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The Effectiveness of Management-By-Walking-Around: A Randomized Field Study

Anita L. Tucker, Harvard Business School

Sara J. Singer, Harvard School of Public Health

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Abstract

Management-By-Walking-Around (MBWA) is a widely adopted technique in hospitals that involves senior managers directly observing frontline work. However, few studies have rigorously examined its impact on organizational outcomes. This paper examines an improvement program based on MBWA in which senior managers observe frontline employees, solicit ideas about improvement opportunities, and work with staff to resolve the issues. We randomly selected 19 hospitals to implement the 18-month long MBWA-based improvement program; 56 work areas participated. We find that the program, on average, had a negative impact on performance. To explain this surprising finding, we use mixed methods to examine the impact of the work area's problem solving approach. Results suggest that prioritizing easy-to-solve problems was associated with improved performance. We believe this was because it resulted in greater action taking. A different approach was characterized by prioritizing high value problems, which was not successful in our study. We also find that assigning to senior managers responsibility for ensuring that identified problems get resolved resulted in better performance. Overall, our study suggests that senior managers' physical presence on their organizations' frontlines was not helpful unless it enabled active problem solving.

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1. Introduction

Hospitals face an imperative to improve quality of care and decrease medical errors that harm patients. Healthcare thought leaders and policy makers have advocated for the adoption of “Management-By-Walking-Around” (MBWA) to achieve these goals, resulting in widespread adoption in the U.S. and the U.K. (Institute for Healthcare Improvement 2004, National Patient Safety Agency 2011). These types of programs—in which senior managers visit the frontlines to work with staff to identify and resolve obstacles—came to the attention of hospitals with the publication of one healthcare system’s success at improving safety climate through its MBWA-based intervention (Frankel et al. 2003).

Despite the intuitive appeal of MBWA, evidence on the program’s efficacy is mixed. Of seven hospitals that implemented an MBWA-based program, only two sustained the effort over a three-year period (Frankel et al. 2008). Those two reported a positive impact on staff perceptions of safety climate, but the effect on the five aborting hospitals was not reported. A study of one Veterans Affairs hospital found that patient safety climate worsened on two units that implemented the program, while it improved or stayed the same on two control units that did not implement the program (Singer et al. 2013). Another found that hospitals that implemented a general improvement program with an MBWA component did not improve on a variety of measures compared to control hospitals (Benning et al. 2011).

To test more systematically the impact of MBWA-based improvement programs, we implemented one such program in 19 randomly selected hospitals. We compared nurses’ perceptions of improvement in performance in work areas that implemented the program to the same type of areas at 68 randomly selected control hospitals that did not implement the program. Our study thus sheds insight into the program’s generalizability beyond those where senior managers decided on their own to implement such a program. We find that, on average, our MBWA-based program had a *negative* impact on nurse perceptions of performance, suggesting that

senior manager presence on hospital frontlines to solicit improvement ideas could be detrimental to workers' perceptions. However, we find that our MBWA-based program was associated with improved perceptions of performance under two conditions: (1) when a higher percentage of solved problems were considered "easy" to solve, enabling more problem solving, and (2) when senior managers took responsibility for ensuring that identified problems were resolved. This suggests that the action-taking that results from the program, rather than the mere physical presence of the senior managers, is what positively impacts the front line staff.

2. MBWA-based Improvement Program's Impact on Performance

Research has found that quality improvement programs that solicit frontline workers' ideas, such as MBWA, can have a beneficial impact on organizational outcomes (Dow et al. 1999, Powell 1995). MBWA relies on managers to make frequent, learning-oriented visits to their organization's frontlines to observe work and solicit employees' opinions (Packard 1995). Hewlett-Packard, the company in which MBWA originated, attributed its success using MBWA to good listening skills, willing participation, a belief that every job is important and every employee is trustworthy, and a culture where employees felt comfortable raising concerns (Packard 1995). MBWA is similar to the Toyota Production System's "gemba walks" (Mann 2009, Toussaint et al. 2010, Womack 2011). In a gemba walk, managers go to the location where work is performed, observe the process, and to talk with the employees (Mann 2009). The purpose is to see problems in context, which aids problem solution (Mann 2009, Toussaint et al. 2010, Womack 2011).

MBWA has resulted in positive organizational change (Frankel et al. 2003, Pronovost et al. 2004). One explanation is that MBWA leads to successful problem resolution because seeing a problem in context improves managers' understanding of the problem, its negative impact, and its causes; increasing their motivation and ability to work with frontline staff and managers to resolve the issue (Mann 2009, Toussaint et al. 2010, von Hippel 1994, Womack 2011). Theory further

suggests that MBWA's repeated cycles of identifying and resolving problems may create an organizational capability for improvement that reduces the cost of future improvement efforts, creating a positive dynamic (Fine 1986, Fine and Porteus 1989, Ittner et al. 2001). This virtuous cycle is further strengthened because communication from frontline workers about problems aligns manager's perspectives with customers' experiences (Hansen et al. 2010, Hofmann and Mark 2006, Huang et al. 2010, Singer et al. 2009), enabling managers to effectively allocate scarce resources among the organization's multiple improvement opportunities. Performance is also enhanced because managers' presence on the frontlines sends a visible signal that the organization is serious about resolving problems. This increases employees' beliefs that leadership values improvement, which in turn spurs employees to engage in the discretionary behaviors necessary for process improvement (McFadden et al. 2009, Zohar and Luria 2003). For these reasons, we hypothesize that MBWA will positively impact performance.

Hypothesis 1 (H1). *Participation in a MBWA-type program leads to improved performance.*

2.1. The Effect of Problem Solving Approach

Although we hypothesize a positive impact from MBWA, programs that solicit employee suggestions can uncover more problems than an organization can resolve given its limited problem solving resources (Bohn 2000, Frankel et al. 2003, Repenning and Serman 2002). When this happens, the organization's problem-solving support personnel must decide which of the identified issues they will work to resolve and which ones will be ignored or delayed (Keating et al. 1999, Morrison and Repenning 2011). Thus, an MBWA's program's success may be contingent upon which problems the organization decides to address.

One approach to prioritizing problems would be to address issues that are causing—or have the potential to cause—large disruptions. A *high value prioritization approach* ranks problems according to a value score and solves the highest valued problems. This approach is part of many structured approaches to improvement, such as 6-sigma and risk management (Anderson et al. 2013). Hospital

incident reporting systems (Bagian et al. 2001) and MBWA-based programs (Frankel et al. 2003) use this approach to calculate a problem's "value" by multiplying the problem's scores for severity and frequency of occurrence (Bagian et al. 2001, Frankel et al. 2003). The organization would then resolve the highest value problems first, followed by the second highest, continuing until problem solving resources are depleted or remaining problems fall below a threshold value (Bagian et al. 2001). Surfacing and solving these high value problems should yield substantial gain in performance (Bagian et al. 2001, Girotra et al. 2010). This approach ensures that limited resources are preserved for high value problems (Frankel et al. 2003). Prioritizing high-value problems may also be helpful because it enables low value problems to consume few resources, which queuing theory suggests is necessary to prevent the queue of unsolved problems from growing unmanageably long (Bohn 2000). The potential negative impact of not resolving all identified problems is predicted to be low because ignored problems constitute the "trivial many" that do not have a large negative impact on performance (Juran et al. 1999). We thus predict that tending toward a high value prioritization approach will be associated with improved performance.

