



Settling Sapporo: City and State in the Global Nineteenth Century

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Settling Sapporo: City and State in the Global Nineteenth Century

A dissertation presented

by

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to

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Abstract

In this thesis, I investigate the role of citybuilding in the colonization of Japan's northernmost island, Hokkaido, during the nineteenth century. Using archival sources from the United States and Japan, I explore five spatial strategies deployed by the Japanese state to assert its control over the region: planning for a new capital; mapping the city; encouraging and controlling migration to the city; administering the city; and modeling new forms of agricultural practice in the city for use throughout the wider colony. I consider the debates and contests that characterized all these strategies, and illustrate their importance in turning Sapporo from a riverside outpost of two houses into the indisputed capital of the region. I argue that Sapporo was essential as a centralized site of power and authority for a settler-colonial Japanese regime.

Despite the strong role of the state, ordinary people—whether Indigenous Ainu or settler Japanese—made their own way in the young town. High levels of transience, temporary residence, and disorder characterized Sapporo's early years, and its frontier location meant that the rule of law often had to be modified to encourage settlement. Yet this frontier location did not mean isolation: flows of people, ideas, and plant matter connected Sapporo to the rest of Japan, and further afield. Its founding and development took place in a world that was become much more closely connected by the second half of the century. Sapporo's functions, therefore, evolved from a version of Japan's early modern castle towns toward the central node in a modernizing bureaucratic apparatus that envisioned a much more powerful state role in territorial expansion in northern Japan.

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Dates, Measures, and Abbreviations

Dates and measures

Japan switched from a lunar-based calendar to the Gregorian calendar, starting with January 1873 (the eleventh month of 1872 in the old calendar). Because of the complexity of keeping everything straight, I have written dates in the same way as my sources: 1871/4/3 for the third day of the fourth month of 1871, or 3 April 1871 if the source writes it so. There is one exception: I have not used Japanese era names for years, converting those into western calendar years (e.g. Keiō 2 to 1866).

Changes in the Japanese currency systems are confusing throughout the nineteenth century. I have tried to indicate the value of items where relevant to guide the reader. In 1871, one ryō was made equal to one new yen.

Abbreviations

The following abbreviations for frequently used sources appear throughout the notes:

HC Papers: Horace Capron Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library

KJH: Kaitakushi jigyō hōkoku

LB Papers: Louis Boehmer Papers, Hokkaido University Library Northern Studies Collection

SSS: Shin Sapporo shishi

Introduction

How did Japan's cities change across the nineteenth century? This broad question serves as a starting point for this thesis, in which I investigate the transformation of ideas about urban planning, forms of urban governance, and experiences of urbanization in the city of Sapporo, capital of Japan's northernmost island Hokkaido. Today, Hokkaido is known for its wintry climate, agricultural bounty, and sparsely populated expanses. It is Japan's largest prefecture by size, at 83,500 square kilometers, but only its eighth largest by population, at 5.5 million people. It has the lowest population density of any prefecture. Yet Sapporo is Japan's fifth-largest city, with a population of 1.95 million, and a metropolitan region incorporating nearly half of Hokkaido's population. It occupies an overwhelming position in a prefecture otherwise known for pristine national parks and rural spaces.

Despite Sapporo's present-day prominence, in 1869—when the city was founded—the area now occupied by central Sapporo contained only a few homes belonging to indigenous Ainu people, and the residences of two ethnic Japanese ferrymen on the banks of the Toyohira River. In the eyes of most mid-century travellers to the region, Sapporo was a desolate forest, “inhabited only by bears and wolves,” with little to recommend it to the merchant, bureaucrat, or tourist.¹ How did the Japanese government decide to build a city here, and for what purposes? Why did the city become so important? What was the specific experience of urbanization in Sapporo from the perspective of the people who lived there? While the answers to these particular questions cannot fully answer the broader question of urban change across the nineteenth century, they offer a starting point for thinking about the relationship between city

¹ Kaitakushi, “Imin rireki shirabe,” 1878, 別 325-Im, Hokkaido University Library Northern Studies Collection (hereafter NSC), also available at <http://www2.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/cgi-bin/hoppodb/record.cgi?id=0A0162500000000000>.

building, state building, settler colonialism, and the increasingly global connectedness of the nineteenth-century world.

Sapporo offers an interesting perspective on the question of how Japanese cities changed in the nineteenth century, because in many respects it is dissimilar to cities in the Japanese mainland. Its relative youth in comparison to other Japanese cities means that we can trace very clearly the origins of city planning, municipal governance, and urban society, and thus gain a window into how people thought about cities in mid-nineteenth-century Japan. Similarly, it was planned in a top-down fashion by the central state, largely without reference to preexisting settlements, which offers insights into the ideal form of urban space from the perspective of official planners. Finally, it was designed from its beginnings as a colonial capital, the headquarters of the nineteenth-century project of turning Hokkaido from a semi-foreign land, tied to mainland Japan by trade and diplomacy, into a settler colony dominated by ethnic Japanese and governed by an arm of the imperial government. This meant both that Sapporo reflected the transplantation of ideas from other parts of Japan, tying it to forms of urban practice elsewhere in the archipelago, and that the city was the product of fundamentally different circumstances: a different climate, a foreign society and culture, and an economy undergoing massive changes under the direction of the colonial state. The desire to recreate a Japanese city on foreign soil was often at odds with a recognition that Sapporo fundamentally differed from cities elsewhere in the archipelago.

More abstractly, Sapporo's planning and construction unfolded at the same time as this state-led colonial project, and the city's growth took place in the same geographical space as the colonization of the entire territory of Hokkaido. These twin overlaps are inescapable features of the city's early history. In other words, the city's history cannot be understood in isolation, and I

will contend throughout this thesis that Sapporo not only was a product of the broader colonial project in Hokkaido, but also played an instrumental role in shaping that project, both over time, and across the colonial space of Hokkaido.

Over the course of the nineteenth century, Sapporo became an increasingly valuable and influential site of state power in northern Japan. The city developed in networks that became more extensive, stretching across the globe, and housed state institutions that became more intensive in their transformative effects on Hokkaido. These networks and institutions transferred knowledge and material in and out of Sapporo, consolidating its role as a node in the colonization of Hokkaido. At the same time, they shaped the city through new forms of municipal administration and the production of particular urban spaces, deeply influencing the experience of living in Sapporo for the city's early residents.

Context

Over the course of the nineteenth century, Japan transformed from a relatively isolated and fractured early-modern polity to an industrial nation-state with imperial ambitions in East Asia and the Pacific. The causes of this transformation include domestic factors such as commercialization and dissatisfaction with an increasingly inflexible social and political system, as well as international factors such as the weakening of Qing China and the encroachment of Russia and other Western powers in the region. These pressures mounted exponentially after the so-called 'opening' of Japan to trade and diplomatic relations with western states in 1853, finally leading to the collapse of the early-modern Tokugawa state and the establishment of the Meiji emperor as ruler of a centralized Japanese state in 1868. The early-modern status system, which had placed all people into specific social categories, was swept away. Merchants, freed from restraints on mobility and commercial expansion, swiftly linked Japan's sophisticated domestic

commercial networks much more tightly into global economic systems. Universal education and conscription helped knit together a common national identity to replace provincial loyalties.

These transformations also entailed the reshaping of territory and space in the Japanese archipelago. In the face of external threats and internal pressures, the Tokugawa state moved tentatively towards consolidating its control over the archipelago's territory. This process continued past 1868, with the Meiji regime introducing a simplified, centralized, and comprehensive hierarchy of administrative prefectures. The central state gradually replaced the patchwork of early modern domains, temple lands, and Tokugawa fiefdoms with a standardized and comprehensive division of Japan's territory. In the process, the boundaries of that territory became much more clearly defined. One of the most notable cases of this more aggressive, state-led effort to consolidate spatial control was in the far north of the archipelago, on the island now known as Hokkaido.

Hokkaido had long occupied an ambiguous place in Japan's territory. It was not until the end of the sixteenth century that a permanent Japanese presence developed, in the form of Matsumae Domain on the very southern tip of the island. This region was called the Wajinchi, and sharply delineated from the rest of the island, which was called Ezochi. Ethnic Japanese (Wajin²) were not permitted to reside in Ezochi (see Figure 0.1³). Matsumae's leaders swore allegiance to the Tokugawa family around 1600, and in return were granted the privilege and obligation to conduct foreign relations with the peoples living in Ezochi. These peoples—mostly various Ainu tribes on the island, but extending to tribes in the Kuriles, Sakhalin and the

² Wajin refers to ethnic Japanese resident in Ezochi, Matsumae and northern Tohoku, as distinct from Ainu populations in the same areas.

³ Map from David Howell, *Geographies of Identity in Nineteenth-Century Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), p. 111.



Figure 0.1: Tokugawa-era Hokkaido (Ezoichi and Wajinchi)

area around the Amur River in northern Manchuria—engaged in extensive trade with Matsumae merchants and officials.⁴ Over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Matsumae

⁴ The Ainu were not, of course, an undifferentiated mass of people: there were distinct linguistic and cultural groups in the Kuriles, Sakhalin, and on Hokkaido, including small populations in northern Tōhoku. For simplicity's sake, I will refer to the Ainu throughout this dissertation. For fuller discussion of Ainu society prior to Japanese settlement, see Brett Walker, *The Conquest of Ainu Lands: Ecology and Culture in Japanese Expansion, 1590–1800* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). For an overview of different treatments of Ainu history in Japanese, and particularly more recent attention to the diversity of Ainu society, see David Howell, “Is Ainu History Japanese History?,” in *Beyond Ainu Studies*, ed. Mark J. Hudson, ann-elise lewallen, and Mark K. Watson (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2014), pp. 101–16.

oversaw Japanese encroachment around the coast of Ezochi and beyond as the fishing industry grew in importance as a source of income for the domain, whose climate was generally too cold for extensive agricultural production. Japanese trading posts became the sites of increasingly exploitative fisheries, which bolstered the power and wealth of merchants transporting goods to mainland Japan, particularly to Nagasaki, the principal port for the China trade. By the end of the eighteenth century, the power of these merchants had largely outstripped the ability of Matsumae officials to effectively regulate them, while the exploited Ainu were growing restless, angry, and occasionally violent in response to their poor treatment. The Tokugawa authorities in Edo worried that the combination of a wealthy yet unsupervised merchant class and a restless indigenous population would turn the region into a source of threats to Japan's security.

Matters did not improve in 1771, when the Tokugawa first learned of Russian missionaries and traders in the Kurile Islands. Over the next few decades, Russia became the overwhelming geopolitical preoccupation for Japanese officials, both in Matsumae and in the shogunate's capital, Edo (present-day Tokyo). In the minds of many officials and scholars, this growing threat necessitated a more proactive approach to Ezochi on the part of the shogunate. Additionally, more progressive officials believed a stronger state presence would allow the state to extract more revenue from the resource-rich region, an increasingly urgent priority for the cash-strapped government.⁵

From the 1780s, a series of proposals called for the expansion of state power in Ezochi. These ranged from calls for greater commercial regulation to calls for outright colonization and settlement. Featuring in many of these proposals were arguments in favor of a new, centrally

⁵ For an overview of the politics of this era, and particularly the importance of Ezochi and Russia to bakufu leaders, see Fujita Satoru, *Tanuma jidai* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2012). For a brief English-language survey see Conrad Totman, *Politics in the Tokugawa Bakufu, 1600-1843* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).

located city. A new city would replace the existing towns on the south of the island as the economic and political stronghold of the region, and would allow the state to administer the region and provide defense more efficiently and effectively. Over the next seventy years, debates about the form and function of this hypothetical city continued to unfold as the Tokugawa state made tentative steps towards consolidated control of the region. Nevertheless, the importance of an urban headquarters remained unquestioned throughout these debates. In the views of state elites, a new city was essential to the project of colonizing Ezochi.

Ultimately, this city came into existence in 1869 when the newly established Hokkaido Colonial Agency⁶ selected Sapporo as the site for its new headquarters. Matsumae Domain was abolished, and the entire island was renamed Hokkaido and soon incorporated into the national administrative geography of prefectures. The Colonial Agency focused its efforts on developing infrastructure and encouraging settlement by mainland Japanese families. Because Hokkaido was seen as a ‘foreign’ place, and because the new government was keen to jumpstart the growth of a more industrial economy, the Colonial Agency hired a cast of foreign advisors. These advisors provided guidance for all aspects of the colonial project: agricultural practices, factories, mining, education, engineering, railways, and so on. They lived in Sapporo for much of the 1870s, giving the young town an unusually cosmopolitan character.

⁶ Hokkaido Kaitakushi. Other authors have translated Kaitakushi as Office of Colonization (James Ketelaar, “Hokkaido Buddhism and the Early Meiji State,” in *New Directions in the Study of Meiji Japan*, ed. Helen Hardacre with Adam L. Kern [Leiden: Brill, 1997], 534); Colonization Office (Daniel Botsman, *Punishment and Power in the Making of Modern Japan* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005], 184); or Development Agency (Brett Walker, *The Conquest of Ainu Lands*, and Howell, *Geographies of Identity*). Horace Capron, hired as advisor to the Kaitakushi in 1871, translated it as “Commission for Opening Up and Developing” (Horace Capron, *Reports and Official Letters to the Kaitakushi* [Tokei: Kaitakushi, 1875], note on reverse of title page). See p. 20 for more discussion of my use of colonization as a translation of *kaitaku*.

Sapporo grew fitfully at first, but quickly turned into a sizeable town of ten thousand people or so by the early 1880s. Political scandals brought down the Colonial Agency in 1882, ushering in a brief period of turmoil in Hokkaido's administration, but after 1886 Sapporo was once again the undisputed capital of the island. It surpassed Otaru and Hakodate to become the island's largest city in the early twentieth century, and today it is Japan's fifth-largest city with a population just shy of two million people. It accounts for two-fifths of the population of Hokkaido, and remains the cultural, political, and commercial hub of the island.

Historiography

My argument that city building and state building were mutually constitutive in nineteenth-century Hokkaido contributes to several fields of Japanese historiography. Most directly I address the history of Sapporo and Hokkaido by taking the study of the city beyond the realm of local history; the broader field of Japanese urban history by focusing on understudied Sapporo, and on the relationship between local, national, and global factors of urban development; and the history of Japanese imperialism by arguing that Hokkaido was Japan's first (and only 'successful') settler colony, and that Sapporo's urban development played a key role in the broader colonial project.

History of Sapporo and Hokkaido

The historiography of Sapporo fits into broader trends in urban history writing in Japan. To date, four comprehensive histories of the city have been published with the imprimatur of the municipal authorities.⁷ They have grown in size and scope over time, and draw increasingly on the standards of the historical profession. Nevertheless, they remain largely written for a local

⁷ Sapporo shigakkai, ed., *Sapporo enkaku shi* (Sapporo: Hokkaidō shuppan kikaku sentā, 1979 [1896]); Sapporo-ku, ed., *Sapporo kushi* (Sapporo: Sapporo-ku, 1911); Sapporo-shi, ed., *Sapporo shishi*, 4 vols. (Sapporo: Sapporo-shi, 1953–58); Sapporo-shi kyōiku iinkai, ed., *Shin Sapporo shishi*, 8 vols. (Sapporo: Hokkaido shinbunsha, 1986–2008), hereafter SSS.

audience, and at the behest of local officials keen to generate a strong sense of local identity. As a result, the focus of each tends to lie with a summary of events that took place within the geographical boundaries of the contemporary city, rather than with questions about the urban processes that structured that space, or the broader context of urban development. This leads to a strong sense that Sapporo's development was preordained: for example, as the 1911 *Sapporo kushi* proclaims, Sapporo "was not built in a day. There were many preexisting factors, such as the settlements of Ainu tribes; the Tokugawa shogunate's early efforts to settle soldier-farmers; and the Meiji government's decision to establish a regional capital here. These all played a part in the natural emergence of the city."⁸ The basic sense that Sapporo's history incorporates all other histories that precede the city's development, simply by virtue of taking place in the same geographic space, characterizes all four of these works. This view disregards all manner of historical discontinuities, and also ignores the politicized and contingent nature of city building in nineteenth-century Japan. By folding the history of the region into the narrative of the modern city, these authors downplay the radical changes that took place as the early-modern Japanese state encroached and ultimately colonized the region. More generally, it also restricts the scope of 'urban history' to a variety of local history. In other words, these works form a biography of a place, in which the city of Sapporo becomes the principal actor and subject. The tradeoff, of course, is that the people, objects, and ideas that affected Sapporo's development only matter when they cross paths with the city (or the location on which the city was built). This privileging of the city's physical location downplays the migratory networks, geopolitical pressures, economic systems, and environmental contexts that stretched far beyond Sapporo's municipal

⁸ Sapporo-ku, *Sapporo kushi*, p. 2.

boundaries, and yet profoundly shaped the urban environment and the lives of the people who lived there.

The most recent official history, *Shin Sapporo shishi*, is probably the most nuanced and scholarly of local histories in Hokkaido. Written and edited by a committee of historians and other scholars, the series seeks to provide an archival (and archaeological) base, rather than relying on commemoration and boosterism. The text provides ample detail and a clear narrative of the city's development, and treats topics unexplored in earlier versions, such as social history, women's history, and Ainu history. While it is primarily directed at a popular audience, it is rigorously researched. The fruits of this research were also published in more detail, and with an academic audience in mind, in a companion journal, *Sapporo no rekishi*.⁹ In various articles the authors pursue more critical and structured analyses of various facets of Sapporo's history, many of which I draw upon in this thesis. Yet, almost all of these articles remain narrowly focused on events within the city, and do not seek to relate the city's growth to broader structures and trends in nineteenth century Japan and the world.

One notable exception is historian Tanaka Akira, best known as a scholar of the 1868 Meiji Restoration, who argued in a short provocation that historians should use Sapporo to think about the broader horizons of Japanese history. Sapporo, he argued, was a "modern, man-made city...whose history, as a city, reveals Japan's place in the world, Hokkaido's place in Japan and Sapporo's place in Hokkaido—that is, Sapporo is *a point of cohesion in Japan's modern history*."¹⁰ Tanaka's brief remarks raise at least three important themes. First, he highlights Sapporo's unusual position in Japan as a city that was more-or-less built from scratch in the

⁹ *Sapporo no rekishi*, 54 issues, 1981–2008.

¹⁰ Tanaka Akira, "Kindai no jinkō toshi," in *Sapporo no rekishi*, 2 (March 1982): p.7. Emphasis in the original.

modern period. This distinguishes Sapporo from most other Japanese cities, and offers an excellent opportunity to think about the continuities and discontinuities in Japanese urban development across the nineteenth century. Second, Tanaka emphasizes the importance of the relationship between Sapporo and the rest of Japan, and the rest of the world. The city developed within networks of imperialist state-building, commodity exchange, knowledge and labour flows, and environmental transformation, to name just a few of the national, regional and global processes in which Sapporo was embedded. Third, he urges historians to approach Sapporo's history as an *urban* history, not just as a local history. That is, rather than focus on narratives of municipal growth and development, Tanaka urges historians to treat Sapporo's urban function and form with analytical rigor. I follow his call in this dissertation by addressing the urban processes and structures that shaped Sapporo's development, and linked it to historical changes unfolding at different scales, connecting the city to other networks.

Sapporo figures into another variation of local history: that of Hokkaido as a whole. Three official histories, produced or approved by the prefectural authorities, discuss Sapporo as part and parcel of the history of the region.¹¹ This framing inevitably helps situate Sapporo's development in its regional context. Yet, these works fall into a similar mode as the city histories, tracing key events on the way to the present day. As Louise Young writes, "For Hokkaido, these local milestones of progress marked stages in a teleology of colonization: first contacts, the opening of trade, the beginnings of Japanese settlement, annexation, and so forth. Together they told the story of the evolution of Ezo into Hokkaido."¹² In these histories, Sapporo features as the

¹¹ Kaitakushi, ed., *Hokkaidō shi*, 35 vols. in 25 bks. (Tokyo: Ōkurashō, 1884); Hokkaido-chō, ed., *Shinsen Hokkaido shi*, 7 vols. (Sapporo: Hokkaidō-chō, 1936–37); Hokkaidō, ed., *Shin Hokkaidō shi*, 9 vols. (Sapporo: Hokkaidō, 1969–81).

¹² Louise Young, *Beyond the Metropolis: Second Cities and Modern Life in Interwar Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), p. 161.

headquarters of this colonial project after 1869, and particularly as the locus of industrial and commercial prosperity for the region. The authors of these Hokkaido histories spend little time on more theoretical or comparative enquiries into the nature of Sapporo's urban growth.

In the last few decades, scholarly attention has moved beyond the field of local history. Hokkaido, like many of Japan's more peripheral prefectures, has received less attention in English-language historiography of Japan than more central places, notably Edo/Tokyo and Kyoto. This is true not only among works whose focus explicitly includes place and space, but also among works on other topics that often derive a national story (whether political, economic, social or cultural) from events that take place much more narrowly in Edo/Tokyo or Kyoto. That is, many historians do not explicitly articulate the spatial assumptions of the histories they write. One of my secondary arguments in this thesis is that the particular spatial configurations of historical change matter to our understanding of those changes. In the case of Sapporo, its geographical position in Ezochi/Hokkaido, as well as the particular spatial processes that undergirded its development and structured its position in the political, economic and social development of Hokkaido, are essential to understanding the city's planning and development.

Nevertheless, studies of Hokkaido across the early-modern and modern eras have influenced Japanese historiography in several key ways, most notably by emphasizing the relevance of this seemingly peripheral place to the major transformations of Japan's geopolitical, economic, and social orders in the nineteenth century. Scholars have demonstrated the importance of Russia to late-Tokugawa geopolitical concerns, helping to shift the narrative of Japan's so-called 'opening' to the outside world away from the story of the Dutch in Nagasaki and the arrival of Commodore Perry in 1853.¹³ The "four openings" of Japan included Matsumae

¹³ See, for example, Tessa Morris-Suzuki, "Lines in the Snow: Imagining the Russo-Japanese Frontier," *Pacific Affairs* 72, no. 1 (Spring 1999): pp. 57–77, and Fujita, *Tanuma jidai*.

Domain, which oversaw economic and political relations with the Ainu, and via the Ainu the peoples of the northeast Asian continent.¹⁴ From the 1750s, Russian expansion in the region heightened the shogunate's concern with the region.¹⁵ Matsumae, and by extension Ezochi, was thus an integral part of the Tokugawa geopolitical order, and of disproportionate interest to the central state.

Scholars of Hokkaido have also emphasized the ways in which economic transformations made the region modern across the nineteenth century. David Howell identified proto-industrialization in the fisheries of coastal Ezochi, which laid the groundwork for capitalism in the region.¹⁶ Nagai Hideo has argued that Hokkaido's unique features (the building of a new society, the idealization of western technology, and the active efforts to assimilate indigenous peoples) crystallized the broader processes of modernization across Japan: the centralization of authority, the cultural changes of modernity, and the increasing coercion of labor and exploitation of other resources.¹⁷ The rise of scientific agriculture in Hokkaido and the introduction of new forms of policing, for instance, highlight the ways in which Hokkaido, far from being a backwards periphery, became modern at the same time, if in distinctive ways, as the rest of Japan.¹⁸ In these ways, Ezochi/Hokkaido's experience is central to the histories of

¹⁴ For a brief discussion in English of Matsumae Domain and its place in the Tokugawa geopolitical order, see David Howell, *Capitalism from Within: Economy, Society, and the State in a Japanese Fishery* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 27–34.

¹⁵ For a study of Japanese intellectuals and policymakers concerned with Ezochi, see Horimoto Fumiko, “Ezochi of Northern Japan: From Outer Land to Inner Land” (PhD diss., University of Toronto, 2004). For an overview of Russian interest in Japan, see the introduction to *Russian Views of Japan, 1792–1913: An Anthology of Travel Writing*, ed. and trans. David N. Wells (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 1–31.

¹⁶ Howell, *Capitalism from Within*.

¹⁷ Nagai Hideo, *Nihon no kindai to Hokkaidō* (Sapporo: Hokkaido Daigaku shuppankai, 2007).

¹⁸ Walker, “Meiji Modernization, Scientific Agriculture, and the Destruction of Japan's Hokkaidō Wolf”, *Environmental History* 9, no. 2 (April 2004): pp. 248–74; Naoyuki Umemori, “Modernization Through

national identity, industrialization, and imperialism in Japan. Sapporo has not featured heavily in these arguments about the modernization of Hokkaido, however, and I hope to contribute to these veins of scholarship by suggesting that Sapporo, too, was a site of modernization, in many ways ahead of changes elsewhere in Japan, and a key site of these changes across Hokkaido. At the same time, its history reflects surprising continuities in ideas about colonization and urban development from the Tokugawa period, thus tempering slightly the notion that Hokkaido's development was entirely a product of modern times.

Another recent trend in the history of the region has been to focus on the story of the Ainu people with greater attention to Indigenous agency.¹⁹ Brett Walker's study of the Japanese conquest of Ezochi prior to 1800 focused on the environmental and cultural transformation of the region, which he defines as a 'frontier' between two distinct societies, by violence and economic exploitation.²⁰ David Howell pinpointed the intersection of the Tokugawa status system and the ethnic differentiation between Ainu and Wajin, and then the new logic of "Ainu protection" that emerged in the Meiji period.²¹ Robert Siddle looks at the emergence of an Ainu resistance movement in the modern era, in response to the repressive assimilationist measures taken by the Japanese state in the Meiji and subsequent eras.²² Scholars such as Tanimoto Akihisa and

Colonial Mediations: The Establishment of the Police and Prison System in Meiji Japan" (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2002), pp. 211–26; and Botsman, *Punishment and Power in the Making of Modern Japan*, pp. 165–200.

¹⁹ For an overview of changing approaches within Japanese-language scholarship, and particularly the difficult question of the relationship between Ainu history and Japanese history, see Howell, "Is Ainu History Japanese History?"

²⁰ Walker, *Conquest of Ainu Lands*.

²¹ Howell, *Geographies of Identity*; see also David Howell, "The Meiji State and the Logic of Ainu 'Protection'," in *New Directions in the Study of Meiji Japan*, pp. 612–34.

²² Richard Siddle, *Race, Resistance, and the Ainu of Japan* (London: Routledge, 1996).

Christopher Loy have built on earlier Ainu studies to demonstrate the complexity of the Ainu encounter with Japanese merchants and officials, showing the ways in which Ainu worked within new economic and political constraints, even as many faced terrible oppression.²³ Kirsten Ziomek has traced the experience of Ainu participants in Japanese expositions at world's fairs at the beginning of the twentieth century to highlight the experience of being stuck between metropole and colony.²⁴ Finally, among scholars of contemporary Ainu, Mark Watson has expanded the study of Ainu beyond Hokkaido, particularly the Ainu community in Tokyo, while ann-elise lewallen has introduced new themes such as gender to the study of Ainu identity.²⁵

By and large, however, Ainu history has not focused on Sapporo, in large part because by the time of the city's founding, most Ainu from the area had either been pressed into service in the coastal fisheries, or had been forced into remoter parts of Hokkaido.²⁶ Nevertheless, Sapporo does have an Ainu history, because Ainu periodically lived in areas now part of Sapporo.²⁷ This history forces us to reckon with several issues, including most obviously the silencing of certain groups in histories produced under the conditions of the nation-state. More abstractly, it raises again the question about whether common geographic location requires us to connect disparate

²³ Tanimoto Akihisa, "Ainu no 'jibunkasegi'," in *Ezogashima to hoppō sekai*, ed. Kikuchi Isao (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 2003), pp. 199–321 and Christopher Loy, "Cultivating Ezo: Indigenous Innovation and Ecological Change During Japan's Bakumatsu Era," *Asian Ethnology* 75, no. 1 (2015): pp. 63–85.

²⁴ Kirsten Ziomek, "Subaltern Speak: Imperial Multiplicities in Japan's Empire and Post-War Colonialisms," PhD Dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara, 2011.

²⁵ Mark Watson, *Japan's Ainu Minority in Tokyo: Diasporic Indigeneity and Urban Politics* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), and ann-elise lewallen, *The Fabric of Indigeneity: Ainu Identity, Gender, and Settler Colonialism in Japan* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2016).

²⁶ Howell, "The Meiji State and the Logic of Ainu 'Protection'," pp. 614–21.

²⁷ The editors of the *SSS* make an effort to discuss various aspects of the Ainu history of Sapporo, such as the villages in and around the Sapporo area during the early-modern period and the forced relocation of Karafuto Ainu to a village on the outskirts of Sapporo in the 1870s, but the Ainu take up only 35 of the 600 pages on the era from 1800 to 1869, and a measly 15 of the 1000 pages of the volume covering 1869 to 1900. *SSS*, vol. 1, pp. 846–79; vol. 2, pp. 534–49.

historical moments and experiences. Is Sapporo a geographic container, in which many different histories overlap? Or should we approach the city of Sapporo as a distinct historical process, marked more by discontinuity from the preexisting communities that may have occupied the same place? I have chosen here to emphasize the history of city building, rather than the history of the place we now call Sapporo. Because of Sapporo's role as an urban expression of the Meiji state's assimilationist project in Hokkaido, this means that I do not focus on the history of Ainu people who lived in Sapporo, either before the establishment of the city, or in later years.

Nevertheless, I recognize that their relative absence in historical records from the Colonial Agency period is itself an important feature of the settler-colonial character of Sapporo, and I try to address this absence at relevant points throughout the thesis.

Japanese Urban History

Sapporo's role within the field of urban history in Japan—as distinct from local history—is decidedly underplayed. Few scholars draw on Sapporo as a case study in research about modern Japanese urban development, whether in the field of urban planning, social unrest and the urban poor, or the transition from early-modern castle town to modern industrial city.²⁸ A recent compendium of essays representing the forefront of urban historical scholarship contains only a three-page column on Sapporo that largely summarizes some conclusions from the *Shin Sapporo shishi*.²⁹ Andre Sorensen's survey of urban planning in Japan from 1600 to the present similarly devotes only two pages to Sapporo, despite Sapporo's rather unique position as the

²⁸ The major exception to this is Suzue Eiichi, who has written extensively on the transition from early-modern to modern municipal structures in Hokkaido. However, even Suzue devotes most of his work to the towns and villages of former Matsumae Domain; he admits to a relative lack of detailed knowledge about Sapporo despite devoting an entire essay to the city. Suzue Eiichi, *Hokkaidō chōson seido shi no kenkyū* (Sapporo: Hokkaidō Daigaku tosho kankōkai, 1985), pp. 281–313.

²⁹ Yoshida Nobuyuki, "Sapporo," in *Toshi shakai shi* (Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppansha, 2001), pp. 359–362.

largest city in Japan that was fully planned in the modern period.³⁰ The exception to this trend is Louise Young's recent monograph comparing four 'second cities,' including Sapporo, but her work focuses on the early twentieth century.³¹

There are two possible reasons for this general lack of attention: The first reason lies with the overwhelming interest of urban history associations in Japan either in the medieval and early-modern city, whether provincial castle towns or the glittering commercial and cultural hubs of Edo, Kyoto and Osaka, or in the twentieth-century one, with the full array of "urban questions" ushered into existence by the rise of industrial capitalism and the imperial nation-state.³² The transition between early modern and modern—that is, the mid-nineteenth century—remains relatively understudied in the field of urban history, despite calls to fix this historiographical lacuna since the 1970s. In English, Gilbert Rozman outlined the broad demographic features of cities in the Tokugawa–Meiji transition, identifying general growth in castle towns and some decline in the major cities of Edo/Tokyo, Osaka, and Kyoto, and suggesting that urban change built upon earlier practices in a gradual way.³³ Many scholars have focused on the changes in Edo/Tokyo, tracing its demographic volatility around 1868, and the transformation of the built environment as part of its remaking as the new imperial capital, but also the persistence of Edo-

³⁰ Andre Sorensen, *The Making of Urban Japan: Cities and Planning from Edo to the Twenty-first Century* (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 79–80. Sorensen attributes Sapporo's appearance to U.S. and Australian models, despite its primary origins in Japanese castle town plans. See chapter 2. In general, historians of urban planning in Japan have focused on the twentieth century, after urban planning was codified into law.

³¹ Young, *Beyond the Metropolis*.

³² The earliest Japanese academic journal devoted to the study of the city started publication in 1925. Called "Municipal Problems" (*Toshi mondai*), it focused on the social dislocations and other urban questions caused by the rapid and uncontrolled growth of Tokyo.

³³ Gilbert Rozman, "Castle Towns in Transition", in *Japan in Transition*, ed. Marius Jansen and Gilbert Rozman (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014 [1988], pp. 318–46.

era commoner culture into the early decades of the Meiji period.³⁴ Ironically, Sapporo's development in the 1870s echoes these findings, despite the lack of an early-modern city from which to draw continuities. I elaborate upon the balance of change and continuity across 1868 throughout this thesis, in hopes of tracing how precisely the transition from early-modern to modern times unfolded in urban space.

The second reason for the lack of attention to Sapporo relates to its peripheral geographical location: it is far from Tokyo and the traditional centers of Japanese urban life further west, and has long been perceived as a provincial backwater or remote frontier. The treaty ports of the mid-nineteenth century, and political drama in Tokyo, garner much more attention. The colonization of Hokkaido more broadly has been overwhelmingly understood as a process of agricultural settlement and ethnic tension rather than as a process of extending urban networks across new spaces at the edge of the consolidating Japanese nation-state. I argue in this thesis that the process of colonization and settlement across Hokkaido was driven in large part by urban institutions, which in turn must be understood in contexts that stretch far beyond municipal boundaries.

I extend the broader study of Japanese urban history by focusing on the political decisions and debates that shaped the course of Sapporo's development, whether at the level of policymakers, planners on the ground, or local residents and bureaucrats. The English-language historiography of Japanese cities has focused on cultural production, economic networks, social structures, and changing architectural forms; relatively little work has focused on the day-to-day

³⁴ Henry D. Smith III, "The Edo-Tokyo Transition: In Search of Common Ground," in *Japan in Transition*, pp. 347–74. Some more recent work includes Tristan Grunow, "Paving Power: Western Urban Planning and Imperial Space from the Streets of Meiji Tokyo to Colonial Seoul," *Journal of Urban History*, 42, no. 3 (May 2016), pp. 506–56 and Matsuyama Megumi, *Edo/Tokyo no toshi shi: kindai ikōki no toshi, kenchiku, shakai* (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku shuppankai, 2014).

administration and organization of cities.³⁵ In Japanese, recent work on early-modern urban history (which Sakamoto Tadahisa has termed the “third wave”) has focused on the role of the status system in urban space, and by extension the notion of cities as sets of urban communities (*chō kyōdōtai*), sometimes at the expense of studying the role of cities in the wider political economy and political geography of the archipelago.³⁶ Scholars such as Yoshida Nobuyuki and Tsukada Takashi, working on Edo and Osaka, respectively, have made enormous gains in excavating the mechanisms of the status system and its particular spatial expression in the great cities of early modern Japan, breathing life into the field of early-modern urban history.³⁷ Their work has illustrated the structure of urban life, and has inspired me to pay attention to the

³⁵ Some recent works on Japanese urban history in English include Matthew Stavros’ study of premodern Kyoto (*Kyoto: an Urban History of Japan’s Premodern Capital* [Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2014]); Louise Young’s study of second cities in interwar Japan (*Beyond the Metropolis* [2013]); Jordan Sand’s study of memory, museums, and urban protests in postwar Tokyo (*Tokyo Vernacular: Common Spaces, Local Histories, Found Objects* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013]); Constantine Vaporis’ study of the effects of alternate attendance on Edo and national culture (*Tour of Duty: Samurai, Military Service in Edo, and the Culture of Early Modern Japan* [Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2007]); Mary Elizabeth Berry’s study of the role of cities in producing a national print culture in early-modern Japan (*Japan in Print: Information and Nation in the Early Modern Period* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006]); and Jeffrey Hanes study of municipal reforms in interwar Osaka under mayor Seki Hajime (*The City as Subject: Seki Hajime and the Reinvention of Modern Osaka* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002]). Older works, such as Gary Leupp’s study of lower class people in Edo-era cities (*Servants, Shophands and Laborers in the Cities of Tokugawa Japan* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992]) Nishiyama Matsunosuke’s study of Edo culture (*Edo Culture: Daily Life and Diversions in Urban Japan, 1600 – 1868* [Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1997]) remain important studies of the culture and social forms of the shogunal capital, while James McClain’s work on Kanazawa, Osaka, and Edo remains influential (James McClain, *Kanazawa: A Seventeenth-Century Japanese Castle Town* [New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1982]; McClain and Wakita Osamu, eds., *Osaka, the Merchant’s Capital of Early-Modern Japan* [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999]; and McClain, John Merriman, and Ugawa Kaoru, eds., *Edo and Paris: Urban Life and the State in the Early Modern Era* [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994]).

³⁶ Sakamoto Tadahisa, *Kinsei kōki toshi seisaku no kenkyū* (Osaka: Osaka Daigaku shuppankai, 2003).

³⁷ For an overview of Yoshida and Tsukada’s approaches to urban history, see Daniel Botsman, “Recovering Japan’s Urban Past: Yoshida Nobuyuki, Tsukada Takashi, and the Cities of the Tokugawa Period,” *City, Culture, and Society* 3, no. 1 (March 2012): pp. 9–14. Representative work by these and other scholars includes Takahashi Yasuo and Yoshida Nobuyuki, eds., *Toshi shi nyūmon* (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku shuppankai, 1989); Satō Makoto and Yoshida Nobuyuki, eds., *Toshi shakai shi* (Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppansha, 2001); and Tsukada Takashi, *Toshi shakai shi no shiten to kōsō: hō, shakai, bunka* (Osaka: Seibundō, 2015).

experience of urban life in Sapporo alongside the politics and policies of city building from above. By investigating the interactions of local residents and state structures, I hope to convey a sense of how the relationships between elite-level ideas about cities, the social structures of urban life, and the people on the ground shaped the development of urban space.

Japanese Imperial/Colonial History

Whether Hokkaido is (or was) a colony is a debate that hinges on several related questions: the nature of the relationship between mainland Japan and Hokkaido prior to formal incorporation as a prefecture in 1868; the nature of Hokkaido's post-1868 relationship to other parts of Japan; and the definition of 'colony' and its applicability to the social and political structures of nineteenth-century Hokkaido. The 1850s and 1860s mark a turning point: exploitative but limited relationships between Japanese and Ainu, primarily focused on trade and loose political hegemony by Japanese rulers, transformed into intensive structures of domination that turned Ezochi into Hokkaido, a settler colony of Japan. This colonial relationship obtained both in the subordinate relationship of settlers to the mainland; the dismissive and exploitative attitude of settlers toward the indigenous population; and a mentality of settlement that explicitly emulated other settler societies around the world.

A key sticking point has to do with the term *kaitaku*, as in Kaitakushi. In classical and medieval times, the concept of *kaitaku* was applied to the ongoing expansion of the Yamato state northward: much of the conquest of what is now Tōhoku during the Heian period, for instance, was described as *kaitaku*, in the sense of claiming land and developing it for wet-rice agriculture. This civilizing process did have a military component—keeping northern barbarians at bay—but at its heart it was a gradual extension of a way of life by claiming ever more territory. In the Meiji era, this term—like so many other classical referents—was revived to give the new state

credence and legitimacy as a centralized power in the Japanese archipelago. I have chosen to translate it as ‘colonization’ or ‘colonialism’ in part because of the strong connotations with settling land for agricultural purposes, which characterized late-Tokugawa and Meiji attitudes toward Ezochi/Hokkaido, and because contemporaries understood it in this way. Horace Capron, for instance, an American hired as advisor to the Colonial Agency in 1871, understood the Colonial Agency’s purpose to be “the settlement of Hokkaido.” Settlement of new territory lays at the heart of all settler-colonial projects, and it is in this vein that I choose to use ‘colonization’ as a translation of *kaitaku*.

Until recently, scholarship on Japan’s empire barely mentioned Hokkaido. Standard accounts of Japan’s colonial empire date it to 1895, with the formal colonization of Taiwan.³⁸ The settlement of Hokkaido, if discussed at all, was mentioned in passing as a form of informal or internal colonization, a term that reinforces “a periodization of Japan’s empire that excludes Hokkaido, as well as Okinawa, from canonical colonial history.”³⁹ Robert Eskildsen’s seminal 2002 article on the Taiwan Expedition of 1874 made the increasingly accepted argument that “mimesis of Western imperialism...went hand in hand with mimesis of Western civilization”, although he too excluded Hokkaido and Okinawa from the category of imperialism; his framing

³⁸ The significant edited volume *Japan’s Colonial Empire, 1895–1945*, eds. Ramon Myers and Mark Peattie (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984) is a representative example.

³⁹ Michele Mason, *Dominant Narratives of Colonial Hokkaido and Imperial Japan: Envisioning the Periphery and the Modern Nation-State* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 16. For a representative example of “internal” colonization, see Tamura Sadao, “Naikoku shokuminchi toshite no Hokkaido,” in *Iwanami kōza kindai Nihon to shokuminchi*, ed. Ōe Shinobu et al., vol. 1 (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1992), pp. 87–100. Frustratingly, Tamura relies on an undefined “internal colonization” (*naikoku shokuminchika*) in his essay, even though the violent process he describes resembles the more recent accounts by Walker and others that explicitly challenge the anodyne connotations of the trope of internal colonization.

also disregarded existing ideas about colonial expansion in pre-Meiji Japan.⁴⁰ Brett Walker, in his work on the conquest of Ainu lands in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, described Hokkaido as a “middle ground” as a way to center our understanding of the colonial process on the displacement of Indigenous society that it entailed, rather than on rosy images of a “frontier” that dominate many representations of Hokkaido in Japan to this day.⁴¹ More recently, Mark Caprio has suggested the concept of “peripheral colonization” to refer to the assimilation of Ezochi and Ryukyu into modern Japan as Hokkaido and Okinawa. He argues that the “success in assimilating these peoples has camouflaged their colonial roots.” More broadly, Caprio argues that the extension of the same processes of nation building—the creation of a national identity in particular—to Ezochi/Hokkaido—distinguishes such “peripheral” colonization from the more familiar acquisition of more distant territories as colonies, as characterized Japanese imperial expansion in the twentieth century.⁴² By drawing a line from the creation of national identity, to the peripheral colonization of Ryukyu and Ezochi, and then to the colonization of Taiwan and Korea, Caprio echoes Eskildsen to challenge older views that date Japan’s colonial empire to 1895. Finally, Michele Mason argues that Hokkaido’s colonial status has been “concealed,” pointing to the fact that most Japanese believed Ezochi to be distinctly foreign as late as the 1850s to argue that the Meiji state “cunningly and strategically repressed” the colonial status of Hokkaido by denying any claim to sovereignty on the part of the Ainu; by giving Hokkaido an administrative geography continuous to that of mainland Japan; and by treating migration to the

⁴⁰ Robert Eskildsen, “Of Civilization and Savages: The Mimetic Imperialism of Japan’s 1874 Expedition to Taiwan,” *The American Historical Review* 107, no. 2 (April 2002): pp. 388–418.

⁴¹ Brett Walker, *The Conquest of Ainu Lands*.

⁴² Mark Caprio, *Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea, 1910–1945* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009), pp. 49–80.

region as a domestic issue.⁴³ She welcomes the concept of “settler colony,” drawing on work in Indigenous studies across the globe, although pushes further to suggest that “settler-invader colony” would more accurately convey the process of violent dispossession that characterized the modern settlement of Hokkaido by ethnic Japanese.⁴⁴

Put bluntly, Hokkaido is the only territory in the world where ethnic Japanese began to settle permanently in modern times, overwhelmingly displaced the indigenous population, and then never left. Along with the Ryukyu and Ogasawara island chains, it is one of the few parts of Japan’s vast Pacific-Asian empire that was not stripped from the nation in 1945. Japanese in the late Tokugawa and early Meiji periods understood Hokkaido as a foreign place (*iiki*); granted, a foreign place to which Japan had long exerted varying degrees of political authority, but nevertheless a foreign place that was distinct from the domains and prefectures of the main islands.⁴⁵ Migrants to the region distinguished their new home from the “mainland” (*naichi*), a term that would in future decades be used by Japanese residents of Taiwan, Korea, and elsewhere in the empire—and is still used today in Hokkaido. The central government sought out westerners with experience of colonization and settlement, such as in the American West and Ireland, because they recognized the similarities between Japan’s relation to Hokkaido, and the processes in those parts of the world.

This is not to say that colonial Hokkaido can be interchanged with colonial Australia, or the colonial West of the United States. There is a much older and more complicated relationship

⁴³ Mason, *Dominant Narratives*, pp. 7–13.

⁴⁴ Mason, *Dominant Narratives*, p. 19.

⁴⁵ The concept of *iiki* fits into a broader understanding of the geopolitical order which Japan had adapted from the Chinese model of concentric rings of civilization (*ka-i chitsujo*). Unlike the Westphalian model of states common in Europe, borders were more fluid and relations with other peoples were defined by their relative state of civilization vis-à-vis the center. See Ronald Toby, *State and Diplomacy in Early Modern Japan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984).

between mainland Japan and the peoples of Hokkaido; geographic contiguity distinguishes it from the overseas colonies of Britain and other European powers; and the eventual equalization of political rights and structures between mainland Japan and Hokkaido, at least for ethnic Japanese, which in turn probably forestalled any effort at creating an autonomous settler nation, makes Hokkaido unusual in a comparative light. Nevertheless, the historical similarities between Japanese expansion into Hokkaido and the expansions of other colonial states elsewhere; Japan's subsequent imperial aggression in East Asia and the Pacific; and the ongoing, postcolonial condition that Ainu continue to live under in Hokkaido and throughout Japan make it worthwhile to think about Hokkaido as a colonial space in the mid-nineteenth century.

New Directions: Methods and Theories

In this thesis, I draw on the concepts of settler-colonialism and settler-colonial urbanism to think about the role of Sapporo in the broader colonial project in Hokkaido, while using a transnational perspective to excavate people, places, and ideas in Sapporo that were tied to global trends, thus providing a provisional basis for thinking about colonial Sapporo in a comparative and connective light. I also draw on the ideas of historians of spatial change to focus on the spatial dynamics of urbanization in Sapporo and Hokkaido, and more generally the role of space in state-led efforts to assert and extend territorial control as a key feature of the intensification of state structures in the nineteenth century. All together these approaches allow me to bridge the historiographical fields of local history, urban history, and imperial history.

Settler-Colonial Urbanism

In particular, I will use the concept of settler colonialism, and settler-colonial urbanism, throughout this thesis. Lorenzo Veracini argues for the need to distinguish settler colonialism from colonialism, because the logics undergirding each process fundamentally differ: in colonies,

an exogenous minority dominates a large Indigenous population; in settler colonies, the exogenous group becomes overwhelmingly dominant. Settler colonial societies exist in a triangular relationship between the metropole as well as the indigenous societies they dominate.⁴⁶ The key motive in settler colonies was typically to acquire land and replace its inhabitants, rather than exploit Indigenous labour.⁴⁷ The archetypical examples of settler colonialism are the British Dominions, especially Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, and the U.S. West. These settler-colonies, as James Belich has masterfully demonstrated, developed through cycles of colonization and recolonization that fostered population booms, economic dependence on metropolitan centers (notably London and New York), and then a process of reinvestment that knitted these settler colonies into a cultural and economic world that sustained them.⁴⁸ Veracini notes that settler-colonial spaces are often “interpenetrated” by colonial processes, so the distinction between the two is not absolute. Given the complex history of relations between Hokkaido and the rest of Japan, I acknowledge that other dynamics and processes also conditioned the transformation of Ezochi into Hokkaido. Nevertheless, in the mid-nineteenth century, settler-colonial processes became the dominant factors in reshaping Hokkaido and producing the urban space of Sapporo.

So far, most attention to settler colonialism has focused on Euro-American examples. Jun Uchida’s recent work on settlers in colonial Korea is one of the first to apply the concept to the

⁴⁶ Lorenzo Veracini, *Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

⁴⁷ Patrick Wolfe, *Settler Colonialism and the Transformation of Anthropology: the Politics and Poetics of a Ethnographic Event* (London: Cassell, 1999), p. 163.

⁴⁸ James Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783–1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 9.

Japanese empire.⁴⁹ Uchida argues that focusing on settlers themselves breaks down the monolith of the colonial state, and illustrates the diverse interests that went into the construction of colonial systems of power and domination in Korea. I differ slightly from Uchida in taking a narrower definition of settler-colonialism—Japanese in Korea never outnumbered Koreans—but I suggest that similar dynamics were at play in colonial Sapporo: Japanese migrants had interests that overlapped, but did not always coincide, with the interests of the state. The production of colonial space in the city emerged from the interaction of many different actors, and those interactions are worth studying to gain a better handle on the overarching colonial system in the region.

Settler-colonial cities, or more precisely settler-colonial urbanization, occupy a subfield within settler colonial history. David Hugill argues that “the ‘settler-colonial city’ differs fundamentally from the ‘colonial city’ because a) its accumulation strategies are primarily oriented around the enrichment of settler constituencies, rather than far-flung metropolitan sponsors, b) the colonial relation remains a central and enduring element of its contemporary life, albeit in dynamic and frequently recomposed forms, c) and Indigenous peoples themselves have more often been excluded from, rather than exploited in, its core economic activities.”⁵⁰ Sapporo exhibits many of these features: the city developed its own economic base, and in fact marked a shift away from the extractive economics of the pre-modern fisheries toward a more sustained economic presence across the interior of Hokkaido; the city remains the preeminent symbol of (post)colonial authority in contemporary Hokkaido; and the story of the Ainu in Sapporo is largely one of exclusion.

⁴⁹ Jun Uchida, *Brokers of Empire: Japanese Settler Colonialism in Korea, 1876–1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2011).

⁵⁰ David Hugill, “What Is a Settler-Colonial City?” *Geography Compass* 11 (2017), pp. 6–7.

Few scholars have adopted this model to discuss Japan's imperial cities. Although the field of urban history in the Japanese empire has boomed, it tends to focus on the narrower timeframe of empire, from 1895 through 1945.⁵¹ Todd Henry's work on Seoul focuses on the spatial strategies of assimilation and the messiness of those strategies. Nevertheless, the difference between Seoul as a colonial city and Sapporo as a settler-colonial one is clear: assimilation strategies were directed at the very large non-Japanese population of Seoul, whereas such strategies either did not exist in Sapporo, or were aimed at turning Japanese migrants into permanent settlers.⁵² Emer O'Dwyer, in her recent study of Dairen (Dalian), relies explicitly on a settler-colonial frame to make a similar argument as Uchida about the role of ordinary people in the production of colonial space, and the role of cities as "sites deeply involved in determining the functional meaning of imperialism."⁵³ That is, by looking at the urban experience in colonial cities, we can better understand how Japan's empire actually worked. Sapporo's history complicates our understanding of these twentieth-century colonial cityscapes by pushing the history of Japanese imperial urbanism back in time to the mid-nineteenth century, and by introducing a new type of colonial framework to our understanding of Japanese imperialism in its urban forms.

Transnational/Global History

⁵¹ To mention just a few recent works: Todd Henry, *Assimilating Seoul: Japanese Rule and the Politics of Public Space in Colonial Korea, 1910–1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014); Tristan Grunow, "Paving Power," and finally Emer O'Dwyer, *Significant Soil: Settler Colonialism and Japan's Urban Empire in Manchuria* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2015). O'Dwyer extends Louise Young's argument that modernity was a coproduct of the metropolitan centers and second cities of modern Japan by arguing that this took place throughout the empire; she discusses the Korean- and Chinese-language historiography of colonial cities that have allowed us those insights. See especially pp. 15–16.

⁵² Todd Henry, *Assimilating Seoul*.

⁵³ O'Dwyer, p. 16.

In an introduction to a 2014 *American Historical Review* forum on Japan's "new international history," Louise Young noted the rise of new scholarship on Japan that seeks to place social and cultural developments in Japan and its empire into a comparative, international, and transnational framework.⁵⁴ In 2017, Sheldon Garon issued a call to historians of Japan to embrace transnational history, both to enrich global history with a Japanese perspective, and to enrich the field of Japanese history with a transnational one.⁵⁵ No longer focused on the diplomatic relations that previously characterized international history, new work in this vein seeks to put Japan into conversations about global trends and ideas, such as humanitarian movements, international politics, science and medicine, and cultural flows, building on long-standing research about nineteenth-century Japan's receptiveness to ideas from abroad, while making novel arguments about Japan's active participation and dissemination of ideas in global contexts.⁵⁶ Migration and colonialism are no exception to this trend, although so far the bulk of the work in this field remains limited to the twentieth century.⁵⁷

Sapporo's settler-colonial setting may have been unique within Japan, but Sapporo was not alone in the world: its growth as a settler-colonial capital took place in the same era that the settler-colonial cities of European empires were booming. While my focus in this thesis is not

⁵⁴ Louise Young, "Introduction: Japan's New International History," *American Historical Review* 119:4 (October 2014), pp. 1117–28.

⁵⁵ Sheldon Garon, "Transnational History and Japan's 'Comparative Advantage'," *Journal of Japanese Studies* 43:1 (Winter 2017), pp. 65–92.

⁵⁶ One notable recent example is Mark Ravina's study of the Meiji Restoration as a moment of globalization, characterized by "radical nostalgia" and "cosmopolitan chauvinism," pressed into service to defend Japan's "local distinctiveness" by embrace of a more globalized world. Mark Ravina, *To Stand with the Nations of the World: Japans' Meiji Restoration in World History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

⁵⁷ See the various essays in *Transnational Japan as History: Empire, Migration, and Social Movements*, ed. Pedro Iacobelli, Danton Leary, and Shinnosuke Takahashi (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016).

explicitly comparative, I draw on the fields of transnational history and the history of settler-colonial urbanism across the globe. Sapporo's history is both connected to these histories, and also serves as an interesting comparison to the histories of cities such as Melbourne and Chicago. Sapporo's history helps bring Japan into these global fields, and enriches those fields by offering a non-European example that both confirms and extends the findings of this body of research.

Production of Space

Over the course of the nineteenth century, the Japanese presence in Ezochi shifted from a series of points, in the form of a series of coastal fisheries, to an increasingly contiguous plane, spreading across the interior of the region.⁵⁸ The decision to found and build a new capital city inland, rather than at an existing port or trading post, both reflected and enabled this dramatic spatial transformation. In other words, the spatial intervention in Sapporo—the decision to build a new city—led to new ways of planning, settling, and administering space across Hokkaido. William Cronon, in his pioneering work on the dual processes of urban development and rural settlement in the American West, and particularly his argument that Chicago's growth was essential to the settlement of the West, has been particularly influential in helping me think about the role of cities in transforming vast hinterlands.⁵⁹ Sapporo resembles Chicago in many ways, albeit at a smaller scale; unlike Cronon, I focus on the messiness of urban politics and policymaking, rather than the broader, more abstract structures of economic change, such as finance and commodity flows, but the broader point about understanding urban development in the context of the city's hinterland and beyond lies at the heart of my project.

⁵⁸ In the Ishikari region, this began with the second era of shogunal control, which marked the beginning of inland agricultural settlement near Sapporo; see *SSS*, vol. 1, p. 562.

⁵⁹ William Cronon, *Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991).

Given that Sapporo's development took place at the same time as the Japanese state was becoming increasingly modern, and at the same time that the Japanese state was colonizing Hokkaido, it is important to mention the specific relationship between state, territory, and colony. I do not explicitly address these theoretical concerns in this thesis, but I draw on some recent insights about the role of spatial strategies as they relate to state attitudes toward territory. Classic definitions of the state in the Western sociological tradition pinpoint sovereignty over a bounded territory as one hallmark of the modern state, with borders clearly demarcating a domestic and foreign sphere. These geographic boundaries in turn contain social, political and economic processes, and map onto the ideological and cultural formations of the nation.⁶⁰ More recent theoretical work has sought to complicate this formulation, mostly by arguing that territoriality should be understood not as a static attribute of states, but rather as an ongoing process conducted by states. That is, a key function and characteristic of modern states is that they continually *produce* a particular type of territory through an array of strategies designed to organize and control space. It is precisely through the definition and control of space that states are able to derive an autonomous source of power. By defining and controlling territory, states are able to justify the extension of state power into other arenas, including military, economic, social, and cultural spheres.⁶¹

More specifically, the modern state is uniquely able to provide a territorially centralized form of organization. It is this feature that distinguishes the state from other forms of social

⁶⁰ This is most famously attributed to Max Weber, who argued that the monopoly of violence over a circumscribed geographic area defines the modern state. Max Weber, "Politics as a Vocation," in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, trans. and ed. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 77–128.

⁶¹ Neil Brenner et al., "State Space in Question", in *State/Space: A Reader* (Malden: Blackwell, 2003), pp 1–26.

organization, such as religious groups, cultural alliances, business communities, or kinship networks.⁶² The state's monopoly over the processes of territorial centralization affords it a base of power upon which to negotiate with civil society groups, and extend its influence throughout society. The modern state has developed many ways to pursue territorial centralization. On a basic level, the use of diplomacy and military force to define boundaries marks a legacy from earlier state forms, but the hardening of borders as precise lines on maps, and increasingly rigid in practice, distinguishes the modern world from the past. States also deploy a range of strategies to consolidate power over their territories, including infrastructural/material, political, and ideological strategies. Infrastructure such as telecommunications and transport networks serve military purposes, but then allow the state to support economic and social practices. Schools work in similar ways. Modern states universally develop systematic internal geographical divisions, which enable an administrative hierarchy that allows decisions from the center to spread across the state's territory. (This, too, can be seen as a legacy from earlier state forms, reminding us that the features of the modern state do not spring out of nowhere.) States also deploy ideological strategies to legitimize and reify their territoriality. Mapping (and other forms of 'imaging' the state) serves an important purpose, especially when the veneer of scientific legitimacy (in the case of surveying) and cultural identity (in the mapping of ethnic groups or the use of particular toponyms) are overlaid onto these efforts.⁶³

⁶² Michael Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms, and Results," in *State/Space: A Reader* (Malden: Blackwell, 2003), pp. 53–64.

⁶³ In the field of Japanese history, Marcia Yonemoto and Kären Wigen have led the way in spatial history. Yonemoto's work on mapping in early-modern Japan (Marcia Yonemoto, *Mapping Early Modern Japan: Space, Place, and Culture in the Tokugawa Period, 1603–1868* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003]), and Wigen's work on the transformation of particular regions from thoroughfares to backwaters (Kären Wigen, *The Making of a Japanese Periphery, 1750–1920* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995]), as well as her work crossing the Meiji Restoration to track changing representations and ideologies of regional identity (Wigen, *A Malleable Map: Geographies of Restoration in Central Japan*,

Henri Lefebvre described these various levels of shaping space as a process of production. The production of space, in Lefebvre's view, is a combination of physical strategies, such as the creation of borders, the construction of infrastructure, and the administration of places, and mental strategies, such as mapping space, naming places, and ascribing cultural values to geographic features.⁶⁴ Put differently, the tension between imagined spaces—in this case, the city as envisioned by planners—and real spaces—the built environment of Sapporo—together created a holistic urban space, the city of Sapporo, in the mid-nineteenth century. I stress throughout this thesis the contingent nature of these processes: people chose to describe and create spaces in particular ways, and in dialogue with environmental, social, and political factors. There is nothing natural or preordained about the location, form, or function of Sapporo.

Rather, elites in late Tokugawa Japan began planning for a new city to serve new functions in Ezochi: they sought a base for military, political, social, and economic control to accommodate growing demands for tax revenue and the increasing need for geopolitical security. In the Meiji period, these pressures continued, albeit transformed by the new geopolitical realities of treaty relations with western powers and the greater urgency of domestic social and economic crises. In both eras, building a new city was a conscious choice to achieve the particular goals of Japanese settler-colonization in Hokkaido.

Dissertation Structure and Argument

In sum, city building functioned as a strategy of the modernizing state in colonial Hokkaido to bring the entire region under centralized control, and thereby to quickly and efficiently settle large swaths of the region with ethnic Japanese. In the chapters that follow, I

1600-1912 [Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010]), have inspired my attention to the various ways space has been produced, both in the mind and on the ground, throughout Japan and its history.

⁶⁴ Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).

tackle various pieces of this broad spatial strategy to highlight the various ways in which the production of urban space played a crucial role in the production of colonial space, and in which the production of colonial state space had profound effects on the production of urban space in Sapporo.

I also suggest that deep continuities connect the efforts to colonize Hokkaido from an urban capital in both the Tokugawa and Meiji periods. Certainly the period between 1853, when the Tokugawa shogunate agreed to open more ports to western trade, and 1868, when the shogunate fell and the Meiji regime took power, ushered in significant changes: the colonial project became more intense and extensive during the early Meiji period, with new technologies, much greater investment, and an explicit turn to western models to achieve colonial goals. Yet, these changes are a question of degree, not of kind: the fundamental goals, priorities, and conditions of Japanese expansion into Hokkaido, and indeed of the founding and building of Sapporo itself, remained remarkably constant throughout the nineteenth century.

In chapter 1, “Envisioning a Capital,” I discuss visions for a new city in Ezochi/Hokkaido, produced by elites in mainland Japan and local officials in Sapporo from the 1780s to the 1880s. This history of ideas about city building in the region reveals the continuities between the Tokugawa and Meiji periods, notably the importance of defensive and economic concerns facing nineteenth-century Japan, and the recurrent belief that a new, inland city could adequately address these concerns. These visions also include series of beliefs about the role of urban space in creating social order, illustrating elite and non-elite faith alike in the possibility of urban placemaking as a means to social improvement. This chapter also serves as an overarching narrative framework for the whole dissertation.

The second chapter, “Mapping Sapporo,” zooms into Sapporo between 1869, when the first attempts at city building took place, and the 1880s, when the city was firmly established and growing rapidly. I examine a corpus of eighteen maps to show how Sapporo changed from a city focused on defense and administration to a more complex urban space serving a wider variety of functions. By analyzing these maps as dynamic texts, rather than ossified artifacts, I show how they worked to articulate certain narratives of sociospatial development, including the displacement of Ainu and laborers, and generally reflect the imposition of colonial geographies onto Indigenous space.

In chapter 3, “Flows of People,” I trace the demographic changes in early Sapporo, focusing particularly on the migration of several groups of people to the city in the mid-1870s. Sapporo grew more rapidly than the agricultural parts of Hokkaido, underscoring the importance of the city to the broader colonial project, but the majority of this growth came from the large number of “temporary residents,” who dominated the city. These sojourners and transient migrants stymied official desires for permanent settlement, and illustrate the diverse experiences of settlers in Sapporo.

The next chapter, “Administering Sapporo,” once again zooms into the city proper, taking up the question of how the city went from a disorderly, lawless colonial town to a neatly-governed city with reliable structures of local political engagement and administration. The process of introducing local government reforms from mainland Japan to Sapporo highlights both the state’s efforts to incorporate Sapporo into the framework of the nation-state, and the limits of that project: local officials resisted and modified those efforts, and local elites played an increasingly prominent role in local government, reminding us that the colonial state was not monolithic.

In the final chapter, “The Capitol Orchard,” I explore the local, regional, national, and transnational networks that shaped the construction of an orchard in the grounds of the Colonial Agency capitol at the center of Sapporo. The story of this orchard illustrates how far-reaching networks of people and ideas shaped particular urban spaces in Sapporo; it also illustrates how Sapporo, far from being a remote frontier outpost, played a central role in those networks as part of a two-way exchange of ideas and plant matter in and out of Hokkaido.

Chapter 1

Envisioning a Capital: The Urbanization of Ezochi and Hokkaido, 1785–1882

In the summer of 1785, the shogunate's chief councilor, Tanuma Okitsugu (1719–88), dispatched a team of officials to survey Ezochi. The surveyors noted the region's vast size, low population, and lack of available food, and suggested that teaching the indigenous Ainu to farm would be the first step in turning the region into a productive part of the Tokugawa state. They estimated that turning merely 10% of the island over to cultivation could produce over five million *koku* in agricultural yields, a figure that would more than double the total value of agricultural land under Tokugawa house control.¹ Despite the lack of substantial evidence for this figure, Ezochi appealed to state elites as a source of potential wealth.

In the fall of 1789, war erupted in Ezochi. The shogunate was under new leadership: Tanuma had been ousted and replaced by Matsudaira Sadanobu, who rejected Tanuma's state-led economic policies in favour of austerity and retrenchment. Yet, he too recognized the value of Ezochi, and made Ezochi policy a centerpiece of his administration. The outbreak of war with the Ainu of eastern Ezochi reminded the shogunate of the potential threat to the security of the state: not only might restive Ainu rebel against Japanese rulers, sucking up military resources, such unrest might also encourage an encroaching Russian Empire to take advantage of the Japanese weaknesses so exposed and stake a territorial claim to Ezochi, bringing a powerful Western power to Japan's doorstep.

These two factors—economic and defensive—remained the dominant features of debates about the proper place of Ezochi in the Japanese state from the late eighteenth to late nineteenth centuries. Elites argued about the proper weight to ascribe to these factors, and the best means of

¹ Sapporo-shi kyōiku iinkai, ed., *Shin Sapporo shishi*, vol. 1 (Sapporo: Hokkaidō shinbunsha, 1986), p. 417. Hereafter SSS.

dealing with each, but the persistence of these twin features throughout the century stands out. In turn, many of the responses to these issues also remained constant, in broad strokes if not in the particulars. By looking at some of these themes, it is possible to identify broad continuities from the 1780s through the 1880s, which helps explain the rapidity with which Meiji-era elites turned Ezochi into an integral part of the Japanese state as Hokkaido after the 1868-69 civil war.

To trace these continuities, and to track the ebb and flow of debates, I will focus on space as a crucial dimension through which the central Japanese state sought to address the economic and military role of Ezochi. State elites deployed a range of spatial strategies to reconceptualise and remake Ezochi into an integral part of Japan, one over which they could assert control for a range of purposes. At the heart of this effort lay the centralization of Ezochi around a new capital city. The reimagining of Ezochi as an urbanized space (and a space to be urbanized) largely drew on existing models of political and economic space in Japan—the model of the early-modern fief centred on the castle town—but also involved the exploration of new spatial forms to accommodate both the failure of the existing castle-town in Matsumae to effectively administer Ezochi, and the rise of long-distance commercial networks that connected Ezochi to the rest of Japan and abroad.² This tension between old and new urban forms thus predated the novelty and Western-style features that Meiji-era people (from Japan or elsewhere) commented upon when visiting Sapporo. New ways of thinking about cities were already on the rise well before the arrival of any Western advisors.

In this chapter, I focus on four components of the reimagining of Ezochi. First, I consider debates about the function of the proposed new capital city to trace the connection between the

² For a discussion of the challenges to Matsumae rule in the face of changing economic and social structures, see David Howell, *Capitalism from Within: Economy, Society, and the State in a Japanese Fishery* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 25–49.

city and the broader state project of increasing control over Ezochi. Second, I look at proposals for the form of the city, including its location and layout, to identify assumptions about the ideal urban form in nineteenth-century Japan and areas considered ripe for improvement. Third, I identify the relationship between urban space and the social order, pinpointing the ways in which state elites sought to use spatial arrangements to influence and control people's lives. Finally, I consider the ideological or symbolic representation of the region through surveys, maps and textual descriptions. Together, these modes of making Ezochi legible to elites unfamiliar with the region helped incorporate it into the geographic idiom of mainland Japan.

This chapter is structured chronologically to give some context for the chapters that follow. I identify key figures and turning points as a way to highlight the components above, and to illustrate the importance of continuities in the urbanization of nineteenth-century Ezochi and Hokkaido.

Ezochi in 1785

By the late eighteenth century, the economy and social order of Ezochi had shifted significantly since the origins of Matsumae Domain and the initial establishment of formal relations with the Ainu at the start of the seventeenth century. In particular, the rise of the contract fishery system had initiated fundamental changes to the social and economic order of Ezochi. This system, which functioned as an “institutional appendage” of Matsumae domain, emerged out of Matsumae's peculiar economic situation.³ Unlike most other early-modern domains, Matsumae did not grow rice, although the domain had a putative yield of 10,000 *koku*

³ Howell, *Capitalism from Within*; p. 44. The next two paragraphs draw on chapters 2 and 3 more broadly, pp. 25–92.

in recognition of its vital role as a gateway to Ezochi, and its concomitant military duties.⁴

Instead, it relied on trade with the Ainu, and, from the late seventeenth century, the production of dried fish and other marine products for markets in mainland Japan and China. Matsumae's lords initially awarded their vassals control over various trading posts around the coast of Ezochi, but over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, control of these posts was contracted out to merchant houses. These merchants expanded commercial fishing, seeking higher profits through the introduction of more efficient technology, the greater use of exploitative wage labor, and greater reliance on credit.

These structural changes tied Ezochi ever closer to the mainland Japanese economy. Trade along the Sea of Japan coast to western Japan flourished, funneled through Matsumae's ports, and dried marine goods in particular became a major export to China via Nagasaki.⁵ The fishing industry in Ezochi became increasingly attractive to fishermen from Matsumae and northern Honshu; despite official proscriptions on Wajin residence in Ezochi, many seasonal workers crossed into Ezochi to work in the summer and autumn fisheries, and increasingly many wintered in the Ezochi trading posts. After 1777, fish stocks in the Wajinchi began to decline, leading fishermen to petition for the right to fish in Ezochi.⁶ Fishery managers recruited more Wajin fishers, as the Ainu population, suffering from increasingly exploitative economic circumstances and the rapid disruption of its ecological and social networks, shrank.

⁴ Howell, *Capitalism from Within*, p. 29. This figure fluctuated over time, and was increased to 30,000 *koku* in 1855. Like Tsushima Domain, which oversaw relations with Korea, Matsumae had less onerous alternate attendance duties in Edo in exchange for diplomatic and military duties befitting its gateway status. See Kaiho Mineo, "Matsumae-han," *Kokushi daijiten*, 15 vols. (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 1979–97), accessed online through Japan Knowledge.

⁵ For a discussion of this trade, see Matsuura Akira, "The Trade in Dried Marine Products from Nagasaki to China during the Edo Period," transl. Michael Thornton, in *Copper in the Early Modern Sino-Japanese Trade*, ed. Keiko Nagase-Reimer (Leiden: Brill, 2015), pp. 118–56.

⁶ See Hokkaidō, ed., *Shin Hokkaidō-shi nenpyō* (Sapporo: Hokkaidō shuppan kikaku sentā, 1989), p. 74.

