in the CIS study respondents could declare themselves a sympathizer of a smaller party such as Izquierda Unida or importantly, a regional party. This is likely why percentages are higher in my study, especially for Ciudadanos and Podemos (which supports claims for devolution of power to the regions), though a younger sample might be in part responsible for this discrepancy. Importantly, the sample does not differ from a nationally representative sample in terms of mean ideological identification. The sample is also much more educated than a nationally representative sample and somewhat more optimistic about the economic situation in Spain.

C.2 Baseline levels

See Table C.2 for baseline levels used in all AMCE models in the paper.

C.3 Robustness Check

The primary analyses in the paper focus on the Candidate Selected outcome, in which respondents are forced to choose between one of two political candidates – one they would be more likely

Table C.1: Characteristics of the Sample: Comparison of the Study Sample to a Nationally Representative Sample

	Study Sample (N=1,013)	CIS Barometer June 2016 (N=2,484)
Gender		
Man	49.4%	48.6%
Woman	50.6%	51.4%
Education		
Less than primary	3%	4.4%
Primary	2.6%	19.9%
Secondary 1st	3.9%	23.9%
Secondary 2nd	19.9%	13.7%
Vocational education	25.8%	16.4%
Higher education	47.3%	21.3%
Ideology (1-10)		
Mean Self-Placement	4.63 (s.d.: 2.38)	4.67 (s.d.:1.99)
Party ID		
PP	22.9%	20.5%
PSOE	22.7%	20.5%
Ciudadanos	21.8%	10.3%
Podemos	32.6%	10.5%
Voted	82%	83.4% (2015 election)
Age		
18-24	9.9%	8.6%
25-34	17.3%	14%
35-44	22.9 %	18.9%
45-54	24.4%	19.4%
55-64	17.5%	15.2%
65 and up	8%	23.8%
Economic Situation		
Very good or good	10.8%	3.2%
Regular	36.1%	28.7%
Very bad or bad	53.1%	67.9%

Table C.2: AMCE Baseline Levels		
	Attribute	Level
1	education	Secondary education.
2	experience	Manager of a small firm.
3	gender	Man
4	outsider	Experienced politician.
5	party	Partido Popular
6	signal	Time commitment

to vote for or one that better embodies a particular character trait such as e.g. honesty or likability. Specifying the dependent variable as a forced choice makes it possible to isolate determinants of vote choice and set aside general opinions about the candidates. However, it is also important to test whether the results differ substantially when respondents are not forced to choose between two candidates. After indicating which candidate they would be more likely to vote for, the respondents also rated each candidate on a seven-point scale, with 1 being the lowest and 7 the highest rating. Using these ratings of each candidate profile, I replicate the model using the Positive Rating outcome, which is coded as 1 if the 7-point rating is above 4 (the median rating is 4 and the mean 3.5) and zero otherwise. The effects of the attributes on this outcome are displayed in Figure C.2. The results are similar to the ones obtained when using the Candidate Selected as preferred vote choice outcome variable (Figure C.1 below).




Figure C.1: Candidate Selected (N=1,013).




Figure C.2: Positive Rating (N=1,013).

C.4 Results with weights

See Figures C.3, C.4 and C.5 for results of the main analysis with weights. Results are similar to those displayed in Figures 1, 2, and 3 in the paper although weighted results for the Center show preference (over PP) for PSOE in addition to Ciudadanos.




Figure C.3: Vote Choice: Left With Weights. Figure C.4: Vote Choice: Right With Weights.

C.5 Additional Analyses

See Figures C.6 through C.8.

C.5.1 Likability

C.5.2 Interaction between Activism and Party for Left-wing Parties

See Figures C.9, C.10, and C.11 for Average Component Interaction Effects (ACIEs) between party and experience for candidates of left-wing parties. Number of respondents = 1013. Number of observations (profiles) = 5106. This portion of the analysis was not pre-registered.




Figure C.5: Vote Choice: Center With Weights.




Figure C.6: Likable: left




Figure C.7: Likable: center




Figure C.8: Likable: right

C.5.3 Economic Crisis: A Window of Opportunity?

As part of the study, I also explored whether preferences change when respondents are primed to think about the current economic situation. In order to test this, respondents were randomly assigned to receive a question about their assessment of the current economic situation in Spain either before seeing the series of candidate profiles or at the end of the survey. In the pre-registration document for the study, I hypothesized that among those respondents who rate the economic situation in Spain as bad or very bad, those who were asked the question at the beginning of the survey (and thus primed to think of the economic crisis) will be more likely to prefer political outsiders and social movement activists. As Figures C.12 and C.13 show, I do not find support for this hypothesis. The question was likely too subtle to prime respondents to think about the economic crisis and a focus on the *political crisis* could likely have stronger effects. I view this as exciting area for future research. For this project, since the results are substantively and statistically similar in the prime and control conditions, regardless of respondents' assessment of the economic situation (negative in Figure C.12 and both negative and positive in Figure C.13), I pool those respondents together in the main analyses.