Hypothesis 2 (H2): Work areas that resolve a higher percentage of high value problems will have greater improvement in performance than work areas that solve a lower percentage of high value problems.

Another approach is to prioritize problems that are easy to solve (Johnson 2003, Reppenning and Sterman 2002). An *easy-to-solve prioritization approach* enables the organization to address problems that are straightforward and quick to remedy—the so-called "low hanging fruit". This approach may free up resources for addressing problems because the more formal approach of assigning a prioritization score based on severity and occurrence has required significant resources in the case of incident reporting systems in both aviation and healthcare (Johnson 2003).

An easy-to-solve prioritization approach may also be helpful because the cumulative benefit of resolving many small problems can add up to be a significant source of improvement (Jimmerson et al. 2005). It may also be that organizations need to address basic, fundamental problems before they

can benefit from trying to address more complex organizational issues. Problem solving efforts are most successful when the organization uses relatively straightforward problems to develop sufficient problem-solving capacity before trying to tackle larger, more complex issues (Keating et al. 1999, Morrison and Reppenning 2011). Addressing easy-to-solve problems enables frequent problem solving cycles, which further develops employees' expertise at problem solving (Adler et al. 2003). These dynamics suggest that organizational problem solving capacity is more like a muscle that strengthens with exercise rather than a resource that gets depleted with use (Fine 1986, Fine and Porteus 1989, Ittner et al. 2001). Finally, research has found that major accidents typically result from an unpredictable combination of small magnitude problems rather than from a single large magnitude problem (Perrow 1984, Reason 2000). According to the "Swiss Cheese Theory," multiple small-scale problems in an organization's defensive layers can align in an unfortunate way that enables an error to harm the customer (Cook and Woods 1994, Reason 2000). Consequently, resolving seemingly low value problems can be beneficial because they otherwise might contribute to the next major accident (Perrow 1984). For these reasons, we hypothesize that tending toward an easy-to-solve prioritization approach will be associated with improved performance.

Hypothesis 3 (H3): Work areas that solve a higher percentage of easy-to-solve problems will have greater improvement in performance than work areas that solve a lower percentage of easy-to-solve problems.

2.2. The Role of Senior Managers in Problem Solving

Advocates have proposed that successful MBWA implementation requires senior managers to take responsibility for ensuring that problems are resolved (Frankel et al. 2005, Pronovost et al. 2004).

This recommendation would seem to contradict the quality improvement literature, which emphasizes frontline employees' involvement in identifying and resolving issues (Jimmerson et al. 2005). However, quality improvement research has found that both manager support and employee engagement are necessary (Dow et al. 1999, Kaplan et al. 2012, Samson and Terziovski 1999).


Senior managers can be helpful to frontline workers' resolution efforts because they control financial

resources needed to address issues that involve capital investment (Carroll et al. 2006). They also possess the perspective necessary to solve problems that cross organizational boundaries (MacDuffie 1997). Furthermore, resolving problems requires that people take time away from their direct production responsibilities (Repenning and Sterman 2002, Victor et al. 2000), which can be difficult for frontline employees. Senior managers can authorize frontline workers to spend time on resolution efforts (Repenning and Sterman 2002). Therefore, we hypothesize that assigning to senior managers the responsibility for ensuring that a problem gets addressed will achieve better results.

Hypothesis 4 (H4). Work areas with a higher percentage of problems assigned to a senior manager to ensure resolution exhibit greater improvement than those with a lower percentage of problems assigned to a senior manager.

These four hypotheses outline the theoretical links between our MBWA-based program and improved performance. **Figure 1** depicts these relationships.

Figure 1. Model of Management-By-Walking-Around’s Impact on Performance



3. Methodology

We test our hypotheses in a field study of U.S. hospitals randomly selected to participate in a patient safety research study, with a subset of the hospitals randomly selected (a second time) to implement our MBWA-based program. The program was launched in January 2005 and lasted for 18 months.

3.1 The MBWA-based Program

We drew on prior research to design our MBWA-based program (Frankel et al. 2008, Pronovost et al. 2004, Thomas et al. 2005). It consisted of repeated cycles of senior manager-staff interaction, debriefing, problem solving, and follow up. Senior managers, such as the Chief Executive, Operating, Medical, and Nursing Officers (CEO, COO, CMO, and CNO, respectively), interacted with frontline staff in a work area to generate, select, and solve improvement ideas. The work area manager was also involved in the selection and solution activities. Senior manager interactions took two forms: visits, called “work system visits,” to work areas to observe frontline work; and special meetings, called “safety forums,” with a larger group of frontline staff from the area to discuss safety concerns. The activities were coordinated with the work area manager.

In work system visits, four senior managers would spend 30 minutes to two hours visiting the same work area. The senior managers would each observe a different process, such as medication administration, or a different person, such as a nurse or physician, to shed cross-disciplinary insight into the work done in the area. The purpose was to build senior managers’ understanding of the frontline work context and gather grounded information about problems (Frankel et al. 2008).


Senior managers also facilitated a safety forum in the work area, which was an informal meeting between senior managers and the frontline staff from the work area, held in the work area, during which the staff talked about their work area’s safety weaknesses and strengths. We added this component to our MBWA-based intervention for two reasons. First, a San Diego children’s hospital improved its organizational climate by holding meetings where frontline staff spoke directly to the hospital CEO about their concerns and ideas (Sobo and Sadler 2002). Second, research found

that an MBWA-based program only succeeded in improving the perceptions of frontline staff who participated in a work system visit (Thomas et al. 2005), which suggested that relying only on work system visits might be insufficient to change organizational climate.

The MBWA-based program continued with a “debrief meeting,” which organized information collected from the work system visits and safety forums. Senior managers attended, as did work area managers, selected frontline workers, and the hospitals’ patient safety officers. The group compiled the improvement ideas identified, discussed and in some work areas prioritized them, and decided next steps, ranging from doing nothing to suggesting solutions and assigning responsibility. Action to address problems selected for resolution followed the debriefing. Managers were encouraged to communicate with staff about implementation efforts, describing what changes, if any, were made in response to identified ideas. Patient safety officers entered the ideas generated and actions taken into an electronic spreadsheet we provided and sent this spreadsheet to our research team for analysis.

Each round of work system visits, safety forums, debrief meeting, solution activities, and communication constituted one cycle. A cycle focused on one work area and took approximately three months, which research has shown is the time required to solve problems in an organization (Pronovost et al. 2004). See **Figure 2** for a diagram of the process. After completing a cycle, the management team would repeat the activities in a different work area. The program focused on the four main work areas in hospitals: operating room or post anesthesia care unit (OR/PACU), intensive care unit (ICU), emergency department (ED), and medical or surgical ward (Med/Surg). Cycles continued over the 18-month implementation, with hospitals conducting an average of one cycle in four work areas.