Meanwhile, mainland intellectuals recognized the potential wealth in Ezochi, and discussed ways to exploit it. The scholar Arai Hakuseki, in his 1720 *Ezoshi*, had suggested that development in the region could help free Japan from a period of economic stagnation. In 1739, Sakura Genjirō penned a treatise on Ezochi calling for the expansion of mining, while Kudō Heisuke and Hayashi Shihei both wrote important and influential surveys of Ezochi in the 1780s. These works helped spread knowledge about Ezochi among shogunal and domanial officials, as well as a more popular audience.

By the late eighteenth century, the situation in Ezochi thus looked considerably different than at the start of the Tokugawa period—and considerably more complex, challenging the capabilities of the Matsumae Domain. In addition to academic curiosity and official interest in the region, external developments towards the end of the century elevated shogunal concern about the security of Ezochi. Matsumae officials first encountered Russians in the Kurile Islands in 1759, although they elected not to notify the shogunate. The shogunate first learned of a Russian presence in eastern Ezochi in 1771. Reports that Russian missionaries sought to convert Kurile Ainu to Christianity raised alarm bells among the shogunate, who recognized Christianity as a disruptive ideology, and one that might embolden the Ainu to rebel against Japanese control. Thereafter, the threat of a Russian invasion became a recurrent theme in academic and official writings about Ezochi, highlighting the shogunate's concern with security to the north—and anxieties about Matsumae's ability to adequately provide it.⁷

The reasons for such concern about Russian interest in a seemingly peripheral part of the Japanese archipelago, and a part where no ethnic Japanese were officially allowed to live, lie in the broader geopolitical challenges facing the Tokugawa shogunate. By the end of the eighteenth

⁷ SSS, vol. 1, pp. 415–18.

century, the shogunate was increasingly worried about a triad of international concerns that threatened to undermine its longstanding approach to foreign affairs. The export of silver and other precious metals reached dramatic levels by the end of the century, threatening to destabilize Japanese currency; the Napoleonic Wars had thrown the Dutch trade into disarray; and sightings of Russian and English vessels in the waters around Ezochi heightened concerns about foreign military threats throughout the archipelago. In particular, Nagasaki drew the attention of officials keen to address these issues, in part because of its prominence as a city under the direct control of the shogunate, but also because the Nagasaki trade with Chinese and European merchants relied heavily on the domestic trade of marine products and other resources from Ezochi. Threats to the north, in their view, could potentially destabilize the entire system of foreign relations built up over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.⁸

The economic and geopolitical concerns of the eighteenth-century shogunate reveal fundamental transformations in Japanese state and society, a century and a half after the establishment of the Tokugawa state. Political, economic, and cultural networks increasingly bound all parts of the country to the metropolises of Edo, Kyoto, and Osaka, moving beyond the local urban networks of castle towns and regional cities. The alternate attendance system meant that officials in every domain had familiarity with Edo politics and culture.⁹ The rise of a national print culture, for both intellectual and popular purposes, complemented the economic

⁸ See Tanimoto Akihisa, *Kondō Jūzō to Kondō Tomizō: Kansei kaikaku no hikari to kage* (Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppansha, 2014). For a discussion of the marine trade with China, and the place of Hokkaido products in that trade, see Matsuura Akira, “The Trade in Dried Marine Products”.

⁹ Constantine Vaporis, *Tour of Duty: Samurai, Military Service in Edo, and the Culture of Early Modern Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2007).

networks of rice shipments and other commercial products.¹⁰ Enabling these networks was an effective transportation system of roads radiating from Edo and other cities, well maintained and provisioned with inns, post horses, and companies of postal runners.

Edo symbolized the consolidation and centralization of the state under the Tokugawa shogunate.¹¹ Changes in the city's form and function over the first half of the Tokugawa period reflect Edo's role in the transformation of the Tokugawa state, and also provide context for elites' ideas about building a new city in Ezochi. When Tokugawa Ieyasu took control of Edo in 1590, he moved quickly to fortify the existing castle and establish a well-planned commercial district, necessary for supplying his family and retainers. After winning hegemony in 1603, Ieyasu expanded the castle, displacing townhouses to new districts. Tokugawa retainers and daimyo of other domains built their estates around the periphery of the castle, which benefitted them by virtue of proximity to the center of power, but inhibited the clear geographic separation of statuses by encouraging the sprawl of commoner districts around the clusters of daimyo estates. The shogunate used the aftermath of the 1657 Meireki Fire to rationalize this sprawl by consolidating daimyo estates beyond the castle precincts, and centralizing the city's markets, but ultimately this marked the limits of their ability to plan the city's form in any comprehensive way. Sprawl continued as the population soared: dense urban neighborhoods clustered around

¹⁰ See, for example, Mary Elizabeth Berry, *Japan in Print* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007); see also Kären Wigen, *The Making of a Japanese Periphery, 1750-1920* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

¹¹ Kitajima Masamoto, "Edo no toshi kōsei to toshi mondai," in idem, *Kinsei no minshū to toshi* (Tokyo: Meisho, 1985), p. 205.

temples, daimyo estates, and markets, and also along the major highways leading in and out of Edo. The city thus turned into a unique “polycentric castle town.”¹²

In addition to the problem of sprawl, and the difficulty of smoothly accommodating rapid population growth, the shogunate also struggled to address changing social dynamics in Edo. The commoner population of the city stabilized around 500,000 people by the early eighteenth century, with likely a similar number of warriors. In particular, the rise of a commercial society, serving both warrior households and the needs of the commoner population, challenged the moral order of the Tokugawa state. Shogunal intellectuals of the orthodox stripe railed against the decadence of Edo’s wealthy commoners, and warned that the warrior class was losing its power by virtue of its growing indebtedness to merchants and moneylenders. Other officials were more optimistic about the benefits of commerce, but on the whole the shogunate was ineffective at regulating urban life in the face of changing socioeconomic structures among urban commoners amid the soaring population of Edo and other major cities.¹³

By the mid-eighteenth century, however, these abstract questions of ideology demanded more practical responses. The majority of Edo commoners were mid- to lower class, and the proportion of them who rented their homes and shops ranged from just under 60% in wealthier districts to over 80% in the poorer areas around the Sumida River.¹⁴ The crises of the Kyōhō period (1716–36), when famine pushed up rice prices, caused many poorer Edoites to default on their rent payments. Calls for the better regulation of property sales and rentals were shelved

¹² This description is from Kitajima, “Edo bakufu no toshi keikaku,” in *Kinsei no minshū to toshi*, pp. 198–204. The term “polycentric castletown” (*tashinteki jōkamachi*) is attributed to Ogawa Takuji, *Jinbun chiri kenkyū* (Tokyo: Kokin shoin, 1928), p. 100.

¹³ Kitajima, “Edo no toshi kōsei to toshi mondai,” p. 229.

¹⁴ Kitajima, “Edo no toshi kōsei to toshi mondai,” pp. 219–21.

indefinitely, largely due to opposition from powerful landowners, who controlled Edo's commoner districts. Inaction and ongoing hardship finally led Edo commoners to revolt; thereafter, the shogunate continued to worry about a restive urban poor, in Edo and elsewhere.

The shogunate's ambivalence toward urban society carried over to its attitudes toward Ezochi in several ways. On the one hand, proposals for Ezochi focused on agriculture as a source of wealth and security, and sought to curtail the excesses of merchants in the region. On the other hand, observers and proponents of settlement recognized the importance of cities as both the symbols and sites of power, and sought to recreate the splendor of castle towns in the far north. Finally, some reformers argued that settlement in Ezochi would relieve the urban problems of the Japanese mainland: by relocating Edo's urban poor, for example, social pressures could be reduced in the Tokugawa capital. In these interrelated ways, shogunal officials envisioned the future of Ezochi through the lens of their own highly urban environs.

The Shogunate's Plans for Ezochi, 1785–95

The four decades between Tanuma Okitsugu's proposal for the development of Ezochi and the shogunate's decision to relinquish control of Ezochi back to Matsumae Domain in 1821 mark the first period of decisive and proactive engagement with Ezochi on the part of the shogunate. It is in this period that the framework for settling Ezochi became clear, even as control of the shogunate oscillated between reformist and reactionary factions. Despite debates over how best to govern and develop the region, a consensus emerged around the need for a stronger state presence in the region: one that would supplant the string of fisheries and trade posts connected to Matsumae and tie Ezochi firmly into the political and economic geography of mainland Japan. Proposals for agricultural settlement, military control, and more formal trade posts led to plans for a centrally located political and economic headquarters. Officials would

debate the precise form, function, and location of this headquarters over the ensuing decades, but the need for a new capital city in central Ezochi quickly became an unquestioned assumption in debates about the region.

The first serious proposal to settle Ezochi by the shogunate came in the 1780s as part of the economic reforms proposed by Tanuma Okitsugu, who had risen to power as chief councilor in 1770s under the shogun Ieharu. Tanuma's chief task was to reinvigorate the shogunate's fiscal situation, which had grown straitened due to outdated tax collection methods, the failure to keep pace with structural changes in the economy, and mismanagement and corruption. In contrast to the contractionary reforms of the Kyōhō era, which sought to temper commercial excess and luxury in favor of agriculture and austerity, Tanuma proposed embracing the commercial efflorescence of the eighteenth century. In addition to his efforts to shift the shogunate's revenue source to more commercial sectors, he also started a number of development projects designed to jumpstart a stalled economy, including land reclamation and other public works projects. Along these lines, he dispatched a group of officials to survey Ezochi in 1785. As described above, these officials identified the agricultural promise of the vast region.¹⁵ Moreover, agricultural settlement would attract merchants, who would gather (presumably in towns) and spur more population growth.¹⁶

More important than agriculture, however, was Ezochi's commercial importance in both existing and potential trade networks. By the 1780s, fisheries merchants were shipping fertilizer made from crushed herring and trout to the commercial cotton farmers of the Kansai region. Various "bagged goods" (*tawaramono*, especially dried marine products such as kelp and

¹⁵ SSS, vol. 1, p. 417.

¹⁶ Fujita Satoru, *Tanuma jidai*, *Nihon kinsei no rekishi* 4 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 2012), p. 129.

abalone) were shipped from Hokkaido along the Sea of Japan to Nagasaki, where they were sold to Chinese traders. Tanuma promoted this trade as a replacement for copper exports, and in 1785 strengthened the shogunate's trade office in Nagasaki by giving it direct control over the bagged-good trade with Hokkaido. At the same time, he established a similar office in Hakodate in southern Ezochi, shifting power and economic control away from the Matsumae castle town.¹⁷

The officials of the Ezochi survey also suggested opening up formal trade relations with the Russians, as a way of heading off potential conflicts and allowing the shogunate to profit from Ainu–Russian trade that was already taking place clandestinely. By exploiting Ezochi's gold, silver, and copper resources, as well as marine products, they envisioned creating a vibrant trading port that would both give the shogunate a new entrepot, and reinvigorate Nagasaki. Some members of the team proposed a more autarkic approach: by blocking routes to foreign countries, settling Ezochi, and asserting control over Tartary, Manchuria, and even Russia, Japan could safeguard its territory. The fantastical nature of this proposal hints at a broader problem underlying all these Tanuma-era proposals for Ezochi: shogunal officials frankly did not know very much. It turned out that clandestine trade between the Ainu and Russians was virtually nonexistent, and that while Russia may well have wanted trade, the danger of depleting metal supplies and the abundance of western goods flowing through Nagasaki meant that, in the officials' soberer final analysis, agricultural settlement would be about the best that the shogunate could do with Ezochi.¹⁸

Tanuma fell from power in 1786, once a combination of natural disasters, urban unrest and the collapse of many farming villages during the Tenmei Famine (1783–87) emboldened his

¹⁷ Fujita, *Tanuma jidai*, p. 121–22; Matsuura, “The Trade in Dried Marine Products”.

¹⁸ Fujita, *Tanuma jidai*, pp. 127–31.

opponents to challenge his unorthodox economic programs. The shogun's death in 1787 sealed his fate, and cleared the way for Matsudaira Sadanobu (1759–1829) to take power as chief councillor. Matsudaira implemented a series of austerity measures, now known as the Kansei reforms, in large part due to his belief that corruption and maladministration under Tanuma had contributed to the devastation of the Tenmei Famine.¹⁹ Tanuma's ouster ended his vision for development in Ezochi, but his efforts in the region nonetheless ensured that the shogunate would continue to take a much stronger interest in developments to the north, especially as the threat of foreign encroachment continued to grow.

Matsudaira was skeptical of Tanuma's proposals to develop Ezochi for economic purposes, and initially he also took a relatively conservative approach to defensive concerns. "If even heaven hasn't been able to grow rice there, how could we possibly do so?" he mused in response to the Tanuma-era reports about Ezochi's potential agricultural fertility. Resisting calls to take over Ezochi in the aftermath of a major 1789 Ainu rebellion against Japanese merchants on Kunashiri, Matsudaira instead stressed the need to defend "Japan" (*Nihon*) from foreign encroachment by relying on troops from Nanbu and Tsugaru domains, while leaving control of Ezochi to Matsumae Domain and respecting the interests of the Ainu.²⁰

Yet, high-ranking bakufu officials in Matsudaira's administration, most notably Honda Tadakazu (1740–1813), continued to push for a more aggressive defensive stance. In 1792, Honda, citing growing concerns about foreign vessels prompted by shipwrecks around the Japanese coast, once again called on the bakufu to take over Ezochi. One of Honda's most

¹⁹ Matsudaira Sadanobu, *Uge no hito koto* (Tokyo: Matsudaira Sadaharu, 1928). Most of the entries during Tanuma's era (the 1780s) in *Uge no hito koto* revolve around reports of the famine; it seems quite clear that Matsudaira was not interested in the pro-commerce policies of his predecessor.

²⁰ Matsuura, *Uge no hito koto*, p. 121.

damning claims had to do with Matsumae's incompetence: "their maps of Ezochi do not even contain diagrams of the rivers and mountains; they have left Karafuto and the Kuriles off completely; and in fact are generally worse quality than maps we receive from barbarians."²¹ Matsudaira overruled Honda on this issue, but respected him enough to reproduce Honda's memorandum in full in his memoirs, suggesting Honda's arguments had become increasingly persuasive. Matsudaira acknowledged the danger posed by an unguarded northern frontier, even as he continued to oppose settlement.

Kondō Jūzō and the Tokugawa Seizure of Ezochi, 1795–1821

Only a few years later, another young official in Matsudaira's administration, Kondō Jūzō (1771–1829), became a vocal proponent of more aggressive state involvement in Ezochi to secure the territory and trade of the region against foreign encroachment. Kondō had learned of the Ainu rebellions against exploitative merchants in Kunashiri and elsewhere while posted to Nagasaki between 1795 and 1797, where he also grew intimately acquainted with the other foreign policy challenges facing the Tokugawa state. Kondō, upon his return to Edo, submitted a proposal for a new Ezochi policy, and received permission to survey the island in 1798. The results of his survey finally helped persuade the shogunate to strip Matsumae domain of its fiefdom, and formally annex the territory of Ezochi, a process completed by 1802 with the establishment of a shogunal magistrate's office in Hakodate.²²

Kondō was the first to discuss in detail the infrastructural and territorial steps required to settle Ezochi, laid out in a series of memoranda and a map submitted to the bakufu in 1799,

²¹ Cited in Matsuura, *Uge no hito koto*, p. 134.

²² Tanimoto, *Kondō Jūzō to Kondō Tomizō*; Hirano Tomohiko, "Kaidai" [introduction to Kondō Jūzō documents], in *Shin Asahikawa shishi*, ed. Asahikawa shishi henshū kaigi, vol. 6 (Asahikawa: Asahikawa-shi, 1993), pp. 5–6.

including a description of his proposals for the development of the island. In particular, he noted areas that would be suitable for “agriculture by future generations,” advocated an island-wide road network, and recommended a site for “defense and protection” (*yōgo narabini kei’ei*).²³ Key features of Kondō’s proposal, and features that would recur in subsequent debates about the disposition of Ezochi, included the challenges posed by Ezochi’s geography and climate; the relationship of Ezochi to national and international trade and diplomatic networks; the importance of infrastructure; and the economic value of development. All of these features reflected a desire to assert more centralized and consolidated control over the territory of Ezochi, and Kondō emphasized the creation of a new political and military headquarters (*bugyōsho matawa ryōshu jitō no idokoro*²⁴) in the region to establish such control.

Kondō’s proposal for a new headquarters derived from his study of the existing towns in southern Ezochi, and especially the “three ports” of Hakodate, Esashi, and the castle town of Matsumae. He stressed the importance of these towns’ locations, both in terms of geographic location, and in terms of their position in political and economic networks. The prosperity produced by the relationship between these towns and other places—both the Ezochi hinterland and elsewhere in Japan—gave Kondō grounds for arguing that a new capital in Ezochi would be able to generate similar, if not more effective, political and commercial networks. Finally, Kondō recognized that commercial, administrative and military needs required different types of cities.

²³ Kondō Jūzō, *Ezochi ezu*, in *Shin Asahikawa shishi*, vol. 6, p. 9.

²⁴ Kondō Jūzō, *Ezochi ezu*, vol. 6, p. 29. The term *bugyōsho* is usually translated as magistracy, and was the term applied not only to the shōgun’s office at Hakodate, but also to its various central government offices (e.g. the central finance bureau or magistrate for temples and shrines). “Residence of local lords or stewards” (*ryōshu jitō no idokoro*) refers to a retainer with personal land holdings secured by military force, rather than a bureaucrat employed directly by the shogunate.

This pushed him to argue that creating a new city from scratch was necessary to respond to the new circumstances in Ezochi at the end of the eighteenth century.

Kondō readily acknowledged the importance of geography, and especially the importance of spatial relations as a factor in political, military, and economic planning. While all three ports were equally prosperous, the harbor at Matsumae was notoriously difficult to access, and many ships foundered in poor weather. Despite this deficiency, the town's "proximity to Minmaya in Tsugaru...makes it a convenient location for the daimyo's government." Matsumae officials could quickly come and go, maintaining their ties to northern Tohoku and Edo. In contrast, Esashi and Hakodate enjoyed superior harbors, which more easily fostered commerce and "led naturally to prosperous towns." In Kondō's view, the rulers of Matsumae had adapted the spatial organization of their domain to the natural features of the region, but political considerations also influenced the development of towns in the area.²⁵ Kondō used the example of Matsumae to argue that politically created administrative or military towns—even ones sited less favorably in terms of geography—could grow into prosperous and flourishing cities. He applied this logic to his proposal that, ultimately, the center of the bakufu's centralized administration of Ezochi should be placed in the upper Ishikari Valley, 250 kilometres north of Matsumae and over 100 kilometres from the mouth of the Ishikari River.

At first glance, Kondō's proposal for a remote inland site for a new capital seems to sit at odds with his favorable evaluation of the port towns in Matsumae. After all, their harbors underpinned their prosperity. Hakodate, with its fine harbor, sizeable coastal plain and proximity to the Japanese mainland, was an obvious choice as an initial base from which to defend Ezochi. Indeed, the Tanuma-era decision to establish a government trade office there reflects its strong

²⁵ Kondō, *Ezochi ezū*, p. 10.

position in commercial networks that connected it to both Edo and eastern Japan, as well as the booming Sea of Japan trade. Moreover, its distance from Matsumae allowed the shogunate to maintain the fiction of delegating Ezochi affairs to Matsumae Domain. In 1798, after the bakufu decided to take direct control of Ezochi, Kondō himself recommended building a new military headquarters (*chinpu*, *chinbu*) there to serve as the headquarters for a new governor of Ezochi.²⁶ The term *chinpu* dates to the establishment of regional military capitals (*chinjufu*) in the Tohoku region during the Nara and Heian periods, for use in the campaigns accompanying the Yamato state's colonization of the northern part of Honshū. The term was resurrected during the Kenmu era (1333–36), when Emperor Godaigo wrested control of the central state back from the Kamakura shogunate and established a provincial civil and military capital in Tohoku. (In the Meiji era, the term was appropriated by the Imperial Navy and used to refer to its major regional bases.) All told, it had a strong military connotation, and one that presumed a connection to the settlement and administration of the region it controlled; it also linked Kondō's vision to a historical understanding of the conquest of the north a millennium earlier.

Yet, while he recognized the importance of defending Hakodate, he also called for the construction of a fortress (*sairui*) on the Ishikari River to control eastern and western Ezochi, and a fort (*jin'ya*) at a site which could “keep all Ezochi in a stranglehold.”²⁷ The geographic centrality of this inland redoubt became increasingly important to Kondō, who continued to stress the value of consolidating the defense of Ezochi away from the scattered coastal trading posts, which were vulnerable to coastal bombardment. The central inland location of the site,

²⁶ Tokyo Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo, ed., *Kondō Jūzō Ezochi kankei shiryō*, Dai Nihon kinsei shiryō 12, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo, 1984), p. 108–9. Details about *chinpu/chinjufu* from the *Koji ruien*, kan'i bu, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Jingū shichō, 1905), p. 13.

²⁷ Tokyo Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo, *Kondō Jūzō Ezochi kankei shiryō*, vol.1, p. 108–9.

near present-day Asahikawa, featured prominently in Kondō's 1799 submission to the shogunate. His proposed site, on the upper reaches of the Ishikari River, was practically in the center of Ezochi, and "probably the most suitable site for defending the entirety of Ezochi, and establishing a magistrate's office or the headquarters of a local lord." No longer just a fortress, the Ishikari site was gaining the functions of a political and administrative headquarters.

Kondō's justification for this central location reflects the challenges posed by the existing climate and administrative geography of Ezochi. His proposal for the new city relied heavily on regional infrastructural solutions that would ensure the political, economic, and defensive viability not only of the new city, but also of Ezochi at large. Ezochi's harsh winters posed significant problems for both defense and commerce. Coastal travel in the far north was virtually impossible for much of the year: blizzards were a regular feature in all parts of Ezochi, while sea ice could damage ships and block harbors on a regular basis. In Kondō's view, these factors favored the development of an inland transport network that could better serve administrators, soldiers and merchants in the winter months. (Kondō seems to have been less concerned by the high mountain ranges dividing Ezochi into east and west, or the six to ten metres of annual snowfall in the western half of the island.)

A central headquarters would also solve the administrative challenges posed by existing patterns of settlement. By the turn of the century, roughly sixty trading posts and fishing villages dotted the 3,000 kilometers of Ezochi's coastline. Choosing any one port as a headquarters—along the lines of Matsumae or Hakodate—would inevitably render those ports on the opposite coast of the island remote and distant. Kondō's determination to change the existing administrative geography, whereby each trading post was functionally autonomous (in no small

part due to its distance from the domain headquarters at Matsumae), reflects a growing commitment to a more centralized state apparatus.

This is clear in Kondō's proposal to divide Ezochi into "roughly eleven" districts, based around coastal defensive outposts that would protect the trading ports and their hinterlands, along the lines of Esashi and Hakodate. Kondō recognized that changing geopolitical circumstances required greater coordination and consolidation of state power. His proposal for more centralized spatial forms of administration in Ezochi, focused on linking towns and settlements to a centrally located capital, demonstrates a shift in territorial thinking towards the occupation and use of contiguous space, as opposed to the trade and political-economic coercion happening at the trading posts (and later contract fisheries) that dotted the Ezochi coastline. Kondō sounded a warning about the danger of a fractured political geography in the face of growing external threats.²⁸

In response to the challenges of climate and existing administrative geographies, Kondō envisioned a new city that relied heavily on new infrastructures for logistics and trade. Kondō noted the lack of a developed road system among the Ainu, who instead measured distances between settlements by the number of nights it would take to walk between them. Along particularly treacherous stretches of the coast, small boats were indispensable. The coastal villages such as Abashiri and Monbetsu along the Sea of Okhotsk that formed the bases for this coastal transport network were "ideal for guard posts," thought Kondō, especially if they could be linked via inland routes to the Ishikari headquarters.²⁹ Kondō proposed seventeen such coastal

²⁸ Kondō, *Ezochi ezu*, p. 29.

²⁹ Kondo, *Ezochi ezu*, pp. 20–21.

military stations along with “new land and sea routes.”³⁰ The dispatch of troops to and from Ishikari would ensure quick responses to any coastal attacks.

Kondō also worried about the supply of food. While food was regularly imported from mainland Japan to Ezochi, the inefficiencies in supply chains made clear by the Tenmei famine, and the difficulty of sustaining a large population on expensive imports, led Kondō to promote agricultural settlement as an inextricable part of the building of towns and cities, whether commercial, administrative, or military. City building was far more than the erection of walls and buildings; it required a reshaping of the hinterland and resources necessary to support the city’s population, and give it an economic basis upon which to grow. Kondō argued that the development of agriculture would complement the existing prosperity of Matsumae Domain’s towns, which thrived on the basis of trade. Wajin settlers would need rice or grain to eat, assumed Kondō, whether imported from Tsugaru and Nanbu or grown directly in Ezochi. Developing a regional agricultural base would strengthen Ezochi against foreign threats by boosting its resilience and self-sufficiency, as well as expanding and diversifying its economic activity.³¹

The development of new trade routes directly connecting Ezochi to Edo and eastern Japan was a key element of Kondō’s vision. Such a move would boost the economies of coastal ports by giving them more transport options (and reducing the monopoly of the Matsumae merchants). He was concerned not only with the consolidation of Edo’s control over the region as a buffer zone against potential western threats, but also with strengthening Edo’s significance within regional economic networks. In addition to giving Edo more direct control over the trade

³⁰ Tokyo Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo, *Kondō Jūzō Ezochi kankei shiryō*, vol. 1, p. 108.

³¹ Kondō, *Ezochi ezu*, p. 11.

of marine products and other goods from Ezochi, Kondō and other officials envisioned expanding trade with China via Manchuria. The route through Karafuto (Sakhalin) was a relatively well-established trading route, conducted largely by Ainu and the indigenous peoples of Karafuto and far eastern Manchuria, and served as a major import route for Chinese silk products and other goods that were often difficult to acquire through the Nagasaki junk trade.³² Kondō proposed making Karafuto a territory of Matsumae in order to “formally establish trade relations between Japan (*Nihon*) and Manchuria (*Manchiukoku*).”³³ Yet, he was not a proponent of free trade: Kondō had earlier warned that plans to establish a trading post with Russia on the island of Urup would only serve to encourage Russian designs on Japan, in much the way that the ceding of Macao to the Portuguese by China had given the Europeans a stronghold there.³⁴ He recognized that trade, like religion, was a potential source of conflict and destabilization, even as it provided valuable objects and income. A strong state presence would be necessary to oversee and manage commerce in Ezochi.

In sum, Kondō laid out a vision for Ezochi that would address some of the military, administrative, and economic challenges facing the shogunate at the end of the eighteenth century by creating administrative and logistical networks centered on a new headquarters in central Ezochi. Kondō did not describe this headquarters in much detail, although he came to see it as more than a simple guard post. “Although the area is undeveloped and wild, once a regional lord/military commander (*shugo*) takes up residence, it will flourish.” That is, a remote city built

³² Donald Keene, *The Japanese Discovery of Europe, 1720–1830* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969), p. 144.

³³ Kondō, *Ezochi ezu*, p. 18.

³⁴ Tokyo Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo, *Kondō Jūzō Ezochi kankei shiryō 1*, p. 124.

for political purposes could nevertheless become a wealthy, prosperous town.³⁵ This confidence in the future of such a city would continue to drive visions for Ezochi, even as the shogunate struggled to act on such ambitious proposals.

After the 1802 establishment of the Hakodate magistracy, Kondō travelled extensively throughout Ezochi to further develop his plans. After a few years on Etorofu in the Kuriles, where contact with Russians was most frequent (culminating in an armed attack in 1807 on Japanese merchants), Kondō travelled along the western part of Ezochi in 1807. After visiting Ishikari, he elaborated on his proposal to site a capital in the river valley. He reemphasized the importance of situating the city away from the coast (along the lines of castle towns in Nanbu, Tsugaru, and Sendai); the value of a central location in Ezochi; and the necessity of building robust overland transport networks. He explicitly criticized the development of Matsumae, Esashi, and Hakodate as mere “gateways” to the island: they were the first line of defense, not the last, and their constrained location meant they would never grow sufficiently to drive development and defense of the region.³⁶ These theoretical musings, however, did not take precedence over Kondō’s more realistic observations about the true value of the Ishikari area: its annual bounty of salmon, and its proximity to the wealthy fisheries on the Sea of Japan coast. The fisheries were the mainstay of the economy, driving both Japanese and Ainu populations to the area, making it prosperous and comparatively easy to defend.³⁷ As these observations suggest, fishing and the fishery trade would remain the dominant factors in the political calculus about

³⁵ Kondō Jūzō, *Ezochi ezu*, pp. 10–11.

³⁶ Tokyo Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo, *Kondō Jūzō Ezochi kankei shiryō*, vol. 2, p. 392.

³⁷ Tokyo Daigaku Shiryō Hensanjo, *Kondō Jūzō Ezochi kankei shiryō*, vol. 2, p. 346.

Ezochi, and—barring significant foreign attacks—ensured that the shogunate would take few steps to enact Kondō's vision for a new political geography.

The shogunate did not develop its own force to defend Ezochi, preferring to delegate defensive responsibilities to various northeastern domains, notably Nanbu and Tsugaru. The bakufu also shipped merchants, doctors, artisans, and others from Edo to serve in the coastal towns. Most of these people ended up in Hakodate, which grew to over 10,000 people by 1811: one fifth of Ezochi's Wajin population.³⁸ Hakodate's stint as the shogunate's political outpost in the region helped boost its stature compared to Matsumae and Esashi; it would remain the largest city in the region until the 1920s. The addition of political functions onto what had been primarily a commercial town helped cement its dominant position as a center of power in Ezochi, and lent Hakodate a certain weight in future discussions about how to pursue urban development in the region. The layering of political functions onto commercial ones generated a type of inertia, making it more difficult to develop alternative urban centers without renewed political force.

Shogunal Retreat, 1821–54

The shogunate, struggling with fiscal problems and other political priorities, relinquished control of Ezochi back to Matsumae Domain in 1821, after a relatively unproductive two decades in control. Few of the proposals drafted at the end of the eighteenth century had been carried out: in fact, shogunate officials posted to the trading posts were either ineffective at curbing the exploitative conditions there, or complicit in them. Meanwhile, the vast expense of transporting goods and people to Ezochi, and the relative lack of resources there, outweighed the

³⁸ Hokkaido, *Shin Hokkaidō shi nenpyō*, p. 103.

benefits slowly trickling in from mining and other ventures.³⁹ Poor harvests in Nanbu and Tsugaru, as well as fluctuations in the Sea of Japan trade with Nagasaki, further complicated the situation. The shogunate did send a series of men to explore the region, including Mogami Tokunai and Mamiya Rinzō; these men made extensive forays into the Kuriles, Sakhalin, and onto the continent, developing ties with Ainu and encountering Russians in the region. Their information was valuable and formed the basis of future developments, but at the time did little to contribute to the construction of a stronger state apparatus in Ezochi.⁴⁰ as asa

The first era of Tokugawa control highlights a tension within the shogunate's Ezochi policy. On the one hand, they clearly wanted to expand Edo's control over the region, both by establishing direct administrative control, and by reshaping trade networks to favor Edo and deemphasize the importance of Matsumae and the trade via western Japan. At the same time, Kondō at least seemed unwilling to challenge the existing structure of foreign policy in the Tokugawa state, whereby Matsumae domain was tasked with managing foreign relations with the Ainu (and, by extension, the various peoples around the Sea of Okhotsk and in coastal Manchuria). Despite Matsumae's inability to effectively protect the vast space of Ezochi, and clear signs that it was driving the Ainu into the arms of the Russians through its exploitative contract fishery system, the shogunate seemed unwilling to take control of foreign relations with the Ainu, or the peoples further to the north. It instead delegated military responsibilities, and continued to rely on the commercial fishing industry for revenue. In this regard, at least, the

³⁹ Kikuchi Isao discusses the relatively limited scope of gold, and the more lucrative lumber industry, but notes that they paled in comparison to fishing. "Ezogashima no kaihatsu to kankyō," *Ezogashima to hoppō sekai*, ed. Kikuchi Isao (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 2003), pp. 232–59.

⁴⁰ See Donald Keene, *The Japanese Discovery of Europe, 1720–1830* for some discussion of these and other explorers, and other intellectuals engaging with Ezochi. Honda Toshiaki in particular stands out for his interest in building cities in Ezochi—he proposed relocating Japan's capital to Kamchatka, as that would put it on the same latitude as London—but his writings did not circulate during his lifetime, making him less relevant to the debates I trace here.

shogunate chose not to overhaul the institutional structures of Ezochi, virtually ensuring that many of the same problems facing Matsumae would continue: lack of good infrastructure, corruption in the fisheries, disaffected Ainu, and a general lack of resources to move forward with a more ambitious vision for a centralized, consolidated state territory in the region. Nevertheless, that vision did take form in this era, and remained a surprisingly constant blueprint for future efforts.

Matsumae Domain regained control over Ezochi until 1854. In that period, it replaced the contract fishery system with a system of centralized control, assigning salaried retainers to the trading posts. Matsumae once again facilitated trade and diplomatic relations with the Ainu. Despite the end of shogunal rule, defensive concerns remained chronic, and Matsumae reported a worrying rise in sightings of foreign vessels, as well as encounters with Russians in the Kuriles and Sakhalin. As a result, Ezochi remained a site of concern and interest to the shogunal and observers elsewhere in Japan. Prominent scholars such as Aizawa Seishisai emphasized the importance of defending Ezochi from barbarian influence, and argued that taking over the region would ensure Japan's security and help revive a moribund domestic spirit.⁴¹ Bakufu officials continued to travel to Ezochi, and debates about defense and economic development in Ezochi continued to simmer.

Two men stand out for their prominent engagement with Ezochi: Tokugawa Nariaki (1800–60) and Matsuura Takeshirō (1818–88). Nariaki, daimyo of Mito from 1829 to 1844, submitted a proposal for the development of Ezochi to the shogunal councilors in 1839, laying out a plan to relocate his domain to the region to bolster defense and establish permanent

⁴¹ Aizawa Seishisai, *New Theses*, in Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, *Anti-Foreignism and Western Learning in Early-Modern Japan: The New Theses of 1825* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Council on East Asian Studies, 1986), pp. 222–223.

Japanese settlement. Nariaki had become an increasingly important player in Edo politics by the 1830s, and sought to extend his influence after the retirement of the shogun Ienari 1837, urging chief councilor Mizuno Tadakuni to implement a series of reforms under the banner of moralism, echoing the efforts of Matsudaira Sadanobu fifty years earlier.⁴² In addition to ambitions at Edo, Nariaki also sought to boost his own domain's role in the Ezochi trade by shifting some control away from the Sea of Japan merchants, a goal that Mito officials had pursued since the 1780s in tandem with the shogunate. Nariaki's proposal was drastic and ultimately went nowhere, but his specific ideas about territorial control and the construction of a new capital fit into the developing debates over the disposition of the region.⁴³

A generation younger than Nariaki, Matsuura Takeshirō was the third son of a rural samurai in Tsu Domain (modern-day Mie prefecture). He attended a domain school between 1830 and 1833, where he excelled in literature and science, and made intellectual connections that he would maintain for the rest of his life. In 1833, at the age of fifteen, he travelled alone to Edo on foot, kicking off what his first English-language biographer termed a lifelong *Wanderlust*. His travels took him to Nagasaki in 1843, where he learned about Japan's international relations from merchants and officials. Stories of encounters with Russians in Ezochi sparked his interest, and he decided to travel to Ezochi to assist in the development and defense of the region.

Matsuura arrived in Matsumae Domain in the spring of 1845.⁴⁴ Matsuura made three trips to

⁴² See Conrad Totman, *Politics in the Tokugawa Bakufu, 1600–1843* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 228–230.

⁴³ SSS, vol.1, pp. 686–92.

⁴⁴ Hans Dettmer, “Ein Japanischer Forschungsreisender des 19. Jahrhunderts: Matsuura Takeshirō”, *Oriens* 27/28 (1981): pp. 539–42. Dettmer's *Wanderlust* citation comes from Frederick Starr's 1916 biography of Matsuura: Frederick Starr, *The Old Geographer, Matsuura Takeshiro* (Tokyo: Fukuin Printing Co., 1916), p. 3.

Ezochi between 1845 and 1849, recording his experiences in three published diaries, and summing up his ideas for Ezochi's development in a proposal for naval defense.

Partly as a result of their differing positions and varying degree of direct experience in Ezochi, Nariaki and Matsuura had sharply differing ideas about the proper role of the state, and these differences colored their ideas about the territorial reorganization of Ezochi. Their ideas about commerce, the place of the Ainu, and the importance of a central defensive center reveal some of these differences, although they also illustrate some common assumptions about the place of Ezochi within the broader territory of the Japanese state. While both men argued for the stronger imposition of state control, Nariaki was much more enthusiastic about replicating the model of castle towns for the purpose of defense and commercial growth; Matsuura emphasized the moral obligations of the state to its subjects, which required the devotion of resources to welfare provision rather than economic development or construction projects, and was thus compatible with the existing pattern of diffuse territorial organization in Ezochi.

The power of merchants in Ezochi gave both Nariaki and Matsuura cause for alarm. In both cases, their suspicion of the fisheries' merchants might be seen as a conservative backlash against the commercialization of Ezochi, and the commercialization of castle towns elsewhere in Japan. The famines of the Tenpō era had affected Matsumae as well, with many impoverished residents turning to the domain for aid. The austerity measures and calls to return to agriculture that followed the famine seemed a logical choice to both men, and an opportunity to reinvigorate traditional state roles. At first glance, Nariaki's proposal drew on the traditional domain model, with agricultural produce supporting the life of warriors in the castle town, who provided defense. In fact, Nariaki seems to have hoped for an even older model, one that predated the commercialization of the warrior classes in the towns, by forcing them to live on fiefs in the

countryside, where they would oversee farmers. These officials would rotate through fiefs, taking turns on coastal defense and checkpoint duty throughout Ezochi.

Yet Nariaki was not simply an ideological reactionary: rather, he intended to bring the contract merchants under his control by requiring them to set up shop in his castle town; any who failed to headquarter their operations in his town would lose their contracts. This reflected a practical recognition that the merchants held enormous power in Ezochi, and would have to be brought to heel slowly by incorporating them into the fabric of a new domain. At the same time Nariaki's opinions about the role of commerce in his new domain reflected his recognition that commerce was indispensable to the hierarchical structure of power in towns, and by extension throughout his domain. While prioritizing agriculture, he also hoped to attract Osaka merchants to "make the town flourish," with rice merchants and bathhouses a top priority. In particular, he recognized that warriors would find it difficult to live in Ezochi without the comforts of home: he proposed building a pleasure quarters at some remove from the town, which in addition to providing an "indispensable" source of entertainment for his men, would also help bolster the Ezochi economy by providing a place for his men to spend their salaries within the island.⁴⁵ As we will see, brothels would play an important role in the early economy of Sapporo, too.

Nariaki also accepted the value of fishing and hunting as reasonable pursuits not only for the Ainu, but also for warrior and commoner families. These activities—already the source of most wealth in Ezochi—would offer a route to prosperity for individual families, and also allow Nariaki's men to participate in the lucrative trade networks connecting Ezochi to the rest of Japan. Thus Nariaki's efforts to regulate commerce were not merely an ideologically driven reaction against commercialization, but rather a more nuanced attempt to capture some of the

⁴⁵ Tokugawa Nariaki, "Hoppō mirai kō," in *Mito Gikō, Rekkō shū*, Mitogaku taikei 5 (Tokyo: Mitogaku taikei kankōkai, 1941).

wealth of the great Ezochi traders. This wealth could then be used to build a strong state apparatus across the island.

Matsuura's view was less sanguine: he saw commercial fishers as a scourge on Ezochi. He believed that the state's primary goal was to protect the people, rather than further its own wealth. In this regard, Matsuura became particularly concerned by the plight of the Ainu, whose working conditions in the Ishikari fisheries were appalling by the time Matsuura visited in the late 1840s. The use of forced labor in the herring processing plants, the low wages paid to Ainu, and the low prices given for trading goods all combined to erode the economic stability of the Ainu.⁴⁶ Disease spread, contributing to a plunging population, despite the forced relocation of Ainu from elsewhere in Ezochi to help shore up numbers. Matsuura decried this horrendous treatment, and strongly recommended greater state protections to preserve the livelihoods and wellbeing of the Ainu.⁴⁷ Nariaki also believed relations with the Ainu would have to be improved by treating them with greater respect and mercy (*megumi*). This paternalistic approach—focused on teaching them Japanese and encouraging them to adopt Japanese customs—aimed to eradicate the difference between Wajin and Ainu, thus incorporating all people in Ezochi fully into the Japanese state. While Nariaki did not discuss the potential disposition of the Ainu within the status system, for example, his proposals clearly anticipate the aggressively assimilationist policies of the Meiji regime, whereby the Ainu were rendered subjects of the Japanese imperial state.⁴⁸ To a much stronger degree than Matsuura, Nariaki

⁴⁶ Howell, *Capitalism from Within*, pp. 24–49.

⁴⁷ Akiba Minoru, “Sapporo to Matsuura Takeshirō”, *Sapporo no rekishi* 12 (February 1987): pp. 22–29.

⁴⁸ For an overview of this process, see Richard Siddle, *Race, Resistance, and the Ainu of Japan* (London: Routledge, 1996) and David Howell, *Geographies of Identity in Nineteenth-century Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).

believed the maintenance of Ainu relations to be a necessary tactical component of ensuring stable Japanese rule over Ezochi. That is, ethnic relations, along with commercial control, fit into an overarching system of state control.

Nariaki's vision of state control included the most detailed and flamboyant proposal for a new urban center yet. Nariaki offered to relocate his family and the families of his high-ranking retainers to Ezochi in order to ensure the long-term viability of the new domain. He quickly delved into the nuts and bolts of the relocation process, discussing the transport of horses and other supplies, as well as raising the issue of corruption and bribery in dealings between officials at Matsumae and the contract fishery merchants. He then turned to the establishment of a new capital as the first step in the development of his domain. Nariaki prioritized the construction of a new castle in a good location along the Ishikari River. Nariaki outlined the specific process by which he intended to choose a site for his new capital:

After clearing land along the right bank of the Ishikari River, we will climb nearby mountains to survey the topography of the region. At a well-defended site, with a good harbor and mountains providing shelter to the north and west, we will build a castle. In appropriate areas, the keeper of the castle will gather logs to build housing.... Vassals will be urged to live on the land in the area between 2 and 10 *ri* from the castle; under no circumstances should wives and children be allowed to live in the area around the castle.⁴⁹

Nariaki thus emphasized the defensive purpose of the castle town, and also stressed the importance of developing its hinterland. The castle would form the center of his new domain, but it would be reliant upon the opening up of agricultural land under the direction of his vassals in the countryside around the town.

Nariaki had more ambitious goals than merely building a new Mito in the Ishikari Valley. He argued that the construction of one castle in the center of the island would be insufficient to

⁴⁹ Tokugawa, "Hoppō mirai kō."

provide defense. In order to promote development across Ezochi, castles would have to be built across the province, linked by well-defended roads along which soldiers would travel regularly on their regional rotations. A series of checkpoints would help facilitate defense, while a torch signaling system would allow coastal defenders to inform the capital of potentially hostile vessels. The network of castles would be enfeoffed to Nariaki's retainers and their descendants, leading to the creation of a single massive domain linked by transport infrastructure and trade networks, as well as military obligations and other social ties.

In sum, Nariaki envisioned the creation of a comprehensive and all-encompassing state in Ezochi, one that started with (and remained centered on) a new headquarters in the upper Ishikari Valley. This city, predominately a military castle town but also the locus of commerce and culture, resembled castle towns elsewhere in Japan, up to and including Edo. Nariaki never carried out this plan, of course: he was forced to retire in 1844 after his attempts at political intrigue won him enemies in the shogunate, and his influence at Edo quickly waned. Nevertheless, his proposal served as a bridge between the earlier efforts to extend bakufu control over the region, and later efforts to restart the settlement of Ezochi. Many of his ideas resurfaced in those later plans for the formal annexation of Ezochi, and the development of a new capital at its heart.

Meanwhile, Matsuura's belief that the state's primary role was to protect the physical, social and economic wellbeing of the people influenced his ideas about territorial organization, and help him explain his relative lack of enthusiasm for large-scale urban development with a focus on commerce and state-run profit-making enterprises. At the same time, he firmly believed that Ezochi was an integral part of Japanese state territory, and urged the shogunate to extend its benevolence to the Ainu throughout Ezochi. Matsuura's observations and proposals reached the

attention of Mito domain officials, who passed on his diaries to the shogunate in the early 1850s. This likely led to his appointment by the shogunate to Ezochi during the second era of shogunal control, and his subsequent employment by the Colonial Agency during the first years of the Meiji period. In this regard, Matsuura formed an important bridge between the Tokugawa and Meiji eras, highlighting some of the ideological, political, and personal continuities across the mid-nineteenth century.

Centralized Reengagement, 1854–68

The simmering late-Tokugawa crisis of foreign relations boiled over with the Tokugawa shogunate's 1854 decision to accept U.S. Commodore Matthew Perry's demands for formal diplomatic and trade relations, and the beginning of negotiations with Russian envoys that same year. Treaties with both the U.S. and the Russian Empire had a direct and immediate effect on Ezochi: Hakodate was opened as first a provisioning port in 1855 and then a trading port in 1859. As part of the Russo-Japanese Treaty of Shimoda, the bakufu negotiated with Russian envoys to draw boundaries between Japan and the Russian Empire, drawing a line between Etorofu and Urup in the Kuriles, and agreeing to jointly administer Sakhalin/Karafuto. This formal delineation of state territory marked Japan's entry into the Westphalian territorial system, and kicked off a century and a half of territorial disputes with the Russian state.

The return of Ezochi to the center of the shogunate's foreign policy reignited debates about how best to administer and secure the island. Between 1855, when the shogunate formally reannexed the region, and 1869, with the capture of the island by the new Meiji regime, the shogunate and its supporters sought to strengthen their hold on the region, and finally started to act on dormant plans dating to the Tanuma period. After 1869, the Meiji state continued many of these plans in much the same form, even while claiming the mantle of innovation by hiring

western advisors, introducing new technologies of development, and renaming the region. The state established the Hokkaido Colonial Agency, or Kaitakushi, which turned Hokkaido into a settler colony in this period by advocating for the large-scale settlement of the region by Wajin, and its incorporation into the political, social, and geographic structures of the mainland. As in the Tokugawa era, a new city figured prominently in this process. Both the Tokugawa shogunate and the Meiji state adopted plans to build a new capital as the headquarters of a centralized, consolidated territory. The twin goals of defense and development continued to inform the state's urban planning, even as the location, form, and function of the envisioned capital shifted. The Colonial Agency finally built a city at Sapporo, in the center of Ezochi, fulfilling the 80-year old dreams of Kondō Jūzō, and the overarching continuities in the ideological and political factors driving the construction of Sapporo fundamentally shaped the development of the city, even as they remained up for debate well into the Meiji period.

On the eve of the shogunate's reacquisition of Ezochi, two treatises by shogunal officials outlined the importance of defense and development in plans for Ezochi. Yabe Kōjūrō (dates unknown), a Matsumae native and long-serving official in the Ōtsu intendant's office, submitted an opinion on the development of Ezochi in 1853. A year later, the prominent scholar and shogunal advisor Yasui Sokken (1799–1878) published a *Discourse on Ezo*, in which he laid out his vision for the region.⁵⁰ Although the two men focused on different aspects of Ezochi in their

⁵⁰ Yasui Sokken, *Ezoron*, in *Sokken ikō* (Tokyo: Yasui family, 1878). Sokken is his penname; his given name at birth was Junsaku. Following convention I refer to him by his penname. There is some confusion about dating here. The Miyazaki Prefectural Library gives 1854 (see <http://www.lib.pref.miyazaki.jp/hp/menu000000400/hpg000000338.htm>), but the University of Hokkaido Library has estimated a date in the late 1830s or 40s (see <http://www2.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/cgi-bin/hoppodb/record.cgi?id=0A0081200000000000>). The essay appears in a collection of Sokken's works published posthumously in 1878, but there is undated. It seems unlikely that Sokken would have written earlier than 1846, when James Biddle arrived in Uraga, although information about Ezo and debates about the bakufu's role in developing the region stretched back to the 1780s, making it difficult to rule out an earlier date of composition completely.

respective treatises, they both reflected the dominant strands in bakufu thinking about the region as it prepared to reassert control.

Yabe envisioned Ezochi as a source of revenue for the shogunate, rather than a defensive stronghold. “While I was unable to achieve any significant success in my efforts to support villagers with the opening of new farmland and mines,” he stated humbly, “my experience made me think of Matsumae and Ezochi. If that vast region were opened up for cultivation, it would make an enormous contribution to the national wealth.” Like Matsuura and Nariaki before him, Yabe bemoaned how Japanese and Ainu villagers alike “placed much greater weight on hunting and fishing.” In his view, the climate was not the true obstacle to agriculture: a cultural preference for lucrative seasonal labour in the fisheries was. Yet, Yabe was not wedded to rice farming, and in fact promoted lumber, sericulture, and mining as ideal sources of wealth in the region. His goal was to promote the overall wealth of the region by exploiting inland resources. While this was not framed in explicitly strategic ways, Yabe’s vision of a state-directed shift of Ezochi’s economy away from the seasonal coastal fisheries fits into long-standing discourses about economic development, and complemented the more strategic rationale for such a move offered by some of his contemporaries.⁵¹

Yasui Sokken had risen to prominence as a Confucian scholar in both his home domain of Obi (now part of Miyazaki prefecture), and at the Shōheizaka shogunal academy in Edo. Sokken’s writings attracted the attention of Tokugawa Nariaki, and thereafter Sokken gathered

⁵¹ The text in question is Yabe Kōjūrō, “Matsumae Ezochi kaitaku iken,” 1853, Hokkaido University Library Northern Studies Collection, Kyūki 1419. Scholars disagree on the pronunciation of his name, with some arguing for Yato rather than Yabe. (The characters are 八戸.) Interestingly, his third son (Yabe Junshuku) may have triggered a diplomatic incident by publishing an article in Hong Kong calling for the Japanese invasion of Korea in 1867, an early sally in the *seikanron* debates. See Woong Joe Kang, *The Korean Struggle for International Identity in the Foreground of the Shufeldt Negotiation, 1866–1882* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2005), p. 45.

political connections and influence. In 1862 was appointed Confucian advisor to the shogun. He continued to work for the government until 1868, although he declined an appointment in the new Meiji regime in 1869.⁵² His appointments and connections suggest that his views carried great influence among the highest ranks of the shogunate, and he penned essays on naval defense, the development of sericulture, vaccinations, and foreign policy, including the settlement of Ezochi.

A close analysis of *A Discourse on Ezo* illuminates five key themes: first, the mutability of borders; second, the relationship between peripheries and centres; third, the role of infrastructure in shaping space; fourth, the importance of Japan's broader geopolitical context; and finally the historical relationship between contemporary efforts to colonize Ezochi, and earlier moments of expansionism and military aggression. Together, these themes illustrate the fluidity of state space in late Tokugawa Japan, and the political choices that helped shape that space. That is, ideas about territory were not fixed, and the shogunate, contrary to its reputation as an inflexible and brittle institution, hosted active debates about the shape and future of its territory. These debates encouraged Tokugawa elites to make preliminary steps towards the colonization of Ezochi, while also setting the stage for the transformation of Ezochi into Hokkaido as Japan's first modern colony.

"The shape of things is never constant," began Sokken, immediately ushering us into a nineteenth-century world full of change and transformation, both real and imagined. As the world changes, so too must the assessment of strengths and weaknesses. Sokken argued that the Tokugawa rulers, the implied audience of his writings, should boldly reimagine the defensive priorities of the state, and in particular the location of its borders, as new historical pressures

⁵² This biographical sketch is taken from Yamamoto Takeo, "Yasui Sokken," in *Kokushi daijiten*.

emerge. In this way, Sokken linked the tumult of time to the fluidity of space. In particular, he focused on the different geographical and political situations in Ezochi and Ryūkyū to highlight the importance of making the most of advantageous positions, and being willing to sacrifice potentially disadvantageous ones. Both lands had only recently been absorbed into the Japanese sphere of influence, through the Shimazu of Satsuma in the case of Ryūkyū, and the Matsumae in the case of Ezochi. Sokken stressed that any effort to extend control further into Ezochi, possibly by relinquishing control of Ryūkyū, would not constitute a violation of Japan's ancient form. Although it would superficially "defy our ancestors" by giving up their gains in Ryūkyū and overruling the early Tokugawa proscription on Japanese settlement in Ezochi, the purpose of such moves would remain "in accord with their intent." That is, the preservation of Japanese strength and autonomy was the true purpose of earlier rulers, as seen in the militaristic ventures around East Asia in the sixteenth century. Thus, the reconfiguration of borders to address new geopolitical circumstances fit in with this larger ideology.

The juxtaposition of Ezochi and Ryūkyū highlights a second theme: the importance of peripheral places, and the relationship between those places and the central areas of the state. That is, matters far from Edo played a role in domestic politics, and illustrate the complex structure of the central Japanese state in the nineteenth century. Ezochi presented both a headache to the Edo authorities, due to its distance, foreign culture, and climate, as well as an opportunity to pursue reforms and expansion. Sokken highlighted the exploitation of the indigenous Ainu by Matsumae officials, who forced them to fish and gather seaweed rather than teach them agriculture. Sokken viewed this as an ethical failing on the part of the state: the Ainu had not been taught the ways of civilization, and were treated "like beasts." Despite these problems, Sokken argued that firmer shogunate control of the region would allow the state to

develop economic resources, settle poor people and prisoners. In this way, Ezochi provided an opportunity to solve some domestic issues—the increasingly dire fiscal straits of the shogunate and the growing population of disaffected poor people, a population markedly present in the shogun’s capital, Edo—and take an assertive foreign policy stance by establishing a strong state presence in the region.

Sokken alluded to specific ways to bring the territory of Ezochi under state control, offering insights into the practical means of governing and organizing state space. In a laundry list of Edo-era statecraft, Sokken argued that “provinces [shall be] established, districts built, castles erected, post stations created; taxes will be set, and a conscription system enforced.” The social and administrative backbone of Ezochi was clear: a hierarchical system of administrative districts, including provinces (*shū*) and counties (*gun*), would organize the space of Ezochi. These districts would be connected by a road system modeled on the highways that linked Edo to the provinces across the rest of Japan, with post stations established at regular intervals both to facilitate the rapid and effective dissemination of information, and to control the movement of commoners. At the center of provinces (or perhaps districts) would lay castle towns, again presumably modeled on the existing towns of mainland Japan. Finally, settlers in Ezochi would pay taxes and be subject to military duties. This last point is curious, as in the rest of Japan warriors were tax-exempt, while commoners were forbidden from military activities. Sokken’s intriguing suggestion that settlers in Hokkaido be subject to both duties echoes the proposal of Nariaki before him, and indicates his flexibility and willingness to question the existing social order, and also marks a step towards a more ‘modern’ body of subjects with common obligations and status.

Ultimately, Sokken's suggestions remained vague and incomplete, and did not provide concrete advice for overcoming the specific challenges posed by Ezochi's climate, distance, and lack of existing Japanese settlement. Sokken never visited the region, and his advice was clearly more theoretical than practical. Nevertheless, his comments once again highlight the dominant way of thinking about space from a top-down, state-centered perspective in the mid-nineteenth century—a way of thinking that influenced more detailed plans for the development of Ezochi and, eventually, Hokkaido. The importance of hierarchical divisions of space, logistical networks that connect regions, and the pairing of physical and administrative infrastructures would remain key themes in the modern colonization of the region after 1868.

With views like Yabe's and Sokken's firmly in mind, the shogunate once again took formal administrative control of Ezochi in 1855, removing Matsumae to a small fief in northern Honshu. The magistrate's office at Hakodate again became the center of shogunal authority in the region, in addition to its diplomatic and commercial role as a treaty port. The shogunate also finally began to act on the abstract theories and proposals for a new headquarters. They established an office in Ishikari, which oversaw the fisheries of western Ezochi, and began to plan for permanent agricultural settlement and to tackle the problem of Ainu exploitation. Meanwhile, shogunal officials continued to submit proposals for Ezochi.

Jūmonji Ryōsuke (1812–82) was born the third son of a domain official in Wakuya, Sendai Domain. Little is known about his early life: he too studied at Shōheizaka, and got to know several notable explorers of Ezochi in the bakumatsu era, including Matsuura Takeshirō, Shima Yoshitake, and Tamamushi Sadayū (a fellow Sendai-ite). He travelled to Ezochi to observe conditions there, and while residing in Hakodate around 1856, wrote a lengthy proposal

for the development of the region.⁵³ His primary concern was the security and defense of the Japanese state, and he argued that Ezochi was Japan's most vulnerable frontier, precisely because of its uncertain territorial identity. The boundaries of Ezochi were blurry, Jūmonji argued, and foreigners were gradually encroaching upon the area's remotest islands, particularly in the Kuriles. To Jūmonji, these territories were unquestionably Japanese, by virtue of the trade in marine products and other goods that linked them to national and international commercial networks centered on Nagasaki. Yet, Russian traders threatened to redirect this trade towards Beijing, allowing them to capitalize on the wealth of the region—and stripping the bakufu of much-needed revenue, as well as a firm hold over its boundaries. Coupled with this external threat was the internal unrest sparked by economic troubles in the mid-nineteenth century, and the further turmoil invited by the opening of the first treaty ports in 1854. In particular, Jūmonji urged the bakufu to promote the settlement of Ezochi as a way to deal with the problem of “landless people”, who threatened to undermine the social order elsewhere in Japan. Encouraging them to settle in Ezochi, and providing them the wherewithal to make a living there, would help calm matters, and restore stability to the state.

Jūmonji devoted the bulk of his essay to concrete strategies for developing Ezochi. In relation to the development of new urban networks in the region, three features of his proposal are worth dwelling upon: first, his contradictory attitudes towards commerce; second, his understanding of Ezochi's territoriality, and the proper way to administer the geographical expanse of the region; and finally, his proposals for the Ishikari Valley as the ideal site for a defensive capital. In general, Jūmonji made a powerful call for long-term planning, urging the

⁵³ Jūmonji Ryōsuke, “Ezochi kaitaku ikensho sōkō,” 1856, in *SSS*, vol. 6, pp. 567–81.

bakufu to focus on building the foundation for a permanent colony rather than extracting maximum revenue from short-term commercial ventures.

First and foremost, Jūmonji argued that the socioeconomic structure of Ezochi needed to change from one centered on commercial networks, to one focused on the permanent settlement of farmers. Moreover, he insisted that relying on commercial profits to fund the settlement of the island was too risky, and would fail to establish a firm basis for long-term settlement. Fishing was too fickle, and had shown little growth in recent years. Jūmonji pointed to the relative poverty and precarious position of many contractors in the trading posts, especially relative to their counterparts elsewhere in Japan, as well as the expense of tools, nets and other supplies. Annual catches fluctuated considerably, making them less reliable than harvests.

Jūmonji's suspicion of and arrogance toward merchants reflected his reading of the situation in Ezochi, where he identified few steps toward permanent settlement on the part of Wajin merchants and traders, as well as his ideological convictions about the relative value of agriculture and commercial activity, particularly in relation to the defensive requirements of the state. Jūmonji criticized the existing model of contracting coastal territories out to private merchants as a shortsighted approach that failed to lay the groundwork for permanent settlement—the best way to solidify the Japanese state's claim to the territory, and address the internal problem of landless, transient people. Permanent settlement on the land was both morally superior to the short-termism of commercial activity, and also offered a better practical way to secure state control over Ezochi. As it stood, commercial interests outweighed defensive concerns in the region. Jūmonji decried the suffering of soldiers and officials, who “died while fish dried” along the island's shores.⁵⁴ In some cases, commercial interests worked against

⁵⁴ SSS, vol. 6, p. 577.

military needs: Jūmonji claimed that fishermen and merchants prevented domain forces from carrying out naval maneuvers, which might disrupt catches and drive away fish. In the wealthy Ishikari trading posts, government officials had to intervene to prevent disputes from boiling over into outright conflict. These cases symbolized the dangers of leaving Ezochi's developments in private hands: merchants, fundamentally, were not primarily concerned with the security of the state.

Jūmonji readily admitted that his vision for agricultural settlement, and the comprehensive reshaping of the existing commercial economy, would require a long time and lots of money. He also acknowledged that the vast space of Ezochi made this an overwhelming task. As a result, he proposed dividing the region into a series of smaller territories, which would make it easier to pursue reforms. He called for ten "large divisions", which would further be divided, with each division becoming the site for land reclamation and housing construction. He argued that responsibility for each region should be divided among several lords, with each building a castle town and promoting permanent settlement there. His argument for the division of Ezochi's territory reveals the importance of contiguous territorial control, the validity of existing models of delegated governance, and the importance of towns to stable agricultural settlement.

At the apex of this administrative geographic hierarchy ought to sit a central headquarters, which Jūmonji believed should be in the Ishikari Valley. The valley's central location, good topography, and existing Wajin presence (including, by the 1850s, a shogunal outpost in the fisheries) made it an ideal location, and he argued that a castle should be built there, manned with soldiers and surrounded by permanent settlements. He proposed giving retainers groups of farmers (presumably as sources of revenue), and urged the selection of "serious and principled"

men to serve as village headmen. He used classical Chinese examples to argue that a strong and prosperous castle town would spur development and settlement, and also allow the state to protect the “four corners” of Ezochi. In these ways, Jūmonji echoed the relationship between economic development (in this case through agriculture) and military strengthening. Meanwhile, the shogunate implemented the so-called Ishikari Reforms, whereby they overhauled the administration and commercial functions of the Ishikari region. From 1857 to 1863, the shogunate ended the contract fishery system, bringing the fisheries under the direct control of the government, and sought to use the new fishery revenue to encourage agriculture, establish permanent Japanese settlements, improve the treatment of the Ainu, and bolster overland and maritime transport links. Officials created a network of guard posts across the Ishikari area, and established schools and model farms to promote settlement. As a result, the population grew, and merchants and artisans began to settle in the area.

The shogunal official in charge of Ishikari, Arai Kinsuke, believed that the Ishikari region could host a new “northern capital,” and he promoted further measures to attract migrants and establish a firm economic foundation for the region.⁵⁵ Arai left Ishikari in 1863, but a sequence of shogunal officials continued to promote development in the region. Plans to build shrines and temples in the area of an Ainu village called Sapporo reflect awareness of plans to build a proper castle town there, inland from the coastal Ishikari office.⁵⁶ The Ishikari area was profitable for the shogunate, which imposed a 20~30 percent tax on trade and production: nearly three quarters of the revenues went to shoring up an outpost on Sakhalin, which gave the Japanese government a leg to stand on in territorial negotiations with Russia. The end of the contract fishery system

⁵⁵ SSS, vol. 1, pp. 578–86.

⁵⁶ SSS, vol. 1, pp. 605–11.

undermined Matsumae's revenue, and weakened the domain. Together, these developments in the 1860s made the Ishikari region increasingly obvious as the potential economic and political center of Ezochi.⁵⁷

The Birth of Hokkaido, 1868–1882

In the final years of the shogunate and the first years of the Meiji period, matters in Ezochi were never far from national concerns. The restoration government in the new imperial capital of Tokyo turned to the question of Ezochi in the midst of the upheavals and warfare of 1868 and 1869. Officials in the Council of State, the Dajōkan, asked how best to administer and rule Ezochi. The Dajōkan's consideration relied heavily upon a memorial submitted by Takano Yasutate (dates unknown) and Shimizudani Kinnaru (1845–82) on 1868/2/27. The two men were concerned that rebellious clansmen in Ezochi supporting Tokugawa forces might cause Russians keen to cultivate silkworms in Karafuto to act in “unknown” ways.⁵⁸ The emperor issued a rescript stating his desire that his ministers respond to the question of Hokkaido on 3/9.⁵⁹ The Dajōkan tentatively accepted the need to settle or administer Ezochi. On 3/19, Takano and Shimizudani submitted a revised memorial that laid out several conditions and specific suggestions. In particular, they emphasized the need for a centrally located administrative site:

Regarding the location of the Hakodate headquarters (*hyōjo*) we have travelled around Ezochi to inspect the island, and naturally we should move [the headquarters] to Ishikari. With one order, the outdated and intransigent customs of the Tokugawa family should be expunged, and plans for the settlement of all reaches [of Ezochi] established. Wanting to spread [new] principles across the realm, we would make Ishikari the center of the island, as the region is the most defensible place on the whole island....⁶⁰

⁵⁷ SSS, vol. 1, pp. 802–8.

⁵⁸ SSS, vol. 2, p. 4.

⁵⁹ Tada Kōmon, *Iwakura-kō jikki*, vol. 2 “chū” (Tokyo: Hara shobō, 1968), p. 349.

⁶⁰ Cited in SSS, vol. 2, pp. 4–5.

The desire to rid Ezochi of Tokugawa influence sits at odds with policy suggestions that are virtually identical to decades of shogunal proposals. The recognition of the Ishikari region as a military stronghold and as a central location from which to govern the wider territory remained a central feature of this vision, and the ambition to settle all of Ezochi also reflected longstanding goals. Nevertheless, the clear association of Hakodate with the shogunate no doubt encouraged the Meiji state to accelerate plans to relocate power to Ishikari.

Civil war in 1868 and the first half of 1869 delayed the Meiji state's ventures in Ezochi, but they did quickly rename it Hokkaido and announce plans to relocate the capital to a new site in the Ishikari area. This did not happen until 1869, after the Battle of Hakodate ended and the civil war drew to a close, but nevertheless the Meiji government's prioritization of Ezochi reflects the significance of the region to the fragile regime, as well as the ability of the state to make use of the extensive and well-developed Tokugawa-era plans for Ezochi and Sapporo in particular. In the summer of 1869, following the conclusion of hostilities, the Meiji government established the Hokkaido Colonial Agency as a cabinet-level agency.⁶¹ They divided Hokkaido into 11 provinces (*kuni*) and 86 districts (*gun*), bringing the region into alignment with the rest of Japan's new administrative geography, and fulfilling Kondō Jūzō's proposal for geographic divisions.⁶² The use of these ancient geographic categories made Hokkaido seem like a natural extension of Japan, although the use of Ainu names underscored the difference of this territory. To add to the confusion, the government distributed these districts among various domains and other governmental divisions, creating a messy patchwork of overlapping jurisdictions.

⁶¹ There was a brief period of control by multiple organizations, such as the Army and individual domains.

⁶² Karen Wigen discusses the complexities of adapting an ancient geographic framework for a revolutionary age in *A Malleable Map: Geographies of Restoration in Central Japan, 1600–1912* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), p. 11.

Shortly after its creation in the summer of 1869, the Colonial Agency dispatched Shima Yoshitake (1822–73) to the Ishikari region. Shima was born in Saga, the eldest son of an academically inclined samurai family and an adherent to theories of a unified Japanese monarchy popularized by Yoshida Shōin and others. He explored Ezochi in 1856 as part of his domain's efforts to establish a claim to the region once it became clear that the shogunate was pursuing a more aggressive development policy. Upon his return, he became an officer in Saga's navy, and after meeting with Katsu Kaishū and other pro-imperial activists, urged his domain to fight against the Tokugawa during the civil war of 1868–9. His actions secured him a position in the financial offices of the Meiji government in 1868, as well as a joint position in the office of Ezochi development, before becoming a full-time officer of the Colonial Agency after its establishment.⁶³

Shima travelled to the lower Ishikari valley in the autumn of 1869 with instructions to start construction of a new city, needing to hurry before the onset of winter. After scouting the area, he affirmed the area near Sapporo as an ideal site for a capital. In the eleventh month, Sapporo was officially named the Colonial Agency's site of administration (*chisho*), although the Agency's main offices remained in Tokyo.⁶⁴ In letters to other Colonial Agency officials that autumn, Shima extolled Sapporo, based on its prime location between Otaru and Ishikari ports, as well as its good connections to Chitose and Muroran, on the Pacific side of the island. In a poem composed after his tenure in Sapporo, Shima described the good transport connections and

⁶³ Enomoto Yōsuke, *Shima Yoshitake: 1822–1874* (Saga: Saga Prefectural Historical Society, 2011), pp. 8–11.

⁶⁴ Kaitakushi, *Kaitakushi hōkokusho*, vol. 1 (Sapporo: Kaitakushi, 1876), p. 1.

fertile land around Sapporo, obvious justifications to “establish a capital” which, “some day, shall rank as the greatest city in the world”.⁶⁵

Shima’s remarks about the new city reveal his beliefs about the role of the new capital within Hokkaido. Transport and logistics proved crucial, not least because Shima set up camp at Zenibako, where the coastal road from Otaru turned inland towards Sapporo, and commuted to and from the site of the new city on a regular basis. Shima proceeded to plan a grand capital with symbolic and practical dimensions: one of his first moves was to ensconce a deity from Hakodate’s Hachiman Shrine in the new Sapporo Shrine to protect the entire colonial project in Hokkaido.⁶⁶ He began a number of construction projects, hiring dozens of laborers and artisans to begin work on a plan of the city that centered on a massive castle complex surrounded by officials’ homes. Unfortunately, the difficulty of building in remote and snowy Sapporo taxed the Colonial Agency’s finances and ability to procure supplies. Soaring costs of the construction work and disagreements with between Shima and his superior over the degree of autonomy he ought to enjoy led to Shima’s recall and dismissal in early 1870.⁶⁷ The construction of the city stalled, half-finished, as heavy winter snows drove ill prepared workers away.⁶⁸ Shima, like so many of his predecessors, lacked the resources, if not the determination, to overcome the environmental and fiscal challenges of city building in the Ishikari Valley.

⁶⁵ See Enomoto, *Shima Yoshitake*, pp. 81–2; the full poem is quoted and glossed on p. 5. The relevant line is 他日五洲第一都.

⁶⁶ Kaitakushi, *Kaitakushi hōkokusho*, vol. 1, p. 1. I discuss this more in chapter 2.

⁶⁷ The editors of the *SSS* argue that political disagreements, especially over Shima’s proposals to reel in the powerful contract fisheries, prompted his recall and the subsequent stall in construction at Sapporo. *SSS*, vol. 2, pp. 53–58.

⁶⁸ Sapporo shigakkai, ed., *Sapporo enkaku shi* (Sapporo: Hokkaido shuppan kikaku sentā, 1979 [1898]), p. 32.

