Forthcoming	
  in	
  Philosophy	
  Compass,	
  2012	
  

	
   	
  

	
   	
   	
   	
   The	
  philosophical	
  discussion	
  of	
  art	
  is	
  seemingly	
  endless,	
  whereas	
  that	
  of	
  museums	
  is	
   scant	
  indeed.	
  My	
  focus	
  in	
  this	
  two-­‐part	
  article	
  is	
  on	
  museums	
  as	
  a	
  whole	
  rather	
  than	
  art	
   in	
  museums.	
  Museums,	
  after	
  all,	
  deal	
  with	
  much	
  more	
  than	
  art.	
  	
   	
   Why	
  should	
  philosophers	
  be	
  interested	
  in	
  museums?	
  One	
  reason	
  is	
  that	
  museums	
   remain	
  significant	
  generators	
  and	
  distributors	
  of	
  knowledge	
  claims	
  in	
  a	
  wide	
  variety	
  of	
   fields	
  of	
  inquiry.	
  This	
  remains	
  the	
  case	
  even	
  though	
  they	
  may	
  have	
  been	
  overshadowed	
   in	
  certain	
  respects	
  by	
  other	
  institutions	
  of	
  scholarship.	
  Although	
  few	
  philosophers	
  have	
   addressed	
  museums,	
  many	
  theorists	
  have	
  done	
  so.	
  Although	
  much	
  theorizing	
  about	
   museums	
  has	
  a	
  Continental	
  flavor,	
  little	
  is	
  philosophically	
  oriented.	
  I	
  shall	
  not	
  directly	
   address	
  the	
  vast	
  literature	
  on	
  museums	
  by	
  theorists	
  of	
  various	
  persuasions,	
  for	
  a	
   plethora	
  of	
  commentaries	
  is	
  already	
  available.	
  Instead,	
  I	
  offer	
  discussions	
  of	
   philosophical	
  issues	
  concerning	
  museums	
  under	
  three	
  headings	
  in	
  Part	
  1—Cultural	
   Variety,	
  Taxonomy,	
  and	
  Epistemology—and	
  a	
  further	
  three	
  in	
  Part	
  2—Teleology,	
  Ethics,	
   and	
  Therapeutics	
  and	
  Aesthetics.	
   	
   	
   I.1.	
  Cultural	
  Variety	
   	
   Westerners	
  use	
  the	
  terms	
  art	
  and	
  museum	
  in	
  predominantly	
  Western	
  senses,	
  but	
  there	
   is	
  a	
  difference	
  between	
  their	
  respective	
  implications.	
  Western	
  philosophers	
  and	
  scholars	
   in	
  other	
  disciplines	
  contest	
  whether	
  some,	
  most,	
  or	
  all	
  non-­‐Western	
  societies	
  of	
  very	
   varied	
  character	
  have	
  a	
  concept	
  of	
  art.	
  For	
  our	
  purposes,	
  such	
  discussions	
  are	
  only	
  of	
   immediate	
  interest	
  insofar	
  as	
  they	
  affect	
  our	
  ability	
  to	
  understand	
  museums.	
  In	
   contrast,	
  most	
  Western	
  and	
  other	
  scholars	
  agree	
  that	
  although	
  there	
  might	
  have	
  existed	
   and	
  in	
  some	
  societies	
  yet	
  exist	
  collections	
  of	
  tangible	
  things	
  in	
  some	
  respects	
  analogous	
   to	
  museums,	
  as	
  a	
  concept	
  the	
  museum	
  is	
  in	
  origin	
  a	
  product	
  of	
  the	
  Western	
   Enlightenment.	
  We	
  can	
  take	
  its	
  paradigm	
  to	
  be	
  the	
  British	
  Museum,	
  London,	
  founded	
  in	
   1753.	
  This	
  is	
  not	
  to	
  say	
  that	
  the	
  variety	
  of	
  practices	
  of	
  currently	
  existing	
  museums	
   worldwide	
  is	
  not	
  considerable,	
  but	
  that	
  all	
  in	
  some	
  sense	
  derive	
  from	
  Western	
  models.	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
*

Museums	
  and	
  Philosophy—Of	
  Art,	
  and	
  Many	
  Other	
  Things	
   Part	
  I	
   	
   Ivan	
  Gaskell*	
   Bard	
  Graduate	
  Center	
  

	
  Correspondence:	
  Bard	
  Graduate	
  Center,	
  38	
  West	
  86th	
  Street,	
  New	
  York,	
  NY	
  10024,	
  USA.	
  Email:	
   gaskell@bgc.bard.edu.	
  	
  

	
  

1	
  

This	
  is	
  so	
  even	
  when	
  one	
  takes	
  account	
  of	
  predecessor	
  institutions.	
  It	
  is	
  a	
  commonplace	
   that	
  some	
  Western	
  museums	
  and	
  art	
  galleries	
  derive	
  from	
  predecessor	
  institutions	
  such	
   as	
  Kunst-­‐	
  and	
  Wunderkammeren	
  (or	
  cabinets	
  of	
  curiosities),	
  princely	
  and	
  noble	
  art	
   collections,	
  and	
  ecclesiastical	
  treasuries.	
  Krzysztof	
  Pomian	
  has	
  influentially	
  traced	
  this	
   development	
  in	
  a	
  broader	
  context	
  of	
  Western	
  practices	
  dating	
  from	
  classical	
  antiquity.1	
   However,	
  although	
  some	
  non-­‐Western	
  museums	
  occupy	
  the	
  sites	
  of	
  predecessor	
   institutions	
  that	
  could	
  be	
  seen	
  as	
  culturally	
  characteristic	
  of	
  their	
  societies,	
  they	
  derive	
   from	
  Western	
  models	
  that	
  had	
  been	
  exported	
  by	
  Western	
  colonizers,	
  or	
  adopted	
  by	
   Westernizing	
  Indigenous	
  elites.	
  For	
  instance,	
  the	
  Imperial	
  Treasury	
  and	
  other	
  parts	
  of	
   the	
  Ottoman	
  Topkapı	
  Palace	
  in	
  Istanbul	
  can	
  be	
  said	
  to	
  have	
  functioned	
  in	
  part	
  in	
  the	
   manner	
  of	
  a	
  museum	
  even	
  before	
  the	
  redesignation	
  of	
  the	
  palace	
  as	
  a	
  museum	
  in	
  1924	
   by	
  the	
  government	
  of	
  the	
  new	
  Republic	
  of	
  Turkey.	
  That	
  museum	
  conformed	
  to	
  Western	
   prototypes	
  from	
  the	
  outset,	
  and	
  continues	
  to	
  do	
  so.	
  Although	
  there	
  were	
  various	
   princely	
  and	
  temple	
  collections	
  in	
  India,	
  the	
  British	
  introduced	
  museums	
  on	
  their	
  own	
   model,	
  the	
  earliest	
  and	
  largest	
  being	
  the	
  Indian	
  Museum	
  in	
  Kolkata	
  (Calcutta).	
  It	
  was	
   founded	
  in	
  1814	
  as	
  the	
  Oriental	
  Museum	
  of	
  the	
  Asiatic	
  Society	
  of	
  Bengal.2	
  Kavita	
  Singh	
   and	
  Saloni	
  Mathur	
  are	
  researching	
  colonial	
  museums	
  in	
  India	
  and	
  their	
  postcolonial	
   transmutations.3	
  The	
  Western	
  museum	
  model—however	
  varied	
  it	
  may	
  be,	
  especially	
  in	
   respect	
  of	
  collection	
  types—has	
  undergone	
  and	
  continues	
  to	
  undergo	
  a	
  wide	
  range	
  of	
   transformations	
  in	
  postcolonial	
  settings.	
  Some	
  are	
  transformations	
  of	
  pre-­‐existing	
   institutions	
  to	
  reflect	
  emergent	
  postcolonial	
  circumstances.	
  One	
  example	
  is	
  the	
   Museum	
  of	
  New	
  Zealand	
  in	
  Wellington,	
  now	
  called	
  Te	
  Papa	
  Tongarewa,	
  with	
  a	
   bilingual—English	
  and	
  te	
  reo	
  Māori—website.4	
  Others	
  reflect	
  the	
  communal	
  concerns	
  of	
   new	
  nation	
  states,	
  such	
  as	
  the	
  National	
  Museum	
  of	
  Vanuatu	
  in	
  Port	
  Vila.	
  There	
  are	
  also	
   museums	
  firmly	
  anchored	
  in	
  Indigenous	
  communities	
  that	
  are	
  motors	
  of	
  cultural	
  and	
   social	
  resurgence.	
  Among	
  the	
  most	
  remarkable	
  is	
  the	
  U’mista	
  Cultural	
  Centre,	
  Alert	
  Bay,	
   British	
  Columbia,	
  Canada.	
  This	
  is	
  the	
  cultural	
  center	
  of	
  the	
  Kwakwa ka ’wakw	
  people,	
   whose	
  traditional	
  way	
  of	
  life	
  was	
  severely	
  threatened	
  by	
  prohibitions	
  imposed	
  by	
   colonial	
  authorities.	
  The	
  potlatch	
  ceremony	
  (the	
  ritual	
  dispersal	
  of	
  goods)	
  was	
  banned	
   between	
  1885	
  and	
  1951.	
  Many	
  masks	
  and	
  other	
  regalia	
  associated	
  with	
  potlatch	
  were	
   confiscated	
  after	
  a	
  ceremony	
  in	
  1921.	
  The	
  collection	
  of	
  sacred	
  potlatch	
  materials	
  now	
  in	
   the	
  U’mista	
  Cultural	
  Centre	
  and	
  the	
  Nuyumbalees	
  Cultural	
  Center,	
  Quadra	
  Island,	
  BC,	
   were	
  returned	
  after	
  years	
  of	
  petitioning	
  and	
  negotiation	
  by	
  the	
  Kwakwa ka ’wakw	
  from	
   institutions	
  including	
  the	
  Canadian	
  Museum	
  of	
  Civilization	
  (previously	
  the	
  National	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
1