Figure 2. Depiction of the MBWA-based Program Activities in a Work Area



3.2 Recruitment

Our study employed an experimental design, which included a pre-test and post-test of similar work areas in treatment and control hospitals. We randomly selected 92 U.S. acute-care hospitals, stratified by size and geographic region, to participate in a patient safety climate survey. We provided no financial incentive, but participation in the safety climate study fulfilled a national accreditation requirement. At enrollment, all hospitals were aware that they may be invited to participate in a program to improve patient safety, but details regarding the program were withheld to prevent contamination of control hospitals. To select hospitals to participate in the MBWA-based program, we drew a second, stratified, random sample of 24 hospitals from the sample of 92. The remaining 68 hospitals not selected were control hospitals. Data on staff perceptions of performance were collected at control and treatment hospitals through surveys before implementation of program activities (2004, “pre”) and again after the program was completed (2006, “post”). At each hospital, we surveyed a random 10% sample of frontline workers, with additional oversampling in OR/PACUs, EDs, and ICUs in the post survey period to improve sample size. The baseline “pre”

response rate was 52%; and the follow-up “post” response rate was 39%. For our analyses, we used data from registered and licensed vocational nurses (n=1,117 pre and n=903 post).

Of the 24 treatment hospitals, 20 completed the program in at least two work areas. Of the four that did not complete the treatment, one went out of business, one was purchased, and two experienced significant senior management turnover. As a result, they were unable to complete more than one cycle of activities and did not provide data. We thus excluded these four from our analysis. There was no difference in staff perceptions of performance in the pre period between the four hospitals that dropped out of the treatment and the 20 that did not. Of the original 68 control hospitals, 48 completed the posttest survey, making an initial total sample of 68 hospitals. There was no difference on survey measures in the pre period between the 20 control hospitals that dropped out of the post survey and remaining hospitals. There was also no difference between treatment and control work areas on pre period measures of staff perceptions of performance.

3.3 Data and Measures

Using the data collection spreadsheet that we provided (Figure 3), treatment work areas reported 1,245 patient-safety problems identified during the visits and forums. Each hospital also provided a list of the senior managers, which we used to determine whether a senior manager attended the program activity and whether a senior manager was assigned responsibility for the problem. The spreadsheet also contained three columns that the work areas could use to prioritize identified problems. Work areas in eight hospitals filled out this information.

Independent Variables. To test the overall impact of the MBWA-based program (H1), we created a treatment variable, “MBWA in the work area,” which indicated whether the work area received the MBWA-based treatment (=1) or was a work area from a control hospital (=0). To test the high value prioritization approach (H2), we calculated a value score for each problem by multiplying problem severity (1 = low; to 10, could cause death) by estimated frequency of occurrence (1 = very unlikely, 3 = very likely) (Bagian et al. 2001, Frankel et al. 2003). This method

for calculating the potential value of solving a problem is similar to six-sigma's risk prioritization number, which uses the product of the scores (on a scale from 1 to 10) of a problem's frequency of occurrence, detectability and severity (Evans and Lindsay 2005). It is also similar to risk registers used for risk management. A risk register scores each potential risk to a project by multiplying the risk's likelihood of occurrence by severity of the impact if it does occur (Anderson et al. 2013). We used our value score in combination with whether or not the problem was addressed to create a unit-level variable that represented the percentage of problems in the top quartile (ranked by value) that were resolved, which we call, "% of top quartile that were resolved." As an alternate test of H2, we also created a dummy variable, "Top ranked problem resolved?" a dichotomous variable that indicated whether or not the top ranked problem in the work area was resolved. The alternate specification for H2 allowed us to test our prediction using innovation literature theory, which asserts that success can come from identifying and solving even just one high value idea (Girotra et al. 2010). To test the easy-to-solve prioritization approach (H3), we calculated, from a work area's set of problems that were resolved, the percentage that were rated "easy-to-solve", a "1" on a 3 point scale, meaning it is was "easy and could be resolved within 30 days". The higher the percentage, the more the unit solved easy-to-solve problems. We called this variable, "% of problems solved that were low hanging fruit." Finally, to test our hypothesis about senior managers (H4), at the work area level we found the percentage of problems for which a chief executive level manager was assigned responsibility for ensuring that the problem was resolved. See **Figure 3** for details on these variables.

Measure. In accordance with prior research (Chandrasekaran and Mishra 2012, Frankel et al. 2003, Frankel et al. 2005, Frankel et al. 2008), we evaluate the program's performance using staff perceptions of improvement in performance ("PIP"). To measure PIP, we used four survey items (see **Appendix 1**) from validated survey instruments that measured the effectiveness of quality improvement efforts (Shortell et al. 1995, Singer et al. 2009). Respondents rated each item using a

Figure 3. Data Collection Sheet Used by Treatment Hospitals and One Problem as an Example

Hospital #	Date of Activity	Activity Type: Worksite Visit or Safety Town Meeting	Participant from executive team	Location	"Hindersers" to patient safety, or system weaknesses observed during worksite visit, or brought up during safety town meeting (one item per row)	Safety Risk 1: Low 3: Mild discomfort 5: Would require intervention 10: Could cause harm or death	Likelihood or frequency of risk 1 = Very unlikely 2 = Possible 3 = Very likely	Ease of implementation 1=Easy, within 30 days 2=Moderate - multiple departments (90 days) 3 = Difficult - process changes and/or major budget (6 months)	Action items or proposed changes to hinderers	Team member(s) responsible for follow up	C-Suite (yes = 1, no = 0)	Date change completed
100	3/16/2006	Worksite Visit	Betsy Green, CNO	Medical/Surgical Unit	Newly diagnosed diabetic patients - insurance and Medicare won't pay for glucometers. Staff concerned about patients' inability to get the devices and their own need to learn many different devices based upon what the patient purchased. The delay decreases the amount of time nursing staff have to teach patients about using the device.	10	2	2	Director of Laboratory Services communicated the need to a vendor of diabetic supplies.	Director of Laboratory Services and CNO	1	Mar-06
another problem of lower value would be here								2			0	
another problem of lower value would be here								2			0	
100	3/14/2006	Worksite Visit	Jen Calhoun, Safety Director	Medical/Surgical Unit	Overbed tables being used to hold Personal Protective Equipment (PPE).	5	1	1	Isolation Carts have been purchased to hold and store PPE outside of patient rooms.	CNO and Director of Medical/Surgical Unit	1	1st cart arrived 03/20/2006

Value = 10*2 = 20
 Top quartile? = 1 (yes)
 Addressed? = 1 (yes)
 Top quartile & addressed? = 1 yes

To test H2: % of the top quartile (of value) that were resolved =100%

To test H3: % of resolved problems that were "easy-to-solve" =50%

To test H4: % of problems assigned to senior manager =50%

5-point scale ranging from 1=strongly disagree to 5=strongly agree. Agreement indicated that respondents thought quality and safety performance were improving. The scale exhibited high reliability (Nunnally 1967), with a Cronbach's alpha of 0.84 (n=1147 nurses) in the pre period and 0.88 (n=1103 nurses) in the post period.