In the aftermath of this setback, Kuroda Kiyotaka (1840–1900), a young and ambitious member of the Meiji government, moved quickly to assert his voice in the debate about how to proceed in Hokkaido. He submitted a proposal to the court in 1870/10, calling for greater court control over the entirety of Hokkaido, including Karafuto. Kuroda framed his proposal with three major concerns: the threat of Russian aggression necessitated a stronger military presence in the north; corrupt officials in a fractured and unstable administrative apparatus continued to dog the new Meiji regime; and famine in 1869 imposed severe hardships on the general population, requiring the swift action of a benevolent government to alleviate their suffering. The best way to address these problems was to assert greater central state control over Hokkaido. Kuroda proposed abolishing the domain-controlled territories, and replacing them with a system of prefectures under the central government. By imposing uniform taxes on Hokkaido, cutting the numbers of officials, and reducing official stipends, Kuroda argued, the government could establish a centralized administration that would be better able to defend Japan from the Russian threat to the north, and provide relief to Japan's suffering masses.

A more centralized government apparatus would require a new base for both military control and civil administration, and Kuroda assumed that the Ishikari Valley was the obvious choice. "Ishikari is in the center of Hokkaido, and is conveniently located to control all directions. As a result, we should build a military headquarters (*chinpu*) there, and use it to administer all of Hokkaido." Kuroda also suggested assigning a minister of state to this capital, to oversee the division of Hokkaido into prefectures along natural boundaries. Like Kondō Jūzō before him, Kuroda's vision of a provincial capital incorporated both civil and military purposes.⁶⁹ It also had an ancient lineage, and—like so many Meiji reforms—dressed modernizing rationalization

⁶⁹ Kuroda's proposal is in Nihon shiseki kyōkai, ed., *Kaitakushi nisshi*, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku shuppankai, 1987), pp. 156–66.

in the language of the past, just as the subdivisions of Hokkaido took on the ancient titles of provinces and districts.

Despite Kuroda's call to reform the administration of Ezochi by bringing it under the direct control of the imperial government, this military-centered vision for Sapporo resembled the proposals by officials and academics in the last decades of the Tokugawa shogunate, and clearly complemented the work started by Shima. Nevertheless, Kuroda's vision was certainly more ambitious, with control of Karafuto a key element of Sapporo's military role. Moreover, Kuroda's envisioned a more activist state role in the development of Hokkaido in order to accelerate the settlement of the region. To guide this project, Kuroda also proposed hiring an expert in colonial development, either someone with experience in Ezochi, or a person from a "suitable country" overseas. The Council of State, agreeing to the bulk of his proposal, moved the Hokkaido base of the Colonial Agency from Hakodate to Sapporo in 1871/4. The national government abolished all domains across Japan in the summer of 1871, including the end of domain-controlled regions across Hokkaido in 1871/8, giving the Colonial Agency complete geographic control over Hokkaido (and, from 8/8, Karafuto). Kuroda secured a ten-year, ten-million-yen commitment to the development of Hokkaido, which would come into effect in 1872. Finally, the Council of State sent Kuroda to the United States in the summer of 1871 to find someone willing and able to advise on this growing state priority.⁷⁰

Kuroda arrived in the United States in the sixth month of 1870, and met with President Ulysses S. Grant to seek a recommendation for a suitable advisor for the development of Hokkaido. Kuroda sought an advisor with knowledge of "geological, mining, agricultural and industrial sciences," able to advise the head of the Colonial Agency on matters including "the

⁷⁰ SSS, vol. 2, pp. 117–21.

general planning of the island; surveying expeditions; road, river and canal construction; the layout of villages, towns and cities; methods of agriculture, livestock rearing, mining, fishing and hunting; and an overall plan for the expenses and timeframe required.”⁷¹ Grant immediately recommended his Commissioner of Agriculture, a former military man named Horace Capron (1804–85). Capron accepted the offer, and drafted an elaborate proposal for the settlement of Hokkaido, drawing on the information he gathered from Kuroda and other Japanese officials, as well as his own understanding of westward expansion in North America. His proposals included the introduction of new technologies, but on the whole they reinforced eighty years of Japanese conventional wisdom about the best way forward in Hokkaido. His remarks addressed the same concerns—climate, economic development, and regional infrastructure—even as they proposed new technologies to solve them (see chapter 5). Capron reported directly to Kuroda, and was charged with hiring experts in the various fields requested. Capron wrote to his friends and colleagues throughout the U.S. to select those advisors, and, with an initial group of four men, travelled to Tokyo via San Francisco in the summer of 1871.

That autumn, Capron dispatched engineer A.G. Warfield to Sapporo to examine “the location of the capital, in reference to its proximity to a suitable and available harbor, and the country...in the immediate vicinity of both places.” In his report to Capron, Warfield extolled the choice of the Ishikari valley for the site of a new capital:

Viewed as a whole, the valley of Ishikari is undoubtedly one of the most interesting and inviting portions of the island, and the location of Sapporo, with its unequalled water-power, and the proximity of that power to the city—together with its comparatively central position between the Japan Sea and Pacific Ocean, in the Great Plain that extends from coast to coast, and lying as it does but little north of the forty-second parallel of latitude, in the Temperate Zone, with a climate most favourable to physical strength and

⁷¹ Mori Arinori to Horace Capron, 1871/6, reproduced in *Nihon shiseki kyōkai, Kaitakushi nisshi*, vol. 1, pp. 180–81.

intellectual activity, it must eventually become the great commercial and manufacturing centre of the island.⁷²

Warfield's report led Capron to conclude that Sapporo would serve well as "the future capital of Yesso" in his 1875 report to the Colonial Agency, submitted at the conclusion of his four-year tenure as Commissioner and Advisor.⁷³ Warfield's observations illustrate three major concerns about and visions for urban growth in Hokkaido among the Colonial Agency's foreign advisors: the city's infrastructure, and particularly its connection to a national and regional urban network; the potential for an urban industrial economy; and the city's environmental context. Together, these three themes illustrate how the construction of Sapporo was embedded in broader considerations about the relationship between city and the environment; the importance of cities as infrastructural nodes; and the emerging identity of cities as key sites in a global, industrializing economy.

Warfield and Capron stressed the importance of transport and communication networks, reflecting both longstanding Japanese concerns and Western ideas about the role of cities as nodes in increasingly elaborate and efficient transportation networks. Sapporo's central location, close to a low pass between the Pacific and Sea of Japan watersheds, would favor its development, an observation that echoed the comments of Tokugawa-era travellers to the region. Capron's advice regarding mineral extraction and the fuller exploitation of Hokkaido's natural and future agricultural resources highlight the colonial position of Hokkaido within Japan and, by extension, East Asia. Sapporo's primary role as a transportation center was to facilitate the transportation of lumber, coal and other products to the ports that would ship Hokkaido's goods

⁷² A.G. Warfield, "Report of A.G. Warfield, Esq.," 29 December 1871, reprinted in Horace Capron, *Reports and Official Letters to the Kaitakushi* (Tokei: Kaitakushi, 1875), pp. 26–7. Hereafter *ROLK*.

⁷³ Horace Capron, "Abstract of the First Annual Report of Commissioner Horace Capron, 1871" reprinted in *ROLK*, p. 44.

to the rest of Japan. Simultaneously, it would administer the shipment and distribution of food and other supplies from Japan to colonial settlements throughout Hokkaido.

Sapporo necessarily had to function as a link between the metropolitan center of mainland Japan and the colonial settlements of Hokkaido so long as Hokkaido's Wajin settlers remained dependent upon the rest of Japan for supplies. Yet, in the long term Capron believed the wealth of the Ishikari valley would "sustain a large population" at Sapporo.⁷⁴ That is, Sapporo would grow into more than a mere clearinghouse for natural and agricultural resources. Warfield anticipated the turn towards industry and Western-style agriculture under the Colonial Agency, and imagined the future city as an industrial and commercial node in an economically powerful Hokkaido.

Of course, industry and resource extraction went hand in hand, and the Colonial Agency's foreign advisors advocated the industrialization of the mining and especially lumber sectors as a key step in transforming Sapporo into a prosperous city. Capron appointed M.C. Holt, a US engineer, to oversee the construction of a sawmill on the outskirts of Sapporo. Kuroda inspected the mill in November 1872, and was "well pleased" with the progress.⁷⁵ Yet, despite this promising start, officials failed to use the mill's full potential. In the summer of 1874, Horace Capron wrote to Matsumoto Jūrō (1840–1916), the principle Colonial Agency official in Sapporo, to encourage the development of industry. "Something must be done to stimulate the growth and encourage the growth and prosperity of this town or it will go down.... I do not know of any one thing that will do more to assist this place, than to drive this machinery to its fullest capacity in working this lumber into suitable shapes for shipment to Tokei [Tokyo], Yokohama

⁷⁴ Capron, "Abstract of the First Annual Report," p. 44.

⁷⁵ M.C. Holt to Capron, 8 November 1872, box 1, folder 15, Horace Capron Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library (hereafter HC Papers).

and other markets for building purposes.... It would give active employment to quite a large population....”⁷⁶ An industrial labor force would underpin the city’s growth, in Capron’s view, by creating an economic base upon which Sapporo would prosper, while the development of a lumber export industry would boost Sapporo’s economic position within Japan.

Capron would continue to be frustrated by officials in Sapporo, who never seemed quite as devoted to his vision of an industrial city as he had hoped. But Colonial Agency officials in turn struggled to persuade Sapporo’s residents to embrace new economic activities. A mature, self-sufficient social and economic structure in Sapporo was slow to emerge. An anonymous report on the situation of Sapporo’s settlers, written in 1878, identified the lack of long-term economic planning on the part of the city’s early residents. Most residents, the report’s authors bemoaned, were “only interested in small, short-term profit, with only a very few residents interested in developing long-term livelihoods.” This made them unprepared for unforeseen crises, and unable to sustain themselves.⁷⁷ I will explore the reasons for this reluctance to settle more permanently in Sapporo more fully in chapter 3, but for now I will highlight one major factor that dominated the debates among Meiji officials: the weather.

A major hindrance to the growth of a permanent industrial and commercial workforce in Sapporo was the climate, which continued to overwhelm settlers from mainland Japan and the Colonial Agency officials tasked with feeding, clothing, and housing them. Shima’s first efforts at city building had been derailed partly due to the “heavy snowfall and freezing cold”, which

⁷⁶ Capron to Matsumoto Jūrō, 18 June 1874, box 2, folder 45, HC Papers.

⁷⁷ Kaitakushi, “Imin rireki shirabe,” 1878, 別 325-Im, Hokkaido University Library Northern Studies Collection (hereafter NSC), also available at <http://www2.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/cgi-bin/hoppodb/record.cgi?id=0A016250000000000>.

made construction difficult.⁷⁸ Settlers were ill prepared for the weather, and officials implemented a series of measures to promote the construction of warmer housing. The harsh winters also made transport of food and supplies difficult. In general, Hokkaido—despite the name change and enthusiastic government budget—remained an inhospitable, forbidding place in the minds of prospective colonists. Kuroda, recognizing the need to overcome these impressions, was forthright about Hokkaido's harsh climate in his initial overtures to Horace Capron. Mori Arinori, the Japanese envoy to the United States, told Capron that Hokkaido's climate "resembled that of New England," and hoped that the U.S. experience there would be helpful for Japan's efforts in Hokkaido.⁷⁹ After accepting the position of Commissioner and Advisor to the Colonial Agency, Capron focused on Hokkaido's climate by gathering data and visiting the island. He quickly argued that, instead of a liability Hokkaido's climate would be a boon to the development of colonial society.

Capron began his 1875 report to the Colonial Agency with a disquisition on the admirable climate of Hokkaido, based upon meteorological tables from Hakodate and surveys of the plants common to the region. "[A]ll the trees of the forests of New York, Pennsylvania and Ohio...grow in abundance and to perfection in Yesso.... The isothermal line passing through Raleigh, N.C. crosses the island of Nippon near Yedo...the line touching the city of New York is found...near Hakodate....The great fall of snow in Yesso is a great advantage, serving...to protect grains and grasses from the frost and to prevent the freezing of the ground to any depth." These various observations led Capron to conclude "that the obstacles to a profitable and permanent development of the resources of the island of Yesso lie neither in the soil nor in the

⁷⁸ Kaitakushi, "Imin rireki shirabe."

⁷⁹ Harada Kazufumi, *Oyatoi gaikokujin: Kaitaku* (Tokyo: Kajima kenkyūjo shuppankai, 1975), p. 44.

climate.”⁸⁰ That is, Capron believed Japanese concerns about the unsuitability of Hokkaido for settlement by Wajin migrants were unfounded.

In making this confident claim, Capron relied on several assumptions. On a basic level, he estimated snowfall and temperature for the entirety of Hokkaido based on measurements taken at Hakodate, which lies at the far southern tip of the island. As travellers and settlers had long observed (and would continue to discover), the Sea of Japan coast near Sapporo was considerably snowier than Hakodate, while interior parts of the island endured frigid temperatures and heavy blizzards.⁸¹ More importantly, Capron’s advice reflected his belief that the proper course for Japanese settlers in Hokkaido was to emulate the experience of white settlers in the western United States. This would entail a radical overhaul of existing Japanese agricultural, architectural, and social practices. Capron even suggested that the settlement of Hokkaido might be better conducted by his countrymen: “What a country this would be in the hands of the American people,” he noted in July 1872.⁸² Capron implied that (white) Americans, and their social and economic practices, were best suited to the rigors of the climate in Hokkaido.

Capron’s claims about Sapporo’s ideal climate notwithstanding, many Japanese people remained skeptical of the viability of a city built in such a cold, snowy place. “Sapporo is in the highest latitude in North and we can very hardly see the sun break out from the month of October to March,” warned an influential village headman from (very snowy) Niigata Prefecture, in a *Tokyo nichinichi shinbun* article condemning proposals to relocate the Japanese capital to

⁸⁰ Capron, “Abstract of the First Annual Report,” pp. 42–43.

⁸¹ Average annual snowfall based on modern data: Sapporo: 6 meters; Hakodate: 3.8 meters; Asahikawa 7.4 meters. Average Temperatures (high/low, in centigrade): Sapporo: 12.9/5.1; Hakodate: 13.1/5.2; Asahikawa: 11.9/2.0. From Japan Meteorological Agency, www.jma.go.jp.

⁸² Capron to Rear Adm. Thornton Jenkins, 10 July 1872, box 1, folder 8, HC Papers.

Sapporo to better confront a Russian military threat.⁸³ “It is strange that the people of Japan should continue for so long a time in complete ignorance of a portion of their domain,” Capron noted, warning Kuroda that allowing these “erroneous statements” to go unchallenged would “have an injurious effect upon the efforts of the Kaitakushi for the development of that island.”⁸⁴

Crisis and Consolidation: 1881–86

Despite these doubts and hesitations, Sapporo grew steadily from the mid-1870s. While no castle was built, elaborate administrative buildings were. Model farms and factories, an agricultural college, roads, and eventually the railway all gave Sapporo an infrastructure for growth. Building projects and a large population of government officials attracted merchants and artisans, while the growth of suburbs populated by soldiers and ordinary farmers bolstered the economic basis of the city. By 1881, when the Meiji Emperor made a formal visit to the city, it had a population of roughly 10,000 people, and its role as capital seemed secure. Yet, that same year marked the start of a brief period of turbulence that saw Sapporo’s role as capital called into question—on largely the same principles that had structured earlier debates about the location of the city. As the Colonial Agency’s ten-year funding period drew to a close in the early 1880s, officials began quietly selling off government land at low prices to friends and relatives. Discovery of this issue led to outrage and uproar in the popular press throughout Japan, and helped usher in the Freedom and Popular Rights Movement’s calls for a constitutional system that would protect against such blatant abuse of power by state officials.⁸⁵ In some ways,

⁸³ Koyanagi Kiyonaga, 18 February 1875, box 2, folder 6, HC Papers.

⁸⁴ Capron to Kuroda, 17 March 1875, box 2, folder 63, HC Papers.

⁸⁵ Kyu Hyun Kim, “The 1881 Crisis and the Hokkaido Colonial Office Scandal,” in *Age of Visions and Arguments: Parliamentarianism and the National Public Sphere in Early Meiji Japan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2007), pp. 288–328.

however, this scandal merely hastened the end of the Colonial Agency, which was already struggling with soaring expenses and the overwhelming ambitiousness of its own development proposals for Hokkaido. The agency was abolished in 1882, and replaced with three prefectures to bring Hokkaido in line with local administration elsewhere in Japan. Hakodate became capital of its own prefecture, with Sapporo and Nemuro forming the other two.⁸⁶ (Since 1875, Karafuto had been ceded to the Russian Empire, while the southern Kuriles were incorporated into Nemuro Prefecture as Chishima Province.) Sapporo no longer served as the capital of Hokkaido, and Hakodate—still much larger and more important from a commercial perspective—seemed likely to become the more important city.

Despite promising to simplify and rationalize the administration of Hokkaido, the separation of the region into three prefectures seems to have caused as many problems as it was intended to solve. The duplication of administrative and bureaucratic functions helped push up the costs of governing Hokkaido even further, while interregional jealousies and competition undermined the overall development goals for the region. In 1886, the three prefectures were abolished and replaced with Hokkaidō-chō, which remains, more-or-less, the administrative entity in place today. Sapporo once again became capital of the island.

This period of administrative reorganization unsurprisingly entailed a fair amount of chaos and disorder, which helped depress the Hokkaido economy and stall the immigration of people from elsewhere in Japan. It hit Sapporo particularly hard, as the city lost its administrative primacy. Moreover, the dissolution of the Colonial Agency opened up spaces for criticism of the agency's development policy, including its choice of Sapporo as capital, and its general approach

⁸⁶ The prefectures were based on Colonial Agency-era subdivisions: the main Sapporo subdivision (*honchō*), which varied in scope over the Colonial Agency period but included nearly half the island; and the subdivisions (*shichō*) of Nemuro and Hakodate (several smaller ones also existed for brief periods of time).

to spatial administration across its vast territory. A significant critic was, in fact, a former Colonial Agency official instrumental in the construction of Sapporo: Iwamura Michitoshi (1840–1915).

Iwamura, born to a Tosa samurai family, fought for the imperial side in the Boshin War before joining the Ministry of Civil Affairs in 1869/6. Almost immediately the Ministry dispatched him to Hakodate, and he became a Colonial Agency official upon that agency's formation in 1869/7. He was promoted in 1872 to the second-highest rank in the Agency. His primary role in this period was to supervise construction at Sapporo, a job that he ceded to Matsumoto Jūrō in 1873. After leaving Hokkaido in 1873, Iwamura rose through the civil service, and served as the governors of both Saga and Kagoshima Prefectures, helping to reconstruct prefectural administration in the aftermath of the Saga Rebellion and Seinan War, respectively. In 1882, Iwamura returned to Hokkaido to survey the three prefectures established on the island after the dissolution of the Colonial Agency. After a brief stint in Okinawa, Iwamura returned to Hokkaido in 1885. He was appointed the first governor of Hokkaido in 1886, once the region was reunified.

Iwamura's experience in the early years of Sapporo, as well as his subsequent experience in prefectural administration, made him well placed to critique the Colonial Agency's efforts in Hokkaido. In 1882, he submitted a report to Prime Minister Sanjō Sanetomi urging the government to adopt more aggressive development policies. Crucial to Iwamura's proposal was the relocation of the island's capital from Sapporo to the Kamikawa region, 160 kilometres up the Ishikari River in the vicinity of today's Asahikawa—the same site, ironically, that Kondō Jūzō had proposed a hundred years earlier. Moreover, he argued, this new capital should serve not only as the capital of Hokkaido, but as an alternative capital for the imperial state.

Iwamura's proposal to relocate the imperial capital to Kamikawa, while audacious in comparison to previous proposals, nevertheless remained firmly in their mold. Kamikawa, unlike Sapporo, was "at the center of Hokkaido," and was easily accessible by riverboat. The surrounding area was lush with forests and fertile land; no other area of Hokkaido would provide such a firm foundation for "an eternal stronghold." Several tens of thousands of homes could be built there, and good transportation meant that, like Sapporo, a new city could flourish. Moreover, if the imperial court were moved there, even if only on a seasonal or temporary basis, the need for many officials would naturally spur the development of a town.⁸⁷ Iwamura's argument for relocating not only Hokkaido's capital but also the imperial court itself to Kamikawa echoed Kondō Jūzō's proposals a century earlier. The importance of geographic centrality, good transport connections, and the prospect of robust agricultural development to support the new town highlight the continuity of these values in thinking about cities across nineteenth century Japan. His proposal also highlights another key factor: that city building was largely a politically driven process in Ezochi. Urban planning and development was the product of political debates and choices that could have far-reaching effects not only on the urban environment of particular cities, but also throughout the entire territorial framework of Ezochi.

Conclusion: City and State in an Era of Territorial Reconfiguration

As this rapid survey of a century of memoranda, proposals, and petitions illustrates, plans for building a capital city to oversee the settlement and colonization of Ezochi by ethnic Japanese unfolded within a remarkably consistent framework of defensive and economic concerns. While different authors weighed those factors differently, and while the immediacy of those concerns shifted over time, the discourse about building a new city in Ezochi was relatively

⁸⁷ Iwamura Michitoshi, "Hokkyō wo Hokkaido Kamikawa ni sadamuru no gi," in *Shin Asahikawa shishi*, ed. Asahikawa shishi henshū kaigi (Asahikawa: Asahikawa-shi, 1993), vol. 6, p. 166.

circumscribed throughout the nineteenth century. This is true even when considering the work of foreign observers like Horace Capron and his team. The similarities of Capron's proposals to the work of Tokugawa-era officials suggests that he relied heavily on the ideas and developments of Japanese officials and ordinary people on the ground, who in turn were observing the longer patterns of development by Ainu and Wajin alike. We do not have access to those voices, but by noting the deep continuities in ideas about Sapporo, it seems reasonable to identify the conventional wisdom of the local residents and guides as an important factor in shaping official observations and decisions about how to build themselves a new capital.

The continuities across the nineteenth century might also suggest that the shogunate was unable to develop new ideas, reinforcing its reputation as sclerotic and reactionary. While there were certainly reactionary voices within the shogunate, the fact that they accepted the broad contours of plans for Ezochi suggests that at least some officials were forward thinking; their problem, at least in the case of Ezochi, had more to do with a lack of resources, political challenges from powerful merchant networks, and the logistical hurdles posed by Ezochi's distance and climate. The Meiji state was successful only by throwing huge amounts of money and institutional resources at Ezochi, not because it had a fundamentally better plan for the region.

Above all, the identification of city building with plans for more aggressive state building in Ezochi and Hokkaido speaks to the importance of cities in the Tokugawa state, and the extent to which urbanization had come to dominate the social, political, and economic world of early modern Japan. Building a new city and increasing agricultural settlement went hand-in-hand in Tokugawa- and Meiji-era ideas about Ezochi and Hokkaido; Sapporo's growth went hand-in-hand with the colonial settlement of Hokkaido. There were some dissenting voices, such as

Matsuura Takeshirō's, who called for greater attention to welfare and support for the Ainu and poor farmers, but even his vision of greater state control relied upon the administration of the entire territory of Ezochi/Hokkaido. By the mid-nineteenth century, a new capital city, whether at Ishikari, Sapporo, or Kamikawa, seemed indispensable to any vision of colonial settlement.

Chapter 2

Mapping Sapporo: Past and Future in Plans for a Colonial Capital, 1869–1893

Shima Yoshitake (1822–74) left Hakodate on 1869/10/22, carrying with him the abodes of three deities to enshrine at Sapporo, where he was charged with constructing a new capital for Hokkaido. The Meiji emperor had consecrated mirrors for the “three gods of colonization” (*Kaitaku sanjin*) earlier that fall.¹ The mirrors, accompanying Shima and his entourage, arrived at Zenibako, a coastal settlement roughly twenty kilometres from Sapporo, on 11/6. Shima set up a temporary headquarters there, and began to plan construction of the new city. That same week they travelled to Sapporo, and on 11/11 and 11/12 laid out the sites of the first structures of the new capital, including officials’ residences and a temporary shrine for the three deities. Construction proceeded quickly: the first residence was completed on 12/3, and more buildings followed over the course of the winter. Yet, harsh weather delayed construction, and exorbitant costs led the Colonial Agency to recall Shima to Tokyo in 1870/2.² Construction in Sapporo proceeded in fits and starts for several years, but ultimately Sapporo grew along the lines first sketched by Shima. By the end of the Colonial Agency period in 1882, the city had grown beyond its role as an administrative headquarters, and since 1886 it has served as the prefectural capital. In the grounds of Hokkaido Shrine, which still enshrines the three gods of colonization, a larger-than-life statue of Shima stands erect, commemorating his role in the founding of Sapporo and the beginning of the Meiji-era settler-colonial project in Hokkaido.

¹ Sakamoto Koremaru, “Sapporo Jinja (Hokkaidō Jingū) shōron,” in *Hokkaidō Jingū kenkyū ronsō*, ed. Hokkaidō Jingū and Kokugakuin Daigaku kenkyū kaihatsu suishin sentā (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 2014), pp. 1–53. The deities are Ōkunitamanokami, the principal deity of Hokkaidō, and the two land-creating deities Ōnamuchinokami and Sukunahikōnanokami. Helen Hardacre calls these deities “three pioneer gods”; for a brief discussion of Shintō in early-Meiji Hokkaido, see Helen Hardacre, *Shintō: A History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 392–95.

² This narrative comes from Takamizawa Gonnojō, *Takamizawa nikki*, in *Saisen kai shiryō*, ed. Takakura Shin’ichirō, vol. 1 (Sapporo: Hokkaido kikaku shuppan sentā, 1982), p. 25.

Despite Shima's founding role in the establishment of the Colonial Agency's capital, he left few records of his thoughts and ideas about the city he planned. Aside from a few poems, and some letters to his colleagues, our knowledge of Shima's tenure in Sapporo largely comes from the writings of other men involved in the construction of the city.³ Yet, two maps attributed to Shima offer some insights into his vision for the city (Figures 2.1 and 2.2). Roughly drawn and schematic in nature, they nevertheless represent his understanding of local geography, and hint at his ambitious vision for the region's urban transformation. In Shima's mind, Sapporo would be an administrative headquarters, dominated by a massive government compound, ringed by officials' residences, and connected to the rest of Hokkaido by a network of roads and waterways. The paramount importance of defense, the feature of six decades of Japanese policy-making vis-à-vis Ezochi and Hokkaido, informed this vision of the city-as-stronghold.

In some ways, Shima's maps are hard to superimpose onto modern maps of Sapporo: Shima's outline of the major features of the city, including a massive headquarters and a linear avenue of officials' residences, do not resemble Sapporo's layout today. The purpose and form of the city changed rapidly in the first decade or two of Sapporo's growth, as a model of settler colonialism premised upon state-funded and increasingly industrial forms of agriculture and resource extraction replaced defense as the primary driver of the development of Hokkaido. Yet, in many respects Shima's early ideas fundamentally shaped the built environment of Sapporo: the rectilinear layout of the city, the oversized plot of land for a headquarters, the north-south orientation, and division of the city between official and commoner districts, are all features that

³ The best biography and analysis of Shima's life, including a discussion of his time in Sapporo, is Enomoto Yōsuke, *Shima Yoshitake: 1822–1874* (Saga: Saga Prefectural Historical Society, 2011). The *Shin Sapporo shishi* also discusses Shima's time in Sapporo: see Sapporo-shi kyōiku iinkai, ed., *Shin Sapporo shishi*, vol. 2 (Sapporo: Hokkaidō shinbunsha 1991), pp. 18–58. Hereafter SSS.




Figure 2.1: *Ishikari taifu sashizu*




Figure 2.1: Inset




Figure 2.2: Ishikari honpu sashizu

anchored subsequent rounds of planning and construction. That is, the lines on paper (and stakes in the ground) quickly informed the shape of the city, even as the city's actual form and function ended up somewhere far different than Shima must have imagined. The influence of Shima's early efforts speaks to the inertia that shaped the transformation of urban space in Sapporo.

Maps allow us to trace changing representations of space in early Sapporo, and the ideological shifts that both produced and were produced by those representations. Maps of Sapporo simultaneously represented the city as it was, and articulated the city as it was envisioned. They were not fixed snapshots of urban space, but rather dynamic texts that highlighted changing ideas about urban space in 1870s and 1880s Sapporo. Maps produced by both state and non-state actors were put to a variety of uses in the service of urban expansion. They represented and articulated the developing colonial ambitions of the Colonial Agency. They tell us how Sapporo's early residents understood the space they inhabited, and how they envisioned the future of the city they were building. Put together, they show how Sapporo developed from a city focused on defense and administration, to a more complex city with a greater degree of social and economic diversity, reflecting a more comprehensive vision of colonial settlement that emerged over the first two decades of the Meiji period.

Mapmaking: Theory and History

Many maps of early Sapporo exist, and are widely reproduced and discussed. Yet, for the most part they serve as illustrations of the city (in, for instance, the official city histories⁴), or as the basis for identifying the location of certain buildings, or where people lived in the past.⁵ Few

⁴ The most recent official city history reproduces many of the maps from the Hokkaido University collection that I draw on in this chapter, but they are small, difficult to read, and serve as illustrations more than objects of analysis. *SSS*, vols. 1 and 2.

⁵ Takakura Shin'ichirō wrote a short piece on using maps to trace the early construction of the city, introducing mapmakers, techniques, and the various features of the maps, but he doesn't analyze the

scholars take an analytical approach to maps of the city as texts that allow us to explore spatial ideologies, sociopolitical relations, or the interplay between plans and reality—features that would turn a cartographic history of Sapporo into a key avenue for recreating the forces of change in the young city. In this section, I will briefly lay out the theoretical and historiographical frameworks that justify the use of maps as texts for recreating these forces.

Since the seminal work of Brian Harley in the late 1980s and early 1990s, maps have become a part of historians' standard repertoire. Harley argued that, rather than treating maps primarily through the lens of semiotics, scholars ought to treat them as texts expressing the relationship between power and knowledge, thus drawing upon Foucault and Derrida in a forceful claim that historians could learn much about the relationship of power to spatial knowledge and ideology by “deconstruct[ing] all aspects of the mapping process.”⁶ Historians of cartography have largely followed Harley's call, although some scholars have since argued that deconstruction of a map to uncover the power relations encoded in it fails to take into account the fact that mapmaking itself is an expression of those relations; that is, there is no “real” geography out there that can be uncovered. In other words, all space takes on meaning through its representation, or mapping.⁷ Jeremy Crampton, for example, has called for more social-anthropological work on cartographers to better understand the production of power relations

relationship between maps and broader ideas about space in early Sapporo. Takakura Shin'ichirō, “Sapporo no kensetsushi wo kataru chizu,” *Sapporo no rekishi* 7 (August 1984): pp. 1–3.

⁶ Denis Cosgrove, “Epistemology, Geography, and Cartography: Matthew Edney on Brian Harley's Cartographic Theories,” *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 97, no. 1 (March 2007): p. 209.

⁷ This approach stems from the work of Henri Lefebvre, whose concept of the “production of space” is clearly at play here. Henri Lefebvre, *The Production of Space*, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).

through cartography.⁸ Going even further, Rob Kitchin and Martin Dodge argue that, while exploring the social construction of maps is essential, we must also remember that maps themselves are not static entities: they should be better understood as processes, or *mappings*, that are constantly recreated every time they are drawn or used.⁹ That is, the map is not so much a set of lines on paper as it is the set of spatial knowledge and conventions that allows maps to be produced *and* understood by a variety of people. The authors' primary goal is to reunite the study of technical cartography and the study of spatial ideology (or critical geography), which have been divided since Harley's provocative remarks offended many professional cartographers.

The position of Kitchin and Dodge is intriguing, although the benefit of collapsing analysis of map production and map consumption is unclear for a historian. Quite frankly it is very difficult to recreate the 'reading' of a map in the past, except indirectly, although it is certainly true, as Kitchin and Dodge remind us, that we read maps, no less than other historical sources, with our own set of geographic conventions firmly in place. Instead, historians have to interpret maps as evidence of mapmakers' ideological, political, and technical beliefs, rather than those of map-readers; despite these limitations, an analysis of historical maps can nevertheless reveal much about commonly held beliefs about space.¹⁰ The most common topic that showcases the mismatch between our own conventions and those of historical maps must be the topic of geographic accuracy: historians of maps have long fought to show that historical maps' seeming

⁸ Jeremy Crampton, "Maps as Social Constructions: Power, Communication, and Visualization," *Progress in Human Geography* 25, no. 2 (2001): pp. 235–252.

⁹ Rob Kitchin and Martin Dodge, "Rethinking Maps," *Progress in Human Geography* 31, no.3 (2007): pp. 331–344.

¹⁰ Other documents can too, of course; Marcia Yonemoto argues that "mapping" should be broadly construed to include other texts that represent space, such as travel literature, travel guides, encyclopedias, and other works. Marcia Yonemoto, *Mapping Early Modern Japan: Space, Place, and Culture in the Tokugawa Period (1603–1868)* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), especially the Introduction.

lack of accuracy is a limited way of thinking about cartography. Rather than see the history of mapmaking as an inevitable march toward greater and greater accuracy, most historians would argue that we should treat maps as insights into different ideas about spatial organization in times and places distant from our own.¹¹

Historians of Japan are no strangers to maps as sources. The publication of *Cartographic Japan* in 2016 highlights the surge in interest in map history in the last two decades, at least in Western-language scholarship.¹² Comprising a series of short essays on several dozen maps, ranging from classical to contemporary times, the volume highlights the range of Japanese cartography, as well as changing mapmaking practices over time, and the range of interest in cartography among historians, cartographers, geographers, and art historians working on Japan. A similar compilation in Japanese from 2011, *Ezugaku nyūmon*, speaks to the ongoing popularity of early-modern maps as a lens onto Japanese history.¹³

The bulk of research conducted by historians interested in Japanese maps has been on the construction of national (or protonational) space through the state's use of *kuniezu* (provincial maps) and other large-scale maps, which functioned very obviously as instruments of power. Maps were not just about political power: the expansion of commercial print culture and the spread of a "spatial vernacular" in Tokugawa Japan help explain the surge in map production, while the remarkable coastal surveys by Ishikawa Ryūsen and Inō Tadakata show the developments in technical skill and cartographic interest among commercial, as well as official,

¹¹ Yonemoto draws on David Turnbull's term 'workability' to describe this approach; see Yonemoto, *Mapping Early Modern Japan*, p. 5, also p. 181, n. 16.

¹² *Cartographic Japan: A History in Maps*, ed. Kären Wigen, Sugimoto Fumiko, and Cary Karacas (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2016).

¹³ Sugimoto Fumiko, Isonaga Kazuki, and Onodera Atsushi, eds., *Ezugaku nyūmon* (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 2011).

mapmakers.¹⁴ Kären Wigen shows how mapmaking played a role in defining regional identities alongside (and sometimes against) the creation of a national geography in the mid-nineteenth century.¹⁵ Marcia Yonemoto focuses less on the production of maps themselves than on the emergence of new and more elaborate ways of talking about space in maps, literature, and travel diaries, and the relationship between these ways of talking about space and the emergent definitions of Japaneseness.¹⁶ Mary Elizabeth Berry asks why and how maps came to flourish in the early modern period: she argues that “the ability of ideologues to think generically about the space of the nation” led to a boom in mapmaking after the reunification of Japan, as particularistic visions of space were swept away by increasingly national visions of geography.¹⁷

Mapping at the local level has been less thoroughly researched. Berry hints at some of the specific features of city mapmaking in Tokugawa Japan, in a short article focusing on the persistence of neighborhood names rather than street names in Japanese cities.¹⁸ Ronald Toby has also focused on city mapping, using maps to illustrate the interconnection of geography and status in early-modern urban space.¹⁹ In the modern period, city maps have gained attention

¹⁴ See Marcia Yonemoto, “The Spatial Vernacular in Tokugawa Maps,” *Journal of Asian Studies* 59, no. 3 (2000): pp. 647–66.

¹⁵ Kären Wigen, *A Malleable Map: Geographies of Restoration in Central Japan, 1600–1912* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010).

¹⁶ Yonemoto, *Mapping Early Modern Japan*.

¹⁷ Mary Elizabeth Berry, *Japan in Print: Information and Nation in the Early Modern Period* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), p. 60.

¹⁸ Berry, in *Cartographic Japan*, p. 85–88. Both Berry and Yonemoto devote considerable parts of their monographs on spatial history to cities, but they rely on travel guides and other literature, rather than maps, in their analysis (in contrast to their discussions of the production of national space through mapmaking). See Berry, “The Freedom of the City,” ch. 5 in *Japan in Print*, pp. 139–84, and Yonemoto, “Remapping Japan: Satire, Pleasure, and Place in Late Tokugawa Fiction,” ch. 5 in *Mapping Early Modern Japan*, pp. 129–72.

¹⁹ See Ronald Toby, “Mibun hyōgen” in *Ezugaku nyūmon*, pp. 26–29; as well as idem., “Spatial Visions of Status” in *Cartographic Japan*, pp. 78–80.

among urban historians and planning historians, although relatively few scholars have adopted critical analysis of maps as the primary lens through which to approach the rapid and dramatic urbanization of Japan, and the concomitant development of the urban planning profession, in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

In Japanese, the field of cartographic history has been dominated most recently by Sugimoto Fumiko, who along with earlier scholars such as Unno Kazutaka have focused on Japan's early-modern mapmaking, with a focus on national and provincial mapping and the emergence of increasingly sophisticated mapmaking techniques that reflected and reified new forms of political, social, and cultural power.²⁰ City mapping was first the subject of Yamori Kazuhiko's work in the 1970s, including *Toshizu no rekishi* in which he traces the diversity and vibrancy of Japan's city maps from medieval times to the present.²¹ More recent work includes art historian Ozawa Hiromu's work²² on maps of Edo, conducted largely during his tenure as director of the urban history division of the Edo-Tokyo Museum; and historical cartography of Kyoto, led by doyen-of-the-field Kinda Akihiro at Kyoto University.²³ As with many historians of Japanese cities, these scholars' interests lay firmly in the pre-Meiji era (or in the preservation of pre-Meiji townscapes in the present day). Planning historians tackle maps from the twentieth century onwards, when urban planning became increasingly professionalized, but—in line with a

²⁰ See Unno Kazutaka, "Cartography in Japan," in *The History of Cartography, Volume Two, Book Two: Cartography in the Traditional East and Southeast Asian Societies* ed. J. B. Harley and David Woodward (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 346–455; and *Chizu to ezu no seiji bunka shi*, ed. Kuroda Hideo, Mary Elizabeth Berry, and Sugimoto Fumiko (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 2001); *Ezugaku nyūmon*, ed. Sugimoto Fumiko, Isonaga Kazuki, and Onodera Atsushi (Tokyo: Tokyo daigaku shuppankai, 2011).

²¹ Yamori Kazuhiko, *Toshizu no rekishi* (Tokyo: Kōyōsha, 1974).

²² Ozawa Hiromu, *Toshizu no keifu to Edo* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 2002).

²³ Kinda's work mostly focuses on classical Kyoto; see, for instance, Kinda Akihiro, ed., *Heiankyō–Kyōto: toshizu to toshikōzō* (Kyoto: Kyoto Daigaku gakujutsu shuppankai, 2007).

general scholarly lacuna around cities during the Tokugawa–Meiji transition—few scholars have looked at early Meiji maps for insight into the urban planning and urban development of that era. Finally, the preponderance of work on Edo and Kyoto (and to a similar degree Osaka) highlights the general neglect of other cities by scholars working at the national, rather than local, level; studies of local city maps usually fall to local historical societies, or scholars at regional universities. In Sapporo’s case, three compilations of historical maps exist: the first, produced by the commission charged with writing the most recent official city history, reprinted several old and rare maps (including several discussed in this chapter), with some annotations.²⁴ The second, published in 2012 by physicist-turned-map-enthusiast Hori Jun’ichi, similarly traces the changing depiction of the city for a lay audience interested in learning about changes in the urban environment.²⁵ The third collection, also by Hori, is part of a multivolume series on old maps from around Japan.²⁶ Neither author engages with the analytical scholarship of cartographers, geographers, or historians of mapmaking, and the reprinted maps are so small as to be virtually unreadable. Nevertheless, they are important collections for gathering together and illustrating the diversity of maps of Sapporo.

Building on this range of scholarship, I use maps of Sapporo to explore some of the ideological values and spatial practices of the people who planned and built the city. These maps show a tension at the heart of city building in Sapporo: on the one hand, they illustrate the dramatic development and transformation of urban space in Sapporo; on the other, they reveal the long-lasting impact of early decisions about space, and the inertia that early representations

²⁴ Sapporo-shi kyōiku iinkai, ed., *Sapporo rekishi chizu–Meiji-hen* (Sapporo: Hokkaido Shinbunsha, 1978).

²⁵ Hori Jun’ichi, *Chizu no naka no Sapporo: machi no rekishi wo yomitoku* (Sapporo: Arisusha, 2012).

²⁶ Hori Jun’ichi, *Nihon no kochizu 15: Sapporo* (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1977).

of Sapporo took on in future mapping. In these respects, I argue that mapmaking in Sapporo was a dynamic process, but one that was fundamentally conditioned by a dominant cartographic framing that not only influenced future maps, but also influenced the layout and development of the city.

The Cartographic Archive

In this chapter, I will focus on a selection of eighteen maps of Sapporo produced between 1869 and 1893, and held in the Hokkaido University Library's Northern Studies Collection. They represent the largest collection of maps from early Sapporo, and a collection that mostly exists as a result of Hokkaido University historians' efforts to gather materials related to the history of the city as part of the production of the most recent official city history.²⁷ This collection represents a substantial archive for recreating ideas about urban space in early Sapporo.

Figure 2.0: List of Figures						
Fig.	Date	Title	Author	Size (cm)	Format	Record²⁸
2.1	1869	<i>Ishikari taifu sashizu</i>	Shima Yoshitake (?)	65x95	Hand-drawn, folded	図 239
2.2	1869	<i>Ishikari honpu sashizu</i>	Shima Yoshitake	86x47	Hand-drawn, scroll	軸 116
2.3	1870–1	<i>Sapporo chizu</i>	N/A	47x88	Ink, folded	図 218
2.4	1871–2	<i>Sapporo kukakuzu</i>	Kaikongakari	88x80	Hand-drawn	図 203
2.5	1872	<i>Proposed Location of Hospitals</i>	Stuart Eldridge (Colonial Agency)	26x20	Hand-drawn	図 425
2.6	1873	<i>Sapporo shigai no zu</i>	Colonial Agency	28x40	Enlargement of a map printed in <i>Kōbunroku</i> ²⁹	図 215

²⁷ Takakura Shin'ichirō, one of the principal editors of the SSS and so-called father of Ainu studies served as head of the Hokkaido University Library, and edited the definitive collection of old maps of Hokkaido: *Hokkaido kochizu shūsei* (Sapporo: Hokkaido shuppan kikaku sentā, 1987), as well as contributed to *Sapporo no rekishi chizu – Meiji hen*.

²⁸ This corresponds to the record locator in the Hokkaido University Library Northern Studies Collection (Hoppō shiryōshitsu; hereafter NSC); the easiest way to find these maps is to search the maps and images category of the Collection's database by title or author. The database, which includes many low-resolution versions of these maps, is at www.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/hoppodb. 図 is an abbreviation for 図類; 軸 for 軸物.

²⁹ This is according to a note on the map; I have not found the relevant part of the 1873 *Kōbunroku*, which was a compilation of key documents produced annually by the Colonial Agency between 1873 and 1881.

Figure 2.0, continued						
2.7	1873	<i>Hokkaido Sapporo no zu</i>	Colonial Agency Survey Department	44x49	Black and white	図 893
2.8	1873	<i>Hokkaido Ishikarishū Sapporo chikei mitorizu</i>	Funakoshi Chōzen	32x48	Woodblock, colored, scroll	軸 124
2.9	1874	<i>Meiji 7-nen Sapporo shigai zu</i>	Ōmura Kōtarō (Sapporo city council)	77x115	(Handdrawn reproduction)	軸 33
2.10	1874	<i>Sapporogun kakuson chizu</i>	Funakoshi Chōzen	60x56	Handdrawn, folded	図 206
2.11	1875	<i>A Map of Sapporo, Island of Hokkaido</i>	[Colonial Agency?]	41x46	Lithograph, black and white	図 1446
2.12	1875	<i>Meiji 8-nen no Sapporo</i>	Funakoshi Chōzen	36x52	Reprint with annotations by Takakura Shin'ichirō	図 1283
2.13	1875	<i>Takamizawa kyū Sapporo zu and Takamizawa Gonnojō mitorizu</i>	Takamizawa Gonnojō	31cm wide	Long scroll; contains both maps. The first is a recollection of Sapporo in 1869/11.	軸 150
2.14	1878	<i>Hokkaido Sapporo no zu</i>	Katō Yoshinori for the Surveying Department	140x118	Scroll, color	軸 26
2.15	1882–6	<i>Ishikarinokuni Sapporo no zu</i>	Koike Kuninobu	34x27	Lithograph; enlarged version of an inset on Koike's <i>Sapporo ken kannai zu</i> ³⁰	図 858
2.16	1889	<i>Sapporo shigai no zu</i>	Hokkaido chō	56x44	Lithograph; 1:10,000 scale	図 964
2.17	1891	<i>Sapporo shigai no zu</i>	Murao Motonaga for Sapporo city	54x45	Lithograph, folded, 1:10,000 scale; very similar to Fig. 16	図 713
2.18	1893	<i>Sapporo ku jitchi meisai ezu</i>	Kawase Zen'ichi	120x72	Copperplate, folded	図 708

In addition to the maps in this table, a host of documents from surveyors and other officials, as well as diaries, memoirs, and contemporary accounts, help flesh out the process by which the city went from lines on a map to buildings in the ground—and back again. These materials help us recreate ideas about space, and help overcome some of the limits of maps as sources. Reading maps alongside other documents helps us focus on the processes of producing space, rather than reading maps as static snapshots of a particular time and place. In the remainder of the chapter, I will analyze the authorship, audience, and technical features of these

³⁰ Koike Kuninobu, *Sapporo-ken kannai zu*, prob. 1886, 図類 706, NSC.

maps, before showing how they together created a “spatial vernacular”—that is, a common language of representing space. Then, I will turn to three tales that these maps tell: first, a predominantly state-centered historical narrative of urban growth; second, the historical changes alluded to but not emphasized in these maps; and third, the microhistorical events and processes of city planning and construction that require us to go beyond the maps themselves to understand. In the final section of this chapter I zoom out to touch on three themes illustrated across these maps: social disparities, the tension between reality and idealism, and the elements of a settler-colonial ideology at play in Sapporo.

Technical Analysis: Context, Format, Function

A - Authorship

By 1869, officials and commoners across Japan were familiar with a wide range of mapmaking practices, ranging from local village maps (*muraezu*), used largely for local land surveys and property disputes, to travel maps, national maps, and world maps.³¹ Representing space at both the most local and most abstract levels was a familiar practice among educated Japanese across the archipelago. In the case of Ezochi, Japanese explorers in the region had long produced maps to accompany their travel diaries. Officials had mapped the region as early as the 1790s, while shogunal officials in the Hakodate magistracy had detailed coastal maps of Ezochi.³² Long-term Ezochi experts such as Matsuura Takeshirō had produced comprehensive charts of the Ishikari region, which circulated among shogunal officials in the last decades of

³¹ See Sugimoto et al., eds., *Ezugaku nyūmon* for a survey of the vast range of map types produced in the early modern era.

³² Notable examples include Imai Hachikurō, *Matsumae Ezochi kaigan meisaizu*, 1830-44, 図類 1510-1~61, NSC, and Yabuuchi Ototarō [?], *Ezo zenchi*, 1858[?], 図類 619, NSC. Images of each are available on www2.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/hoppodb/.

Tokugawa rule, along with travel diaries and other territorial descriptions.³³ Shima Yoshitake, sent to Ezochi for the first time in 1858, also drew maps of the areas to which he travelled, and compiled a four-volume diary of his experiences. (Sadly the volume presumed to contain his reflections on the Sapporo area has been lost.)³⁴ Thus when Shima headed for Sapporo in the autumn of 1869, he did so not across landscapes unfamiliar to Japanese officials, but rather through well-plotted territory. The familiar practice of representing space through maps and texts carried over into his city-planning efforts: mapping a future city was part of a practice of representing space, and imagining future places. The two maps of Sapporo that he drew were merely the first of a long string of maps produced by Colonial Agency officials that both recorded their capital's development, and laid out a vision for its future growth.

Most of the Colonial Agency's maps that have survived were produced by the Surveying Department, which was established in 1873. The Department explicitly adopted western trigonometric surveying techniques under the leadership of several western advisors. Shortly after his arrival in Tokyo after being appointed Commissioner and Advisor to the Colonial Agency, Horace Capron dispatched a team of surveyors to Hokkaido in the autumn of 1871 to conduct a topological and mineralogical survey of the entire island: mapping Hokkaido was a prerequisite to development, in Capron's view. The headquarters of the Surveying Department moved to central Sapporo in 1875, from which surveyors departed to map the routes connecting

³³ SSS, vol. 1, p. 1010. Matsuura recorded his thoughts about the Sapporo area in his *Nishi Ezo nisshi*, a reproduction of which can be found in *Nihon koten zenshū, dai 3-ki* (Tokyo: Nihon koten zenshū kankōkai, 1928–33), vol. 10 (a copy of the original is available on the NDL digital library); and *Jinshin yoseki*, reproduced in *Teibon Matsuura Takeshirō*, ed. Yoshida Takezō (Tokyo: San'ichi shobō, 1973), vol. 2, pp. 178–538.

³⁴ See Enomoto Yōsuke, *Shima Yoshitake: 1822–1874* (Saga: Saga Prefectural Historical Society, 2011), p. 25–31.

the city to towns and regions further afield.³⁵ Detailed trigonometric surveys of Sapporo were finally produced in 1878.³⁶ These official maps illustrate the administrative and development interests of the Colonial Agency and its advisors, which dominate their representations of urban space in Sapporo. The changing priorities of official mapmakers helps us track the changing priorities of the state, while illustrating the interplay between maps as plans for the future, and maps as representations of the present.

Private-sector mapmakers emerged quickly in Sapporo, although they probably worked closely with Colonial Agency officials, blurring the boundary between official and commercial publication. Some maps, such as those by Takamizawa Gonnojō (1814–80) and Ōmura Kōtarō (1851–1922?), reflected a much more impressionistic sense of the city—but one that nevertheless drew on both men’s close ties to the government. Takamizawa travelled with Shima in 1869, and his diary provides one of the most detailed accounts of the work that took place in Sapporo’s earliest months. His maps are recollections of Sapporo as it was when Shima arrived in 1869/11, and the state of Sapporo at the time of Shima’s departure a few months later. He drew these maps in 1875, which raises some questions about the accuracy of his memory. Nevertheless, they offer some important insights into the geographic imaginary of Sapporo’s early citizens: how did they imagine the growth of their city in cartographic terms? Ōmura Kōtarō, secretary for the Sapporo city assembly in the mid-1870s, similarly blurred the boundary between official and commoner. His map also poses some challenges: the extant copy was drawn in 1932, and we cannot know what the original looked like. Yet, the focus on commoner Sapporo

³⁵ Ōkurashō, *Kaitakushi jigyo hōkoku* (Sapporo: Hokkaido shuppan kikaku sentā, 1981–85 [1885]), vol. 1, p. 304. Hereafter *KJH*.

³⁶ *KJH*, vol. 1, p. 308.

and the detailed description of each block makes it impossible to resist the comparison with official maps.

Funakoshi Chōzen (1830–1881) was the most notable non-official mapmaker and illustrator of early Sapporo. Born in Nanbu Domain, he studied art at the domain school. The domain assigned him to military duty in Ezochi in 1855 and 1856, after which he rose through the domain bureaucracy, where he developed formal surveying skills. After a brief stint as a surveyor for the Iwate Prefectural Tax Office in 1872, he moved to Sapporo and entered the Colonial Agency's employ in 1873/2. In addition to surveying and mapmaking, he enjoyed socializing with high-ranking Colonial Agency officials.³⁷

B – Audience and Purpose

Who, and what, were these maps for? A few were printed in the official records of the Colonial Agency (or subsequent Sapporo Prefecture and Hokkaido-chō documents). They stand as documents of record: snapshots of official policy and progress. These maps were usually lithographed, and contain many formal elements (legends, cartouches, compasses, and so on). Several are quite large, indicating they may have been hung in offices. A couple maps, such as those by Funakoshi, were printed by woodblock, suggesting that they were intended for widespread circulation. Most, however, were handdrawn on either scrolls or folded paper, and are relatively small in size. These were portable documents that could be put to use in the field, or amended easily. Some, like Ōmura's, contain the type of minute detail that would have been useful to a city official needing to refer to geographic data. Shima's maps are sketches: easy to adjust, and quick to create, hinting at the rapid pace of construction and the rapidly changing environment of the city. In contrast, Takamizawa's maps are more artistic, reflecting his desire to

³⁷ Kudō Tomoe and Watanabe Takashi, "Funakoshi Chōzen 'Sapporo kinkō no sumie' ni tsuite," *Bulletin of Botanic Garden, Hokkaido University* 10 (Oct 2010): pp. 97–116.

record his memory of Sapporo's geography for aesthetic and historical reasons, perhaps, rather than a need to accurately record surveys, plans, or land use patterns. In sum, the maps discussed here were put to a wide range of uses, reflecting the versatility of cartography in early Sapporo. The differences in their content reflect this variation, but the similarities among them further speak to the emergence of a dominant cartographic idiom for the city.

The publication of many of these maps by the Colonial Agency also reflects the value of cartography as a way to explain and introduce the young city of Sapporo to officials in Tokyo. In addition to the written reports and budget exhibits sent back to the Tokyo government, these maps offered a striking visual snapshot of the city's growth. They were quick and effective means of updating officials in Tokyo, and established Sapporo as a specific site, grounded in a specific geography, and taking on a specific cartographic identity that would eventually make its way into ideas about the city in the popular imagination. People were widely versed in map reading, and maps were a common way to represent urban space for both administrative and cultural purposes.

C – Techniques

The eighteen maps vary in technique: some are hand drawn, others printed on woodblocks, and others produced by lithograph. Several are colored and illustrated, while a few are very basic black-and-white sketches. Almost all orient the reader with compass directions, although the orientation varies: the official maps produced after the adoption of Western trigonometric techniques tend to put north at the top of the map, but the others can be orientated in all directions (as was common with early-modern maps in Japan more generally). More elaborate maps use a range of intricate shading to illustrate different land uses or administrative boundaries. After 1871, maps produced by the Colonial Agency adopted western trigonometric

surveying techniques. This required an enormous amount of labor, and produced maps that in some respects feel much more ‘modern’ than maps that bear greater resemblance to typical Japanese early-modern city maps, which tend to include greater pictographic and visual representations of landscapes, notable buildings, and streetscapes. The surveyed maps have cleaner lines, more precise notations, and a more consistent (and clearly marked) set of icons that create an abstract spatial vocabulary, allowing for the more efficient representation of spatial features.

Yet, a comparison of the Colonial Agency maps and those that came before and after them reveals the interplay of these different mapmaking modes. The choices of what to include and what to elide bear remarkable consistency across the different styles of maps, while questions of framing, orientation, and visual representation have also been treated similarly by different mapmakers. Certainly several of the later commercial maps seem to have been based on the surveyed maps produced by the Colonial Agency, but the Colonial Agency’s maps were clearly influenced by the maps that came before them. The shape of the city, the centering of Sapporo and its road system within a broader hinterland, the depiction of official buildings, the importance of watercourses and the mountains—these geographic, infrastructural, and political features of Sapporo’s environment governed Sapporo’s earliest mapmakers, who, by including them on their maps, would ensure that they remained central to maps of the city that followed. The boundaries of provinces and districts were explicitly taken from Matsuura Takeshirō’s ideas, which predated the efforts of the surveying department, highlighting the continuity and continued importance of earlier ideas about the space of Sapporo and its environs.³⁸ The inertia

³⁸ *KJH*, vol. 1, p. 306.

of these choices, like the physical features they represented and forecast, would define Sapporo for many years to come.

D – “Spatial Vernacular”

The different positions of Sapporo’s early mapmakers led to different emphases in their maps, but despite these differences, both administrative and commercial maps contributed to a relatively standardized image of the city. The goals of the state and the interests of locals did not always align, but the similarities in maps illustrate the ability of geographic representations to become hegemonic: that is, the representation of Sapporo on maps became naturalized in ways that quickly elided earlier, more diverse understandings of the region’s geography and history. This ideological work was not necessarily intentional, but rather stemmed from the layering of many different cartographic representations of the city that, by the end of the Colonial Agency era, paved the way for new and more playful representations of the city. That is, the establishment of a cartographic baseline of Sapporo—characterized by the city’s rectilinear grid, the emphasis on rivers and roadways, and the prominence of official institutions—allowed more elaborate maps to come later. That state-built grid, though, would remain paramount, undergirding other representations of Sapporo in official and commercial publications.

Marcia Yonemoto introduced the term “spatial vernacular” to refer to the ways in which maps reflected and reinforced a set of shared ideas about how to represent space, and how to use those representations in the “daily navigation of the natural and built environment.”³⁹ While Yonemoto focuses on the usefulness of maps, particularly for urban commoners, it is also worthwhile to think about this spatial vernacular at the level of political elites. Mapmaking in Sapporo, especially in its early years, was less about practical guides for city residents—the city

³⁹ Yonemoto, “Spatial Vernacular,” p. 648.

was small enough that such guides were less important—and more about the practical and ideological needs of elites trying to build a capital city in a newly settled land. Officials in the Colonial Agency and prominent local elites together used maps as a way to project settler-colonial domination, to boost Sapporo's stature, and to make this semi-foreign place immediately legible to elites elsewhere in Japan, not least the government in Tokyo making decisions about Hokkaido. The enduring force of the cartographic image of Sapporo that emerged in its early years suggests the importance of early choices in shaping future city-planning efforts.

The spatial vernacular in these early maps of Sapporo contains several elements, which together express Sapporo's deep roots in earlier urban forms; the colonial mindset of the city's officials; and the heavy role of the state in the city's growth. I have already mentioned the dominance of the rectilinear grid in representations of the city, which is notable for at least three reasons: first, it ties Sapporo to older forms of city building, both from the immediate past and to older, imperial ideas about the proper layout of capital cities. The most obvious connection relates Shima's vision of Sapporo to the existing castle towns that formed the urban network of political power in Tokugawa Japan, and in particular his home town of Saga.⁴⁰ The ideological primacy of military defense, which governed all aspects of Tokugawa politics, stands out in the massive headquarters, as well as the moats, earthen barriers, and gates that surround it (Figure 2.2). The decision to surround the headquarters with official and bureaucratic institutions reflects the layout of cities from Edo to Saga, where retainer households provided concentric rings of defense. The division between official and commoner districts also reflects a second ideological pillar of early-modern Japan: the sociospatial division of cities based on status. The literal

⁴⁰ The authors of the *SSS* suggest this direct connection to Saga, yet provide no evidence (*SSS*, vol. 2, p. 32). Enomoto Yōsuke mentions the values of defense and sociospatial stratification in his study of Shima, but does not provide more detail: the lack of extant evidence from Shima makes it difficult to go further. See Enomoto, *Shima Yoshitake*, pp. 83–91.

division of commoner and official districts by a massive open space (today's Ōdōri Park and boulevard) reflects this governing ideological principle (see the sharp distinction in Figure 2.6). The relevance of both these features is not surprising: during Shima's tenure in Sapporo, the status system had yet to be dismantled, and the central government had only just suppressed a rebel state in southern Hokkaido. Social stratification and military needs thus were logical principles of urban planning in 1869–70 Sapporo. These features have led scholars to call Sapporo “the Colonial Agency's castle town,”⁴¹ a place “undeniably...envisioned as an early-modern city.”⁴² While the city would quickly adopt other, more modern functions, these elements nevertheless shaped the fundamental structures of the city.⁴³

The grid layout had more aspirational meaning for Sapporo's early mappers. Vivian Blaxell has argued that the grid system “brought the center to the periphery so that the periphery could be brought into the Meiji political order.”⁴⁴ That political order explicitly sought to recreate elements of classical Japan, and urban space was no exception. Classical Japanese capitals (those of the Nara and Heian periods) had been constructed along classical Chinese planning principles, characterized at least superficially by a rectilinear grid on a north-south axis, with wide boulevards extending south from the main gate of the palace. These features, along with the geomantic placement of temples and other facilities, shaped the classical capital of Heian-kyō (present-day Kyoto) in significant ways. Despite the early-modern reordering of

⁴¹ Yamada Hiroshi, “Kikō to soshiki,” in *Kaitakushi jidai*, ed. Sapporo-shi kyōiku iinkai (Sapporo: Hokkaido shinbunsha, 1997), p. 45.

⁴² Suzue Eiichi, “Sōsōki Sapporo no shihai to shakai,” in *Sapporo no rekishi* 5, p. 6.

⁴³ Yoshida Nobuyuki makes this point in *Toshi shakai shi*, Shin taikai Nihon shi 6 (Tokyo: Yamakawa shuppansha, 2001), p. 361.

⁴⁴ Vivian Blaxell, “Designs of Power: the ‘Japanization’ of Urban and Rural Space in Colonial Hokkaido,” *Japan Focus* 7, issue 35, no. 2 (Aug 2009): p. 6. Karen Wigen has also discussed the adaptation of classical geographies in the modern state, using Shinano Province as a case study, in *A Malleable Map*.



Figure 2.6: *Sapporo shigai no zu*, 1873

Kyoto during the sixteenth century, the capital continued to signify an imperial urban form. Ambitious elites in Hokkaido envisioned recreating such an imperial capital in the Sapporo region: Shima envisioned Sapporo becoming one of the “greatest cities of the world.”⁴⁵ Others compared Sapporo to Kyoto, and occasional proposals to make Sapporo the new imperial capital, or at the very least a detached palace, hint at the underlying value of these old ideas.⁴⁶ On paper (and in practice) Sapporo’s north-south alignment reflects these ideas most strongly, although the wide north-south boulevard of Shima’s plans did not turn into reality, and other features of the imperial model (such as carefully placed temples and palaces) also did not come to pass. Nevertheless, the presence of these ideals hints at the importance of older urban principles in Sapporo’s development. The spatial representation of these ideals in the form of the grid, and the clear domination of the grid in subsequent maps of Sapporo, speaks to the influence that such values would have on the city’s growth, even as the city increasingly took on modern, rather than classical or early-modern, functions.

Second, the grid is not drawn as contained—there are always peripheral elements (roads, villages, buildings) that are drawn with dashed lines, or roads that trail away, maintaining the possibility of expansion. This could be read as a forward-looking vision for settlement, perhaps, but also as an admission that the city’s edges were poorly defined and sparsely inhabited. And indeed, Sapporo’s formal municipal boundaries were defined only passively when the edges of

⁴⁵ Enomoto, *Shima Yoshitake*, p. 5.

⁴⁶ Matsuura Takeshirō, in one of his late-bakumatsu trips to the area, envisioned Sapporo in relation to its port at Otaru along the lines of Kyoto’s relationship to Osaka and Fushimi. See SSS, vol. 1, pp. 1021–22. In 1875, rumors of relocating the Japanese capital to Sapporo elicited criticism in the popular press (see a translation of a letter in the *Tokyo Daily News* by Koyanagi Kiyonaga given to Horace Capron, 18 February 1875, box 2, folder 60, Horace Capron Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library; hereafter HC Papers). In 1893, a proposal to establish such a palace at Asahikawa was vehemently opposed by Sapporo notables. See *Kamikawa rikyū setchi ikensho*, 1893, NSC, 別 325-Ka.

the surrounding villages were demarcated in 1874.⁴⁷ When maps are read alongside descriptive accounts of the city, the desolate, uninhabited nature of much of the city's territory becomes clear. Nevertheless, the inclusion of these undeveloped spaces on early maps of the city—and the fact that they gradually get filled in over time—marks the importance of this forward-looking representation to officials and residents of the growing city. The grid was always expanding: the city would continue to grow. This fundamental optimism sat at odds with the many social, political, and economic challenges facing Sapporo in its early years, but it reflected elites' faith in the possibility of the settler-colonial project in Sapporo.

Third, the grid stands in stark contrast to the rivers that flow through the region, and more generally the wider natural environment of the city. Sapporo's grid rationalized natural space. It was built parallel to an irrigation and transport canal dug in 1866, the first attempt by Japanese settlers to tame the Toyohira River's watery web of tributaries, meandering secondary watercourses, and marshes. The gradual efforts to reroute waterways along the roads of the grid system, while never fully achieved, nevertheless successfully subordinated the water system to the street grid. In most maps, these watercourses are shown as reference points, far less important to the city's shape and image than its streets. This is despite the fact that water crossings (notably a ferry, and then bridge, to the southeast of the city center) and water transport were the economic lifeblood of the young city: it would be several years before an adequate road system displaced canals as the most efficient means to transport goods to the city; the railway came to play the same role only in the 1880s. Despite this economic reality, the choice to map the city around its streets reflects both the rationalizing impulse of colonial officials, as well as the importance of land-based infrastructure projects to the Colonial Agency's city-building efforts.

⁴⁷ Endō Akihisa, "Keikaku to jissai" in *Kaitakushi jidai*, p. 53.

Sapporo's grid also marked the city as a place in uneasy tension with the natural environment, which is treated both as a necessary resource and as an object to be controlled and overcome. Maps often depict mountains, springs, ground cover, and other natural features, but they tend to be seen as resources for the city's use (in the case of water supply) or obstacles to efficient transport (in the case of heavy brush and marshland). The natural environment is a canvas for the city: it is worth mapping insofar as it allows people to imagine what might replace it. The city gradually encroaches on these natural features, which are spaces to be controlled (whether through urbanization, or through the application of new agricultural and industrial techniques). In this respect, Sapporo's planners continued Tokugawa-era efforts in the region to develop new farms and other settlements. Treating the natural world as a resource to be corralled and shaped for the process of urbanization reflects the principles and values at play in the broader project to settle Hokkaido, reminding us of Sapporo's actual and symbolic roles in that project.

Other elements of the spatial vernacular expressed in these maps of Sapporo include the tendency to represent government buildings in some detail, while leaving the commoner districts of the city as undifferentiated blocks, highlighting the ongoing values of a status-conscious society. The landmarks and notable sites of the city were invariably those created by the Colonial Agency, a reflection both of the state-driven development of Sapporo, and of the importance of the city as a political capital above all else. The sheer space of the city devoted to official functions helped give more weight to their representation on maps, but the decisions to illustrate official sites with pictures and textual descriptions also reflects a strong awareness of the city as primarily a site of government-led, rather than private, development and growth.

Finally, the occasional use of artistic representations—either of mountains, or places within the city—suggests that maps did not function as only abstract representations of urban space, but also as visual depictions of the city (as well as vistas seen from within the city). These features speak to a long history of maps as not only planners’ documents, but also as texts that made certain features of the landscape or built environment a part of the city’s visual and cartographic identity. The most obvious features were the mountains ringing Sapporo, and some key Colonial Agency-era buildings. Their clear representation on many maps reflects a long history of representing famous places on maps.⁴⁸ Sapporo’s early residents struggled to make the place home: it was a transient city, with a high proportion of seasonal residents, and its distance from the rest of Japan made it a lonely and forlorn place. It is not surprising that depictions of the city sought to make it familiar by offering some visual guide in a manner familiar to consumers of maps of other parts of Japan. These efforts helped make Sapporo seem more permanent, more accessible, and more appealing than it was to many travelers first encountering the young, isolated, and somewhat desolate city.

These maps of Sapporo, while drawn by different people using various techniques and highlighting different features of the city, nevertheless portray a common vision of the city: a highly ordered place, orientated around state functions, that was constantly expanding. Nature surrounds the city, and provides it with resources; but the city inexorably rationalized that nature, turning it into managed space. In these respects, maps of Sapporo highlight how the city’s development was a microcosm of the broader colonization of Hokkaido. These features together

⁴⁸ Both Yonemoto and Berry discuss Kaibara Ekiken’s travel guides; see Yonemoto, *Mapping Early Modern Japan*, pp. 55–61, and Berry, *Japan in Print*, pp. 185–96. Laura Nenzi’s work on travel, and the multiple ways in which travel maps were produced, highlights the growth of leisure travel (and the intersections with gender and status) in early-modern Japan. Laura Nenzi, *Excursions in Identity: Travel and the Intersection of Place, Gender and Status in Edo Japan*, (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2008).

comprise the spatial vernacular of early Sapporo: they provide a shared cartographic vocabulary that mapmakers adopted readily in each representation of the city. In terms of authorship, audience, and format, these maps convey a particular way of seeing urban space that emerged over the first two decades of mapmaking in Sapporo. The heavy role of state actors and predominance of state institutions in the city, the idealism of Sapporo's grid, and the downplaying of natural features in favor of the manmade all showcase the role of city-building as a form of state-building, and a reading of the city as metonym for the settler-colonial state.

Yet, like other Colonial Agency depictions of its own colonial project, its maps do not so readily reveal the shortcomings and limitations of the state-led settlement of Hokkaido, or other stories about Sapporo's development. A closer look at some of the elements of these maps will allow me to elaborate on the disparate representations of different social groups, economic activities, and other features of the spatial vernacular. They will also allow me to describe more specifically the Colonial Agency's vision for Sapporo. Finally, I will draw out some of the gaps and elisions from the maps, and the insights they provide on the development of Sapporo. Looking at these less visible narratives illustrates the ways in which maps of Sapporo served an ideological purpose, masking certain experiences in favor of others and projecting a strong vision of the colonial state at the expense of the social and cultural forms that predated it.

Cartographic Narratives

I: Growth and Development

At first glance, the content of these maps largely reinforces the cartographic idiom, or spatial vernacular, they convey. The state is dominant; social relations are clear; and the focus on infrastructure as both a literal and symbolic manifestation of the broader colonial project all work well with the methods of depiction that give these maps their strength as tools and symbols of

state power in Sapporo. At the same time, though, the details of the maps hint at some of the limits of that power, or at least at the messy reality on the ground. That is, when they are read as both plans for the future and representations of the present, gaps between ideal and real emerge. These elements hint at the challenges facing Sapporo's builders. Together, the ambitions and shortcomings of city planning in Sapporo help us trace changing ideas about the city: from one relatively narrowly defined as a military outpost, to one that served as a model for the more expansive settler-colonial project that developed across the Colonial Agency years. The importance of state functions in Sapporo persists as a dominant feature in later maps of the city, but the content of those functions changes, highlighting the growth of an increasingly complex, developmental, and colonial state apparatus in Sapporo.