	
  Krzysztof	
  Pomian,	
  Collectionneurs,	
  amateurs,	
  curieux:	
  Paris-­‐Venise,	
  XVIe	
  -­‐	
  XIIIe	
  siècles	
  (Paris,	
  Éditions	
   Gallimard,	
  1987)	
  published	
  in	
  English	
  translation	
  as	
  Collectors	
  and	
  Curiosites:	
  Paris	
  and	
  Venice,	
  1500-­‐1800,	
   trans.	
  Elizabeth	
  Wiles-­‐Portier,	
  (Cambridge,	
  Polity	
  Press,	
  1990)	
   2 	
  See	
  Desmond	
  Ray,	
  The	
  India	
  Museum	
  1801-­‐1879	
  (London:	
  Her	
  Majesty's	
  Stationery	
  Office,	
  1982).	
   3 	
  No	
  Touching,	
  Spitting	
  or	
  Praying:	
  Modalities	
  of	
  the	
  Museum	
  in	
  South	
  Asia,	
  ed.	
  Saloni	
  Mathur	
  and	
  Kavita	
   Singh	
  (New	
  Delhi:	
  Routledge	
  India,	
  forthcoming).	
  See	
  also	
  Kavita	
  Singh,	
  “Museums	
  and	
  Monuments”	
  in	
   Mulk	
  Raj	
  Anand:	
  Shaping	
  the	
  Indian	
  Modern,	
  ed.	
  Annapurna	
  Garimella	
  (Mumbai:	
  Marg	
  Publications,	
   2005),	
  and	
  Kavita	
  Singh,	
  “Material	
  Fantasy:	
  The	
  Museum	
  in	
  Colonial	
  India”	
  in	
  India:	
  Art	
  and	
  Visual	
  Culture,	
   1857-­‐2007,	
  ed.	
  Gayatri	
  Sinha	
  (Mumbai:	
  Marg	
  Publications	
  and	
  Bodhi	
  Art	
  Gallery,	
  2009).	
   4 	
  See	
  http://www.tepapa.govt.nz/	
  (accessed	
  July	
  25,	
  2011)	
  

	
  

2	
  

Museum	
  of	
  Man),	
  Ottawa	
  (now	
  Gatineau,	
  Québec);	
  the	
  Royal	
  Ontario	
  Museum,	
   Toronto;	
  and	
  the	
  George	
  Gustav	
  Heye	
  Foundation’s	
  Museum	
  of	
  the	
  American	
  Indian,	
   New	
  York	
  (now	
  the	
  National	
  Museum	
  of	
  the	
  American	
  Indian,	
  Washington,	
  DC	
  and	
  New	
   York).	
  The	
  restitution	
  of	
  cultural	
  goods	
  of	
  their	
  own	
  societies	
  is	
  one	
  of	
  the	
  most	
   important	
  aims	
  of	
  many	
  postcolonial	
  national	
  and	
  Indigenous	
  museums.	
  After	
  the	
   “[c]ollection	
  and	
  preservation	
  of	
  artifacts	
  that	
  represent	
  different	
  aspects	
  of	
  the	
   cultures	
  and	
  history	
  of	
  the	
  country,”	
  the	
  second	
  listed	
  objective	
  of	
  the	
  National	
  Museum	
   of	
  Vanuatu	
  is	
  “[l]ocating	
  collections	
  of	
  Vanuatu	
  artifacts	
  held	
  overseas	
  and	
  establishing	
   relationships	
  with	
  their	
  care-­‐taking	
  institutions	
  as	
  a	
  first	
  step	
  towards	
  possible	
   repatriation	
  of	
  items.”5	
  	
   	
   Although	
  most	
  museums	
  throughout	
  the	
  world	
  adhere,	
  broadly	
  speaking,	
  to	
  a	
   Western	
  paradigm,	
  their	
  concerns	
  vary	
  considerably,	
  and	
  no	
  difference	
  is	
  more	
  extreme,	
   and	
  on	
  occasion	
  divisive,	
  than	
  that	
  between	
  so-­‐called	
  encyclopedic	
  world	
  museums	
   (which	
  are	
  without	
  exception	
  in	
  wealthy	
  Western	
  countries),	
  and	
  institutions	
  in	
  the	
   developing	
  world	
  or	
  Indigenous	
  communities.	
  This	
  is	
  a	
  pressing	
  ethical	
  issue	
  to	
  which	
  I	
   shall	
  return.	
  My	
  point	
  here,	
  however,	
  is	
  to	
  draw	
  attention	
  to	
  the	
  wide	
  variety	
  of	
   institutions	
  that	
  vary	
  in	
  their	
  aims	
  and	
  methods	
  in	
  social	
  and	
  ethnic	
  terms,	
  but	
  while	
   often	
  reflecting	
  local	
  cultural	
  values,	
  nonetheless	
  adhere	
  to	
  a	
  Western	
  paradigm.	
  Much	
   discussion	
  of	
  museums	
  is	
  tacitly	
  confined	
  to	
  overtly	
  Western	
  institutions,	
  which	
  James	
   Clifford	
  calls	
  “majority	
  museums,”	
  to	
  the	
  exclusion	
  of	
  what	
  he	
  calls	
  (with	
  non-­‐ derogatory	
  intent)	
  “tribal	
  museums.”6	
  Rather	
  than	
  the	
  terms	
  used	
  by	
  Clifford,	
  I	
  prefer	
   hegemonic	
  museums	
  and	
  subaltern	
  museums	
  respectively.	
  Any	
  philosophical	
  discussion	
   of	
  museums	
  should	
  take	
  account	
  of	
  the	
  entire	
  cultural	
  range	
  of	
  these	
  institutions,	
  or	
   state	
  why	
  it	
  should	
  be	
  confined	
  to	
  one	
  or	
  more	
  in	
  particular.	
  	
   	
   	
   I.2.	
  Taxonomy	
   	
   In	
  spite	
  of	
  a	
  shared	
  origin	
  in	
  the	
  European	
  Enlightenment,	
  museums	
  have	
  developed	
  in	
   culturally	
  varied	
  ways	
  in	
  vastly	
  differing	
  societies—from	
  the	
  privileged,	
  imperial	
   encyclopedism	
  of	
  the	
  British	
  Museum,	
  to	
  the	
  Indigenous	
  persistence	
  of	
  the	
  U’mista	
   Cultural	
  Centre.	
  They	
  also	
  vary	
  according	
  to	
  the	
  material	
  to	
  which	
  they	
  attend.	
  For	
   instance,	
  when	
  founded	
  in	
  1814,	
  the	
  Oriental	
  Museum	
  of	
  the	
  Asiatic	
  Society	
  in	
  Kolkata	
   was	
  divided	
  into	
  two	
  sections,	
  one	
  being	
  archaeology,	
  ethnology	
  and	
  technology,	
  the	
   other	
  comprising	
  geology	
  and	
  zoology;	
  that	
  is,	
  the	
  consequences	
  of	
  human	
  activity	
  in	
   one,	
  and	
  of	
  natural	
  occurrences	
  in	
  the	
  other.	
  Things	
  still	
  living	
  were,	
  and	
  remain,	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
5

	
  Vanuatu	
  Cultural	
  Centre	
  website	
  (the	
  National	
  Museum	
  is	
  part	
  of	
  the	
  Centre):	
   http://www.vanuatuculture.org/site-­‐bm2/museum/050520_nationalmuseum.shtml	
  (accessed	
  July	
  15,	
   2011).	
   6 	
  James	
  Clifford,	
  “Four	
  Northwest	
  Coastal	
  Museums:	
  Travel	
  Reflections,”	
  in	
  ed.	
  Ivan	
  Karp	
  and	
  Steven	
  D.	
   Lavine,	
  Exhibiting	
  Cultures:	
  The	
  Poetics	
  and	
  Politics	
  of	
  Museum	
  Display	
  (Washington,	
  DC	
  and	
  London:	
   Smithsonian	
  Institution	
  Press,	
  1991),	
  pp.	
  212-­‐54.	
  

