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The Politics of Food: How Cuba Teamed Up With U.S. Food and Agricultural Interests to Outmaneuver the Pro-Embargo Lobby
By
Armando A. Musa
Class of 2003
In satisfaction of the combined Course and Written Work Requirements at
Harvard Law School
April 2003
This paper will show that in the recent past the Cuban government, with the help of the U.S. food and agricultural lobby, has altered its strategy for dealing with the U.S.—at least with respect to the Cuban government’s efforts at getting the remnants of the trade sanctions against it lifted. Instead of deploying its customary loud rhetoric in opposition to the embargo, the Cuban government has co-opted, if you will, an important United States constituency to help it in its crusade.
By way of background, Part III of this paper describes in broad terms the United States statutes that interact to form the legislative bases upon which the trade sanctions against Cuba are founded. Then Part IV examines the most recent successful Congressional effort to ease the current trade sanctions, as well as the imposition of some additional hurdles to normalized commercial relations. Part V analyzes in some detail the “charm offensive” strategy that Cuba adopted—with the help of United States food and agricultural interests—in an effort to make an end run around the pro-embargo lobby. Then Part VI examines—primarily in the context of wrangling between the Executive and Legislative branches of our federal government—some of the major policy arguments customarily employed in normative debates involving the desirability of the remaining trade sanctions. Finally, Part VII concludes with some observations and comments.
Since the time that Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba, United States – Cuba relations have been, by and large, rather strained. The history of this government-to-government animosity can be traced, in no small measure, to the unique geopolitical structural alignment and risks of the Cold War period faced by both countries at mid-century.
However, after the fall of the Soviet Union, the confrontation game played by the United States and Cuba during the Cold War seemingly outlived what some would have called its raison d’ etre. In other words, the fall of the Soviet Union—with its former contributions of huge subsidies to Cuba—had the effect of significantly diminishing any level of serious threat that Cuba might have posed to the national security of the United States. Nevertheless, the trade sanctions initially imposed at the height of the Cold War have remained in place to this day. But more germane to the subject matter of this paper, the confrontation game played by both countries also remained in place.
By “confrontation game” I am referring to the general dour tenor of official government positions adopted by Washington and Havana since the initial imposition of trade sanctions against Cuba. From the severing of formal diplomatic ties between the countries and the CIA’s failed attempts at assassinating Castro in the sixties, to Cuba’s downing of several unarmed civilian aircraft over international waters in 1996 and the use by each country of defiant rhetoric when addressing the other, throughout the years both countries have refused to engage each other in any meaningful way.
However, this paper will show that in the recent past the Cuban government, with the help of U.S. food and agricultural interests, has altered its strategy for dealing with the U.S.—at least with respect to the Cuban government’s efforts at getting the remnants of the trade sanctions against it lifted. Instead of deploying its customary loud rhetoric in opposition to the embargo, the Cuban government has co-opted, if you will, an important United States constituency to help it in its crusade.
By way of background, Part III of this paper describes in broad terms the United States statutes that interact to form the legislative bases upon which the trade sanctions against Cuba are founded. Then Part IV examines the most recent successful Congressional effort to ease the current trade sanctions, as well as the imposition of some additional hurdles to normalized commercial relations. Part V analyzes in some detail the “charm offensive” strategy that Cuba adopted—with the help of United States food and agricultural interests—in an effort to make an end run around the pro-embargo lobby. Then Part VI examines—primarily in the context of wrangling between the Executive and Legislative branches of our federal government—some of the major policy arguments customarily employed in normative debates involving the desirability of remaining trade sanctions. Finally, Part VII concludes with some general observations and comments.
Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba on January 1, 1959. [1] On January 7, 1959, the United States government officially recognized the new Castro government. [2] But when this Cuban government began to expropriate U.S. property in Cuba, the United States responded by initiating economic sanctions against the island. [3] Although the details and specifics of these sanctions have varied throughout the years, their general thrust has remained the same. What follows is a brief overview of the four major statutes from which these trade sanctions derive their legal authority. [4]
The Trading With The Enemy Act (TWEA) was signed into law in 1917 as the U.S. entered World War I. [7] The purpose of the TWEA was to give the President authority to “prohibit, limit, or regulate trade with hostile countries in times of war.” [8] Furthermore, the TWEA was amended in 1933 to grant the President the ability to exercise the powers granted him under the act, not only during times of war, but also in times of national emergency during peacetime. [9]
For example, President Truman invoked the authority of the 1933 amendment in connection with the Korean conflict. [10] On December 16, 1950, Truman issued a proclamation that noted the “increasing menace of the forces of Communist aggression” as a basis for declaring a state of national emergency. [11] Soon after that presidential proclamation was issued, under the authority of the 1933 amendment, the treasury secretary promulgated regulations imposing a total embargo on unlicensed financial and commercial transactions between U.S. nationals and North Korea. These regulations came to be known as the Foreign Assets Control Regulations (FACR) [12] which served as the model for similar regulations issued in 1963 implementing the trade embargo against Cuba. [13]
In 1977, Congress curtailed the broad presidential powers granted under the 1933 amendment by revoking the President’s authority to use the declaration of a national emergency as a justification for imposing a trade embargo on a foreign country. [14] However, concomitant with this rollback in authority, the Congress grandfathered the President’s existing exercises of his national emergency powers. [15] This grandfather provision allowed, inter alia, for the Cuban embargo to remain in place, subject to annual presidential determinations that the exercise of such authority is in the national interest of the Untied States. [16] Since the 1977 provision was enacted, every U.S. President has issued annual determinations that it is in the national interest of the United States to maintain the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba. [17]
The Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) was signed into law in 1961. [19] The FAA’s legislative history indicates that it was enacted for the purpose of giving vigor and new direction to the foreign aid program. [20] However, the FAA also sought to withhold aid from Cuba, and gave the executive branch specific authority to impose a trade embargo against Cuba. [21] Section 620(a) of the FAA, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a), provides, in relevant part: [22]
1. No assistance shall be furnished under this chapter to the present government of Cuba. As an additional means of implementing and carrying into effect the policy of the preceding sentence, the President is authorized to establish and maintain a total embargo upon all trade between the United States and Cuba.
2. Except as may be deemed necessary by the President in the interest of the United States, no assistance shall be furnished under this chapter to any government of Cuba . . . until the President determines that such government has taken appropriate steps according to international law standards to return to United States citizens . . . property taken from such citizens and entities on or after January 1, 1959, by the government of Cuba.