We used perception of performance for four reasons. First, employee perceptions are an important outcome because they influence behaviors, which in turn impact objective measures (Zohar and Luria 2003). Second, staff perceptions of performance are a valid indicator of performance (Ketokivi and Schroeder 2004). This is because employees are close to the work and often know if system failures are decreasing or increasing. Research has found that nurses' perceptions of safety are correlated with objective measures of safety outcomes, such as mortality, readmissions, and length of stay (Hansen et al. 2010, Hofmann and Mark 2006, Huang et al. 2010, Singer et al. 2009). Third, employee perceptions have been widely used as outcome measures in operations management research because they enable comparison across organizations (Anderson et al. 2013, Atuahene-Gima 2003, Bardhan et al. 2012, Chandrasekaran and Mishra 2012, Flynn et al. 1995, Kaynak 2003, Swink et al. 2006). Finally, the use of a perceptual measure was necessitated by hospitals' unwillingness to share data on safety incidents.

Our dependent variable was the *change in PIP* from the pre to the post period. The use of change scores allowed us to examine change over time (Fitzmaurice 2001). To create a composite change score for each work area, we used the pre data to calculate the mean of the four items for each nurse, and then averaged by work area. We repeated this process for the post data, and subtracted each work area's pre score from its post score. We calculated intraclass correlations (ICC) and mean interrater agreement score (r_{WG}) to test whether aggregation of PIP was appropriate. Significant intraclass correlations (ICC[1]=.06, F=5.69, p-value < .000, and ICC[2] = .82) supported aggregation (Bliese 2000). The r_{WG} for nurses' rating of PIP was 0.60, which also was sufficient for aggregation (Zellmer-Bruhn 2003). Furthermore, our use of a change score as our dependent

variables met the two conditions specified by Bergh and Fairbank (2002): the reliabilities of our survey measures for PIP in pre and post periods were high (.84 and .86 respectively) and the correlation between the measures from the two different time periods was low ($\rho=.24$, $p<.001$). As is common in studies using a change score (Bergh and Fairbank 2002), the correlation between the change score and the PIP measure in the pre period was negative ($\rho= -0.67$, $p<.001$). This indicates that there was a greater opportunity for improvement in PIP among work areas with a low PIP in the pre period (Fitzmaurice 2001). Therefore, to control for impact of a work area's starting point on the change in PIP, we included a dichotomous variable indicating whether PIP in the pre period was in the lower quartile ("bottom quartile for 2004 PIP"). The variable was coded "1" if the work area was in the bottom quartile of work areas in PIP in the pre period and "0" for all others. This method enabled us to test for the change in PIP while controlling for a low starting point.

3.3.1 Control Variables. For H1, which tested the overall impact of our MBWA-based program, the large sample size enabled us to include the following control variables: major teaching hospital (1 = yes, 0 = no); Dun & Bradstreet's measure of the hospital's financial stress, with higher numbers indicating a higher likelihood that the business will seek legal relief from creditors or cease operations without paying creditors in full over the next 12 months; and a set of dummy variables for the number of hospital beds (reference group = less than 100 beds; medium = 100 to 250 beds; large = more than 250 beds); a set of dummy variables for type of work area (reference group = non-clinical; OR/PACU; ICU; ED; Med/Surg unit; and other clinical unit). Data on size and teaching came from the 2004 American Hospital Association Survey of Hospitals.

For the hypotheses about problem prioritization (H2 and H3), our sample size was limited to the 24 work areas that formally prioritized their problems in the data collection spreadsheet. As a result, for these hypotheses we did not have a large enough sample size to include non-significant control variables in our regression. However, our random selection of hospitals helps alleviate concerns that our model may be subject to omitted variable bias (Antonakis 2010). We did not include control

variables for unit type (e.g. ED, ICU, OR/PACU) as none were significant and their inclusion did not change our results. We also tested for hospital-level control variables, such as teaching status and number of beds, but none were significant and their inclusion did not change our results. We controlled for availability of “low hanging fruit”, which was the percentage of identified problems that were rated as easy to solve. We also controlled for the average value of the top quartile of identified problems.

Our regression equation for H4, the impact of a senior manager being assigned responsibility for problem resolution, included the full set of 58 intervention work areas. We controlled for the percentage of problems within a work area that were resolved (% of problems resolved) by coding a problem as having had solution effort if there was evidence in the data set that action had been taken to address the problem, and taking the average of this variable at the work area level. We also controlled for the fidelity of implementation with the following variables: the number of work system visits that were conducted, whether a work system visit was conducted by a senior manager (1=yes, 0=no), and whether a safety forum was conducted in the area (1=yes, 0=no).

3.4 Sample Size and Analysis

We used linear regression with robust standard errors and clustered by hospital (Rabe-Hesketh and Everitt 2004) in Stata 11.1™ to test our hypotheses. The Shapiro-Wilk test for all regressions showed that the residuals were normally distributed (V close to 1 and $p > .10$) (Royston 1992). Multicollinearity was also not an issue as all Variance Inflation Factors for all of our equations were less than 2.5, well below the upper threshold of 10 (Chatterjee and Hadi 1986).

To test the overall impact of our MBWA-based program (H1), we use data from the four main clinical work areas (OR/PACU, ICU, ED, Med/Surg). We had data for both pre and post PIP measures from 58 intervention work areas in 20 treatment hospitals and 138 work areas in 48 control hospitals. However, missing data for a control variable (financial stress) in two intervention work areas resulted in a final sample size of 56 intervention work areas. To test the impact of

problem selection (H2, H3), we used data from the 24 work areas from eight treatment hospitals that formally prioritized their problems. Finally, to test the impact of senior manager assignment to problem resolution (H4), we used the full set of intervention work areas (n=58).

3.5 Qualitative Data Collection and Analysis

During the intervention, we visited each treatment hospital to tour the clinical areas, and to observe MBWA activities, including work system visits, safety forums, and debrief meetings. In addition, we discussed and observed examples of changes implemented in response to problems identified through the program to verify accuracy of the data submitted. There were no discrepancies. We also conducted semi-structured interviews with a frontline staff member, a department manager, and the CEO from each hospital (See **Appendix 2**). Interviews addressed the nature of performance improvement in the hospital in general and as it related to implementing the MBWA-based program. Interviews and notes from the meetings were recorded and transcribed. Investigators also wrote a journal of the day's activities from notes taken during the day. The journal and transcripts from each hospital were combined into a single document, which served as our source of qualitative data.

After the intervention was complete, we used these qualitative data in combination with the problem data submitted by the work areas to illuminate differences among work areas in the types of issues identified, actions taken to resolve them, and managers' attitudes. We analyzed transcripts using the procedure described in Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 58-62). We initially used a list of codes based on our interview questions. We read the transcripts multiple times, revising the codes as we deepened our understanding of similarities and contrasts among the implementation of the program. How the managers prioritized problems for solution efforts emerged as a main theme. One author went through the qualitative data to select all relevant quotes for this theme. Both authors independently reviewed the quotes while blinded from the performance results. We compared our perceptions to come to consensus.

4. Results

4.1. Summary Statistics

Average PIP in the 56 treatment work areas was 3.78 in the pre period and 3.69 in the post period. The difference of -.09 was not statistically significant at the 10% significance level. The same four types of work areas (n=138) in control hospitals had a mean PIP of 3.8 in both time periods. **Table 1** shows descriptive statistics. Using the subset of work areas that prioritized their problems (n=24), the mean value score for all identified problems was seven on the scale of 1 (lowest) to 30 (highest). Descriptive statistics and correlations are shown in **Table 2**. On average, the mean value score was 17 for the top quartile of identified problems. The highest score, on average, was about 19.