Shima's plans for Sapporo illustrate his vision of the city as an administrative capital for Hokkaido, modeled in part on the castle towns of early-modern Japan. In *Ishikari taifu sashizu* (Figure 2.1), Shima sketches a headquarters surrounded by officials' residences (役宅), many along the roads linking the planned city to surrounding villages. This expansive approach harkens back to Tokugawa Nariaki's vision: a castle town with retainers scattered about the hinterland to provide defense. In addition to these scattered residences around the Sapporo headquarters, a row of officials' residences connects the headquarters to the town (大町) and fort (本陣). The other major feature of the headquarters, in the foothills across town from the headquarters, is a shrine (神社), with a line of houses for shrine officials. These features—official residences and a shrine—were, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, Shima's construction priorities in 1869. *Ishikari honpu sashizu* (Figure 2.2) provides more detail of the core of this headquarters: the row of official compounds connecting the headquarters to the town. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the hierarchy of official compounds cascaded from the headquarters

towards the town according to the rank of the office holder. In addition, the location of specific divisions within the Colonial Agency hints at some of Shima's priorities: the offices for civil, agricultural, and criminal affairs, for instance, are combined in one building, far from the headquarters. Much closer to the capitol are a school and hospital, as well as the residences and offices of high-ranking officials.

Scholars have long since identified the extent to which Shima's plans were put into practice. One source is the diary and maps of Takamizawa Gonnojō, whose 1875 *Kyū Sapporo zu* and *Mitorizu* (Fig. 2.13) show a before-and-after portrayal of Sapporo (including the prominent Tokugawa-era canal, which runs through the center of the map).⁴⁹ These records show that a few official residences were built on a north-south axis parallel to the Toyohira River, with commoners' residences at the southern end of the axis, nearest the traditional river crossing. No headquarters was built during Shima's brief tenure, which ended with his recall to Tokyo in 1870/2.

Shima's successor, Iwamura Toshimichi, switched tacks to focus on the development of the surrounding villages. Agricultural development was a necessary precursor to urban growth, Iwamura argued, reflecting a common mindset that distinguished agricultural production in rural villages from the administrative, military, artisanal, and commercial roles of the cities. That is, city and country were proxies for social and economic distinctions that underpinned the early-modern status system, even as they contained spatial divisions of their own that reinforced status distinctions. The cities relied on agricultural production from their hinterlands. In Shima's Sapporo, the supply of food was a constant concern: a ship carrying rice sank in the winter of

⁴⁹ Enomoto, *Shima Yoshitake*, p. 83–87. See also Endō Akihisa, “Keikaku to jissai,” and Koshino Takeshi's discussion of Takamizawa's maps later in the same volume (“Machinami no keisei,” *Kaitakushi jidai*, pp. 68–91) for more detailed discussion of the individual elements of the maps.



Figure 2.13: *Sapporo chizu*, 1870-1, and inset, depicting Sapporo before Shima's arrival in 1869/10





Figure 2.13: insets, depicting Sapporo after Shima's departure in 1870/2

1870, causing major price inflation, while the surge of construction workers and day laborers overwhelmed the small scale of local farming. As a result, city officials argued that the settlement of rural villages was key to the long-term viability of Hokkaido; Sapporo's development should wait until its hinterland grew.⁵⁰ They turned their attention to the settlement of farmers in the villages around Sapporo. Some 424 farmers from Sakata and Niigata prefectures relocated to the Sapporo area, populating four new villages, one of which appears as the “third village of 1870” (庚午三ノ村) on the 1870 *Sapporo chizu* (Figure 2.3).⁵¹

Figure 2.3: *Sapporo chizu*, 1870-1



⁵⁰ A brief overview of the steps involved in this change in priorities, and the four villages established in 1870, can be found in SSS, vol. 2, pp. 81–91.

⁵¹ The SSS gives the figure of 424 people, noting the discrepancy with the 394 people noted in the *KJH*. See SSS, vol. 2, p. 89.

Yet, this view did not last long. That same month, Kuroda Kiyotaka was appointed Director of the Colonial Agency, and he quickly countered this conservative approach with a bold call for massive investment in the region, and a concomitant increase in attention on Sapporo not only as a defensive headquarters, but also as an model city designed on the most modern principles. The consolidation of Hokkaido under Kuroda's leadership of the Colonial Agency in 1871, along with an expanded budget, led to new attention to Sapporo. A key figure in this reimagining of the settler-colonial project in Sapporo was Horace Capron, hired as advisor to the Colonial Agency by Kuroda in 1871. One of Capron's first moves was to hire American surveyors, tasked with conducting a survey of all of Hokkaido for the purposes of identifying natural resources, especially coal, and improving the region's infrastructure. More broadly, he wanted a snapshot of the region's potential for development before he arrived there to oversee that project in person. He was particularly interested in the value of Sapporo as capital, and his instructions for surveying the region were specific:

At this point especial attention should be given to an examination of the character of the soil, and its adaptation to draining, either naturally or by artificial means. The natural production of the region should also be carefully looked to; the trees, with reference to their abundance, size, and quality of the timber they will furnish etc. and the grasses in connection with their availability for forage purposes. The fall and volume of any particular waterpowers should be determined as accurately as possible. The most available seaport in the neighborhood of Sapporo should be determined and an examination made to the general character of the country intervening between it, and the new capital, especially with reference to facilities for making either rail or common roads.⁵²

Capron's instructions reveal what he believed to be essential to a new city: abundant natural resources, good irrigation and drainage, and the potential for infrastructure connecting the city to its hinterland, and other parts of the country. In this respect, he differed little from the shogunal

⁵² Horace Capron to Thomas Antisell and A. G. Warfield, 27 September 1871, reprinted in Horace Capron *Memoirs of Horace Capron – Volume 1: Autobiography*, 1884, Special Collections, National Agricultural Library, pp. 33–34. Available online at <https://specialcollections.nal.usda.gov/guide-collections/horace-capron-memoirs>.

officials and early Meiji officials before him. The crucial difference lay in his emphasis on waterpower as the key to develop industrial capacity in Sapporo.

In his first annual report to Kuroda, dated 2 January 1872, Capron approvingly noted that “excellent [riverine] navigation, a fine water power, and a good supply of timber are thus to be found in the neighborhood” of Sapporo, “leaving no means of material development and improvement to be desired.” The most immediate goal of the government was to improve access to and communication with the new capital.⁵³ Yet, Capron embedded this discussion of Sapporo in a broader argument about the need to develop Hokkaido along the most modern lines: “The rapid social and political changes now in progress in Japan must necessarily involve a revolution in the whole labor system of the Empire,” Capron explained to Kuroda. “The time must soon come when in the progress of trade, commerce, manufactures, and all the varied arts and industries, a higher civilization will require that in Japan, as in other civilized nations, manual labor shall be supplanted by all known forms of mechanical science and ingenuity. It is eminently proper, therefore, that the work of this Department shall be recognized as having not merely a local but a national significance.”⁵⁴ Specifically, this required the introduction of schools, colleges, model factories and farms, and other sites where the most advanced technology could be tested and applied to Hokkaido’s conditions. Sapporo was the obvious place to put them.

Capron’s claim to national significance helped legitimize to other officials Kuroda’s consolidation of power in the Colonial Agency. Kuroda quickly began construction on a number of model facilities, all in the first half of 1872, cementing the city’s role as the source of a

⁵³ Horace Capron, “Abstract of the First Annual Report of Commissioner Horace Capron, 1871,” reprinted in *Reports and Official Letters*, p. 45.

⁵⁴ Capron, “Abstract of the First Annual Report,” p. 51.

modernized, development-centered vision of settler-colonialism.⁵⁵ Maps of Sapporo drawn after 1872 highlight the new industrial and agricultural sites developed under Capron's guidance, showcasing the city as a model for the modern development of Hokkaido. Alongside the capitol grounds, prominent features include the construction and transport bureaus, along with a variety of agricultural stations: livestock pastures, hops and vegetable gardens, and storehouses. The 1878 *Hokkaido Sapporo no zu* shows in some detail the grounds of a sawmill, silk factory, and other manufacturing facilities, as well as the precise location of buildings in the Agricultural College and other Colonial Agency offices (Figure 2.14). This map also shows the property lines



Figure 2.14: *Hokkaidō Sapporo no zu*, 1878

⁵⁵ See Nihon shiseki kyōkai, ed., *Kaitakushi nisshi*, vol. 1, nos. 5–7; vol. 2, nos. 8–10 (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku shuppankai, 1987).



Figure 2.14 – inset

in the commoner blocks of the city, but does not depict any buildings there. The focus on these institutions continued after the Colonial Agency period, and in many ways these facilities grow even more pronounced on maps from the 1880s and 1890s. They come at the expense of the official residences and religious sites that featured on the earliest maps of the city: the state's emphasis on economic development, rather than the projection of symbolic power, has become clear.

While the proliferation of new, experimental sites is undeniable, official maps of the city downplay the fact that not all these official features were quite so new and modern as Capron or Kuroda claimed. The various agricultural facilities in the city, including the famed Sapporo Agricultural College, traced their roots to the experimental farm established by the shogunate in the 1860s, when Ōtomo Kametarō—builder of the main north-south canal in the city, and a devoted follower of late-Tokugawa agronomists—developed new crops to grow in the region's harsh climate.⁵⁶ Tokugawa-era explorers sought out mineral resources, including gold and coal, while the fishing industry had reached a significant level of industrialization and commercialization by the early nineteenth century.⁵⁷ These structural features of the Hokkaido economy dictated the emergence of urban finance (such as banks) and infrastructure (such as the railway), while road networks—such as the Sapporo–Muroran road promoted by Capron—were built upon the efforts of Tokugawa-era officials, who in turn relied upon preexisting travel routes,

⁵⁶ In particular, the pastures were present in Shima's day. Ōtomo himself worked for the Ministry of Military Affairs on agricultural development in the Ishikari region until 1871, when he was offered a job with the Colonial Agency that he refused on the same day before transferring to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See Ōtomo Kametarō, "Ōtomo Kametarō rirekisho tsuzuri," *Ōtomo Kametarō monjo*, in SSS, vol. 6, p. 559.

⁵⁷ The best discussion of the commercialization of the Hokkaido fisheries is David Howell, *Capitalism from Within: Economy, Society, and the State in a Japanese Fishery* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).

both Ainu and Japanese, including infrastructure built privately by religious institutions.⁵⁸ In other words, while the form of many of these model facilities—bridges, railways, brick buildings, and factories—may have been new and modern, their functions were not: rivers were crossed, goods and people were transported across networks linking towns to hinterland, and commodities were produced and traded in commercialized, and increasingly industrialized, ways, long before Horace Capron arrived in Sapporo.

I do not mean to underplay the importance of 1872 as a turning point in Sapporo's history: Kuroda Kiyotaka's ambitious proposal for Hokkaido did entail a large increase in state investment, and a concomitant surge in construction and growth in Sapporo. This influx of state resources, along with the advice of foreign employees such as Capron, did qualitatively change Sapporo by introducing new facilities, new architectural forms, and new people. These feature prominently on the maps of Sapporo produced after 1872, which helped identify them as landmarks in a city that otherwise lacked prominent structures. It is important to remember, though, that these landmarks were built in a social, political, and economic structure that predated them, both literally and figuratively: Sapporo's grid reflects the values and mindset of an earlier generation, and the houses and huts that messily overlay that grid in 1871 did not disappear when they ceased to be represented on maps of the city. In other words, maps projecting an image of Sapporo as a model for the modern settlement of Hokkaido contain within them traces of the city imagined differently, and traces of the lives of people who occupied that city before, during, and after its transformation from defensive headquarters to settler-colonial model.

⁵⁸ One famous example is Higashi Honganji, which petitioned the shogunate for permission to build a road to Sapporo from southern Ezochi. For an overview in English, see James Ketelaar, "Hokkaido Buddhism and the Early Meiji State," in *New Directions in the Study of Meiji Japan*, ed. by Helen Hardacre with Adam L. Kern (Leiden: Brill, 1997), pp. 531–48.

The Colonial Agency was disbanded in 1882 after its ten-year budget expired, and Hokkaido was divided into three prefectures for four years before being reunified in 1886. From the perspective of cartographic history, these dates do not mark as dramatic a divide as 1870 or 1872: the maps of Sapporo from the Sapporo Prefecture period are very similar to the maps of the Colonial Agency or subsequent Hokkaido-chō eras. If anything, the themes of growth and development come through more strongly as commerce, industry, and infrastructure developed. The rise of an increasingly vibrant private sector is most noticeable, as Sapporo's population grew and the city's economic foundation grew less precarious. By the time of the 1893 *Sapporo jitchi meisai zue* (Figure 2.18), Sapporo had become a vibrant, growing city, with a large private sector alongside state institutions, firmly at the political and economic center of Hokkaido.




Figure 2.18: *Sapporo jitchi meisai zue*, 1893

II: Gaps, Elisions, and Alternative Histories

Three cartographic features are worth focusing on to dig deeper into the historical changes that took place between 1869 and the 1890s: the representation of the natural environment; the representation of Ainu people; and the use of toponyms. Together, these features highlight some of the gaps, omissions, and elisions on these maps of Sapporo, and reveal the ways in which spatial representation reflected political and social changes in the Sapporo area. While these features reinforce the image of Sapporo as a forward-looking colonial capital offering a vision of Japanese settlement and development of Hokkaido, they also hint at alternative, and less rosy, histories of the city: histories in which the natural world and Indigenous societies were subordinated to the demands of an expansionist settler-colonial state.

A) Nature

The natural world was a source of beauty and resources: it provided newcomers to the Sapporo area landmarks and building materials. On the eve of Shima's arrival, Sapporo's natural landscape was a mix of wooded streams, scattered copses, and grasslands. Wooded hillsides appear at the edge of Takamizawa Gonnojō's maps (Figure 2.13), while Shima himself noted the mountains to Sapporo's south and west, and the hot and cold springs among them (Figure 2.1). Construction of the city took place within this natural environment, which provided wood and grass for buildings and thatch, and watercourses for drinking water, irrigation, transportation, and waste disposal. The natural features on these maps, in other words, are those that provided some utility to the city's builders.

This emphasis on the natural surroundings of the city carries over to other maps, including the spare *Sapporo chizu* (Figure 2.3), dated 1871, and the 1873 *Hokkaidō Ishikarishū Sapporo chikei mitorizu* by Funakoshi Chōzen (Figure 2.8). In these two maps, it is the




Figure 2.3: *Sapporo chizu*, 1870-1



Figure 2.8: *Hokkaidō Ishikarishū Sapporo chikei mitorizu*, 1873

mountains that dominate: they are the backdrop for the city grid, adding a horizontal perspective to the top-down plan of Sapporo. This speaks to the importance of the landscape as a source of visual markers for early migrants, as few other landmarks existed to orientate newcomers. The mountains also speak to a more aesthetic appreciation for the natural environment: Shima's poetry, for instance, extols the natural surroundings of Sapporo.⁵⁹ In Funakoshi's map, Sapporo is overwhelmed by the mountains and undergirded by the Toyohira River. The roads connecting Sapporo to surrounding villages, and the rivers and streams that spread across the lower Ishikari plain, further highlight the contrast between the town and its natural environment: it is a place embedded in a natural, as well as social, network that extends far beyond the city's borders.

Over time, maps of Sapporo show an increasingly tamed nature. While the 1873 *Hokkaido Sapporo no zu* (Figure 2.7) still shows grasslands and trees in the areas around Sapporo, the neat squares of fields and vegetable gardens take up more space, while the long grid of the nascent settler-soldier village to the south of the city extends off the map. The wooded area to the northwest of the capitol complex has been named as a garden—indeed, one of the first public parks in Japan. This impression is even clearer on the otherwise virtually identical *Map of Sapporo, Island of Hokkaido* from 1875 (Figure 2.11) and the 1878 *Hokkaido Sapporo no zu* (Figure 2.14), where the non-urban areas are largely blank. By the 1891 *Sapporo shigai no zu* (Figure 2.17), the areas around the city have been classified by type of vegetation. There are still grasslands and marshes, but they are quickly disappearing under the expanding city and suburban farms.

⁵⁹ For a rather hagiographic but nevertheless helpful analysis and interpretation of Shima's poetry relating to Sapporo, see Ōta Tsuyoshi, ed., *Resshi Shima Yoshitake* (Fukuoka: Shima Yoshitake kenshōkai, 1999), pp. 99–106.



Figure 2.7: *Hokkaidō Sapporo no zu*, 1873



Figure 2.7: Inset




Figure 2.11: *A Map of Sapporo, Island of Hokkaido, 1875*




Figure 2.14: *Hokkaidō Sapporo no zu*, 1878



Figure 2.17: *Sapporo shigai no zu*, 1891

Officials and settlers alike welcomed the taming of the landscape, even as they made efforts to preserve the natural beauty of Sapporo's environs. Officials actively promoted the clearing of grasslands, the rerouting of rivers, and opening of fields for cultivation in the suburban villages. They contrasted their settled landscape favorably with the "desolate landscape of eastern Hokkaido," where settlement was slow to start and farms were poor.⁶⁰ Much of the local history of Sapporo (and especially the surrounding villages) focuses on the considerable labor that went into clearing land, extolling the "pioneer spirit" of early settlers.⁶¹ At the same time, officials worried that the voracious hunger for construction lumber would denude the landscape, and they issued edicts to limit the felling of trees alongside rivers and roads.⁶² In this respect, they were conscious of a history of deforestation in the region that dated back to at least the eighteenth century.⁶³ Wary of the rapid disappearance of wooded lands, the Colonial Agency started taxing lumber in 1870, and designated several areas as government forests; they centralized the Sapporo lumber market, and appointed watchmen and surveyors to keep track of the region's woodlands.⁶⁴ Fears of deforestation and a desire to make Sapporo less wild went

⁶⁰ [Kaitakushi] Henshūka, ed., *Kaitakushi kōbun shōroku* (n.p.: n.p., 1882), vol. 1, no. 56, p. 108, NSC 325/KA.

⁶¹ For example, the Sapporo kyōdo shiryōkan, located just to the northeast of Sapporo's central station, is largely devoted to the farm tools used by the first settlers in the region. The term "pioneer spirit" is the usual translation for *kaitaku seishin* ("colonial spirit" would better reflect the circumstances of 1870s Hokkaido), and it is ubiquitous: it even forms a pillar of Hokkaido University's mission today.

⁶² *KJH*, vol. 6, pp. 384, 391.

⁶³ Kikuchi Isao, "Ezogashima no kaihatsu to kankyō," in *Ezogashima to hoppō sekai* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2003), p. 232–259. Conrad Totman, in *The Green Archipelago: Forestry in Preindustrial Japan* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1989), p. 248 n. 14, argues that there was "no sustained effort to log the island" in the Edo period. Kikuchi counters this view by telling the story of Hidaya Kyūbei, who began logging in the region in the early 1700s, followed by other loggers from Nanbu and other parts of northern Japan by the end of the century. Matsumae Domain issued restraints on logging to prevent denuding the mountains of the island, aware that deforestation had been a serious issue in the rest of Japan (as Totman otherwise carefully details).

⁶⁴ *KJH* vol. 1, p. 429.

hand-in-hand. Despite these official efforts to protect natural resources, the city's growth would continue to erode natural space, while expanding communications and transport networks would make its hinterland, and concomitant environmental footprint, larger and larger. The railway linking Sapporo to the coalfields of Iwanai and the port at Otaru, completed at the end of the Colonial Agency period, symbolized this expanding reach, and an ongoing feature of urban development: the economic boon of the coalfields went hand-in-hand with environmental degradation.

B) Ainu

Maps of Sapporo are more elliptical when it comes to the story of Sapporo's Ainu population, but they offer enough of a window to raise important questions about the fate of Ainu communities in Sapporo, and the place of the Ainu vis-à-vis Japanese settlers and the Japanese state. Both Takamizawa and Funakoshi pinpoint the residences of Ainu, who lived on the outskirts of Sapporo or in their own hamlets. They are the only two cartographers who show Ainu homes: Funakoshi also depicted Ainu hamlets in his 1874 *Sapporo-gun kakuson chizu* (Figure 2.10). The hamlets are not in the center of town: Takamizawa's map shows a village on a tributary of the Toyohira, to the northeast of Sapporo. On Funakoshi's 1873 map, a group of three houses are located just to the northwest of the capitol compound, in what is today the grounds of Hokkaido University; another village is located past Kotoni on the road to Zenibako. On Funakoshi's 1875 map, both these groups of Ainu houses are still shown. The houses closest to the capitol appear on an official Colonial Agency Survey Department map, but are not labeled as Ainu villages (*Hokkaido Sapporo no zu*, 1873; Figure 2.7). Subsequent maps of Sapporo, including the 1875 *Hokkaido Sapporo no zu*, which otherwise is an almost identical reproduction of the 1873 *Hokkaido Sapporo no zu*, do not show these homes. One exception is an 1882



Figure 2.10: *Sapporo-gun kakuson chizu*, 1874




Figure 2.10 – inset



Figure 2.10 – inset

pictorial map of the Kairakuen Gardens, which were established to the northwest of the capitol, that includes a tiny image of an Ainu home (Figure 2.19). This home likely belonged to Kotoni Mataichi (b. 1846), who became an indispensable resource for the Colonial Agency, as well as an active member of Sapporo society: he acquired a title to his land when the Colonial Agency instituted property ownership in Hokkaido, and even petitioned the Colonial Agency for an invitation to the imperial palace in Tokyo.⁶⁵



Figure 2.19: *Kairakuen no zu*, 1882

⁶⁵ Kotoni refers to the area in which Mataichi lived, bordering Sapporo (today occupied by Hokkaido University). Tanimoto Akihisa has compiled a number of sources about Kotoni Mataichi, including a Colonial Agency document attesting Mataichi's property ownership (and subsequent enclosure of that property by the Agency): ("Kairakuen chizoku kyūdojin Kotoni Mataichi shoyūchi wo kangyōka shoshushokuchi toshite kakoikomi no ken", Kakugun bun'iroku, kangyōka, 1878, A4/48(15), HPA. A brief biography of Mataichi is in *Sapporo jinmei jiten*.

The erasure of Ainu homes, either by removing labels or by removing the buildings in which they lived, reflects the formal decision to treat Ainu as Japanese subjects—that is, there was no official distinction drawn between Ainu and non-Ainu subjects of the emperor. This assimilationist policy was enormously damaging to Ainu society, but at the time many Colonial Agency officials viewed this approach as a sincere effort to improve the lives of Ainu people who had otherwise been exploited by private merchants. That is, key officials in the Colonial Agency, many of whom had served in Ezochi during the Tokugawa period, believed they had a duty to protect the Ainu from horrific conditions in the fisheries. At the same time, this protection went hand-in-hand with a desire to civilize the Ainu. The institution of a number of policies and laws restricting the traditional activities of the Ainu meant that the state was, whether maliciously or not, complicit in the destruction of traditional Ainu society in the Sapporo region.⁶⁶

Despite this erasure, it is true that only small numbers of Ainu permanently resided in the area of Sapporo by the time of Shima's arrival in 1869—a stark contrast to an area that had once been among the most prosperous and vibrant centers of Ainu society. The so-called thirteen fisheries of Ishikari included both Upper and Lower Sapporo, where salmon fishing and trading supported large seasonal Ainu populations. It is unclear whether the fishery posts would have hosted permanent Ainu settlements, but there was a large Ainu population in and around the Sapporo area. Despite the difficulty of representing fluid settlement patterns in the fixed medium of printed maps, population surveys, travel accounts, and other documents attest to the presence

⁶⁶ See David Howell, *Geographies of Identity in Nineteenth-Century Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), especially chapter 5, “Ainu Identity and the Early Modern State,” and chapter 8, “Ainu Identity and the Meiji State,” for discussions of the transformation of Ainu subjectivity vis-à-vis the central Japanese state across the nineteenth century. For more specific discussion of Ainu in and around Sapporo, see the SSS, vol. 2, p. 534–549; see also chapter 3 in this dissertation.

of a sizeable Ainu population in and around the Sapporo area throughout the first two thirds of the nineteenth century.⁶⁷

Yet, as Matsuura Takeshirō and other travellers noted, the increasing Japanese presence in the Ishikari region from the 1850s led many Ainu to flee; others were pressed into seasonal work at the coastal fisheries.⁶⁸ Despite the disappearance of many of the traces of these communities, the appearance of even just a few homes on Japanese maps into the 1880s is an undeniable reminder that the city was not actually built on empty land, “inhabited only by bears and wild boar” in the words of Ōtomo Kametarō.⁶⁹ Rather, the conditions for Japanese officials and settlers to claim that they were taming wild land in the Sapporo region stemmed in no small part on social and economic changes that had removed preexisting communities from the area.

C) *Toponyms*

In a more abstract way, the maps of Sapporo adopt and adapt the area’s Ainu past. The names of almost every geographic feature are taken from Ainu place names (including, of course, Sapporo itself, which probably means something like “wide, dry river”⁷⁰). The representation of these names, increasingly with kanji rather than the katakana common in the early-modern period, made them part of Sapporo’s Japanese vernacular. The most notable example of this adoption of local names came with the Colonial Agency’s decision in 1872/9 to name the streets

⁶⁷ SSS, vol. 1, p. 867.

⁶⁸ In particular, by the early 19th century Ainu populations in the Ishikari region had declined due to mobilization in the fisheries, the spread of diseases such as cholera, and a declining birthrate. For an overview of these demographic trends, and the efforts to counter them by the bakufu, see SSS, vol. 1, pp. 537–40, and especially pp. 846–79. David Howell has discussed these structural changes towards wage labor in *Capitalism from Within*.

⁶⁹ Ōtomo Kametarō, “Ishikarigun Tō[b]etsu gokaikon no gi ni tsuite ukagai,” *Ōtomo Kametarō monjo*, in SSS, vol. 6, p. 503.

⁷⁰ Honda Mitsugi, *Hokkaido chimei bunrui jiten* (Sapporo: Hokkaido shinbunsha, 1999), p. 87.

of Sapporo after the provinces and districts (*kokugun*) established with the annexation of Hokkaido. Names that historically had been represented in katakana were given *kanji* as part of a wholesale reconstitution of Hokkaido's geography into a classical tradition based on the circuits and provinces of the Heian-era state. The Colonial Agency's choice to use these names in Sapporo reflected their vision of the city as the center of this new imperial geography. This effort, of course, stripped those names of the foreignness that had characterized Ezochi in the early modern period. While elites in the Tokugawa period were well aware of Ezochi's geography, and relied extensively on Ainu names for most places in the region, they nevertheless considered Ezochi a foreign land. The shogunate never applied the geographic language of the main islands to Ezochi, even after taking control of the whole region. The decision to consciously convert Ainu toponyms into a neoclassical geography symbolized the Meiji state's more aggressive claims to the entire territory of the region.

In Sapporo, the naming conventions were also designed to resemble those in Kyoto: addresses were given in the Kyoto style (indicating location relative to an intersection), rather than on a system of block numbers used in Tokyo and most other cities.⁷¹ Ironically, pragmatic considerations quickly outweighed this rather cumbersome system. Ainu place names were difficult to read when rendered into *kanji*, and many Sapporo residents were confused by names applied to roads that did not have any buildings on them yet. Moreover, as Colonial Agency chief secretary Zusho Hirotake wrote to Kuroda Kiyotaka on 1880/7/8, "as the population grows, the number of neighborhoods will grow, and likely outgrow the limited number of district names.

⁷¹ Minjikyoku chirika, "chōka chōmei fukoku no ken," ryōchi busho, 19 September 1872, A4/305(6), Hokkaido Prefectural Archive, Sapporo (hereafter HPA).

Switching to a numbering system would be simpler, and easier for the public to remember.”⁷²

After consulting a Dutch employee, who recommended naming streets after local landmarks, famous artists and authors, or plants and animals, the Colonial Agency ultimately decided to follow the advice of Ōshima Keisuke, an employee sent to the United States to study various administrative and development practices in the mid-1870s. On the matter of streets, Ōshima lauded the grid approach as necessary for Sapporo’s expansion and as a template for any new cities built in Hokkaido; he also urged the use of street numbers (rather than names) for “the convenience of future generations.”⁷³ Reflecting on time spent in Philadelphia, he also proposed a standardized address system, numbering houses by block, which would be “easy even for women, children, and foreigners to understand immediately.”⁷⁴ In 1881, the Colonial Agency replaced street names with numbers, ascending in all directions from a starting point at the intersection of the main east-west boulevard and the original north-south canal; these street numbers define Sapporo to this day. Sadly officials did not adopt the corresponding address system, making it nearly as difficult today to find a specific address in Sapporo as in other Japanese cities.

Streets were not the only urban features whose names became the topic of high-level debate: the name of Sapporo’s major waterway also troubled the Colonial Agency. Shima labeled this waterway the Sapporo River, and the old trading posts along the river (Upper and Lower Sapporo) suggest that the river had traditionally been called the Sapporo. Yet, maps of the

⁷² Quoted in Endō Akihisa, “Shoki Sapporo no toshi keisei wo megutte,” *Sapporo no rekishi* 1 (Dec 1981): p. 10.

⁷³ Quoted in Endō, “Shoki Sapporo no toshi keisei wo megutte,” p. 15.

⁷⁴ Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho minjikyoku chirika, “tofu shigai shinkai hōhō,” *ryōchi busho*, 1877, no. 1, 15 March 1874, A4/305(31), HPA

city variously call the river the Sapporo, the Toyohira, or simply leave it unnamed. In 1877, an official in the Geography Department complained to his superiors that “recently, people have suddenly started calling the river the Toyohira, and even official documents use both names; this might lead some people to think quite naturally that there are two rivers, instead of just one.” His superiors denied his request to mandate the return to using only Sapporo as the river’s name, arguing that “it is natural for local custom to dictate the names of rivers and mountains. As everything here is brand new, the use of a new name is not a problem; and given it has been used regularly, including by the head of the Colonial Agency, the name Toyohira should become the official name.”⁷⁵ On the one hand, we might read this as a case of colonial imposition of Japanese names onto a foreign landscape, as would happen in Japan’s urban development efforts in Pusan, Seoul, and Taipei.⁷⁶ The local people adopting the name Toyohira, of course, were not anyone who had lived in the area prior to the establishment of Sapporo: this is a rare case of a Japanese name replacing an Ainu one, against the wishes of some colonial bureaucrats who hoped to preserve traditional names. On the other hand, this story offers a glimpse into the limits of the Colonial Agency’s ability to reshape the landscape of Sapporo. The state was powerful, but not all-powerful: and its plans were not so ironclad that local custom and preference could not change them. Settler-colonial power was not monolithic.

III: Static Maps, Dynamic Urban Space

⁷⁵ Kaitakushi Sapporo honchō minjikyoku chirika, “Sapporogawa meishō no ken,” ryōchi busho, 1877, no. 1, 3 October 1877, A4/305(89), HPA.

⁷⁶ For an overview of the Japanese development of colonial cities across its Asian empire, see Hashiya Hiroshi, *Teikoku Nihon to shokuminchi toshi* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2004). For a more detailed dive into Japanese names in colonial Seoul, see Todd Henry, *Assimilating Seoul: Japanese Rule and the Politics of Public Space in Colonial Korea, 1910–1945* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), p. 37.

Maps show Sapporo's growth, and the changing nature of the state's purpose in building the city. Yet, it is hard to avoid seeing these maps as a succession of snapshots, illustrating new features but not necessarily the process by which those new features (buildings, neighborhoods, or places) came into being. For the most part, we must look beyond these maps to discover *who* built the city, and how that process unfolded.

Takamizawa and Funakoshi include several groups of people who tend to be left off other maps of the city. Takamizawa notes the residences of prominent townspeople by name, but he also includes the barracks built for carpenters and laborers. These features are also noted in considerable detail on the *Sapporo kukaku zu*, probably drawn in 1871 or 1872 by the Colonial Agency's Office of Development (Figure 2.4). This map, presumably designed for internal use, details the precise position of buildings within Sapporo's grid, including the huts of carpenters (大工), sawyers (コビキ), and manual laborers (土方). These huts are scattered across the open space between the northern and southern halves of the city, speaking to their temporary nature. Officials bemoaned the use of flammable thatch in these huts, and their shoddy construction was a major target for Colonial Agency edicts in the following years.⁷⁷

From the fall of 1869, the Colonial Agency recruited hundreds of artisans and labourers to build their capital, but the rapidly changing priorities and fiscal resources of the Colonial Agency meant that the numbers and tenures of these workers fluctuated. Bookkeeping by Jūmonji Ryōsuke, the Colonial Agency official charged with oversight of day-to-day finances, shows that nearly a thousand workers were employed from Tokyo, northern Tōhoku, and elsewhere to build roads, transport rice, and construct buildings in the spring of 1870. The

⁷⁷ See *SSS*, vol. 2, pp. 160, 178 for efforts to rid the city of straw huts in 1871 and 1873, respectively. These efforts were insufficient: an edict issued in 1879 by the Colonial Agency called on residents to improve housing stock to better cope with the cold, and to prevent fires. See *KJH*, vol. 6, p. 750.




Figure 2.4: *Sapporo kukaku zu*, 1871-2



Figure 2.4 - inset




Figure 2.4 - inset

Colonial Agency spent 50 *ryō* building huts for manual labourers (人足小屋) in 1870/4, while salaries, food and shelter, and transport stipends constituted the vast majority of Colonial Agency expenses in 1870.⁷⁸ The suspension of construction in 1870/4 led the Colonial Agency to send many workers home; a group of artisans from Morioka, for instance, were sent home with a bonus and gifts of sake in 1870/8.⁷⁹ Yet, migrants continued coming to Sapporo, either en route to the villages nearby, or in pursuit of jobs in the city, where construction did not halt completely.

The Ainu also played an important role in the construction of Sapporo. The Higashi Honganji temple relied extensively on Ainu guides and workers to carve a road from Usu to Sapporo, and their illustrated silk-screen print of the festive end of construction depicts many Ainu receiving alcohol and other gifts from Japanese officials.⁸⁰ Clearing roads, building houses, and other menial tasks often fell to Ainu men and women throughout the Colonial Agency periods.⁸¹ Our cartographer Takamizawa himself was charged with recruiting much of the menial and skilled labour in early Sapporo, and he recounts hiring “84 Ainu labourers” to clear roads in the city in the summer of 1870.⁸² Sapporo officials arranged to pay a number of Ainu from Yūfutsu in 1870 for their construction work in the capital.⁸³ The homes of these Ainu are not listed on the maps of the city: perhaps they lived in the laborers’ huts (土方小屋) or longhouses

⁷⁸ Jūmonji Ryōsuke, “Sapporo hikae,” in *SSS*, vol. 6, pp. 582–718. The figures for 1870/4 are on pp. 639–645.

⁷⁹ Jūmonji, “Sapporo hikae,” p. 679.

⁸⁰ Ichiyōsai [Utagawa] Kunitaru, *Higashi Honganji Hokkaido kaitaku nishikie* (Tokyo: Kansendō, 1871), 図類 1062, NSC.

⁸¹ See various entries in Jūmonji Ryōsuke, “Sapporo hikae.”

⁸² Takamizawa Gonnojo, *Takamizawa nikki*, in *Saisen kai shiryō*, p. 27.

⁸³ [Kaitakushi] Henshūka, ed., *Kaitakushi furei roku*, vol. 1 (1869–71) (n.p.: Kaitakushi, 1871), no. 14, 1870, p. 89, 345/K, NSC.

(長屋) scattered around the town. Or perhaps they commuted from villages further afield.

Regardless, the daily presence of Ainu in and around Sapporo seems likely, at least in the city's earliest years, and should not be ignored despite their elision from the Colonial Agency's official maps of the city.

I will discuss Sapporo's society in more detail in the following chapters; here, I want to stress that maps of the city offer windows into various histories of Sapporo, not all of which are immediately obvious. Using other accounts to complicate or corroborate the stories told by maps helps make these other histories come to life, and encourages us to tease apart maps' neat lines and abstract symbols to find the messier social reality of early Sapporo. Most of these maps push a vision of state-led development, a triumphalist narrative of progress and development; yet, by reading them more critically, we can glimpse the messier processes of city building and the settler-colonial process of displacing preexisting Ainu society and culture.

Spatial Themes

I will now turn to several broader themes illustrated by these maps. The first is the question of social disparities, and particularly the distinction between official and commoner spaces. Second, I will explore how maps work as ideals, both for the present (representations) and the future (plans); I also explore the tension between both these ideal functions and reality on the ground. Finally, I will conclude this chapter with some thoughts on the degree to which these maps of Sapporo articulate settler-colonial ideologies or approaches, and what that means for our understanding of early Sapporo.

I: Social Disparities

From the perspective of the Colonial Agency, Sapporo was an urban canvas on which to paint the ideologies of the state, and by which to project state power to the wider region and

world. We have seen how this played out in the changing types of official institutions. It was also true of architecture: the buildings of the capitol and agricultural school, for instance, were grand and imposing in their western inspiration, and they signaled the modernizing values of the Colonial Agency after 1871.⁸⁴ These state ideologies, however, also included the social divides that underpinned the hierarchy of power in Meiji Japan—and in turn drew on much older ideas about the proper role of different social or status groups within systems of power.

Maps of Sapporo underscore a divide between officials and commoners, representing the two parts of town in different ways. Sapporo's officials built this division into the fabric of the city by retaining the wide, open space envisioned by Shima as the city grew. This space, first called Shiribeshi-dōri and then renamed Ōdōri, today hosts Sapporo's annual Oktoberfest, Snow Festival, and other major celebrations, as well as a host of monuments, civic buildings, and the major transfer station of the Sapporo Municipal Subway. Yet, in early Sapporo it was a relatively unused space: the major east-west thoroughfare of the city lay one block south, which provided the main road to the villages west of Sapporo. Moreover, in Shima's original plans the space was further divided by earthen walls (*dorui*), and a jail was built in the middle. The main town noticeboard (*kōsatsuba*) was erected further south, in the heart of the commoner part of town (see Figure 2.4). As these features suggest, the large divide between the two halves of the city was just that—a divide, not a crossroads.

In general, mapmakers lavished the most attention and detail on the official part of town—perhaps not surprising given the authors of Colonial Agency maps. Yet, the Colonial

⁸⁴ For a discussion of early-Meiji architecture in Sapporo, see Koshino Takeshi and Kado Yukihiro, "Early Western Style Architecture and its Diffusion in Hokkaido," *Bulletin of the Faculty of Engineering, Hokkaido University* 145 (Dec 1988): pp. 125–137. Consider also Vivian Blaxell's claim that the mix of western and Japanese architecture in Sapporo was part of "the construction of a unified modern Japanese identity drawing on reworked forms from Japan's past and selected Western forms." "Designs of Power," p. 11.

Agency also produced the most detailed maps of the commoner parts of town—those that recorded property lines and ownership, for instance—reminding us that the purpose of mapmaking shapes the form of maps. Focusing on the publicly orientated maps produced by the Colonial Agency, however, it is clear that the agency wished to portray the city as a majestic capital (or strong headquarters, in Shima's case), rather than as a vibrant commercial and residential center. Even after the end of the Colonial Agency, this view remained prevalent: on both the *Ishikarinokuni Sapporo no zu* (Figure 2.15) and both the 1889 and 1891 *Sapporo shigai no zu* (Figures 2.16 and 2.17), the commoner blocks of town are depicted as blank squares, while the institutions and agencies of official Sapporo are carefully labeled—all this despite the fact that most Sapporo residents lived in the commoner part of town.

One corrective to this state-centred perspective appears in Funakoshi Chōzen's 1875 map of Sapporo, which more evenly depicts the development in Sapporo, but an even more dramatic perspective appears in the 1893 *Sapporo-ku jitchi meisai zue* (Figure 2.18). Small pencil sketches of notable buildings, both official buildings like the capitol, as well as prominent private businesses, ring the entire map, adding a visual perspective to the map. This, along with the list of businesses on the obverse of the map and the map's commercial publisher, suggests the map was aimed at travelers or new city residents. Official buildings, while interesting and important, were not more so than the various shops and businesses scattered throughout the southern half of the city. The map itself, unlike its predecessors, labels not only official institutions but also prominent businesses. They are identified with their trademarks, which would also have identified them on street signs. For the average resident or visitor, the center of their daily activities was more likely to be the commercial district of Sapporo, not the sprawling complex of official institutions in the northern half of the city.



Figure 2.15: *Ishikarinokuni Sapporo shigai no zu*, 1882–6



Figure 2.16: *Sapporo shigai no zu*, 1889




Figure 2.16 – inset





Figure 2.18 - insets



Figure 2.18 – insets

By the 1890s, the city had swelled in size and diversified in function: it was no longer only a redoubt of state institutions and ancillary services. Yet, its role as capital of Hokkaido was, if anything, more prominent than during the Colonial Agency period as the island's population grew, its economic value increased, and infrastructure tied the region closer and closer together. The *Jitchi meisai zue* boasts that Sapporo contained 6,673 households with 20,305 residents, a huge increase over the ten thousand residents at the end of the Colonial Agency era in 1882. Next to this data, a chart of railway fares shows that passengers could take the train to the port of Otaru on the Sea of Japan coast, thirty kilometers distant, or to the deep water port of Muroran on the Pacific coast, a 170-kilometer ride; trains also reached the coalfields at Yūbari, Sorachibuto, and Utashinai—each roughly 100 kilometers away. The inclusion of this handy reference on the guide map to Sapporo hints at the city's strengthening ties to, and central position in, a growing hinterland knitted together by a burgeoning rail system. This map seems designed for people from around Hokkaido travelling to Sapporo, or people in the city travelling further afield. While the official institutions of Sapporo continued to identify the city as the centre of state power, the city had also become embedded in new and more complex networks of commerce, travel, and settler expansion.

II: Ideal (Plans) vs. Real (Representations)

Maps project a vision of the future, as well as an idealized vision of the past and present. We have seen this in the ways maps elide certain people and features (nature, the Ainu, labor), and the ways in which technical representation can highlight certain institutions or sites. These choices reveal some of the ideological work that went into creating these maps of Sapporo: the efforts by officials to project state power; the efforts of commercial and private mapmakers to define Sapporo for people who lived there; and the more abstract ways in which maps, by

simplifying and coding spatial features into a limited set of representations, persuade cartographers and map readers that space is legible and controllable. Mapping techniques naturalize the depiction of space in ways that are equally hegemonic, if politically less value-laden, than the geographic content maps represent.⁸⁵ In the case of mapmaking in early Sapporo, this process of naturalization works to make the city an almost organic feature of the landscape, as well as a rational entity. Sapporo embodies both natural as well as human order: urban space grows, but in a way that follow conventions and plans.

Yet, if we dig into some of these maps, we see not only that there are other histories to tell about Sapporo, but also that the rational order of city building was not always quite so rational; there are traces of messiness that belie the ideal form of the city projected by neat lines, tidy pictures, and crisp, rectangular frames. For example, the lack of detail in the commoner parts of the city serves as a good reminder that Shima's maps were drawn as plans for the future, not accurate representations of the present. In Figure 2.2, the Sapporo River is lined by houses, hinting at the value of the river as a transport artery for goods, much like the canals of Edo or Osaka. Yet, a canal had already been dug through the area, which was much easier to use than the volatile Toyohira; this canal appears on almost all subsequent maps of Sapporo. On one level, we might interpret its omission by Shima as a sign that he drew his plans before reaching the Sapporo area. More importantly, though, Shima's plans sketch out his ideal city: the relative location of different functions and districts matter more than their geographic accuracy. This interpretation is further buttressed by the lack of a consistent scale in Shima's maps: the hierarchy of space and function is more important than the precise position of different buildings.

⁸⁵ See Berry, *Japan in Print*, pp. 60–69, for a clear discussion of the role of semiotic systems in mapmaking that avoids reducing maps entirely to a set of codes and signs.

Similarly, the saga of street names seems like an esoteric question, but it gets at one of the key lessons that a close analysis of these maps teaches us: the importance of looking beyond the neat lines of the street grid and the property boundaries to understand the interplay between official ideal and lived reality in early Sapporo. Looking again at the *Sapporo kukaku zu* (Figure 2.4), the almost haphazard placement of buildings becomes clear. Not only the huts of labourers: the homes of contractors also seem to have been built with relative disregard for the grid system. Within the street blocks, houses are scattered unevenly: some blocks are tightly packed, while others have few homes. Later maps of the city also show this uneven density of settlement. Funakoshi's 1875 map of the city illustrates the difference in density between the commoner and official districts (Figure 2.12), while *Hokkaido Sapporo no zu* (1878, Figure 2.14) shows a number of empty blocks: areas where property had not yet been sold or titled. Finally, the two final maps—produced in 1889 and 1891—shade the areas of the city that were “urban”, revealing again the distinction between official and commoner parts of the city (despite the blurring of that distinction by this time), and the existence of unsettled areas within the city grid well into this period (Figures 2.17 and 2.18). Photographs of Sapporo from the mid-1870s clearly show the considerable amount of unbuilt land along the town's major thoroughfares.

These several maps illustrating the uninhabited or unbuilt parts of the city stand in contrast to most maps produced by the Colonial Agency, which present the city as a solid grid, firmly established and occupying a contiguous, well defined territory. At one extreme, Stuart Eldrich's proposal for the location of hospitals defines Sapporo entirely by a border, implying a stark divide between town and country (Figure 2.5). While this map is clearly a schematic representation for the purposes of planning, much like Shima's maps, other Colonial Agency maps present a similarly robust view of the city. The most striking example is the 1875 *A Map of*




Figure 2.12: *Meiji 8-nen no Sapporo*, 1875




Figure 2.5: *Proposed Location of Hospitals, 1872*

Sapporo, Island of Hokkaido (Figure 2.11), a lithograph map produced by the Colonial Agency's Survey Department. The city blocks jump out of the monochrome map, clearly dominating the region and overshadowing the villages to the southeast and west. In particular, the depiction of the capitol complex (labeled '1') as a single mass stands in striking contrast to the village homes and fields, even though the capitol grounds were largely given over to agricultural production in the mid-1870s. This map projects the power of the city by choosing to represent urban places more dramatically than rural ones, even though the built and natural environment were much less diametrically opposed.

Non-official maps of the city similarly present a robust view of Sapporo: maps such as the *Sapporo kukaku zu* (Figure 2.4) and *Meiji 7-nen Sapporo shigai zu* (Figure 2.9) list all of Sapporo's commoner residents, but do not differentiate between permanent and temporary residents, and do not include the many people who were not household heads: most of Sapporo's female residents, for instance, as well as children, servants, and lodgers (see chapter 3). These maps did not need to show this diversity: they were designed to help officials keep track of households (the primary unit of commoner society), not fully account for the complexity of Sapporo's young society. Nevertheless, they do help reinforce this model of society by normalizing these features as the bedrock of urban spatial relations in the commoner districts of town.

III: Settler-colonial mentality

The Colonial Agency, in its official account of its accomplishments, started with Shima's arrival in Sapporo with the sacred mirrors of the three deities of colonization. These deities would protect new settlers to Hokkaido, and the construction of Colonization Shrine on the grounds of the larger Sapporo (later Hokkaido) Shrine complex speaks to the importance of these



Figure 2.9: Meiji 7-nen Sapporo shigai no zu, 1874

南入 井手正文 関口藤四郎 鶴岡伊三助 徳田兵作 松本第吉 小林久作	清水盛太郎 田中宗太郎 上田幸三郎 石井三郎 山本三郎 山村久太郎 清藤源次郎	奥泉清吉 王造三太郎 山中善吉 小野吉兵衛 前田慶吉 黒田六助 福原亀吉
橋山南入 大友甚作 常陸重次郎 岩城守太郎 藤田喜助 西山常吉 境谷常吉 山田安太郎 小笠原豊吉 吉田義忠	大藤孝光 深尾金吾門 山本安太郎 松原多吉 富田重太郎 石川孝二	金居喜吉門 野村梅吉 千葉仲藏 竹内久兵衛 浮田金次郎 多田市太郎 岩間信吉 藤島孝太郎
津軽南入 大岡	大岡助吉門	藤井安兵衛 佐々木幸吉 吉田辰五郎 茅森吉太郎 小田徳松 佐木傳十郎 田中勘助

Figure 2.9 – inset

deities in the colonial mindset of the agency. The colonialism expressed in these religious terms explicitly linked Shima's vision to an ancient (and mythical) understanding of Japan's territory and land, drawing on the tales of the *Kojiki* and *Nihon shoki*. The appeal to ancient rites in the decision to frame the settlement of Hokkaido with the enshrinement of old Shintō deities in Sapporo reflects, then, not only the common Meiji practice of drawing on a "largely invented Japanese past"⁸⁶ to legitimize and justify a new and fragile government, but also a commonsense continuation of a long history of agricultural settlement and territorial encroachment that contained a significant religious component. Just as fishermen around the Hokkaido coast built shrines to Inari throughout the late Tokugawa period, and as Buddhist sects established branch temples in Ezochi with shogunal permission to cope with increasing numbers of Japanese residents (and funerals), so too did agricultural settlement of a more permanent nature come with spiritual trappings.⁸⁷

Yet, the oddly distant location of Hokkaido Shrine from the center of Sapporo raises questions about how ideological the religious articulation of a colonial mentality actually was. Based on a series of exasperated entries in the diary of Jūmonji Ryōsuke in Sapporo in 1870, there was a fair amount of division within the ranks of the Colonial Agency: Jūmonji seems to have felt that other construction projects deserved priority, given the straitened finances and difficult circumstances facing officials and settlers in Sapporo, but shrine officials insisted on proceeding with shrine construction. The pragmatic negotiations between the two help explain the timing of Hokkaido Shrine, as much as any ideological or symbolic considerations on the

⁸⁶ Blaxell, "Designs of Power," p. 5.

⁸⁷ Tanimoto Akihisa, "Shūkyō kara miru kinsei Ezochi zaichi shakai," *Rekishi hyōron* 629 (July 2002): pp. 48–59.

part of the Meiji state. In other words, there was no unified approach to spreading the ideology of colonization, at least in religious terms.⁸⁸

Under Kuroda, the Colonial Agency backed away from discussing its project in religious language: instead, colonization was discussed as economic development, for the purpose of producing wealth in what had been an otherwise inhospitable land (if not sea). The maps of Sapporo post-1873 convey this developmentalism: the establishment of model factories, experimental orchards, and schools all speak to the state's interest in introducing and managing new forms of economic production in Hokkaido via their Sapporo base. The secular symbolism of the capitol and other official facilities, conveyed by their location as well as architecture, celebrate the bureaucratic state's ability to orchestrate this project. Ironically, Sapporo's bureaucratic apparatus was largely staffed by former shogunal officials with longstanding experience in Ezochi, at least initially. Nevertheless, the shift towards a more 'modern' presentation, cloaked in the language of classical Japan, reflects trends throughout Japan in the early Meiji period. In this respect, the 'colonialism' of Sapporo's spatial vernacular bears similarities to the domestic transformations enacted in response to the threat of more aggressive imperialism of other nations, such as the industrial mills of northeastern Japan, the modern bricktowns of Ginza, and the treaty-port architecture in Yokohama, Kobe, and elsewhere.

In a more abstract sense, maps of Sapporo reveal a shift towards a more literal colonization of territory: the state no longer controlled a series of nodes, but rather a single, contiguous landmass. Instead of shipping routes extending commercial and military power to

⁸⁸ Endō Jun discusses the shrine's value as both an element of the city, and as a symbol of the state in Hokkaido (by virtue of its position as the only state-run shrine in the region after 1871. He argues that the shrine's distant location from central Sapporo speaks to the scale of Shima's vision for the city, rather than a desire to separate the shrine from the city; yet, the distance does emphasize that municipal and state-level decision-making did not overlap completely. Endō Jun, "Meiji shoki no Hokkaidō kaitaku to Sapporo Jinja no sōken/tenkai," in *Hokkaidō Jingū kenkyū ronsō*, pp. 103–30.

certain points along the Hokkaido coast, new roads and rails allowed settlers to colonize the interior of the island. The contrast between Shima's first map—a series of points connected by the dashed lines of roads—and later maps of Sapporo, which show fields stretching across the countryside—highlight this shift toward a more comprehensive control of territory. The prioritization of trigonometric surveying after 1871 enabled the accurate parceling out and sale of land to settlers, and gave the Colonial Agency detailed knowledge of the vast territory of Hokkaido. The process of mapmaking, then, connected directly to new ways for the state to understand and control space.

In sum, the settler-colonial elements of early Sapporo, at least as seen in spatial representations of the city, were complex and multifaceted: certain sites, such as Sapporo Shrine and the capitol, were architectural, symbolic, and physical manifestations of Japanese power and authority in a place where it had not previously existed in such hegemonic form. Institutions in Sapporo enabled and promoted settlement of a wide hinterland: roads and rails to facilitate the movement of people and goods, schools to pass on new agricultural techniques suited for the cold Hokkaido climate, and the commercial and administrative institutions necessary for economic and political life in a land distant from home. And the symbolism of street names and other features helped make this distant place more familiar, at the cost of appropriating preexisting indigenous geographies. These features, common to settler-colonial places around the world in the mid-nineteenth century, are a good reminder that Sapporo—and Hokkaido more generally—was perceived and built as a settler-colonial space.

At the same time, the different streams feeding this settler-colonial capital remind us also that settler-colonialism in Hokkaido was not identical to settler-colonialism elsewhere. The deep connections to earlier forms of expansion in northern Japan, as well as the influence of early-

modern models of political economy on the structure and form of the city, are a good reminder that settler-colonialism was not always about grand strategy and geopolitical maneuvering. Rather, it functioned as much as a hybrid of old practices and new ideas as a coherent, modern ideology of expansion and aggression spurred by a belligerently competitive and industrially armed world order. The settler-colonial state in Hokkaido was not a monolith, either in ideology or practice: digging beneath the surface of the maps of that state's capital starts to reveal the complex histories, changing values, and messy experiences that undergirded the expansion of Japanese state and society into Hokkaido.

Conclusion

Reading maps of Sapporo from the perspective of critical cartographic analysis draws attention to the different arguments they made about the Colonial Agency capital, underscoring their function as dynamic texts that pushed certain narratives while also containing traces of less obvious or even concealed stories of the transformation of space in colonial Sapporo. These maps were powerful in large part because cartography was a commonly understood mode of representing space in nineteenth century Japan, onto which new techniques of surveying could be grafted to reinforce the colonial state's claim to the space of Sapporo and Hokkaido. The increasing focus on the 'rational' street grid at the expense of natural features, for example, reflects the Colonial Agency's vision of taming the natural environment of Sapporo to turn it into an urban center, while the appropriation of Ainu names and gradual disappearance of Ainu features from the maps of the city hint at the dispossession of Indigenous society in the region. More generally, the focus on official buildings and the infrastructure of the colonial state that connected Sapporo to its hinterland speaks to the state's attempts to lay claim to the region, both by imagining the future, and by emphasizing the accomplishments of the present.

Yet, even official maps were unable to fully erase the messier situation on the ground: the construction workers' huts scattered along the streets, the Ainu homes that clung on in Sapporo's early years, or the patches of scrub and forest that took years to clear. The persistence of these features speaks to the use of maps as dynamic tools for people, whether officials or not, to navigate their built environment. Here it is often essential to read maps alongside other sources: by doing so, we learn, for instance, why Sapporo Shrine ended up so far from the center of town, and that many of the laborers in the huts scattered throughout the city may well have been Ainu, hired for short-term work from villages far from Sapporo. The richness of the narratives and themes that emerge from these maps illustrates the many actors at work in the production and representation of urban space in Sapporo. Today it is easy to recognize the city almost immediately from a snapshot of its distinctive street grid, but by excavating the trajectory of mapping that led to this iconic image, we discover that this process was not nearly as tidy as its product.

Chapter 3

Flows of People: Temporary Residents and State-led Settlement, 1869–1887

In 1878, the headmen of Sapporo submitted a description of their town's history to the Hokkaido Colonial Agency headquarters: "Sapporo used to be an endless wilderness, filled with great trees and inhabited only by bears and wolves. There were a few Ainu houses, but after the Restoration [of 1868] the Ainu scattered, leaving the place without human settlement...."¹ Over the course of the decade prior to this report, the Colonial Agency had selected this site to be its capital, and rapid construction had eliminated most of the tree cover. Factories, farms, office buildings and over a thousand homes employed and housed more than 3,000 people.

In 1879, the population had more than doubled, to 7,500 people. Yet, virtually all of this growth was due to a sudden influx of temporary residents: people who lived in Sapporo, but maintained their formal household registration elsewhere. In fact, temporary residents accounted for 60% of Sapporo's population that year, and they continued to form the majority of the population for the next two decades. Who were these people? And how did they end up in Sapporo? Their story—both collectively and as individuals—illustrates the extent and the limitations of the Japanese state-led project to settle Hokkaido.

With renewed vigor after the overthrow of the Tokugawa shogunate and establishment of the imperial Meiji regime in 1868, Japanese state officials were keen to encourage migration to Japan's new colony. Yet, old habits of population control died hard: officials carefully tried to control the process of migration, and especially worried about rootless people, who were difficult to track and posed challenges to the provision of both security and welfare. The presence of high

¹ Kaitakushi, "Imin rireki shirabe", 1878, 別 325-Im, Hokkaido University Northern Studies Collection (hereafter NSC). Also available at <http://www2.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/cgi-bin/hoppodb/record.cgi?id=0A016250000000000>.

numbers of temporary residents, as well as residents who spent long periods of time away from Sapporo, made the city a transient place. In the views of local administrators, this had negative effects on the built environment, local administration, the economy, and public morals. From the perspective of temporary residents, however, the ability to move in pursuit of work or better living conditions was necessary to make their migration to Hokkaido a success—or to mitigate the fallout if they decided migration was going to be a failure.

In this chapter, I outline the changes in Sapporo's demography, and situate it within the broader demography of migration to colonial Hokkaido in the 1870s. I will then zoom in on two groups of migrants to the city to illustrate official migration policies, and the ways in which those policies were challenged by the specific experiences of migrants in the early 1870s. I conclude by returning to the large jump in temporary migrants in 1879.

The combination of microhistorical vignette and larger-scale demographic analysis illustrates the complexity of migration to Hokkaido. Scholars have long focused on the state-centered features of Hokkaido's development, and indeed the state played a crucial role in facilitating migration to the region.² Yet, an ideological preference for agricultural migrants, and sheer logistical and fiscal hurdles, limited the state's interest and ability to foster urban migration to Sapporo. In turn, urban dwellers themselves were also less interested in permanent migration: rather, they were determined to find stable employment and, if possible, profit. Their own agency, both individually and collectively, played an important role in shaping state policies, and contributed independently to Sapporo's development. They also helped give Sapporo the

² Enomoto Morie, for example, argues that the “state-produced colonization” (*kansei kaitaku*) of Hokkaido is one reason for the shallowness of historical awareness there: that is, because so much attention is focused on the modern state and its particular form of colonization, little attention is paid to older, deeper, and more complicated histories. See Enomoto Morie, “‘*Shokumin kōhō*’ to Hokkaido kaitaku,” *Chiiki to keizai* 6 (Mar 2009): p. 45.

character of settler-colonial cities elsewhere: very rapid growth, coupled with a boom-and-bust economic cycle, and the presence of labor crews needed for short-term work.³ Women in particular played an important role in Sapporo's early economy, most visibly through sex work (although also as the rooted counterpart to sojourning males). While brothels are not unique to settler-colonial towns, they were seen as indispensable (if distasteful to some officials), a feature that echoed Tokugawa-era projects and presaged features of Japan's twentieth-century colonies.⁴

The state's emphasis on fostering permanent settlement, the importance of household registration and the structure of municipal administration, and urban boosters' desire to foster civic identity, have long privileged the people who stay in one place for a long time. While these people are important, it is also important to recognize that cities are also home to many, many people who do not stick around for very long. Many of Sapporo's most famous early residents fall into this category, such as the foreign advisors, leading officials, and prominent students of the Agricultural College. Thousands more temporary residents, part-time labourers, and other transient people also passed through Sapporo. We can catch glimpses of these people by reading through the state archive. Their interactions with officials offer some insights into the construction of urban space: the messy process by which individuals and state institutions

³ James Belich, *Replenishing the Earth* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 2–3, and pp. 322–3 for a discussion of 'crews' as an important sector of booming settler towns.

⁴ For an excellent study of the trade in women from rural areas to towns and cities during the early modern period, see Amy Stanley, *Selling Women: Prostitution, Markets, and the Household in Early Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012). For studies of overseas migration and sex work, see Bill Mihalopolous, "Statehood, Gender, and Japanese Migration to Singapore, 1890–1920," in *Transnational Japan as History: Empire, Migration, and Social Movements*, ed. Pedro Iacobelli, Danton Leary, and Shinnosuke Takahashi (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 144–66; and a fuller treatment of Japanese peasant women who travelled overseas to engage in sex work between the 1870s and 1930s in *Sex in Japan's Globalization, 1870–1930: Prostitutes, Emigration and Nation Building* (London: Pickering and Chatto, 2011).

together created the built environment of colonial Sapporo, and the social and political worlds that inhabited it.

Demographic Overview

Prior to the founding of Sapporo in 1869, the bulk of the ethnic Japanese population of Hokkaido lived in the southern part of the island, in or around the territory of Matsumae Domain, also known as the Wajinchi. There were probably roughly 40,000 ethnic Japanese in the region in the early 1850s.⁵ Permanent residence in Ezochi was officially forbidden to ethnic Japanese. Yet, over the course of the preceding century, Japanese had steadily encroached: merchants ran the fishing posts around the coast of the island, and a growing number of Japanese stayed in the fishing grounds throughout the year. The Matsumae government was unable and unwilling to prevent this encroachment, not least because the fishing industry provided the bulk of its revenue. By the mid-nineteenth century, a consensus had emerged among officials in the shogunate that the settlement of Ezochi was necessary to fend off a threatening Russia, and more fully exploit the economic product of the region. They called for an end to restrictions on Japanese settlement, and ultimately encouraged a policy of formal colonization of the entire region by farmers, thus laying claim not only to the fishing grounds, but also, and more importantly, to Hokkaido's terra firma.

Yet, Tokugawa officials found it difficult to persuade people to stay in place: Jūmonji Ryōsuke, sent to Ishikari in the early 1850s to build a model agricultural settlement, noted that “farmers in Hokkaido do not invest in rice farming, preferring to gather firewood and grow cash crops,” relying on seasonal transient labour. As a result, they did not invest in their land, and showed little interest in permanent settlement. Even the wealthy merchants supervising the

⁵ Ōkurashō, *Kaitakushi jigyō hōkoku* (Sapporo: Hokkaidō shuppan kikaku sentā, 1981–85 [1885]), vol. 1, p. 543. Hereafter *KJH*.

coastal fisheries did not invest their income in land or property, making these commercial towns impermanent and tenuous.⁶ Jūmonji argued that the government needed to place greater emphasis on permanent settlement if it was to secure its hold over Ezochi in the face of foreign threats.

Jūmonji also touched on a separate political issue: the domestic problem of rootless people. This theme recurred across the nineteenth century as the soaring number of rural and urban protests began to alarm officials about the decay of the social order. While migration was by no means forbidden in nineteenth-century Japan—in fact, the shogunate and domains alike sought to encourage migration into depopulated areas of northern Japan throughout the Tokugawa period—the uncontrolled movement of people was more alarming.⁷ Demographic crises caused by famine, ensuing political unrest, and the destabilizing impact of commercial expansion on traditional agricultural villages all combined to produce anxiety among Tokugawa elites about rootless vagabonds.⁸ Jūmonji argued that settling Ezochi would be one way to remove these landless people from mainland Japan, and keep them out of trouble. In these ways, Ezochi/Hokkaido was a region closely associated with transient populations—but also a region that could potentially solve the problem of transience.

The political turmoil of the 1850s and 60s—caused by a confluence of latent domestic crises and the sudden, and forced, expansion of foreign relations—meant that permanent

⁶ Jūmonji Ryōsuke, “Ezochi kaitaku iken sho,” 1856, in Sapporo-shi kyōiku iinkai, ed., *Shin Sapporo shishi*, vol. 6 (Sapporo: Hokkaido shinbunsha, 1987), p. 576. Hereafter SSS.

⁷ See Fabian Drixler, “The Politics of Migration,” *JJS* 42, no. 1 (2016): pp. 1–28. Aizawa Seishisai also commented on the problem of casual travellers blocking the roads, and otherwise being distracted from their proper roles settled on the land. In Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, *Anti-Foreignism and Western Learning in Early-Modern Japan*, p. 228.

⁸ See Anne Walthall, “Peace Dividend: Agrarian Developments in Tokugawa Japan,” *Japan Emerging*, ed. Karl Friday (Boulder: Westview Press, 2012), p. 398–400.

settlement in the region was slow until after 1869, although the population of Hokkaido did increase by about 40% during the bakumatsu period. Thereafter, however, Japanese settlement rapidly spread across Hokkaido: the Japanese population increased nearly threefold from approximately 58,000 people in 1869 to 171,000 people in 1873. Thereafter the pace of growth slowed, but by the end of the Colonial Agency in 1882 there were a quarter million ethnic Japanese in the region, of whom one quarter were “temporary residents.” The Ainu population, at least to the extent the Colonial Agency was able to record it, seems to have remained relatively stable at around 17,000 people, although the fluidity of the Ainu population, the increasing assimilation of Ainu into Japanese society, and the lack of attention to the Ainu by the Colonial Agency makes this figure a rough estimate at best.⁹ Nevertheless, it is clear that the rapid and overwhelming domination of Hokkaido by ethnic Japanese, especially in the areas outside the Wajinchi, displaced many Ainu populations, underscoring the settler-colonial nature of post-1869 Hokkaido.

At the center of this project of settlement lay the new capital, Sapporo. It became a model and experimental ground for the colonial project, especially after 1871: schools, agricultural stations, livestock facilities, factories, sawmills, and a railway served as a microcosm of the new Western techniques and technologies that the government hoped to deploy in its colonization effort. Sapporo was also home to the large bureaucratic apparatus of the Colonial Agency, including a number of advisors hired from the US and Europe to help Japan model its colony on Western practices. All told, the rapidly growing city required not only merchants and wholesalers, but also construction workers, day laborers, household servants, translators, clerks,

⁹ In 1873, between 12,000 and 13,000 Ainu resided in the Sapporo Subdivision (*honchō*), with 3,500 in Nemuro Subdivision (*shichō*), 2,000 in Karafuto, and around 700 in Hakodate Subdivision. Data from *KJH*, vol. 1, pp. 578, 603, 629, 631.

prostitutes, and restaurateurs. None of these people were stereotypical “pioneer farmers” taming virgin land in Hokkaido; and, unlike those farmers, many of them saw Sapporo as only one among many possible places to set up their business. They were quite happy to relocate in pursuit of better opportunities. Interestingly, many pioneer farmers themselves decided the possibilities of the city were preferable to the misery of a Hokkaido winter with inadequate clothing, shelter, and supplies. The result was a significant amount of population flow into and out of Sapporo.

Despite Sapporo’s formal role as capital of Hokkaido, it would not become the region’s largest city until well into the twentieth century. Two other cities remained preeminent: Hakodate, a treaty port and the major commercial center of the former Matsumae Domain, and Otaru, the closest port to Sapporo and an important banking center and fishery. As these two cities’ maritime location suggest, fishing and trade remained by far the most important part of the Hokkaido economy for many years after the formal start to agricultural settlement in the region. Nevertheless, the role of Sapporo as colonial headquarters, the city’s sheer newness, and the determined efforts by elites to use the city as a laboratory from which to send out new technologies, goods, and ideas throughout colonial Hokkaido, make it a worthwhile place to explore the limits and possibility of settler-colonial urban development in nineteenth-century Hokkaido.

Sapporo served as the Colonial Agency’s headquarters until 1882. Between 1882 and 1886, Hokkaido was divided into three smaller prefectures: Sapporo, Nemuro, and Hakodate, based on the subdivisions of the Colonial Agency period. The inefficiencies of multiple jurisdictions led to the reunification of the island in 1886, with Sapporo regaining its position as capital. Between 1870 and 1886, Sapporo’s population grew by an average of 25% a year,

although this figure masks the very uneven nature of population growth: some years saw huge booms, while others saw the population contract. Growth slowed slightly after 1889, with an 8% average from that year until the end of the century. Overall, though Sapporo exploded in size, as the following data illustrate:¹⁰

Figure 3.1: Population growth rate		
Year	Population	Growth factor
1871	637	
1881	8842	13.9x
1891	25634	2.9x
1901	48720	1.9x

The years 1869 to 1881, with the most spectacular growth rate, reflect the frenetic pace of the Colonial Agency's initial efforts in Sapporo. By the turn of the century, Hokkaido had roughly one million people. On the one hand, this is a good reminder that Sapporo was not the major population center of the island; on the other, it is also worth noting that Sapporo's growth rate outstripped overall settlement rates, and its share of Hokkaido's population went from 1.1% to 5% over this period. (This process of concentration has continued more-or-less unabated: Sapporo today accounts for 35% of Hokkaido's population, albeit with a much larger set of municipal boundaries.)¹¹

Sapporo's total growth rate disguises the difference between the increase of permanent residents (an average of 18% per annum between 1869 and 1881, excluding the first year) and temporary residents (33% per annum between 1874, when records began, and 1881, excluding a huge slump in 1873, and a huge jump in 1879).¹² This feature of Sapporo's population

¹⁰ Figures from *SSS*, vol. 8, p. 100.

¹¹ In addition to the above sources, data also comes from various Home Ministry surveys prior to the start of a national census in 1920. Naimushō, ed., *Nihon jinkō tōkei shūsei*, comp. Hayami Akira (Tokyo: Tōyō shorin, 1992). Volumes 1 through 6 cover 1872 to 1900.

¹² Figures from *KJH*, vol. 2, p. 18, and *SSS*, vol. 8, p. 100.

complicates the story of the city's growth, and also forces us to look more closely at who migrated to Sapporo in its boom years.