Some have noted that there was no legislative need for this statute [23] and that its enactment “arose from a desire in Congress to provide an explicit political response to Cuba’s expropriation of the assets of U.S. citizens.” [24] Nevertheless, section 620(a) of the FAA remains in effect and serves as an alternative source of legislative authority for the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR). [25]
The Cuban Democracy Act (CDA), also known as the Torricelli Act, was signed into law in 1992. [27] Much like the FAA, there was no legislative need for the CDA. [28] Instead, the statute essentially provided a statement of U.S. policy toward Cuba, namely the intention to maintain “sanctions on the Castro regime so long as it continues to refuse to move toward democratization and greater respect for human rights.” [29] However, the statute did impose some additional restrictions on trade with Cuba. [30] For example, the CDA proscribed foreign subsidiaries of U.S. corporations from engaging in trade with Cuba. [31] It also sought to prohibit the entry into U.S. ports of vessels that have entered Cuba to engage in trade within the preceding 180 days. [32] And the CDA also instructed the President to establish strict limits on remittances to Cuba. [33]
A notable feature of the CDA is its adoption of what has come to be known as a “two-track” U.S. policy with respect to Cuba. [34] The first track consists of the relatively well-known strict trade sanctions against the present Cuban government. [35] The second track consists of the promise of U.S. aid once the island has undertaken a political and economic transition to a free-market democracy. [36] For example, section 1708(a) of the CDA allows the President to waive the sanctions it imposes against Cuba once the President determines and reports to Congress that the following conditions have been met:
Furthermore, the CDA provides that once the section 1708(a) determinations have been made, the President shall encourage admission of the new Cuban government into international financial institutions, provide emergency relief during Cuba’s transition to a viable economic system, and take steps to end the U.S. trade embargo against Cuba. [38]
The Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act, also known as the Helms-Burton Act, was signed into law in 1996. [40] The statute sought to “tighten further the embargo by discouraging investment by nationals of third countries in Cuba; encourage Cuba’s transition to democracy through inter-nationally supervised, free and fair elections; define a plan for the U.S. to assist transition and democratic governments in Cuba; and protect United States nationals’ property rights abroad.” [41] The Libertad Act is divided into four major sections (Title I through Title IV). [42] Each will be examined briefly seriatim. [43]
Title I seeks, inter alia, to end the “indirect financing of Cuba” by prohibiting any U.S. individual or U.S. company from extending any loan, credit, or other financing for any transaction involving property confiscated by the Cuban government from a U.S. national who holds a claim for such confiscation. [44] But most importantly, Title I includes a provision that codifies into positive law all regulations (including the Cuban Assets Control Regulations) imposing economic sanctions against Cuba in effect as of March 1, 1996. [45] This move is notable because, by codifying the regulations into law, the Executive branch was left without any authority to institute any major changes in U.S. policy towards Cuba so long as the current Cuban regime remains in power. [46]
Title II lays out a program according to which the U.S. will lift trade sanctions and provide economic assistance to Cuba once the President determines that a transition or democratically elected government is in place in Cuba. [47]
Title III arguably has been the most controversial piece of the legislation. [48] The main thrust of Title III aims to discourage investment in Cuba by means of internationalizing the embargo. [49] It does this by granting U.S. nationals whose property was confiscated by the Cuban government the right to bring civil actions for money damages in U.S. federal district courts against foreign nationals deemed to be trafficking in confiscated property. [50] Liability in those actions will result from a finding that the foreign national is “trafficking” in “confiscated property” subject to a claim that is owned by a United States person. [51] However, recognizing the politically sensitive nature of a provision with such extraterritorial application, Congress included a waiver provision in Title III. [52] That provision grants the president the authority to suspend the effective date of Title III for consecutive 6-month intervals. [53] Since the passage of Helms-Burton in 1996, U.S. presidents have consistently exercised their authority to suspend the effective date of Title III. [54]
Title IV contains a provision that aims to exclude from the United States any foreigner who is found to be involved in transactions dealing with previously confiscated property. [55] Unlike Title III, the Title IV immigration exclusion does not grant the president suspension authority to prevent its application. [56] Therefore, the immigration exclusion is currently in effect. However, there are very few cases in which the U.S. State Department has denied entry visas to foreign nationals under the authority of Title IV. [57]
Since the passage of Helms-Burton in 1996, there was no significant Congressional activity regarding Cuba until the summer of 2000.
The Trade Sanctions Reform & Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) was signed into law in the summer of 2000. [59] The law essentially terminates any existing unilateral U.S. agricultural or medical trade sanctions, and restrains the president from imposing any new agricultural or medical sanctions against a foreign state unless he obtains the prior approval of Congress. [60] However, the law does contain some special provisions relating to certain countries that the State Department has determined to be state sponsors of terrorism. [61] Since the State Department lists Cuba as one of those countries, [62] exports to Cuba are governed by a set of special rules under TSREEA. [63] But notwithstanding these special rules governing trade in agricultural commodities with Cuba, passage of the TSREAA was “heralded as significantly altering the comprehensive economic sanctions” imposed on Cuba. [64]
Section 906 of TSREEA allows for the export of U.S. agricultural commodities to Cuba through the issuance of one-year licenses. [65] The licensing procedure is administered by the Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) of the U.S. Department of Commerce. [66] However, despite the easing of trade sanctions with respect to U.S. food sales to Cuba, TSREEA also erected some significant hurdles. [67]
Chief among these hurdles is § 908(b), which prohibits any U.S. person from providing financing for any U.S. sale of agricultural commodities to Cuba. [68] The result is that Cuba is effectively forced either to pay in cash for such sales or else obtain financing from a foreign source.
Cuba’s initial reaction to the passage of TSREEA was overwhelmingly negative. [69] The Cuban government’s main grievance concerned the restrictions on U.S. financing of the newly authorized sales. [70] In fact, Castro initially said he would not buy a single “grain of rice” from the U.S. until the financing restrictions were removed. [71]
In November of 2001Hurricane Michelle pummeled the island of Cuba. [72] It brought with it strong winds and caused significant damage to crops. [73] In the wake of Michelle’s destruction, the United States offered to extend humanitarian assistance to Cuba, but Cuba declined the offer of aid. [74] Instead, Cuba announced its intention to make a “one time” cash purchase of U.S. food and agricultural products. [75] The prospect of such a sale was of historical significance, as it would mark Cuba’s first direct purchase of U.S. goods in over 40 years. [76]
In late November 2001 Cuba signed contracts with several U.S. food companies for shipments of grain, wheat, corn, soy, and rye. [77] The first shipments of food arrived in Cuba on December 16, 2001. [78] The first salvo in Cuba’s “charm offensive” had just been fired.
The term “charm offensive” has been used to describe the rather remarkable shift in Cuba’s public posture, official discourse, and—in a nutshell—its strategy, in its dealings and exchanges with the U.S. [79] This so-called “charm offensive” had its origins in the opportunities that arose in late 2001 for Cuba to make significant inroads in its quest to have U.S. trade sanctions against it lifted.
As discussed above in Part IV(C), Hurricane Michelle marked a turning point in Cuba’s strategy for dealing with the United States with respect to the decades-long embargo. [80] No longer would Cuba keep playing the confrontation game with the United States government and with certain hard-line factions within the Cuban-American exile community. [81] Instead, Cuba joined hands with the powerful U.S. food and agricultural lobby—a group in search of overseas markets in which to sell its products. Together, these U.S. business interests and Cuba embarked on an intense lobbying crusade intended to win American public opinion over to their cause, [82] i.e., the further easing of embargo restrictions.