4.2. Regression Results

Contrary to our prediction, the MBWA-based treatment was associated with a statistically significant *decrease* in PIP (-.17, $p < 0.05$) compared to the same types of work areas in control hospitals (H1, **Table 3**, Model 1). A possible explanation is that some treatment work areas failed to conduct the recommended activities (Nembhard, et. al., 2009). However, the following statistics provide evidence that treatment areas did indeed implement the MBWA-based program: 91% had a work system visit; each treatment work area received a mean of 3.41 visits (SD = 3.16, maximum of 12); 50% had a safety forum; on average, they identified 19 problems and took action on 11 (Table 1).

The effectiveness of the program did vary, however, among work areas. As you can see in Model 1, our control variable for whether or not the work area was in the bottom quartile for pre-period PIP was significant ($\beta = 0.75$, $p < .001$), suggesting that work areas with the lowest PIP scores in the pre-intervention period exhibited a positive change in PIP over the course of the intervention. Additional analysis revealed that the work areas that were in the bottom quartile for our dependent variable, change in PIP, had a decline in PIP ranging from 0.375 to 2.25. Of these 15 work areas that experienced the greatest decline in PIP, four were already below median in the pre-period,

Table 1. Mean, Standard Deviation (SD), and Correlations for Treatment Work Areas (N=56 work areas)

	Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max	1	2	3	4	5
1	Post period PIP	3.69	.61	1.92	5.00					
2	Change in PIP	-0.09	0.67	-2.25	1.33	.639*				
3	Had work system visit	91%	29%	0	1	-.195	-.197			
4	Number of work system visits in area	3.41	3.16	0	12	.055	-.1	.342*		
5	Had safety forum	50%	50%	0	1	.056	.028	-.313*	.097	
6	Percent of problems addressed	62%	31%	0	1	-.088	.079	.083	.043	-.074

* p<0.05

Table 2. Mean, Standard Deviation (SD), and Correlations for Treatment Work Areas and Identified Problems (n=24)

	Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max	1	2	3	4	5	6
1	Change in PIP	.02	.53	-1.17	1.1						
2	Avg value of top quartile of identified problems	17.23	6.67	6	30	.298	1				
3	Highest valued score	18.75	7.43	6	30	.325	.952*	1			
4	Availability of low hanging fruit	36%	26%	0%	100%	-.016	-.305	-.289	1		
5	% of top quartile problems solved	88%	29%	0%	100%	.186	.091	.109	-.045	1	
6	Highest valued problem was solved	88%	34%	0	1	.209	.110	.039	-.086	.799*	
7	% of solved problems that were low hanging fruit	33%	27%	0%	83%	.327	.097	.099	.551*	.432*	.350

* p<0.05

suggesting that their decline was not merely a regression to the mean effect. The work areas in the top quartile of change in PIP experienced an increase in PIP ranging from 0.38 to 1.33 points. This large variation in results prompted us to examine factors associated with success.

Table 3. Linear regression testing Hypothesis 1 (the change in PIP in treatment work areas versus the same types of work areas from control hospitals) clustered by hospital with robust standard errors in parenthesis

	Model 1
H1. Treatment work area (1=yes)	-.17* (.08)
Bottom quartile PIP (pre period)	.75*** (.10)
Major teaching hospital (1=yes)	.21^ (.13)
Financial stress	.00 (.00)
Medium size hospital (100-250 beds)	-.43* (.10)
Large size hospital (>250 beds) (1=yes)	-.26* (.12)
OR/PACU (1=yes)	-.08 (.11)
ICU (1=yes)	.00 (.13)
ED (1=yes)	-.15 (.13)
Was a work system visit conducted?	Not in model
Was a safety forum conducted?	Not in model
Constant	-.02 (.20)
Observations	194
Treatment & control work areas	56 & 138
Degrees of freedom	F(9,55)
F statistic	9.06***
Adjusted R-squared	.20

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^ p<0.10

Model 1 in **Table 4** shows results from testing H2 and H3. A higher percentage of problems solved that were rated as “easy-to-solve” was associated with higher % change in PIP (coefficient = 1.00, p<.05), providing support for H3. A one standard deviation (27%) increase in the percent of solved problems that were easy-to-solve was associated with a 1.0 point increase in change in PIP, which was a 26% improvement. However, the percentage of problems rated in the top quartile for value that were solved was not significant. Thus, H2 is not supported.

Testing H2 using highest value score instead of the mean priority of the top quartile and a dummy for whether the top ranked problem for value was resolved instead of the percentage of problems rated in the top quartile for value that was solved was also not significant (Table 4, Model 2). This result fails to support theory from the innovation literature suggesting that solving the

highest value idea drives performance in our context. However, the percentage of problems resolved that were rated “easy-to-solve” remained significant in this model (coefficient = .82, $p < .01$) providing additional support for H3. Prioritizing easy-to-solve problems appeared to increase PIP.

An alternate explanation for our finding could be that work areas were more successful because they spent more money on problem solving rather than because they prioritized easy problems. To control for this “spend more” explanation, the authors individually rated the rough cost of each solved problem on a scale of 1 to 3 with 1=low (cost \leq \$500), 2=medium (cost $>$ \$500 $<$ \$150,000), and 3=high (cost \geq \$150,000) based on the description of how work areas solved the problem and independent research to check the cost of products or services mentioned in the description. Actual examples of actions and their class of solution cost are: for “1”, apply a coating to one window to improve patient privacy; for “2”, purchase new lighting in a catheterization laboratory to illuminate procedures; and for “3”, hire several new personnel to address patient transportation needs. We compared scores and discussed our rationale until we reached consensus for all solved problems. We then summed the total estimated solution costs, estimating 1 = \$250; 2=\$5000; 3=\$150,000, for all of the solved problems in each work area.

Another possible explanation is that variation in quality of solution efforts impacted the results (e.g. some work areas might have engaged in only superficial steps while others might have systematically resolved underlying causes). We also controlled for this “higher quality” explanation by hiring 10 nurses not affiliated with our study hospitals to rate the solution effectiveness of the proposed solution for each problem using a scale from 1 to 10, with 1 being “no information given” and 10 being “systemic fix” that would prevent recurrence (scale is available from authors). Agreement among nurses on their ratings was acceptable ($\kappa = 0.23$) (Landis and Koch 1977). The mean rating for solution effectiveness was higher at 5.9 for solved problems (“solution action in progress” on our scale) than 2.7 (“no solution implemented”) for unsolved problems, which validates their coding.