	
  

3	
  

excluded.7	
  The	
  Indian	
  Museum	
  is	
  divided	
  into	
  six	
  sections:	
  Art,	
  Archaeology,	
   Anthropology,	
  Economic	
  Botany,	
  Geology,	
  and	
  Zoology.8	
  The	
  museum	
  scholars’	
  work	
   was	
  far	
  from	
  merely	
  academic:	
  the	
  first	
  superintendent	
  of	
  the	
  Indian	
  Museum,	
   Nathaniel	
  Wallich,	
  and	
  his	
  colleagues	
  were	
  responsible	
  for	
  the	
  successful	
  introduction	
  of	
   the	
  tea	
  cultivar	
  from	
  China	
  to	
  India,	
  with	
  enormous	
  economic	
  consequences.	
  	
   	
   In	
  nineteenth-­‐century	
  Kolkata	
  we	
  see	
  a	
  collecting	
  institution	
  progressively	
   developing	
  and	
  establishing	
  a	
  taxonomy	
  of	
  material	
  things.	
  Similar	
  developments	
  were	
   going	
  on	
  at	
  much	
  the	
  same	
  time	
  in	
  many	
  other	
  parts	
  of	
  the	
  world.	
  George	
  Brown	
   Goode,	
  assistant	
  secretary	
  of	
  the	
  Smithsonian	
  Institution	
  in	
  charge	
  of	
  the	
  United	
  States	
   National	
  Museum	
  in	
  Washington,	
  DC,	
  analyzed	
  and	
  codified	
  them	
  in	
  Principles	
  of	
   Museum	
  Administration	
  (1895).	
  In	
  his	
  first	
  axis	
  of	
  categorization,	
  Goode	
  describes	
  six	
   types	
  of	
  museums:	
  “A.	
  Museums	
  of	
  Art;	
  B.	
  Historical	
  Museums;	
  C.	
  Anthropological	
   Museums;	
  D.	
  Natural	
  History	
  Museums;	
  E.	
  Technological	
  Museums;	
  F.	
  Commercial	
   Museums.”	
  Goode’s	
  second	
  axis	
  of	
  categorization	
  concerns	
  the	
  character	
  of	
  museums	
   by	
  type	
  rather	
  than	
  by	
  field	
  of	
  inquiry:	
  “G.	
  National	
  Museums;	
  H.	
  Local,	
  Provincial,	
  or	
   City	
  Museums;	
  I.	
  College	
  and	
  School	
  Museums;	
  J.	
  Professional	
  or	
  Class	
  Museums;	
  K.	
   Museums	
  or	
  Cabinets	
  for	
  special	
  research	
  owned	
  by	
  societies	
  or	
  individuals.”9	
  Thus	
   Goode	
  classifies	
  the	
  classifiers.	
  With	
  the	
  exception	
  of	
  F,	
  and	
  a	
  requirement	
  to	
  add	
  a	
   category	
  of	
  Indigenous	
  or	
  subaltern	
  museums,	
  this	
  schema	
  still	
  obtains.10	
  	
   	
   This	
  state	
  of	
  affairs	
  raises	
  a	
  host	
  of	
  philosophical	
  and	
  other	
  questions.	
  First,	
  is	
   categorization	
  of	
  tangible	
  things	
  such	
  as	
  are	
  found	
  in	
  museums	
  an	
  exclusively	
  Western	
   preoccupation?	
  If	
  not,	
  how	
  might	
  schemata	
  of	
  categorization	
  of	
  tangible	
  things	
  vary	
   among	
  societies?	
  Both	
  Westerners	
  and	
  non-­‐Westerners	
  propose	
  groupings	
  other	
  than	
   those	
  identified	
  by	
  Goode	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  harness	
  the	
  numinous	
  characteristics	
  of	
  certain	
   tangible	
  things	
  for	
  intervention	
  in	
  the	
  sacred	
  realm,	
  or	
  for	
  aesthetic	
  understanding.	
   Certainly,	
  Westerners	
  have	
  distinguished,	
  named,	
  sorted,	
  grouped,	
  gathered,	
  and	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
7

	
  The	
  East	
  India	
  Company	
  Botanic	
  Garden	
  (now	
  the	
  Acharya	
  Jagadish	
  Chandra	
  Bose	
  Indian	
  Botanic	
   Garden),	
  which	
  also	
  employed	
  the	
  first	
  superintendent	
  of	
  the	
  Oriental	
  Museum,	
  Nathaniel	
  Wallich,	
   remained	
  and	
  still	
  remains	
  an	
  entirely	
  separate	
  institution.	
   8 	
  For	
  further	
  discussion	
  of	
  the	
  Indian	
  Museum,	
  and	
  local	
  popular	
  beliefs	
  and	
  behavior	
  regarding	
  it—the	
   jadughar	
  (“House	
  of	
  Magic”)—see	
  Mark	
  Elliott,	
  “Side	
  Effects:	
  Looking,	
  Touching,	
  and	
  Interacting	
  in	
  the	
   Indian	
  Museum,	
  Kolkata,”	
  Journal	
  of	
  Museum	
  Ethnography	
  18,	
  2006,	
  pp.	
  63-­‐75.	
   9 	
  George	
  Brown	
  Goode,	
  The	
  Principles	
  of	
  Museum	
  Administration	
  (New	
  York:	
  Coultas	
  &	
  Volans,	
  1895),	
  p.	
   22.	
   10 	
  Steven	
  Conn,	
  Museums	
  and	
  American	
  Intellectual	
  Life,	
  1876-­‐1926	
  (Chicago:	
  University	
  of	
  Chicago	
  Press,	
   1998),	
  p.	
  21.	
  Commercial	
  museums	
  (of	
  which	
  the	
  Philadelphia	
  Commercial	
  Museum	
  was	
  the	
  prime	
   example)	
  have	
  not	
  survived:	
  see	
  Conn,	
  pp.	
  115-­‐50.	
  By	
  subaltern,	
  following	
  the	
  usage	
  of	
  the	
  term	
  first	
   coined	
  by	
  Antonio	
  Gramsci,	
  and	
  established	
  by	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  Indian	
  historians,	
  I	
  refer	
  to	
  groups	
  at	
  a	
   disadvantage	
  to	
  those	
  exercising	
  power	
  within	
  a	
  society.	
  It	
  should	
  be	
  noted	
  that	
  subaltern	
  includes	
  many	
   groups	
  often	
  referred	
  to	
  as	
  Indigenous;	
  that	
  is,	
  societies	
  that	
  have	
  been	
  in	
  any	
  given	
  place	
  longer	
  than	
   those	
  who	
  consequently	
  came	
  to	
  dominate	
  them.	
  There	
  is	
  clearly	
  significant	
  overlap	
  between	
  subaltern	
   and	
  Indigenous	
  groups,	
  although	
  the	
  two	
  are	
  not	
  coextensive.	
  I	
  use	
  the	
  more	
  inclusive	
  subaltern	
  because	
   it	
  captures	
  the	
  feature	
  that	
  is	
  relevant	
  to	
  this	
  inquiry:	
  the	
  systematic	
  and	
  persistent	
  subordination	
  of	
  the	
   group	
  in	
  question.	
  I	
  follow	
  the	
  practice	
  adopted	
  by	
  A.W.	
  Eaton	
  and	
  myself	
  in	
  our	
  chapter,	
  “Do	
  Subaltern	
   Artifacts	
  Belong	
  in	
  Art	
  Museums?”	
  The	
  Ethics	
  of	
  Cultural	
  Appropriation,	
  ed.	
  James	
  O.	
  Young	
  and	
  Conrad	
   Brunk	
  (Oxford	
  and	
  Malden,	
  Mass.:	
  Wiley-­‐Blackwell,	
  2009),	
  pp.	
  235-­‐267.	
  

	
  

4	
  

subsequently	
  deployed	
  many	
  tangible	
  things	
  in	
  order	
  to	
  make	
  knowledge	
  claims	
  about	
   both	
  the	
  things	
  themselves	
  and	
  the	
  emergent	
  concepts	
  their	
  users	
  have	
  associated	
  with	
   them.	
  These	
  activities	
  are	
  the	
  basis	
  of	
  much	
  Western	
  methodical	
  thinking	
  since	
  classical	
   antiquity.	
  Is	
  this	
  method	
  exclusively	
  Western?	
   	