Figure 3.2: Population growth by type

Year	Total Population	Permanent Residents	Temporary Residents	Temporary Residents, %
1870	13	13		
1871	637	637		
1872	1256	1256		
1873	1949	1949	~4000?	
1874	2165	2027	138	6%
1875	2570	2126	444	17%
1876	2758	2238	520	19%
1877	2909	2398	511	18%
1878	3361	2678	683	20%
1879	7395	2910	4485	61%
1880	8222	3383	4839	59%
1881	8842	3823	5019	57%

1872 and 1873 were especially convulsive years for Sapporo. Road laying, land clearing, and various construction projects led to laborers and artisans “pouring in day by day, making the town boom.”¹³ The very next year, an economic slump hit hard, decimating the city's population. A compilation of population surveys conducted that year by the ward headmen in Sapporo and the surrounding villages illustrates both the difficulty of recreating the population of Sapporo's early years, as well as the fluidity of that population and the complicated place of temporary residents in Sapporo. The surveys were conducted as part of the Meiji state's first formal population survey, which adapted the Tokugawa-era temple-based population registration system for a modern bureaucracy. The logistical challenges posed by Hokkaido's size, and the lack of neighborhood-level organization, meant that the Colonial Agency delayed its survey, but by 1872/9 it, too, had completed a comprehensive survey of the household registries in Hokkaido. Data was recorded for the entire district of Sapporo, as well as for five urban sub-districts and

¹³ *KJH*, vol. 2, pp. 16–20.

twelve suburban villages. Yet, some data—such as those for temporary residents—were only gathered at the larger district level. Nevertheless, the relative granularity of this dataset allows us to make some educated guesses about the whereabouts and occupations of various Sapporo residents.¹⁴

The official permanent population of the urban districts of Sapporo as of 1872/9 was 1,256 people, living in 567 dwellings. The surrounding villages contained another 2,245 people. In an almost perfect example of the classic definition of the city as a place where the predominant mode of economic production is non-agricultural, only nine of the 571 farmers in Sapporo district lived in Sapporo's urban districts; only one of the 108 registered artisans lived outside the urban area. There were more men than women in town and in the villages (in both cases, roughly 54% men to 46% women).

Unfortunately, the data for temporary residents are not divided by urban and village districts. While they show a total of 4,717 temporary residents, they do not indicate where they lived. Yet, given their occupations, we can assume that most lived in town: the 187 officials, the 2,493 artisans, and the 342 merchants (not to mention their family members) all most likely lived in town. Several hundred servants and a few prisoners, too, would have lived in the city. Thus, it seems likely that the vast majority of these people lived in town, with just a few hundred registered farmers most likely residing in the villages. The gender balance was much more skewed: less than 20% of these temporary residents were women. In particular, artisans and merchants tended to be single men, as were half of all “temporary” farmers.

Temporary residents tended to live in temporary residences: only 37 households were owned by their occupants, while a further 98 households were rented. Many of these migrants

¹⁴ Kaitakushi Sapporo honchō minjikyoku kosekika, “Chōka koseki/shokubun sōkei shirabe,” 1873/6, 簿書 668, HPA. Subsequent paragraphs all derived from this source.

must have lodged with permanently registered residents. Each household registered to permanent residents in the urban districts of Sapporo contained two to three permanent residents; there was ample room to house temporary tenants. Moreover, it seems unlikely that the 4,717 temporary residents to Sapporo would have fit in the 135 households registered as temporary: 35 people per home would have been quite a squeeze. The poorest and most temporary of the temporary residents probably did not live in houses at all: grass huts, lean-tos, and other scanty forms of shelter were scattered throughout the city.¹⁵ Despite the tantalizing gaps and likely errors in the demographic data, it seems safe to assume that an overwhelming majority of Sapporo's urban population was registered as 'temporary' in 1873, and again from 1879. It is also clear that Sapporo's early population was a fluid one: while the city grew quickly, it retained a character of impermanence that caused headaches for municipal officials, and affected the built environment of the city. The transience of Sapporo's population stands out in comparison to other cities in the mid-1870s: roughly 14% of Tokyo's 600,000 people, and 9% of Kyoto's quarter million residents, were registered as temporary residents. In Hokkaido as a whole, the proportion was closer to 20%--still a far cry from the figures in Sapporo.¹⁶

The stories of two groups of migrants help to illustrate how people ended up in Sapporo, and also shed light on the factors behind the fluctuating population around 1873. They also illustrate some of the challenges facing Sapporo's municipal administrators in this period. Together, they reveal the limits to state-centered attempts to control migration, even as they highlight the state's strong desire to shape the demographic development of Sapporo.

Vignette 1: Migrants from Imari

¹⁵ SSS, vol. 2, p. 520.

¹⁶ Seiin chishika, ed., *Nihon chishi teiyō*, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Nippōsha, 1877), pp. 2, 10. Available on the NDL digital library at <http://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/762407>.

In the third month of 1872, Matsumoto Jūrō, then the chief official of the Colonial Agency's Nemuro Division in eastern Hokkaido, submitted a report on the suffering of a group of poor farmers who had recently relocated to two districts along the Pacific Coast, some 350km east of Sapporo. These farmers had arrived the previous spring from Imari, a town 2,500 kilometers away in far southwestern Japan, utterly unprepared for Nemuro's harsh winter. In addition to the climate shock, Matsumoto noted, these migrants had struggled to make ends meet even back in Imari. They were "incapable of even gathering firewood," and their prospects for becoming self-sufficient were slim. Their lack of skills meant that fishing was not a viable proposition. These migrants were not just poor and unskilled: Matsumoto noted also that the land they had been assigned was particularly barren, and the local officials were corrupt and inept. Some 46 of the 285 migrants had already left for employment in mainland Japan, but the rest remained a source of worry for Matsumoto. He noted that efforts to resettle a group of indigent and homeless Tokyoites in the same area the previous year had ended in disaster, with illness and death ravaging the unprepared and ill-supplied settlers. He sought advice on how to prevent a similar situation unfolding with the Imari migrants.¹⁷

Over the next two months, the situation grew more chaotic. The leader of the migrants had apparently coerced many of them into the relocation plan: they wanted to return to Imari, but could not afford the significant travel expenses—and nor could the Colonial Agency.¹⁸ Matsumoto wrote to municipal officials in Sapporo on 4/10 and again on 4/15 with a proposal to send the Imari migrants to the capital. Matsumoto expressed skepticism that these migrants

¹⁷ Kaitakushi Nemuro shutchō Kaitakushichō shomugakari, "Kushiro-shū e hikiutsuri no Imari-ken hinkyūmin no jōkyō hoka hachiken no ken," *Tokyo, Hakodate, Sapporo sashidatejō*, 1872/2~8, 1872/3/13, 簿書 544(9), HPA.

¹⁸ Kaitakushi Tokyo shutchōjo, "Akkeshi, Kushiro ryōgun e ijū no moto Saga-ken nōfu 286-meī Sapporo fuka e ijū tanga no ken," *Kaitakushi kōbunroku* 24, 1872/4/30, 簿書 5509(27), HPA.

would be able to function in the fisheries or on their own farms. Instead, citing Sapporo's comparatively mild climate, the excessive expense of sending migrants back to Imari, and fast-growing Sapporo's appetite for construction, he asked municipal officials to accept several hundred migrants, and proposed that they be reclassified as manual laborers.¹⁹

Sapporo officials were unenthusiastic about Matsumoto's proposal. The chief official in the city, Iwamura Michitoshi, responded to Matsumoto on 4/30: "Will these migrants require rice and housing subsidies? Or will they be able to support themselves?" He warned that the finances of the Colonial Agency were already stretched by the expenses of introducing new farm machinery and providing for existing settlers.²⁰ If these migrants were to relocate to Sapporo, they would need to come as "self-migrating" farmers, artisans, or merchants.

The term "self-migrating" referred to the hierarchy used by the Colonial Agency to manage colonial settlement. There were four categories of migrant: recruited farmer, self-migrating farmer, recruited merchant or artisan, and self-migrating merchant or artisan. The agency gave by far the most support to recruited farmers: in addition to gifts of housing, utensils, and farm implements, all families received a daily rice stipend. Self-migrating farmers received the gifts of housing and tools, but did not receive any stipend. Recruited merchants received money to build houses, an initial capital grant for their business, and a three-year fixed stipend. At the bottom of the totem pole, self-migrating merchants and artisans received money to build

¹⁹ Entries in Kaitakushi Nemuro shutchō Kaitakushichō shomugakari, *Tokyo, Hakodate, Sapporo sashidatejō*, 1872/2~8, HPA: "Imari kenka yori Akkeshi, Kushiro ryōgun e hikiutsuri no imin no ken," 1872/4/15, 簿書 544(33); "Moto Saga kenka yori Akkeshi, Kushiro ryōgun e hikiutsuru nōfu no ken," 1872/4/15, 簿書 544(35); "Imari-ken kan'in daikyo Kumanosuke, Nemuro saiyō kata no ken," 1872/4/10, 簿書 544(36); "Imari-ken yori Akkeshi, Kushiro ryōgun e hikiutsuru nōfu no ken," 1872/4/15, 簿書 544(38).

²⁰ Kaitakushi Nemuro shutchō Kaitakushichō shomugakari, "Moto Saga-ken yori ijū nōmin Akkeshi Kushiro ryōgun yori Sapporo fuka ijū negai no ken," *Honchō narabini kaku shichō raikan*, 1872/4/30, 簿書 548(8), HPA.

housing, but—unlike the other three groups of migrants—it took the form of a ten-year interest-free loan rather than an outright grant.²¹ These categories reflect the Agency’s emphasis on farming, but also show that they sought to recruit urban artisans and merchants to support the growth of Sapporo and other towns in the region.

Despite his hesitation, Iwamura recognized that Sapporo was in need of manual labor to work on its various projects. He proposed that any skilled migrants be hired as artisans, while farmers could be employed as “basic manual laborers.” Farmers who wished to work as farmers could do so, but would have to follow the rules: they could not take part-time work as laborers, and, crucially, could not become seasonal laborers in the fishing industry.²² The paper record here grows a bit patchy, but a notice circulated to one group of the Imari migrants in the fifth month of 1872 announced that “any farmers wishing to change their status to manual laborer and move to Sapporo for three years, and any former artisans wishing to work as artisans in Sapporo, should follow the attached guidelines and submit a certificate of intent.” The guidelines are missing, but it is clear that Matsumoto had accepted Iwamura’s terms, and offered the Imari migrants the option to relocate to Sapporo.²³

Matsumoto wrote to Iwamura on 6/7 with updated figures: of the 285 migrants, 165 had expressed interest in relocating to Sapporo. (The rest were resolved to make a go of it as fishers in Nemuro; that winter, many would choose to relocate to the wealthier fisheries on the west

²¹ *KJH*, vol. 2, p. 3.

²² Kaitakushi Tokyo shutchōjo, “Akkeshi, Kushiro ryōgun e ijū no moto Saga-ken nōfu 286-meī Sapporo fuka e ijū tangan no ken.”

²³ Kaitakushi Sapporo honchō shomugakari, “Akkeshi, Kushiro ryōgun no moto Saga-ken imin Sapporo fuka ijū hō tangan no ken,” *Nemuro ōfuku 1872*, 1872/5, 簿書 406(24), HPA.

coast of Hokkaido.²⁴) These 165 had hired a ship that would take them along the coast to Yūfutsu, whence they would make their way overland to Sapporo.²⁵ All but five of the group arrived in Sapporo safely, according to a 6/24 memo from Sapporo to Nemuro. The remaining five had stopped at Chitose, some thirty kilometers from Sapporo, and elected to stay there.²⁶

Who were these migrants? We have nothing written by them except signed certificates of intent submitted to the Nemuro authorities, but a manifest sent along with the group offers some insight into their lives. The majority—91—were adult men, of whom 20 were married (with a further three due to marry three widows in the group). Two mothers, three siblings, twenty sons and twenty-three daughters made up the rest of the group. Overall, the group comprised 112 men and 53 women. The average age of the 91 male heads of household was 32; the youngest was 19, and the eldest 53. All but six of the twenty married couples had children, ranging from one to six in number, and there was one single father to an eleven-year-old daughter.

Of the 91 men, 43 had surnames, while 48 did not. Traditionally only members of the samurai class carried family names: commoners (of any status group) would not have official surnames, although many adopted the name of their village or, in the case of shopkeepers, their businesses. After 1868, the new regime encouraged commoners to adopt surnames as part of the abolition of the formal status system, but surnames were not mandated until the introduction of the Family Registry Law of 1898. This suggests that the Imari migrants were either a mix of

²⁴ Kaitakushi Tokyo shutchōjo kaikeigakari, “Kyū Saga-ken yori Akkeshi gun e no ijūmin no uchi ejū nōkōshōgyo nado kyūjo hō no ken,” *Ryakushū kyū Kaitakushi kaikei shorui* 24, 1873/1, 簿書 6395(6), HPA.

²⁵ Kaitakushi Sapporo honchō shomugakari, “Akkeshi, Kushiro ryōgun no moto Saga-ken ijūmin Sapporo fuka ijū hō tangan no ken,” *Nemuro ōfuku* 1872, 1872/6/7, 簿書 406(48), HPA.

²⁶ Kaitakushi Sapporo honchō shomugakari, “Akkeshi, Kushiro ryōgun no moto Saga-ken ijūmin Sapporo fuka ijū hō tangan no ken,” *Nemuro ōfuku* 1872, 1872/6/24, 簿書 406(50), HPA.

former samurai who had become farmers—a common phenomenon in the late Tokugawa period, and common among early migrants to Hokkaido—or a group of commoners, of whom some had already adopted surnames. All but one of the surnamed men applied to work as manual labourers, however, suggesting that they lacked either farming experience or artisanal skills. Some may have been low-ranking samurai back in Imari who had elected to migrate to Hokkaido. If so, they fit the stereotype of late-Tokugawa samurai: underemployed, underpaid, and underskilled. By contrast, the men with only first names volunteered a range of occupations, hinting at a greater range of practical experience in their home villages or towns. It was unlikely that a mixed-status group of commoners and samurai would have travelled together, so perhaps it is safest to assume these migrants were all poor commoners.

Regardless, sixty-five men signed up as manual laborers. The rest registered as artisans: eight sawyers, six carpenters, six blacksmiths, three housebuilders, one shipwright, one cooper, and one reed-mat maker. Interestingly, nineteen listed different professions on their certificate of intent, compared to the professions listed on the manifest submitted to Sapporo: it is impossible to tell whether this was clerical error or a more calculated effort either to claim the slightly higher prestige of a skilled trade, or to adapt to the fluctuating demands of Sapporo's construction projects.²⁷ After arriving in Sapporo, the Imari migrants mostly disappeared from the documentary trail. On 7/5, Iwamura reassured Matsumoto that he would provide jobs to the migrants, suggesting that the men found work on the construction sites.²⁸ This was not a good line of work to enter in mid-1872: 1873 would usher in a harsh depression in Sapporo, with

²⁷ All of this data is from Kaitakushi Sapporo honchō shomugakari, “Akkeshi, Kushiro ryōgun no moto Saga-ken ijūmin Sapporo fuka ijū hō tangan no ken.”

²⁸ Kaitakushi Sapporo honchō shomugakari, “Kushiro-shū dojin narabini uma 160-tō kaisatsu hō narabini hoka goken no ken,” *Nemuro ōfuku 1872, 1872/7/5*, 簿書 406(54), HPA.

many construction projects abandoned or postponed. Whether the Imari migrants weathered that crisis is unclear.

In fact, of the 165 people who travelled to Sapporo in the summer of 1872, only one appears in later municipal population records. Twenty-seven year-old Ono Satarō applied to work as a manual labourer. According to an 1879 land survey of Sapporo, Ono was given a 165-square-metre plot of land on Hiyama-dōri in October 1876. The plot was a subdivision of a larger plot, and sat slightly outside the central part of the city. It was one of the smallest plot sizes in the city, and faced a back alley; the other plots on the block were similarly sized. The land value was assessed at 55 yen per 3.3 square meters. (Land taxes ranged from 10 yen to 180 yen per 3.3 square meters.) Ono built a house there before the end of the year. This is the extent of information about Ono: the census does not include Ono's permanent household registration, his occupation, or income, facts present for virtually every other entry.²⁹ He was merely a name affixed to a place for the brief moment of census taking; despite owning a home in Sapporo, he had no identifiable past or predictable future.

It is hard to know how representative Ono and his fellow Imari migrants were. Few migrants to Sapporo came en masse in quite this way; most travelled in smaller groups, or through the auspices of quasi-official migration companies. And it may well be that all the Imari migrants stayed in Sapporo, but never made enough money to buy their own property. Nevertheless, these figures offer a glimpse along some of the paths people took to get to Sapporo, and the ambivalence of the Colonial Agency toward immigration to their booming capital.

Vignette 2: The Tōkyō-rō Brothel

²⁹ Ono is listed in Kaitakushi, *Chika sōtei ukesho*, 1879/5/12, reproduced in SSS, vol. 7, pp. 441–557. He appears on p. 455.

In the spring of 1872, a Tokyo commoner named Shiroto Yasaburō and his business partner Matsumoto Yazaemon requested permission from the Colonial Agency to establish a brothel in Sapporo. They asked officials to pick a suitable site in the city, and also asked for tax breaks, temporary quarters until a permanent brothel could be built, and a loan of 6,000 ryō to get their business off the ground. They proposed transporting roughly 30 women and ten attendants to Sapporo, along with their own families. The authorities approved their request in the seventh month of that year, and Shiroto and Matsumoto moved to Sapporo that summer. They received two adjacent plots of land in 1873/1, and built a property spanning the two plots. Three geisha and 21 prostitutes travelled with them, along with a retinue of a dozen servants and the two entrepreneurs' wives and children. In the first half of 1873, the revenue from the brothel totaled 1830 ryō for Matsumoto, and 1680 ryō for Shiroto. Put together this made them the wealthiest brothel keepers in Sapporo, and among the most successful businessmen in the city. Yet, this boom was short-lived: the impact of new laws, economic depression, and personal legal troubles put pressure on the brothel business. The two men struggled to repay their loans, and ended up working odd jobs to make ends meet; they both eventually left the city as they sought to stay ahead of their creditors.

The details of Matsumoto and Shiroto's application to the Colonial Agency, as well as the subsequent legal cases and the abandonment of their business in Sapporo, offer glimpses into the world of Sapporo's early immigrant businessmen. The costs of relocation, the bureaucratic process of opening a business and relocating a household, and the business risks associated with Sapporo shine through clearly. The motives and agency of the women who worked for Matsumoto and Shiroto are harder to detect, but the hints that do exist also speak to the economic and social challenges of life in Sapporo's brothel district, particularly amidst the legal and social

transformations of the early 1870s. Together the stories of Matsumoto and Shiroto, and the conditions and actions of the women working in their brothel, illustrate the dynamic and precarious nature of the young city: a place where fortunes could be made, but also lost. At the same time, they also reveal the elaborate legal, political, and social networks that bound individual migrants to broader social systems. While these systems may have posed cumbersome obstacles to growth and development in the city, they also worked to mitigate exploitation and lawlessness in the new town.

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It cost a lot of money to move to Sapporo in 1872. Transport from mainland Japan was exorbitantly expensive, supplies had to be carried along, and the high cost of housing, food, and labor in the city made opening a business a risky and expensive affair. In their 1872/5 application to the Colonial Agency, Shiroto and Matsumoto estimated a 12,000-ryō outlay would be necessary to open a brothel in Sapporo, not even counting the land and temporary premises (which they hoped the Agency would provide for free and exempt from taxes). Half of this sum would be used to pay salaries to thirty prostitutes and geisha, and provide their supplies (clothing, hair products, and so on). Several thousand ryō would go to pay attendants, servants, and other brothel workers. All told Shiroto and Matsumoto expected to take roughly fifty people to Sapporo. They estimated it would cost thirty ryō per person for transport to Sapporo (for a total of 1500 ryō). They also anticipated spending the same sum on fifty laborers to build permanent premises.³⁰ The Colonial Agency anticipated spending 13,900 ryō in total on public buildings in

³⁰ All this from Ōkurashō Kaitakushi kaikei zanmu seiri iin, “Hokkaido Sapporo kaitaku basho e tochi haishaku kasaku kanpi wo motte toritate oyobi haishakukin no ue yūri kiritsu kaigyō hō no ken,” *Ryakushū kyū Kaitakushi kaikei shorui* 4: *Matsumoto Yazaemon, Shiroto Yasaburō hennōkin shorui*, 1872/5, 簿書 6817(1), HPA. Kaiho Yōko is the only scholar to write on the Tōkyō-rō brothel, arguing for its importance in the minds of Colonial Agency officials (liberation edict notwithstanding), as part of a

1872, giving a sense of the scale of Shiroto and Matsumoto's plans, although they likely requested far more than they actually needed as a negotiating tactic.³¹

Shiroto and Matsumoto did not have 12,000 ryō to hand, of course, and they sought public financing to help capitalize their venture. They requested 6,000 ryō directly from the Colonial Agency, who ultimately responded with a seven-year, interest-free loan of that amount. The loan was split unevenly between the two men, with Shiroto taking on a third, and Matsumoto the remaining two-thirds. Shiroto and Matsumoto both provided personal guarantors, and the Colonial Agency wrote immediately to Tokyo Prefecture to ask for a background check on those guarantors. Shiroto's guarantor, a sawyer named Morikawa Toshihachi, had a sizeable property worth 800 ryō; Matsumoto's guarantor, a man named Nakamura Shōtarō, owned a range of property in and around Shinagawa post station—a large brothel district on the southern edge of Tokyo. Both guarantors were judged respectable, and Tokyo endorsed the businessmen's request for a loan, and stated no objection to their plans to move to Sapporo.³² Three thousand ryō were distributed first, with 2,400 ryō disbursed on 1872/7/8, to pay for travel costs; the rest followed later that month.³³ It is unclear when the remaining 3,000 ryō was disbursed.

long history of ideas about the necessity of brothels to encouraging settlement (by men) in remote areas. Kaiho Yōko, *Kindai hōpōshi: Ainu minzoku to josei to* (Tokyo: San'ichi shobō, 1992), pp. 231–257.

³¹ The Colonial Agency massively increased its expenditures the following year: the capitol building, for example, cost 32,000 ryō. In this sense, the brothel loan was lavish, but not outrageous, in comparison to other large building projects in Sapporo. *KJH*, vol. 2, pp. 678, 680.

³² Ōkurashō Kaitakushi kaikei zannu seiri iin, “Hokkaido Sapporo kaitaku basho e tochi haishaku kasaku kanpi wo motte toritate.”

³³ Ōkurashō Kaitakushi kaikei zannu seiri iin, “Shiroto Yasaburō sonohoka ichimei Sapporo omote yūjōya shutten ni tsuki kensazumi no ue haishakukin no uchi sagewatasu hō no ken,” 1872/7/8 簿書 6817(10), and “Sapporo yūjōya shutten haishakukin nokoshi sagewatasu hō no ken,” 1872/7/19, 簿書 6817(11), *Ryakushū kyū Kaitakushi kaikei shorui 4: Matsumoto Yazaemon, Shiroto Yasaburō hennōkin shorui*, HPA.

While the two men negotiated with the Colonial Agency over the terms of their loan, they also had to prepare transport and lodging. Shioto and Matsumoto were keen to move quickly, so booked travel for the beginning of 1872/7. Most of the party travelled on 7/10, although Shioto and two of the women followed on a later ship due to a sudden case of diarrhea.³⁴ By the end of the month, everyone had arrived in Sapporo. When they got there, they found themselves in a fast-growing town: a boon for business, but a challenging and expensive environment for housing. Shioto and Matsumoto had initially proposed borrowing the Colonial Agency headquarters' annex (*wakihonjin*) until permanent quarters were found, to which officials in the Colonial Agency's Tokyo office initially agreed.³⁵ Yet, the annex was in heavy use by officials visiting Sapporo from around Hokkaido, and the Sapporo office preferred to assist Shioto and Matsumoto in finding quarters elsewhere in the city. Unfortunately, "the crush of people flooding into the city" made it difficult to find a suitable location or building, and several divisions of the Colonial Agency were pressed into service to find such a site. Despite the large amount of construction in Sapporo, no townhouses were deemed suitable for a new brothel, leading the Construction Department to help Shioto and Matsumoto build new quarters.³⁶ They

³⁴ Ōkurashō Kaitakushi kaikei zanmu seiri iin, "Shioto Yasaburō oyobi yūjo Suzu, Haru 7-gatsu 10-ka jōsen ainarigataku, zenkai no ue shuppon hō no ken," *Ryakushū kyū Kaitakushi kaikei shorui* 4: *Matsumoto Yazaemon, Shioto Yasaburō hennōkin shorui*, 1872/7/13, 簿書 6817(8), HPA.

³⁵ Ōkurashō Kaitakushi kaikei zanmu seiri iin, "Matsumoto Yazaemon hoka ichimei Sapporo omote e yūjoya kaigyō no tokoro kakunai kasaku toritatsu made waki honjin kashiwatashi sōtō no kazei jōnō hō nado no ken," *Ryakushū kyū Kaitakushi kaikei shorui* 4: *Matsumoto Yazaemon, Shioto Yasaburō hennōkin shorui*, 1872/5/25, 簿書 6817(5), HPA.

³⁶ Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho shomugakari, "Tokyo Shioto Yasaburō hoka hitori negaizumi ni yoru girō kenka no ken," *Tokyo ōfuku* 2, 1872/6/14, 簿書 402(52), HPA.

received an additional 3,196 yen as a loan for building costs, which—like their 6,000-yen startup loan—came interest-free, but with a seven-year repayment window.³⁷

Business started off strong in the fall of 1872, although not without hiccups: a “rampaging patron” led the authorities to suspend the business for a period in the autumn.³⁸ Nevertheless, by 1873/1, Shiroto and Matsumoto were back at the Colonial Agency, asking for permission to expand their business by opening up new quarters. “Thanks to the beneficence of the authorities, we have continued our business here in Susukino [Sapporo’s brothel district]...yet, we are a jointly run business with many family members, and the number of customers has soared to the point of running out of rooms.” The two men proposed that Shiroto temporarily move in with Kaneko Sadakichi, a brothel owner one street over who was in desperate need of more employees. Matsumoto would adopt responsibility for the housing loan repayments, while each would continue to honor their obligations to their creditors in Tokyo.³⁹ The Colonial Agency granted this request on 1873/1/22. Somewhat confusingly, Shiroto continued to own the lot adjacent to Matsumoto’s, although no building was constructed on it. The two men continued as business partners, despite this increasingly convoluted property arrangement.

³⁷ Ōkurashō Kaitakushi kaikei zanmu seiri iin, “Matsumoto Yazaemon hoka ichimei Tokyo omote haishaku jōnōzumi zankin jōnō no gi sarani mōshide ni yori Tokyo e uchiawasu hō no ken,” *Ryakushū kyū Kaitakushi kaikei shorui* 4: *Matsumoto Yazaemon, Shiroto Yasaburō hennōkin shorui*, 1872/7/8, 簿書 6817(21), HPA.

³⁸ Ōkurashō Kaitakushi kaikei zanmu seiri iin, “Sapporo omote yūjoya shutten Matsmoto Yazaemon sonohoka ichimei haishakukin hennō entai ni tsuki shobun hō no ken,” *Ryakushū kyū Kaitakushi kaikei shorui* 4: *Matsumoto Yazaemon, Shiroto Yasaburō hennōkin shorui*, 1876/10, 簿書 6817(22), HPA.

³⁹ Ōkurashō Kaitakushi kaikei zanmu seiri iin, “Matsumoto Yazaemon hoka ichimei Sapporo Susukino ni oite yūjoya tosei no tokoro, gappei no gyōtei nite kensū busoku ni tsuki kasaku dekiru made Kaneko Sanekichi [*sic*] kata e Shiroto Yasaburō dōkyo tosei ganshutsu no ken,” *Ryakushū kyū Kaitakushi kaikei shorui* 4: *Matsumoto Yazaemon, Shiroto Yasaburō hennōkin shorui*, 1873/1, 簿書 6817(13), HPA.

In the first six months of 1873, the men did well: Matsumoto listed returns of 1830 yen, and Shiroto made 1680 yen, together accounting for one fifth of all brothel revenue in Sapporo, and putting them among the most successful brothel owners in Sapporo (and consequently among the most successful businessmen of early 1873: brothel owners were second only to general contractors in average income). Sixteen brothel keepers were in business in Sapporo in the first half of 1873: most had been granted land in 1871 or 1872. In fact, Shiroto and Matsumoto were the last brothel owners to secure permanent lodgings until 1878.⁴⁰ The success of these early brothels surely played a role in encouraging Shiroto and Matsumoto to seek fortunes in Sapporo; and in this first year, fortunes they found.

Yet, Shiroto and Matsumoto were latecomers to a bubble that was about to burst. Starting in the winter of 1873, Sapporo entered a serious economic depression as funds for construction projects dried up. Laborers drifted away, and the population declined. The drop in revenues caused the two men to fall into arrears on their monthly payments. Shiroto suspended his side of the business, and traveled to the hunting grounds of the Ishikari Valley to set up a “temporary brothel” for seasonal hunters; this business also failed to pan out, and he returned to Sapporo late in 1873.⁴¹ By that point, officials in the Colonial Agency’s Tokyo branch had grown weary of waiting for repayments to begin. On 10/24, they wrote to Matsumoto and Shiroto to summon them to Tokyo to explain their lack of loan repayments.

Matsumoto and Shiroto replied on 10/31, arguing that the economic downturn since mid-winter had harmed their business. Nevertheless, they promised to start making annual payments,

⁴⁰ Kaitakushi, *Chika sōtei ukesho*.

⁴¹ Ōkurashō Kaitakushi kaikei zanmu seiri iin, “Sapporo omote yūjoya shutten Matsmoto Yazaemon sonohoka ichimei haishakukin hennō entai ni tsuki shobun hō no ken.”

“no matter how painful.”⁴² That same day they requested a postponement in repayments for the housing loan extended by Sapporo officials.⁴³ In addition to the economic slump, Shiroto and Matsumoto blamed the impact of new laws banning the sale of women as prostitutes. Referring to the 1872/10 Ordinance Liberating Prostitutes, the men complained about the decreased revenue caused by limits on women’s working hours, and the fact that several women had left their employ.⁴⁴ They used this argument in a request to extend the term of their seven-year loan to thirty years, which would allow them to reduce their monthly fees. Local officials sympathized with this argument. “While the lack of loan repayments in nearly a year makes it difficult to extend the loan period to thirty years,” wrote the Accounting Division in a memo to Matsumoto Jūrō, “the fact that they didn’t know about the prostitution law made it difficult to produce a good business plan.” The office proposed a ten-year loan period instead.⁴⁵ Tokyo

⁴² Ōkurashō Kaitakushi kaikei zanmu seiri iin, “Tokyo omote nite haishaku 6000 en 6-nen 10-gatsu yori geppu jōnō no gi Matsumoto Yazaemon Hakodate omote yori kitaku jukudan no ue nite mōshiageru made yūyo hō no ken,” *Ryakushū kyū Kaitakushi kaikei shorui* 4: *Matsumoto Yazaemon, Shiroto Yasaburō hennōkin shorui*, 1873/10/31, 簿書 6817(15), HPA.

⁴³ Ōkurashō Kaitakushi kaikei zanmu seiri iin boshō, “9-gatsu chū kasaku jūkyō haishakukin waritsuke tsukizuki 100-en jōnō no gi Matsumae Yazaemon Hakodate omote yori kitaku jukudan no ue nite mōshiageru made yūyo hō no ken,” *Ryakushū kyū Kaitakushi kaikei shorui* 4: *Matsumoto Yazaemon, Shiroto Yasaburō hennōkin shorui*, 1873/10/31, 簿書 6817(16), HPA.

⁴⁴ Ōkurashō Kaitakushi kaikei zanmu seiri iin, “Sapporo omote shutten no Shiroto Yasaburō sonohoka ichimei haishakukin ni tsuki tangan no gi 10kanen fu jōnō hō no ken,” *Ryakushū kyū Kaitakushi kaikei shorui* 4: *Matsumoto Yazaemon, Shiroto Yasaburō hennōkin shorui*, 1874/1/12, 簿書 6817(17), HPA. Scholars assume this ordinance had little actual effect, and certainly at a societal level prostitution continued (subject to local regulations). Nevertheless, Shiroto and Matsumoto’s complaint suggests that there may have been an impact at the microeconomic level—although they may also have been using government actions as a convenient way to demand some form of recompense. See Sheldon Garon, *Molding Japanese Minds* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 91–92, and Daniel Botsman, “Freedom without Slavery? ‘Coolies,’ Prostitutes, and Outcasts in Meiji Japan’s ‘Emancipation Moment’”, *The American Historical Review* 116, no. 5 (December 2011): pp. 1323–47.

⁴⁵ Ōkurashō Kaitakushi kaikei zanmu seiri iin, “Sapporo omote shutten no Shiroto Yasaburō sonohoka ichimei haishakukin ni tsuki tangan no gi 10kanen fu jōnō hō no ken.”

agreed to the ten-year plan in 1874/2, with a monthly payment of fifty yen for the 6,000-yen loan, and 20.80 yen for the housing loan.

Yet, even this proved too burdensome: Shiroto and Matsumoto petitioned the authorities on 2/22 to reduce their monthly payments. In essence, “business conditions are such that it will be impossible to pay fifty yen a month,” they said, while asking that Sapporo reduce the housing loan repayments to fifteen yen per month. Shiroto was particularly hard-pressed: he had suspended his business in January due to poor revenues, and requested a stay on repayments until he was able to reopen. An audit of Matsumoto’s books revealed profits of only two yen a month, assuming a fifteen-yen housing loan payment and 21 yen in payments to Tokyo; paying the full amount under the ten-year plan would push him into the red.⁴⁶

Meanwhile, legal problems from Tokyo had caught up to Shiroto. Yoshizumi Sunpei, a former samurai, filed a suit in the Tokyo High Court, claiming that Shiroto had failed to repay a 180-yen loan for a house in Tokyo. Shiroto had left for Sapporo without informing Yoshizumi, and the High Court had been unable to track down Shiroto’s guarantor. The court summoned Shiroto to Tokyo in 1873/8.⁴⁷ Shiroto tried to avoid appearing in court by sending a written response; the court reiterated their summons in 1873/11. Claiming illness, Shiroto sent a proxy to Tokyo in the spring of 1874; the proxy, claiming seasickness after the voyage from Sapporo, failed to appear in court. On 1874/3/24, another claim was filed against Shiroto: two commoners argued that Shiroto had reneged on a property deal. The Colonial Agency once again urged

⁴⁶ Ōkurashō Kaitakushi kaikei zanmu seiri iin, “Matsumoto Yazaemon hoka ichimei Tokyo omote haishaku jōnōzumi zankin jōnō no gi sarani mōshide ni yori Tokyo e uchiawasu hō no ken.”

⁴⁷ Kaitakushi Sapporo honchō shomukyoku, “Tokyo-fu kanzoku shizoku Yoshizumi Sunpei yori Sapporo Susukino e kiryū Shiroto Yasaburō he kakaru kashikin todokōri ni tsuki shusso no ken,” *Tokyo raikan dome*, 1873/8/31, 簿書 603(109), HPA.

Shiroto to go to Tokyo to answer the charges against him.⁴⁸ In 1874/4, Shiroto announced his plans to go to Tokyo to answer charges; he promised, however, to “return swiftly and reopen business in July,” at which point he would start to repay his loans. Despite returning to Tokyo, Shiroto failed to appear in court. The Colonial Agency, now alarmed by the prospect that it too might fail to get its money back, investigated Shiroto’s whereabouts, and found him living under an assumed name and selling rice as of 1874/9. A month later he had returned to his mother’s house across town.⁴⁹

Over the next five years, the Colonial Agency continued to wrangle with Shiroto and Matsumoto over their various debts. Neither man moved back to Sapporo, despite assurances that they would do so. Shiroto cleared his debts with his Tokyo creditors by giving them his property there, leaving him homeless and penniless; the illness then death of his mother further compounded his difficulties, while a series of menial jobs in Yokohama failed to give him the income necessary to pay off his debts.⁵⁰ Matsumoto, on the other hand, had left the Sapporo property to a relative named Isaburō, who continued to negotiate with the Colonial Agency. The collapse of his business had led him to work odd jobs for the Colonial Agency, but as Isaburō noted in 1878/11, “he is so poor that he can barely cover his family’s living expenses,” let alone make regular loan repayments. Isaburō offered to give the Colonial Agency the Sapporo property in lieu of loan repayments, an offer over which the Colonial Agency hemmed and hawed: a year

⁴⁸ Kaitakushi Tokyo shutchōjo shomuka, “Tokyo-fu kanzoku shizoku Yoshizumi Sunpei yori Sapporo omote kiryū Shiroto Yasaburō e kakaru kashikin todokōri no ken,” *Shihōshō ōfuku*, 1874/3/7, 簿書 1172(34), HPA.

⁴⁹ Kaitakushi Tokyo shutchōjo shomuka, “Tokyo fuka kiryū Kagoshima-ken heimin Uchimura Heizō hoka ichimei yori, Sapporo omote kiryū Shiroto Yasaburō he kakaru, kenka hikiwatashi iyaku no ken,” *Shihōshō ōfuku*, 1874/3/28, 簿書 1172(37), HPA

⁵⁰ Ōkurashō Kaitakushi kaikei zanmu seiri iin, “Sapporo omote yūjoya shutten Matsmoto Yazaemon sonohoka ichimei haishakukin hennō entai ni tsuki shobun hō no ken.”

later, no decision had been made, and exasperated officials in Sapporo pestered the Colonial Agency's Tokyo accounting office to hurry up and resolve the matter as the house "was falling apart due to the harsh winter weather" and the prospects of Matsumoto ever being able to repay the loan were virtually nil.⁵¹

The women who travelled to Sapporo by Matsumoto and Shiroto are harder to trace, but we can start to imagine the broad contours of the world of sex workers in Sapporo by comparing slivers of information from Sapporo to evidence from elsewhere in Japan and its empire. Only one of Matsumoto's employees appears definitively in the 1875 licensing records: a young woman named Fujita Hana, registered as a dependent of Matsumoto, who returned her license, giving up her profession, on 1875/4/8. Several other women bear the same names as women in the manifest accompanying Shiroto and Matsumoto, but it is impossible to know for sure whether they are the same women. It seems likely that some of those women would have gone to work for other brothels in Sapporo after the collapse of Matsumoto and Shiroto's business. Hasegawa Yae, for example, was granted a license after medical inspection on 1875/2/18, to work for Kaneko Sadakichi, the brothel owner whose premises Shiroto shared for a brief period in 1873/1. Perhaps she is the same Yae that travelled to Sapporo with Matsumoto and Shiroto as a nineteen-year old.⁵²

⁵¹ Ōkurashō Kaitakushi kaikei zanmu seiri iin, "Sapporo omote yūjōya shutten Matsmoto Yazaemon sonohoka ichimei haishakukin hennō entai ni tsuki shobun hō no ken."

⁵² The records of medical exams and licenses are in Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho, "Sapporo Fukushima-dōri Kashizashiki tosei Yashiro Asanosuke kigū Takahashi Kiyo hoka e, shōgi menkyo kansatsu sagewatashi nado no ken," *Kaitakushi kōbunroku 1875*, 1875/1/8, 簿書 6103(15); compare to the manifest in Kaitakushi Sapporo Kaitakushi chō shomukakari, "Yūjōya tosei Shiroto Yasaburō Matsumoto Yazaemon Sapporo omote shutten torimōke ni tsuki yūjō geisha meshitsure *Yokohama-maru* nite shutchō no ken," *Tokyo ōfuku*, 1872/7/9, 簿書 403(26), HPA.

The legal abolition of prostitution in late 1872 did prompt many women to leave Matsumoto and Shiroto's employ, and ushered in broader changes in the structure of sex work in Sapporo, as across Japan. The number of sex workers in Susukino shrank from roughly 300 in 1873 to 94 in 1882, implying that many women took advantage of their increased freedom to quit.⁵³ The general economic downturn in Sapporo in 1873 and 1874 no doubt contributed to their desire either to find other work, or return to mainland Japan. Of 46 sex workers who were inspected and licensed in the first four months of 1875, 33 were given licenses; five had their license suspended (likely for health reasons); eight returned their licenses (presumably to leave sex work altogether); and three of the 33 granted licenses returned them within months.⁵⁴ The world of sex workers was also a transient one.

As Daniel Botsman has illustrated, the liberation edict did not at all mark the end of prostitution—it allowed brothel owners to very easily recategorize their indentured female employees as “voluntary” sex workers—but it did mark the beginning of new ways of thinking about sex work that focused on regulation and the (at least putative) guarantee of individual rights.⁵⁵ Susan Burns has similarly emphasized the importance of these changes, along with the development of a discourse of public health, to changing ideas about sex work: in particular the emergence of the prostitute as a dissolute figure in need of regulation, rather than a celebrated cultural icon.⁵⁶ These changes are visible in the attitude of Sapporo's officials towards sex

⁵³ SSS, vol. 2, p. 581.

⁵⁴ Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho, “Sapporo Fukushima-dōri Kashizashiki tosei Yashiro Asanosuke kigū Takahashi Kiyō hoka e, shōgi menkyo kansatsu sagewatashi nado no ken.”

⁵⁵ Botsman, “Freedom without Slavery?”

⁵⁶ Susan Burns, “Bodies and Borders: Syphilis, Prostitution, and the Nation in Japan, 1860–1890”, *U.S.-Japan Women's Journal, English Supplement* 15 (1998): pp. 3–30.

workers in the aftermath of the 1872 edict. Bureaucrats' concerns about prostitution after 1872 reveal three specific issues.

The first was the economic hardship that an outright ban on prostitution posed to many women. By the spring of 1874, Colonial Agency officials had begun implementing the liberation edict in Susukino, but “the sudden loss of many brothel businesses has led to the loss of a livelihood for many workers; others are now suddenly unable to care for their elderly parents,” reported an official to Matsumoto Jūrō on 1874/4/27. “The desperate circumstances are leading some women to work on their own, or in groups.”⁵⁷ The letter lacks detail, but presumably the sudden end to prostitution had pushed many sex workers into an unregulated sphere. The author proposed letting two groups of women continue to work, subject to licensing: those who had already been sex workers, and wished to continue; and those women who had travelled to Sapporo in order to “help their impoverished parents” yet were unable to find other work. By contrast, anyone who wanted to engage in sex work “in hedonistic ways, or who have children, or who take on sex work while serving as a maid,” would be prevented from doing so. The moral rhetoric around sex work had thus narrowed the acceptable range of reasons for women to enter the workforce.⁵⁸ Yet, despite the highly prescriptive language of the Colonial Agency official, he nevertheless recognized that women often engaged in sex work for particular economic reasons that were separate than the economic interests of brothel owners. Women still needed their

⁵⁷ Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho, “Geishōgi eigyō shutsugan no mono zōka ni tsuki, shochi hō toiwase no ken,” *Kaitakushi kōbunroku 1874*, 1874/4/27, 簿書 6006(14), HPA.

⁵⁸ Amy Stanley has argued that the commercialization of the sex industry by the end of the Tokugawa period undermined many of the moral claims of filial piety used by male elites to justify the sex industry, while revealing their hypocrisy in criticizing women who turned to sex work out of economic need; this carried into the early Meiji Period. *Selling Women*, pp. 189–97. Kaiho Yōko has also discussed the various efforts to control unlicensed prostitution in late Tokugawa period Ezochi, and the responses to the Liberation Edict in the Meiji period. *Kindai hoppōshi*, pp. 206–30, 249–54.

parents' approval, and also a guarantee from their village head that they were truly desperate,⁵⁹ but nevertheless this recognition of economic agency on the part of women sex workers is important.

The stress on poor women needing to help their impoverished parents speaks to a growing sense that sex workers had chosen that path out of desperation, but also touches on additional concerns about the moral position of sex workers vis-à-vis broader society. Bureaucrats were especially concerned with which women should engage in sex work in Sapporo, and implemented a strict rule against former samurai from either running brothels, or engaging in sex work.⁶⁰ This was not an abstract concern imported from mainland Japan: local officials pushed back on the regulation, suggesting that it was too difficult to implement and enforce in Hokkaido, presumably because many impoverished samurai families had migrated to the region and were thus no less likely than their commoner counterparts to turn to sex work out of economic need. Many former samurai women appear to have done so, and continued to do so even after rules against their involvement were put in place: the Colonial Agency issued special orders to village and district headmen to carefully register all applicants' status, and ensure that former samurai "are not trying to pass themselves off as commoners" when applying to be brothel owners or prostitutes.⁶¹ These concerns speak to longstanding associations of prostitution with commoner culture, and highlight the continued importance of status distinctions even after the formal abolishment of the Tokugawa-era status system. Yet, these norms were reinforced by

⁵⁹ Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho, "Geishōgi eigyō shutsugan no mono zōka ni tsuki, shochi hō toiwase no ken," referring to a 1873/8/19 city edict in Sapporo.

⁶⁰ Kaitakushi Sapporo honchō, "shizoku no kashizashiki tosei oyobi shizoku fujo no geishōgi nado eigyō, sashidome no ken," *Kaitakushi kōbunroku 1876*, 1876/10/5, 簿書 6150(26), HPA.

⁶¹ Kaitakushi Sapporo honchō, "shizoku no kashizashiki tosei oyobi shizoku fujo no geishōgi nado eigyō, sashidome no ken."

their incorporation into a bureaucratic system of petty criminality, making regulation of the brothel quarters and sex work more broadly the purview of the central state, rather than associations of brothel owners.

This increasingly bureaucratic regulatory regime speaks to the third concern of officials: the coding of sex work as a form of public disorder. The imposition of aggressive new standards of licensing and medical exams also interfered with many women's economic needs. Officials in Muroran, the Pacific port some 130 kilometers south of Sapporo, wrote asking for guidelines on how to deal with sex workers who either worked without a license, or "sold sex furtively" (*hisoka ni baiin seshi mono*) when they were meant to be on medical leave; Sapporo officials instructed them to imprison the women for ten and twenty days, respectively.⁶² More generally, officials in the Colonial Agency worried that the liberation of prostitution and the introduction of new regulations to address both women's economic needs and the moral concerns of the state would merely accelerate the growth of prostitution in Sapporo and throughout Hokkaido. In 1874/4, Matsumoto Jūrō received a worried letter from a lower official noting an increase in the number of applications to run brothels, and expressing concerns that brothels would "attract unreliable and shifty figures"; that official proposed higher taxes to discourage applications.⁶³ Matsumoto was also concerned about the women: in 1874/8, he acknowledged that many women "had to work out of necessity," but also warned that the Colonial Agency must figure out how to prevent more and more women applying to work in brothels.⁶⁴

⁶² Kaitakushi Sapporo honchō, "Shōgi inkansatsu ishitsu, narabini ryōyōchū mitsubaiin no mono, shobun no ken," *Kaitakushi kōbunroku* 1875, 1875/8/13, 簿書 6077(6), HPA.

⁶³ Kaitakushi Sapporo honchō, "Kashizashiki tosei narabini geishōgi zeisoku no ken," *Kaitakushi kōbunroku* 1874, 1874/4/18, 簿書 5979(5), HPA.

⁶⁴ Kaitakushi Sapporo honchō, "Geishōgi eigyō shutsugan no mono zōka ni tsuki, shochi hō toiwase no ken."

The story of women hired to work in a brothel in Zenibako, a small town on the coast some twenty kilometres northwest of Sapporo, illustrate the way these various issues played out in the development of brothels after the updated guidelines in 1876. The brothel was owned and run by Kudō Toki, and was in business by the spring of 1883. Toki was head of the household and ran the business; her husband, Takematsu, fished and did occasional construction work. (He also conveniently got a job as the town's brothel regulator, with a four-yen salary, starting in 1883/6, which must have made Toki's paperwork less stressful.) Five women worked in her brothel, and lived there as temporary residents of Zenibako: two, seventeen-year-old Itō Tama and sixteen-year-old Satō Koyo, had already been in her employ. She hired three more women that year: seventeen-year-old Takemura Risa, from near Hakodate, whose application to live with Toki and whose father's supporting documentation both stressed his poor health, and her need to engage in such work to support him.⁶⁵ The application letters from Ono Toyo and Nishizawa Yayo, both from Aomori prefecture, do not use the same language: instead, they only seek permission for temporary terms of residence (15 and 30 months, respectively) rather than formal applications to work as prostitutes.⁶⁶ Whether this was an attempt to evade taxation (by not registering the women as highly-taxed sex workers) or simply a form of apprenticeship (Yayo was only fourteen) is unclear. It is interesting, though, that these women traveled to Zenibako (rather than the much larger towns of Otaru or Sapporo, let alone the much nearer Hakodate or Aomori) to pick up this work. There is no evidence of what connections might have made this a sensible choice, but the migratory nature of women working in the sex industry probably applied to Sapporo, too.

⁶⁵ *Zenibakomura Kudō-ke shorui hikae*, 1879–87, 道写本 186, NSC, pp. 65–67, 101.

⁶⁶ *Zenibakomura Kudō-ke shorui hikae*, pp. 105, 141.

While the early sex workers were often brought from Tokyo, as Hokkaido developed women within the region and from further afield migrated to places like Sapporo to earn a living, for themselves or for their family. Sex work remained lucrative, and despite official efforts to curtail its growth the Susukino brothel started growing again by the late 1870s. The number of women involved rose again throughout the 1880s and 1890s, surpassing 400 licensed sex workers in 30 brothels in 1897. In 1888, taxes on brothels and prostitutes accounted for 44% of all regional tax revenue, speaking to the enormous role sex workers played in Sapporo's economy, and the fiscal contributions they made, however unwillingly, to municipal finances.⁶⁷ All told we have little information about how female sex workers in early Sapporo understood their own work, and how they chose (or did not choose) to act in the pursuit of a livelihood, but the brief glimpses afforded by bureaucratic documents gives at least some sense of the transient population of sex workers in early Sapporo and its environs.

Analysis

These vignettes help put some real people behind the Colonial Agency data on temporary residents, and showcase the circumstances and choices that led them to (and from) Sapporo. They also illustrate some of the factors that made the category of "temporary residents" complicated and frustrating to Colonial Agency officials.

One factor was institutional: the limits of the household registration system as a useful way to account for an increasingly mobile population. The categories of "temporary" and "permanent" were legally defined by the location of residents' household registration. This system was based on the Tokugawa-era temple registration system, which reflected an ideological preference for agricultural villages as the mainstay of the commoner population;

⁶⁷ SSS, vol. 2, p. 581.

relatively more mobile elites (warriors) were not included. The post-1868 Meiji state retained this system, but struggled to accommodate the explosion in sojourners and internal migrants caused by the relaxation of Tokugawa-era restrictions on mobility, and the changing economic structure of a rapidly industrializing nation. Simply put, merchants and artisans were far more likely to move than farmers, and as the Japanese economy became more commercialized over the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, more and more farmers moved to cities to work in the multiplying factories, port facilities, and businesses.⁶⁸ The turmoil and uncertainty of the 1870s in particular led many people to travel far from home in pursuit of opportunity or survival, but they were often wary of giving up their ties to ancestral homelands. This was especially true for migrants to distant Sapporo.

This was also true for the officials of the Colonial Agency, many of whom were bureaucrats anticipating only a short assignment from Tokyo or elsewhere in Japan. Mostly members of the former warrior class, long accustomed to moving around Japan, their inclusion in the new registration system was often awkward. Moreover, officials in Sapporo had few incentives to settle permanently: they were given free housing and travel stipends, and long leaves of absence to return to their hometowns or to Tokyo. Eventually the Colonial Agency introduced guidelines to encourage these officials to transfer their registration to Sapporo, but many preferred not to commit to what was in essence a hardship posting.⁶⁹ This feature persisted

⁶⁸ Andrew Gordon discusses the rise of sojourning factory workers in *The Evolution of Labor Relations in Japan: Heavy Industry, 1853–1955* (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1985).

⁶⁹ See Enomoto Yōsuke, *Kaitakushi to Hokkaido* (Sapporo: Hokkaidō Shuppan Kikaku Sentā, 2009) for a discussion of these officials and their careers.

beyond the end of the Colonial Agency: officials of Hokkaidō-chō were singled out as setting a bad example by not transferring their permanent residence as late as 1887.⁷⁰

A second factor was economic, and particularly the seasonal economic structure that historically predominated in Hokkaido, as well as the cyclical economics of state-led building projects. As the continued preeminence of ports such as Hakodate and Otaru suggests, shipping and fishing continued to drive the Hokkaido economy despite the Colonial Agency's emphasis on permanent agricultural settlement. The lucrative but seasonal fishing industry enticed many Sapporo residents when conditions in the city got tough. Moreover, the urban economy was largely focused on construction in the early years, encouraging the predominance of a temporary population.⁷¹ The Colonial Agency did not keep track of how many residents left the city for work, but qualitative evidence hints at the phenomenon: an edict issued by the Agency on 12 July 1874 describes conditions in Sapporo during a serious economic depression: "Merchants and artisans leave in search of seasonal work in greater and greater numbers. Some have lost their property, and have no choice but to leave. This has led to confusion among the people, and angry protests in the streets against poor government."⁷² The risk of economic busts was high in the young city. This uncertainty made many merchants and laborers wary of transferring their permanent household registration to Sapporo. They preferred to keep their options open should better economic opportunities arise elsewhere.

A final factor in the divergent rates is more prosaic: the Colonial Agency's record keeping practices changed in 1873 to more scrupulously keep track of temporary residents,

⁷⁰ "Mazu kanri yori hajimu beshi," *Hokkai shinbun*, 17 May 1887.

⁷¹ Suzue Eiichi, "Sōsōki Sapporo no shihai to shakai," in *Sapporo no rekishi* 5 (August 1982): pp. 3–22.

⁷² *KJH*, vol. 6, p. 523.

which may account for the dramatic fluctuation in their numbers. In response to the depression in the early part of the year, municipal officials used a wide range of public-works projects to jumpstart the economy, and imported large numbers of laborers and artisans to work on building projects. The same had happened in 1869, but the carpenters, manual workers, and prison laborers of that period were not recorded in the population registers. This suggests that Sapporo may have had even more people, who were even more transient, than the ‘official’ temporary residents who made it into the population registries.⁷³

Alongside these systemic features of 1870s Sapporo and the early Meiji state, the experiences of the Imari migrants, the two brothel keepers, and brothel workers should also be read as a story of individuals seeking to carve out a livelihood in a volatile world. Ignoring the exhortations of government officials, ordinary people chose commerce, construction, and seasonal labor as more promising routes to profit. They manipulated the structures of the state to achieve their goals, and, when things didn’t go well, relied upon older forms of official benevolence to avoid total misery. Officials themselves seem to have been torn between anger and disapproval toward migrants who did not fully commit to the project of permanent settlement in Hokkaido, and sympathy for fellow migrants to a cold and distant place during a time of enormous unpredictability.

Beyond 1873

In the aftermath of the economic downturn in 1873, which lasted through most of 1874, the number of temporary residents plummeted, although the number of permanent residents remained roughly steady. In 1879, the number of temporary residents once again exploded, far

⁷³ See Enomoto, *Shima Yoshitake to Sapporo* (Saga: Saga Prefectural History Museum, 2013) for a discussion of the turmoil of 1869 and 1870, when the Colonial Agency was overwhelmed by conditions at Sapporo. The Colonial Agency decided to track temporary residents as early as 1871, but Sapporo figures are only available after 1874. See *KJH*, vol. 1, p. 547.

out of proportion to the growth in permanent residents. These trends pose two questions: first, why didn't permanent residents flee the city when the economy tanked in 1873? And second, what caused the boom in temporary residents in 1879?

The government's subsidy system for permanent migrants probably insulated many permanent residents from the ravages of the economy. Since its establishment, the Colonial Agency had sought to recruit people to Sapporo with the promise of land, supplies, and subsidies. In 1869/12, officials wrote to Sakata Prefecture, now part of Akita, seeking roughly 100 men and women to relocate to the Sapporo area, "where our capital is now being built." They promised three years of per diem subsidies, as well as housing, land, and supplies.⁷⁴ After the first few rocky years, which were characterized by ad hoc requests for migrants, the Colonial Agency developed a more systematic four-fold schema of subsidies. While this schema was by far the most generous to recruited farmers, it nevertheless also provided aid to recruited merchants and artisans, as well as those farmers, merchants, and artisans who moved to Hokkaido of their own volition. Despite the less generous terms for self-migrating merchants and artisans—their housing support came in the form of loans, for example, rather than outright grants—the Colonial Agency quickly reduced the loan burden for many of these households as a form of relief during economic hardship. In the summer of 1875, for example, the Agency announced that 80% of all housing loans would be converted into outright grants. They cited inflation in the price of both labor and goods as factors "forcing people to give up building homes and

⁷⁴ Kaitakushi Sapporo honchō shomukyoku henshūka, "Kaitakushi honpu Ishikari e toritatsu Sapporo kinpen kaikon no tsumori ni tsuki Uetsunokuni no uchi yori nōmin ijū irai no ken," *Kokushi henshū shorui sōkō* 1, 1869/12, A4/198(28), HPA.

abscond.”⁷⁵ The problem of people being unable (or unwilling) to stay put in Sapporo led officials to act decisively.

In addition to direct subsidies, officials also sought to create employment opportunities to persuade people to stay. After the initial building boom in 1873, the government shifted its development policy towards promoting agriculture within the city. As discussed in chapter 5, fruit trees—along with flax, mulberry, various grains, vegetables, and other crops—were distributed to city residents to give them a source of food as well as possible marketable goods. The municipal authorities explicitly urged local headmen to ensure artisans and merchants “used their spare time” to reclaim land for agriculture, and the government developed a program to buy crops at market rates from urban farmers.⁷⁶ In addition to the monetary value of agricultural products, the time and money invested in land would have made people think twice before relocating.

After 1873, the program of development put forth by Kuroda Kiyotaka and his principal American advisor, Horace Capron, led to a renewed building boom that established new sites of employment. Horace Capron in particular was confident that the construction of mills, factories, orchards, school buildings, and western-style housing for Colonial Agency advisors would reinvigorate the economy. Other facilities included the famous Sapporo Brewery and a gristmill in 1872, a paper mill and several orchards in 1873, miso and soy sauce factories in 1877 and 79, and a fish-oil refinery in 1878. The establishment of Sapporo Agricultural College in 1875 also

⁷⁵ [Kaitakushi] Henshūka, ed., *Kaitakushi furei roku*, vol. 4 (1875) (n.p.: Kaitakushi, 1875), 345/KA, NSC, no. 288, 1875/6/7, p. 505.

⁷⁶ See Kaitakushi Sapporo honchō shomukyoku henshūka, “Sapporo shigai shōnin, shokunin no yokei wo motte no kaikon sashiyurushi no ken,” *Kokushi henshū shorui sōkō* 2, 1871/2/9, A4/199(6), HPA; and Kaitakushi Sapporo honchō minjikyoku kangyōka, “Jinmin kanshō no tame kōsanbutsu nenjibetsu kaiage no ken,” *Shusairoku* 1877, 1877/3/20, A4/38(29), HPA.

helped anchor the city's economy, ironically by recruiting students for short-term visits to the city to learn new agricultural techniques before returning to their villages elsewhere in Hokkaido. Finally, the establishment of soldier-farmer settlements in the villages surrounding Sapporo from late 1874 helped create a hinterland economy for the city.⁷⁷ These various efforts started to pay off around 1876, when commercial activity started to flourish again in the district just south of Sapporo's central park. As with the first phase of Sapporo's growth, state-led investment played a central role in keeping the city alive, and stimulating the wider economy.

The question of why 1879 marked a sudden surge in temporary residents is harder to answer: no single factor drove this boom. Contemporary observers noted the gradual recovery of the economy, and the ongoing work at the various government factories and farms, but they also commented on how quickly the city's street grew quiet after leaving the one or two busiest blocks.⁷⁸ Others pointed to Prime Minister Sanjō Sanetomi's visit to Hokkaido in 1876, and his encouragement of more settlement in Sapporo, as the start of renewed migration.⁷⁹ Yet, three features of 1879 in particular do shed some light on some reasons for the resurgence of temporary residents in Sapporo. First were a series of administrative reforms that clarified the structure of local government in Sapporo, and probably made it easier for local officials to count the number of residents in the city. By 1878, Colonial Agency officials were complaining that local headmen did not understand their roles, which mostly involved administering the household registration system.⁸⁰ The confusion largely stemmed from the awkward and unwieldy

⁷⁷ See *SSS*, vol. 2, pp. 222–65.

⁷⁸ *SSS*, vol. 2, p. 524.

⁷⁹ Ōmura Kōtarō, “Sono koro, Sapporo nite medatsu ie jūgoken,” in *Sapporo no mukashi banashi: Meiji hen, jō*, ed. Kōno Tsunekichi (Sapporo: Miyama shobō, 1978), p. 107.

⁸⁰ Kirokukakari to Kuroda Kiyotaka, “Kukochō shokumu shōtei no sekō,” 1878/5/18, in *SSS*, vol. 7, pp. 954–55.

system of administrative districts that lumped the administration of urban Sapporo with the administration of the rural villages in the city's hinterland (see chapter 4). The Colonial Agency, following the lead of the national government, reformed this system in 1879, making urban Sapporo its own district and clarifying the roles of local officials. By rationalizing the functions of local government, the Agency probably gave local officials greater capacity to more accurately record the number of temporary residents, who would have been harder to track as they travelled frequently and had less permanent dwellings. Put differently, the official number of temporary residents prior to 1879 may be somewhat undercounted due to the limits on the capacity of local officials to keep accurate records.⁸¹

Yet, two other trends support the data that the number of temporary workers did increase rapidly around 1879: the resurgence of Colonial Agency construction projects in Sapporo, and the push for robust housing reform. Both these factors relate to the fact that most temporary residents in Sapporo had historically been artisans and laborers, brought to the city to provide skilled and manual labor. The difference between 1871 and 1879 has to do with the growth of construction by private individuals alongside renewed state-led investment in the city.

By the end of the 1870s, Colonial Agency spending in Sapporo and its surrounding district had returned to levels close to the initial building boom of 1873 (see Figure 3.3; the data reflect year of completion, so many projects would have been under construction the previous year). It is important to consider construction both within the city and in the surrounding district, as workers would have travelled to job sites in both places, but probably would have lived in the worker housing provided by the Colonial Agency in the city. The Agency built new

⁸¹ I discuss these changes in more detail in chapter 4.

accommodation for workers in Sapporo in 1879, hinting at the increase in numbers.⁸² The projects included new government offices, school buildings, factories, and other pieces of infrastructure, but spending also shifted somewhat to maintenance, and the reconstruction of many buildings with sturdier materials. In addition to the construction projects included in the data above, two other significant projects started in 1879: the construction of flood defenses along the Toyohira River, which accounted for an additional 8,300 yen of spending in 1879 and lasted for a further two years; and the start of railway construction between Otaru and Horonai, via Sapporo, in 1880.⁸³ Both these projects required significant labor, and would have seen a large, but temporary, influx of workers to the Sapporo area. The flood defense project in particular led to a big boom in the city, causing a large group of people to return to the city after abandoning it in prior years.⁸⁴ While the increase in spending is not proportional to the tenfold increase in the number of temporary workers seen between 1878 and 1879, it does go some way to explaining the growth in the construction industry that year.

Figure 3.3: Colonial Agency construction spending (in yen)⁸⁵				
	<i>Sapporo urban area</i>			<i>Sapporo district</i>
Year of completion	New construction	Maintenance projects	Total spending	Total spending
1871	12,296	4,406	16,702	49,091
1872	47,314	10,501	57,815	67,251
1873	136,405	4,296	140,701	142,411
1874	1,599	429	2,028	2,219
1875	42,641	25,124	67,765	119,658
1876	23,183	5,615	28,798	85,136
1877	35,352	7,642	42,994	59,842

⁸² *KJH*, vol. 2, p. 701.

⁸³ *KJH*, vol. 2, p. 830.

⁸⁴ Satō Kaneharu, “Kaitakushi setchi to Shima hangan chakunin no koto,” in *Sapporo no mukashi banashi*, pp. 7–11. Originally serialized in the early 1900s.

⁸⁵ Data taken from *KJH*, vol. 2, pp. 669–715. The data do not include projects smaller than 100 yen.

1878	16,731	16,977	33,708	48,852
1879	39,706	11,522	51,228	60,935
1880	62,870	18,119	80,989	129,241
1881	70,740	8,196	78,936	81,417

In addition to state-led infrastructure projects, the promotion of housing reform probably accounted for additional growth in the number of construction workers. Kuroda Kiyotaka had long pushed for improvements to the city's housing stock, and in 1876/9 he announced new regulations designed to make housing more suited to Hokkaido's cold weather. "Without improving our housing stock," he argued, "it will be impossible for the people to flourish and develop a foundation for self-sufficiency." He went on to discuss detailed suggestions for construction, based on the advice of Capron and other American advisors, and exhorted the public to "use stoves to heat rooms and preserve fish, meat, and fruit, and thus be able to wait for the summer work season."⁸⁶ Kuroda seems to have been unsatisfied with the Americans' suggestions, as he travelled to Vladivostok and Khabarovsk in November 1878 to seek out construction methods and heating devices better suited to Hokkaido's climate. He returned with several Russian stonemasons, although the buildings they constructed were ultimately deemed unsuccessful.⁸⁷ Nevertheless, Kuroda instructed that government buildings and official residents be built in stone, and in 1879/3 the Colonial Agency recruited 55 stonemasons and other builders from Tokyo to jumpstart this process.⁸⁸ Private citizens were also encouraged to rebuild their homes, likely contributing to the need for laborers. That year, the Colonial Agency made 50,000 yen available in loans (with individuals able to take out a maximum of 1,800 yen for a twelve-

⁸⁶ *KJH*, vol. 2, p. 654.


⁸⁷ *SSS*, vol. 2, pp. 520–21.

⁸⁸ *KJH*, vol. 2, p. 656.

tsubo stone building, or 135 yen for a 16.5-tsubo wooden building), doubling total construction expenditure in the city. Stone construction methods were shortly replaced by earthen construction (similar to traditional mud-walled buildings), while wooden buildings were built “in the Russian log style.”⁸⁹ It is unclear how many residents of the city took advantage of these loans, but buildings with glass windows and new chimneys did start to appear around this time.⁹⁰ Altogether, the concerted push for better housing, alongside the expansion of state-led infrastructure projects, likely attracted a large labor force to Sapporo once again, where they took up temporary residence. This feature persisted well past the end of the Colonial Agency tenure in 1882. In fact, temporary residents continued to be a majority of Sapporo’s population—or close to it—until well into the twentieth century (see Figure 3.4).

⁸⁹ *KJH*, vol. 2, p. 659.

⁹⁰ *SSS*, vol. 2, p. 521.



Conclusion

Not all temporary residents were construction workers, of course. The Imari migrants, the two hapless brothel owners, and the women who worked in their brothel represent just a few of the thousands of temporary residents who travelled to Sapporo for economic reasons, and then chose (or were forced) to leave again. Their lack of strong affective and material ties to Sapporo, and their dependence on the shaky economics of the young city, meant they often invested little in building permanent homes and putting down roots in the city. This made Sapporo feel empty and ramshackle at times; photographs of the city reinforce this impression (see Figure 3.5).⁹¹

⁹¹ Baron Raimund von Stillfried, "Sapporo wakihonjin okujō yori tōzai minami wo nozomu," 2, 1872/9, A(b) 5, NSC, <http://www2.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/hoppodb/contents/photo/l/0B001280000000002.jpg>.

The Colonial Agency exhorted residents to put down roots, but as their own officials' reluctance to transfer their residence to Sapporo suggests, this was not an easy sell. The lack of good communications and transport infrastructure, the harsh climate, the high prices and economic uncertainty, and the appeal of more lucrative economic pursuits made many people unwilling to settle permanently.



Figure 3.5, A View to the South from the Roof of the Sapporo Headquarters Annex, 1872

The boom-and-bust economic cycle and the structural seasonality of the wider Hokkaido economy help explain why the city saw such a high proportion of temporary workers. Without major changes in the structure of the economy of Sapporo and Hokkaido, the presence of temporary residents continued to define the city. Despite the Colonial Agency's efforts to foster

permanent settlement, its heavy investment in infrastructure and concomitant need for a mobile labor force meant that Sapporo would inevitably contain a large number of migrant construction workers. In general, the population remained poor, at least in the eyes of mainland Japanese observers: “Sapporo is the center of Hokkaido, and with a huge influx of population has become the largest settlement after Hakodate,” wrote Toida Ryūdō, an official of the Ministry of Agriculture and Commerce dispatched to Hokkaido in 1882. “While there are capitalists (*shisanka*) in Sapporo, only a few are men of wealth (*koyū zaisanka*); most came [to Hokkaido] to seek their fortune, and are very inexperienced. There are few truly wealthy people (*kosansha*)... Migrants are not capitalists from the mainland, and only a few are pure farmers or artisans. There aren’t even people trying to be full-time merchants. Without such people, it is hard to imagine the formation of society in the region.”⁹² The emerging class of local elites in Sapporo would probably have contested this rather pessimistic view, but overall the impression matches the demographic data: the city was dominated by a transient population for decades after its founding.

The state had to work hard to overcome this reluctance to settle by making increasingly attractive offers (in terms of housing, loans, and outright grants). This illustrates that, while the state was the prime mover in settling Hokkaido, the personal agency of individual migrants played a big role in shaping state policy towards migration. That is, the state was never able to attract its desired groups of migrants: dedicated farmers, hardworking artisans, and honest merchants. Instead, the focus on construction and the rapid pace of urban development meant that the most successful residents of the city were those who benefited directly from the fast pace

⁹² Toida Ryūdō, “Hokkaido kikō shōshutsu,” 1882, 別 915-Hi, NSC, <http://www2.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/cgi-bin/hoppodb/record.cgi?id=0A0044600000000000>.

of urban growth: construction firms, innkeepers, and (eventually) financiers, as well as local officials.

The occupations of a group of men interviewed as the “town elders” in the late 1890s as part of a local history project in Sapporo reflect these trends. Three major contractors (Nakagawa Genzaemon, Ōoka Sukeuemon, and Suibara Torazō) appear in procurement documents from the beginning of the 1870s: they managed laborers, secured lumber and other supplies, and then branched out into other businesses. Nakagawa, for example, had been in charge of recruiting laborers from Hakodate, Tohoku, and Tokyo for construction projects in Sapporo in the 1870s. He lost money on a contract for railway ties in the 1880s, and otherwise focused on house-building and other projects as a contractor. Suibara, initially a manual laborer, worked his way up to foreman, then contractor, and eventually became an apple farmer in the outskirts of Sapporo. Innkeepers who survived the 1873 economic slump became wealthy and powerful figures in the city, while employees of the Mitsui group—who became the Colonial Agency’s chief financiers—in turn became entrepreneurs and capitalists on their own.⁹³ Ishikawa Shōzō exemplifies the type of immigrant to Sapporo who stayed in the city and become a local notable: he moved to Sapporo in 1872 as an employee of a Tokyo exchange office, but when that business collapsed he started his own financing operation, lending money to officials and commoners alike. He was the first entrepreneur to establish a legal company in Sapporo (a transport company, in 1876), and he went on to become a prolific businessmen, with ventures in hotels, fisheries, freight transport, matchstick manufacturing, and the first local newspaper. He

⁹³ This list of men were interviewed by Kōno Tsunekichi, both individually and in a group, in the late 1890s; their accounts are scattered throughout *Sapporo no mukashi banashi*. They were also remembered specifically by Omura Kōtarō as the “eminent men” of Sapporo in his memoir of 1918. Ōmura Kōtarō, “Sono koro, Sapporo nite medatsu ie 15-ken,” in *Sapporo no mukashi banashi*, p. 98.

also funded various academic societies as well as a fire brigade for the city before his death in 1888.⁹⁴

The ambition and persistence of men like Ishikawa make for good stories about the dedicated individuals who helped develop Sapporo and create a sense of community and permanence in the town. Yet, too many histories of the city focus only on men like Ishikawa: that is, the permanent residents who stayed in the city. His many counterparts—the small shopkeepers and businessmen, construction foremen and brothel owners, local officials and schoolteachers—who did *not* stay in Sapporo are much harder to incorporate into the story. Even the successes, like Ishikawa, only looked that way much later: even in 1882, an observer like Toida could identify few people of such stature in Sapporo. More importantly, a focus on this relatively elite stratum of Sapporo's commoner society, whether those whose businesses succeeded and led to long-term residence or those who failed and returned to hometowns elsewhere, disregards the fact that so many people in early Sapporo never intended to settle permanently, and lived lives that were structured around seasonal and long-distance employment opportunities.