Table 4. Regression comparing change in PIP in treatment work areas that rated the severity, frequency, and ease of solution of the problems, clustered by hospital with robust standard errors in parenthesis (H2 and H3)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Mean value of top quartile of identified problems	.02 (.02)	-	-
Highest value score of identified problems	-	.02 (.02)	-
Availability of low hanging fruit	-.60 (.49)	-.45 (.45)	-.90 [^] (.42)
H2. % top quartile value resolved	-.22 (.23)	-	-
H2. Was top-ranked value problem resolved (1=yes)	-	-.01 (.26)	-
H3. % of solved problems that were low hanging fruit	1.00* (.30)	.82** (.21)	1.22* (.46)
Bottom quartile 2004 PIP pre (1=yes)	.39* (.16)	.36 [^] (.19)	.38* (.13)
Cum. cost of solving problems	-	-	.00 (.00)
Avg effectiveness of solution effort	-	-	-.11 (.10)
Constant	-.25 (.48)	-.47 (.46)	.61 (.62)
Observations	24	24	24
Degrees of freedom	F(5,7)	F(5,7)	F(5, 7)
F statistic	10.99**	5.28*	7.08*
Adjusted R-squared	.06	.07	.08

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, [^] p<0.10

Given our small sample size, in this secondary analysis we omitted the high-value prioritization variables, as they were not significant in our primary analyses. As Model 3 shows, the variable for the cumulative “cost of solving problems” was not significant. This may be because work areas could improve PIP without having to spend a lot of money on solutions. Solution effectiveness was also not significant. The percentage of solved problems that were low hanging fruit remained significant (coefficient = 1.22, p<.05), indicating that the results are similar after accounting for spending and solution effectiveness. The evidence in the three models supports H3, which predicted that prioritizing easy-to-solve problems would be associated with higher PIP.

Table 5 shows the results from testing H4, which proposed that senior managers taking responsibility for ensuring that identified problems get resolved would be associated with higher % change in PIP. H4 was supported (coefficient = .79, p<.05). Increasing the percent of problems

assigned to senior managers by one standard deviation (23%) was associated with a 0.79 increase in PIP. This equates to a 21% increase in PIP.

Table 5. Impact of the Percentage of Problems Assigned to Senior Managers on Change in PIP in Treatment Work Areas (H4)

	Model 1
H4. % of problems assigned to senior managers for resolving	.79* (.32)
Bottom quartile PIP pre (1=yes)	.56** (.15)
Percentage problems solved	.12 (.33)
Number of work system visits in the area	-.04 [^] (.02)
Senior manager participated in work system visit (1=yes)	-.12 (.23)
Safety forum in the area (1=yes)	-.12 (.14)
Constant	-.08 (.31)
Observations	58
Degrees of freedom	F(6, 19)
F statistic	2.96*
Adjusted R ²	.10

*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, [^] p<0.10

4.3. Robustness Check

Other scholars have used a different approach for testing improvement over time by using the post measure as the outcome variable and the pre measure as a control variable (Fitzmaurice 2001). We tested our hypotheses using this method and the results were the same (results not shown).

4.4. Qualitative Results

To provide insight into the nature of implementation of MBWA-based programs, **Table 6** presents qualitative data from the five work areas that improved the most and the five that decreased the most. Between pre and post periods, on average PIP improved by .85 for the top five work areas and decreased by 1.4 for the bottom five. Our examination of issues identified and actions taken suggests that the top work areas identified meaningful problems and managers took these problems seriously. For example, Hospital 88's Med/Surg unit was one of the most improved work areas. One of the identified issues was that the small size of the medication room prevented two nurses from preparing medications simultaneously, which was an inconvenience and delayed patient care.

Senior managers discussed the issue with staff and they collectively made a plan to move the medication room to a larger space. The COO commented, “It’s a little thing, but when you actually see them doing the process, you say, ‘Wait a minute, that is difficult for them.’” An interview with a nurse highlighted management’s willingness to address issues. She commented, “These people address safety issues. It may not always get addressed the way you want, but it still gets addressed.”

Conversely, in the bottom work areas, an emphasis on prioritizing the highest valued problems limited solution efforts. For example, Hospital 129’s ED identified valid issues, such as long lead times to receive lab results. However, in the safety forum we observed the manager spend the entire time getting staff input on prioritizing the items, leaving no time to discuss how the issues might be resolved. This work area did not solve any of the problems they had identified, despite investing substantial time in identifying and prioritizing them. As Table 6 shows, this pattern was common. Two of the six bottom work areas did not resolve any problems, another’s “solutions” were largely to re-educate staff, and a fourth area had no information about solved problems. These facts are indicative of their inability to make meaningful progress on solving the problems. The lack of substantive solution efforts exemplifies the potential pitfall of relying too heavily on the high value prioritization approach, which is a lack of action taking. Furthermore, in some of the work areas in the bottom quartile for change in PIP scores, such as Hospital 34’s OR/PACU and Hospital 65’s ED, identified issues had to be validated by an external group, such as the patient safety committee, before resolution efforts would be authorized. This additional step substantially slowed the pace of change. Hospital 65’s CEO explained his prioritization philosophy, “You can’t fix them all, but you have to prioritize. Our patient safety committee will end up doing that.” However, the safety officer from that hospital explained the negative effect this had on staff’s perceptions, “**What happens is you heighten the awareness among people and then, if they don’t see resolutions, then it becomes a bone of contention.**”

Table 6. Illustrative Problems, Solutions, and Quotes from Top and Bottom Quartile Work Areas

Hosp ID	Work Area	2004 Score	2006 Score	% Change	Examples	Solution Efforts	Illustrative Quotes and Examples about Prioritization
116	OR/ PACU	3.3	4.6	41%	Need more clinic space	Made new clinic rooms	The associates will prioritize with the managers, who have a good idea of what the staff want to do.
100	Med/ Surg	2.6	3.6	38%	Newly diagnosed diabetic patients can't get glucometers from insurance; buy different kinds, hard for nurses to teach.	Vendor donated glucometers, in-serviced nurses, made kits for newly diagnosed diabetic patients	Manager ordered new isolation carts to keep supplies for each patient outside the door to prevent spread of MRSA.
88	Med/ Surg	3.6	4.7	31%	Medication room is very small for 2 people	After discussing with staff, changed medication preparation to a larger room.	These people address safety issues. It may not always get addressed the way you want it to, but it still gets addressed.
47	ED	3.0	3.8	28%	Need prompt response from pharmacy for selected meds; need lift equipment for obese patients; Pyxis# IT display disposed to medication	Installed phone system with priority access to pharmacy; identified or added lift equipment; reprogrammed	We understand what needs to be done - trying to get rid of verbal orders, trying to set up our Pyxis machine differently.
39	ED	4.0	5.0	25%	Feel like "dumping ground" when the clinic closes; Roof leaks, Need more blood pressure machines	Relocated clinic in to expand ED patients; hired additional ED staff; fixed roof; provided blood pressure equipment	Nurse almost gave wrong medication because two similar drugs next to each other in Pyxis. Told CNO. Pharmacist came up right away and changed
34	OR/ PACU	5.0	3.8	-25%	OR table not safe for bariatric patients; insufficient checking of patient labs prior to surgery	No solutions listed	Anyone can submit safety idea to their vice-president. It gets sent out for review to applicable departments.
119	OR/ PACU	3.8	2.6	-31%	Need exhaust air, some equipment (chairs), back up of patients in ED, beds not ready	Changes to improve air, equipment ordered or repaired, working on flow in ED	It is hard to find the time and energy [to sustain this program] because there are other demands that pour in.
129	ED	4.4	3.0	-31%	Long lead times for radiology and lab, ties up rooms, long waits in ED, units not taking patients	No solutions listed.	Spent 30 minutes deciding on priority scores with no discussion of actions to resolve them.
9	ED	2.9	1.9	-33%	13/22 problems were audit items by managers such as: Not washing hands, leaving cabinet unlocked	Nine solutions were to "educate staff."	No data about their solution efforts.
65	ED	4.3	2.0	-53%	Police bringing in dangerous patients with only two people on at night	Talk to police department about patients, have security cameras and panic buttons	You can't fix them all, but you have to prioritize. Our patient safety committee will end up doing that.