   The	
  most	
  influential	
  thinker	
  in	
  this	
  field	
  in	
  recent	
  years	
  has	
  been	
  Michel	
  Foucault.	
   His	
  most	
  significant	
  contribution	
  to	
  the	
  discussion	
  is	
  his	
  1966	
  book,	
  Les	
  Mots	
  et	
  les	
   choses:	
  Une	
  archéologie	
  des	
  sciences	
  humaines.11	
  Foucault	
  famously	
  begins	
  the	
  book	
   with	
  a	
  consideration	
  that	
  he	
  had	
  read	
  in	
  Jorge	
  Luis	
  Borges’s	
  essay,	
  “El	
  idioma	
  analítico	
   de	
  John	
  Wilkins”	
  (Otras	
  Inquisciones,	
  1952)	
  of	
  a	
  list	
  of	
  seemingly	
  unrelated	
  things	
  that	
   are	
  grouped	
  together	
  in	
  a	
  “certain	
  Chinese	
  encyclopedia.”	
  Many	
  scholars	
  who	
  believe	
  all	
   categorization	
  to	
  be	
  arbitrary	
  rather	
  than	
  derived	
  from	
  the	
  accurate	
  discernment	
  of	
  the	
   particular	
  qualities	
  of	
  things	
  have	
  cited	
  this	
  passage.	
  While	
  the	
  question	
  of	
  the	
  claims	
  of	
   empiricism	
  versus	
  those	
  of	
  idealism	
  in	
  this	
  area	
  remains	
  pressing,	
  the	
  principal	
   underlying	
  danger	
  in	
  acceding	
  wholly	
  to	
  Foucault’s	
  careful	
  arguments	
  is	
  that	
  they	
  too	
   readily	
  subordinate	
  all	
  analysis	
  of	
  the	
  treatment	
  of	
  tangible	
  things	
  to	
  considerations	
  of	
   language.	
  Foucault’s	
  contemporary,	
  Jean	
  Baudrillard,	
  broadens	
  the	
  case	
  to	
  address	
  what	
   he	
  terms	
  the	
  “system	
  of	
  objects.”12	
  Yet	
  in	
  spite	
  of	
  writing	
  a	
  book	
  urging	
  us	
  to	
  Forget	
   Foucault,13	
  Baudrillard’s	
  claims	
  meet	
  the	
  case	
  no	
  more	
  comprehensively	
  than	
  do	
   Foucault’s.	
  Tangible	
  things	
  require	
  a	
  more	
  complex	
  and	
  varied	
  set	
  of	
  approaches	
  than	
   Baudrillard	
  offers	
  when	
  discussing	
  them	
  in	
  terms	
  of	
  their	
  sign	
  value	
  superseding	
   functional	
  and	
  exchange	
  values.14	
  Acknowledgement	
  that	
  the	
  “linguistic	
  turn”	
  is	
  long	
   over	
  may	
  now	
  be	
  commonplace,	
  yet	
  the	
  reduction	
  of	
  things	
  to	
  phenomena	
  wholly	
   subordinate	
  to	
  language,	
  or	
  to	
  signs	
  or	
  texts,	
  continues	
  to	
  affect	
  scholarly	
  discussion,	
   often	
  adversely.	
  	
   	
   Even	
  before	
  we	
  consider	
  the	
  ways	
  in	
  which	
  things	
  are	
  apportioned	
  among	
  various	
   types	
  of	
  museums,	
  we	
  should	
  recognize	
  the	
  fundamental	
  distinction	
  between	
  those	
   things	
  that	
  have	
  found	
  places	
  within	
  them,	
  and	
  those	
  that	
  have	
  not.	
  In	
  acknowledging	
   that	
  there	
  are	
  some	
  things	
  that	
  have,	
  or	
  yet	
  might,	
  find	
  a	
  place	
  in	
  a	
  museum,	
  and	
  other	
   things	
  that	
  most	
  likely	
  never	
  shall,	
  we	
  should	
  bear	
  in	
  mind	
  that	
  there	
  are	
  two	
  kinds	
  of	
   collections	
  of	
  things:	
  representational	
  and	
  aesthetic.15	
  Representational	
  museums	
  aim	
   to	
  convey	
  knowledge	
  about	
  things	
  and	
  the	
  societies	
  or	
  places	
  in	
  which	
  they	
  originated.	
   To	
  serve	
  this	
  function,	
  things	
  should	
  be	
  typical	
  of	
  the	
  area	
  from	
  which	
  they	
  come,	
  of	
  the	
   species	
  to	
  which	
  they	
  belong	
  (even	
  if	
  previously	
  unrecognized	
  or	
  stipulated),	
  or	
  of	
  the	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
11

	
  Michel	
  Foucault,	
  Les	
  Mots	
  et	
  les	
  choses:	
  Une	
  archéologie	
  des	
  sciences	
  humaines	
  (Paris:	
  Éditions	
   Gallimard,	
  1966)	
  published	
  in	
  English	
  translation	
  as	
  The	
  Order	
  of	
  Things:	
  An	
  Archaeology	
  of	
  the	
  Human	
   Sciences	
  (London:	
  Tavistock	
  Publications,	
  Ltd.,	
  1970).	
   12 	
  Jean	
  Baudrillard,	
  Le	
  Système	
  des	
  objets	
  (Paris:	
  Éditions	
  Gallimard,	
  1968)	
  published	
  in	
  English	
  translation	
   as	
  The	
  System	
  of	
  Objects,	
  trans.	
  James	
  Benedict	
  (London	
  and	
  New	
  York:	
  Verso,	
  1996).	
  	
   13 	
  Jean	
  Baudrillard,	
  Oublier	
  Foucault	
  (Paris:	
  Éditions	
  Galilée,	
  1977)	
  published	
  in	
  English	
  translation	
  as	
   Forget	
  Foucault	
  and	
  Forget	
  Baudrillard:	
  An	
  Interview	
  with	
  Sylvère	
  Lotringer	
  (New	
  York:	
  Semiotext(e),	
   1987).	
   14 	
  See	
  also	
  Jean	
  Baudrillard,	
  Pour	
  une	
  critique	
  de	
  l’économie	
  politique	
  du	
  signe	
  (Paris:	
  Éditions	
  Gallimard,	
   1973)	
  published	
  in	
  English	
  translation	
  as	
  For	
  a	
  Critique	
  of	
  the	
  Political	
  Economy	
  of	
  the	
  Sign,	
  trans.	
  Charles	
   Levin	
  (St.	
  Louis:	
  Telos	
  Press,	
  1981).	
   15 	
  This	
  discussion	
  derives	
  from	
  Eaton	
  and	
  Gaskell,	
  “Subaltern	
  Artifacts,”	
  p.	
  244.	
  

	
  

5	
  

culture	
  that	
  produced	
  them.	
  In	
  this	
  way,	
  representational	
  museums	
  treat	
  the	
  things	
   they	
  address	
  as	
  specimens.	
  Goode’s	
  historical	
  museums,	
  anthropological	
  museums,	
   natural	
  history	
  museums,	
  and	
  technology	
  museums	
  are	
  all	
  examples	
  of	
  representational	
   museums.	
  Aesthetic	
  institutions,	
  on	
  the	
  other	
  hand,	
  seek	
  to	
  avoid	
  artifacts	
  that	
  typify	
  a	
   society,	
  place,	
  or	
  species.	
  In	
  contrast,	
  they	
  collect	
  things	
  that	
  are	
  in	
  some	
  way	
   aesthetically	
  extraordinary.	
  They	
  aim	
  to	
  highlight	
  aesthetically	
  exceptional	
  features,	
   treating	
  the	
  objects	
  they	
  address	
  as	
  artworks.	
  Typically,	
  although	
  not	
  invariably,	
   decision-­‐makers	
  at	
  aesthetic	
  institutions	
  assume	
  the	
  standards	
  for	
  aesthetic	
  excellence	
   to	
  be	
  self-­‐evident.	
  Further,	
  although	
  the	
  aims	
  of	
  representational	
  and	
  aesthetic	
   institutions	
  are	
  not	
  necessarily	
  incompatible,	
  they	
  often	
  conflict.	
  On	
  representational	
   criteria,	
  anything	
  could	
  potentially	
  find	
  a	
  place	
  in	
  a	
  representational	
  institution,	
  though	
   some	
  things	
  are	
  far	
  more	
  likely	
  to	
  than	
  others	
  because—as	
  we	
  shall	
  see—even	
   representative	
  institutions	
  are	
  selective	
  and	
  limited	
  in	
  the	
  range	
  of	
  fields	
  they	
  address.	
   Most	
  obviously,	
  contemporary	
  ordinary	
  things	
  from	
  the	
  dominant	
  culture	
  within	
  which	
   a	
  museum	
  functions	
  find	
  little	
  or	
  no	
  place	
  within	
  its	
  collections,	
  whereas	
  things	
  that	
   might	
  be	
  ordinary	
  in	
  a	
  foreign	
  society,	
  yet	
  exotic	
  from	
  a	
  domestic	
  vantage	
  point,	
  might.	
   In	
  this	
  way,	
  contemporary	
  supermarket	
  packaged	
  groceries	
  that	
  would	
  be	
  unremarkable	
   in	
  Tokyo	
  find	
  a	
  place	
  in	
  the	
  Children’s	
  Museum,	
  Boston	
  as	
  specimens	
  of	
  an	
  unfamiliar,	
   foreign	
  way	
  of	
  life.	
  Clearly,	
  those	
  things	
  unlikely	
  to	
  enter	
  an	
  aesthetic	
  institution	
  as	
   aesthetically	
  extraordinary,	
  even	
  though	
  they	
  might	
  be	
  eligible	
  to	
  enter	
  a	
   representational	
  institution	
  as	
  specimens,	
  constitute	
  the	
  largest	
  category	
  numerically.	
   Things	
  of	
  many	
  kinds	
  outside	
  the	
  various	
  museums	
  vastly	
  outnumber	
  things	
  within	
   them,	
  whether	
  representational	
  or	
  aesthetic,	
  or	
  both.	
  The	
  very	
  fact	
  of	
  selection	
  for	
   inclusion	
  of	
  even	
  the	
  most	
  banal	
  specimen	
  confers	
  special	
  status	
  on	
  it	
  as	
  a	
  museum	
   object.	
  Let	
  us	
  consider	
  in	
  more	
  detail	
  how	
  this	
  happens.	
   	