In a more abstract sense, the huge numbers of temporary residents complicates our understanding of civic identity and relations of power in Sapporo. Residents tended to gain power and authority by virtue of their longevity, and tended to write about transient people as a negative aspect of Sapporo's life: a source of disorder and lawlessness, as I will explore in the next chapter. The stories of temporary residents are worth remembering as we read the memoirs

⁹⁴ Ishikawa's diaries offer glimpses of his work for the Colonial Agency, as well as his interests in national news in the 1870s and his efforts to start his transport agency. See Ishikawa Shōzō, "Ishikawa-ke monjo 2," 1872–77, 道写本 008(2), NSC, <http://www2.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/cgi-bin/hoppodb/record.cgi?id=0A017900000002000>. This very brief overview of Ishikawa's life comes from Sapporo shi kyōiku iinkai, ed., *Kaitakushi jidai* (Sapporo: Hokkaido Shinbunsha, 1989), p. 223.

and accounts of long-term Sapporo residents. Officials and civic boosters, and as a result many historians, have tended to follow the stories of people who remained in one place for a long time: but more transient people also gave life to cities like Sapporo, and indeed gave Sapporo its character as a settler-colonial capital: a restless town, with both economic and demographic fluidity, that functioned as a funnel of people and node of control for the broader colonial project in Hokkaido.

Chapter 4

Administering Sapporo: Urban Disorder and Local Government, 1869–1887

Imamura Wasaburō, a construction worker, spent the night of 1872/7/4 at a small brothel in the Susukino quarter, owned by a man named Takase Kenjirō. The next morning, Imamura got into a fight over the bill, which he was unable to pay as he had failed to bring any money. After he beat up Takase's servant, some of Imamura's friends persuaded him to leave behind a blanket he owned, and he went home, seemingly placated. Yet, that afternoon, Imamura got very drunk, and his anger reignited. He gathered up his construction team and some other men and went back to Susukino that night. The angry mob rampaged through Susukino, and ultimately destroyed Takase's brothel. They roughed up an official sent to calm them down, and massed together near their camp. "There must have been two thousand people," remembered Yamashita Jihē, who apprehended criminals for the Colonial Agency's Criminal Department; "it really felt like the beginning of a war."¹ Quick thinking on the part of some local men scared the mob, and they scattered without fighting.

Imamura soon turned himself in. Charged with incitement to violence, concealment of criminal intent, and the destruction of property, he was sentenced to death, although the sentence was reduced to banishment by virtue of Imamura's proactive submission to the authorities. Banishment might not have seemed like such a terrible fate: Imamura was already far from his origins in a farming village on the outskirts of Tokyo, and Sapporo's remote location, scarce and

¹ Yamashita Jihē, "Katate ni jitte, katate niwa torinawa wo tazusaete," in *Sapporo no mukashi banashi: Meiji hen, jō*, ed. Kōno Tsunekichi (Sapporo: Miyama shobō, 1978), p. 155. The interviews were originally conducted and serialized in *Hokkaido Mainichi Shinbun*, 1898. While the reliability of these and other memoirs of early Sapporo is questionable, when carefully read in conjunction with other contemporaneous sources they offer helpful counterpoints to the Colonial Agency accounts of events, and add some color to the lives of ordinary people in the city.

expensive food, poor housing, cold climate, and lack of consistent employment must have felt like a form of banishment.²

To the authorities in Sapporo, Imamura's actions sparked alarm. The outbreak of violence was a stark reminder of their precarious position, isolated from the more robust structures of the state in southern Hokkaido and mainland Japan. The incident led officials to recruit a police force from Hakodate, and put in place stricter laws on behavior and conduct. Yet, local leaders—particularly the principal Colonial Agency official in Sapporo, Matsumoto Jūrō—also understood that the broader issues exposed by Imamura's outburst required more sustained attention. The vast inequality of wealth between poor laborers and wealthy contractors, greedy brothel owners and their indentured workers, soaring rice prices, and the ineptitude of officials were issues that had been plaguing Japanese towns and villages since the end of the eighteenth century. Matsumoto also recognized that Sapporo's position as a colonial capital, and a town being built from scratch in a part of the world unfamiliar to most immigrant Japanese, created unique challenges. He and his colleagues worked tirelessly to create and adapt regulations that would bring mainland Japanese civilization to Sapporo, but adapted to the particular circumstances of the settler colony.

By 1887, Sapporo's elites still worried about construction workers, large numbers of whom lived in the southeastern part of the city that was becoming known as a working-class quarter.³ Yet, the concern had shifted from a fear of violence to a concern that these sojourning

² The story of Imamura's case is discussed in Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho shomukakari, "Sapporo Susukino yūjo tosei Takase Yoshijirō taku nit e ranbō no Imamura Wasaburō hoka sho shokunin shokei hō no ken," *Tokyo ōfuku* 3, 1872/8/17, 簿書 403(45), HPA, and idem., "Katsushika-gun nō Genshirō segare Imamura Wasaburō Sapporo Susukino yūjoya uchikowashi no ken," *Sho shō ōfuku* 1872, 1872/10, 簿書 428(75), HPA.

³ Kanita Seiji, "Sapporo ni okeru saimingai no seiritsu: 1880-nendai no Sapporo shigai," *Sapporo no rekishi* 16 (February 1989): pp. 18–33.

residents were “retarding Hokkaido’s development”, as the editor of the newly founded *Hokkai shinbun* pointed out in an editorial on 17 May 1887. To tackle this problem, it was important to debate two key proposals: one, whether to levy different tax rates on temporary and permanent residents; and two, whether to recruit local officials only from permanent residents. By revising these bureaucratic mechanisms, the argument went, people would be induced to settle permanently in Sapporo.⁴

Less than two decades had passed between Imamura’s rampage and the call to use tax policy and bureaucratic recruitment standards to tackle the broader problem of transient people in Sapporo. In that period, the city had ballooned in size from 2,000 people to 13,000 people, and had become capital of the newly established Hokkaidō-chō, which had replaced the Colonial Agency and its short-lived successor prefectures of Sapporo, Hakodate, and Nemuro. That these two policy tools—tax rates and official recruitment—had become commonplace enough to merit discussion in a Sapporo newspaper reflects the rise of a more bureaucratically organized city, one in which many residents trusted the apparatus of local government to solve the broader challenges of colonial settlement. More specifically, a class of local elites, drawn largely from the city’s earliest and wealthiest residents, had become increasingly powerful in local government, and they were concerned with making systems of local government work more efficiently. During the spring of 1887, editorials continued to advocate for reforms to the system of local representation, partly by criticizing inept local officials, and partly by expressing more abstract goals for local assemblies, civic duties, and the importance of trusting one’s fellow citizens.

⁴ “Mazu kanri yori hajimu beshi,” *Hokkai shinbun*, 17 May 1887.

The lack of preexisting Japanese society in Sapporo made the colonial state a crucial actor in determining the organization of the city: and indeed, historians of Sapporo's social structure have emphasized the dominant role of the state in shaping the institutions of civic control and the lives of local people.⁵ Certainly the state, as the dominant economic motor in Sapporo, played an enormous role in people's lives. It created municipal ordinances and the police forces to enforce them; it taxed and regulated businesses; it processed applications for employment, residence, and travel; and it subsidized almost everyone in early Sapporo, either directly through disbursements to recruited migrants, or by seizing Indigenous land and distributing it cheaply to immigrant Wajin, along with low- or no-interest building loans.

Yet, it is simplistic to see the state as a monolithic, top-down entity treating the people of Sapporo as pieces in a colonial board game. The transition in local government between 1869 and the 1880s reveals an irony: even as Sapporo became more firmly established as a colonial city, the colonial state became less powerful as local elites took a greater interest and role in local government. Shifting political goals, a chronic lack of funding, and the vagaries of environment and economy made it impossible for the state to implement its goals in full. Officials on the ground in Sapporo argued with their Tokyo counterparts, and mediated the imposition of orders from above. Migrants to Sapporo, both settlers and sojourners, were keen to assert their own ambitions to make money, gain power, or simply establish a community. The interplay between officials, local elites, and a range of ordinary people, as well as the adaptation of older urban practices from mainland Japan to a distinctly colonial urban context, characterized the administration of space in 1870s Sapporo.

⁵ See, for example, Suzue Eiichi, *Hokkaidō chōson seidoshi no kenkyū* (Sapporo: Hokkaido Daigaku tosho kankō kai, 1985); Harada Kazufumi, *Oyatoi gaikokuin: Kaitaku* (Tokyo: Kajima kenkyūjo shuppankai, 1975); Enomoto Morie, "'Shokumin kōhō' to Hokkaido kaitaku," *Chiiki to keizai* 6 (Mar 2009): pp. 45–52.

In particular, as the many petitions, criminal records, and civil disputes brought before the government make clear, local elites and ordinary people actively sought to shape their community by setting norms, creating institutions and building physical infrastructure to supplement the work of the Colonial Agency. On the side of the government, the process of creating laws reveals the process of negotiation and revision deemed necessary to accommodate the transient population, indigenous culture, and isolation of Sapporo. In a newly founded town with no traditions and little non-indigenous history, colonial residents and officials alike turned to historical precedent from elsewhere in Japan to establish the rudiments of local government. At the same time, Sapporo's role as a colonial capital made it a testing ground for the most 'enlightened' policies of the young Meiji regime. Together, the efforts of local people in both civil society and the government helped establish a basic municipal architecture by the end of the Colonial Agency period that enabled the town to function as the symbolic and political centerpiece of the colonial state in the northern Japanese archipelago.

In the first part of this chapter, I will focus on the lawlessness of early Sapporo: the immediate challenges of crime, economic crisis, and environmental factors. I will then look at official responses to these challenges in the form of police enforcement and the establishment of municipal ordinances. I will then turn to the role of local bureaucrats and local elites in supplementing and shaping the structures of municipal authority, both through formal mechanisms of governance and local autonomy, and through informal pressure on the central state. Both local officials and local notables understood their efforts as addressing the uniqueness of Sapporo's colonial context in comparison to their origins elsewhere in Japan, and the establishment of local government in Sapporo marked an important step in the settling of the city as the headquarters of the colonial project in Hokkaido.

Lawless Sapporo: Bad Behavior as Criminal and Civilizational Affront

From Sapporo's founding in 1869, the city's administrators saw their town as a hotbed of lawlessness: not only in terms of criminality, but also in the lack of civilization among its poor and Indigenous residents, and the untamed natural environment surrounding the city. This understanding stemmed in part from the broader historical context of late-Edo-period urban unrest, which was characterized by social conflict, political upheaval, and economic disruption, and in part from the peculiar circumstances of Sapporo's youth and colonial location. As the police bureau put it, "Sapporo is a new town; its residents are a disorderly mob."⁶ This disorder included the personal behavior of residents: officials bemoaned the short-termism of money-grubbing merchants, the "evil customs" of Ainu residents, and the drunken carousing of laborers. From the perspective of non-official residents of Sapporo, the lack of established institutions, an unfamiliar environment, and tumultuous political and economic changes of the early years of the colonization of Hokkaido created a different kind of lawlessness, one in which personal initiative and manipulation of government resources could make the difference between success or failure.

The urgency of settling Hokkaido meant that officials were "unable to select rich people rather than poor, good people rather than bad," a situation that led to "violent gangs" terrorizing ordinary people and "duplicitous behavior in the extreme."⁷ The precise quantity of this behavior in Sapporo between 1869 and 1875 is hard to determine, as police records prior to 1876 have been lost,⁸ but court records suggest that the vast majority of cases tried in the Sapporo district (which included much of central and northern Hokkaido) were violations of bureaucratic

⁶ Ōkurashō, *Kaitakushi jigyo hōkoku* (Sapporo: Hokkaidō shuppan kikaku sentā, 1981–85 [1885]), vol. 5, p. 222. Hereafter *KJH*.

⁷ *KJH*, vol. 5, p. 266.

⁸ *KJH*, vol. 5, p. 228.

procedures or absenteeism, with only three people in the entire district tried for “gathering a malicious gang,” in 1872.⁹ Otherwise, the crimes in Sapporo were mostly small: thefts of tools, food, and sake; gambling; failure to submit the proper documents for various bureaucratic procedures; and leaving Sapporo for more than fifty days without permission.¹⁰ The threat of disorder may have loomed large, and a large number of crimes may have gone unreported and unprosecuted, but for the most part lawlessness seems to have been a question of disorder rather than violent criminality.

Nevertheless, disorder frustrated officials struggling to impose the rule of law on Sapporo, as well as city residents concerned with safety and economic security. Sapporo residents frequently complained about suspicious types loitering around. An 1872 petition urged the government to build an assembly hall in which all itinerant entertainers should be ordered to purvey their services, arguing that these fortune-tellers hung around the streets and annoyed local residents.¹¹ Itinerant merchants also caused problems, mostly by letting their packhorses roam freely through the city.¹² These itinerant wanderers, along with the floating population of seasonal workers and the high numbers of residents who absconded during economic downturns,

⁹ *KJH*, vol. 5, pp. 285–88.

¹⁰ This smattering, from 1874 and 1875, appears in *Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho kirokukyoku henshūka*, *Sapporo honcho nisshi sōkō*, 2, 1876, 簿書 A4/297, HPA.

¹¹ *Kaitakushi kaikongakari*, “Shichū sho negai tojikomi,” 1871–72, 道資料 161, NSC, pp. 73–74. Available online at <http://www2.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/cgi-bin/hoppodb/record.cgi?id=0A0106800000000000>.

¹² “Honchō gokō dorui narabini naigai suido seiyōkei gomōn gokasho saku, yara toritate no ken,” *Kaitakushi kōbunroku – Tokyo*, 1873/10/14, 簿書 5757, reprinted in Sapporo-shi kyōiku iinkai, ed., *Shin Sapporo shishi*, vol. 7 (Sapporo: Hokkaidō shinbunsha, 1986), p. 179. Hereafter SSS.

led town headmen to complain about the impermanent population and its unruly character for at least a decade after the city's founding.¹³

The precarious state of early Sapporo's economy led many residents to exploit the resources offered by the Colonial Agency, further aggravating officials. Most notable were the housing loans provided to all city dwellers. Migrants to Sapporo were provided housing, either as an outright gift (in the case of recruited farmers), or in the form of a ten-year, zero-interest 100-yen loan. Much to the dismay of local officials, these loans did not always go to the construction of robust housing. Some residents used their housing loan as collateral to take out mortgages or other loans from private lenders.¹⁴ Others simply pocketed the money, or used it for other things, saving housing costs by living in subpar housing. On 1872/3/26, Colonial Agency officials set fire to a large swathe of the commoner district of the town, filled with grass huts that had been built by early settlers. These huts had long been a fire concern, and the Agency was especially upset that newcomers to the city were squatting in these huts, rather than using their housing loans to build more substantial homes.¹⁵ This fire, while dramatic, seems not to have been sufficient to encourage the construction of sturdier homes; in 1879, the Colonial Agency issued formal rules for the construction of housing to improve quality.¹⁶

The economic and political conditions of the early city help explain the incidences of vagrancy, theft, and rowdy behavior. Many of the migrants to Sapporo were poor and unskilled,

¹³ "Sapporo shigai imin kaitaku no teimatsu," *Imin rireki shirabe*, 1877, NSC, reprinted in *SSS*, vol. 7, p. 242.

¹⁴ *KJH*, vol. 6, p. 742.

¹⁵ *SSS*, vol. 2, pp. 159–64, discusses some of the other possible motives at play: safeguarding property for government buildings, and realigning the street grid, for instance, which had been encroached upon by buildings.

¹⁶ *KJH*, vol. 6, pp. 750–53.

and they encountered a harsh climate and lack of regular employment. Many of the artisans and laborers who traveled with Shima Yoshitake to build the first institutions in Sapporo abandoned the city in droves after Shima was recalled to Tokyo. The government renewed its construction effort in 1871, but a second crunch in 1873 decimated the city's population and again left many workers without jobs. This boom-and-bust cycle was largely driven by the government's strained budget, reinforcing the sense that the state was both the sole source of aid and the primary obstacle to an independently sustainable urban economy.

More pressingly, the prices of rice and other supplies fluctuated wildly and made it difficult for city residents to build homes, run their businesses, and keep their families fed and sheltered. Rice prices fluctuated all around Japan in the first years of the Meiji period, exacerbated by crop failures in 1869. The situation was exacerbated even further in Sapporo, where all rice had to be imported. When the Colonial Agency's principal transport vessel sank in the winter of 1870, it caused rice prices to skyrocket in Sapporo. The high cost of transport and the unreliability of maritime transport kept rice prices unsteady for several years, although the decision to prioritize the settlement of farming villages in the suburbs of Sapporo helped alleviate the food shortages somewhat.¹⁷ Costs for housing were also high: residents of the city complained that the lack of stonemasons and carpenters made it very expensive to build their homes.¹⁸ Lumber was shipped to Sapporo from the Ishikari river valley, but the Colonial Agency's large building projects used up much of it, and shipping itself was unreliable: the rivers around Sapporo tended to either flood or run dry, making water transport unreliable. There were forests around the city, but the Colonial Agency placed strict limits on felling lumber to prevent

¹⁷ SSS, vol. 2, pp. 68–70.

¹⁸ Kaitakushi kaikongakari, "Shichū sho negai," pp. 52–53, 54–55.

deforestation and conserve valuable resources for their own income.¹⁹ Altogether, the challenges posed by high prices, supply shortages, and an unpredictable economy help explain why residents pocketed their stipends, turned to petty theft, and got angry at wealthy brothel owners.

In addition to combatting these familiar sources of urban disorder, officials in the Sapporo area also saw themselves as vanguards of a civilizing mission in Hokkaido. They enacted a series of regulations specifically targeting Ainu cultural practices in the villages around Sapporo in 1870/10, explicitly banning piercings, tattoos, and the practice of burning houses after the death of a family member.²⁰ The “ongoing cleansing of evil customs of the past among Ainu around Sapporo” was proceeding by 1872, but the Ainu were “clinging on” to some customs, such as the bear ceremony and *omusha* ceremonies with Japanese officials, where sake and other goods were exchanged. New regulations outlawed these practices, too.²¹ Other Ainu economic practices, such as fishing with stakes in the rivers around Sapporo, were outlawed on the grounds that they “disrupted shipping.”²² Ainu land in the Sapporo area that had long been used as hunting or fishing grounds, logging, or other economic uses was expropriated by the government and sold to immigrant Japanese as private property.²³ Ainu were legally able to

¹⁹ *KJH* vol. 6, pp. 368, 382.

²⁰ Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho shomukyoku henshūka, “Kaitakushi, Ainu no kaikonsha he kyoka/nōgu sagewatashi no mune nado futatsu no ken,” *Tokyo shorui sōkō* 1872, 1872/10/14, A4/218(9), HPA.

²¹ Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho shomukakari, “Ishikari Sapporo dojin rōshū senjo no tame omusha, kumaokuri haishi no ken,” *Kaigi shorui* 1872/10, 1872/10, 簿書 433(31), HPA.

²² Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho shomukakari, “Toyohira sonohoka sho kawa unsō senyō ni tsuki sakegyo nado no tame kuiki tate teishi no ken,” *Kaitakushi gofukoku 1 – 1871*, 1871/6, 簿書 279(49), HPA.

²³ See the Hokkaido Land Regulations, as in Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho shomukyoku henshūka, “Sapporo kankatsu shizai shiyūchi haishaku chisho kisoku kōsei no ken,” *Kokushi henshū shorui sōkō* 3 – 1872, 1872/10, A4/200(55), HPA; Katsuya Hirano has written about land expropriation in the colonization of Hokkaido in “Settler Colonialism in the Making of Japan’s Hokkaido,” in *The Routledge Handbook of the History of Settler Colonialism*, ed. Edward Cavanagh and Lorenzo Veracini (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2017), pp. 327–338, although he does not look at Sapporo specifically.

secure deeds to private property, and in the villages around Sapporo one or two Ainu did indeed become property owners, but the seizure of their traditional land in the first place makes it difficult to speak favorably of this ostensible egalitarianism on the part of the Colonial Agency.²⁴

The practical concerns of municipal leaders thus aligned with the ideological goals of a colonial state keen to civilize the Ainu people. This marked a drastic shift from pre-Meiji government policy towards the Ainu, which recognized their distinctiveness and sought to protect them, however futilely, from the excesses of economic exploitation by Japanese merchants. The tactics used by the government to address both longstanding forms of domestic unrest and the civilizing mission vis-à-vis the Ainu, however, were very similar: stricter enforcement by the police, and the construction of firmer institutions of local government.

Creating Order: Police and Policy

In the aftermath of Imamura Wasaburō's riot against the Takase brothel, local officials quickly requested the creation of a police force in Sapporo to replace the ad hoc services of men like criminal catcher Yamashita Jihē. Twenty men arrived from Hakodate by the end of July 1872, and began patrolling the city. The provisional rules established for their work directly reflect the concerns raised by both city officials and ordinary residents. The draft rules started with a striking moral call for police to "punish evil gangs and protect good people," although this was edited to the much more benign exhortation to "protect the following rules." The rules themselves, though, continued to express the range of practical and moral concerns facing Sapporo's government. For example, the conflation of crime with poverty appears in the instruction to patrolmen to "pay special attention to the back alleys, where poor artisans and

²⁴ On the seizure of Kotoni Mataichi's land near present-day Hokkaido University, see "Kairakuen chizoku kyūdojin Kotoni Mataichi shoyūchi wo kangyōka shoshushokuchi toshite kakoikomi no ken," *Kakugun bun'iroku, kangyōka*, 1878, A4/48(15), HPA.

other propertyless residents live together,” while concern about loitering gangs led to several lines about questioning suspicious characters and breaking up groups of people behaving oddly. The police were also charged with more prosaic duties related to the maintenance of public order. They were to keep the roads clear of travelling merchants; prevent public nudity and urination; shush carousing drunkards; and help prevent fires.²⁵

By the end of 1872, the police force had grown to fifty men, and over the course of 1873 new hierarchies, salary scales, and a physical headquarters were established. The force continued to grow, as did its responsibilities, over the course of the next decade. Fire and flood defense became increasingly important, while the national overhaul of the police system in 1875 also affected the Sapporo force. In 1877, the police started issuing detailed regulations for different industries: permits were now required for theatre, sideshows, and other performances; new regulations on the brothel industry came into effect, with the police put in charge of enforcement. The following year saw the introduction of rules for keeping large animals, running pawnshops, and selling secondhand goods. The police were also put in charge of enforcing public health during a cholera outbreak in 1879, by which point there were 100 police officers in a town of nearly 8,000 people.²⁶

This history of institutional development echoes a general transformation from early-modern to modern urban policing that unfolded in cities across Japan. While the cities of Tokugawa Japan were perhaps not as “unpoliced” as some scholars have suggested, it is true that

²⁵ Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho shomukakari, “Sapporo rasotsu torimōke ni tsuki migi kisoku Hakodate no furiai wo motte torikime no ken,” *Tokyo ōfuku* 3 – 1872, 1872/7/28, 簿書 403(20), HPA.

²⁶ This survey from *KJH*, vol. 5, p. 222–26.

the manpower in urban police forces was very small.²⁷ Yet, by the end of the Tokugawa period, this idealized ‘self-regulating’ urban system had begun to fall apart as rising numbers of poor farmers, transient merchants, and roaming samurai challenged the capability of residence-based neighborhood structures to effectively keep public order. Gangs of youths became particularly problematic from the 1790s, although this was mostly from the perspective of the central authorities: local household-group heads were less keen to crack down on these groups, who played an important role in internal regulation.²⁸ Yet, as economic conditions worsened in the early to mid-nineteenth century, desperate families often disowned their children. Apprentices absconded, often after stealing from their masters, adding to the mix, while vagrants—whether peasants who had fled the land, or urban dwellers who ran away or were kicked out of their homes—multiplied. Official policy was to turn these unregistered people over to the outcaste status group of the *hinin*, but this was often insufficient to handle their growing numbers, and the shogunate turned to other means to deal with the rising tide of vagrants, such as workhouses and stockades.²⁹

Resistance to crackdowns notwithstanding, periodic bakufu efforts to rid the cities of these people required the creation of larger police forces, which ironically often drew on the

²⁷ James Leavell argues that Tokugawa cities were “unpoliced,” relying instead on self-policing household groups. “The Policing of Society,” in *Japan in Transition: Thought and Action in the Meiji Era, 1868–1912*, ed. Hilary Conroy, Sandra T.W. Davis, and Wayne Patterson (London: Associated University Presses, 1984), pp. 22–49. Daniel Botsman and Umemori Naoyuki have challenged this view, showing the elaborate and spectacular forms of policing at play in Tokugawa Japan, and the transition to a modern penal system in the late Tokugawa and early Meiji periods. See Daniel Botsman, *Punishment and Power in Early Modern Japan* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005) and Naoyuki Umemori, “Modernization through Colonial Mediations: The Establishment of the Police and Prison System in Meiji Japan” (PhD diss., University of Chicago, 2002).

²⁸ Takeuchi Makoto, “Festivals and Fights,” in *Edo and Paris: Urban Life and the State in the Early Modern Era* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 402–405.

²⁹ David Ambaras, *Bad Youth: Juvenile Delinquency and the Politics of Everyday Life in Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), pp. 9–29.

same unruly people that caused headaches for the authorities. By the end of the Tokugawa period, cities like Edo had sizeable but increasingly unreliable police forces that attempted to deal with the large population of people who didn't fit neatly into the self-policing neighborhood system.³⁰ Starting in the 1860s, government elites looked to western models to tackle longstanding urban problems related to poverty, transience, and immorality, as well as new problems accompanying structural changes in a nascent industrial economy and political unrest in the transition to a centralized state facing new forms of geopolitical pressure. Police forces grew in size, became more bureaucratized, and took on a wider range of functions. Nevertheless, their primary concern with dealing with the “social problems” of cities continued largely unchanged.

The historical rise of vagrancy and urban disorder, which played out most notably in Edo but also in castle towns and rural areas throughout Japan, informed the actions of Sapporo's officials. They were particularly concerned with rootless laborers, and issued edict after edict to limit seasonal labor, and urge the registration of workers in Sapporo. In 1871/1, for instance, they strictly forbade artisans and merchants in Sapporo from taking seasonal employment in the fisheries, and conversely banned fishery workers from “secretly taking up jobs in Sapporo.”³¹ Rules for migrants to the city, such as those from Imari, explicitly forbade them from taking on seasonal employment in the fisheries.³² Limits on property ownership and eligibility for so-called

³⁰ Minami Kazuo, *Bakumatsu toshi shakai no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Hanawa shobō, 1999), pp. 67–78. See also Daniel Botsman's summary of Yasumaru Yoshio's account of late-Tokugawa prisons in *Punishment and Power in the Making of Modern Japan*, pp. 127–29. More generally, Botsman discusses the spread of Western ideas about penal systems more than the spread of police forces, but nevertheless shows the wide circulation of these ideas in Japan well before the arrival of Commodore Perry, let alone the Meiji regime. See *Punishment and Power in the Making of Modern Japan*, pp. 115–129.

³¹ [Kaitakushi] Henshūka, ed., *Kaitakushi furei roku*, vol. 1 (1869–71) (n.p.: Kaitakushi, 1871), 345/K, NSC, no. 2, 1871/1/14, p. 165.

³² Kaitakushi Tokyo shutchōjo, “Akkeshi, Kushiro ryōgun e ijū no moto Saga-ken nōfu 286-meī Sapporo fuka e ijū tanga no ken,” *Kaitakushi kōbunroku* 24, 1872/4/30, 簿書 5509(27), HPA.

“temporary” residents also reflect the colonial state’s distrust of sojourning workers, and highlight a central tension between the government’s ideal of a permanently settled population, and the reality of a colonial economy highly dependent on seasonal and migratory labor, as well as an indigenous culture that also relied on seasonal migration. Confronting this tension preoccupied the Colonial Agency throughout its tenure, and it repeatedly sought ways to cut down on disorder.

The evolution of a set of municipal ordinances implemented in Sapporo between 1869 and 1877 reveals some of the continuities that stretched between late-Tokugawa thinking about urban disorder, while also highlighting some of the unique challenges facing officials in Sapporo. In 1869/3, the Colonial Agency issued a series of regulations as they prepared to start in earnest their efforts to colonize the region. Many of these regulations applied to the towns of the former Matsumae domain, and they remained in force until their revision in 1871. As a result, they formed the basis of subsequent measures implemented in Sapporo. Several features stand out in these early regulations that highlight the continued place of Tokugawa-era policies. First is the structure of local authority and enforcement. Household groups (*goningumi*) were the primary site of interaction between individuals and the state, with all disputes and petitions processed through the head of the local household group. Appeals could be forwarded to the town elders (*machidoshiyori*) and beyond, especially if the local household-group head was delinquent or inept. One of the primary responsibilities of these heads was to vet and approve immigrants. This required contacting the immigrant’s former town or village officials, and assessing the migrant’s character, proposed line of work, and assets. This was true for permanent and temporary migrants, as well as servants. Household-group heads were also tasked with keeping an eye out for the disabled, widowed, and solitary dwellers, and secure neighborhood support for the

victims of disasters. In these respects, local household groups were tasked with many of the day-to-day concerns of keeping order and ensuring the wellbeing of ordinary people.³³

Household-group heads ensured moral order by cracking down on illicit business practices, such as collusion and price-fixing, and by overseeing business deals in order to prevent excessive prices, low wages, and poor workmanship. They were to enforce the ban on gambling as well as the ban on child abandonment and abortion. Theatrical performances required permits, and geisha and prostitutes were only allowed in licensed areas. The wives and daughters of townsmen were strictly prohibited from emulating geisha with dancing and musical performance. Heads were also to restrict luxury and ensure that all festivals, weddings, funerals, and other rituals be conducted in accordance with the status of the people involved.³⁴ These sumptuary laws echoed the late Tokugawa shogunate's repeated efforts, dating back to the eighteenth century, to clamp down on the excessive wealth of commoners, and restore a sense of moral and economic balance to society.

In 1871, the Colonial Agency issued a new set of regulations applying throughout Hokkaido that continued the 1869 rules in full while elaborating and doubling down on several of the moral strictures. For example, landlords and household-group heads were expected to intervene in situations of insufficient filial piety or spousal discord.³⁵ People who spent all their time drunk and arguing without doing any work were to be reported, while local headmen were to “regularly patrol temples and woods to make sure no suspicious people were loitering

³³ [Kaitakushi] Henshūka, ed., *Kaitakushi furei roku*, vol. 1, no. 2, 1869/3, pp. 35–37.

³⁴ [Kaitakushi] Henshūka, ed., *Kaitakushi furei roku*, vol. 1, no. 2, 1869/3, pp. 37–41.

³⁵ [Kaitakushi] Henshūka, ed., *Kaitakushi furei roku*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1871/4, p. 152.

around.”³⁶ Other guidelines warned against merchants or land speculators forcing people to buy or sell property, especially those coming from other parts of the country, while all travellers were to be reported and registered with local headmen.³⁷ In all, these rules—which were not specific to Sapporo—reflected longstanding Tokugawa-era concerns with unrestricted travel, the dangers of commercial transaction, and the laziness of commoners.

In 1872/7, the Colonial Agency issued a set of nine municipal ordinances for Sapporo and its surrounding villages. Three tried to prevent itinerant merchants and residents from blocking public thoroughfares with their goods or garbage; two limited the number of packhorses per handler and banned them from roaming around the city center; three related to disorderly behavior, including violence, fireworks displays in crowded alleys, and drunken carousing; and one ordinance banned public nudity and public urination by both men and women.³⁸ These ordinances illustrate a set of practical concerns for urban living, and mostly tried to stem nuisances, although the restrictions on loitering and carousing also echo earlier moral strictures against drinking, gambling, and licentiousness.

In 1872/11, the national government introduced in Tokyo the first of a nationwide set of ordinances governing misdemeanors and minor crimes (*ishiki kaiti jōrei*); they were introduced in mainland cities and villages throughout 1873, including Hakodate in 1873/2. These ordinances, usually numbering between 50 and 60 articles, covered everything from public morals and public health to road sweeping and transportation regulations. In rural areas, they placed greater emphasis on the maintenance of Tokugawa-era laws and neighborhood-based administrative and

³⁶ [Kaitakushi] Henshūka, ed., *Kaitakushi furei roku*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1871/4, p. 157.

³⁷ [Kaitakushi] Henshūka, ed., *Kaitakushi furei roku*, vol. 1, no. 1, 1871/4, pp. 153, 155.

³⁸ [Kaitakushi] Henshūka, ed., *Kaitakushi furei roku*, vol. 2 (1872–73) (n.p.: Kaitakushi, 1873), 345/K, NSC, no. 75, 1872/7, pp. 95–97.

policing structures such as the *goningumi*. The national government prioritized the implementation of these ordinances in the three major cities (Tokyo, Kyoto, and Osaka), as well as the five open ports (Yokohama, Kōbe, Nagasaki, Niigata, and Hakodate), reflecting the importance of a “foreign gaze” in the shaping of these rules.³⁹ These ordinances in many ways symbolized the Meiji government’s attempt to civilize their own people as part of an effort to prove to Western powers that Japan was their equal, and thereby end the unequal treaties signed by the Tokugawa regime. They symbolized to many other contemporary observers (as well as later folklorists and historians) the loss of Japan’s traditional culture, while also highlighting the rise of a state that was gaining the ability and desire to intervene directly in the lives of individual subjects.⁴⁰

Yet, the story of the implementation of these ordinances in Sapporo and the rest of Hokkaido suggests that they were neither a radical break from the past, nor purely a top-down imposition from the central state in Tokyo. In other words, despite scholarly attention on the ordinances that sought to reform people’s behavior in more civilized ways, many of the *ishiki kiai jōrei* echoed longstanding attempts to instill urban order on unruly places—part of a longer history of dealing with urban unrest. Some articles did seek to reform traditional behaviours, including a ban on tattoos and pornography, prohibitions on mixed bathing, and an end to public spectacles such as sumo matches and *misemono* roadside variety shows (although this last edict was only implemented in Hakodate), but many more articles focused on more mundane sources of nuisance. These included proscriptions on public drunkenness, public nudity, the destruction of streetlights, fighting on the streets, knocking off nameplates from people’s front gates, and

³⁹ Momose Hibiki, *Bunmei Kaika: Ushinawareta fūzoku* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2008), p. 8.

⁴⁰ Momose, *Bunmei Kaika*, p. 3.

throwing animal carcasses into the road. City residents were banned from playing with fireworks in built up areas, or riding horses without a light at night. Newer rules included restrictions on access to government gardens and orchards, a ban on housing travelling foreigners without registration, and a prohibition on building houses or planting gardens in public rights-of-way or tax-exempt river banks.⁴¹ In general, though, the rules in Sapporo reflected specific and longstanding concerns of urban disorder and public rowdiness, rather than attempts to produce new, Western forms of behavior among city residents. The codification of these rules in a single document of sixty articles reflects a new, more transparently bureaucratic approach to urban administration in late 1870s Sapporo, but the content of many of the rules would not have been a surprise to city residents familiar with regulations in towns and villages elsewhere in the archipelago.

The ordinances were implemented in Sapporo later than in mainland Japan and Hakodate—they were put in place in the summer of 1877—but this delay was not simply a story of a backwards periphery coming late to the more civilized structures of the national center. The delay stemmed in part from Sapporo’s officials active resistance to the imposition of the national guidelines. In 1874/4, Matsumoto Jūrō responded to the first attempt by the central government to introduce the rules to Sapporo by arguing that Hokkaido’s unique circumstances meant that he needed more time to investigate whether it was appropriate to introduce the new laws. In 1874/7, officials in the divisions of General Affairs, Civil Affairs, and Criminal Affairs all wrote to Matsumoto, expressing concern that the national ordinances would be poorly suited to Sapporo’s circumstances. “Given the ongoing economic downturn, and the many residents fleeing from the

⁴¹ [Kaitakushi] Henshūka, ed., *Kaitakushi furei roku*, vol. 2, no. 75, 1872/7, pp. 95–97; see also Momose Hibiki, *Bunmei kaika*, pp. 161–66 for a slightly easier-to-read version, as well as juxtapositions with the Hakodate and Nemuro versions of these ordinances.

city, implementing such rules now might have the undesired effect of angering people.”

Matsumoto, in a note to his Tokyo counterparts, added that “there aren’t even enough people in most parts of Hokkaido to enforce these rules,” suggesting that the existing police and local headmen would be able to keep order and resolve issues more effectively than a new, bureaucratically elaborate system of fines and short imprisonment for petty crimes and misdemeanors.⁴²

Matsumoto and his colleagues in Sapporo reiterated this line of argument in 1876/6, when they argued that the application of the rules might cause local people to react badly, as “uninformed people will suddenly be put in a position of committing crimes [inadvertently], which will cause everyone much suffering.” Matsumoto again asked the Tokyo office of the Colonial Agency to delay, preferring to rely on local officials and police to keep order. In response, Tokyo officials acknowledged the difficulty of applying the new rules to Sapporo, but stressed that protecting and edifying local people was important, and so asked Matsumoto to “select those articles that might most easily be implemented” and gradually put the new ordinances in place.⁴³

The rationale for delaying the implementation of the ordinances reflected the need of local officials for more flexibility in their toolkit for governing the city. The shortage of officials for enforcing the guidelines, and the existence of other structures already in place to ensure public order, made the national ordinances a burden, rather than an aid to public administration. Moreover, the fragility of local society—the simmering discontent among Sapporo’s poor

⁴² Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho, “Ishiki kaii jōrei, sekō miawase no ken,” *Kaitakushi kōbunroku, hōken etc.*, 1874, 1874/12/9, 簿書 5980(10), HPA.

⁴³ Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho, “Ishiki kaii jōrei, jissai sekō no ken,” *Kaitakushi kōbunroku, hōken etc.*, 1876, 1876, 簿書 6221(37), HPA.

residents—also made the imposition of a top-down set of laws a risky venture in the young city. Finally, many of the principles of the new ordinances already existed in older forms, whether codified or customary, and Sapporo’s officials did not see the value of repackaging those rules in new forms given the shortage of governmental resources and public goodwill.

Nevertheless, by the following year the new ordinances were put in place, and they had an immediate impact on the city. The first year did prove to be an adjustment period as local residents ran afoul of the new laws repeatedly. In 1877, 737 people were arrested for violations of the new laws. Arrests declined sharply in subsequent years (see Figure 4.1), suggesting that many of the 1877 arrests stemmed from ignorance of the new rules. Most violators were men, although a few women were caught every year. Unfortunately, we have no breakdown of the violations by type of misdemeanor, so it is impossible to know which crimes were most common. The punishment for crimes took the form of either a fine or short-term imprisonment (less than a week or between one and two weeks, depending on the severity of the crime), although in fact only one person was ever jailed for violating one of the ordinances. This low rate of imprisonment reflected both the unwillingness of officials to go hard on local violators, as well as the waste of precious jail resources. Revenue from the fines may also have been a boon to local finances, although the relatively low amounts garnered from violators suggests this was not a major priority for the Colonial Agency’s finance department.

Figure 4.1: Violations of <i>Ishiki kaii jōrei</i> in Sapporo⁴⁴				
Year	Total Arrests	Arrests (men)	Arrests (women)	Fines (yen)
1877	737	n/a	n/a	8.807
1878	165	159	6	7.500

⁴⁴ Data from *KJH*, vol. 5, p. 228; see also Momose, *Bunmei kaika*, p. 152. It is not clear whether these figures refer just to Sapporo city, or also to the urban parts of Otaru. Regardless, the relative number of arrests is significant for analyzing the impact of the new laws in their first year.

1879	199	194	5	15.200
1880	221	214	7	26.950
1881	95	90	5	20.700

Despite the familiar content under scrutiny by the state in these ordinances, the increasing bureaucratization of strategies to deal with public disorder and urban rowdiness mark an important shift in the late 1870s. The creation of standard punishments meted out by a nationally homogenous court system, with laws that were publicly available, meant that even small violations were now subject to the laws of the land, rather than the justice of small communities. The creation of a police force to enforce these ordinances, rather than relying upon household groups and local headmen, underscores the new role of the central state in enforcing common rules across the Japanese archipelago in response to longstanding problems of urban disorder. To support this more rigorous system of policing, the government also worked to introduce new forms of local authority, an effort that was particularly challenging in Sapporo given its lack of existing elites and the transience of its population in its early years. Nevertheless, the desire of local officials such as Matsumoto to rely on local authority highlights the value placed on local autonomy, and a strong belief that strengthening local communities could ensure the production of stable, orderly urban space, as well as the more effective implementation of state policies.

Structures of Authority: City Government in 1870s Sapporo

The dizzying changes in the formal structures of local government have preoccupied scholars of the institutional changes of the early Meiji period. Local government and the interaction between the state and local communities have proven ripe ground for discussions of the character of the early Meiji polity. Scholars have studied towns and villages to elucidate the divides between absolutist and more democratic factions in the central state; the place of local communities in opposition to the centralizing reforms of the Meiji oligarchs; and the latent

democratic possibilities present in nineteenth-century Japan.⁴⁵ Studies of local towns and villages became particularly prominent in the 1960s and 1970s, when people's history (*minshūshi*) gained traction as a backlash against the heroic, state-focused histories that surrounded the centennial of the Meiji Restoration. Regions of Japan that produced large-scale protests against the central government have gained especial attention,⁴⁶ although other scholars have made the case for studying regions that saw much less turmoil in the transition from Tokugawa to Meiji.⁴⁷ Scholars of the efforts to revamp local administrative geography have emphasized the state's need to introduce national household registration, while also consolidating and homogenizing local rule in order to implement other measures, such as conscription and compulsory education, more consistently and effectively.⁴⁸

One important element of these reforms was the concept of local autonomy (*jichi*), which involved a degree of local self-sufficiency (in terms of paying for local affairs) as well as self-control (in the form of local elections and decision-making authority). The push by Ōkubo

⁴⁵ For a short historiographical overview in English, see Kyu Hyun Kim, "Local Autonomy in Early Meiji Japan: Competing Conceptions," in *Public Spheres, Private Lives in Modern Japan, 1600–1950*, ed. Gail Lee Bernstein, Andrew Gordon, and Kate Wildman Nakai (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2005), pp. 53–54.

⁴⁶ Michael Lewis, *Becoming Apart: National Power and Local Politics in Toyama, 1868–1945* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2000), and James L. Baxter, *The Meiji Restoration through the Lens of Ishikawa Prefecture* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Council on East Asian Studies, 1994).

⁴⁷ Neil Waters, *Japan's Local Pragmatists: The Transition from Bakumatsu to Meiji in the Kawasaki Region* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Council on East Asian Studies, 1983). Waters situates his work on Kawasaki, where "nothing happened," against Marxian *minshūshi* historians and modernization theorists alike, suggesting that the continuities between Tokugawa and Meiji, such as the strong horizontal structures within and between villages, and the importance of local notables in mitigating the excesses of the central state, help explain the relatively smooth adoption of new structures of local authority in places like Kawasaki—which were more the norm than the exception.

⁴⁸ See Yamanaka Einosuke, *Nihon kindai chihō jichisei to kokka* (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1999); Suzue Eiichi gives a neat, if dated, overview of the Japanese-language historiography of local autonomy in the context of his study of the villages and towns of Hokkaido in the Colonial Agency period in Suzue, *Hokkaidō chōson seido no kenkyū*, pp. 10–36.

Toshimichi and other Meiji leaders to implement a series of local-government reforms throughout the 1870s and 1880s has generally been interpreted as a reactionary move designed to head off local protests and increase state presence in local affairs. Kenneth Pyle has argued that the encouragement of local participation in government reflected a fundamentally conservative approach to nation-building in 1880s Japan, in which national leaders believed that local buy-in was necessary and desirable to implement the modernizing reforms they believed necessary.⁴⁹ Yet experiments with a number of assemblies and other democratic institutions prompted too much enthusiasm for popular participation in the eyes of Meiji leaders, and led to a stricter interpretation of local autonomy by the late 1870s.⁵⁰

Looking at local autonomy from the perspective of local places, rather than the central state, the question of state ideology recedes into the background in favor of the production of structures of local authority and political power: in particular, scholars have focused on the rise of “local notables” (*meibōka*) as both formal and informal wielders of political power in villages and towns.⁵¹ These local notables, many of whom had been village headmen during the Tokugawa period, found themselves serving as headmen, or on schoolboards, or otherwise informally advising the governmental appointees in their districts. Many were wealthy landowning farmers who had developed extensive commercial side businesses, and their participation in the cultural and intellectual life of their communities made them generally

⁴⁹ Kenneth Pyle, “Meiji Conservatism,” in *The Nineteenth Century*, vol. 5 in *The Cambridge History of Japan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 699.

⁵⁰ Kim, “Local Autonomy in Early Meiji Japan,” pp. 56–57.

⁵¹ For a good overview of the role of local notables in mainland Japan, see Ushiki Yukio, *Chihō meibōka no seichō* (Tokyo: Kashiwa shobō, 2000), and Yamanaka Einosuke, *Kindai Nihon no chihō seido to meibōka* (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1990).

respected by their communities in the early years of the Meiji period.⁵² Their role as intermediaries between the central state and local people helped the state implement its policies, and also ensured that those policies did not excessively disrupt the livelihoods of many people. By the 1880s this role started to break down, as the disruptive Matsukata Deflation hurt farmers across Japan, heightening social divides, but the position of these local notables nevertheless defined the relationship between central state and local community in the early Meiji period.

Work on local government has tended to ignore Hokkaido, reflecting both the peculiar circumstances of Hokkaido's new settlements in the Meiji period and a general tendency to disregard southern Hokkaido (the territory of the former Matsumae domain) in histories of Tokugawa-era local government. The major exception to this trend is the historian Suzue Eiichi, whose research on the villages of southern Hokkaido as well as the transformations in the government and society of early Sapporo highlights the points of similarity and departure from mainland Japan.⁵³ Like other places in Japan, early-modern customs and forms of local governance persisted in Sapporo; unlike other places, there was no existing stratum of local notables. In Suzue's view, the absence of a class of people interested in maintaining and improving their own position by mediating central state initiatives accounts for a paucity of self-government or local autonomy in Sapporo.⁵⁴ Instead, Sapporo was characterized by the heavy-handed role of the state. Yet, Suzue's view overlooks the flexibility and receptiveness of local bureaucrats to the demands and needs of local people, as well as the emergence of local notables from the booming population of the young city. In other words, by breaking apart the monolith

⁵² Neil Waters, *Japan's Local Pragmatists*.

⁵³ Suzue's major essays have been compiled and reprinted in Suzue Eiichi, *Hokkaidō chōson seido shi no kenkyū*.

⁵⁴ Suzue, *Hokkaidō chōson seido shi*, pp. 374–76.

of the state we see how local conditions and interests affected the adoption of national policies. The creation of municipal government, administrative geographies, and local taxation all reflect the mediation between local and national interests at play in Sapporo, and highlight the peculiar circumstances of Sapporo's colonial location: the need to quickly introduce a familiar system of governance to provide some stability to a society of immigrants and "backward" Ainu in remote Hokkaido.

Local Officials and Administrative Geography

The structures of urban governance in colonial Sapporo largely reflected the needs and the efforts of the state, although as we have seen this was not a simple story of applying rules and laws developed in Tokyo to the colonial periphery: rather, local officials played an important role in mediating between the interests of the central state and conditions and needs on the ground. This mediation led to a gradualist approach to tackling longstanding forms of urban disorder, rather than a brash new vision of a modern, Westernized future. A strong urban community in Sapporo required the participation of local people, and the creation of local structures of authority that helped mitigate both the divides between ordinary people and officials, as well as between very poor and very wealthy residents of Sapporo. The creation of a form of local authority in the positions of local headmen and later district chiefs went some way to making the state more accessible and approachable to Sapporo's early residents, while smoothing the way to the imposition of new tax systems and other obligations.

Resistance to the top-down enactment of ordinances also illustrates local officials' desire to establish systems of governance that were more organically rooted in the nascent community of Sapporo. The establishment of these political and bureaucratic institutions allowed the government both to tackle the urban disorder in the city, and also to gain support for the broader

colonial project through education and persuasion. As early as 1871/9, local officials appointed local headmen to deal with municipal administrative matters and serve as role models in the local community.⁵⁵ Matsumoto Jūrō exhorted local headmen to “feel the sufferings and joy of local people, heartily encourage lazy people to take up farming or artisanal production, give special care to the widowed or chronically ill, and avoid disparaging lowly people.”⁵⁶ Brothelkeepers and restaurant owners were banned from holding office in 1874, reinforcing the government’s belief about the moral importance of the local headmen position, and their recognition that the highly wealthy brothelkeepers were an obvious target of popular discontent.

These headmen gradually took on more responsibilities. In 1873/2, the “increase in population” led the government to create the position of district chair and vice-chair, charged with helping the local headmen in all affairs. The district leaders attended the city office every five days, where they were expected to review all policies developed by the city office.⁵⁷ These district leaders and local headmen worked closely with the Colonial Agency’s Department of Cultivation (which turned into the Department of Civil Affairs after 1873), creating a joint structure for municipal administration.⁵⁸ Sapporo had two or three headmen below the district leader, a figure that remained relatively constant even as the city’s population increased. A number of lower-ranked officials helped staff the increasingly busy office. The town office also employed a number of scribes and runners to help manage the growing workload.

⁵⁵ The *SSS* identifies Shimizu Sanjirō as the first *chōdai* in 1872/2, although the Colonial Agency also recognized the appointment of Ōtomo Jinsaku in 1871/9 as assistant *chōdai*, suggesting the system was already in place in late 1871. *SSS* vol. 2, p. 138.

⁵⁶ Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho minjikyoku, “Ku-, kochō kinmu ni tsuki kokoroe hō no ken,” *Shi futatsu – 1874/1~2, 1874/7*, 簿書 926(93), HPA

⁵⁷ “Kuchō, gonkuchō ni tsuite no kokoroe,” *Shizai sho tasshi tome*, reprinted in *SSS*, vol. 7, p. 932.

⁵⁸ *SSS*, vol. 2, p. 139.

The process of selecting people to serve in the city office helped make the office more accountable to local residents. Headmen and their deputies were selected by election: residents could submit the names of their peers into a box for consideration by the Colonial Agency. The details of this process are unclear, but any male permanent resident who was not a brothel keeper or restaurant owner seems to have been eligible to serve. Votes were tallied, and positions assigned based on the total vote count: in elections for headmen in 1876/8, for example, the two candidates with the most votes were appointed headmen, while the next three highest recipients were appointed as deputy headmen.⁵⁹ Enthusiasm for democratic participation did not always prevail: in an election for general representative (*sōdai*), a position below that of deputy headman, the top three vote-getters (all of whom seem to have been appointed) received only nine, six, and five votes, respectively.⁶⁰ The low turnout supports Suzue Eiichi's contention that the election of local officials was not democratic, but rather a thinly veiled attempt at social control by Colonial Agency officials.⁶¹ Nevertheless, elections did continue, and the reelection of many men (especially towards the end of the Colonial Agency period) suggests that they, at least, saw this as a valuable avenue towards power and influence in Sapporo.

Who were these men? Most were local merchants, and many held considerable amounts of land in the city. Yamaguchi Shigejirō, for example, who served as deputy headman in 1873 and then headman in 1877 owned half a dozen large plots of land around the city. At one point his profession was listed as "brothel owner," although he later claimed to have left that business and become a merchant. Kitajima Kumejirō, who arrived in Sapporo in perhaps 1871, served as

⁵⁹ "Sōdai no toyō," *Ku-, kochō shintairoku*, 簿書 1589, HPA, reprinted in SSS, vol. 7, p. 948.

⁶⁰ "Sōdai no toyō," p. 949.

⁶¹ Suzue Eiichi, *Hokkaido chōson seido shi*, pp. 299, 324.

general representative in 1874; professionally, he ran a hardware store, and also owned several large plots of land in the city.⁶² Relatively few city officers stayed in an official position for very long: no office holder in 1873 remained in office by 1878, for example, while of the 1880 city officials, one had been in office in 1874 (but not in the intervening years) and one since 1877.⁶³ The high turnover was likely an intentional product of the Colonial Agency's rules on elections: early guidelines are no longer extant, but guidelines from 1880 state that general representatives were not to serve more than two years at a time, and elections for half the officials should take place every year, suggesting the government had either formally or informally limited the terms of local officials.⁶⁴ District leaders were not subject to election; instead, they were appointed directly by the Colonial Agency.

In addition to rapid turnover, the confusing range of titles and responsibilities in local administration also made local politics somewhat opaque to city residents, although over time the shift away from generic titles such as “deputy headman” towards jobs in specific divisions of the city office contributed to the increasing bureaucratization and standardization of local administration. The earliest forms of local officialdom appear to have been a combination of town clerks (*chōdai*), a Tokugawa-era position that was the lowest rung of paid officialdom, and primarily responsible for countersigning document and vetting petitions to the government, as well as enforcing statutes and civil order. In 1872/5, the national government ordered that Sapporo adopt a system of headmen (*kochō*) and deputy headmen (*fukukochō*), who in support of the district leaders (*kuchō*, *fukukuchō*, *gonkuchō*) oversaw civil government and a network of

⁶² Kaitakushi, *Chika sōtei ukesho*, 1879/5/12, reproduced in SSS, vol. 7, pp. 441–557.

⁶³ This is based on the chart in SSS, vol. 2, p. 142.

⁶⁴ “Sōdainin no kaisen hō,” *Sapporo ken chirui ten*, 簿書 8028, HPA, reprinted in SSS, vol. 7, p. 1017.

household-group heads (*gochō*), who probably represented groups of households; these two groups likely replaced the responsibilities of the former town clerks. Yet, the workload of the city office increased, which led the Colonial Agency to establish in 1872/9 a new position of municipal aide (*machiyōgakari*) which was to take over the responsibilities of the former town clerks, while household-group heads were given a more circumscribed set of rules to follow.⁶⁵

In 1874/7, the colonial agency moved to eliminate the household-group heads that had been the point of contact between residents and the state. “Although there are over fifty of these leaders in the city, they do not take their responsibilities at all seriously because they are not paid,” wrote the Civil Affairs Bureau to Matsumoto Jūrō in 1874/7.⁶⁶ This resonated with an earlier effort to replace the household-group heads with a smaller number of better-trained headmen in the suburban villages, because most household-group heads were illiterate and therefore unable to perform their duties.⁶⁷ Instead of these fifty leaders, a group of five town assistants (*machiyōsuke*) took over responsibilities for helping the headmen of the town office; these positions seem to have been turned into the job of general representative by 1874/9, and they were the largest and lowest paid group of officials in the city office.⁶⁸ Despite these efforts to standardize the city office, confusion reigned, and by 1878 “complaints about the delay in

⁶⁵ Kaitakushi minjikyoku, *Shizai sho tasshi tome*, 1872–73, 道資料 162, NSC, pp. 74–75.

⁶⁶ “Shichū machiyōsuke no settei,” *Kaitakushi kōbunroku – Sapporo*, 1874/7/9, 簿書 6013, HPA, reprinted in *SSS*, vol. 7, p. 938.

⁶⁷ “Ku-, kochō mibun toriatsukai,” *Kaitakushi kōbunroku – Tokyo*, 1874/3, 簿書 5782, HPA, reprinted in *SSS*, vol. 7, pp. 934–5. The illiteracy is surprising, as by the mid-Tokugawa period almost every village in mainland Japan would have had several literate individuals, and by the end of the period many women and small farmers across Japan could read, at least rudimentarily. The widespread illiteracy among village leaders around Sapporo speaks to the high number of migrants from relatively impoverished areas. See Richard Rubinger, *Popular Literacy in Early Modern Japan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2007).

⁶⁸ “Ku-, kochō ika no kaisei,” *Kaitakushi kōbunroku – Sapporo*, 1874/9/13, 簿書 6024, HPA, reprinted in *SSS*, vol. 7, pp. 939–42.

clarifying the roles of district leaders and urban headmen are mounting,” and the “extremely confusing nature of the current system is causing people to lose trust in local officials,” bemoaned an official in the records office on 5/28.⁶⁹ The general representative position was abolished later that year, and the responsibilities of the district leader were clarified in subsequent announcements. In 1880, local officials began to be appointed to particular divisions within the city office, such as accounting, tax collection, and general affairs. In a vestige of the earlier pattern, one headman was assigned to the eastern and western halves of Sapporo. The headmen were abolished by 1884, by which point the city office had ballooned in size from 10 officials in 1880 to 38 officials in 1884 (see Figure 4.3).⁷⁰

Figure 4.3: Local officials in the Sapporo Town/District Office				
Date	District Head • Deputy	Headman • Deputy	Municipal Aide/Town Assistant/General Representative	Total
1873/2	1 • 1	1 • 3	5	11
1874/9	1	1 • 3	4	9
1875/12	3?	1 • 3	5 • 2 (deputies)	14
1877/2	1	1 • 2	4	8
1878/12	1 • 1	1 • 2	5	10
1880/3	1	2	7 (various positions in town office)	10
1884	1	0	37 (various positions in town office)	38

The expansion of the city office, and the shift towards a division of responsibilities by job type rather than hierarchy, reflects a broader trend toward consolidation and growing bureaucratic complexity in the administration of Sapporo and its surrounding districts. In 1876, a new administrative geography based on large and small districts (*daishōku seido*) put Sapporo’s urban district (*shigai/shichū*) under the broader umbrella of Sapporo District (*Sapporo gun*), and

⁶⁹ “Ku-, kochō shokumu shōtei no sekō,” *Kaitakushi kōbunroku - Tokyo*, 1878/5/18, 簿書 5881, HPA, reprinted in SSS, vol. 7, pp. 953–55.

⁷⁰ SSS, vol. 2, p. 142.

in 1878, the town office was folded into the Sapporo District Office (*Sapporo kuyakusho*), which had responsibility for the city proper as well as the suburban villages in Sapporo District (see Figure 4.4). This administrative merger reflected a general trend across Japan, where villages and towns were consolidated into larger administrative districts that could be more efficiently




Figure 4.4, *Sapporo gun kakuson no zu* (1874)

The diamond partially covered by a red street grid represents the city of Sapporo; the various colored blocs around the city indicate the suburban villages that, together with the city, formed Sapporo District. Clockwise from yellow: Naebo; Kariki (later part of Ebetsu); Kami-Shiroishi (closer to Sapporo) and Shiroishi; Toyohira (in red) and Tsukisappu (today Tsukisamu); Hiragishi; Yamahana; Maruyama; Kotoni; Kami-Teine; Hassamu; Shinoro; Okadama; and Sapporo Village (in blue). North is to the bottom of the image; one centimeter is equal to two kilometers.

governed by the introduction of new local government reforms.⁷¹ It also reflected the particularity of Sapporo's regional government, closely tied as it was to the broader Colonial Agency. The villages around Sapporo had been constructed for the explicit purpose of supplying the city, and their development was intimately linked to the city's growth. This intertwined administration manifested in the large number of edicts and ordinances that applied to both city and suburban village, as well as the taking of population records and other statistical surveys that did not distinguish clearly between city and village. The introduction of the District Office further reinforced the close connection between the city and its surrounding villages.

In 1878 and 1879, the short-lived large and small districts were replaced by a district-and-ward system that in mainland Japan reinstated the traditional districts and villages, and assigned new urban wards in built up areas. While Hokkaido's "traditional" districts were only a decade old, they too were reinstated in 1879. Sapporo, on account of its "concentration of population," was assigned its own urban district (*ku*), one of only 20 cities in Japan to receive such a designation.⁷² Municipal government was once again separated from the administration of

⁷¹ Suzue Eiichi, *Hokkaido chōson seido shi*, Introduction, for a brief discussion of understanding the history of towns as both administrative entities of the state, as well as communities that exist to some degree in opposition to the central state. For a discussion of the amalgamation of Japan's villages and towns under the 1878 laws, see Mizumoto Tadatake, *Kosūwarizei no seiritsu to tenkai* (Tokyo: Ochanomizu shobō, 1998).

⁷² Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho minjikyoku kosekika, "Gunku hensei no gi Sapporo e kuyakusho setchi hō no ken," *Tokyo ōfuku* 1879/1, 1879/6/21, 簿書 3120(33), HPA, for a discussion of whether Sapporo should receive *ku* designation.

rural villages in Sapporo's immediate hinterland, and it would remain independent thereafter, although the city would not attain a degree of administrative autonomy until the administrative reorganization of Hokkaido in 1899, and it did not receive city status on par with cities in mainland Japan until the national city system was extended to Hokkaido in 1922.

In practice, however, the administration of urban Sapporo and its surrounding hinterland fell to the same set of people: headmen and later district leaders often held multiple positions, spanning a wide geographic range, blurring the practical distinction between municipal and rural government. Despite the separation of urban (*ku*) and district (*gun*) government in 1879, Yamazaki Kiyomi was selected as not only Sapporo's urban leader, but also the leader of fourteen rural districts stretching as far as Yūbari and Shizunai, some 130 kilometres away.⁷³ Local headmen occasionally held the position in Sapporo proper as well as in one of the suburban villages, suggesting the close economic and political ties between Sapporo and its surroundings, as well as a factor that encouraged the government to pursue the consolidation of government at larger geographic scales.

The tasks of the Sapporo town office reflected the priorities of the state. Headmen reported to the officials of the Department of Cultivation (after 1873, the Department of Civil Affairs), and their responsibilities were remarkably similar to the household-group headmen of Tokugawa-era cities. They conveyed and enforced laws and ordinances, administered the household registration system, handled permits and other administrative requests from local people, disbursed land and subsidies to settlers, and collected fees and taxes. They had relatively limited power relative to Colonial Agency officials, and their responsibilities were left vague, making them subject to the needs of the Colonial Agency. Their appointment did not include the

⁷³ "Shigai kochō no jinsen," *Kochō shintairoku*, 1880/2/28, 簿書 3819, HPA, reprinted in SSS, vol. 7, p. 958.

establishment of a forum for ordinary people to voice their concerns or contribute to any form of self-governance.⁷⁴ Over time, the responsibilities of the town office became more bureaucratic, and local officials took on a greater degree of autonomy for managing the city. The office was divided into three parts in 1873: a general affairs division, a division for processing petitions and applications, and a division in charge of financial affairs. These officials handled almost all civil affairs in the city—and there were many.

By 1880, the range of activities handled by the city office had increased dramatically. In any given month, the city office handled between 100 and 250 discrete items. A large number of these related to household registration, and often involved lengthy correspondence with other towns and villages around Japan to keep records up to date. Tax collection, the processing of applications to start new businesses or occupations, the regulation of brothels and other businesses, and permits for exterminating wild animals comprised the bulk of the remaining work.⁷⁵ These activities illustrate the importance of the city office to local residents, who needed the approval of city officials to conduct much of their professional lives. In this regard, the city office became an important interface between the larger colonial state apparatus, and the lives of ordinary people in Sapporo.

Taxation and Local Government

⁷⁴ Suzue Eiichi, “Sōsōki Sapporo no shihai to shakai,” *Sapporo no rekishi* 5 (August 1983): p. 10.

⁷⁵ For a survey of the city office’s work in 1880, see the following documents: Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho kirokukyoku kōbunka, “Sapporo kunai ni kakaru toriatsukai jimu shobunzumi no ken,” *Kakugun ukagai jōshin todoke roku*, 1880/6/16 簿書 3794(38); 1880/7/17, 簿書 3794(55); 1880/11/8, 簿書 3794(103); 1880/12/14 簿書 3794(154), HPA, which cover May, June, October, and November, respectively. Similar accounts for January through March of 1882 can be found in Kaitakushi zanmu toriatsukaisho kyū Sapporo honcho kirokuka kōbungakari, “Sapporo kunai toriatsukai jimu shobunzumi no gi jōshin no ken,” *Kaku gunku jōshin todokeroku*, 1882/2/2, 簿書 5160(1); 1882/3/15, 簿書 5160(21); 1882/3/3, 簿書 5160(23), HPA.

Despite the increasing power and scope of the city office, it remained an endpoint of the Colonial Agency's state apparatus, rather than a site of autochthonous local government. Yet, from an early stage the Colonial Agency sought to make Sapporo's urban affairs self-sufficient by encouraging the town office to fund its activities through local levies and fees. While these efforts to create a form of local autonomy reflected the national effort to reform local government, the arguments between officials in Sapporo and their counterparts in Tokyo highlight the influence of local conditions and local decisionmakers on policy. The twists and turns in local tax policy in Sapporo reveal debates over the value of local autonomy, and the best way to ensure that cities were governed and funded by and for their residents.

Debates about local and regional tax policy in Hokkaido illustrate several themes concerning local autonomy in early-Meiji Sapporo, and also point to some features unique to Hokkaido's colonial position. First, the tension between local autonomy and government control was heightened by the Colonial Agency's concern with its own finances, and the desire to make the colonial project successful. Creating a self-sufficient municipal government, able to handle local affairs, would aid the Agency by freeing up resources for the further development of Hokkaido. Second, the heavy reliance of the Colonial Agency on the Export Tax as a way to supplement local budgets speaks to the continued domination of an extractive economy in the form of fishing and other marine products, rather than the establishment of a land tax (based on agriculture) as the primary source of revenue for the region. Third, debates over how to assess municipal taxes highlight the problem of social inequality in Sapporo, and more particularly to the need of local officials to address rising discontent towards the wealth gaps and poor government in the young city, which occasionally expressed itself in riots and often expressed itself in abandonment, petty theft, and other forms of disorder. The ideal tax system, in the eyes

of ambitious officials, would help foster a sense of community that would provide a stable basis for growth, and an ideal city to serve as capital of a successful colonial project.

In 1871/4, permanent residents of Sapporo were taxed a flat rate of 35 mon per household; this was a very small amount (a bowl of soba cost 16 mon in late-Tokugawa Edo⁷⁶). In 1872/10, the Accounting and Development bureaus proposed ending the Colonial Agency's funding of the town office, due to the rising number of houses and concurrent increase in town office expenses. Under this plan, support for the town office would be converted to an annual loan of 500 yen, to cover salaries and supplies. Local headmen would be responsible for dividing the burden of the loan among city residents, in part by assessing the value of residents' property, and repaying the loan in semiannual installments.⁷⁷ In early 1873, the Colonial Agency approved such a system for residents of Sapporo and Hakodate.

The 1873 system, however, ran immediately into problems caused by the economic downturn that hit Sapporo that year. The large number of poor migrants to the city, including those relocated from other parts of Hokkaido, made it very difficult to levy the household rates, and Matsumoto Jūrō estimated that only one half of all households in Sapporo had paid it. To cover the essential costs of the town office, each household needed to pay 10 *sen* per month, but this proved too difficult. The Colonial Agency took over payment of headmen's salaries, and extended emergency loans to the town office, but officials there flatly stated that it would prove impossible to repay them.⁷⁸ Amidst rising discontent in Sapporo, Matsumoto proposed a

⁷⁶ This is from the Bank of Japan website:
<https://www.imes.boj.or.jp/cm/history/historyfaq/answer.html#a05>

⁷⁷ Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho shomugakari, "chōkaisho sho shippi shichū kyojū no mono yori chōshū no ken," *Kaigi shorui*, 1872/10, 簿書 433(27), HPA.

⁷⁸ "Ku'nyūhi no sai ukkagai," *Kaitakushi kōbunroku – Tokyo*, 1873/12/25, 簿書 5782, HPA, reprinted in *SSS*, vol. 7, p. 1076.

reworking of the system in 1873/10 to more fairly distribute the local tax burden, as well as encourage greater compliance. He argued that the exemption of official residences from the household tax was “unfair”, and proposed a one-half percent salary tax for the 153 employees of the Colonial Agency in Sapporo, which would generate some 227 yen each year. He estimated that the 700 households in Sapporo would generate 840 yen per year, assuming an assessment of 10 sen per household per month. Matsumoto proposed assessing property values according to the *koma* system of Tokugawa-era cities, which taxed households according to their size and in a three-tiered division based on the assessed value of their physical location.⁷⁹ The resulting tax would be progressive, as landlords with larger holdings would pay more tax for their properties, but it was also simpler and more transparent than the subjective assessment of property values by local headmen—who tended to be richer property owners—in the previous system. Matsumoto also proposed earmarking a third of the revenue for emergencies, such as firefighting and repairs, and increasing the town office budget to 684 yen per year to cope with the city’s growing population.⁸⁰

Matsumoto’s proposal reflected his desires to address popular discontent towards bad government in the city. He pushed for greater transparency and accountability, for example by suggesting that the town office publish its spending plans monthly by posting them on the town noticeboard. In a more radical proposal, which Matsumoto appended as a question for his superiors, officials would pay significantly higher household tax rates: 1.2 yen per *koma*, compared to the 2 sen per *koma* for commoners. It’s unclear whether this was in addition to the

⁷⁹ One *koma* was roughly 20 tsubo, or 66 square meters; the average plot in Sapporo was approximately five *koma* in size.

⁸⁰ “Ku’nyūhi no chōshūhō,” *Kaitakushi kōbunroku – Tokyo*, 1873/10/15, 簿書 5782, HPA, reprinted in *SSS*, vol. 7, p. 1074–75.

salary tax, or as an alternative, but Matsumoto's desire to have officials pull greater weight stands out. He also proposed an even lower rate for commoners (1.5 sen per *koma*), underscoring his concern with the tax burden on ordinary residents.