Pyxis™ is an automated medication dispensing device used by nurses to administer medications to their patients.

5. Discussion, Implications and Limitations

In this paper we investigated the effectiveness of an MBWA-based program in randomly selected hospitals. We found evidence that participating in this particular program decreased performance on average. Given that many quality-improvement initiatives fail to achieve expected gains (Beer 2003, Nair 2006, Repenning and Sterman 2002), it is perhaps not surprising that our program failed to yield positive results for all work areas. Nonetheless, this is an important result because many hospitals throughout the US and UK have implemented—and continue to implement—similar programs. Our study provides a cautionary tale that visits by senior managers to the frontlines of the organization to solicit improvement ideas will not necessarily increase staffs' perceptions of performance improvement. There may be negative repercussions if senior managers attempt, but fail to engage meaningfully with frontline staff. We suspect that the negative consequences arose from soliciting, but not sufficiently addressing, frontline staffs' concerns (Keating et al. 1999, Morrison and Repenning 2011). Failure to meet expectations, once raised, can frustrate employees, negatively impact organizational climate, and dampen employees' willingness to provide future input (Tucker 2007). Thus, our study suggests that there is a hidden, psychological cost of asking employees for ideas that are subsequently disregarded.

To understand why some units had better results than others, we examined two approaches to problem solving. Solving a higher percentage of the highest-valued problems was not associated with increased PIP. This result is similar to an earlier finding in the TQM literature that formalization could overwhelm actual improvement efforts, leading to employee dissatisfaction with the program (Mathews and Katel 1992). Conversely, solving a higher percentage of easy-to-solve problems was successful, lending support for approaches that create a bias toward action. This signals the value in addressing “low-hanging fruit,” at least in the short-term (Keating et al. 1999, Morrison and Repenning 2011). Our research does not find that a focus on surfacing and resolving only high value problems yields improved staff perceptions.

Senior managers can facilitate a bias for action. We found that having senior managers assume responsibility for ensuring that problems get resolved was associated with increased PIP. One explanation for this finding is that organizational change often requires senior managers to provide financial resources to pay for required equipment, materials, or labor; and organizational support to get an upstream department in the organization to change how they do their work if benefits accrue downstream. In other words, senior managers can help ensure that action happens. Given the improvement literature's emphasis on empowering frontline employees to solve problems (Powell 1995), our finding may be interpreted as highlighting the importance of empowering frontline employees to identify and solve problems while supporting those efforts by ensuring that organizational obstacles to improvement are removed.

5.1. Implications for Theory

Manager commitment is associated with successful implementation of performance improvement programs that rely on frontline employee participation (Ahire and O'Shaughnessy 1998, Coronado and Antony 2002, Kaynak 2003, Nair 2006, Worley and Doolen 2006). We found that a program that stimulated managerial involvement was productive for some, but not all, work areas. An explanation of the negative result of our MBWA-based program was that asking employees for their suggestions and then using the prioritization step as an excuse not to implement them sent the message that employees' ideas were not valued and that the program was symbolic. Research by Miles supports this explanation (1965). He postulated that managers hold one of two beliefs about the value of employee participation programs. One belief was that frontline staff participation was valuable because it increased morale, though the actual ideas they contributed were unhelpful. These managers believed in the symbolic value of employee participation programs, such as MBWA. Miles (1965) found that improvement programs failed when managers held this belief. The second belief—which was associated with success in Miles' study—was that interactions with frontline staff were valuable because their ideas were actually useful. The belief in the substantive value of

employees' ideas underlies a core TPS principle: respect for people (Liker 2004). Miles' study suggests that senior managers' respect for frontline employees' concerns may have been an important, but unmeasured moderator variable for our MBWA program. An implication is that rather than just seeking to increase manager involvement, it may be critical first to ensure that managers value the ideas raised by frontline staff.

Another explanation for the lack of positive impact from the high value prioritization approach may be that problem values in hospital work areas have a relatively flat landscape. In flat landscapes, the difference between a local high point and the global high point is too small to justify an extensive search effort (Sommer and Loch 2004). Problem landscapes in healthcare may be flat because, with work divided among specialties, departments, and shifts, there are many opportunities to fail, thus less likelihood of a dominant source of failure. When there is a flat landscape, improvement arises from solving the lower tail of problems. Our findings may be applicable to other service industries that offer complex, customizable services that are co-created with customers, such as software, consulting, and legal industries, because they likely also have flat landscapes.

Another reason why the easy-to-solve prioritization approach was successful in our study is because process improvement efforts must first tackle the basic problems before advancing to more complex problems (Keating et al. 1999, Morrison and Repenning 2011). Taking care of the basic infrastructure and requirements is a necessary precursor to making more comprehensive organizational change that is likely required of higher priority score problems (Keating et al. 1999, Morrison and Repenning 2011).

There are likely circumstances under which prioritizing high value problems is helpful, such as when only one idea can be fully developed, like implementation of an enterprise-wide information system. We also believe that organizations benefit from resolving high value problems, which tend to be top-down, strategic improvements, as well as easy-to-solve problems, which tend to be

bottom-up, tactical initiatives. Organizations should try to nurture both kinds of problem solving capabilities. For example, organizations may have experts working on identifying and solving high value problems through six sigma projects, while frontline employees simultaneously work on resolving smaller-scale issues in their local work area through lean initiatives. Furthermore, it may be that organizations begin their improvement journey by successfully resolving relatively easy problems, but then need to develop new capabilities to resolve more complex problems (Keating et al. 1999, Morrison and Reppenning 2011). For example, reducing the time required to find vital sign monitor equipment on a nursing unit likely requires different problem solving skills than reducing patients' lengths of stay in the hospital.

5.2. Implications for Policy

Policymakers can play an important role in encouraging organizations to build problem-solving capacity. Rather than requiring participation in change programs that have not yet been fully validated, they could provide incentives for organizations to build the generic capacity to solve frontline problems and engage in process improvement. Given regulatory and industry pressure to implement multiple quality improvement initiatives at the same time, it is very likely that many programs are being implemented superficially and in ways that lead to harmful results similar to those we observed in this study. This could be contributing to the oft-reported failure to achieve gains through improvement initiatives that frustrate the healthcare industry (Landrigan et al. 2010). Our study provides a warning about mandating implementation of improvement programs before fully understanding the conditions required for the programs to yield successful outcomes.

The financial incentives used to encourage adoption of electronic health records in the U.S. may be instructive. Policy makers rewarded “meaningful use,” as demonstrated by the functionality that was achieved, rather than rewarding implementation of a particular software (Blumenthal 2010). Similarly, policy makers could provide incentives for building problem-solving capabilities that improve patient-centered performance rather than advocate for a specific improvement program.