   All	
  museums	
  contain	
  two	
  kinds	
  of	
  things:	
  those	
  that	
  are	
  part	
  of	
  their	
  collection,	
  and	
   those	
  that	
  are	
  not.	
  Things	
  that	
  enter	
  the	
  collection	
  do	
  so	
  through	
  a	
  practical	
  ritual	
  of	
   accession,	
  usually	
  following	
  the	
  decision	
  of	
  a	
  scholarly	
  committee.	
  Having	
  been	
   accepted,	
  they	
  are	
  registered.	
  This	
  permanently	
  changes	
  their	
  status,	
  even	
  if	
  they	
  might	
   be	
  subsequently	
  deaccessioned	
  by	
  means	
  of	
  another	
  practical	
  ritual.	
  This	
  secular	
   consecration	
  consigns	
  the	
  thing	
  to	
  perpetual	
  surveillance.	
  All	
  of	
  its	
  movements	
  and	
  its	
   whereabouts—in	
  storage,	
  in	
  a	
  laboratory,	
  on	
  display,	
  or	
  on	
  loan—are	
  tracked	
  and	
   recorded.	
  But	
  first,	
  it	
  is	
  given	
  an	
  identification	
  number	
  that	
  never	
  changes,	
  however	
  its	
   description	
  might	
  be	
  altered	
  in	
  the	
  light	
  of	
  continuing	
  scholarship.	
  That	
  number	
  is	
   literally	
  inscribed	
  upon	
  it,	
  marking	
  it	
  unequivocally	
  as	
  a	
  museum	
  object.	
  This	
  is	
  so	
  in	
  the	
   case	
  both	
  of	
  human-­‐made	
  things,	
  and	
  things	
  from	
  the	
  natural	
  world.	
  These	
  acts—most	
   visibly	
  that	
  of	
  inscribing—set	
  museum	
  specimens	
  and	
  artworks	
  apart	
  from	
  all	
  other	
   things	
  in	
  the	
  world.	
  	
   	
   This	
  transformation	
  occurs	
  within	
  a	
  schema	
  comprising	
  an	
  ever-­‐branching	
   conceptual	
  tree	
  of	
  knowledge.	
  It	
  begins	
  with	
  the	
  major	
  distinction	
  between	
  specimen	
   and	
  artwork,	
  continues	
  with	
  the	
  appropriate	
  choice	
  among	
  Goode’s	
  six	
  types	
  of	
   museum	
  or	
  their	
  local,	
  contemporary	
  variants,	
  and	
  then	
  by	
  sub-­‐category,	
  usually	
   represented	
  by	
  an	
  individual	
  museum	
  department.	
  From	
  the	
  level	
  of	
  department—such	
   as,	
  for	
  instance,	
  Herpetology	
  within	
  a	
  natural	
  history	
  museum,	
  or	
  Sculpture	
  within	
  an	
  art	
   	
   6	
  

museum—categorization	
  follows	
  in	
  greater	
  detail	
  with	
  ever	
  nicer	
  distinctions.	
  In	
  zoology	
   or	
  botany,	
  these	
  include	
  place	
  of	
  origin	
  and	
  Linnaean	
  designation	
  by	
  genus	
  and	
  species.	
   For	
  example,	
  within	
  Herpetology	
  we	
  might	
  find	
  a	
  giant	
  tortoise	
  associated	
  with	
  the	
   Galápagos	
  Islands,	
  designated	
  Testudo	
  nigra.	
  In	
  the	
  case	
  of	
  artworks,	
  curators	
  might	
   designate	
  the	
  medium,	
  place	
  and	
  date	
  of	
  making,	
  subject,	
  and	
  even	
  supposed	
  maker	
  of	
   a	
  thing	
  described	
  broadly	
  as	
  sculpture.	
  For	
  instance,	
  we	
  might	
  find	
  a	
  terracotta	
  model	
   for	
  a	
  sculpture	
  made	
  in	
  Rome	
  in	
  1658	
  by	
  Gian	
  Lorenzo	
  Bernini	
  representing	
  Saint	
   Ambrose.	
  In	
  these	
  real	
  cases,	
  the	
  Testudo	
  nigra	
  in	
  the	
  Harvard	
  University	
  Museum	
  of	
   Comparative	
  Zoology	
  is	
  the	
  internationally	
  recognized	
  holotype,	
  the	
  particular	
  specimen	
   that	
  sets	
  the	
  standards	
  for	
  the	
  unique	
  characteristics	
  all	
  examples	
  of	
  that	
  species.	
  Its	
   description	
  is	
  unlikely	
  ever	
  to	
  change,	
  its	
  number—R-­‐11064—never.	
  The	
  same	
  is	
  true	
  for	
   the	
  Bernini	
  terracotta	
  sculptural	
  model	
  of	
  Saint	
  Ambrose	
  in	
  the	
  Harvard	
  Art	
  Museums.	
   Its	
  permanent	
  accession	
  number	
  is	
  1995.60,	
  and	
  will	
  remain	
  so	
  even	
  if	
  scholars	
  in	
  the	
   future	
  change	
  its	
  attribution	
  or	
  description.	
  	
   	
   This	
  system	
  of	
  categorization	
  allows	
  scholars—usually	
  curators—to	
  make	
  knowledge	
   claims	
  about	
  the	
  specimens	
  and	
  artworks	
  they	
  study.	
  The	
  major	
  problems	
  with	
  it	
  are	
   twofold.	
  First,	
  it	
  is	
  culturally	
  specific,	
  in	
  that	
  it	
  embodies	
  sets	
  of	
  assumptions	
  about	
  the	
   nature	
  of	
  things	
  and	
  their	
  relationships	
  with	
  one	
  another	
  that	
  are	
  characteristically	
  and	
   in	
  some	
  aspects	
  exclusively	
  Western.	
  For	
  many	
  Indigenous	
  peoples,	
  for	
  instance,	
  things	
   regarded	
  by	
  Westerners	
  as	
  inherently	
  inanimate,	
  or	
  once	
  living	
  but	
  now	
  dead,	
  are	
   animate,	
  and	
  must	
  be	
  treated	
  as	
  such.	
  Some	
  things	
  of	
  this	
  kind	
  retain	
  their	
  sacred	
  status	
   in	
  perpetuity,	
  and	
  must	
  be	
  treated	
  appropriately.	
  This	
  is	
  in	
  spite	
  of	
  many	
  Western	
   museum	
  scholars’	
  assumptions	
  that	
  incorporation	
  within	
  their	
  collections	
  by	
  means	
  of	
   the	
  ritual	
  practice	
  of	
  accession	
  has	
  definitively	
  desacralized	
  and	
  secularized	
  them.	
  Such	
   assumptions	
  concern	
  not	
  only	
  some	
  Indigenous	
  and	
  subaltern	
  things,	
  but	
  also	
  some	
   things	
  from	
  certain	
  European	
  societies,	
  such	
  as	
  Orthodox	
  Christian	
  icons.	
  Second,	
  the	
   taxonomic	
  tree	
  is	
  relatively	
  inflexible	
  and	
  unadaptable.	
  It	
  accommodates	
  new	
  ideas	
   about	
  things	
  with	
  difficulty,	
  especially	
  those	
  that	
  relate	
  to	
  claims	
  concerning	
  their	
   multivalency,	
  and	
  the	
  multiplicity	
  of	
  their	
  roles	
  in	
  various	
  societies	
  and	
  across	
  time.	
  Even	
   if	
  things	
  have	
  fixed	
  physical	
  characteristics,	
  which	
  is	
  not	
  invariably	
  the	
  case—as	
  decay,	
   for	
  instance,	
  makes	
  plain—they	
  do	
  not	
  have	
  fixed	
  uses,	
  let	
  alone	
  meanings.	
  Museum	
   categorization,	
  strictly	
  institutionalized,	
  does	
  not	
  respond	
  well	
  to	
  claims	
  regarding	
  the	
   ambiguity,	
  uncertainty,	
  or	
  multiplicity	
  and	
  shifts	
  of	
  significance	
  of	
  things.	
  It	
  is	
  unwieldy,	
   and	
  relatively	
  unresponsive.	
  This	
  is	
  so,	
  even	
  though	
  organizational	
  rearrangement	
  takes	
   place	
  in	
  long-­‐lived	
  museums	
  from	
  time	
  to	
  time	
  in	
  attempts	
  to	
  accommodate	
  revised	
   conceptions	
  of	
  the	
  things	
  in	
  their	
  care.	
  	