Although initially insisting that the food purchases were strictly a “one-time” deal intended to alleviate the immediate shortages occasioned by Hurricane Michelle, the Cuban government soon began to express its interest in making more purchases from U.S. food and agricultural companies. [83] Indeed, by the time March 2002 came along, Cuba had purchased an additional $32 million worth of food from United States companies, and was promising further purchases. [84]
At the same time that Cuba was announcing further purchases of food products from major U.S. companies and farmers, the Cuban government was heavily courting prominent U.S. public officials and business people. [85] The typical visit consisted of U.S. Congressmen and/or state delegations accompanied by several industry representatives. [86] The guests would arrive in Havana. They were then given a tour of some government facilities or tourist attractions, and would finally spend the evening dining and engaging in lively conversation with Fidel Castro himself into the wee hours of the morning. [87]
Journalists from respected American media would be dispatched to cover these meetings and dinners, and the following morning Americans would wake up and read about these encounters in the American press. Through these media reports, the American public was constantly told that the majority of Americans oppose the current trade sanctions against Cuba, and that there was a growing momentum in the Congress to further ease—if not completely lift—the remaining trade and travel restrictions. [88]
One of the main driving forces behind this media strategy was, and continues to be, the Cuba Policy Foundation (CPF). Founded by senior diplomats in Republican administrations, the CPF believes that lifting trade sanctions would be in the national and economic interests of the United States, and would bring democratic reforms to Cuba. [89] As its brochure proudly mentions, the CPF leads “an aggressive media campaign. The Cuba Policy Foundation appears regularly in national and international television, radio and print media; in over just a year, we have appeared in over 350 media reports worldwide, making CPF the #1 most cited anti-embargo organization . . . Through these efforts and more, the Cuba Policy Foundation is building a national constituency in favor of ending the embargo.” [90]
On March 21, 2002 thirty-four members of Congress joined together to announce “the formation of the bipartisan Congressional Cuba Working Group (CWG).” [91] By June 10, 2002 the membership of the Cuba Working Group had grown to forty-four Congressional representatives and promised to expand further. [92] The stated goal of the Cuba Working Group is, inter alia, to lift the ban on travel to Cuba and permit the United States financing of food and agricultural sales to the island. [93]
As part of their coordinated effort to increase the political pressure to further reform U.S. policy toward Cuba, members of the Cuba Working Group pressed for Congressional hearings on Capitol Hill to denounce current U.S. policy toward Cuba. [94] As Chairman of the Senate’s Appropriations Treasury Subcommittee, Senator Byron Dorgan (D-ND) obliged and held a hearing on February 11, 2002 in which he blasted what he called the United States’ “ill-advised” policy toward Cuba. [95]
An interesting facet of the “charm offensive” involved Cuba’s decision to host President Jimmy Carter—a vocal opponent of U.S. trade sanctions against Cuba—in May of 2002. [96] Although Castro had extended the invitation to Carter months earlier, [97] it is noteworthy that Carter chose to accept it at the time that this concerted “charm offensive” was being waged in the halls of Congress and in the American press.
As the American press constantly reminded its readers, Carter’s visit would mark the first time that a United States President, in or out of office, would visit Cuba since Fidel Castro came to power. [98] Further fueling interest in and expectations of this historic trip was Castro’s public commitment to allow Carter to speak uncensored and directly to the Cuban people. [99] Such a public commitment on Castro’s part prompted some at the time to wonder aloud, perhaps naively so, whether significant political and economic liberalization lied in store for Cuba in the near future. [100]
In order to place Carter’s Cuba visit in a broader context, it is useful to examine what was happening domestically in Cuba at the time. In early 2002, American media began reporting on an emerging civic movement within Cuba’s borders. [101] This movement consisted of an unprecedented grass-roots petition drive—known as the Varela Project—that requested Cuba’s National Assembly to consider a public referendum on granting Cuban citizens certain rights such freedom of expression, the right to own and operate businesses, the right of assembly, and electoral reforms. [102] The Varela Project availed itself of a loophole in the Cuban Constitution that allows citizens to petition the national legislature once they’ve collected 10,000 signatures on a given initiative. [103]
On the eve of Carter’s visit, Varela Project organizers, led by Oswaldo Paya, delivered the petition with over 11,000 signatures to Cuba’s National Assembly. [104] In doing so, they effectively parlayed Carter’s visit to Cuba—and its concomitant international attention—into an opportunity to shine an international spotlight on and give international recognition to the Varela Project. [105]
Although the Varela Project threatened to steal attention away from the aim of Carter’s visit, in the end it ultimately failed to do so. [106] It is true that in his televised address to the Cuban people Carter urged the Cuban government to allow more basic freedoms and political rights to its people. [107] However, Carter also pleased Castro and U.S. food and agricultural interests by publicly calling on the United States to act first in lifting trade and travel restrictions against Cuba. [108]
With the backdrop of Cuba’s newly found legitimacy conferred upon it by Carter’s visit and his public exhortation to the United States to unilaterally lift its remaining trade sanctions against Cuba, the island nation braced itself for an extravagant event no doubt staged for the American press. [109] The event—organized by major U.S. food and agricultural interests—was dubbed The U.S. Food & Agribusiness Exhibit and was held in Cuba in September 2002. [110]
At the Exhibit, United States companies used the occasion ostensibly to showcase their food and agricultural products to the Cuban government. [111] In turn, Cuban officials—including Fidel Castro himself—milled about the convention center where the Exhibit was being held sampling the various food products, making small talk with participants, and granting interviews to members of the American press who had been invited to cover the Exhibit. [112]
At the conclusion of the Exhibit, the Cuban government announced how impressed it was with the food products showcased. In fact, it was so impressed with the items showcased that it had decided to enter into additional contracts with participating U.S. companies for millions of dollars worth of food and agricultural products. [113] Through this Exhibit, the Cuban government was in effect speaking to the American public (and Congress) and saying “look at how much we’re buying from you and your constituents despite the financing and other trade restrictions in place; imagine the possibilities for expanded commerce were the remaining restrictions to be lifted. Help us get rid of the remaining trade sanctions and you stand to benefit directly.” [114]
In the months succeeding the Exhibit, additional food sales between the two countries have taken place. In fact, Cuba has gone from being ranked last (i.e., number 228) on the list of U.S. food export recipients in the year 2000, to being ranked 45th by the end of 2002. [115] Furthermore, another interesting statistic—that perhaps shows the lengths to which Cuba has gone to increase pressure on the U.S. Congress for further easing of trade restrictions—shows that the U.S. became Cuba’s number one source of imported food in 2002 and is expected to remain so in 2003. [116]
Without expressing a view either way on the normative question whether current U.S. trade sanctions against Cuba should remain in place or be relaxed further, [117] it is worth examining in brief form some of the major policy arguments that are customarily employed in carrying out the debate.
Proponents of continued trade sanctions usually rely on variations of the following three arguments [118] in support of their position: (1) Cuba is a poor credit risk to U.S. businesses; (2) Cuba lacks a free-market economy supportive of beneficial trade relationships; and (3) Cuba poses a national security threat to the United States.
On the other hand, opponents of trade sanctions argue that: (1) Engagement, not a policy of isolation, is likely to bring about a political and democratic transition in Cuba; (2) Trade sanctions unduly restrict American’s freedom and harm American economic interests; and (3) Cuba poses no threat to the national security of the United States.