5.3. Implications for Practice

Many initiatives to improve safety begin by trying to increase employees' reports of near misses, errors, and incidents (Bagian et al. 2001, Evans et al. 2007). Implied assumptions are that increasing the number of reports enables organizations to conduct trend analysis that illuminates high value problems which can then be solved; and that many issues will be of sufficiently low value that they can be ignored at low or no cost to the organization. In contrast, our study suggests that there may be little benefit, and some potential harm, to this approach. Rather than increasing reporting, organizations might be better served by addressing known problems, which builds problem-solving capabilities, which in turn enables action-taking on more problems. Our finding corroborates prior research that highlighted the importance of problem-solving capacity for successful improvement programs (Adler et al. 2003, Keating et al. 1999, Morrison and Reppenning 2011). This advice is consistent with the vision for a continuously learning health care system articulated by the US Institute of Medicine, requirements for which include systematic problem solving. Our study also resembles Kaizen, a structured problem-solving approach involving managers and frontline workers. However, important differences that may make Kaizen more successful than our program are that Kaizen occurs after managers and frontline staff have been trained on a standardized problem solving technique and that it emphasizes taking action to solve as many problems as possible within the given time period (Imai 1986). Thus, it prevents resource depletion by limiting the time spent identifying and solving problems rather than by selecting among them.

5.4. Limitations

Our findings must be considered in light of study limitations. First, our small sample size limited our analysis. Our sample was small for several reasons. The cost and time intensive nature of conducting an experiment with hospitals over 18 months made it challenging to conduct our field-based, interventional program with 24 organizations, and we would have struggled if there were more. In addition, despite our providing a method of prioritizing problems, many organizations chose not to

assign prioritization values and therefore work-area coded data on problem value was not available for all treatment work areas. Future research with larger sample sizes could test more nuanced theory. For example, an easy-to-solving prioritization approach may be most successful for work areas that start from a weak position and can benefit most from action, whereas a high value prioritization approach may be most helpful for experienced work areas that can be more selective.

A second limitation is the perceptual measure of improvement. Hospitals were unwilling to share actual safety incident measures with us. In addition, publicly available clinical measures, such as mortality, readmissions, and process of care measures, started being reported publicly only after the initiation of this study. Although we conducted analyses using these “post study” clinical outcome data, the regressions were not significant in explaining variation. However, for reasons detailed above, a perceptual measure is an important indicator of the impact of the intervention we tested. Furthermore, prior research on an MBWA-based intervention that did have access to clinical outcome data did not find links between multiple clinical outcomes and the intervention (Benning et al. 2011), corroborating our study results.

Third, hospitals did not track resources spent on solutions efforts. Therefore estimation was the only way of testing the alternate explanation that spending more money on process improvement yielded better outcomes. Future research could contribute to improvement theory by examining the cost of improvement efforts compared to benefits. A fourth limitation is that we did not randomize an easy-to-solve prioritization approach versus a high value prioritization approach among work areas. Instead those differences emerged naturally. A randomized assignment of these two prioritization approaches would provide a stronger test of the hypotheses.

5.4 Conclusions

Understanding the impact of MBWA-based programs is helpful for organizations that may be considering implementing them. In our study, organizations whose managers ensured that problems were addressed achieved better results. This suggests that improvement programs are more likely to

change employees' perceptions when they result in action being taken to resolve problems than when they are a symbolic show of manager interest. Based on study findings, we recommend that organizations focus on increasing their capacity to act on improvement suggestions rather than expending further effort on generating more suggestions and prioritizing them.

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Appendix 1. Survey Questions for Perceived Improvement in Performance

The quality of services I help provide is currently the best it has ever been.
 We are getting fewer complaints about our work.
 Overall, the level of patient safety at this facility is improving.
 The overall quality of service at this facility is improving.

Appendix 2. Interview Questions

Front-Line Personnel Interview Protocol

I wanted to ask you some questions about the patient safety culture at this hospital. We recognize that most hospital personnel experience problems in the course of their work and that these are not a reflection of their skill level or of the quality of care provided at their facility. My goal is to understand differences in safety culture among organizations.

1. Do personnel on this unit talk openly about safety issues and errors?
2. Who (or what) provides impetus for patient safety at this hospital? How do they do it?

Reporting of near miss or safety-related incidents has received some attention lately. We would like to better understand how healthcare professionals that actually provide direct care to patients think about reporting incidents related to patient safety.

3. Have you ever reported something? What made you decide to report that incident? What happened as a result of reporting? Did you ever learn the outcome?
 Can you recall a specific adverse event that was caused by an error or series of errors? What happened? Can you describe the investigation process (i.e. what happened to people involved, what changes, if any, resulted from the investigation)?

My last question relates to a major change in a care process at your hospital.

4. Thinking about a recent major change related to patient care processes, can you describe how this change introduced in your unit? Probe: What training did you receive? Has implementation required any workarounds of the built-in features of the system?

Manager Interview Protocol

I wanted to ask you some questions about the patient safety culture at this hospital. We recognize that most hospital personnel experience problems in the course of their work and that these are not a reflection of their skill level or of the quality of care provided at their facility. My goal is to understand differences in safety culture among organizations.

1. Do you feel comfortable talking about safety issues and errors in your manager meetings with senior leadership?
2. Do you encourage your staff to speak up? How?
3. Who (or what) provides impetus for patient safety at this hospital? How do they do it?

Reporting of near miss or safety-related incidents has received some attention lately. We would like to better understand how healthcare professionals that actually provide direct care to patients think about reporting incidents related to patient safety.

4. Can you step through a recent “near-miss” safety report that you addressed? Briefly (don’t need details) what was the situation and what was the response, if any?
5. Can you recall a specific adverse event that was caused by an error or series of errors? Briefly, what happened? Can you describe the investigation process (i.e. what happened to people involved, what changes, if any, resulted from the investigation)?

My last question relates to a major change in a care process at your hospital.

6. Thinking about a recent major change related to patient care processes, can you describe how this change was introduced to a unit? Probe: What training was provided? Has implementation required any workarounds of the built-in features of the system?

Hospital Administrator Interview Protocol

I wanted to ask you some questions about your daily activities as a hospital executive and your views on the patient safety culture at your hospital. We recognize that leadership styles and organizational cultures are unique at every institution and none is necessarily better than any other. My goal is to understand the full variation among organizations.

1. What are your primary priorities for the hospital? [Prompt if it isn’t mentioned] Where does patient safety fall in your list of priorities?
2. How do you see your role in patient safety? In what ways do you provide leadership in this area?
3. How would you describe the general attitude of healthcare professionals and employees within the hospital towards patient safety?

4. It is well known that middle managers are a key to implementation, and these people are often extremely pressed due to budget constraints. What is the situation with middle managers in your hospital?
5. How do you obtain information about the hazards present at the front lines of your organization?
6. Thinking about the most recent major organizational change related to patient safety, can you describe the change, your decision-making process, and its implementation? Probe: Did some event or new piece of information prompt your decision to implement the change? Did you evaluate the business case before making the change?