   	
   None	
  of	
  these	
  taxonomic	
  matters	
  has	
  received	
  adequate	
  or	
  even	
  peremptory	
   philosophical	
  attention.	
  Much	
  the	
  same	
  can	
  be	
  said	
  of	
  the	
  topic	
  that	
  categorization	
   prompts	
  us	
  to	
  consider:	
  the	
  distinctive	
  epistemology	
  of	
  museum	
  scholarship.	
  	
   	
   	
   	
   	
   	
   	
   7	
  

I.3.	
  Epistemology	
   	
   Several	
  academic	
  commentators	
  on	
  museums	
  have	
  credibly	
  claimed	
  that	
  museums	
  of	
   all	
  kinds—by	
  which	
  they	
  mean	
  hegemonic	
  museums	
  of	
  all	
  kinds—have	
  lost	
  their	
   scholarly	
  standing	
  at	
  base	
  not	
  because	
  of	
  a	
  decline	
  in	
  standards,	
  or	
  diversion	
  of	
  talent	
  to	
   universities	
  and	
  other	
  research	
  institutions	
  (though	
  these	
  may	
  have	
  occurred)	
  but	
   because	
  of	
  a	
  fundamental	
  epistemic	
  shift.	
  They	
  contend	
  that	
  the	
  consideration	
  of	
   abstractions	
  tested,	
  where	
  appropriate,	
  by	
  experimentation	
  as	
  distinct	
  from	
   observation,	
  has	
  superseded	
  a	
  process	
  of	
  knowledge	
  establishment	
  proceeding	
  from	
   first-­‐hand,	
  close	
  examination	
  of	
  and	
  comparison	
  among	
  tangible	
  things.	
  (There	
  are	
   exceptions:	
  the	
  observation	
  of	
  extraterrestrial	
  phenomena	
  remains	
  essential	
  to	
   astronomy	
  and	
  its	
  related	
  disciplines.)	
  In	
  the	
  course	
  of	
  the	
  nineteenth	
  century,	
  even	
  as	
   museums	
  were	
  gaining	
  their	
  characteristic	
  and	
  enduring	
  form,	
  the	
  empirical	
  principles	
   of	
  observation,	
  description,	
  and	
  comparison	
  based	
  on	
  a	
  priori	
  principles,	
  derived,	
  to	
  a	
   greater	
  or	
  lesser	
  extent,	
  from	
  antecedent	
  inductive	
  reasoning	
  (such	
  as	
  the	
  Linnaean	
   systematization	
  of	
  living	
  things)	
  increasingly	
  gave	
  way	
  to	
  the	
  testing	
  of	
  hypotheses	
  by	
   physical	
  experimentation;	
  that	
  is,	
  human	
  physical	
  intervention	
  by	
  contriving	
  dynamic	
   courses	
  of	
  events	
  as	
  opposed	
  to	
  the	
  ostensibly	
  unintrusive	
  and	
  disinterested	
  registering	
   of	
  the	
  states	
  of	
  affairs	
  of	
  things.	
  The	
  emergence	
  of	
  psychology	
  in	
  the	
  later	
  nineteenth	
   century	
  cast	
  doubt	
  on	
  the	
  essential	
  objectivity	
  and	
  disinterestedness	
  of	
  the	
  observer.	
   This	
  development	
  undermined	
  the	
  epistemological	
  status	
  of	
  museums	
  more	
  than	
  that	
   of	
  fields	
  such	
  as	
  experimental	
  science	
  and	
  anthropology,	
  for	
  museum	
  scholars	
  were	
  not	
   able	
  to	
  propose	
  and	
  develop	
  qualifications	
  (such	
  as	
  the	
  idea	
  of	
  the	
  participant	
  observer)	
   that	
  partially	
  allayed	
  the	
  doubts	
  of	
  at	
  least	
  some	
  of	
  the	
  new	
  skeptics.	
  Some	
  of	
  them,	
   including	
  William	
  James,	
  had	
  experience	
  of	
  museum	
  scholarship.	
  James	
  came	
  to	
  hold	
   that	
  the	
  very	
  process	
  of	
  observation	
  itself	
  affects	
  the	
  result	
  of	
  any	
  empirical	
  attempt	
  to	
   establish	
  veracity	
  owing	
  to	
  the	
  inseparability	
  of	
  the	
  mind,	
  its	
  experiences,	
  and	
  nature.16	
   While	
  still	
  a	
  student,	
  he	
  had	
  participated	
  in	
  the	
  Thayer	
  Expedition	
  to	
  Brazil	
  in	
  1865-­‐66,	
   led	
  by	
  the	
  founder	
  of	
  the	
  Museum	
  of	
  Comparative	
  Zoology	
  at	
  Harvard	
  University,	
  Louis	
   Agassiz.17	
  Even	
  then,	
  his	
  praise	
  of	
  Agassiz	
  was	
  ambivalent.	
  In	
  a	
  letter	
  from	
  Brazil	
  to	
  his	
   father,	
  he	
  wrote:	
  “No	
  one	
  sees	
  farther	
  into	
  a	
  generalization	
  than	
  his	
  [Agassiz’s]	
   knowledge	
  of	
  details	
  extends,	
  and	
  you	
  have	
  a	
  greater	
  feeling	
  of	
  weight	
  and	
  solidity	
   about	
  the	
  movement	
  of	
  Agassiz’s	
  mind,	
  owing	
  to	
  the	
  continual	
  presence	
  of	
  this	
  great	
   background	
  of	
  special	
  facts,	
  than	
  about	
  the	
  mind	
  of	
  any	
  other	
  man	
  I	
  know.”	
  Yet	
  the	
   sentence	
  immediately	
  preceding	
  reads:	
  “I	
  have	
  profited	
  a	
  great	
  deal	
  by	
  hearing	
  Agassiz	
   talk,	
  not	
  so	
  much	
  by	
  what	
  he	
  says,	
  for	
  never	
  did	
  a	
  man	
  utter	
  a	
  greater	
  amount	
  of	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
16

	
  William	
  Brandom,	
  “From	
  German	
  Idealism	
  to	
  American	
  Pragmatism—and	
  Back,”	
  The	
  William	
  James	
   Centennial	
  Lecture,	
  delivered	
  at	
  Harvard	
  University,	
  December	
  3,	
  2010.	
   17 	
  See	
  Brazil	
  through	
  the	
  Eyes	
  of	
  William	
  James:	
  Letters,	
  Diaries,	
  and	
  Drawings,	
  1865-­‐1866,	
  ed.	
  Maria	
   Helena	
  P.T.	
  Machado	
  (Cambridge,	
  Mass:	
  Harvard	
  University,	
  David	
  Rockefeller	
  Center	
  for	
  Latin	
  American	
   Studies,	
  2006).	
  See	
  also	
  Ivan	
  Gaskell,	
  “’Making	
  a	
  World’:	
  The	
  Impact	
  of	
  Idealism	
  on	
  Museum	
  Formation	
  in	
   Mid-­‐Nineteenth-­‐Century	
  Massachusetts,”	
  The	
  Impact	
  of	
  Idealism,	
  ed.	
  Nicholas	
  Boyle,	
  &	
  al.,	
  vol.	
  2	
   Historical,	
  Social	
  and	
  Political	
  Thought	
  (Cambridge,	
  U.K.	
  and	
  New	
  York:	
  Cambridge	
  University	
  Press,	
   forthcoming).	
  

	
  

8	
  

humbug,	
  but	
  by	
  learning	
  the	
  way	
  of	
  feeling	
  of	
  such	
  a	
  vast	
  practical	
  engine	
  as	
  he	
  is.”18	
   Here	
  we	
  see	
  particular	
  “knowledge	
  of	
  details”	
  and	
  of	
  “special	
  facts,”	
  which	
  are	
  the	
   province	
  of	
  the	
  museum	
  scholar,	
  already	
  on	
  their	
  way	
  to	
  marginalization.	
  	