The weeks and months following the launch of Cuba’s “charm offensive” witnessed the political struggle over the future of U.S. policy toward Cuba between pro-embargo forces and opponents of trade sanctions. As discussed below, the pro-embargo contingent found reliable allies in the Bush administration, while opponents of trade sanctions found champions in the Congress. Throughout this ongoing political struggle, each side is seen deploying the prototypical policy arguments identified above in their efforts to influence the future direction of United States’ Cuba policy.
The battle lines began to be drawn in early January 2002 when high level Cuban officials—testing the waters—began to suggest that friendlier relations between both countries might be within reach, and were immediately shot down by U.S. officials. [119] Additionally, at around the same time, the Bush administration moved ahead and appointed several individuals known for their pro-embargo stance to select foreign policy positions giving them jurisdiction over Cuban affairs. [120] Furthermore, the Bush administration’s top diplomat in Cuba made clear the administration’s policy position when she said that “Fidel Castro launched a ‘charm offensive’ to try to persuade the U.S. to soften its 40-year-old trade embargo . . . [and] ‘our policy can’t change just because Cuba wants it to.’” [121] Soon thereafter, the Bush administration announced that it was undertaking a complete Cuba policy review to be due some time in May of 2002. [122] But even before that policy review was completed, pro-embargo forces attempted to diminish the impact of Cuba’s “charm offensive” in several ways.
First, they sought to point out that trading with Cuba is a losing proposition in the long run because of Cuba’s credit problems. [123] The main argument here is that Cuba is essentially a bankrupt regime that can’t afford to pay its debts. Many have pointed out that the way Cuba has managed to pay cash to U.S. food companies is by defaulting on its debts to other creditors who are owed money. [124] Who’s to say, the argument goes, that Cuba won’t likewise stop paying U.S. companies who extend credit to Cuba once trade restrictions are lifted? [125]
Next, proponents of continued trade sanctions argued that in the absence of political and economic reforms, trading with and investing in Cuba’s command and control economy makes little business sense, [126] and in any event, doing so will not in and of itself bring free markets and democracy to Cuba. [127]
The third argument lodged by supporters of the status quo centered on Cuba’s purported threat to the national security of the United States. In efforts to bolster their claims, they pointed to the Cuban government’s friendly relations with rogue states and Castro’s ominous anti-U.S. rhetoric. [128] They also pointed out that the recent arrest of the U.S. Defense Department’s top Cuba analyst on espionage charges suggested that the United States’ Cuba threat assessment had been underestimated for years. [129] In addition, on the eve of Carter’s visit to Cuba, some in the Bush administration even suggested that Cuba harbored weapons of mass destruction. [130] But while pro-embargo forces were scrambling to influence the direction of U.S. Cuba policy, opponents of trade sanctions were likewise busy at work.
First, keeping up the pressure on the Bush administration to further ease trade sanctions, Congress held hearings in which members of Congress and others touted the benefits of a policy of engagement. [131]
Additionally, anti-embargo organizations like the Cuba Policy Foundation commissioned policy reports and flooded the media with information on how current trade sanctions restrict Americans’ freedom and harm U.S. economic interests. [132]
Furthermore, members of Congress and others pressed the administration hard to clarify its position on whether Cuba in fact possesses weapons of mass destruction; in the end, some would say, the administration did some backtracking on the weapons accusations. [133]
On May 20, 2002, the Bush administration unveiled the contents of the administration’s Cuba policy review that Cuba watchers had been awaiting for months. [134] Named “Initiative for a New Cuba”, the administrations statement of policy contained very few new ideas, and essentially promised to maintain trade sanctions until the Cuban government undertakes meaningful political and economic reforms. [135]
While some found the steps and policies outlined in the Initiative for a New Cuba to be sensible and good policy, [136] others disagreed. [137] And while the President has threatened to veto any further relaxation of trade sanctions until Cuba effectuates significant political and economic reforms, there is growing opposition in the Congress to the maintenance of Cuba trade sanctions. In fact, some have noted that the level of Congressional opposition to the embargo is quickly nearing a veto-proof majority. [138]
This paper has argued that in the past year and a half, Cuba has adopted a less confrontational approach in its apparent [139] aim to have the remaining vestiges of U.S. trade sanctions against it lifted. This softer approach—Cuba’s “charm offensive”—has been pretty effective in winning the battle for American public opinion on the issue of trade sanctions. [140]
However, in recent days, Cuba has taken some actions that have disappointed many of those who have argued for further relaxation of trade sanctions. By launching a crackdown on independent journalists, economists, and human rights activists on the island on the eve of the Iraq War, the Cuban government might have put at risk the progress it has made to date with its charm offensive. [141] Even Jimmy Carter has expressed disappointment with the Cuban governments recent wave of repression. [142]
Nevertheless, as of press time, there is every indication that the pro-normalization movement in Congress remains robust. And although it would be foolish to venture a prediction of when remaining trade sanctions against Cuba will be lifted—lest I be proven as wrong as many who have made such predictions in the past—it looks like the politics of food might soon pay off for the relevant stakeholders.
[1] See CIA – The World Factbook, available online at <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/cu.html> (visited March 14, 2003).
[2] See United States International Trade Commission, The Economic Impact of U.S. Sanctions With Respect To Cuba , Investigation 332-413, Publication 3398 (February 2001), Ch. 2 at 2-1 et seq., available online at <ftp://ftp.usitc.gov/pub/reports/studies/pub3398.pdf> (visited February 14, 2003).
[3] Id.
[4] See Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, The Laws and Legal System of a Free-Market Cuba: A Prospectus for Business , Quorum Books, 1997, Chapter 2.
[5] This section of the paper relies heavily on an excellent account of these statutes by a notable Cuba expert, Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, in The Laws and Legal System of a Free-Market Cuba: A Prospectus for Business , Quorum Books, 1997, Chapter 2.
[6] Pub. L. 65-91, 40 Stat. 411, 50 U.S.C. App. § 1 et seq.
[7] See Travieso-Diaz, supra note 4.
[8] Id.
[9] Id.
[10] Id.
[11] Proclamation No. 2914, 15 Fed. Reg. 9029 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S. Code Cong. Service, Vol. 1 at 1557-58.
[12] 31 C.F.R. Part 500.
[13] These regulations are known as the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR), and they are codified in 31 C.F.R. Part 515. The CACR are administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC)—a unit of the U.S. Treasury Department.
[14] See Travieso-Diaz, supra note 4.
[15] Id.
[16] Id.
[17] President Bush issued the most recent presidential determination on September 13, 2002, which extends the state of national emergency until September of 2003. Presidential Determination No. 2002-3, available on line at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020916-1.html> (visited on March 1, 2003).
[18] Pub. L. 87-195, 75 Stat. 444, 22 U.S.C. § 2151 et seq.
[19] See Travieso-Diaz, supra note 4.
[20] See Senate Report No. 612, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2472, 2473.
[21] See Travieso-Diaz, supra note 4.
[22] Id.
[23] The TWEA provided sufficient authority for the imposition of any trade embargo.
[24] See Travieso-Diaz, supra note 4.
[25] Id.