These concerns were very real: in the summer of 1874, by which point the economic downturn in the city had been dragging on for over a year, angry residents were crowding the streets, decrying the poor government of the Colonial Agency and accusing officials of taking large salaries while people starved and fled the city as their businesses failed.⁸¹ That year, the Colonial Agency revised and clarified the rules and structure of the district levy, continuing to emphasize the importance of municipal self-financing while recognizing that many areas were not able to support the necessary infrastructure and investment for colonization. The Agency suggested introducing a *koma* based property assessment system with three categories of property, but left implementation to the discretion of individual districts. Local funding was meant to cover the construction and maintenance of local offices and noticeboards, supplies and equipment, salaries for secretaries and runners, road cleaning and the provision of toilets, small repairs to water and sewer lines, firefighting expenses, emergency funds to help lost or abandoned children as well as people of unknown registration who died or fell ill.⁸² The emphasis on traditional services related to welfare and local improvement no doubt helped appeal to a distrustful population.

Sapporo adopted the *koma* system of assessing property values in 1874, but the system was complex. The assessment of household levies was divided by groups of streets: houses in

⁸¹ Matsumoto Jūrō to Sapporo headmen, in Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho minjikyoku, "Shichū fukeiki ni te jinshin wakumei ni saishi tsutomete ryokushoku no medo wo tatsubekiyō setsuyu hō no ken," *Shi futatsu* 1874/1~2, 1874/7/12, 簿書 926(96), HPA.

⁸² *KJH*, vol. 7, pp. 795–6.

one group, all to the south of Ōdōri in the old commoner half of the city, were assessed at one *sen* per *koma*, with an additional flat fee of five *sen* per household per month for any houses with a frontage greater than five *ken*. A second, smaller group of streets in the northern half of the city—formerly only occupied by officials—contained houses assessed at 0.25 *sen* per *koma*, with an additional flat fee of 7.5 *sen* per month for any properties with a earthen wall of thirty *ken* or longer.⁸³ No officials' residences were taxed in this system, suggesting that Matsumoto's proposals had not been adopted. Based on an 1878 property survey of Sapporo, the standard residential plot was five *koma*; thirty *koma* indicated quite a wealthy landowner, while poorer residents, especially in back streets, often had half- or quarter-size lots.⁸⁴ The assessments, while deviating from the three-tier system proclaimed by the Colonial Agency, nevertheless reflected a degree of progressive taxation.

The central government, meanwhile, hoped to rationalize and consolidate local government with a series of local government reforms in 1878 (the so-called “Three New Laws” *sanshinpō*), including the introduction of a new regional tax (*chihōzei*) to enable prefectural and municipal governments to become fiscally self-sufficient. These regional taxes included a land tax (up to 20% of the national land tax), business and miscellaneous taxes, and a household tax (*kosūwarizei*). The household tax was designed as a tiered rate on all households, based on each

⁸³ Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho minjikyoku kosekika, “Sapporo shigai kuhi fuka no hōhō sara ni chōsa no gi ni tsuki ukagaisho no ken,” *Shusairoku* 1879/1, 1879/3, 簿書 3131(12), HPA. This document was circulated in 1879 as part of the call to return to the older *komawari* system; it is unclear to what degree it reflected the exact rates of the 1874 system, but the general idea is probably close. The exemption of official residences is worth noting, and perhaps reflects disagreements within the Colonial Agency over how to tax their own employees.

⁸⁴ Based on Kaitakushi, *Chika sōtei ukesho*.

household's wealth, although localities had considerable freedom in how to levy it.⁸⁵ On average across Japan, the revenue from the household tax accounted for between 20% and 25% of regional tax revenue between 1879 and 1890, while the regional land tax contributed between 50% and 60%. In towns, household taxes were a higher proportion (rising from 30% in 1879 to 50% by 1889), with the land tax falling from 60% to 40%.⁸⁶

The Colonial Agency began considering similar reforms in Hokkaido, including a new household tax for Hakodate and Sapporo. However, a lack of concrete rules for how precisely to administer the new tax system led local headmen to stick to the more familiar *koma* system again in 1879.⁸⁷ At the beginning of 1880, the Agency announced plans to introduce a new tiered household tax. They converted the three-tier *koma* system to a nine-step fee based on household assets, rather than property size (see Figure 4.5). Local headmen were expected to assess each household and assign it a rate, set by the Colonial Agency. Temporary and permanent residents alike were assessed, although residents—both commoners and officials—who were receiving Agency subsidies, and self-supporting migrants in their first year, were exempt.⁸⁸

⁸⁵ For an overview of the local government laws of 1878, and tax policy, see Baxter, *The Meiji Unification Through the Lens of Ishikawa Prefecture*, pp. 160–200. For a thorough study of local finances throughout the Meiji period, see Takayose Shōzō, *Meiji chihō zaiseishi*, 6 vols. (Tokyo: Keisō shobō, 2000).

⁸⁶ Mizumoto Tadatake, *Kosūwarizei no seiritsu to tenkai*, pp. 5–7. Relatively little work has focused on the land tax reforms of the 1870s in the context of cities: Takishima Isao, in his 2003 study of land tax reform in Tokyo, suggests that three factors are at play in this historiographical gap: the emphasis on tax policy rather than tax practice, which privileges Tokyo archives; the slow pace with which local history has trickled into other historical fields; and the fact that 96.5% of land tax revenues came from rural villages in the early Meiji period. See Takishima, *Toshi to chiso kaisei* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 2003), especially pp. 1–10 for a brief historiographical overview.

⁸⁷ Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho minjikyoku kosekika, “Sapporo shigai kuhi fuka no hōhō sara ni chōsa no gi ni tsuki ukagaisho no ken.”

⁸⁸ *KJH*, vol. 7, pp. 801–4.

Figure 4.5: Household tax rates, 1880⁸⁹

Group	Rank	Household Assets (yen)	Annual assessment (yen)	Maximum Assessment rate (%)
Upper	1	30,000 +	7.80	.026
	2	20,000 +	6.20	.031
	3	10,000 +	4.80	.048
Middle	4	5,000 +	3.60	.072
	5	1,000 +	2.60	.26
	6	500 +	1.80	.36
Lower	7	250 +	1.20	.48
	8	100 +	0.80	.8
	9	< 100	0.60	.6 (minimum)

This complex system prompted confusion among city officials. “Should we use the existing *koma* system, which the Colonial Agency established in 1874? Or should we switch to the household tax?” asked the Sapporo District Head, Yamazaki Kiyomi, in 1880/3.⁹⁰ The government continued to revise the tax system, and in 1880/5, Sapporo officials proposed using a mix of the new regional land tax, a household tax based on *koma* assessments, and supplements from the Export Tax to fund the municipal government. Colonial Agency officials in Tokyo replied that they “did not understand the proposed *koma* assessment method,” and asked for further clarification.⁹¹ Officials in Sapporo and Hakodate—the two places where the household tax was to be implemented—collaborated on devising the new tax code, and proposed a formal version to Tokyo in 1880/6. Every household, regardless of whether a head of household was resident, was subject to the tax, which was to be assessed on towns and villages on a biannual basis to account for changing numbers of households. Government buildings, schools, hospitals,

⁸⁹ *KJH*, vol. 7, p. 802.

⁹⁰ Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho minjikyoku kosekika, “Minpi chōshū no ken,” *Kaku ku-, gunyakusho ōfuku 1880/3*, 1880/3/15, 簿書 3872(19), HPA.

⁹¹ Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho kirokukyoku kōbunka, “Chiso 5-bun no 1 minpi chihōzei e hennyū junjo shōkai no ken,” *Tokyo bun'iroku – rai*, 1880/5/17, 簿書 3775(176), HPA.

temples, shrines, and offices were exempt, unless they were being used as temporary dwellings. Finally, the tax was to be “assessed evenly on every house in the jurisdiction,” although districts, towns, and villages were given the discretion to “divide households into categories based on their wealth, and distribute the tax burden accordingly.”⁹²

Discussions between Sapporo and Tokyo continued for the rest of 1880, and these guidelines were expanded: households with more than one family, or groups of unrelated people living together, were to be treated as one unit. Recent migrants who had spent less than three years were exempt. Specific rates were set (between 0.40 yen and 1 yen). Sapporo officials had proposed having the general representatives assess household wealth, but Tokyo officials overruled them and assigned that duty to government-appointed district leaders. Tokyo officials also overruled local proposals to let municipal taxes be determined by “traditional customs,” including *koma* assessments, although they did not specify an alternative.⁹³ In light of the push to centralize decision-making power to the district level, it seems likely that the Colonial Agency intended for tax rates to be set uniformly, and in line with national standards, rather than based on local custom. As a result of these discussions, the nine-tiered system was replaced in 1881/4 with a simpler three-tier system that also reduced the annual levy significantly: the minimum tax rate was 0.40 yen, and the maximum 1 yen, per household (see Figure 4.6). Across the entire

⁹² Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho kirokukyoku kōbunka, “Kosūwari minpi chihōzei ni hennyū no ken,” *Hakodate bun'iroku – rai*, 1880/5/31, 簿書 3778(98), HPA.

⁹³ Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho kirokukyoku kōbunka, “Kosūwari minpi wo chihōzei ni hennyū chōshū narabini eigyōzei zasshuzei fuka kisoku no ken,” *Chōkan ukagai roku*, 1880/11/4, 簿書 3792(32), HPA.

Sapporo Subdivision,⁹⁴ the rates were set at 0.40 yen, 0.60 yen, and 0.80 yen, although these increased to 0.50 yen, 0.70 yen, and 0.90 yen the following year.⁹⁵

Figure 4.6: 1881 Household Tax Brackets⁹⁶		
Category	Household Assets (yen)	Number of households (Sapporo Subdivision)
Upper	500 +	1,795
Middle	100 +	5,608
Lower	< 100	7,431

The use of local household taxation to fund local government made sense from the perspective of the national government, which was keen to reduce its costs after the Seinan War and also keen to head off the rising tide of popular discontent and calls for political representation. Greater local financing also appealed to the Colonial Agency, which faced rising costs but a fixed annual budget even as the population in Hokkaido increased. It also appealed to the officials of the Sapporo city office, who sought greater responsibility and autonomy as Sapporo developed and their businesses prospered. Yet, for many Sapporo residents local taxation was unwelcome; for many others, it was unpayable.

The projected budget for the Sapporo district office in 1879 admitted to one of the key challenges with the household taxation system: the delinquency of many city residents. Local officials anticipated that they would only be able to collect the household levy from seventy percent of Sapporo residents. The remaining thirty percent were either “properties left empty by landowners engaged in seasonal employment elsewhere (*dekasegi*), or inhabited by

⁹⁴ Sapporo subdivision refers to the large district of Sapporo *honcho*. See Figure 1.

⁹⁵ For 1881, Ōkurashō Kaitakushi kaikei zanmu seiri iin, *Chihō zeichō*, 1882–83, 簿書 5472, HPA; for 1882, Sapporo-ken sozeika chōzeigakari, “15-nendo chihōzei shūnyū yosan gaku no shiwakesho no ken,” *Sozei ni kansuru ken – 1880, 1881, 1881*, 簿書 4645(30), HPA.

⁹⁶ *KJH*, vol. 7, p. 807.

impoverished residents, and therefore should be treated as non-payers.”⁹⁷ While this was an improvement over the half of residents that did not pay in 1873, it nevertheless reflected a pervasive problem in a city where so many residents did not settle permanently.

Most obviously a problem, the local tax system did not raise enough money to cover the costs of local government. Total spending in the urban area (*shichū*) of Sapporo District for the 1879 fiscal year came to 1187.906 yen, covering salaries for headmen and lower ranking officials, night watchmen, supplies, maintenance, and the servicing of a ten-year loan from the Colonial Agency. Only a little more than half of the needed revenue for the year came from local household assessments. This shortfall was even more pronounced at the level of Sapporo District: in 1880, local government costs were 9,957 yen, while revenue from the household levy was only 2,320 yen.⁹⁸ The difference in both cases was supplemented by revenue from other local taxes and the Export Tax, which was a major source of income for the Colonial Agency and was used heavily to supplement the annual budget from the central government (see Figure 4.7). The significant shortfall raises a question of why tax rates were so low across the board: the highest tax rate did not exceed four fifths of a percent. The surprisingly low rate was especially true for the highest tiers of households, most of which paid well less than a tenth of a percent of their assets in household tax. This regressive system, which only produced a quarter of the revenue needed for Sapporo’s local administration, seems at odds with the Colonial Agency’s efforts to make local government self-reliant. The even lower tax rates introduced with the 1881 revisions are even more puzzling in this regard.

⁹⁷ Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho minjikyoku kosekika, “Sapporo shigai kuhi fuka no hōhō sara ni chōsa no gi ni tsuki ukagaisho no ken.”

⁹⁸ Kaitakushi Sapporo honchō kirokukyoku kōbunka, *Honchō tasshi*, 1881, 簿書 A4/178, HPA.

Figure 4.7: Tax revenue by category, Sapporo Subdivision⁹⁹ (in yen)

Year	National tax ¹⁰⁰	% of total revenue	Export tax	% of total revenue	Regional tax	% of total revenue	Total revenue
1875	292,171	86%	43,308	13%	2,744	1%	338,223
1876	292,286	87%	42,328	13%	182	<1%	334,796
1877	260,812	87%	38,237	13%	474	<1%	299,523
1878	320,166	87%	48,691	13%	699	<1%	369,556
1879	495,467	88%	67,169	12%	1,217	<1%	563,853
1880	594,619	88%	75,698	11%	1,956	1	672,273

There are two interlinked answers to the seeming contradiction between the push for local autonomy and the slashing of household tax rates in Sapporo. The first answer relates to the question of practicality: as Matsumoto and his successors in Sapporo immediately recognized, the many poor migrants in Sapporo were simply unable to pay household taxes, while the seasonal, sojourning character of the city's population meant that many households were absent for tax collection, and hard to track down. The burden of local taxes was probably also a contributing factor to the general discontent among Sapporo's residents during the city's early years, and the need to reduce that burden figured large in the minds of officials on the ground.

This led directly to the second answer: calls by national and local bureaucrats to reduce the tax burden on households by shifting it to local businesses. As part of the 1880 discussions about reforming regional taxes, Hakodate officials wrote to Sapporo with a proposal to implement regional taxes on a range of businesses, based on their profitability.¹⁰¹ The same day as the simplified and reduced household tax was implemented, in 1881/4, the Colonial Agency

⁹⁹ *KJH*, vol. 5, pp. 396–7, 409, 419.

¹⁰⁰ National taxes included the land tax, introduced to Sapporo subdivision in 1878 (at 1%), a very lucrative tax on fisheries, and a variety of miscellaneous taxes on liquor, tobacco, lawsuits, applications, and so on.

¹⁰¹ Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho kirokukyoku kōbunka, “Chihōzei fuka kisoku seitei ni kansuru ken,” *Hakodate bun'iroku – rai*, 1880/6/16, 簿書 3778(99), HPA.

introduced a more comprehensive set of local taxes for businesses and other miscellaneous purposes (see Figure 4.8). Comparing these taxes to the 1880 nine-tier household tax rates (Figure 4.4), it seems obvious that the new system sought to separate the household rates and business rates in an effort to ensure that all households chipped in (by assessing much lower rates), while asking business owners, and particularly wealthier and more successful owners, to contribute more to local government by contributing some of their profits.

Figure 4.8: Business taxes introduced in 1881¹⁰²			
<i>< indicates the maximum tax levied, suggesting further gradations within each bracket</i>			
<i>Business type</i>	<i>Assessment type</i>	<i>Tax bracket (yen)</i>	<i>Annual tax (yen)</i>
Companies	Capitalization	30,000 +	< 10
		10,000~29,999	< 7
		< 10,000	3~5
Wholesalers	Sales	10,000 +	< 7
		5,000~9,999	< 5
		< 5,000	1~3
Brokerages	Annual income	3,000 +	< 5
		1,000~2,999	< 3
		< 1,000	0.50~1
Retailers	Annual sales	3,000 +	< 5
		1,000~2,999	< 3
		< 1,000	0.50~1
Miscellaneous businesses	Annual sales	1,000 +	< 3
		500~999	0.50~1
		< 500	0.20~0.50
Ice manufacturers	Annual sales (tons)	1,000 +	< 15
		500~999	< 10
		< 500	3~5
Transportation firms	Annual revenue	1,000 +	< 4
		500~999	< 2
		< 500	0.50~1
Inns	Annual guests	3,000 +	< 4
		1,000~2,999	< 2
		< 1,000	0.20~0.50
Pawnshops	Annual collateral value	3,000 +	< 5
		1,000~2,999	< 3
		< 1,000	0.50~1

¹⁰² Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho kirokukyoku kōbunka, “Kosūwari minpi wo chihōzei ni hennyū chōshū narabini eigyōzei zasshuzei fuka kisoku no ken.”

Figure 4.8 continued			
Used goods merchants	Annual sales	1,000 +	< 3
		500~999	0.50~1
		< 500	0.20~0.50
Restaurants	Annual revenue	5,000 +	< 7
		1,000~4,999	< 5
		< 1,000	1~3
Bathhouses	Annual revenue	1,000 +	< 2
		500~999	< 1
		< 500	0.20~0.50
Laborers' inns	Flat rate	--	2
Food stands (selling sushi, noodles, eel, lunchboxes)	Annual revenue	500 +	< 3
		100~499	0.50~1
		< 100	0.20~0.50
Barbershops	High quality	--	1
	Low quality	--	0.50
Slaughterhouses	Per animal		0.20
Millers	Per grinding		0.20
<i>Geisha</i>	Monthly		1
Theatrical performances, concerts, speeches, sumō exhibitions, exhibits (gardens, <i>misemono</i> , etc.)	Per event	--	3% of total revenue

In addition to the practical benefit of more efficiently tapping into the growing wealth of Sapporo's business world, this move toward a thorough and comprehensive business tax reflected a moral belief that wealthy businesses, especially brothels and other entertainment businesses, should be taxed and regulated more heavily to mitigate their deleterious effects on the city.¹⁰³ (In fact, local officials wanted to tax geisha at two yen a month; this was rejected by Tokyo.) This was a common experience around Japan, where the local business taxes drew most of their revenue from the entertainment sector.¹⁰⁴ More generally, doubling down on a business

¹⁰³ Kaitakushi Sapporo honchō, "Kashizashiki tosei narabini geishōgi zeisoku no ken."

¹⁰⁴ Baxter, *The Meiji Unification through the Lens of Ishikawa Prefecture*, p. 189.

tax allowed officials to extract revenue from people who participated in seasonal employment: that is, even if they were not around in Sapporo when household taxes were levied, their businesses could be taxed more rigorously. In addition, and as later experience with a national personal income tax would show, individuals were savvy about using incorporation to minimize their personal tax burden.¹⁰⁵ It is unclear whether Sapporo's residents used their businesses to hide or reduce their personal tax burden, but the implementation of the new rules would have helped cut down on tax evasion by merchants and wealthy business owners.

One hint at this possibility comes from the heel-dragging of local officials in the implementation of these business taxes in 1881. A key component of the new tax system was the assessment of every business by the general representatives. However, the rules governing the representatives' responsibilities had not been revised to reflect these changes, and local officials worried that they would resist taking on this role.¹⁰⁶ They delayed the implementation of local business taxes for a year to give local officials time to learn their new responsibilities. More cynically, the business owners serving as local officials were likely in no huge rush to enforce levies on the occupations to which they would return after their term in office, or on the firms now run by their family members.

Unfortunately, no statistics remain about the household tax collection in Sapporo proper; the finest-grained detail we have is at the level of Sapporo Subdivision and Sapporo Prefecture, large entities that stretched across a third of Hokkaido. Urban Sapporo represented about 15% of the households of the broader subdivision region. If we assume that the households in Sapporo

¹⁰⁵ Kazuki Onji and John P. Tang, "Taxes and the Choice of Organizational Form in Late Nineteenth Century Japan," *Journal of Economic History* 77, no. 2 (June 2017): pp. 440–472.

¹⁰⁶ Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho kirokuka kōbungakari, "Sapporo honcho kannai eigyōzei zasshuzei fuka kisoku sonota sekō no ken," *Tokyo bun'iroku – ō*, 1881, 1881/6, 簿書 4491(270), HPA.

were roughly proportional to those of the region, both in terms of size and relative wealth, we can generate a very rough estimate of the household tax revenue in the city. With regards to the business and miscellaneous taxes, it seems likely that Sapporo would have had an above-average number of businesses, and then more than 15% of those revenues, although without data about other cities, most notably the wealthy port of Otaru, it is impossible to know how much revenue was derived from the city's business owners. Nevertheless, as Figure 4.9 indicates, the household tax revenue was probably higher than the 600 yen or so raised in the city in 1879.

Figure 4.9: Tax Revenues in Sapporo Subdivision¹⁰⁷

Fiscal Year	National land tax (1%, Sapporo Subdivision)	(national land tax levied on Sapporo urban area households)	Regional land tax (0.2%, Sapporo Subdivision)	Household tax (Sapporo Subdivision)	Business and misc. taxes (Sapporo Subdivision)
1875	--	--	0	0	2,744.833
1876	--	--	0	0	182.522
1877	--	3.456	0	0	474.720
1878	2,414.938	5.290	0	0	699.535
1879	963.613	557.783	0	0	1,217.0540
1880	2,481.848	704.907	1.506	0	1,955.145
1881	3,566.933	709.442	578.789	7,235.700	5,780.362
1882	--	--	841.532	9,352.900	7,897.993

More generally, the tax data illustrate the stabilization and growth of city tax revenues that accompanied urban growth. The introduction of the new regional tax system boosted local tax revenue for Sapporo by placing a higher tax burden on local businesses and residents. A new surveying system introduced in 1879 helps explain the dramatic increase in land tax revenue from households in urban Sapporo, with officials dispatched to measure the total area of the city, and assess its value. This produced a hundred-fold increase in land tax revenue (5 yen to 557

¹⁰⁷ Data through 1881 from *KJH*, vol. 5, pp. 390–407; 1881–82 from Ōkurashō Kaitakushi kaikei zanmu seiri iin, *Chihō zeichō*.

yen) and assessed property values (529 yen to 55,779 yen) between 1878 and 1879, compared to a sixfold increase in total property, from 21,254 *tsubo* to 121,926 *tsubo*.¹⁰⁸ While the burden on local taxpayers clearly increased significantly, the surge in population and the growing wealth of the city also played a role in boosting local tax revenue, while the shift to a business tax and the assessment of property values helped ensure that the wealthiest residents of the city shouldered a greater share of the tax burden.

The consolidation and implementation of a new tax code marked a form of maturity for local government in Sapporo. The new, centralized tax code replaced traditional methods of assessing property values and extracting government revenue, heralding the penetration of local society by the central government in Tokyo—a process that echoed similar processes unfolding across Japan—and also heralding the colonial incorporation of Hokkaido's land into the administrative geography of Japan. Hokkaido was being drawn into a national space, where the aims of the central government played an important role in shaping local developments. Yet, as the back and forth between Sapporo and Tokyo over specific tax policy illustrates, local officials played a crucial role in shaping the implementation of national policies in Sapporo. They pointed to the peculiar features of the city: its newness, the poverty and transience of its residents, and the fact that the Hokkaido regional economy was still heavily reliant on resource extraction centered on the fishing industry, tax revenue from which subsidized the settlement of Sapporo. Despite attempts to wean the region off the Export Tax, it remained a crucial portion of the Colonial Agency's revenue, and the revenue of local government in Sapporo, until the Agency's dismantling in 1882. These reasons meant that reforms introduced elsewhere in Japan had to wait for implementation in Sapporo.

¹⁰⁸ *KJH*, vol. 5, pp. 396–403.

Ironically, this contributed to the persistence of older traditions from Tokugawa Japan in Sapporo, such as the *koma*-based system of taxation. These customary practices provided an anchor for residents and officials alike, both of whom faced shortages of people, funding, and enthusiasm for radical projects when they were often barely scraping by. Moreover, their role as Japanese settlers in a foreign place perhaps encouraged them to double down on the daily practices that defined the societies and communities in more familiar parts of the archipelago. Despite the presence of Western advisors in the Colonial Agency, and indeed throughout the Japanese government, their names are never mentioned in the debates about tax policy, or the discussions of the proper organization of Sapporo's territory. Instead, appeals to custom, efficiency, and on-the-ground pragmatism dominate, underscoring some of the features of Japanese settler-colonialism in early Sapporo: a relatively conservative effort to recreate the castle towns of Tokugawa Japan, coupled with constant trial and error as local bureaucrats and local elites sought to assert themselves and their forms of social organization in the region.

The Limits of State Power: The Growth of Civil Society?

The story of Sapporo's local government, especially when told through the lens of the officials and bureaucracies that created it, largely reflects the top-down reordering of space in Hokkaido by the colonial state throughout the 1870s. Yet, the bureaucratic apparatus in Sapporo remained small and constrained, both in terms of personnel and resources (with the notable exception of the sizeable police force). As a result, local people began to contribute their own labor and resources to build the infrastructure of civic life in Sapporo. Their actions in Sapporo helped produce a class of local notables who would go on to be leading figures in the city. They also highlight the role of ordinary people in the process of city building in Sapporo. Petitions to the government and the direct contributions of money and labor to municipal projects suggests

that the production of urban space in Sapporo was not purely a top-down project, despite the state's dominant role in the broader colonial project.

A series of petitions to the Colonial Agency by Sapporo residents in 1873 highlight the range of ways in which local residents interacted with the state to shape the urban community of Sapporo. Many of the petitions related to personal matters, such as getting approval for adoptions, marriages, or name changes, as well as occupational affairs: requesting to change occupations, or add additional occupations onto existing jobs. Several petitioners requested approval to start innkeeping, which most likely included running a brothel; the association of brothelkeepers successfully petitioned the government to rename “inns” as “brothels” that year, too, along with securing a council of three elected representatives. Several approvals for musical and theatrical performances hint at an emerging cultural life in Sapporo, while the applications for new jobs in transport, construction, and sake brewing from people living in Hakodate or elsewhere in Japan indicate that ambitious merchants and artisans from elsewhere regarded Sapporo as a site of economic opportunity.

Local residents also submitted petitions that directly shaped the built environment. Many requests related to the construction of houses and other buildings, and in particular bemoaned the shortage of labour and supplies. The government agreed to sell lumber and other materials at low cost to help residents construct their homes and businesses. Residents of the brothel quarter asked to rename the quarter's streets in a more poetic fashion (“Willow River Street” rather than “North Street,” for instance). Finally, the government approved several petitions for more housing loans, underscoring their role in capitalizing the construction of the city.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰⁹ Kaitakushi kaikongakari, “Shichū sho negai tojikomi.”

The state sought to incentivize the good behavior and civic mindedness of local people. “The government’s role, like that of a wise local official, is to encourage good behavior. This is doubly important in the frozen lands of the extreme north,” argued the Colonial Agency, which established a fund to reward exemplary subjects, foreign advisors, and diligent officials. City residents who offered particularly good examples of filial piety and passersby who rescued drowning children received silver or wooden bowls from the state, while local entrepreneurs who worked especially hard to make their business succeed and Ainu in the suburban villages who learnt how to cultivate silkworms were rewarded with money.¹¹⁰ These disbursements complemented the government’s relief program, which provided rice and tax relief to the sick, orphaned children, children born due to a ban on abortions, and those who fell into destitution. These rewards were also used to encourage local people to contribute to projects of community importance, including basic infrastructure. In 1876/9, for example, one of Sapporo’s largest contractors, Ōoka Sukeuemon, was rewarded for filling in an old river and building a new road at his own expense. Later that same year, the Colonial Agency began rewarding all low-ranking officials who donated some of their own salaries to construction projects.¹¹¹ Several people each year were rewarded for general land improvement work and the construction of buildings, diligent efforts in government office or as teachers, land reclamation, or the encouragement of migration.¹¹²

The most significant example of this involvement of local people in the funding of construction projects was the construction of the new city office (*kuyakusho*) in 1880 as part of

¹¹⁰ *KJH*, vol. 5, pp. 63–69, 74–78.

¹¹¹ *KJH*, vol. 5, p. 68.

¹¹² *KJH*, vol. 5, pp. 82–84.

the reorganization of Sapporo into an urban district. As a local project, this office was to be financed locally. As we have seen, however, local tax revenues barely covered existing needs, and were not sufficient to cover the costs of constructing a new office, some 2,291 yen. This was twice as much as the total budget for the urban part of Sapporo the previous year, and obviously could not be financed through local tax revenue, leading local officials to persuade residents to contribute directly to the construction project. Colonial Agency officials, as well as lower-ranking officials in the Agency and town office, contributed portions of their salary: the highest-ranking Colonial Agency official, Zusho Hirotake, contributed 35 yen. The District Chief (*kuchō*), Yamazaki Kiyomi, also put in 35 yen, slightly more than half his monthly salary. Employees at the lowest end of the salary scale donated between one tenth and one eighth of their salaries. In all, eleven top-ranking Colonial Agency officials put in 222 yen, and 102 other officials in the Agency and the town office contributed a total of 315.5 yen.

The bulk of the money, though, came from a group of prominent local citizens. Led by Suibara Torazō, a prominent contractor, apple farmer, and petty capitalist, 84 residents contributed a total of 1,753.5 yen. Suibara himself contributed 150 yen, while the list of donors includes local notables such as the contractor Ōoka (55 yen), a variety of former headmen, Sapporo's first photographer, Takebayashi Seiichi (25.60 yen, including a "donation of the 5.60 yen photography fee"), and two institutions: the Sapporo branch of the national bank (30 yen) and the Higashi Honganji temple (4 yen). The four donors who contributed more than 100 yen received gifts of silver bowls and bolts of silk; smaller donors received lesser gifts. The bestowing of gifts in exchange for government work sounds an awful lot like corruption, and certainly the quiet sale of government property to friends and families of Colonial Agency officials in the early 1880s triggered widespread protests across Japan. It is unclear the degree to

which procurement was rigged in favour of certain companies and contractors in early Sapporo. The close relationship between government and local elites shines through clearly in the practice of rewarding local merchants and contractors. Putting aside the ethical questions of this relationship, the resulting creation of an elite class of local notables stands out as a major development in Sapporo by the end of the Colonial Agency period.

Conclusion: Settler-Colonial Urban Government

The funding and construction of the city office encapsulates some of the features and dynamics of local government in Sapporo after one decade of growth. From a rowdy frontier town, filled with a transient population struggling to make ends meet, Sapporo had started to mature into a stable urban center with a class of local elites who worked closely with government officials to enforce order, assess taxes, and provide local administration. The limits of government finances opened up opportunities for these elites to assert themselves in the implementation of projects of the central state. The growth of a class of local elites that mediated between state and society resembles the trajectory of local government elsewhere in Japan, and underscores the continuation of older forms of local power structures across the archipelago. Yet, the lack of a robust local tax base hints at the ongoing poverty of this colonial outpost: most residents continued to be poor or temporary, lacked roots in the region, and therefore were unwilling and unable to contribute local taxes. The ongoing reliance of the Colonial Agency on the export tax to subsidize the extensive and expensive infrastructure projects required to expand and support the growing city also reminds us that Hokkaido's economy and society was significantly different than other parts of Japan. Nevertheless, despite delays, the introduction of the national system of local government reveals the state's relative success in incorporating the

region into the administrative geography and institutional structures of an increasingly centralized nation-state.

More generally, the establishment of local government in Sapporo was part of a broader effort to establish order in a place seen by most Japanese as lawless, disorderly, and lacking in community, civilization, or history. This stemmed from the fluid population, and the large number of poor people and sojourning labourers, as well as the identification of Sapporo (and Hokkaido more generally) with the “uncivilized” culture of the Ainu. Colonial Agency officials were determined to impose order onto this space, and their efforts dominated the construction and administration of Sapporo, whether in the form of establishing police forces, proclaiming municipal ordinances, or funding the creation of local government. Local bureaucrats, such as Matsumoto Jūrō, helped adapt the demands of the national state to the peculiar circumstances of colonial Sapporo by delaying and modifying many of Tokyo’s instructions in favor of more familiar, traditional models of local government inherited from practices common across Tokugawa Japan. These efforts are a good reminder that the state was not monolithic in early Meiji Japan, and separating the central state from local state apparatuses can help us understand the importance of continuities and traditional practice in the implementation of new, seemingly modern forms of government.

State officials were not the only ones interested in creating order in the new city. Local residents petitioned the government to establish laws that would help quell disorder and keep the peace, particularly around the nightlife district. In 1871/10, two local residents called for stricter regulation of innkeepers to prevent undesirable people from loitering in town: prescient, perhaps, given Imamura Wasaburō’s violent attack on the brothel district the following summer. As that attack makes clear, it would take much more work to crack down on violence

and crime: the establishment of a police force, the enforcement of ordinances on misdemeanors and petty crime, and the replacement of ineffective household-group heads with paid headmen accountable to the newly established town and district offices.

By the fall of 1880, the participation of local people in their own government had become increasingly expected: an editorial in the *Sapporo shinbun*, first published that year, argued that it was important for all residents to pay their local tax, because it “has been established for us: to cover the costs of the district office and headmen, and to pay for road repairs and bridge construction, which are for our convenience.”¹¹³ The contributions of local elites to the construction of the city office also illustrate the rise of a civic-mindedness. It is difficult to say how deeply this took root among Sapporo’s non-elite residents, and the city remained a transient place: by the 1880s, the southeast of the city had become the location of transient workers’ flophouses, subject to flooding, contagious disease, and poverty.¹¹⁴ The Ainu are almost totally absent from records of the city in this period, as forced resettlement projects kept them further inland in central and eastern Hokkaido, or on the coasts in the fishing industries. Nevertheless, the introduction of ordinances in Sapporo banning traditional Ainu cultural practices hints at their presence, however fleeting, in the construction of this colonial Japanese city.

The picture, then, is mixed: the rise of local participation in Sapporo’s government reveals similarities with other parts of Japan, where local notables seized on the opportunities provided by new local government laws in the late 1870s to create spaces for their own participation and power. As with elsewhere in Japan, this participation did not extend to poorer residents. Sapporo’s colonial features, though, created some differences with the rest of Japan:

¹¹³ “Minpi no hōdō kiji,” *Sapporo shinbun*, 1880/10/20, reprinted in SSS, vol. 6, p. 1080.

¹¹⁴ Kanita Seiji, “Sapporo ni okeru saimingai no seiritsu: 1880 nendai no Sapporo shigai,” in *Sapporo no rekishi* 16 (Feb 1989): pp. 18–44.

local bureaucrats played a stronger role, and relied more heavily on traditional notions of government benevolence to offer some semblance of familiarity to migrants. At the same time, they also made it virtually impossible for Indigenous residents of the region to maintain their ways of life, underscoring the fact that the creation of a Japanese city in Sapporo was an explicit rejection of the Ainu societies that had lived in and around the region for much longer than any Japanese settler. The creation of a stable society in Sapporo, predicated upon the taxation of property, the enforcement of laws, and the administration of space, required the erasure of the communities that predated it, a good reminder of the colonial nature of Sapporo's settlement.

Chapter 5

The Capitol Orchard: Botanical Networks and the Production of Urban Space

The walk south from Sapporo's central railway station towards Ōdōri Park and the nightlife district of Susukino passes through an unremarkable series of mixed-use buildings and some newer glass-and-steel high-rise boxes characteristic of Sapporo's most recent wave of redevelopment. Behind this row of banks and insurance firms stands the former prefectural capitol: a three-storey red-brick building, fronted by a small park (and backed by its 1960s Brutalist replacement, a hulking concrete mass that does little credit to that architectural movement). Throughout the year the park hosts farmers' markets and snow festivals, cherry-blossom viewing and bird watching, as well as busloads of tourists snapping selfies. Today the capitol feels diminutive amidst the bustling high-rise center of Sapporo, but at the time of its construction in 1873 it dominated the city and served as the headquarters of the Colonial Agency apparatus. With its grand Western-influenced architecture, it embodied Sapporo's role as capital of Hokkaido, and symbolized the Colonial Agency's aspiration to turn Sapporo into one of the major cities of a young, modernizing, and outward-looking Japanese empire.

Curiously, and in contrast to today's ornamental ponds and shrubbery, the capitol was initially surrounded by an extensive orchard, with thousands of fruit trees imported from as far away as New England and France. The story of these fruit trees, and the Colonial Agency's decision to place them at the political and administrative heart of its capital, illustrates several key features of Sapporo's form and function as a capital city. First, it highlights the persistent importance of the central state to the development of Sapporo, in particular through the form of state-led agricultural experiments that drew upon efforts by the Tokugawa shogunate in the first half of the nineteenth century. The dominance of the state both before and after Sapporo's

founding underscores the role of the city as a headquarters for centralizing, colonizing regimes. Second, the decision to import trees from around the world marked the expansion of commercial, scientific and personal networks stretching far beyond Japan's borders, networks that became more intense, comprehensive, and institutionalized following the opening of the treaty ports in 1854. Sapporo's development took place within these transnational networks, but it is also important to note that they were not one-way transfers of Western knowledge to Japan: rather, the fruit-growing work of the Colonial Agency and its advisors reveals an exchange of botany and botanical knowledge in and out of Japan. Finally, the inclusion of a large orchard, along with other agricultural stations, in the center of Sapporo blurs the boundary between urban and rural space, and illustrates the urban processes driving the agricultural settlement of the region. Experiments in the city would shape the course of settlement throughout the region, tying far-flung farmers to the capital and situating the city within a wide-reaching hinterland.

Together, these three features demonstrate that Sapporo mediated between transnational, regional and local networks of botanical exchange. This mediating function shaped the form of the city through agricultural sites such as the capitol orchard, and the planting of fruit trees in the city's private residences. Yet, these networks did not emerge naturally: they reflected the choices and efforts of politicians, bureaucrats and Sapporo's residents, whose aims were often complementary but occasionally antagonistic as they struggled to transform the social and natural landscape of Hokkaido with a colonial city-building project in Sapporo.

Agricultural Experimentation in the Settlement of Hokkaido, 1780s–1869

Ezochi's harsh climate posed a major challenge to the first wave of Wajin farmers to settle in the Sapporo area during the early nineteenth century. In the 1850s and 60s, shogunal officials set up government-run experimental agricultural stations to develop new crop strains to

handle the cold and snowy winters, but had little success with rice farming—a major ideological goal for the shogunate, whose taxation system was officially based on rice production.¹ After the collapse of the shogunate in 1868, the new Meiji government decided to accelerate the development of Ezochi, which they renamed Hokkaido in 1869. The new government, through the office of the Colonial Agency, promoted Western-style agriculture as a mainstay of the future settler economy on the advice of American officials hired to assist the colonization effort. Wheat, corn and dairy products—many of the items now typically associated with Hokkaido—date to the Colonial Agency’s efforts to introduce new crops and farming practices in the 1870s. Immigrant farmers received loans and outright gifts of seeds, farming tools, and land to set up homesteads across the sparsely settled inland areas of Hokkaido.

Until recently, historians of the Wajin settlement of the region focused on the experience of these farmers, many of whom were impoverished former samurai, including the soldier-farmers (*tondenhei*) envisioned as a defensive force for the region. Moving to sparsely populated Hokkaido and clearing land for agriculture, these families undeniably faced hardships as they made their new homes.² From the 1870s, their experiences led promoters of settlement to draw comparisons with the Pilgrims landing in New England in the seventeenth century or the white

¹ Matsumae Domain was an exception to this: despite having an assessed yield of between 10,000 and 30,000 *koku*, it produced no rice in the early modern period. Instead, it enjoyed monopoly trade rights in Ezochi, which accounted for nearly the entirety of its wealth. Tamura Sadao, “Naikoku shokuminchi toshite no Hokkaido,” in *Iwanami kōza kindai Nihon to shokuminchi*, vol. 1, “Shokuminchi teikoku Nihon,” ed. Ōe Shinobu et al. (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1992), p. 88. (Tamura gives a figure of 50,000 *koku*, but this is an error.)

² The *tondenhei* have been the focus of many studies. David Howell, “Early ‘shizoku’ colonization of Hokkaidō,” *Journal of Asian History* 17 (1983): pp. 40–67, discusses the experience of some groups of former samurai from the perspective of their particular status group as former samurai (*shizoku*). The treatment of the *tondenhei* around Sapporo in the most recent city history is also relatively nuanced, and draws heavily on archival sources (rather than nostalgic commemoration). Sapporo-shi kyōiku iinkai, ed., “Tonden heisei no saiyo,” in *Shin Sapporo shishi*, vol. 2 (Sapporo: Sapporo shi, 1991), pp. 334–376, and *ibid.*, “Tondenhei mura no saihei,” in *Shin Sapporo shishi*, vol. 2, pp. 772–819. Hereafter SSS.

colonization of the British Dominions, while U.S. advisors to the Colonial Agency drew explicit and favorable comparisons to westward expansion in the United States.³ Ever since, Hokkaido boosters and people throughout Japan have associated the island with a “pioneer spirit,” an association that persists to this day: Hokkaido University’s newest mission statement includes an explicit appeal to this spirit.⁴ Yet, as Michele Mason and others have argued, this emphasis on agricultural pioneers elides several key features of the colonization of Hokkaido: the fact that settler-soldiers, for instance, were a miniscule proportion of the total migrants to the region; the continued and overwhelming reliance of the Hokkaido economy on fishing and resource extraction rather than farming until well into the twentieth century; and the attacks on and frequent destruction of Indigenous communities that agricultural settlement entailed.⁵ More recent scholarship has focused on these elements to a greater degree, emphasizing the violence of the colonial process at both the structural and the personal level.⁶ We now know that this

³ For comparisons to New England and other colonial forms, such as the British Dominions, see *Kaitaku zasshi* 2 (14 Feb 1880): pp. 1–8. This article discusses four approaches to colonialism, starting with the individual efforts of ideological groups such as the Puritans; the forced colonization through use of slavery; the settling of soldier-farmers; and finally the use of settlement as a form of welfare, relocating poor residents and providing migrants with lots of aid. This last approach was the ideal model for Hokkaido. For an overview of the attitudes of many foreign advisors, and their reception of those advisors by their Japanese colleagues, see Fujita Fumiko, *American Pioneers and the Japanese Frontier: American Experts in Nineteenth-Century Japan* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994).

⁴ In his inaugural address in April 2017, president of Hokkaido University Nawa Toyoharu identified the university’s mission to be a “core institution...for developing Hokkaido, Japan’s frontier,” while the “Frontier Spirit” is the first idea underpinning the university’s educational philosophy. Nawa Toyoharu, “Creating a Hokkaido University that flourishes with a spirit of independence and autonomy,” Inaugural Address, Hokkaido University, 5 April 2017, <https://www.global.hokudai.ac.jp/about/presidents-welcome/inaugural-message/>

⁵ Michele Mason, *Dominant Narratives of Colonial Hokkaido and Imperial Japan: Envisioning the Periphery and the Modern Nation-State* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 2.

⁶ The most recent Iwanami series of Japanese imperial history explicitly includes Hokkaido as an ‘internal colony’ in which many of the dynamics of violence and expropriation that would characterize the later empire were already visible; see Tamura, “Naikoku shokuminchi toshite no Hokkaido,” and Ōe Shinobu’s preface to that same volume. David Howell has shown how the rise of capitalism in the fisheries led to exploitative dynamics between Japanese and Ainu people in *Capitalism from Within: Economy, Society,*

“pioneer spirit” was underpinned and encouraged by a concerted state-led effort to colonize the region for the purposes of national defense and economic growth, while the establishment of pioneer communities required the destruction of preexisting Ainu society and the replacement of early-modern forms of exchange between Ainu and Wajin, as well as major transformations to Hokkaido’s environment.

In addition to these broader structural changes that unfolded across Hokkaido, underpinning agricultural settlement, this vision of pioneering agricultural settlement also relied upon the development of a very particular urban headquarters: the Colonial Agency’s capital, Sapporo. Famously, the Sapporo Agricultural College (today’s Hokkaido University) became the center for disseminating practical and scientific knowledge of Western agriculture across Hokkaido. Less well known but more striking, at least from the perspective of Sapporo’s urban development, was the Colonial Agency’s decision to surround its capitol building in central Sapporo with an orchard. The juxtaposition of the stately Western-style capitol and row after row of fruit trees highlights Sapporo’s position at the center of local, regional and transnational networks of botanical exchange, which in turn illustrate the mutual relationship between—if not the blurring of—urban and rural space in Hokkaido. Far from a natural development, these

and the State in a Japanese Fishery (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995); Daniel Botsman has demonstrated the important role of prison labor and new regimes of policing in the creation of much of the physical infrastructure in Hokkaido; Botsman, *Punishment and Power in the Making of Modern Japan*, ch. 7, “Punishment and Prisons in the Era of Enlightenment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp. 165–200. Brett Walker has discussed the environmental side of this story by focusing on new regimes of environmental control that destroyed habitats to pave the way for agricultural settlement; Brett Walker, “Meiji Modernization, Scientific Agriculture, and the Destruction of Japan’s Hokkaido Wolf,” *Environmental History* 9, no. 2 (April 2004): pp. 248–72. Walker has also argued that the incorporation of Ainu people into Japanese commercial networks in the early-modern period also entailed a reshaping of the Ainu relationship to land and territory in the “middle ground” of Hokkaido; Walker, *The Conquest of Ainu Lands: Ecology and Culture in Japanese Expansion, 1590–1800* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). Finally, for an overview of the place of the Colonial Agency era in the broader history of the modern Ainu, see Richard Siddle, *Race, Resistance and the Ainu of Japan* (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 51–75.

networks—and Sapporo’s place in them—were the product of a series of political contests between the central government, Sapporo’s officials, and local residents in Sapporo and around Hokkaido during the middle of the nineteenth century.

Plans to turn Hokkaido into an agricultural colony predate the Meiji period, and repeatedly involved the introduction of new agricultural techniques. The first serious proposals for agricultural settlement date to Tanuma Okitsugu’s 1780s plans to promote rice cultivation in Ezochi as part of comprehensive economic reforms to stabilize the shogunate’s finances and reinvigorate the economy.⁷ Shogunal surveys estimated that cultivating just ten per cent of Ezochi’s land (by teaching the Ainu to farm) could produce 5.8 million *koku*—a major boon to the government, which was facing increasingly dire fiscal straits.⁸ These early plans were abandoned when Tanuma fell from favor in 1786. Tanuma’s successor, Matsudaira Sadanobu, implemented an austerity program that curtailed large public expenditures such as the state-backed settlement of Ezochi. Nevertheless, shogunal officials, academics, and other commentators continued to urge greater state control of the region. Officials dispatched to survey Ezochi, such as Kondō Jūzō, recognized that food supply would be essential to the long-term defense of Ezochi, and called for agricultural settlement. The Ishikari valley was widely recognized as the most fertile and productive part of the island for this purpose.⁹ Between 1799 and 1807, the Tokugawa government formally took control of the entirety of Ezochi, stripping Matsumae Domain of all but a sliver of land and directly administering the coastal trading posts

⁷ See Fujita Satoru, *Tanuma jidai*, Nihon kinsei no rekishi 4 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa kōbunkan, 2012).

⁸ SSS, vol. 1, p. 417.

⁹ In addition to chapter 1 of this thesis, see overview in SSS, vol. 1, pp. 415–74, for more details about the shogunate’s efforts in Ishikari, focused on the fisheries, relations with the Ainu, and the importance of maintaining transport links to Karafuto (Sakhalin), a defensive stronghold against Russian encroachment.

that formed the mainstay of Ezochi's economic network, linking the entire island to Matsumae, Nagasaki, and thence to the rest of Japan and the outside world.

Before long, fiscal constraints once again led the shogunate to scale back its plans for Ezochi; in fact, it returned control of the region to Matsumae Domain in 1821.¹⁰ Nevertheless, as sightings of Western ships increased throughout the first half of the nineteenth century, calls for more comprehensive development of Ezochi emanated from central and domanial governments alike. The shogunate, after acquiescing to U.S. Commodore Matthew Perry's demands to open more ports to trade in 1853, reinstated direct control of Ezochi in 1855, once again displacing Matsumae Domain. In addition to establishing a magistrate's office at Hakodate, in the south of the island, the shogunate also embarked on a series of administrative reforms designed to consolidate its control over the region.

Beyond the Wajinchi, the shogunate devoted its attention to the Ishikari region. The trading post at Ishikari—actually a composite of thirteen posts along the mouth and lower reaches of the Ishikari river system—was one of Ezochi's most profitable, due to the large annual salmon catches along the Ishikari and its tributaries. Geographically, Ishikari represented a convenient stopover and staging ground for journeys to Karafuto (Sakhalin), which was one of the most pressing geopolitical risks to shogunal strategists. To consolidate control of this region, the shogunate enacted the so-called Ishikari Reform in 1858, which abolished the trading post system, established a shogunal office, and introduced a new status category for permanent

¹⁰ For an overview of the Ishikari area after it was returned to Matsumae Domain, see SSS, vol. 1, pp. 519–39.

settlers (*zaijū*), who were encouraged to adopt agriculture in the region. To bolster this effort, the government planned to use profits from the fisheries to subsidize agricultural experiments.¹¹

Yet, these plans to encourage agricultural settlers struggled to get off the ground. Efforts to grow rice failed, although there were signs that new, hardier strains could be developed with time. Instead, farmers grew soybeans, barley, millet, radishes and other root vegetables.

Ultimately, though, fishing and trade with the Ainu remained far more lucrative, and merchants and government officials alike treated the new farmers poorly.¹² In response to these obstacles, the bakufu established a series of government farms (*otesakuba*) around the Ishikari region to support settlers. Low numbers, a lack of skilled workers, and poor management led to an overhaul of the system in 1866, when an enthusiastic agricultural reformer named Ōtomo Kametarō (1834–97) took control of a consolidated *otesakuba*, located just to the north of present-day central Sapporo.¹³

Ōtomo was born the eldest son of a farmer in Sagami Province. After passing on the family farm to his younger brother in 1855, he became a disciple of Ninomiya Sontoku, the prominent agronomist. Ōtomo travelled to Hakodate in 1858, and found employment on the Hakodate magistracy's farm in the nearby village of Kikonai, where he worked for the next eight

¹¹ SSS, vol. 1, p. 571. The *zaijū* were a new status group established by the shogunate in 1855, comprised of samurai ranging from masterless *rōnin* to hatamoto-level retainers. They were awarded stipends and moving expenses proportional to their former status, and given land to cultivate tax-free for ten years. The shogunate attempted to reform the system in 1862, as it was not producing the desired permanent settlement, by converting stipends to land grants, which drastically reduced *zaijū* revenue; this was strongly opposed by officials in Hakodate, who rightly saw it as a major disincentive for new settlers. The system was abolished with the establishment of the Colonial Agency in 1869/7. There were never more than about 100 *zaijū* households, from a variety of samurai status groups. See SSS, vol. 1, pp. 880–914 for more details.

¹² SSS, vol. 1, p. 912.

¹³ Harada Kazufumi, “Ishikari otesakuba no keiei jittai”, *Sapporo no rekishi* 3 (August 1987): p. 27.

years.¹⁴ In 1866, the magistrate assigned Ōtomo to run the government farm in Ishikari. “While the development of Ezochi continues to move slowly, we do not intend to abandon efforts; therefore, we will support the settlement of farmers, first near Ishikari and then deeper into Ezochi, with a grant of 3,000 ryō for the year,” announced the magistrate in orders to Ōtomo.¹⁵ The figure was based on proposals drafted by Ōtomo, and would be used to provide stipends to farm families and supply them with tools, seeds, and other necessary items. Ōtomo’s detailed proposals demonstrate his dedication to the project, and reveal his influential role in shaping the direction of settlement in the Sapporo area. They also set the stage for the heavy hand of the state in promoting settlement through direct support of migrants.

Ōtomo warned the magistrate that “due to changes in population and the volatility of prices, annual expenses are likely to fluctuate,” and he would not be able to give a firmer estimate or outline for spending and administration until he reached Ishikari.¹⁶ The Ishikari farm was an experimental space: the shogunate, well aware that developing Ezochi would require new approaches, selected Ōtomo for his experience in developing new types of agricultural practices. Ōtomo drew attention to his success in settling fifty households in the government farms around Hakodate, which clearly played a role in the shogunate’s decision to send him to Ishikari. On the flip side, such experiments carried a risk: they cost a lot of money, and their outcomes were unpredictable. The problem of unknown costs and the struggle to develop and execute

¹⁴ Sapporo-shi kyōiku iinkai, Explanatory Preface to *Ōtomo Kametarō monjo*, in SSS, vol. 6, pp. 337–8.

¹⁵ Seki Sadakichi and Ōtomo Kametarō, “Mōshiwatashi,” *Ōtomo Kametarō monjo*, 1866/2, in SSS, vol. 6, p. 342.

¹⁶ Ōtomo Kametarō, “Ishikari otesakuba shinken toritate nyūyō dairiyaku torishirabe kakiage,” *Ōtomo Kametarō monjo*, 1866/2, in SSS, vol. 6, p. 345.

comprehensive plans would continue to affect the development of the Ishikari region well into the Meiji period.

In the face of these challenges, Ōtomo was an assiduous administrator. He prioritized infrastructure such as roads, canals, and drainage ditches to facilitate the movement of horses and people, and also refined the system of subsidies for settlers. He drafted a thirty-year plan for growth: taxes would kick in after ten years, a compromise that would allow settlers to find their feet and become good farmers and loyal subjects. The initial expense of these efforts required Ōtomo to scale back his plans, but he nevertheless succeeded in attracting 95 people in 23 households from northern and northwestern Japan to the Ishikari region.¹⁷ With the fall of the shogunate, funding for the farm dried up. Ōtomo was offered a job by Shima Yoshitake in 1869, but he turned it down and eventually returned to the Kantō area where he worked in a variety of local governments. The migrants he had recruited also scattered once state subsidies disappeared. Nevertheless, in the form of physical infrastructure, most especially the irrigation and drainage canal that runs through central Sapporo, known today as Sōseigawa, Ōtomo's efforts at developing new agricultural practices were absorbed into the Colonial Agency's program of city building at Sapporo. The roads and waterways he built formed the skeleton of the new city.

The Ishikari farm was small and experimental, and Ōtomo aimed to build farming villages, not an urban capital. Yet, the ideal place for farming was also singled out as an ideal place for building that new city. The shogunate's efforts in Ishikari made it a logical choice for the Meiji government to continue state-led settlement projects, while the presence of experimental agriculture at Sapporo would continue to color the development of the region, and the city that emerged at its heart. Meanwhile, the efforts of the state to cultivate new types of

¹⁷ SSS, vol. 1, pp. 941–42; data in detail in Ōtomo Kametarō, “Ishikari otesakuba nōfu gofujomai enso sho dōgu watashikata kakiage chō,” *Ōtomo Kametarō monjo*, 1866/2, in SSS vol. 6, p. 397–404.

crops formed an essential backdrop to the introduction of fruit into Ezochi, and then Hokkaido, a process that expanded the networks of knowledge, plants, and people far beyond the shores of the Japanese archipelago.

Fruit and Foreigners, 1854–73

After the establishment of the treaty ports in the mid-1850s, experimental agriculture in Hokkaido became a transnational project. Imports of foreign crops and seeds accelerated in this period as Japanese officials sought to introduce new technologies and approaches to agriculture. Foreign officials and merchants were keen to tap into this demand, driven largely by their own commercial interests.¹⁸ Meanwhile, foreign botanists and florists were keen to exploit their newfound access to Japan, a hitherto inaccessible source of exotic plant life. These several sources of interest and demand would ultimately become closely linked in a global exchange of botany, part of which passed through Sapporo's orchards and greenhouses.

During the Tokugawa period, the Matsumae clan introduced fruit from mainland Japan into its domain on the southern peninsula of present-day Hokkaido, bordering Ezochi. For the most part these trees, including Japanese plum, apricot and pear, decorated the Matsumae castle and temples in Fukuyama. Fruit was grown for consumption in Kameda and Ono, on the outskirts of Hakodate, at least by the 1850s. Moreover, some records indicate that Japanese fruit trees were also traded to the Ainu, with plum and pear trees found along the Pacific coast of

¹⁸ Foreigners in Hakodate were, almost by definition, primarily interested in trade: both to tap into the trade in marine products between Hokkaido and China, as well as to gain access to the products of Ezochi. The British, at least, were frustrated at their inability to gain a foothold in the government monopolies on Ezochi trade, as can be seen throughout the consular dispatches from Hakodate in the 1850s and 1860s; see, for example, the Hakodate Consulate's 1863 trade report, UK National Archives, FO76. The local British consul was particularly displeased with his American counterpart, E.E. Rice, who seemed driven entirely by "private interests" and was not interested in working with his diplomatic colleagues on non-commercial issues. Abel Gower to Harry Parkes, 17 May 1866, FO111, UK National Archives.

southern Hokkaido.¹⁹ Small numbers of western fruit reached Japan in the 1850s and 60s as the treaty port trade expanded. Tanaka Yoshio, a Meiji-era zoologist and botanist, reported tasting a Western apple in the bakumatsu period, when he was a young scholar at the Institute for Barbarian Books.²⁰ In Ezochi, the first record of Western fruit trees comes from Hakodate, one of the original treaty ports opened in 1854. The U.S. Consul in Hakodate, E.E. Rice, planted fruit trees in the spring of 1862, according to a letter he sent to the magistrate of Hakodate. He was somewhat anxious about his efforts: “Today I commence to plant my fruit trees and I am told that your people pull up and steal. And to prevent I wish you to order your proper officers to appoint a suitable watchman in the night time.... If I am not interfered with in a few years I shall have *fruit trees* to *give* to every Japanese farmer within ten Rees [*ri*] of this city, and when they are full grown will be of much pleasure and profit to your people....”²¹ Rice does not elaborate why locals might have wanted to steal his saplings. But his letter does suggest that he sought to aid local farmers—the fruit trees took the form of an investment and a type of developmental assistance. Rice also offers two reasons local farmers might consider adopting new western trees: pleasure—the taste of fruit, and the attractiveness of flowering trees—and profit: the potential commercialization of these plants and their products. Diet and commercial application became common rationalizations for the introduction of foreign fruit during the early Meiji period.

The interest in new types of plants was not unique to Japanese people in the Hakodate area. Foreign expeditions were eager to explore Japan’s botanical landscape, newly accessible

¹⁹ Kōno Tsunekichi, “Kansei izen Hokkaidō no i’nyū juboku”, in Kōno Tsunekichi chosaku shu, (Sapporo: Hokkaidō shuppan kikaku sentā, 1974), pp. 172–77.

²⁰ Tanaka Yoshio, cited in Fujita Kinsuke, *Ringo no ayunda michi: Meiji kara gendai e, sekai no ‘Fuji’ ga umareru made* (Tokyo: Nōsangyoson bunka kyōkai, 2012), p. 3.

²¹ Letter from E.E. Rice to the Hakodate Magistrate. 24 May 1862, Hokkaido Prefectural Archive [hereafter HPA], boshō 76(18). Emphasis in the original.

after the opening of the treaty ports. The earliest such expedition was the U.S. North Pacific Exploring Expedition, which included the botanist Charles Wright. The expedition visited Japan, including Hakodate, in 1855. Wright's collection of Japanese plants formed the basis for Harvard botanist Asa Gray's controversial argument about the similarities between the flora of Japan and eastern North America.²² The scientific interest in Japanese plants went hand-in-hand with commercial interests. The collectors of the Expedition often sold material to fund their scientific ventures, and prominent florists and commercial plant growers in the United States keenly followed the results of these expeditions to acquire new and exotic material for their customers.

On the eve of the Meiji Restoration, then, plant life was flowing in and out of Ezochi along a range of new transnational corridors of scientific and commercial exchange. After the establishment of the Colonial Agency in 1869, these networks of botanical exchange grew more institutionalized as part of an intensified effort to extend the reach of the Japanese state across Hokkaido, Karafuto, and the Chishima Islands. The growing role of the Japanese state in Ezochi, and the decision to center the colonial state on a new capital at Sapporo, shifted and consolidated these exchanges around that city's model orchards—although competing interests would ensure that Sapporo's model orchards never became truly autonomous or dominant in the botanical networks that shaped them.

Horace Capron and the Colonial Agency

While plans for agricultural settlement had existed since the turn of the century, the establishment of the self-consciously modernizing Meiji regime in 1868 heralded a more aggressive program of development in Hokkaido (as Ezochi was quickly renamed), one drawing explicitly on Western models. The key figure behind this shift was Kuroda Kiyotaka, the

²² Hung Kuang-Chi, *Finding Patterns in Nature*, PhD Diss, Harvard University, 2013.

Satsuma samurai (and future Prime Minister) who led the Colonial Agency from 1870 until 1882.

In the spring of 1871, Kuroda traveled to the United States, where he hired Horace Capron, the former U.S. Commissioner of Agriculture. Together, Kuroda and Capron oversaw the introduction of new technologies of agricultural settlement via the model sites and experimental stations of Sapporo.

The Colonial Agency's overture to Capron reveals its preexisting vision for the island, and its awareness of the knowledge and skills necessary to fulfill its goals. These goals drew in large part upon the efforts of the Tokugawa shogunate during its abortive development plans in the early nineteenth century, and reflects some of the continuities between the Colonial Agency and its predecessors: the emphasis on experimentation, and the recognition that agricultural settlement was key to the success of the broader colonial project in Hokkaido. Capron and his fellow foreigners did not introduce radically new ideas about colonization to the Colonial Agency, but they did introduce valuable new technologies and materials that gave Meiji-era colonization a different flavor than its Tokugawa-era antecedents.²³

On Capron's part, the offer of the Colonial Agency position was an honor and an opportunity: in addition to the handsome salary promised him by the Japanese government (\$10,000 salary plus travel and expenses in his contract, making him the highest-paid official in Japan), Capron saw himself as an ambassador for the United States, and particularly for the

²³ Brett Walker argues that the Meiji restoration and the introduction of these western models marks a radical discontinuity between early-modern and modern ideas about farming, seen through the lens of horse breeding and the concomitant need to exterminate the wolf population. While these new techniques ("scientific agriculture") were important, I want to stress that similar efforts were underway well before the Meiji era; it is true, however, that the scale and effectiveness of these new techniques intensified significantly in the early Meiji period. Brett Walker, "Meiji Modernization."

nation's agricultural knowledge.²⁴ On the eve of his departure, he expressed anxiety about "the effect that any failure in this expedition may have...upon our intercourse, as a nation, with Japan."²⁵ Other observers felt similarly: the Chicago-based *Prairie Farmer* boasted, "It must be a matter of pride to all Americans, that the most enlightened of the Eastern Nations looked at this country, and not to the nations of Europe, to find a representative of the most advanced civilization."²⁶ These comments reflect not only the hubris with which Capron approached his new position, but also the jockeying for influence among the Western powers interested in gaining a foothold in Japan. Hokkaido was a proving ground for the United States, in Capron's view, as much as for Japan.

Capron spent the first six months of his four-year tenure composing a general proposal for the settlement of Hokkaido, drawing on reports and accounts by Western visitors to the region. On 2 January 1872, he submitted a preliminary report to Kuroda, outlining his vision for the economic development of Hokkaido. Alongside the development of infrastructure, mining and other forms of industry, Capron called for a complete overhaul in the approach to agriculture, arguing that "rice, the great staple, is not only the most expensive, but it is also the least nutritive of the food grains." He recognized that Japan's soil and climate might not be conducive to all types of agriculture, but insisted "analysis and experiment...must determine this, and the difficulty, when ascertained, must be remedied by change in cultivation, the introduction of

²⁴ Horace Capron, *Memoirs of Horace Capron: Volume 2, Expedition to Japan, 1871–75*, Special Collections, National Agriculture Library, p. 1. Available online at <https://specialcollections.nal.usda.gov/guide-collections/horace-capron-memoirs>. For a detailed account of Capron's appointment, and the response both within the United States and the foreign community in Japan, see Fumiko Fujita, *American Pioneers and the Japanese Frontier*, especially chapter 2. Fujita argues more generally that the U.S. was disproportionately influential in the development of Hokkaido.

²⁵ Capron, *Memoirs*, vol. 2, p. 6.

²⁶ Clipping from July 1871 edition of the *Prairie Farmer*, in Horace Capron, *Memoirs of Horace Capron – Volume 1: Autobiography*, 1884, Special Collections, National Agricultural Library, p. 170.

renovating crops and the application of animal and mineral manures. Such remedy is merely a question of time and of intelligent observation of causes and effects and judicious application of the teachings of experience.”²⁷ Capron’s confidence in experimentation borders on the condescending, but nevertheless offered an exciting vision of a modern and productive economy to Kuroda and other leaders of the Meiji government.

Capron offered several concrete suggestions for introducing new forms of agriculture. He recommended legal changes that would encourage migration to Hokkaido by offering homesteaders full individual rights over their land, along the model of the Homestead Act and other legislation that had paved the way for white settlement in the American Midwest.²⁸ He proposed the “introduction of a certain foreign population accustomed to the more rigorous climates of Europe and America” to model the types of agriculture and lifestyles necessary for Hokkaido’s cooler climate and heavy snowfall. He also approved of the Colonial Agency’s initial efforts to establish an agricultural station in Tokyo, arguing such a facility would not only allow newly imported seeds and plants time for “rest, examination and partial acclimation,” but also encourage the introduction of new varieties to other parts of Japan. Finally, Capron urged the Colonial Agency to establish agricultural schools as the most efficient means to introduce “scientific, systematic and practical agriculture.”²⁹ Colonization, and the experiments that went

²⁷ Horace Capron, “Abstract of the First Annual Report of Commissioner Horace Capron, 1871,” in *Reports and Official Letters to the Kaitakushi* (Tok[yo]: Kaitakushi, 1875), p. 49. Hereafter *ROLK*.

²⁸ Capron, “Abstract of the First Annual Report,” p. 48. The introduction of new land laws in Hokkaido has been the topic of analysis related to the dispossession of the Ainu; see Richard Siddle, *Race, Resistance and the Ainu of Japan* (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 55–60. See also Katsuya Hirano, “Settler Colonialism in the Making of Japan’s Hokkaido,” in *The Routledge Handbook of the History of Settler Colonialism*, ed. Edward Cavanagh and Lorenzo Veracini (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2017), pp. 327–38.

²⁹ Capron, “Abstract of the First Annual Report,” p. 50.

into it, would benefit the nation at large by modeling new technology and training Japanese with new knowledge.

Fruit figured prominently in Capron's vision of agricultural development. "Not only Yesso [Hokkaido], but the whole Empire of Japan, is capable of becoming a fine fruit country," wrote Capron. "The apple, the most prized of all fruits, flourishes in cold and mild regions, and will find a congenial home both in Yesso and in Nippon."³⁰ Capron based this proposal upon a study of Hokkaido's climate, using temperature measurements to argue that Hokkaido would "compare favorably...with some of the wealthiest and most populous portions of the United States." Capron confirmed these beliefs during his first visit to Hokkaido in the summer of 1872, telling Kuroda that "the climate is no obstacle to the successful occupation and development of Yesso," addressing the longstanding reputation of Hokkaido as a cold, forbidding place.³¹ The climate did, however, preclude the introduction of traditional forms of Japanese agriculture, in particular rice cultivation, necessitating new types of crops. Capron returned to Sapporo in the summer of 1873 to inspect the agricultural efforts in the Sapporo area. He anticipated an abundant harvest that year, and he urged the government to entice "industrious frugal farmers" to Hokkaido. These hardy farmers would need to diversify and adapt to conditions quite different from the rest of Japan:

In this Island isolated as it is, where rice cannot be profitably grown, other crops must be resorted to that can be. This Island, rich in all the elements of production, should export bread food instead of importing it, as is now the case. To accomplish this most desirable object, field grains, garden vegetables and fruits should be introduced, and the farmer encouraged in every possible way to turn his attention to cultivation.³²

³⁰ Capron, "Abstract of the First Annual Report," p. 46.

³¹ Horace Capron to Kuroda Kiyotaka, 22 July 1859, in *ROLK*, p. 59.

³² Capron to Kuroda, 25 July 1873, in *ROLK*, p. 69.

Fruit would play a role in the diversification—and thus the shift towards self-sustainability and future profitability—of Hokkaido’s agriculture.

Louis Boehmer and the Expansion of Botanical Networks

Kuroda had already begun plans for an agricultural station in Tokyo prior to his trip to the United States. The station was established in June 1871 with plants and animals purchased by Kuroda during his trip. The extensive station sprawled across three sites in Aoyama, Tokyo, and included facilities for livestock rearing, horse breeding, crop development and horticulture. The Colonial Agency’s Tokyo office established an Agriculture Division to oversee the Aoyama site, with the goal of “experimenting with various methods of raising plants and livestock.” They hired instructors and recruited vocational students to study these new methods, turning the Aoyama site into a model farm for new agricultural techniques.³³

Bolstered by Capron’s recommendations for the development of Western-style agriculture during their discussions in the summer of 1871, Kuroda hired several foreign specialists to oversee the Aoyama farm. Among these men was the horticulturalist Louis Boehmer, charged with the development of new plant varieties for both agricultural and ornamental purposes. Boehmer, a Prussian living in the United States, arrived in Japan on 1872/3/26, and remained in the Colonial Agency’s employ until its abolition in February 1882; Boehmer’s last contract expired on 30 April 1882.³⁴ Initially at the Aoyama agricultural station, and later at Sapporo, Boehmer oversaw the cultivation of fruit and vegetables, as well as ornamental shrubs and flowers. He coordinated the exchange of plants between Japan, Europe

³³ Kaitakushi, *Kaitakushi hōkokusho*, vol. 1 (Sapporo: Kaitakushi, 1875), p. 2.

³⁴ Harada Kazufumi, *Oyatoi gaikokujin: Kaitaku* (Tokyo: Kajima kenkyūjo shuppankai, 1975), Appendix, p. 9. See also Fujita Kinnosuke, *Ringo no ayunda michi*, p. 15.

and the United States, while working closely with officers of the Colonial Agency to orchestrate the transfer of plants from Aoyama to Hokkaido, as well as to other parts of Japan. He thus played a central role in the growing botanical networks linking Japan to the outside world.

Boehmer's first job after arriving in Tokyo was to oversee the cultivation of fruit trees at the Aoyama experimental farm. Horace Capron had ordered a wide selection of fruit from a grower in Sanford, California, which included year-old saplings, cuttings, and seeds.³⁵ Capron also ordered fruit from the eastern seaboard of the United States during the spring of 1872, although the details of that order are unknown.³⁶ Boehmer took over the responsibility for ordering plants, drawing on his professional network with growers and gardeners in Europe and the United States. At Aoyama, he supervised a wide range of plant experiments. He reported on his progress in a letter to Capron dated 16 July 1872, revealing the scope of his work.