   	
   “Knowledge	
  of	
  details”	
  and	
  “special	
  facts”	
  derived	
  from	
  observation	
  constitute	
  the	
   groundwork	
  of	
  classification.	
  Steven	
  Conn	
  points	
  out:	
  “The	
  ideal	
  museum	
  builders	
   hoped	
  to	
  achieve	
  was	
  …	
  to	
  impose	
  a	
  stability	
  and	
  order	
  on	
  bodies	
  of	
  knowledge	
  and	
  to	
   reflect	
  and	
  produce	
  changes	
  in	
  that	
  knowledge.”19	
  That	
  is,	
  the	
  epistemological	
  structure	
   of	
  the	
  bodies	
  of	
  knowledge	
  produced	
  by	
  museums	
  was	
  and	
  remains	
  such	
  that	
  change	
   occurs	
  only	
  by	
  almost	
  exclusively	
  incremental	
  means,	
  and	
  is	
  a	
  matter	
  of	
  refinement.	
   That	
  structure	
  in	
  which,	
  as	
  Conn	
  remarks,	
  objects	
  function	
  “as	
  synecdoches	
  standing	
  for	
   bodies	
  of	
  knowledge,”	
  does	
  not	
  readily	
  permit—let	
  alone	
  encourage—radical	
  or	
   fundamental	
  alteration	
  or	
  even	
  revision.	
  	
   	
   The	
  ossification—or	
  amenability	
  to	
  mere	
  tinkering—to	
  which	
  the	
  dominant	
   museological	
  epistemological	
  structure	
  is	
  subject	
  is	
  enormously	
  exacerbated	
  by	
  the	
   practice	
  for	
  which	
  museums	
  are	
  best	
  known:	
  exhibition.	
  As	
  Conn	
  points	
  out:	
  “That	
   knowledge	
  could	
  be	
  obtained	
  by	
  anyone	
  who	
  visited	
  a	
  museum	
  and	
  studied	
  the	
  objects,	
   provided	
  the	
  museum	
  curators	
  arranged	
  the	
  displays	
  systematically.”20	
  Many	
   commentators	
  believe	
  that	
  the	
  aims	
  and	
  constraints	
  of	
  display	
  lead	
  it	
  almost	
  invariably	
   to	
  be	
  a	
  clog	
  on	
  alert,	
  adaptable,	
  and	
  radical	
  thinking.	
  They	
  assume	
  display	
  invariably	
   characterizes	
  museums,	
  dominating	
  their	
  entire	
  practice	
  to	
  the	
  exclusion	
  of	
  all	
  else.	
  We	
   should	
  be	
  cautious.	
  While	
  most	
  museums	
  of	
  all	
  kinds	
  engage	
  in	
  exhibition,	
  and	
  while	
   considerations	
  concerning	
  exhibition,	
  both	
  long-­‐term	
  and	
  temporary,	
  are	
  both	
  pervasive	
   and	
  consistently	
  affect	
  other	
  museum	
  activities,	
  exhibition	
  is	
  but	
  one	
  of	
  those	
  activities.	
   It	
  is	
  not	
  necessarily	
  even	
  the	
  most	
  important.	
  Indeed,	
  that	
  it	
  should	
  appear	
  so,	
  and	
  that	
   all	
  commentators	
  tacitly	
  assume	
  it	
  to	
  be	
  so	
  without	
  question,	
  indicates	
  the	
  huge	
   problems	
  that	
  museums	
  face	
  in	
  terms	
  of	
  both	
  perception	
  and	
  practice	
  as	
  sites	
  of	
   scholarship.	
  Regrettably,	
  those	
  few	
  philosophers	
  who	
  discuss	
  museums	
  focus	
  on	
  their	
   exhibition	
  functions	
  alone.	
  For	
  instance,	
  in	
  her	
  three	
  books	
  on	
  museums,	
  Hilde	
  Hein	
   looks	
  at	
  little	
  else.21	
  The	
  same	
  can	
  be	
  said	
  of	
  David	
  Carrier	
  in	
  his	
  book	
  Museum	
   Skepticism.22	
  These	
  works	
  are	
  full	
  of	
  useful	
  observations.	
  Those	
  of	
  Carrier	
  on	
  the	
  large	
   number	
  of	
  Continentally	
  informed	
  theorists	
  and	
  others	
  who	
  describe	
  museums	
  as	
  little	
   more	
  than	
  instruments	
  of	
  social	
  regulation—which,	
  like	
  universities,	
  they	
  are—are	
   especially	
  acute.	
  Yet,	
  like	
  universities,	
  museums	
  are	
  much	
  more	
  besides.	
  And— crucially—they	
  are	
  much	
  more	
  than	
  exhibiting	
  institutions.	
  	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
18

	
  William	
  James	
  to	
  Henry	
  James,	
  Sr.,	
  September	
  12-­‐17,	
  1865,	
  William	
  James	
  Papers,	
  Houghton	
  Library,	
   Harvard	
  University:	
  quoted	
  in	
  Edward	
  Lurie,	
  Louis	
  Agassiz:	
  A	
  Life	
  in	
  Science	
  (Chicago:	
  University	
  of	
  Chicago	
   Press,	
  1960),	
  p.	
  347.	
   19 	
  Conn,	
  Museums	
  and	
  American	
  Intellectual	
  Life,	
  pp.	
  21-­‐22.	
   20 	
  Conn,	
  Museums	
  and	
  American	
  Intellectual	
  Life,	
  p.	
  22.	
   21 	
  Hilde	
  S.	
  Hein,	
  The	
  Exploratorium:	
  The	
  Museum	
  as	
  Laboratory	
  (Washington,	
  D.C.:	
  Smithsonian	
  Institution	
   Press,	
  1990);	
  Hilde	
  S.	
  Hein,	
  The	
  Museum	
  in	
  Transition:	
  A	
  Philosophical	
  Perspective	
  (Washington,	
  D.C.:	
   Smithsonian	
  Institution	
  Press,	
  2000);	
  Hilde	
  S.	
  Hein,	
  Public	
  Art:	
  Thinking	
  Museums	
  Differently	
  (Lanham:	
   AltaMira	
  Press,	
  2006).	
   22 	
  David	
  Carrier,	
  Museum	
  Skepticism:	
  A	
  History	
  of	
  the	
  Display	
  of	
  Art	
  in	
  Public	
  Galleries	
  (Durham,	
  N.C.	
  and	
   London:	
  Duke	
  University	
  Press,	
  2006).	
  	
  

	
  

9	
  

	
   Concern	
  with	
  display	
  alone	
  now	
  extends	
  to	
  consideration	
  of	
  museum	
  buildings	
   themselves.	
  Hein,	
  for	
  instance,	
  invites	
  us	
  to	
  consider	
  museum	
  buildings	
  as	
  themselves	
   art,	
  which	
  thereby	
  contribute	
  to	
  the	
  shaping	
  of	
  public	
  discussion.23	
  A	
  great	
  deal	
  has	
   been	
  published	
  on	
  recent	
  museum	
  architecture,	
  but	
  little	
  of	
  it	
  is	
  by	
  philosophers,	
  with	
   the	
  notable	
  exception	
  of	
  Larry	
  Shiner’s	
  contributions.24	
  That	
  new	
  museums	
  and	
   extensions	
  to	
  existing	
  museums	
  should	
  garner	
  attention	
  from	
  so	
  many	
  (except	
   philosophers)	
  is	
  scarcely	
  surprising,	
  given	
  their	
  prominence	
  in	
  the	
  urban	
  fabric	
  in	
  many	
   places	
  worldwide.	
  These	
  range	
  from	
  Riehen,	
  near	
  Basel,	
  Switzerland	
  (Fondation	
  Beyeler,	
   1997),	
  to	
  Nouméa,	
  New	
  Caledonia	
  (Jean-­‐Marie	
  Tjibaou	
  Cultural	
  Center,	
  1991-­‐98),	
  to	
  San	
   Francisco	
  (California	
  Academy	
  of	
  Sciences,	
  2008),	
  to	
  cite	
  just	
  three	
  of	
  the	
  many	
  museum	
   institutions	
  built	
  or	
  rebuilt	
  by	
  just	
  one	
  celebrity	
  architectural	
  practice,	
  Renzo	
  Piano	
   Building	
  Workshop	
  of	
  Genoa.	
  Museums	
  have	
  become	
  the	
  ultimate	
  prestige	
  projects	
  for	
   architects.	
  As	
  Hein	
  points	
  out,	
  these	
  structures	
  have	
  become	
  foci	
  of	
  attention	
  in	
  their	
   own	
  right,	
  irrespective	
  of	
  their	
  contents.	
  Some	
  architects	
  clearly	
  subordinate	
  the	
   function	
  of	
  the	
  building	
  to	
  their	
  own	
  aesthetic	
  and	
  other	
  ambitions.	
  The	
  2006	
  Frederic	
   C.	
  Hamilton	
  building	
  of	
  the	
  Denver	
  Art	
  Museum	
  by	
  Studio	
  Daniel	
  Libeskind,	
  with	
  its	
   eccentrically	
  angled	
  walls,	
  is	
  an	
  oft-­‐cited	
  notorious	
  example.	
  Yet	
  it	
  is	
  no	
  more	
   impractical	
  than	
  the	
  building	
  that	
  might	
  be	
  said	
  to	
  be	
  the	
  prototype	
  of	
  what	
  Shiner	
  calls	
   the	
  “spectacle	
  museum”:	
  Frank	
  Lloyd	
  Wright’s	
  Solomon	
  R.	
  Guggenheim	
  Museum,	
  New	
   York	
  City,	
  which	
  opened	
  in	
  1959.	
  The	
  tendency	
  of	
  commentators	
  to	
  discuss	
  such	
   buildings	
  in	
  relation	
  to	
  their	
  museum	
  functions	
  in	
  terms	
  of	
  the	
  display	
  of	
  collections	
   alone	
  (sometimes	
  as	
  failing,	
  as	
  in	
  Denver;	
  sometimes	
  as	
  succeeding,	
  as	
  in	
  Riehen)	
   intensifies	
  the	
  myopia	
  they	
  and	
  others	
  exhibit	
  with	
  respect	
  to	
  the	
  many	
  other	
  functions	
   of	
  museums.	
  A	
  consequence	
  has	
  been	
  a	
  reinforcement	
  of	
  the	
  epistemological	
  shift,	
  and	
   a	
  confirmation	
  of	
  the	
  loss	
  of	
  authority	
  suffered	
  by	
  museums.	
  This	
  change	
  has	
  affected	
   the	
  teleology	
  of	
  museums	
  of	
  every	
  kind,	
  as	
  will	
  be	
  explored	
  in	
  Part	
  II.	
   	