[26] Pub. L. 102-484, 106 Stat. 2575, 22 U.S.C. § 6001 et seq.
[27] See Travieso-Diaz, supra note 4.
[28] Id.
[29] Id.
[30] Id.
[31] 22 U.S.C. § 6005.
[32] Id.
[33] See Travieso-Diaz, supra note 4.
[34] Id.
[35] Id.
[36] Id.
[37] 22 U.S.C. § 6007(a).
[38] See Travieso-Diaz, supra note 4.
[39] Pub. L. 104-114, 110 Stat. 785, 22 U.S.C. § 6021 et seq.
[40] See Travieso-Diaz, supra note 4.
[41] Id.
[42] See Travieso-Diaz, supra note 4.
[43] As further discussed below, the meat of the Libertad Act is contained in Title III. Title III has generated much controversy and, since its enactment, U.S. Presidents have consistently waived its application.
[44] See Travieso-Diaz, supra note 4.
[45] Id.
[46] Id.
[47] Id.
[48] See Brice M. Clagett, The Controversy Over Title III of the Helms-Burton Act: Who Is Breaking International Law—The United States, Or The States That Have Made Themselves Co-conspirators With Cuba In It’s Unlawful Confiscations , 30 Geo.Wash.J.Int’L.&Econ. 27(1996-1997); See also Paul Lewis, Cuba Trade Law: Export of U.S. Ire and Politics , The New York Times, March 15, 1996, at D1; Canada to Back EU Protest Against U.S. Anti-Cuba Law: Ottawa May Use Several Dispute-Settlement Tactics as European Union Turns to the WTO , Financial Post, March 19, 1996, at 1; Canada Irked by U.S. Cuba Law , Associated Press, March 28, 1996.
[49] See Travieso-Diaz, supra note 4.
[50] Id.
[51] Id. The words “trafficking” and “confiscated” are terms of art and are defined in the statute.
[52] 22 U.S.C.A. § 6085.
[53] 22 U.S.C.A. § 6085(b)(1) provides, in relevant part: The President may suspend the effective date under subsection (a) of this section for a period of not more than 6 months if the President determines and reports in writing to the appropriate congressional committees at least 15 days before such effective date that the suspension is necessary to the national interests of the United States and will expedite a transition to democracy in Cuba.
[54] The most recent exercise of that suspension authority came in January of 2003 when President Bush waived the effective date of Title III. See Bush Extends Lawsuit Restriction On Cuba , Associated Press, January 16, 2003.
[55] See Travieso-Diaz, supra note 4.
[56] Id.
[57] For an example of a Title IV enforcement action see <http://www.useu.be/ archive/hb1118.html> (visited March 27, 2003).
[58] The law appears as Title IX to H.R. 5426, 106th Cong. (2000), enacted into law pursuant to Pub. L. 106-387, 114 Stat. 1549 (2000).
[59] See Sean D. Murphy, Reform of U.S. Sanctions Relating to Agriculture and Medicine , 95 Am.J.Int’l L. 413 (2001).
[60] Id.
[61] Id.
[62] CRS Report IB95112, Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy (February 25, 2002), by Rensselaer Lee & Raphael Perl, at 6, available online at <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/9040.pdf> (visited March 15, 2003); U.S. Releases List of Nations That Sponsor Terrorism , Associated Press, May 22, 2002.
[63] See Sean D. Murphy, supra note 59.
[64] Id.
[65] See Sean D. Murphy, supra note 59.
[66] A detailed description of the licensing procedure is available online at <http://www.bxa.doc.gov/factsheets/TSRAnExpEnhanceActFactSheet122101.html#PriorNotificationProcedures> (visited March 15, 2003).
[67] See Sean D. Murphy, supra note 59.
[68] Id.
[69] Id.
[70] See Cubans March Against U.S. Bill on Embargo , Associated Press, October 19, 2000 (noting that Castro led a protest march to voice opposition to the bill’s prohibition on U.S. financing).
[71] See David Gonzalez, Cuba Receives U.S. Shipment, First Purchase Since Embargo , The New York Times, December 17, 2001, at A10 (noting that ever since passage of TSREEA, Castro has insisted that his country would not buy “even a grain of rice” until financing restrictions are lifted).
[72] See Rafael Lorente & Vanessa Bauza, Cuba Wants to Buy U.S. Food; Havana Rejects American Offer of Humanitarian Assistance, Relief , Sun-Sentinel, November 10, 2001, at 1A.
[73] Id. Hurricane Michelle was a Category 4 storm, and was reported to be the worst hurricane to hit Cuba in over 50 years.
[74] Id.
[75] As noted above, this was seen as a significant departure from Cuba’s previous stance. After all, only a year earlier upon passage of TSREEA in October 2000, Fidel Castro had stated that Cuba would not purchase “a single grain of rice” from the United States. Now, he was offering to make a “one-time” purchase.
[76] See Four U.S. Companies Sign the First Trade Deals with Cuba , Reuters, November 22, 2001; See also David Gonzalez, Cuba Receives U.S. Shipment, First Purchase Since Embargo , The New York Times, December 17, 2001, at A10.
[77] See Four U.S. Companies Sign the First Trade Deals with Cuba , Reuters, November 22, 2001. The four U.S. companies were Archer Daniels Midland, ConAgra, Riceland Foods, and Cargill.
[78] See note 71, supra.
[79] See Vanessa Bauza & Rafael Lorente, Castro’s Changes Style Over Substance; Cuban Leader Playing Nice To Get Embargo Lifted, But Real Reforms Not Likely , Sun-Sentinel, February 24, 2002 (noting that “experts say Castro’s positions are designed to make an end run around the White House and influence U.S. public opinion and legislators directly”). Similar views have been expressed by social scientists: “‘This is a public relations campaign for the outside with very little change on the island,’ said Damian Fernandez, head of Florida International University's Department of International Relations and author of Cuba and the Politics of Passion . ‘I think they [Castro's government] are serious now about lifting the embargo. The risks are minimal for Cuba. It will be a triumph for the regime and a respite for the population.’“ Id.
[80] There is evidence that John Kavulich of the U.S-Cuba Trade and Economic Council may have played a not so insignificant role in advising Cuba on this strategy. See e.g., Maria C. Werlau, Foreign Investment in Cuba: The Limits of Commercial Engagement , World Affairs Vol. 160 pp. 51-69, footnote 5, (Fall 1997), available online at <http://www.csupomona.edu/~jmvadi/Cuba_ CLS452/Werlau_economy_Cuba.htm > (visited March 15, 2003) (noting that “[f]ounded in June 1994 as a non-profit organization, it [the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, headed by John Kavulich] does not take official positions vis-à-vis Cuba policies as its tax status precludes advocacy. In July 1996, the council had 138 members. Mr. Kavulich explains that the secrecy surrounding the council's membership since its inception is for ‘competitive reasons.’ The Cuban press has reported that Mr. Kavulich is ‘the main bridge between U.S. businessmen and Fidel Castro's government’ and has ‘a special mission to open avenues, dissipate doubts, show the cracks through which to penetrate the wall of the blockade.’ Telephone conversations of July 1996 with Mr. Kavulich; ‘Why the Council Was Established,’ U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council”); See also Peter Slevin, Pursuing An Opening to Cuba , The Washington Post, March 9, 2002 (quoting Kavulich as saying that the purchases are “clearly designed to have a political effect. . .Cuba has discovered that providing a constituency with economic value has more immediate impact than does rhetoric”).