Figure C.9: Interaction between Activism and Party: Interest Representation




Figure C.10: Interaction between Activism and Party: Honesty




Figure C.11: Interaction between Activism and Party: Ideology




Figure C.12: Effects of candidate attribute values on probability of being selected as the preferred vote choice, by economic prime condition. Estimates are based on an OLS model with standard errors clustered at the respondent level. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Data subsetting to respondents who perceive the economic situation in Spain as bad or very bad (n=538).




Figure C.13: Effects of candidate attribute values on probability of being selected as the preferred vote choice, by economic prime condition. All respondents, regardless of assessment of current economic situation in Spain (N=1,013).

C.5.4 Union members and respondents with protest history

See Figures C.14 and C.15 for results when the sample is subsetting to respondents belonging to unions (Figure C.14) and respondents with protest history (Figure C.15).




Figure C.14: Preferred Candidates Among Union Members (n=118). 95% confidence intervals. Preference for unionist candidates and social movements activists (15-M and housing).




Figure C.15: Preferred Candidates Among Respondents With Own Protest History (n=454). 95% confidence intervals. Preference for anti-eviction and 15-M activists and union members.

C.6 Survey Questions

All questions are modeled after questions regularly asked by CIS (Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas), one of the main research institutes in Spain.

C.6.1 Demographic Questions

1. Evaluation of the economic situation: Thinking about the general economic situation in Spain, would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad, very bad?
scale: 1 (very bad), 2 (bad), 3 (neither bad nor good), 4 (good), 5 (very good) [randomized order: beginning/end of survey]
2. Gender (Man/woman)
3. Age (18-24) (25-34) (35-44) (45-54) (55-64) (65 and up)
4. Education: scale with 6 categories. Which is the highest level of education that you have had? (regardless of whether you have completed it or not)
1 (I have less than 5 years of formal education), 2 (Primary education) 3 (Secondary education 1st stage), 4 (Secondary education 2nd stage) 5 (Vocational education), 6 (Higher education)
5. Left-right: When talking about politics, people often use the expressions "left" and "right." On a scale where 1 is "left" and 10 is "right," where would you place yourself?
6. Election: Did you vote in the last election? (Yes/No)
7. Party closeness: For which of the following parties do you feel more sympathy or which one do you consider closer to your own ideas? (List of parties: PP, PSOE, Ciudadanos, Podemos, respondent can only mark one party)
8. Union membership: Are you a member or affiliate of a trade union? (Yes/No)
9. Protest: Please tell me, in the last 3 years, have you attended a demonstration or a protest, never, one time, more than once? 1 (Never), 2 (Once), 3 (More than once)

C.6.2 Outcome Questions

1. If you had to make a choice without knowing more, which of the two would you vote for?
2. Please rate each candidate on a 7-point scale with 1 indicating "very bad" and 7 indicating "very good."
3. When talking about politics, people often use the expressions "left" and "right." On a scale where 1 is "left" and 10 is "right," where would you place Candidate A/B?
4. How certain are you that this is their ideological position? (7-point scale from 1 - "not at all" to 7 - "absolutely certain")
5. Which of the two would you guess is:
 - more competent
 - more honest
 - more likable
 - a person who better represents the ideas and interests of people like you?

C.7 Regression tables corresponding to all figures

C.7.1 Main paper

See Tables 3-9.

Table C.3: Candidate Choice On The Left Without Weights. Corresponds to Figure 1.

	Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	z value	Pr(> z)	
1	education	University education	0.07	0.02	3.44	0.00	***
2	education	Doctorate	0.07	0.02	3.81	0.00	***
3	experience	Pro-democracy activist	0.04	0.04	1.11	0.27	
4	experience	Anti-eviction activist	0.18	0.03	5.12	0.00	***
5	experience	Active participant in 15 ^o M	0.09	0.03	3.42	0.00	***
6	experience	Labor unionist	0.03	0.03	1.04	0.30	
7	gender	Woman	0.01	0.01	0.85	0.40	
8	outsider	New to politics	-0.03	0.02	-1.84	0.07	
9	party	Ciudadanos	0.21	0.03	6.27	0.00	***
10	party	Podemos	0.39	0.04	9.25	0.00	***
11	party	PSOE	0.41	0.04	11.38	0.00	***
12	signal	Leader at local level	0.05	0.04	1.23	0.22	
13	signal	Party leader at local level	0.08	0.04	2.03	0.04	*
14	signal	Arrested during protest	-0.00	0.04	-0.11	0.92	

Note: *p<0.5; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table C.4: Candidate Choice on the Right Without Weights. Corresponds to Figure 2.

	Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	z value	Pr(> z)	
1	education	University education	0.06	0.02	2.35	0.02	*
2	education	Doctorate	0.11	0.02	4.46	0.00	***
3	experience	Pro-democracy activist	-0.04	0.04	-0.83	0.40	
4	experience	Anti-eviction activist	-0.04	0.04	-0.94	0.34	
5	experience	Active participant in 15 ^o M	-0.09	0.03	-2.84	0.00	**
6	experience	Labor unionist	-0.07	0.03	-2.25	0.02	*
7	gender	Woman	-0.01	0.02	-0.68	0.50	
8	outsider	New to politics	-0.03	0.02	-1.46	0.14	
9	party	Ciudadanos	-0.02	0.04	-0.48	0.63	
10	party	Podemos	-0.42	0.05	-8.01	0.00	***
11	party	PSOE	-0.21	0.04	-4.77	0.00	***
12	signal	Leader at local level	0.02	0.05	0.39	0.70	
13	signal	Party leader at local level	-0.03	0.05	-0.61	0.54	
14	signal	Arrested during protest	0.04	0.05	0.76	0.45	

Note: *p<0.5; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table C.5: Candidate Choice by Centrist Respondents Without Weights. Corresponds to Figure 3.

	Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	z value	Pr(> z)	
1	education	University education	0.07	0.03	2.51	0.01	*
2	education	Doctorate	0.14	0.03	4.51	0.00	***
3	experience	Pro-democracy activist	0.02	0.05	0.34	0.74	
4	experience	Anti-eviction activist	0.10	0.06	1.75	0.08	
5	experience	Active participant in 15-20M	0.06	0.04	1.50	0.13	
6	experience	Labor unionist	0.06	0.04	1.50	0.13	
7	gender	Woman	0.04	0.02	1.52	0.13	
8	outsider	New to politics	0.00	0.02	0.14	0.89	
9	party	de Ciudadanos.	0.13	0.06	2.21	0.03	*
10	party	Podemos	-0.07	0.07	-0.98	0.32	
11	party	PSOE	0.06	0.06	0.89	0.37	
12	signal	Leader at local level	0.00	0.06	0.06	0.96	
13	signal	Party leader at local level	0.01	0.06	0.12	0.91	
14	signal	Arrested during protest	-0.11	0.06	-1.98	0.05	*

C.7.2 Appendix

See Tables 10-27.

Table C.6: Perception of Candidate's Ideology on Left(1) to Right (10) Scale. Corresponds to Figure 4.

	Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	z value	Pr(> z)	
1	education	University education	0.01	0.07	0.16	0.87	
2	education	Doctorate	0.09	0.07	1.41	0.16	
3	experience	Pro-democracy activist	-0.36	0.12	-3.08	0.00	**
4	experience	Anti-eviction activist	-0.39	0.12	-3.29	0.00	***
5	experience	Active participant in 15aŁŠM	-0.40	0.09	-4.66	0.00	***
6	experience	Labor unionist	-0.25	0.09	-2.77	0.01	**
7	gender	Woman	0.04	0.05	0.82	0.41	
8	outsider	New to politics	-0.08	0.05	-1.42	0.16	
9	party	Ciudadanos	-1.15	0.13	-8.53	0.00	***
10	party	Podemos	-4.08	0.18	-22.94	0.00	***
11	party	PSOE	-3.22	0.16	-19.98	0.00	***
12	signal	Leader at local level	0.33	0.14	2.45	0.01	*
13	signal	Party leader at local level	0.44	0.13	3.36	0.00	***
14	signal	Arrested during protest	-0.00	0.13	-0.03	0.98	

Note: *p<0.5; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table C.7: Certainty about Candidate's Ideology (1-7 Scale) Scale. Corresponds to Figure 5.

	Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	z value	Pr(> z)	
1	education	University education	0.12	0.05	2.27	0.02	*
2	education	Doctorate	0.14	0.05	3.05	0.00	**
3	experience	Pro-democracy activist	0.21	0.09	2.36	0.02	*
4	experience	Anti-eviction activist	0.21	0.09	2.35	0.02	*
5	experience	Active participant in 15aŁŠM	0.01	0.06	0.09	0.93	
6	experience	Labor unionist	0.05	0.06	0.88	0.38	
7	gender	Woman	-0.03	0.04	-0.77	0.44	
8	outsider	New to politics	-0.03	0.04	-0.83	0.41	
9	party	Ciudadanos	-0.06	0.10	-0.66	0.51	
10	party	Podemos	-0.14	0.12	-1.15	0.25	
11	party	PSOE	-0.27	0.11	-2.45	0.01	*
12	signal	Leader at local level	0.09	0.10	0.84	0.40	
13	signal	Party leader at local level	-0.06	0.10	-0.58	0.56	
14	signal	Arrested during protest	0.00	0.10	0.00	1.00	

Note: *p<0.5; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table C.8: Candidate Selection: Honesty. Corresponds to Figure 6

	Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	z value	Pr(> z)	
1	education	University education	0.00	0.01	0.09	0.93	
2	education	Doctorate	0.03	0.01	2.02	0.04	*
3	experience	Pro-democracy activist	0.02	0.03	0.96	0.34	
4	experience	Anti-eviction activist	0.10	0.02	3.97	0.00	***
5	experience	Active participant in 15 ^o M	0.03	0.02	1.70	0.09	
6	experience	Labor unionist	0.02	0.02	1.21	0.23	
7	gender	Woman	0.01	0.01	1.18	0.24	
8	outsider	New to politics	0.00	0.01	0.17	0.87	
9	party	Ciudadanos	0.12	0.03	4.23	0.00	***
10	party	Podemos	0.05	0.03	1.61	0.11	
11	party	PSOE	0.11	0.03	3.68	0.00	***
12	signal	Leader at local level	0.02	0.03	0.56	0.58	
13	signal	Party leader at local level	0.03	0.03	1.01	0.31	
14	signal	Arrested during protest	-0.01	0.03	-0.29	0.77	

Note: *p<0.5; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table C.9: Candidate Selection: Competence. Corresponds to Figure 7

	Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	z value	Pr(> z)	
1	education	University education	0.09	0.01	6.91	0.00	***
2	education	Doctorate	0.15	0.01	11.14	0.00	***
3	experience	Pro-democracy activist	0.01	0.03	0.20	0.84	
4	experience	Anti-eviction activist	0.04	0.02	1.57	0.12	
5	experience	Active participant in 15 ^o M	-0.01	0.02	-0.52	0.60	
6	experience	Labor unionist	0.00	0.02	0.08	0.94	
7	gender	Woman	0.01	0.01	0.56	0.58	
8	outsider	New to politics	-0.06	0.01	-5.32	0.00	***
9	party	Ciudadanos	0.09	0.03	3.27	0.00	**
10	party	Podemos	0.01	0.03	0.34	0.74	
11	party	PSOE	0.11	0.03	3.70	0.00	***
12	signal	Leader at local level	-0.00	0.03	-0.01	0.99	
13	signal	Party leader at local level	0.05	0.03	1.84	0.07	
14	signal	Arrested during protest	-0.07	0.03	-2.50	0.01	*

Note: *p<0.5; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table C.10: Candidate Selected, All Respondents Without Weights. Corresponds to Figure 1 in Section D of the Appendix.

	Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	z value	Pr(> z)	
1	education	University education	0.06	0.01	4.56	0.00	***
2	education	Doctorate	0.11	0.01	7.46	0.00	***
3	experience	Pro-democracy activist	0.02	0.02	0.63	0.53	
4	experience	Anti-eviction activist	0.10	0.03	4.01	0.00	***
5	experience	Active participant in 15aŁŠM	0.03	0.02	1.49	0.14	
6	experience	Labor unionist	0.01	0.02	0.70	0.48	
7	gender	Woman	0.01	0.01	1.11	0.27	
8	outsider	New to politics	-0.02	0.01	-2.05	0.04	*
9	party	Ciudadanos	0.12	0.03	4.44	0.00	***
10	party	Podemos	0.04	0.03	1.26	0.21	
11	party	PSOE	0.14	0.03	4.74	0.00	***
12	signal	Leader at local level	0.02	0.03	0.74	0.46	
13	signal	Party leader at local level	0.03	0.03	0.99	0.32	
14	signal	Arrested during protest	-0.01	0.03	-0.39	0.70	

Note: *p<0.5; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table C.11: Effects of Candidate Attributes on Positive Ratings, All Respondents Without Weights. Corresponds to Figure 2 in Section D of the Appendix.

	Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	z value	Pr(> z)	
1	education	University education	0.05	0.01	3.55	0.00	***
2	education	Doctorate	0.08	0.01	5.59	0.00	***
3	experience	Pro-democracy activist	0.03	0.03	1.09	0.28	
4	experience	Anti-eviction activist	0.07	0.03	2.79	0.01	**
5	experience	Active participant in 15aŁŠM	0.02	0.02	1.42	0.16	
6	experience	Labor unionist	0.02	0.02	1.04	0.30	
7	gender	Woman	0.01	0.01	0.74	0.46	
8	outsider	New to politics	-0.03	0.01	-2.67	0.01	**
9	party	Ciudadanos	0.08	0.03	3.05	0.00	**
10	party	Podemos	0.06	0.03	1.72	0.09	
11	party	PSOE	0.07	0.03	2.60	0.01	**
12	signal	Leader at local level	-0.04	0.03	-1.51	0.13	
13	signal	Party leader at local level	-0.01	0.03	-0.37	0.71	
14	signal	Arrested during protest	-0.00	0.03	-0.04	0.96	

Note: *p<0.5; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table C.12: Candidate Choice on the Left With Weights. Corresponds to Figure 3 in Section D of the Appendix.

	Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	z value	Pr(> z)	
1	education	University education	0.03	0.04	0.98	0.33	
2	education	Doctorate	0.07	0.03	2.20	0.03	*
3	experience	Pro-democracy activist	-0.00	0.06	-0.03	0.97	
4	experience	Anti-eviction activist	0.18	0.06	3.14	0.00	**
5	experience	Active participant in 15aŁŠM	0.06	0.05	1.34	0.18	
6	experience	Labor unionist	0.02	0.03	0.66	0.51	
7	gender	Woman	-0.03	0.03	-1.10	0.27	
8	outsider	New to politics	-0.04	0.02	-1.79	0.07	
9	party	Ciudadanos	0.17	0.05	3.20	0.00	**
10	party	Podemos	0.38	0.08	4.58	0.00	***
11	party	PSOE	0.37	0.06	6.18	0.00	***
12	signal	Leader at local level	0.16	0.07	2.20	0.03	*
13	signal	Party leader at local level	0.07	0.04	1.61	0.11	
14	signal	Arrested during protest	0.07	0.09	0.84	0.40	

Note: *p<0.5; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table C.13: Candidate Choice On The Right With Weights. Corresponds to Figure 4 in Section D of the Appendix.

	Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	z value	Pr(> z)	
1	education	University education	0.05	0.04	1.24	0.22	
2	education	Doctorate	0.11	0.03	3.58	0.00	***
3	experience	Pro-democracy activist	0.04	0.05	0.87	0.38	
4	experience	Anti-eviction activist	-0.09	0.06	-1.58	0.11	
5	experience	Active participant in 15aŁŠM	-0.19	0.05	-3.58	0.00	***
6	experience	Labor unionist	-0.14	0.05	-2.81	0.01	**
7	gender	Woman	-0.01	0.03	-0.50	0.62	
8	outsider	New to politics	-0.00	0.03	-0.14	0.89	
9	party	Ciudadanos	-0.00	0.05	-0.06	0.95	
10	party	Podemos	-0.35	0.07	-5.34	0.00	***
11	party	PSOE	-0.19	0.06	-3.15	0.00	**
12	signal	Leader at local level	-0.03	0.06	-0.58	0.56	
13	signal	Party leader at local level	-0.07	0.06	-1.21	0.23	
14	signal	Arrested during protest	0.09	0.06	1.42	0.16	

Note: *p<0.5; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table C.14: Candidate Choice by Centrist Respondents With Weights. Corresponds to Figure 5 in Section D of the Appendix.

	Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	z value	Pr(> z)	
1	education	University education	0.05	0.03	1.54	0.12	
2	education	Doctorate	0.14	0.04	3.20	0.00	**
3	experience	Pro-democracy activist .	-0.02	0.08	-0.30	0.77	
4	experience	Anti-eviction activist	0.06	0.07	0.95	0.34	
5	experience	Active participant in 15 ^o M	0.09	0.05	1.92	0.05	
6	experience	Labor unionist	0.12	0.06	2.11	0.03	*
7	gender	Woman	0.03	0.04	0.83	0.41	
8	outsider	New to politics	-0.06	0.04	-1.78	0.07	
9	party	Ciudadanos.	0.15	0.08	1.94	0.05	
10	party	Podemos	0.05	0.09	0.64	0.52	
11	party	PSOE	0.18	0.08	2.22	0.03	*
12	signal	Leader at local level	-0.02	0.09	-0.23	0.82	
13	signal	Party leader at local level	0.10	0.07	1.35	0.18	
14	signal	Arrested during protest	-0.12	0.07	-1.78	0.08	

Table C.15: Candidate Selection: Likability. Corresponds to Figure 6 in the Appendix Section E.1

	Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	z value	Pr(> z)	
1	education	University education	0.02	0.01	1.35	0.18	
2	education	Doctorate	0.04	0.01	2.90	0.00	**
3	experience	Pro-democracy activist	-0.01	0.03	-0.39	0.70	
4	experience	Anti-eviction activist	0.06	0.02	2.22	0.03	*
5	experience	Active participant in 15 ^o M	0.04	0.02	1.96	0.05	*
6	experience	Labor unionist	0.03	0.02	1.73	0.08	
7	gender	Woman	0.01	0.01	0.52	0.60	
8	outsider	New to politics	-0.00	0.01	-0.02	0.98	
9	party	Ciudadanos	0.16	0.03	5.77	0.00	***
10	party	Podemos	0.06	0.03	1.88	0.06	
11	party	PSOE	0.13	0.03	4.57	0.00	***
12	signal	Leader at local level	0.00	0.03	0.17	0.87	
13	signal	Party leader at local level	0.02	0.03	0.65	0.52	
14	signal	Arrested during protest	-0.02	0.03	-0.62	0.54	

Note: *p<0.5; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table C.16: Candidate Selection: Representation of Interests. Corresponds to Figure 7 in the Appendix Section E.1

	Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	z value	Pr(> z)	
1	education	University education	0.04	0.01	2.59	0.01	**
2	education	Doctorate	0.06	0.01	4.34	0.00	***
3	experience	Pro-democracy activist	0.01	0.03	0.53	0.60	
4	experience	Anti-eviction activist	0.08	0.03	3.11	0.00	**
5	experience	Active participant in 15aŁŠM	0.03	0.02	1.41	0.16	
6	experience	Labor unionist	0.01	0.02	0.49	0.62	
7	gender	Woman	0.01	0.01	1.27	0.21	
8	outsider	New to politics	-0.03	0.01	-2.32	0.02	*
9	party	Ciudadanos	0.14	0.03	5.27	0.00	***
10	party	Podemos	0.06	0.03	1.88	0.06	
11	party	PSOE	0.15	0.03	5.15	0.00	***
12	signal	Leader at local level	0.04	0.03	1.29	0.20	
13	signal	Party leader at local level	0.03	0.03	0.97	0.33	
14	signal	Arrested during protest	-0.04	0.03	-1.38	0.17	

Note: *p<0.5; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table C.17: Party and Experience Interaction (ACIE): Interest Representation. Corresponds to Figure 8 in Section E.2 of the Appendix.

	Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	z value	Pr(> z)
1	experience:party	Pro-democracy activist :PSOE	0.06	0.05	1.21	0.23
2	experience:party	Anti-eviction activist :PSOE	0.10	0.05	1.91	0.06
3	experience:party	Active participant in 15aŁŠM:PSOE	0.07	0.05	1.32	0.19
4	experience:party	Labor unionist:PSOE	-0.01	0.05	-0.21	0.84

Table C.18: Party and Experience Interaction (ACIE): Honesty. Corresponds to Figure 9 in Section E.2 of the Appendix.

	Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	z value	Pr(> z)
1	experience:party	Pro-democracy activist :PSOE	0.09	0.05	1.77	0.08
2	experience:party	Anti-eviction activist :PSOE	0.07	0.05	1.51	0.13
3	experience:party	Active participant in 15aŁŠM:PSOE	0.03	0.05	0.63	0.53
4	experience:party	Labor unionist:PSOE	0.02	0.05	0.35	0.73

Table C.19: Party and Experience Interaction (ACIE): Ideological Position. Corresponds to Figure 10 in Section E.2 of the Appendix.

	Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	z value	Pr(> z)
1	experience:party	Pro-democracy activist:PSOE	-0.07	0.23	-0.30	0.76
2	experience:party	Anti-eviction activist:PSOE	-0.03	0.23	-0.14	0.89
3	experience:party	Active participant in 15aŁŠM:PSOE	0.01	0.23	0.03	0.98
4	experience:party	Labor unionist:PSOE	-0.17	0.24	-0.71	0.48

Table C.20: Candidate Choice: Podemos voters. Corresponds to Figure 11 in Section E.3 of the Appendix.

	Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	z value	Pr(> z)	
1	education	University education	0.07	0.02	2.94	0.00	**
2	education	Doctorate	0.06	0.02	2.64	0.01	**
3	experience	Pro-democracy activist	0.10	0.04	2.62	0.01	**
4	experience	Anti-eviction activist	0.19	0.04	4.37	0.00	***
5	experience	Active participant in 15aŁŖM	0.12	0.03	4.19	0.00	***
6	experience	Labor unionist	0.04	0.03	1.46	0.14	
7	gender	Woman	0.03	0.02	1.56	0.12	
8	outsider	New to politics	-0.00	0.02	-0.05	0.96	
9	party	Ciudadanos	0.18	0.04	4.36	0.00	***
10	party	Podemos	0.48	0.05	9.69	0.00	***
11	party	PSOE	0.31	0.04	7.09	0.00	***
12	signal	Leader at local level	0.08	0.05	1.71	0.09	
13	signal	Party leader at local level	0.07	0.04	1.54	0.12	
14	signal	Arrested during protest	-0.01	0.05	-0.28	0.78	

Note: *p<0.5; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table C.21: Candidate Choice: PSOE voters. Corresponds to Figure 12 in Section E.3 of the Appendix.

	Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	z value	Pr(> z)	
1	education	University education	0.07	0.03	2.42	0.02	*
2	education	Doctorate	0.09	0.03	2.98	0.00	**
3	experience	Pro-democracy activist	-0.00	0.05	-0.04	0.97	
4	experience	Anti-eviction activist	0.12	0.05	2.30	0.02	*
5	experience	Active participant in 15aŁŖM	0.06	0.03	1.83	0.07	
6	experience	Labor unionist	0.06	0.03	1.69	0.09	
7	gender	Woman	-0.01	0.02	-0.45	0.65	
8	outsider	New to politics	-0.02	0.02	-0.96	0.34	
9	party	Ciudadanos	0.22	0.05	4.40	0.00	***
10	party	Podemos	0.25	0.06	4.20	0.00	***
11	party	PSOE	0.55	0.05	10.96	0.00	***
12	signal	Leader at local level	-0.02	0.06	-0.40	0.69	
13	signal	Party leader at local level	0.00	0.05	0.07	0.94	
14	signal	Arrested during protest	-0.02	0.06	-0.37	0.71	

Note: *p<0.5; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table C.22: Candidate Choice: Ciudadanos voters. Corresponds to Figure 13 in Section E.2 of the Appendix.

	Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	z value	Pr(> z)	
1	education	University education	0.09	0.03	2.99	0.00	**
2	education	Doctorate	0.15	0.03	4.83	0.00	***
3	experience	Pro-democracy activist	-0.01	0.05	-0.24	0.81	
4	experience	Anti-eviction activist	0.05	0.05	0.90	0.37	
5	experience	Active participant in 15-M	-0.01	0.04	-0.25	0.80	
6	experience	Labor unionist	0.03	0.04	0.88	0.38	
7	gender	Woman	0.03	0.02	1.25	0.21	
8	outsider	New to politics	-0.03	0.02	-1.33	0.18	
9	party	Ciudadanos	0.22	0.06	3.90	0.00	***
10	party	Podemos	-0.20	0.07	-3.06	0.00	**
11	party	PSOE	-0.02	0.06	-0.33	0.74	
12	signal	Leader at local level	0.06	0.06	1.01	0.31	
13	signal	Party leader at local level	-0.02	0.05	-0.32	0.75	
14	signal	Arrested during protest	-0.02	0.05	-0.42	0.67	

Note: *p<0.5; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table C.24: Results in Control Condition and Economic Prime: Respondents with Negative Assessment of Economic Situation. Corresponds to Figure 15 in Section E.4 of the Appendix.

	Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	z value	Pr(> z)		prime
1	education	University education	0.04	0.03	1.47	0.14		Economic prime
2	education	Doctorate	0.07	0.03	2.59	0.01	**	Economic prime
3	experience	Pro-democracy activist	0.04	0.05	0.74	0.46		Economic prime
4	experience	Ant-eviction activist	0.12	0.05	2.69	0.01	**	Economic prime
5	experience	Active participant in 15-M	0.03	0.03	0.94	0.35		Economic prime
6	experience	Labor unionist	0.02	0.04	0.55	0.58		Economic prime
7	gender	Woman	0.01	0.02	0.59	0.55		Economic prime
8	outsider	New to politics	-0.01	0.02	-0.39	0.70		Economic prime
9	party	Ciudadanos	0.21	0.05	4.18	0.00	***	Economic prime
10	party	Podemos	0.25	0.06	4.10	0.00	***	Economic prime
11	party	PSOE	0.30	0.05	5.52	0.00	***	Economic prime
12	signal	Leader at local level	0.01	0.05	0.15	0.88		Economic prime
13	signal	Party leader at local level	-0.03	0.05	-0.55	0.59		Economic prime
14	signal	Arrested during protest	-0.04	0.06	-0.72	0.47		Economic prime
15	education	University education	0.10	0.03	3.60	0.00	***	Control
16	education	Doctorate	0.12	0.03	4.26	0.00	***	Control
17	experience	Pro-democracy activist	0.10	0.05	1.95	0.05		Control
18	experience	Ant-eviction activist	0.15	0.05	2.91	0.00	**	Control
19	experience	Active participant in 15-M	0.07	0.04	1.98	0.05	*	Control
20	experience	Labor unionist	0.02	0.04	0.67	0.50		Control
21	gender	Woman	0.01	0.02	0.45	0.65		Control
22	outsider	New to politics	0.02	0.02	0.67	0.50		Control
23	party	Ciudadanos	0.11	0.05	2.03	0.04	*	Control
24	party	Podemos	0.16	0.07	2.33	0.02	*	Control
25	party	PSOE	0.19	0.06	3.24	0.00	**	Control
26	signal	Leader at local level	0.08	0.06	1.49	0.14		Control
27	signal	Party leader at local level	0.04	0.06	0.62	0.53		Control
28	signal	Arrested during protest	-0.08	0.06	-1.35	0.18		Control

Note: *p<0.5; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table C.25: Results in Control Condition and Economic Prime: All Respondents. Corresponds to Figure 16 in Section E4 of the Appendix.

Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	z value	Pr(> z)		prime	
1	education	University education	0.05	0.02	2.73	0.01	**	Economic prime
2	education	Doctorate	0.08	0.02	4.07	0.00	***	Economic prime
3	experience	Pro-democracy activist	-0.00	0.03	-0.09	0.93		Economic prime
4	experience	Ant-eviction activist	0.09	0.04	2.56	0.01	*	Economic prime
5	experience	Active participant in 15-M	0.01	0.03	0.50	0.61		Economic prime
6	experience	Labor unionist	0.01	0.03	0.36	0.72		Economic prime
7	gender	Woman	0.01	0.02	0.96	0.34		Economic prime
8	outsider	New to politics	-0.03	0.02	-1.78	0.08		Economic prime
9	party	Ciudadanos	0.17	0.04	4.53	0.00	***	Economic prime
10	party	Podemos	0.07	0.05	1.51	0.13		Economic prime
11	party	PSOE	0.17	0.04	4.03	0.00	***	Economic prime
12	signal	Leader at local level	0.02	0.04	0.44	0.66		Economic prime
13	signal	Party leader at local level	0.03	0.04	0.91	0.36		Economic prime
14	signal	Arrested during protest	0.00	0.04	0.06	0.96		Economic prime
15	education	University education	0.07	0.02	3.88	0.00	***	Control
16	education	Doctorate	0.13	0.02	6.51	0.00	***	Control
17	experience	Pro-democracy activist	0.04	0.04	1.08	0.28		Control
18	experience	Ant-eviction activist	0.11	0.04	2.88	0.00	**	Control
19	experience	Active participant in 15-M	0.05	0.03	1.78	0.08		Control
20	experience	Labor unionist	0.02	0.03	0.65	0.52		Control
21	gender	Woman	0.01	0.02	0.62	0.53		Control
22	outsider	New to politics	-0.02	0.02	-1.12	0.26		Control
23	party	Ciudadanos	0.07	0.04	1.75	0.08		Control
24	party	Podemos	0.01	0.05	0.30	0.77		Control
25	party	PSOE	0.11	0.04	2.61	0.01	**	Control
26	signal	Leader at local level	0.02	0.04	0.57	0.57		Control
27	signal	Party leader at local level	0.02	0.04	0.59	0.55		Control
28	signal	Arrested during protest	-0.03	0.04	-0.66	0.51		Control

Note: *p<0.5; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table C.26: Preferred Candidates Among Union Members. Corresponds to Figure 17 in Section E.5 of Appendix.

	Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	z value	Pr(> z)	
1	education	University education	0.10	0.04	2.24	0.02	*
2	education	Doctorate	0.14	0.04	3.32	0.00	***
3	experience	Pro-democracy activist	0.11	0.08	1.43	0.15	
4	experience	Anti-eviction activist	0.23	0.08	2.87	0.00	**
5	experience	Active participant in 15M	0.16	0.06	2.79	0.01	**
6	experience	Labor unionist	0.12	0.05	2.51	0.01	*
7	gender	Woman	-0.03	0.03	-0.95	0.34	
8	outsider	New to politics	-0.03	0.03	-0.99	0.32	
9	party	Ciudadanos	0.08	0.08	0.94	0.35	
10	party	Podemos	-0.12	0.09	-1.25	0.21	
11	party	PSOE	0.01	0.08	0.16	0.87	
12	signal	Leader at local level	0.04	0.09	0.41	0.68	
13	signal	Party leader at local level	0.12	0.07	1.64	0.10	
14	signal	Arrested during protest	0.02	0.08	0.22	0.83	

Note: *p<0.5; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

C.8 Dictionary for Analysis of Podemos Primary Results

Background: Activism, 15-M, 15M, 22M, Attac, Juventud Sin Futuro, LGTB, PAB, PAH, activismo, activista, colectivo, desahucios, feminismo, feminista, hipoteca, movilizacion, movimiento, movimientos, vivienda

Education: diplomado, doctor, doctora, doctorado, estudios, licenciada, licenciado, profesor, profesora, universidad

Labor Union: CCOO, CUT, SAS, SAT, SOC, SUAT, UGT, sindical, sindicalismo, sindicalista, sindicato, trabajador

Political Experience: IU, alcalde, alcaldesa, ayuntamiento, concejal, diputada, diputado, representante, teniente

Table C.27: Preferred Candidates Among Respondents With Own Protest History. Corresponds to Figure 18 in Section E.5 of Appendix.

	Attribute	Level	Estimate	Std. Err	z value	Pr(> z)	
1	education	University education	0.07	0.02	3.19	0.00	**
2	education	Doctorate	0.09	0.02	3.91	0.00	***
3	experience	Pro-democracy activist	0.04	0.04	1.15	0.25	
4	experience	Anti-eviction activist	0.15	0.04	3.91	0.00	***
5	experience	Active participant in 15-ÅŠM	0.07	0.03	2.41	0.02	*
6	experience	Labor unionist	0.07	0.03	2.57	0.01	*
7	gender	Woman	0.01	0.02	0.55	0.58	
8	outsider	New to politics	-0.01	0.02	-0.31	0.75	
9	party	Ciudadanos	0.13	0.04	3.27	0.00	**
10	party	Podemos	0.20	0.05	4.12	0.00	***
11	party	PSOE	0.22	0.04	5.06	0.00	***
12	signal	Leader at local level	0.04	0.04	0.98	0.33	
13	signal	Party leader at local level	0.03	0.04	0.80	0.42	
14	signal	Arrested during protest	0.03	0.04	0.77	0.44	

Note: *p<0.5; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

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