   It	
  would	
  be	
  imprudent	
  to	
  draw	
  any	
  conclusions	
  halfway	
  through	
  a	
  two-­‐part	
  study,	
   yet	
  certain	
  points	
  are	
  worth	
  reiterating	
  at	
  this	
  stage.	
  Everyone	
  affected	
  by	
  museums— and	
  that	
  includes	
  a	
  great	
  deal	
  of	
  people	
  in	
  communities	
  throughout	
  the	
  world—would	
   surely	
  benefit	
  from	
  philosophical	
  attention	
  to	
  the	
  huge	
  variety	
  of	
  institutions	
  gathered	
   under	
  this	
  term.	
  Perhaps	
  in	
  the	
  nineteenth	
  century	
  museums	
  were	
  too	
  self-­‐evident	
  as	
   sites	
  of	
  scholarship	
  to	
  attract	
  philosophical	
  attention,	
  whereas	
  in	
  the	
  twentieth	
  and	
   beyond	
  their	
  precipitate	
  fall	
  from	
  epistemological	
  grace	
  rendered	
  has	
  them	
  irrelevant.	
   Nonetheless,	
  they	
  continue	
  to	
  present	
  philosophical	
  challenges	
  beyond	
  those	
  to	
  do	
  with	
   cultural	
  variety,	
  taxonomy,	
  and	
  epistemology.	
  I	
  shall	
  address	
  some	
  of	
  these	
  further	
   issues—teleology,	
  ethics,	
  therapeutics,	
  and	
  aesthetics—in	
  Part	
  II.	
   	
   	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
23 24

	
  Hein,	
  Public	
  Art.	
   	
  Larry	
  Shiner,	
  “Architecture	
  vs.	
  Art:	
  The	
  Aesthetics	
  of	
  Art	
  Museum	
  Design,”	
  Contemporary	
  Aesthetics	
  5,	
   2007,	
  at	
  www.	
  contemporaryaesthetics.org.;	
  Larry	
  Shiner,	
  “On	
  Aesthetics	
  and	
  Function	
  in	
  Architecture:	
   The	
  Case	
  of	
  the	
  ‘Spectacle’	
  Museum,”	
  Journal	
  of	
  Aesthetics	
  and	
  Art	
  Criticism	
  69,	
  2011,	
  pp.	
  31-­‐41.	
  Glenn	
   Parsons	
  discusses	
  Daniel	
  Libeskind’s	
  2007	
  extension	
  to	
  the	
  Royal	
  Ontario	
  Museum,	
  Toronto	
  in	
  his	
  “Fact	
   and	
  Function	
  in	
  Architectural	
  Criticism,”	
  Journal	
  of	
  Aesthetics	
  and	
  Art	
  Criticism	
  69,	
  2011,	
  pp.	
  21-­‐29.	
  

	
  

10	
  

	
   Acknowledgement	
   	
   I	
  owe	
  debts	
  of	
  gratitude	
  to	
  many	
  colleagues	
  with	
  whom	
  I	
  have	
  discussed	
  museum	
   scholarship	
  and	
  other	
  aspects	
  of	
  museum	
  work	
  over	
  the	
  years.	
  In	
  particular,	
  I	
  should	
  like	
   to	
  acknowledge	
  the	
  following,	
  sadly	
  no	
  longer	
  with	
  us:	
  Michael	
  Baxandall,	
  Jan	
   Białowstocki,	
  Pierre	
  Bourdieu,	
  Nelson	
  Goodman,	
  E.H.	
  Gombrich,	
  and	
  Francis	
  Haskell.	
   Among	
  those	
  who	
  happily	
  still	
  are,	
  Christopher	
  Brown,	
  Michael	
  Conforti,	
  Neil	
   MacGregor,	
  and	
  Charles	
  Saumarez	
  Smith	
  are	
  museum	
  scholars	
  who	
  have	
  long	
  been	
   generous	
  in	
  their	
  discussion	
  of	
  ideas	
  with	
  me.	
  Ruth	
  Phillips	
  is	
  an	
  art	
  historian	
  who,	
  as	
   former	
  museum	
  director,	
  appreciates	
  the	
  difficulties	
  under	
  which	
  museum	
  scholars	
   operate,	
  and	
  is	
  unstintingly	
  generous	
  in	
  discussion.	
  Among	
  historians,	
  Laurel	
  Thatcher	
   Ulrich	
  remains	
  indispensable	
  as	
  a	
  colleague,	
  interlocutor,	
  and	
  friend.	
  In	
  the	
   philosophical	
  community,	
  David	
  Carrier	
  and	
  A.W.	
  Eaton	
  are	
  outstanding,	
  while	
  Sherri	
   Irvin	
  gave	
  me	
  much	
  needed	
  support	
  and	
  understanding	
  during	
  crucial	
  periods.	
  The	
   award	
  of	
  the	
  Beinecke	
  Fellowship	
  at	
  the	
  Sterling	
  and	
  Francine	
  Clark	
  Art	
  Institute,	
   Williamstown,	
  Massachusetts	
  for	
  the	
  fall	
  semester,	
  2011	
  enabled	
  me	
  to	
  complete	
  this	
   article.	
  I	
  wish	
  to	
  express	
  my	
  gratitude	
  to	
  the	
  director	
  of	
  the	
  Research	
  and	
  Academic	
   Program	
  at	
  the	
  Clark,	
  Michael	
  Ann	
  Holly,	
  her	
  colleagues,	
  and	
  the	
  other	
  fellows,	
  for	
   unstinting	
  intellectual	
  stimulation	
  and	
  practical	
  support.	
  Jane	
  Whitehead	
  remains	
  my	
   severest	
  critic,	
  applying	
  tests	
  of	
  comprehensibility	
  worthy	
  of	
  any	
  philosopher.	
  This	
   article	
  is	
  for	
  her.	
   	
   	
   Short	
  Biography	
   	
   Ivan	
  Gaskell	
  is	
  Professor	
  of	
  Cultural	
  History,	
  and	
  of	
  Museum	
  Studies	
  at	
  the	
  Bard	
   Graduate	
  Center,	
  New	
  York	
  City.	
  He	
  has	
  extensive	
  curatorial	
  experience,	
  mostly	
  at	
   Harvard	
  University	
  where	
  he	
  remains	
  Research	
  Associate	
  of	
  the	
  Peabody	
  Museum	
  of	
   Archaeology	
  and	
  Ethnology.	
  His	
  many	
  publications	
  include	
  Vermeer's	
  Wager:	
   Speculations	
  on	
  Art	
  History,	
  Theory,	
  and	
  Art	
  Museums,	
  and	
  six	
  co-­‐edited	
  books	
  in	
  the	
   series	
  Cambridge	
  Studies	
  in	
  Philosophy	
  and	
  the	
  Arts.	
  He	
  has	
  made	
  numerous	
   contributions	
  to	
  journals	
  and	
  edited	
  volumes,	
  and	
  has	
  curated	
  many	
  experimental	
   exhibitions,	
  mostly	
  at	
  Harvard.	
  	
   	
   	
   	
  

	
  

11