[81] In recent years, the Cuban-American exile community has grown increasingly divided. While many members of the old guard persist in their arguably inflexible hard-line views toward Cuba, a new generation of young, highly educated Cuban-American professionals—who bring with them fresh ideas and perspectives—has emerged and begun to challenge the wisdom of what they consider outdated and ineffective policies. See generally Andres Oppenheimer, Poll Says Exiles Shifting From Hard-Line Positions , The Miami Herald, May 16, 2002; See also Andrea Elliott & Elaine De Valle, Cuban Exiles Shifting Hard-Line Position, Polls: Dialogue, Dissidents Backed , The Miami Herald, February 12, 2003; Dana Canedy, Cuban Exiles Finding Spirit Of Reconciliation , The New York Times, March 23, 2003.
[82] At the Twelfth Annual Meeting of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy in August 2002, the author heard John Kavulich state in a speech that Cuba’s current strategy stemmed from a realization that the way to really grab the attention of influential U.S. policy makers—and circumvent vociferous opponents of further relaxation of trade sanctions—was to drop the loud rhetoric and begin making food purchases from U.S. vendors, who would then themselves exert pressure on their elected representatives for further easing of trade and travel restrictions.
[83] See Food, Drug Industries Size Up Cuba Market , Associated Press, January 25, 2002. This article notes that although Fidel Castro had stated repeatedly that the food purchases made in late 2001 were a one-time deal, “it was notable when Pedro Alvarez, president of Cuba's food import enterprise, said this week that Cuba could buy more U.S. farm products if it receives encouraging signs from Washington. It was the first time a Cuban official had indicated the communist government would consider buying more U.S. food.”
[84] See Cuba Buys $32 Million More In U.S. Food Products , Reuters, March 4, 2002; See also Anthony DePalma, Cuban Cash Reopens U.S. Food Trade , New York Times, February 14, 2002.
[85] During the first few months of 2002, hardly a month would pass during which the American press would not report on VIPs visiting Cuba at the invitation of the Cuban government. See e.g., Group Studying U.S. Policy Toward Cuba Ends Visit To Island Nation , Associated Press, January 21, 2002, (noting that members of the delegation included, inter alia, former Texas Governor Ann Richards and Alexander F. Watson, former Assistant U.S. Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs); See e.g., Farm States Want Trade With Cuba , Associated Press, February 19, 2002, (noting that in February of 2002 alone, congressmen from 21 different states attended a Cuba trade conference); See e.g., House Members Travel to Cuba , Associated Press, April 11, 2002, (noting the visit to Cuba of Representatives Charles Rangel (D-NY) and Marcy Kaptur (D-OH), and reporting that the meeting’s stated purpose was “to have business people get a better understanding of the opportunities in Cuba”).
[86] See Anita Snow, U.S. Lawmakers Break Bread With Castro; Seek End of Embargo Against Communist Island , Associated Press, February 12, 2002.
[87] Id . The article describes the Congressional delegation that consisted, among others, of Representatives Diane Watson (D-CA), Sam Farr (D-CA), Mike Thompson (D-CA), and Bob Filner (D-CA). Also invited were representatives of California’s rice and wine industries. The article further notes that their dinner with Castro at the Palace of the Revolution lasted from about 9:00pm on Sunday to about 4:30am on Monday. See also , Castro Delighted With Carter Trip, Senator Says , Reuters, April 22, 2002 (quoting a member of Senator Barbara Boxer’s delegation who said that this was the third time in 2002 that he had sat in on a meeting between Castro and U.S. lawmakers: “‘The drill was the same. They call you to the Revolution Palace in the evening. First, you have cocktails and chat, then a formal meeting, and after that is over, you have dinner until early the next morning,’ he said. ‘Castro is ingratiating and attentive. It is a charm offensive. He gives long answers to every question, but he is a good politician and manages to look you in the eye as he gives them,’ said the delegation member, who asked not to identified”).
[88] See generally , Anita Snow, Study Says U.S. Farmers Losing From Sanctions On Cuba , Associated Press, January 28, 2002; Jay Hughes, Farm States Want Trade With Cuba , Associated Press, February 20, 2002; Peter Slevin, Pursuing An Opening to Cuba , Washington Post, March 9, 2002; Lawmakers Seek Cuba Policy Reforms , Associated Press, March 21, 2002; Nancy San Martin, U.S. Food Sales To Cuba Far Exceed Planned Amount , The Miami Herald, April 3, 2002; Tim Padgett & Dolly Mascarenas, What Castro Wants, Motivated Partly By Regret, He's Making An Effort To Get The U.S. Embargo Lifted , Time, May 27, 2002.
[89] For additional information see the Cuba Policy Foundation’s web-site available online at <http://www.cubafoundation.org> (visited March 20, 2003).
[90] See note 140, infra.
[91] The press release announcing its creation is available online at <http://www.house.gov/lynch/Newsroom/2002_03/3_21_02_pr_cuba_working_group.htm> (visited March 21, 2003).
[92] As of June 10, 2002 the group consisted of twenty-two Democrats and twenty-two Republicans. The Democratic members are: William Delahunt (MA), Tim Roemer (IN), Neil Abercrombie (HI), Howard Berman (CA), Marion Berry (AR), William Clay (MO), Peter DeFazio (OR), Sam Farr (CA), Nick Lampson (TX), Stephen Lynch (MA), Jim McGovern (MA), Collin Peterson (MN), Charles Rangel (NY), Vic Snyder (AR), Hilda Solis (CA), Mike Thompson (CA), Charlie Stenholm (TX), Mike Ross (AR), Cal Dooley (CA), John Tanner (TN), Edolphus Towns (NY), Tammy Baldwin (WI). The Republican members are: George Nethercutt (WA), Jo Ann Emerson (MO), Jeff Flake (AZ), John Boozman (AR), Kevin Brady (TX), Ray LaHood (IL), Jim Leach (IA), Jerry Moran (KS), Tom Osborne (NE), Butch Otter (ID), Ron Paul (TX), Jim Ramstad (MN), Dennis Rehberg (MT), Chris Shays (CT), Nick Smith (MI), John Thune (SD), Wally Herger (CA), Sam Graves (MO), Tim Johnson (IL), John Shimkus (IL), Dave Camp (MI), Paul Ryan (WI). More information on the Cuba Working Group is available online at <http://www.lawg.org/cwg.htm> (visited March 21, 2003). In late March 2003, several Senators also formed their own Cuba Working Group to work alongside the House’s Cuba Working Group. See Senators Form Group To Fight Cuba Embargo , Reuters, March 22, 2003.
[93] See <http://www.house.gov/lynch/Newsroom/ 2002_03/3_21_02_pr_cuba_ working_group.htm> (visited March 21, 2003); Additional information on these issues can be obtained from the Cuba Policy Foundation—the self-proclaimed “leading anti-embargo organization”—at <http://www.cubafoundation.org> (visited March 21, 2003). In fact, as the CPF Brochure indicates, the Cuba Policy Foundation has essentially functioned as the CWG’s public relations arm. See note 140, infra.
[94] See Karen DeYoung, Cuban Travel Ban Questioned In Hearing , The Washington Post, February 12, 2002; Peter Slevin, Pursuing An Opening to Cuba , The Washington Post, March 9, 2002.
[95] See Karen DeYoung, Cuban Travel Ban Questioned In Hearing , The Washington Post, February 12, 2002
[96] See Carter Announces Plans To Visit Cuba , Associated Press, March 23, 2002; Carter Ready To Head To Cuba , Associated Press, April 18, 2002.
[97] See Carter’s Trip To Cuba Is Symbolic , Editorial, St. Petersburg Times, March 30, 2002.
[98] See Carter Announces Plans To Visit Cuba , Associated Press, March 23, 2002.
[99] See Sources Say Carter Will Visit Havana , Reuters, April 9, 2002 (quoting Castro as saying “We want him to see our country, not so that he supports us or anything like that, indeed so that he may make all the criticisms he wants. If he wants, we'll fill Revolution Square so they can criticize us as much as they want, because we are so convinced of the moral, ethical, ideological, political and human strength of our revolution”).
[100] See Armando A. Musa, On Crossing The Strait To Cuba (Letter to the Editor) , The New York Times, May 17, 2002.
[101] See Oscar Corral, Dissidents’ Petition Gets Signatures In Cuba , The Miami Herald, March 6, 2002.
[102] See A Cuban Petition , Editorial, The Washington Post, May 1, 2002, at A24; See also Armando A. Musa, Castro, At Harvard, Showed True Stripes , The Miami Herald, July 6, 2002, at B7. The full text of the Varela Project, translated into English by The Miami Herald, is available online at <http://www.miami. com/mld/miamiherald/news/world/cuba/5253124.htm> (visited March 22, 2003).
[103] See Oscar Corral, supra note 99; See also Kevin Sullivan, Anti-Castro Forces Mount Petition Drive , The Washington Post, April 28, 2002, at A24.
[104] See Cuban Activists Deliver Petitions , Associated Press, May 10, 2002.
[105] Indeed, the international recognition received by the Varela Project was so great that its chief organizer, Oswaldo Paya, was awarded the European Union’s top human rights prize, the Zakharov Award, in December 2002 for his efforts at promoting a peaceful change towards democracy in Cuba. See EU Honors Cuban Dissident, Backs Fight For Democracy , Associated Press, December 18, 2002. Prior to Carter’s visit, the Varela Project had received only minor press coverage in the United States and abroad.
[106] See Cuba’s Two Petitions , The Washington Post, June 19, 2002, at A20.
[107] See David Gonzalez, In Address To The Cuban Nation, Carter Urges Reform , The New York Times, May 14, 2002.
[108] Id.
[109] For details of the extravagance, See Nancy San Martin, U.S. Firms Seek Sales In Cuba With Food Fair , The Miami Herald, August 24, 2002.
[110] See Cubans Have Big Appetite for U.S. Food , Reuters, September 8, 2002 (noting that “agribusiness giants such as Archer Daniels Midland, Cargill and Hormel Foods were among more than 150 companies participating, as [was] maverick Minnesota Gov. Jesse Ventura. The U.S. Meat Export Federation, U.S.A. Rice Federation, other national farm groups and at least 10 state agriculture departments and various ports and shipping companies [were] also on hand for the four-day event”).
[111] See Nancy San Martin, U.S. Firms Seek Sales In Cuba With Food Fair , The Miami Herald, August 24, 2002; Cubans Have Big Appetite for U.S. Food , Reuters, September 8, 2002; Larry Luxner, Dozens Of FL Firms Going To Cuba Expo , Cubanews, September 25, 2002; Kevin Sullivan, At Havana Trade Show, They’re Talkin’ Turkey , The Washington Post, September 26, 2002 at A23; Castro Ready To Buy More U.S. Food , Associated Press, September 27, 2002; U.S. Envoy Tours Cuba After “Poisonous” Comment , Reuters, September 28, 2002.
[112] See Lizette Alvarez, U.S. Agribusiness Peddles To The Proletariat In Cuba , The New York Times, September 27, 2002 (noting that “As Mr. Castro meandered through the hall, sipping red wine from California, feeding baby bison from the Midwest and chatting with vendors, American companies hawked everything from M&M's and Sara Lee cake to soy burgers in hope of bringing home new business. At the very least, these farmers and agribusiness giants — a powerful bloc that has chipped away at a 40-year embargo and persuaded Congress to funnel billions of dollars to the industry — hope for a public relations victory by showing that one can trade with Cuba, a nearby market with 11 million people to feed. The scene in the exhibition hall seemed strangely dissonant. Men dressed like M&M's and cans of Spam drifted past workers who noshed, happily and greedily, on the snacks and drinks offered at the booths. There were boxes of corn flakes, tubs of chocolate ice cream, slices of creamy cake, sausages, cheese, bacon and thick roast beef, all of it a feast to Cuban eyes.
‘It is all very, very good,’ chuckled Benito Barzaga, a worker at the exhibition, a glass of free wine in his hand. ‘Especially the meat. Sheesh.’ He was among the few Cubans allowed to see the show, to which access was restricted to selected officials from industries like the hotel trade that might buy the products”).
[113] Id.
[114] See Larry Luxner, Dozens Of FL Firms Going To Cuba Expo , Cubanews, September 25, 2002 (noting that “Alvarez [the head of Cuba’s state-controlled food import company Alimport] said Cuba currently purchases $1 billion in food products annually, of which U.S. food purchases comprise only 13.3 percent.
But total purchases could reach $1.5 billion by 2005, he said, ‘and if restrictions on travel to Cuba for U.S. citizens were lifted, this volume would be higher’”).
[115] See Nancy San Martin, U.S. Firms Seek Sales In Cuba With Food Fair , The Miami Herald, August 24, 2002; U.S.-Cuba Trade Grows Despite Restrictions , Reuters, February 17, 2003; The Americans Have Come , The Economist, January 2, 2003.
[116] See Anita Snow, So Who’s Putting Food On Cuba’s Table? USA , Associated Press, March 1, 2003 (quoting John Kavulich as saying, inter alia, “the U.S. is likely to remain Cuba’s primary source of imported agricultural products . . . as long as Cuba has a political reason to keep buying, it will”). USDA figures indicate that for the first nine months of 2002, the number two and three sources of farm product imports to Cuba were China and France, respectively.
[117] That is a topic for another paper.
[118] A fourth argument frequently used focuses on the Cuban government’s human rights violations as a justification for trade sanctions.
[119] See George Gedda, State Department Sees No Thaw In Relations With Cuba Within Near Future , Associated Press, January 29, 2002.
[120] See Christopher Marquis, Bush Hires Hard-Liners To Handle Cuba Policy , The New York Times, February 3, 2002.
[121] See Tracey Eaton, American Diplomat In Havana Says Cuba Can’t Charm It Into Easing Embargo , The Dallas Morning News, February 8, 2002.
[122] See Andres Oppenheimer & Tim Johnson, U.S. Policy On Cuba To Receive Full Review , The Miami Herald, March 8, 2002 (noting that the Bush Administration has ordered what it calls “the first comprehensive review of U.S. policy toward Cuba in several years . . . and thus is not likely to loosen the embargo—a position that would have Congress and the White House headed in opposite directions”).
[123] See Debt Defaults Hurt Cuba’s Credit Rating: Cuba’s Credit History Is Not One To Envy , The Miami Herald, April 8, 2002.
[124] See Juan O. Tamayo, Cuba’s Last Gamble , The Miami Herald, April 8, 2002 (noting that “some observers say Cuba's recent purchase from American farmers of about $73 million in food products may be a last-ditch effort to persuade Washington to lift the 40-year-old trade embargo, including a ban on trade credits. ‘It's a Hail Mary pass, bottom of the ninth, the end of the fourth quarter,’ said one U.S. businessman who monitors the Cuban economy. ‘To take $70 million and buy from us when other countries are going unpaid, they are betting the proverbial farm on the U.S. agricultural lobby in Congress’”).
[125] For a series of snippets from news articles addressing Cuba’s credit woes, see Cuba Issue Brief: The Deadbeat Dictator: Why Business Deals With Castro Are A Losing Proposition , available online at <http://www.canf.org/Issues /deadbeatdictator.htm> (visited March 26, 2003).
[126] See The Disaster Is Now “Irrevocable” , The Economist, July 4, 2002 (noting that “It's not easy for foreigners to do business here. Cuba, out of necessity, has allowed capitalism into its socialist system. But it then keeps capitalism down, as it feels it must, with a mass of complex and sometimes contradictory rules and regulations. Just when foreigners find out how things work, the rules change again”).
[127] For an excellent debate hosted by the Cato Institute on this and related issues and arguments, seeWill U.S. Trade With Cuba Promote Freedom Or Subsidize Tyranny? July 25, 2002 available online in real audio at
< http://www.cato.org/events/020725pf.html> (visited March 26, 2003).
[128] For example, in a trip to Iran in May of 2001, Castro said "Iran and Cuba, in cooperation with each other, can bring America to its knees . The US regime is very weak, and we are witnessing this weakness from close up.” (emphasis added ). Iran And Cuba Bolster Ties, Strengthen Anti-U.S. Solidarity , Agence France Presse, May 10, 2001.
[129] See Tim Johnson, Accused Spy For Cuba May Cut Plea Deal , The Miami Herald, March 15, 2002; Neely Tucker, Defense Analyst Pleads Guilty As Spy , The Washington Post, March 19, 2002; Tim Golden, Pentagon’s Top Cuba Expert Pleads Guilty To Espionage , The New York Times, March 20, 2002; John J. Miller, In Castro’s Service , National Review, March 20, 2002; Tim Golden, White House Wary Of Cuba’s Little Spy Engine That Could , The New York Times, January 5, 2003.
[130] See Cuba May Have Bio Warfare Program , Associated Press, May 6, 2002; Judith Miller, Washington Accuses Cuba Of Germ Warfare , The New York Times, May 7, 2002.
[131] See Karen DeYoung, Cuban Travel Ban Questioned In Hearing , Washington Post, February 12, 2002; Lawmakers Seek Cuba Policy Reforms , Associated Press, March 21, 2002; Christopher Marquis & Eric Schmitt, Bush Under Pressure From Congress To Alter Cuba Policy , The New York Times, May 20, 2002; Jimmy Carter, Opening To Cuba, We Must Find A Common Ground , The Washington Post, May 24, 2002, at A35; See also the debate referenced supra note 127.
[132] See Juan O. Tamayo, Report Cites U.S. Benefits Of Cuba Trade , The Miami Herald, January 28, 2002; Anita Snow, Study Says U.S. Farmers Losing From Sanctions On Cuba , Associated Press, January 28, 2002; See also the Cuba Policy Foundation’s CPF Brochure available online at <http://www.cubafoundation.org> (visited March 20, 2003).
[133] See Analysis: U.S. Charges of Cuban Bio-Weapons Draw Skepticism , Reuters, May 12, 2002; Carter Sees No Threat in Cuba Biotech Research , Reuters, May 13, 2002; Powell Eases Off U.S. Accusation On Cuba Weapons , Reuters, May 13, 2002; Tim Johnson, Report Mum On Bio-Threat: U.S. Omits Reference To Cuba , The Miami Herald, May 22, 2002.
[134] The President’s remarks on the Cuba Policy Review are available online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020520-1.html> (visited March 26, 2003).
[135] Juan O. Tamayo, Critics Argue “New” Policy Will Bolster Cuban Leader , The Miami Herald, May 21, 2002.
[136] See Common Sense on Cuba , Editorial, The Washington Post, May 27, 2002 at A22; Fred Barnes, The Bush Doctrine Comes To Cuba , The Weekly Standard, July 15, 2002; Jay Nordlinger, A Cuba Policy To Cheer , National Review, May 21, 2002.
[137] See Mary Speck, Cash-and-Carry Resistance , The Washington Post, June 3, 2002 at A15; No Cuba Libre, No Trade , Editorial, The New York Times, May 21, 2002.
[138] See Adam Cohen, Two Things Linger In Cuba: Fidel And A Pointless Embargo , The New York Times, January 12, 2003.
[139] For a good summary of the argument that Castro really does not want to have the embargo lifted because the embargo provides him with an available scapegoat for the ills of his failed political and economic policies, see the debate referenced supra note 127.
[140] For a description of the Cuba Policy Foundation’s highly successful aggressive media strategy to influence American public opinion, see the CPF Brochure available online at <http://www.cubafoundation.org> (visited March 20, 2003).
[141] See David Luhnow, Castro Regime Continues Crackdown On Dissidents , The Wall Street Journal, March 24, 2003 (noting that “The timing suggests that Mr. Castro is acting while the world is distracted by the Iraq war. ‘Human rights in Cuba can therefore be viewed as one of the first cases of collateral damage in the second Gulf war,’ said Robert Menard, head of the Paris-based Reporters Without Borders rights group. The arrests also cast a shadow on efforts in the U.S. to end the decades-old trade embargo against the island. On Friday, 10 U.S. senators from both sides of the aisle formed an informal group to fight the trade embargo, arguing it costs U.S. businesses and farmers more than $1 billion a year in lost sales. And only a few weeks from now, Cuba is also scheduled to host a meeting with moderate Cuban emigres that Havana hopes to use as a lobbying tool to end the U.S. trade and travel restrictions”); Nancy San Martin, Cuba Expands Crackdown, More Prominent Critics Jailed , The Miami Herald, March 21, 2003.
[142] Tim Cornwell, Cuban Arrests In New Feud With The U.S. , The Scotsman, March 20, 2003 (noting that Carter “said he was disappointed with progress since his visit to the island ten months ago”); Mary Anastasia O’Grady, The U.S. Is Busy, So Castro Fills His Jails , The Wall Street Journal, March 28, 2003.