All trees we planted here last spring look very healthy and vigorous until now and there are no signs of insects which might be troublesome. Vegetables look very well also with the exception of cucumbers and mushrooms, which are attacked by a small yellow bug and won't grow at all. I have taken a great deal of pain with them but have only succeeded in growing few plants in the frames, which have fruits now. These I have been watering with tobacco water twice a day. All grasses have come up very well, but the hot weather leaves its marks on some places now where we have this yellow clay. I water a great deal and do my best in getting the young grass through the hot season. Those small patches of sweet corn we have been planting on this place look exceedingly well and some stalks are from 10 to 12 feet high. The large corn crop on No. III does not look quite as well but we trust it will come out well after a while. Strawberry, roses and the other things are all growing finely now and I have just commenced to propagate them in a small propagating pit, which I keep very moist and shady.³⁷

³⁵ H.P. Smith to Horace Capron, 29 January 1872, box 1, folder 3, Horace Capron Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library (hereafter HC Papers).

³⁶ Horace Dunn to Horace Capron, 31 May 1872, box 1, folder 6, HC Papers.

³⁷ Louis Boehmer to Horace Capron, 16 July 1872, box 1, folder 8, HC Papers.

The range of Boehmer's activities illustrates the wide latitude he had to oversee agricultural experimentation at Aoyama, and also the scale of the Colonial Agency's ambitions. In an update on 24 August, Boehmer reported the continued success of his efforts. The three farm sites in Aoyama required considerable work, and Boehmer secured the labor of "about two hundred coolies to work on [farm] number two...working on the main road and on cleaning up the place in general." Boehmer successfully grew "some very fine watermelons, which the Japanese seemed to like exceedingly well. I shall send some up to the Mikado as soon as he will receive them." The emperor was not the only high-ranking resident of Tokyo to benefit from Boehmer's work: the Russian ambassador sent Boehmer "half a dozen bottles of champagne" in exchange for a delivery of the Colonial Agency's "fine annuals and flowers." Under Boehmer's direction, and with the well-connected status of Colonial Agency officials, the Aoyama gardens became an important source of new plants for wealthy Tokyo residents.³⁸

Boehmer also facilitated the exchange of plants between Japan and several western countries, carrying on collecting practices established in the treaty port era. From the beginning of his tenure, Boehmer received enquiries from western florists seeking exotic plants for their collections. Initially, Boehmer was reluctant to respond to these requests: after receiving a request from the Mt. Hope Nursery in New York for snow lilies and other flowers in the spring of 1872, Boehmer demurred, telling Capron, "my contract don't allow me to engage in any other transactions, so that it will be somewhat difficult for me to buy up these bulbs and plants and ship them to America." Boehmer instead passed on the order to a fellow horticulturalist in Tokyo.³⁹ These reservations did not seem to last long, although whether Boehmer ever

³⁸ Louis Boehmer to Horace Capron, 24 August 1872, box 1, folder 12, HC Papers.

³⁹ Louis Boehmer to Horace Capron, 16 July 1872.

renegotiated the terms of his contract is unclear. More practically, the florists and gardeners from whom Horace Capron had ordered fruit, vegetables and other crops readily enquired about the possibility of exchanging these items for native Japanese flora. Exchanging plants, rather than purchasing seeds with cash, offered the Colonial Agency a way to recoup some of the lavish costs of maintaining its network of experimental agricultural sites.

The transplantation of fruit, flowers and other plants across the globe was a risky and expensive business, and Boehmer helped reduce costs by promoting the exchange of plants rather than one-sided purchases of necessary supplies. Peter Henderson, a prominent New Jersey florist, wrote to Boehmer in December 1874 expressing interest in some of the plants Boehmer had described in personal correspondence earlier that year. “[I] would be happy to exchange for them some of our American novelties in seeds or plants,” wrote Henderson, referring to a list of lilies, hydrangeas and other flowers.⁴⁰ Boehmer forwarded this request to Zusho Hirotake, the chief secretary of the Colonial Agency in Sapporo, who approved the exchange in February 1875. However, gears shifted slowly: Boehmer wrote again to Zusho in June, reminding him of Henderson’s offer, explaining that “it would be very easy and convenient for this Department to import the newest and choicest novelties in the line of fruits, flowers etc., which would be valuable here, almost without any cost or outlay of money.”⁴¹ Yet, shipping plants halfway round the world carried its own set of risks. The first load of flowers Louis Boehmer sent to Peter Henderson was almost entirely destroyed by the time it arrived in New York in August 1875, as

⁴⁰ Peter Henderson to Louis Boehmer, 7 December 1874, reproduced in Kawabata Takashi, ed., *Boehmer kankei Kaitakushi hōbun shokan no honkoku* (n.p.: n.p., 1991), document 0487. This edited compilation of transcriptions of Boehmer’s correspondence is available in the Hokkaido University Library Northern Studies Collection (hereafter NSC), call number 952.03/KAW. Hereafter cited with document number and as LB Papers.

⁴¹ Louis Boehmer to Zusho Hirotake, 13 June 1875, 0502, LB Papers.

“it was about the worst season for shipment, being quite warm when they arrived here.”

Henderson asked Boehmer to resend various samples in the winter, preferably “by way of Panama, not by Rail Road”—cold winters in the American West had destroyed previous shipments. Despite the vagaries of the weather, Henderson was still on the hook for appraisement duties at New York, highlighting the risky and expensive process of shipping in an era prior to refrigeration.⁴² Nevertheless, this first foray into the exchange of plants proved successful enough to warrant future exchanges. Boehmer urged Colonial Agency officials to acquire seeds and saplings from Henderson again in the autumn of 1876.⁴³ Shipping remained a precarious business: Boehmer told Colonial Agency officials that it would be unfair to expect Henderson to cover the costs of dead plants again in the summer of 1877.⁴⁴

The Colonial Agency leadership was pleased with Boehmer’s work at Aoyama, and enthusiastically promoted the spread of fruit farming. The preface to an inventory of fruit trees at Aoyama, published the same month as Louis Boehmer’s proposal to expand the geographic scope of the Colonial Agency’s fruit-raising experiments, offers more detail on the Colonial Agency’s developing attitude towards fruit:

Harvesting the products of fruit trees will not go to waste, but rather have enormous benefits. The fruit themselves will improve people’s health, more so than vegetables, which explains why there are so many fruit growers in western countries. Moreover, fruit can be turned into alcohol, or cakes, or dried and exported to other regions. Yet, many of our countrymen do not know of these benefits. We must first take the excellent varieties that we have purchased from overseas, and plant them in Hokkaido; and then throughout Japan. We hope to take fruit from the U.S. and further afield, especially unusual types, and make them known widely. A list of those varieties and the necessary tools for

⁴² Peter Henderson to Louis Boehmer, 23 August 1875, 0508, LB Papers.

⁴³ Louis Boehmer to Hori Motoki, 12 September 1876, 0528, LB Papers.

⁴⁴ Louis Boehmer to Murahashi [Hisanari], 10 July 1877, 0539, LB Papers.

growing them is below; all are welcome to come to the Colonial Agency grounds and see them in person.⁴⁵

The invitation to visit the Aoyama farm was directed at people living around Tokyo, and reflected the Colonial Agency's interest in distributing its fruit trees elsewhere in Japan. Kuroda wrote to central government officials on 1872/11/28, and several prefectural governments in early 1873 with an invitation to purchase various crops, fruit trees and other plants.⁴⁶ In 1873/3, the Aoyama farm announced the public sale of fruit trees to any interested individuals.⁴⁷ In an internal circular dated 1873/12/14, the Agricultural Division priced apples, cherries and grapes at 25 sen per tree, and apricots, plums, peaches and pears going for 20 sen each.⁴⁸ Over the course of its fifteen-year tenure, the Colonial Agency transferred two million fruit trees of all types around Japan from its experimental farm at Aoyama.⁴⁹

The Origins of the Capitol Orchard: the View from Tokyo

Despite his successes at Aoyama, Boehmer was not convinced that it was the most practical site to experiment with plants ultimately bound for other parts of Japan, including

⁴⁵ Kaitakushi, *Seiyō kaju shurui bo* (Tokyo: Kaitakushi daiichi kan'en, 1873), 別 634-Se, NSC. Available online at <http://www2.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/cgi-bin/hoppodb/record.cgi?id=0A0215200000000000>.

⁴⁶ Kaitakushi Tokyo shutchōjo, "Kan'en baiyō no seiyō sōboku rui, haraisage no ken," *Kaitakushi kōbunroku kangyō no bu*, 1873, 1873/2/28, 簿書 5529(43), HPA.

⁴⁷ Kaitakushi Tokyo shutchōjo, "Kan'en haraisage seiyō kaju, ishoku no ken," *Kaitakushi kōbunroku genkō bunsho no bu*, 1873, 1873/3, 簿書 5754(5), HPA.

⁴⁸ Kaitakushi Tokyo shutchōjo, "ichigō kan'en kajuboku haraisage no ken," *Kaitakushi kōbunroku kangyō no bu*, 1873, 1873/12/14, 簿書 5529(63), HPA.

⁴⁹ Edwin Dun, *Reminiscences of Nearly Half a Century in Japan*, ed. Kawabata Takashi, Nishide Kimiyuki, and Kutsumi Akira (N.p.: n.p., 1993), p. 43. This is a transcribed and edited copy of Dun's memoirs, held in the NSC, call number 952.03 DUN. The Colonial Agency was not the only central government ministry exploring new methods of fruit growing. In the spring of 1871, the Ministry of Civil Affairs and the Ministry of Finance had established a small apple farm in Shinjuku Gyoen, using apples imported from the US. In 1874, the Home Ministry took over these efforts, and began to import fruit from France. Starting in 1875, they sold fruit trees to prefectural governments and individuals, shifting 500,000 apple trees alone by 1887. See Fujita, *Ringo no ayunda michi*, pp. 18–19.

Hokkaido. At the end of his first year on the job, on 16 February 1873, Boehmer submitted a proposal outlining a more ambitious approach to fruit cultivation that sought to adapt existing Japanese fruit-raising practices. He asked permission “to select certain localities outside of the Government farms where the different Japanese fruits are raised, as for example Pears, on low clayey, Peaches on sandy, Grapes on limestone ground e.c.t. [*sic*]” and “to send to each of those localities few of the different fruit trees (American) from our Nurseries or farms and let them be planted there by our people.” He further requested that he and his foremen be allowed to supervise the cultivation of imported trees, and also proposed sending scions for grafting onto Japanese varieties.⁵⁰ In a follow-up letter twelve days later, Boehmer explained that “if we can leave [a] few of these trees for a certain number of years (say from 3 to 5) at Akayama I am almost sure that the result will be very favourable and we shall certainly raise fruits in Akayama faster than here on the Farms.”⁵¹

Boehmer’s reports and 1873 proposal reveal a more pragmatic approach to the introduction of new agricultural techniques than Horace Capron’s blustery confidence in the superiority of Western agricultural practices, or the idealistic plans of Colonial Agency officials. Boehmer recognized that the most efficient way to introduce new varieties of plants was to draw upon existing cultivation methods. In addition to recognizing that existing fruit trees offered an effective avenue for cultivating new, foreign varieties, Boehmer maintained curiosity about Japanese fruit growing practices. In an 1878 letter to the Colonial Agency, Boehmer encouraged the agency not to reject traditional methods: “The mode of training trees on an arbor is not in use in Europe or America...[but] as this mode of training Japanese pear trees has been successfully

⁵⁰ Louis Boehmer to Kaitakushi, 16 February 1873, 0462, LB Papers.

⁵¹ Louis Boehmer to Kaitakushi, 28 February 1873, 0467, LB Papers. It is unclear to where Akayama refers.

carried out in Japan for many years since, it would be worth the trouble to try the same as an experiment with foreign fruit trees.”⁵² Boehmer also understood the importance of climatic and other environmental differences better than Capron and the Colonial Agency officials, whose creation of an agricultural station in Tokyo to test plants bound for Hokkaido baffled many of their foreign employees. “The expense of keeping up such an enormous establishment was very great,” noted Edwin Dun, one of Boehmer’s fellow advisors. “Also owing to the differences in climate, soil and almost all other conditions, it was practically of no value in connection with the colonization and development of the natural resources of Hokkaido.”⁵³ Boehmer likely agreed with Dun’s criticism, judging by his encouragement to select more suitable sites for fruit growing.

Meanwhile, the Colonial Agency had already begun to transfer the products of the Aoyama farm to Sapporo. A 1.2-hectare provisional testing ground for fruits and vegetables was established in the western part of Sapporo in 1871, to which “a few plants of foreign apples, pears, peaches, plums, cherries and grapes were transplanted” in 1873.⁵⁴ A key turning point was the establishment of a 19.4-hectare orchard on the grounds of the Sapporo Capitol in the winter of 1873–1874. The former orchard was converted into a vineyard, while the new site became the destination for “domestic and foreign varieties of plum, cherries, peaches, apricots and apples from the Aoyama experimental farm.”⁵⁵ Matsumoto Jūrō, the Colonial Agency official in charge of Sapporo, wrote to the officials overseeing Aoyama on 1873/10/20, requesting peaches and

⁵² Louis Boehmer to Yamauchi Teiun, 14 February 1878, 0546, LB Papers.

⁵³ Dun, *Reminiscences*, p. 43.

⁵⁴ Ōkurashō, *Kaitakushi jigyō hōkoku* (Sapporo: Hokkaidō shuppan kikaku sentā, 1981–85 [1885]), vol. 2, p. 200. Hereafter *KJH*.

⁵⁵ *KJH*, vol. 2, p. 200.

plums for delivery in the spring of 1874, after the snows melted, including “100 saplings of each” and some samples of flax to test in Sapporo.⁵⁶ As facilities and transport infrastructure improved, the number of fruit trees transplanted to Sapporo soared. The new orchard was on its way to becoming the symbolic and practical heart of the Colonial Agency’s fruit-growing experiments in Sapporo.

The process of setting up the Aoyama orchard, and then relocating many of its functions to Sapporo, reveals several tensions at play in the Colonial Agency’s structure, and their impact on the development of the city. One challenge related to the role of the state in this process. Horace Capron held up an idealized type of the autonomous pioneer settler as the mainstay of Hokkaido’s development, but at the same time he demanded the leadership of a strong state, capable of implementing radical changes in the social and agricultural practices of Japan’s farmers. The project of introducing new practices “can only be done through the Colonial Agency,” he argued to Kuroda.⁵⁷ This tension would surface again and again throughout Capron’s tenure, and well beyond it, as debates over the proper role of government in the development of Hokkaido intensified. Capron himself offered contradictory advice: he bemoaned the excessive costs of government-run industries, and called for privatization, but he also demanded that the Colonial Agency invest more in basic infrastructure and mechanized factories to improve the economic potential of the island.⁵⁸

The high cost of the Colonial Agency’s projects, including the Aoyama farms also hampered the broader colonization efforts. In a letter to Kuroda dated 22 September 1873,

⁵⁶ Kaitakushi Tokyo shutchōjo, “kaju naegi rui toriyose no ken,” *Kaitakushi kōbunroku kangyō no bu*, 1873, 1873/10/20, 簿書 5751(38) HPA.

⁵⁷ Capron to Kuroda, 25 July 1873, in *ROLK*, p. 69.

⁵⁸ See, for example, Capron to Kuroda, 22 July 1872, in *ROLK*, pp. 58–61.

Capron laid out some of his concerns about the soaring expenses of the Colonial Agency's orchards. "You seem to be impressed with the idea, that I contemplated heavy expenditures and a reproduction upon the island of Yesso of the very elaborate and expensive grounds at Aoyama," began Capron.

This is a great mistake...and the misapprehension has no doubt occurred from the want of proper interpretation, which has often occasioned misunderstandings.... It has also been urged to have certain ground cultivated and properly prepared to receive the great variety of fruit trees now ready to be transferred from the nurseries near Tokio. This has been the extent of my asking, all of which has been totally neglected, or so nearly so, as to hazard a failure in any attempt to transfer either animals or plant at present. In no case have I desired or intimated a desire for a large outlay of money to carry out these most important objects. All this array of costly buildings, &c. to the entire neglect of the main object it must be distinctly understood is in direct opposition to my often repeated advice.⁵⁹

Capron blamed poor interpreters for the rising costs associated with the experimental agricultural stations, both in Tokyo and in Sapporo, but this seems a bit unfair. Capron had encouraged the Colonial Agency's earlier outlays on capital-intensive agricultural facilities, which must have frustrated the Japanese officials now facing his criticisms for excessive spending. For many of these officials, particularly those on the ground in Sapporo, instructions from distant advisors in Tokyo failed to account for the expensive reality of building the infrastructure of a new colony. As the government's long experience in Ezochi and Hokkaido showed, it was very expensive to build a new city in a remote and unfamiliar place. Logistical hurdles, a lack of reliable labor and supplies, and the challenges of a climate and environment unfamiliar to most Japanese officials helped push up construction prices.

A third challenge lay in the division of Colonial Agency authority between Tokyo and Sapporo. Despite Sapporo's role as the headquarters of the agency, as the extensive facilities in

⁵⁹ Capron to Kuroda, 22 September 1873, in *ROLK*, pp. 85–86.

Aoyama suggest the locus of actual power lay in Tokyo. As a central government agency, equal in status to the other ministries under the Council of State, the Colonial Agency and its leading officials sought to maintain political influence in Tokyo. At the same time, its specific ambit—to oversee the development of Hokkaido—also gave it the responsibilities usually assigned to prefectural and local governments. Throughout its fifteen-year tenure, the agency would struggle to reconcile its position as both a central government ministry and a regional administrative organ, leading to spats within the agency over inconsistent policies and ambiguous (or simply absent) leadership.

The Origins of the Capitol Orchard: the View from Sapporo

These various challenges played out in concrete ways on the ground in Sapporo, where Matsumoto Jūrō was struggling to guide the city's growth amid soaring economic, political, and social problems. As a result, the history of the capitol orchard is not simply one of foreign experts and Tokyo elites coming up with an idea and implementing it in Sapporo. Factors at play on the ground in Sapporo also shaped the construction of the orchard in the capitol grounds. These included the more immediate economic pressures facing the young city and the difficulty of persuading Sapporo's transient population to adopt new methods of agriculture. The production of the particular space of the capitol orchard, a piece of urban infrastructure devoted to plants, illustrates the very human complexity surrounding the construction of the Colonial Agency's new capital city.

The creation of the orchard in the capitol grounds was a response as much to immediate problems of urban disorder as to the grand vision of foreign advisors. The orchard grounds were cleared in 1873 and 1874, shortly after the construction of a wooden Western-style capitol building in 1873. The capitol grounds occupied twenty blocks in the northwest of the city center,

a rectangle 625 meters north-to-south and 480 meters east-to-west.⁶⁰ Of these 30 hectares, 21.8 hectares were devoted to the orchard (see Figure 5.1).⁶¹



Figure 5.1, *Honchō rachinai kajuen gassaku no ryakuzu* (1874?)

This map was probably based on a sketch by Louis Boehmer. The different colors refer to different pulses planted on the grounds; the various dots and hash marks refer to different types of fruit trees. The capitol building is in the center.

⁶⁰ “Honchō gokōnai mitori ezu,” 1873, 図類 509, NSC, <http://www2.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/cgi-bin/hoppodb/record.cgi?id=0D010850000000000>.

⁶¹ Or 65,957 *tsubo*. Hokkaido jigyo kanrikyoku Sapporo nōgyō jimusho, “Kaitakushi kangyō son’eki shirabe, Meiji 4 nen yori 10 nen ni itaru,” 1886, 道写本 056, p. 5, <http://www2.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/cgi-bin/hoppodb/record.cgi?id=0A0117500000000000&lang=0>. There is a small but clear discrepancy between the 19.4 acres (58,520 *tsubo*) given in the *KJH* for 1874; this might reflect some additional ground clearing in subsequent years.

The construction of the capitol was one of the last projects in Sapporo's initial building boom: the significant expense of construction work in remote and undeveloped Sapporo forced the Colonial Agency to scale back its construction projects. The subsequent drying up of construction work led to rapid and severe depopulation, sparking an economic depression that threatened Sapporo's fragile growth.

It was in this context that Matsumoto Jūrō embarked upon the construction of the capitol orchard. Matsumoto ordered an emergency survey of economic conditions in the city on 1873/6/13, and quickly developed a program to address the city's economic troubles. His suggestions included extra public works projects, beyond the Colonial Agency's budget, to provide employment for idled construction workers, and to encourage long-term residence in Sapporo. Among Matsumoto's suggestions was to hasten the construction of an earthen wall around the capitol, and plant trees throughout the grounds.⁶² He submitted this proposal to the Colonial Agency's Tokyo office, seeking approval from Kuroda Kiyotaka.⁶³

Kuroda did not reply, putting Matsumoto in a bind: Sapporo was disintegrating before his eyes as people left in droves and discontent simmered among jobless workers. Matsumoto decided to move forward with his proposals, and began work on the capitol grounds in early October. He had the Industrial Bureau develop project specifications for earthen banks, drainage channels and gates to surround the capitol grounds. The project was put out to bid early in 1873/10, with a dozen contractors responding with estimates ranging from 868 yen to 2978 yen. On 10/12, Matsumoto wrote to the Accounting Division with his selection of three contractors, each assigned a portion of the work, for a total cost of 1,086 yen. Justifying his decision not to

⁶² SSS, vol. 2, p. 176.

⁶³ SSS, vol. 2, pp. 175–6.

select a cheaper bid, Matsumoto noted, “upon closer inspection of the detailed cost breakdown, it seemed that the lower bids would have a detrimental effect on the completion of the project.”⁶⁴

The contractors included some of early Sapporo’s wealthiest residents, many of whom would go on to become influential figures in Sapporo’s growth later in the nineteenth century. The degree to which these political factors played into the bid decision is unclear. Ironically, one contractor who failed to win the bid for the orchard project, Suibara Torazō, would go on to become the largest apple farmer in Sapporo.

Just four days after Matsumoto finalized the contract for the capitol grounds, Kuroda belatedly replied to his proposal from the summer. Kuroda approved a downsized plan for the capitol orchard, not including the earthen wall, and instructed Matsumoto to stay within the bounds of budget cuts already imposed by the Colonial Agency. Matsumoto was fined for moving ahead with the earthen wall construction before receiving approval, but he moved swiftly once Kuroda’s approval was in hand. On 10/20, Matsumoto wrote to the Colonial Agency’s Tokyo office to organize the shipment of various trees and seeds to Sapporo by 1874/3, preferably to plant as soon as possible once the snows melted. He requested pears, apples, peaches, cherries, grapes and “others to be considered.” In a version of this letter edited by the Colonial Agency for its formal records, an appended note dated 11/17 explains that “the Agricultural Division carefully considered the fruit varieties requested, keeping in mind both the need for high-quality trees, and the desire to plant fruit trees throughout Hokkaido.” In the end, the Tokyo-based agricultural division sent 100 trees each of plums, peaches and pears, along with a load of flax and 30 plums and peaches to plant as seeds.⁶⁵ Matsumoto’s urgency comes

⁶⁴ SSS, vol. 2, p.177. See also vol. 7, pp. 173–82, especially pp. 180–81.

⁶⁵ Kaitakushi Tokyo shutchōjo, “Kaju naegi rui, toriyose no ken,” *Kaitakushi kōbunroku kangyō no bu*, 1873, 1873/10/20, 簿書 5529(40), HPA.

through clearly: he specifically requested that the trees be shipped through the port at Otaru, rather than the larger Hakodate, to avoid both damage to trees caused by the long overland transshipment time from Hakodate, as well as the expenses thus incurred.⁶⁶ Matsumoto's concern remained first and foremost to staunch the flow of workers and residents from Sapporo by moving ahead quickly with the orchard project.

Meanwhile, Matsumoto continued to put together all the pieces of the orchard project following Kuroda's approval. He wrote again to the Accounting Division on 10/20, ordering them to take the 1,086 yen necessary for the capitol orchard out of a 4,500-yen project to build a miso and soy sauce factory in a nearby village.⁶⁷ It is unclear why he selected this particular project from which to appropriate funding: from the perspective of boosting the self-sufficiency and resilience of local residents, and thus encouraging them to remain in Sapporo and its environs, miso and soy sauce production was an important venture—the exorbitant costs of importing basic foodstuffs and other daily goods was a major problem for the Colonial Agency and settlers throughout Hokkaido.

To focus instead on an orchard in the center of Sapporo hints at the complex set of factors driving Matsumoto's administration. Matsumoto touched on some of these factors in a slightly exasperated letter to the Tokyo office, in which he defended his decision to move ahead with the orchard project before receiving approval from Kuroda.

We have already prepared the area to receive transplanted trees. Given that this work has already been done, if we do not enclose the grounds, it will appear very untidy and ugly. If we do not put up gates and earthen banks, it will seem as though we have left this significant project unfinished, which would be very regrettable. If the grounds are left

⁶⁶ Kaitakushi Tokyo shutchōjo, “Sapporo daiichi kan'en uetsuke no kaboku nae, sōchi no ken,” *Kaitakushi kōbunroku kangyōbu 1873*, 1873/10/20 October 1873, 簿書 5751(37), HPA.

⁶⁷ “Honchō gokō dorui narabini naigai suido seiyōkei gomōn gokasho saku, yarai toritate no ken,” *Kaitakushi kōbunroku – Tokyo*, 1873/10/20, 簿書 5757, reprinted in SSS, vol. 7, p. 180.

unenclosed, horses, which currently roam semi-wild, will enter by the hundreds and trample the trees, making it difficult for any to mature. No matter how many times we admonish herders, day after day they let their horses wander freely through the capitol grounds. It is exceedingly inconvenient....

As seen in the attached project specifications...we were able to significantly reduce the expense of the capitol grounds project. While in principle I of course should have sought permission prior to moving ahead with the project, the lateness of the season meant that waiting for directions would have forced us to postpone the work until the spring, due to the snow. Such a delay would have made construction at the low bid price impossible. Therefore, I was forced to act unilaterally, aware that my actions constitute disobedience.⁶⁸

Matsumoto's letter reveals the difficulty of balancing the immediate needs of a city lurching from crisis to crisis, and the long-term demands of the Colonial Agency's overall settlement project in Sapporo. First, he hints at the precarious economic situation facing Sapporo and the Colonial Agency. Budget issues were a constant concern, driven by the high cost of labor and materials in the remote city. The budget cuts demanded by the central government caused a construction freeze, which in turn put contractors and day laborers alike out of work. As the official on the ground, Matsumoto had to deal immediately with the discontent and hardships among Sapporo's population, encouraging him to press forward with new construction work. In fact, the Colonial Agency made the poor-relief function of its work at the capitol orchard explicit in 1877, when it recruited 65 workers from "among the city's poor," including the wives and children of many local men, as well as elderly residents.⁶⁹ In future years, the labor force was recruited from surrounding villages—some four hundred men were ordered to clear the grounds of the capitol orchard in the spring of 1877—which may have been less benevolent, as they likely had their own work to do. Regardless, the ability to employ unskilled workers in the

⁶⁸ "Honchō gokō dorui narabini naigai suido seiyōkei gomon gokasho saku, yarai toritate no ken," p. 179.

⁶⁹ Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho bussankyoku, "Kan'en honchōnai kusatori ninpu shinai hinmin yatoiire no tokoro sara ni negaide no ken," *Zassho* 1874, 1874/7/13, 簿書 953(45), HPA.

clearing of the orchard grounds must have appealed to Matsumoto's desires to fend off discontent and to care for the people in his bailiwick.

Second, the challenges posed by climate and geography reduced the effective construction season to the late spring through fall, and hampered effective decision-making. Sapporo's heavy snowfall hindered infrastructure work, and also snarled transport links to the rest of Hokkaido and Japan. Food shortages and a lack of suitable shelter also made life in Sapporo miserable during its first few years. The challenges of the climate were compounded by the delays in communication between Tokyo and Sapporo and the unwieldy structure of authority within the Colonial Agency. Despite the Meiji government's prioritization of a telegraph network, the Colonial Agency and the Ministry of Construction failed to coordinate their plans for the extension of the network to Hokkaido. As a result, Hokkaido was not connected to Honshu until September 1873, when the undersea line across the Tsugaru Strait linked Hakodate to Aomori. The extension north to Otaru came online over a year later, in October 1874, and public telegraph services began operation in Sapporo in March 1875.⁷⁰ This meant that all correspondence between Matsumoto and officials in Tokyo went at least partway by post, a journey that could take several days. In general Sapporo's distance from the capital made logistical planning difficult, a fact compounded by the undeveloped state of road and shipping infrastructure. It was these concerns that drove Matsumoto to seek the expeditious dispatch of trees from Tokyo, as they would take months to reach Sapporo's orchards. More importantly, the functional primacy of the Tokyo office due to Kuroda's residence in Tokyo complicated administration and governance. The Colonial Agency struggled to find a suitable balance between local autonomy for its officials in Sapporo, and centralized control by Tokyo-

⁷⁰ SSS, vol. 2, p. 196.

based officials. Matsumoto's acceptance of responsibility for his unilateral actions illustrates this struggle neatly, and echoes the actions of his predecessor, Shima Yoshitake, in 1869.

Third, Matsumoto's letter reveals the provisional status of the Colonial Agency's authority in Sapporo, and suggests that the capitol orchard offered Matsumoto a way to bolster that authority, both in symbolic and practical ways. His concern with the appearance of an unfinished capitol illustrates the symbolic importance of the site, both as an aesthetic representation of the Colonial Agency's authority, and as a mark of the Agency's ability to see projects through to completion. In a more practical vein, the capitol orchard project offered a way to assert control over a seemingly unruly population and environment. As Matsumoto's remarks about roaming horses illustrate, herders paid little attention to the remonstrations of officials, suggesting a degree of disregard for authority in early Sapporo. While enclosing the capitol grounds would not directly address these herding practices, it would mark a physical disruption of these activities, asserting the government's authority. More generally, Matsumoto's comment that an unenclosed capitol would look "untidy and ugly" belies, perhaps, a desire to instill order on a place that still seemed foreign to a migrant settler. By imposing order on the capitol grounds, Matsumoto may have hoped to symbolize the broader effort to colonize the region.

Finally, the capitol orchard allowed Matsumoto both to address immediate sources of discontent, and also allowed him to proceed with the long-term plans for Sapporo's development. The orchard project remained important as a means to secure the long-term viability of permanent settlement in Sapporo, as well as to oversee the broader colonization project in Hokkaido. While budgetary pressures and the challenges of securing construction materials and other supplies encouraged Kuroda to seek the cancellation or downsizing of projects such as the

capitol orchard, Matsumoto recognized that such moves would be shortsighted, and ultimately could imperil the broader plan for Sapporo and the development of Hokkaido. His willingness to defy prescribed lines of authority reflects a commitment to a longer-term vision, and the recognition that short-term constraints could not be allowed to derail long-term plans.

Nevertheless, the early days of the capitol orchard illustrate the tension between large-scale planning and the reality on the ground, a tension that repeatedly surfaced during the construction of Sapporo. The exorbitant costs of building in Sapporo shocked Horace Capron, who accused the Colonial Agency of disregarding his advice, and certainly the Agency's inability to control its expenses would ultimately contribute to its downfall. On one level, this can be seen as a failure of planning: wildly inaccurate assumptions about labor and material costs, lack of forethought about the climate, and a general tendency to do things the wrong way round due to lack of experience and expertise. Capron repeatedly urged the Colonial Agency to focus on basic infrastructure, such as roads and canals, before attempting to build grandiose facilities, and the lack of that basic infrastructure—with immediate consequences for the supply of food for Sapporo's early settlers—forced the Colonial Agency to implement major relief programs that ate further into its budget.

The Capitol Orchard as Urban Place, 1874–78

Despite the tumultuous start to the capitol orchard, it quickly grew into a successful site for fruit cultivation, and played a key role in the Colonial Agency's plans to direct the agricultural settlement of Hokkaido from its new Sapporo capital. The capitol orchard became a node in new networks of botanical exchange throughout Hokkaido, Japan, and the wider world. Yet, despite surviving the rocky first years of Sapporo's development, the orchard—and plans to expand fruit cultivation—continued to face obstacles, both within the Colonial Agency, and from

the residents of Sapporo and Hokkaido for whom this “model orchard” was ostensibly constructed.

Over the course of 1874, 2,900 trees—including plum, cherry, peach, apricot, pear and apple—were transferred from Tokyo; a further 2,816 were imported the following year. For the most part, these trees did well in Sapporo, and quickly began to produce usable fruit.⁷¹ By the summer of 1876, the total number of fruit trees in Sapporo’s capitol orchard more than doubled, to 11,900.⁷² Louis Boehmer moved from Tokyo to Sapporo that summer to carry on the work of the agricultural division of the Colonial Agency. By the time he arrived, the Colonial Agency had been developing Sapporo for seven years, and various agricultural facilities were already in place, including the capitol orchard, a vineyard, a hops garden and other sites for horticultural experiments.

Louis Boehmer’s relocation from Tokyo to Sapporo in the summer of 1876 did not mark an end to his involvement in a cosmopolitan, transnational world of scientific and commercial exchange. On the contrary, his position in Sapporo gave him new opportunities to contribute to these networks. On trips around Hokkaido in 1875 and 1876, Boehmer explored the island’s flora, submitting reports to Western publications and attracting the interest of Western florists and horticulturalists. In the summer of 1876, Boehmer published a four-part article for the Philadelphia-based *Gardener’s Monthly*, describing his exploration of Hokkaido’s flora. The bulk of his report focused on flowers and other ornamental plants that would make exotic and attractive additions to parks and gardens in the West.⁷³ Boehmer’s report attracted renewed

⁷¹ Hokkaido jigyo kanrikyoku Sapporo nogyo jimusho, “Kaitakushi kangyo son’eki shirabe,” p. 5.

⁷² Kaitakushi, *Kaitakushi hōkokusho*, vol. 1, p. 27.

⁷³ Louis Boehmer, “General Observations on the Flora of Hokkaido,” *Gardener’s Monthly*, June–September 1876.

interest from florists in the US and Britain, who were keen to add exotica from Hokkaido to their collections. The florists F. Sander and Co., based in St Albans and London, wrote to Boehmer in June 1876 after reading the first installment of his *Gardener's Monthly* report. “We would very much like to get new varieties of plants from Japan and either pay for them in advance or exchange for them anything you would like to obtain from here,” the letter began, before outlining the firm’s history of introducing exotic plants from around the world into the commercial markets of Britain and Europe. Of particular interest were flowers, such as lilies, hydrangeas and orchids, as well as ornamental trees. F. Sander and Co. also offered to refer Boehmer “to Professor [Asa] Gray in America and all large European firms.”⁷⁴ This letter reveals a well-defined world of botanical exchange, and the close ties between scientific botanists and commercial plant collectors. Such networks allowed Boehmer both to pursue his intellectual interests in botany and horticulture, and to secure a wide variety of plants, seeds and other agricultural tools for the development of the Colonial Agency’s experimental orchards. Boehmer’s report, and his correspondence with colleagues in the Western horticultural profession, helped generate ongoing interest in Hokkaido, which in turn provided material support for Boehmer’s projects at Sapporo. They also show that Sapporo—still a small and remote city, far from the treaty ports and major cities of mainland Japan—was not isolated: sites like the orchard connected it to the world.

The orchard had a greater effect, though, on the city of Sapporo and the broader colony of Hokkaido. When Boehmer arrived, the capitol orchard was flourishing, as his colleague William Clark, an American tasked with the establishment of Sapporo Agricultural College, described in a letter to relatives in Connecticut: “The Colonial Agency under Gov. Kuroda have, however,

⁷⁴ F. Sander and Co. to Louis Boehmer, 24 June 1876, 0527, LB Papers.

imported all our best American fruits and are propagating and distributing gratuitously them by the thousand. There are several thousand apple, pear, peach, apricot, plum and cherry trees now growing finely in the park around the Capitol in the city....”⁷⁵ The orchard began to fulfill its role as a model space for new forms of agriculture, while becoming a key place in Sapporo’s urban fabric.

Despite the public purpose of the orchard, access to the physical grounds was carefully controlled. The Colonial Agency implemented new rules for access to the capitol on 1874/5/1. The main gate to the compound, facing the official residence and administrative district to the east, was kept open from five o’clock in the morning until six o’clock in the evening. Two other gates on the northeast and southeast of the compound had slightly shorter opening hours; the remaining three gates in the west and rear of the compound were kept shut. Non-officials were not allowed to pass through the compound at night, and all visitors were expected to register and announce their purpose before being allowed entry.⁷⁶ Later on, the Colonial Agency appointed watchmen to guard the orchard, and asked the police to track down suspected trespassers and thieves.⁷⁷

Careful control over access to the orchard did not mean its contents were secret. The Colonial Agency’s Agriculture Division, working closely with Boehmer, shared the orchard’s content throughout Sapporo and Hokkaido, both through the physical transplantation of fruit

⁷⁵ W.S. Clark to S.W. Leete, 5 August 1876, in *W.S. Clark kankei Kaitakushi hōbun, shokan*, ed. Kawabata Takashi and Nishide Kimiyuki (n.p.: n.p., 1993). Transcriptions of Clark’s correspondence, available at the NSC, call number 952.03/KAW.

⁷⁶ [Kaitakushi] Henshūka, ed., *Kaitakushi furei roku*, vol. 3 (1874) (n.p.: Kaitakushi, 1874), 345/KA, NSC, no. 92, 1874/4/27, pp. 122–25.

⁷⁷ Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho minjika kangyōgakari, *Kangyōka kōbunroku genkō, jugei no bu*, “Kajuen kanshunin yatōiire no ken,” 1881/7/28, A4/118(62) and “Kyū honcho dorui nai kajitsu kanshunin zōin no ken,” 1881/8/26, A4/118(75), HPA; and Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho minikyoku kangyōka, “Sapporo honcho kōnai sumomo tōnan no ken,” *Kangyōka kōbunroku zatsu no bu*, 1879/8/16, A4/75(52), HPA.

trees, and the transfer of knowledge related to their care. In August 1875, the Manufacturing Division requested dozens of newly arrived fruit trees for planting in factory grounds, a practice echoed by Sapporo's hospitals.⁷⁸ The Colonial Agency also distributed fruit trees to private residences around Sapporo, at first limited to the residences of Colonial Agency officials. A set of guidelines issued to officials, approved in February 1878, illustrates the Agricultural Division's approach to fruit growing in the city. Each official residence in the northern half of Sapporo was to be surrounded by fruit trees, and members of the Agricultural Division would conduct regular inspections to determine the health of the plants. Officials could sell the trees they received to commoners, but had to reimburse the Colonial Agency the cost of the trees. However, officials were free to sell any fruit or seeds at their own discretion, forming a potential source of revenue. Finally, officials were required to report any instances of pruning or felling trees.⁷⁹ Commoners were also eligible to get trees from the Colonial Agency: they initially had to pay a small fee, although this was abolished in April 1878.⁸⁰ That same month, the Sapporo authorities circulated a memo to headmen in Sapporo's wards and surrounding villages regarding the protection of fruit trees distributed to residents. "The Colonial Agency has made fruit trees available at no cost, without worrying about the significant expense of providing them, as a form of aid to the people. As a result, we would like to urge people to take good care of these trees,

⁷⁸ Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho minjikyoku kangyōka, "Tokyo yori kaifu no kaboku seirenka shozoku mugishu, budōshu jōzōsho sonota e shokusai irai no ken," *Shoka bun'iroku*, 1877/4/28, A4/23(208), HPA.

⁷⁹ Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho kirokukyoku, "Sapporo honchōka kanteinai kuwa kaju saibai kisoku seitei kata no ken," *Gianroku – 1878*, February 1878, 簿書 2448(19), HPA.

⁸⁰ Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho minjikyoku kangyōka, "Kaboku nae yūryō haraisage kōkoku torikeshi mudaika sagetsuke no ken," *Shusairoku saibainobu*, 1878/4/16, A4/56(10), HPA.

paying attention to their health and striving to select the best varieties for the future flourishing of fruit across Hokkaido.”⁸¹

These two sets of guidelines illustrate the value placed upon fruit trees as a form of capital by the Colonial Agency, and their desire to retain control over them. Not long after making fruit trees freely available, the Colonial Agency changed its mind, and started charging a modest sum to commoners seeking trees in 1881/4. They blamed the “haphazard care” shown by current owners of fruit trees, suggested that the fine taste of fruit would “be lost on lower-class citizens” (*katō shimin*), and rebuffed instructions from Tokyo to distribute more trees to local people, preferring instead to harvest and store the fruit themselves, or grant them to other government agencies.⁸² At times the Colonial Agency’s protective attitude could seem a little heavy handed. Fukaya Tetsusaburō, a commoner who moved to Sapporo from nearby Ishikari in 1869, remembered that each household was allowed to select up to twenty fruit trees, including apple, cherry, pear and apricot trees. Yet, a year after receiving these trees, residents woke up to find the tops chopped off. Residents raised a clamor over the apparent destruction of their trees, while the pre-dawn raid by members of the Colonial Agency’s Industrial Division struck many as sneaky and suspicious. To everyone’s relief, the officials had merely been pruning fruit trees (although why they did this in the dark remains a mystery—or perhaps Fukaya’s memory was not completely reliable on this point).⁸³ Nevertheless, the Colonial Agency’s determination to

⁸¹ Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho kōbunka, “Jinmin e fuyo no seiyō kaju oyobi honpō kuwanae aigo ni tsuki kokuji kata no ken,” *Honcho buka tasshigaki roku*, April 1878, 簿書 2422(32), HPA.

⁸² Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho minjikyoku kangyōka, “Kangyōgakari saishoku no kajitsu haraisage no ken,” *Kangyōgakari kōbunroku, shokubutsurui*, 1881, 1881/8/18, A4/115(100), HPA.

⁸³ Fukaya Tetsusaburō, “Arekore to amari ni arisugite,” in *Sapporo no mukashi banashi: Meiji-hen*, ge, ed. Kōno Tsunekichi (Sapporo: Chikuma shobō, 1978), p. 131.

protect its investments in fruit trees clearly outweighed their desire to foster self-sufficient, independent farmers.

Officials had good reason to worry about the willingness, let alone the ability, of residents to care properly for the trees. According to the first local history of Sapporo, produced at the end of the Meiji period by a group of early residents, “the people did not understand the benefit of fruit, and loathed having to cultivate them. Some even went so far as to dig up and throw out the saplings.”⁸⁴ Minami Takajiro, a child during the Colonial Agency period and later the president of the Hokkaido Fruit Growers Association (and then president of Hokkaido Imperial University between 1930 and 1933) recalled the suspicions of his fellow residents towards the newfangled fruit: “No one had ever seen, let alone eaten, an apple. When we were offered apple seedlings, some of us even thought they were a nuisance, and no one wanted to take any.” Other fruit were judged even stranger: western-style pears, for instance, were deemed suitable only for pig feed.⁸⁵ Many farmers requested Japanese fruit trees as well (mostly plums and pears), reminding us that the adoption of new forms of diet and taste was not a quick or smooth process.⁸⁶

Other practical problems meant that even dedicated farmers might give up on their new fruit trees. The voracious appetites of the local mice and rabbit populations, which were little deterred by tree bark, lime or sulphur treatments, led to the destruction of many plants. Reports from villages across Hokkaido suggest that these countermeasures had only limited effect: in

⁸⁴ Sapporo shigakkai, *Sapporo enkakushi* (Sapporo: Hokkaido shuppan kikaku sentā, 1979 [1898]), pp. 54–55.

⁸⁵ Sapporo-shi kyōiku iinkai, *Shinbun to jinmeiroku ni miru Meiji no Sapporo* (Sapporo: Hokkaido shinbunsha, 1985), pp. 167–8.

⁸⁶ Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho minjikyoku kangyōka, “Shizunai-gun Kunugibetsu-mura Nishida Shinbē hoka 17-mei kaboku haraisage negaide no ken,” *Kangyōka kōbunroku – jugei no bu*, 1879/5/2, A4/84(25), HPA.

Muroran, eighty of some five hundred trees died, while villages in Shizunai saw up to fifty percent of their trees die in 1878. The difficulty of keeping trees alive led many farmers to give up out of discouragement.⁸⁷ Boehmer ordered vats of tar to protect tree roots in an increasingly desperate bid to stave off the furry pests, and he tried to acquire sturdier varieties.⁸⁸ Boehmer noticed after a couple years that American varieties were not always the hardiest, and he started gathering plants from Germany and Great Britain to test out new varieties; in the meantime, many plants failed to survive transshipment from Tokyo.⁸⁹

The lack of immediate returns on fruit trees may also have contributed to the lack of enthusiasm among Sapporo's early residents. Fruit trees were a long-term investment: Boehmer warned officials that it would take at least three to five years before trees began to produce edible fruit, requiring constant attention and care.⁹⁰ Colonial Agency officials constantly bemoaned the short-term mindset of Sapporo residents, who were reluctant to invest in decent housing and were quick to leave whenever the economy showed signs of faltering. Severe winters and an unfortunately timed volcanic eruption in 1874/2 didn't help.⁹¹ The fluidity of Sapporo's early population made Colonial Agency officials understandably wary of entrusting care of trees to local residents. For many residents, fruit trees were more valuable as a source of lumber than as a source of fruit, while their horses continued to enjoy grazing in Sapporo's orchards. The Colonial

⁸⁷ Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho minjikyoku kangyōka, *Honka todokeroku* – 1878, “Chōka kakuson junkai mokugeki no jikkyō chinjutsu no ken,” 1878/4/30, A4/51(67), and “Usu, Shizunai ryōgun nōji keikyō narabini imin gaikyō shirabegaki no ken,” 1878/5/23 A4/51(73), HPA.

⁸⁸ Louis Boehmer to Agricultural Division, 30 April 1878, 0554, LB Papers.

⁸⁹ Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho minjikyoku kangyōka, “Geruman narabini Eikoku-shu budō nae gaikoku e chūmon no ken,” *Kangyōka kōbunroku – jugei no bu*, 1880/4, A4/94(9), HPA.

⁹⁰ Louis Boehmer to Kaitakushi, 28 February 1873, 0467, LB Papers.

⁹¹ Sapporo shigakkai, *Sapporo enkakushi*, p. 73.

Agency caught and punished several residents found felling trees in Sapporo's tree nurseries, including one man who dispatched a servant to cut down trees in the capitol orchard to build a sled.⁹² Horses trampled plants in the orchard, as well as other nurseries and gardens around Sapporo, on a frequent basis, leading the Colonial Agency to fine and reprimand residents. After the orchard started bearing fruit, local residents occasionally snuck into the capitol grounds after dark, and stole ripened fruit.⁹³

Settlers were also wary of shedding traditional livelihoods in favor of untested and unfamiliar fruit cultivation. A report from officials in Tōbetsu, a village approximately 25 kilometers northeast of Sapporo in the Ishikari valley, highlights the difficulty of changing existing economic and social behaviors. On 1876/3/31, the Colonial Agency Department of Civil Affairs in Hakodate had informed the Tōbetsu officials of plans to deliver fruit trees to “interested individuals,” as a delivery of fruit trees had arrived in Nanae from Tokyo. Students from the Colonial Agency's farm at Nanae would accompany the trees, and teach villagers how to care for them. Tōbetsu's officials replied two days later with a warning that the trees might not be welcomed by Tōbetsu's residents: “most male household heads in this village are migrant workers and many of the households are run alone by their wives. Most of them have no interest in fruit trees.”⁹⁴ Migrant (or seasonal) workers most likely referred to men working in the fishing industry, which had long been the mainstay of both Ainu and Wajin inhabitants of Ezochi and early Hokkaido. Fishing was clearly a more lucrative livelihood than agriculture, even for

⁹² Sapporo honchō minjikyoku kangyōka, “Kan'ennai ni oite batsuboku ni tsuki Matsuo Rokubei yori shazai mōshiide no ken,” *Shoka bun'iroku* 1877/1–4, 1877/1/12, A4/23(15), HPA.

⁹³ A man stole 200 apples: Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho minjika kangyōgakari, “Kyū Sapporo honchōnai saishoku no ringo tōnan no ken,” *Kangyōgakari kōbunroku genkō – jugei no bu*, 1881/8/26, A4/118(73), HPA.

⁹⁴ Kaitakushi Hakodate shichō minjika kangyōkakari, “Seiyō kaju nozomibito e sagewatashi no ken,” *Hyōgidome – 1876*, 28 March 1876, 簿書 1724(50), HPA.

residents of inland Tōbetsu. While women likely engaged in light agriculture at home, tending vegetables and other household goods, they were unlikely to welcome the challenge of cultivating fruit trees, especially if they did not recognize the value of the fruit.

The report by Tōbetsu's officials touches on several features of the early spread of fruit growing across Hokkaido. First, it reveals that Sapporo was not the only destination of foreign fruit trees in Hokkaido: in May of 1875, the Colonial Agency began to distribute tree cuttings from Aoyama to villagers in eleven districts in Hokkaido, including "Sapporo, Ishikari, Otaru, Takashima, Yoichi, Usu, Horobetsu, Muroran, Urakawa, Shizunai and Saru."⁹⁵ The following April, once roads had been cleared of snow, 75 packhorses were dispatched to the counties east and west of Sapporo, laden with fruit saplings.⁹⁶ In 1877, 130,000 fruit trees were transported to Sapporo; only 9,000 stayed in the capitol orchard, with the rest being shipped to villages in the hinterland.⁹⁷ Most villages had a handful of families that requested a dozen to a couple hundred trees apiece; grapevines were by far the most popular.

Second, as the Tōbetsu officials note, the transfer of saplings and seeds was insufficient for the spread of fruit cultivation: settlers had to be taught how to care for the new trees, and persuaded of their value. To this end, the Colonial Agency set up a system of vocational schooling and commissioned several textbooks to disseminate new botanical knowledge. Starting in 1875, the Colonial Agency recruited boys and young men from colonial settlements around Hokkaido to spend a year in Sapporo learning about horticulture, animal husbandry and other

⁹⁵ *KJH*, vol. 2, p. 200.

⁹⁶ Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho minjikyoku kangyōka, "Tōzai gunson e kaboku sashitate ni tsuki unsō irai no ken," *Shoka bun'iroku*, 1877/4/26, A4/23(196), HPA.

⁹⁷ Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho minjikyoku kangyōka, "Sakura hoka 5-kaboku gunson e sagewatashi no ken," *Shusairoku – 1877*, 1877/4/12, A4/40(13), HPA.

Western agricultural practices. “This Agency has already established schools and practical grounds to teach various agricultural and technical skills indispensable to the livelihoods of the people,” noted the Colonial Agency’s 1875 recruitment regulations.⁹⁸ The most prestigious of the Sapporo schools was the Sapporo Agricultural College, directed by Massachusetts native William S. Clark, but other institutions in Sapporo also attracted dozens of students every year to learn the newest agronomical sciences.⁹⁹ The 1875 recruitment notice indicates part of the Colonial Agency’s rationale for distributing western fruit: the Agency, clearly reflecting the vision of Horace Capron and Kuroda Kiyotaka, envisioned a new generation of self-sufficient homesteaders. More practically, the Colonial Agency extolled the virtues of fruit: in the preface to an 1873 catalogue, it highlighted the benefits to health, as well as the potential profitability of “alcohol and dried products made with fruit, which can be exported to our country’s profit.”¹⁰⁰ In its 1878 memo to the headmen of Sapporo’s wards and neighboring villages, the Colonial Agency emphasized the ways “the flowers of these trees please the spirit and gaze, and the fruit thereof supplement the diet.”¹⁰¹ The Colonial Agency worked hard to persuade the people of Hokkaido that fruit trees were valuable, relying on textbooks, official encouragement, and the dispatch of trained students along with saplings to demonstrate their benefits.

Conclusion

Ultimately, hundreds of thousands of trees travelled from Germany, Britain, both coasts of the United States, and finally from Tokyo to Hokkaido throughout the 1870s, a transplantation overseen by Louis Boehmer and his colleagues in Sapporo. The number of fruit trees eventually

⁹⁸ *KJH*, vol. 6, p. 543.

⁹⁹ *KJH*, vol. 4, pp. 402–30.

¹⁰⁰ Kaitakushi dai-ichigō kan’en, *Seiyō kaju shurui bo*.

¹⁰¹ Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho kōbunka, “Jinmin e fuyo no seiyō kaju.”

overwhelmed the capacity of the orchard: Sapporo officials had to turn down trees in 1876, because of a lack of places to plant them, and another offer of 50,000 trees in the spring of 1881.¹⁰² There were not enough gardeners to care for the trees.¹⁰³ The people to whom the Colonial Agency disbursed the trees were not trained in how to care for them properly, while unexpected challenges, such as the ravages of pests and the sheer number of plants damaged in transit, further stymied the successful spread of fruit farming. The capitol orchard was an expensive experiment, and from early on, the Colonial Agency began to explore ways to make it self-sufficient. A set of rules devised at the end of 1875 lay out the decision to sell off trees and invest the proceeds as a source of ongoing revenue for the orchards.¹⁰⁴ Despite these efforts, in 1881, the final full year of Colonial Agency administration, total expenses amounted to 5,000 yen; revenue from the sale of fruit and saplings covered only 1,900 yen.¹⁰⁵ As the debate over whether to charge residents for fruit trees suggests, the challenge of how to fund the Colonial Agency's expensive experiments remained a fraught one: officials did not want to throw away their trees by giving them to people who did not value them, but charging people money made people less enthusiastic about taking on this strange, unfamiliar practice.

Despite these challenges, fruit farming did put down roots in Sapporo. With the dismantling of the Colonial Agency in early 1882, the agricultural experiments of the capitol

¹⁰² Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho minjikyoku kangyōka, "Tokyo kan'en ni oite baiyō no kaboku, Hokkaido e sōfu no ken," *Tokyo kaku shichō bun'iroku – 1878*, 1878/2/1, A4/72(34), HPA, and Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho minjika kangyōgakari, "Tokyo yori kaboku nae nyūyō umu, denpō shōkai no ken," *Kangyōgakari kōbunroku – shokubutsurui*, 1881/7/15, A4/115(95), HPA.

¹⁰³ Kaitakushi Sapporo honcho minjika kangyōgakari, "Jugei toriatsukai shōbo ni tsuki shigansha torishirabe no ken," *Kangyōgakari kōbunroku genkō – jugei no bu*, 1881/3/28, A4/118(12), HPA.

¹⁰⁴ Kaitakushi Tokyo shutchōjo kangyōka bussangakari, "Nōgyōka shokatsu ichi, nigō kan'en kaju sosai nado shussan kyota ni tsuki shokkin wo motte shohi ni atsuru nado no ken," *Zassan ruishū*, 1875/12/28, 簿書 1989(2), HPA.

¹⁰⁵ Kyū Kaitakushi zanmu seiri iin, *Kaku enpo iji hōan narabini yosan shirabe*, 1882, A4/172, HPA.

orchard were transferred to the Sapporo Agricultural College, which continued to recruit students from around Hokkaido and Japan to learn new agricultural techniques. Sapporo also became the center of apple production in Japan for a time. Suibara Torazō, a contractor-turned-entrepreneur, was the first private citizen to build an orchard in Japan, establishing an apple farm in the south of Sapporo in 1876. He started marketing his fruit around Japan in the 1880s. The first local history of Sapporo, published in 1897, noted that “Sapporo apples have become famous even in Tokyo, while Sapporo wine is also gaining recognition.”¹⁰⁶ Suibara offered his apples to the Meiji emperor during an imperial visit to Hokkaido in 1881. By 1887, his orchard contained 700 fruit trees, and he harvested 30,000 apples a year.¹⁰⁷ Other farmers in the region followed his lead, and by the 1890s they were exporting apples throughout Japan and to China, Russia, and the Philippines. Tastes had clearly changed: western fruit was no longer just fit for pig feed, but rather a valuable and sought-after commodity.

The capitol orchard illustrates the many factors at play in the production of a particular urban space in 1870s Sapporo. Local political needs intersecting with policy making in Tokyo led to the clearing of the orchard grounds in 1873 and 1874 by impoverished local residents. The recruitment of students and gardeners to learn how to care for the trees, and then share that knowledge with local people and villagers further afield illustrates the complexity of introducing new practices of agriculture to a society dominated by transient workers reluctant to invest in long-term projects. The experimental ambitions of Horace Capron and high-ranking Colonial Agency officials were tempered by Louis Boehmer’s careful observations, and his critiques of

¹⁰⁶ Sapporo shigakkai, *Sapporo enkakushi*, pp. 54–55.

¹⁰⁷ Takashima Ryūtarō, *Sapporo han’ei zuroku*, May 1887, National Diet Library Digital Collection, p. 34, dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/803665.

the attention lavished on Tokyo for plants destined for Hokkaido. Transnational networks linking Sapporo to the United States, Britain, and Germany in particular were essential for the production of local space, in both the import and export of plant material and scientific knowledge to and from Hokkaido, channeled through the experimental agricultural grounds in the capitol orchard.

These factors highlight some tensions surrounding the strong role of the state in the production of Sapporo. Officials from Capron and Kuroda on down recognized that the massive increase in experimental agriculture could “only be done through the Kaitakushi,” and they kept a close watch on fruit growers by dispatching officials to care for plants, report on the percentages of dead trees, and admonish lazy locals.¹⁰⁸ The lavish spending on the various experimental sites, first at Aoyama then in Sapporo and ultimately throughout Hokkaido, as well as the cost of labor and supplies, ultimately overwhelmed the Colonial Agency, and made officials desperate to recoup some of their expenses by charging local people for trees, and by selling the products of the orchard. Disdain for “lower class citizens” who were lazy and unskilled reveals the distrust officials had for many commoners, an attitude which surely undermined their efforts to encourage affection from migrants to Sapporo. The division of the Colonial Agency leadership between Tokyo and Sapporo exacerbated many of these tensions, largely by increasing costs and delaying decisions due to the slow pace of communication and a bifurcated decision-making structure. Kuroda spent most of his tenure as director of the Colonial Agency in Tokyo, and his other obligations in the central government meant that lower-ranking officials such as Matsumoto Jūrō became key decisionmakers. From their position on the ground in Sapporo, they were able to adapt Agency policy to local needs.

¹⁰⁸ Capron to Kuroda, 25 July 1873, p. 69.

The history of the orchard also challenges stereotypes of the agricultural settlement of Hokkaido, and illustrates the central role of the city of Sapporo in that process. The orchard surrounding the Colonial Agency capitol building served as a microcosm of the broader transformation the flora of Hokkaido. Gardeners and botanists imported fruit trees to develop strains hardy enough for Hokkaido's climate, and then exported those trees around the island. This transfer echoed the spread of other crops, such as wheat, corn, potatoes, and beans, and marked the introduction of radically new ways of using the land of Hokkaido in comparison to the small-scale farming of the Ainu, or the almost exclusive emphasis on fishing and mining by pre-Meiji Japanese in the region. Exploitation of the natural environment in Hokkaido was by no means a new phenomenon, but the scale and intensity of that exploitation changed dramatically with the introduction of increasingly industrial forms of agriculture in the 1870s. In Sapporo itself, the rapid clearing of land for orchards and other agricultural facilities denuded the landscape and eliminated lumber for housing construction, leading the Colonial Agency to protect large swathes of forests on the city's edge. The import of new plants, like the introduction of livestock rearing, horse breeding, and intensive human migration, was not a benign addition to Hokkaido's ecology.

For the most part, however, the Colonial Agency and Sapporo residents treated fruit trees as commodities rather than natural objects, and as commodities that circulated in far-reaching networks of commercial and scientific exchange. The capitol orchard functioned as a node in these networks, mediating between the transnational, regional, and local distribution of plants and dissemination of scientific knowledge. Agricultural settlement in Hokkaido was not the solitary endeavor of hardy pioneers; it was driven by urban institutions such as the capitol orchard, overseen by a determined state that nevertheless had to contend with diverse opinions

and a range of unexpected challenges on the ground. This urban institution was the product of forces and individuals with roots across the world, across Japan, and on the ground in Sapporo, and it played a key role in the broader agricultural colonization of Hokkaido.

Conclusion

Over the century between the first concrete proposals for settling Ezochi in 1785, and the reestablishment of Sapporo as capital of a unified Hokkaido in 1886, a mix of national policymakers, local officials, foreign advisors, and city residents debated the ideal location, function, and form of this colonial capital. Starting in 1869, construction on the city began, and after fits and starts produced the broad outline of the city of Sapporo as we know it today. By 1882, with the end of the Colonial Agency, and more resoundingly by 1886, when the city once again became capital of a unified Hokkaido, Sapporo was flourishing, and its future as a major regional city seemed assured. In this thesis, I have addressed how this process unfolded, and why Sapporo became so important. What functions was it meant to serve from the perspective of the state? And what did the experience of urbanization mean to the people who lived in and around Sapporo?

I argued that we should understand the process of urbanization as a tool deployed by the state in pursuit of territorial goals: in this case, the goal of drawing Ezochi (and later Hokkaido) fully into the Japanese nation-state by turning it into a settler colony. Building a city at Sapporo gave the central state a platform from which to orchestrate this colonization process, in both practical and symbolic ways. The persistence of this colonization goal, which aimed to achieve both military security in the northern part of the Japanese archipelago and economic bounty for the central state, defined efforts to build Sapporo across the nineteenth century. Defensive concerns gradually lessened with the signing of treaties with the Russian Empire, although war with Russia in 1904–5, again in World War II, and the continued disputes over territory in the Kurile Islands suggests that while defense receded as a preoccupation of the state, it did not disappear. In economic terms, the grand goal of turning Hokkaido into an agricultural colony

took much longer to achieve; fishing remained the mainstay of the economy until the turn of the twentieth century, when a renewed push for agricultural settlement led to an explosion in rice agriculture.¹ Nevertheless, the use of the city of Sapporo as a model site for new agricultural techniques helped spread fruit farming and other agricultural knowledge from the West and elsewhere in Japan to the immigrant farmers across Hokkaido.

State actors, both in Tokyo and on the ground in Sapporo, deployed several spatial strategies to turn Sapporo into a colonial capital, strategies that reveal the interconnectedness of city building and state expansion in nineteenth-century Hokkaido. Intellectual debates based on surveys, travel diaries, and reports helped create a dominant framework for understanding the importance of an urban center to any colonial project in Ezochi and Hokkaido, which shaped the political discussions among mainland elites across the nineteenth century. Mapping the new city enabled the state to plan an ideal capital, and then tell a narrative of progress and development, establishing Sapporo as an urban capital containing model sites, government buildings, and a rational urban form that both harkened back to traditional models from the Japanese mainland and projected a modern future for colonial Hokkaido. Efforts to encourage and control migration, through economic subsidies and political regulation, helped create a permanent population in the city. A variety of measures to control and administer space, such as the creation of a police force, municipal ordinances, and structures of local government, made Sapporo more orderly and familiar to migrants from elsewhere in Japan, while also contributing to the Colonial Agency's stature as a bringer of civilization to Hokkaido. Finally, the construction of the orchard in the grounds of the capitol in the 1870s, and the use of that site to disseminate plants and knowledge

¹ Kuwabara Masato, "Hokkaidō kaitaku," *Nihon daihyakka zensho (Encyclopedia Nipponica)*, Japan Knowledge, <https://japanknowledge-com.ezp-prod1.hul.harvard.edu/lib/display/?lid=1001000212730>

throughout Hokkaido, illustrates how one particular urban site played a transformative role in the broader colonial project.

All of these strategies reveal, too, how the imperatives of colonial settlement fundamentally shaped Sapporo's built environment, and the people who lived there. Anxieties about defense and the desire to surround a new city with agricultural land gave Sapporo its inland location; the lack of a port would long contribute to high prices and difficult transportation for the city. The model of the castle town, and the social divisions that accompanied the early-modern status order, led to the sharp division between official and commoner parts of the city, even though they were constructed at the same time as the status system was being dismantled. Mapping shaped the city's layout from the very beginning: Shima Yoshitake's first sketches had a profound influence on the orientation and layout of the city. The state's building priorities contributed to the high percentage of temporary residents, while the slow pace of developing an agricultural economy in the city's hinterland meant that seasonal employment remained the norm in Sapporo for many years. Municipal ordinances and local government enabled a class of local elites to rise to power, and also ensured that the Ainu people would remain unwelcome in the city of Sapporo barring assimilation to mainland Japanese norms. Finally, the orchard's function as a model site for Hokkaido overlapped with its role as an economic lifeline for a city in crisis. The spread of fruit farming to city residents also blurred the line between urban and rural space in colonial Hokkaido, underscoring the interconnectedness of urbanization and agricultural settlement.

These two interconnected processes did not unfold automatically. Rather, debates and contests between actors at all levels of society, and across the nineteenth century, shaped Sapporo and the colonization of Hokkaido. Although the central state played a dominant role in

driving the colonization and settlement of the region, at every step of the way it confronted challenges: whether environmental, in the form of the climate and the difficulty of adapting mainland agriculture to this region; geographic, in the logistical hurdles of moving people and material to Hokkaido; or political, in the shogunate's inability to muster consensus around colonization, the disagreements between officials in different branches of the Colonial Agency, and the structural division between Tokyo and Sapporo during the 1870s. Moreover, local people also challenged Tokyo officials: local bureaucrats such as Matsumoto Jūrō used his on-the-ground knowledge to push back on unreasonable dictates from Tokyo, while local people often acted—or more precisely, failed to act—in ways that the central state either did not anticipate, or did not embrace. The continued reliance on seasonal employment, the exploitation of housing subsidies, the building of houses in the middle of proposed street grids, the decision to pursue unregulated sex work in the aftermath of legal liberation, and the use of riots to express displeasure at economic inequality exposed some of the limits of the state's ability to implement its vision of colonization, while also highlighting the myriad actors involved in the production of urban society in Sapporo.

In sum, the spatial strategies of city building helped produce the settler-colony of Hokkaido by the late nineteenth century. These spatial strategies transformed the Japanese presence at coastal fisheries along the coast of Ezochi into the contiguous possession of the interior of Hokkaido. The Japanese state transformed the land of the Ainu into the property of Japanese settlers and the Japanese state, in large part by constructing Sapporo as the headquarters of a large bureaucracy that processed the acquisition and dissemination of land titles, created and enforced laws that curtailed Ainu culture, and encouraged large-scale migration of ethnic Japanese to Hokkaido. This process of transformation was not monolithic: settlers themselves

played a crucial role in shaping the contours of colonization in Sapporo and elsewhere.

Nevertheless, the result was the almost complete incorporation of Hokkaido into the structures of the Japanese nation state. It is in part because this process was so thorough that it is difficult today to remember Hokkaido's colonial status, and Sapporo's role as a colonial capital.

Beyond 1886

After the reunification of Hokkaido with Sapporo as its capital in 1886, Sapporo continued to grow. The population more than quadrupled over the next two decades, from 16,342 to 71,423 by 1906. Hokkaido's population surpassed one million shortly after the turn of the century, and continued to grow. The state's strong role in developing Hokkaido continued apace: Hokkaido governor Sonoda Yasukata embarked on a 33-million-yen, ten-year plan in 1901 (although it was halved in value in 1905 due to the exigencies of the Russo-Japanese War). His successor launched a 70-million-yen, fifteen-year plan in 1910, which ultimately produced 158 million yen in spending on infrastructure, land reclamation, and migration, and helped make agricultural production the true mainstay of the region's economy.² Sapporo was no exception to this state-led development: in the 1880s, the transfer of government-owned factories to private hands spurred the development of industry, while continued public-works projects helped extend the city and protect it from flooding. Meanwhile, the private sector blossomed: the establishment of new banks in 1889 and 1891 helped spur commercial growth, while capital from outside Hokkaido started flowing into Sapporo. The establishment of a local chamber of commerce also helped boost the local economy, although a major fire in 1892 stifled growth and shifted the commercial heart of the region to Otaru. Nevertheless, industrial investment continued: factories, mills, printing shops, and the famous brewery all flourished, supported by pro-capitalist policies

² Kuwabara Masato, "Hokkaidō kaitaku".

on the part of the city and prefectural government. Hokkaido was hit hard by financial crises and poor harvests between 1901 and 1904, although the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 spurred the expansion of manufacturing in Sapporo, helping return the economy to growth. Investment increased, the population grew, and Sapporo began the process of absorbing its surrounding villages into the city proper.³

As Louise Young has illustrated, Sapporo became an important site of the production of modernity in Japan in the interwar period, despite its distant location from Tokyo and other cosmopolitan centers. The flourishing of intellectual and cultural networks between Sapporo and Tokyo, along with the rise of the service sector in the economy and concomitant explosion of the middle class in Sapporo, contributed to the emergence of a strong civic identity in Sapporo. A boom in local history writing in the 1930s, Young suggests, encapsulates this rising spirit. Coupled with the extension of infrastructural ties across Hokkaido, these factors cemented the city as the undisputed urban center of the region.⁴ We can see several of these patterns emerging earlier than the interwar period: the first local history of Sapporo dates to 1897, while the city's function as a node in regional infrastructure was explicit and important from the very beginning. Nevertheless, Young's work illustrates how new social and cultural forms led to a more mature and more modern Sapporo by the 1920s. In 1922, Sapporo finally earned the classification of "city" under the 1889 local municipality law, bringing its administration fully into line with cities throughout Japan. It had a population of 120,000 people, putting it still behind Otaru and

³ Ebina Kenzō, *Hokkaidō takushoku/kaihatsu keizai ron* (Tokyo: Shinhyōron, 1983), pp. 113–123.

⁴ Louise Young, *Beyond the Metropolis* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013), especially pp. 116–37; regarding Sapporo's local history, pp. 160–162. It is curious that Young does not discuss the earlier versions of the city's history—she focuses on the broader regional history of the 1936 *Shin Hokkaidō shishi*, rather than the 1897 *Sapporo enkaku shi*.

Hakodate as the third-largest city in Hokkaido; it overtook Otaru by 1925, and by 1940 was Hokkaido's largest city.

To what extent did Sapporo prefigure the establishment of colonial cities elsewhere in Japan's empire? Perhaps oddly, not very much. While scholars have noted the precedent of Hokkaido as a form of peripheral colonization that set the stage for settler colonialism in Korea or Manchuria, the experience of Sapporo as a model for colonial urban planning or colonial urban life is an area ripe for further research. The temporal gap between the founding of Sapporo in 1869 and the construction of colonial space in the twentieth century probably contributes in part to the relative lack of attention to Sapporo; other colonial cities (such as the treaty ports of China) were more modern, and more relevant, examples for Japan's expansion. In the case of Dairen, for example, the preexisting Russian settlement was a ready-made template for Japanese colonization.⁵ In other ways, by the early twentieth century Sapporo was very clearly part of Japan proper: despite minor differences, the governance of the city and the region was indistinguishable from mainland Japan. The Hokkaido Ainu population was by and large not in Sapporo, and there was no longer a sizeable group of foreign advisors to give the city a cosmopolitan cast. Perhaps for these reasons, Sapporo was not seen as an obvious example of colonial settlement by the turn of the twentieth century.

Beyond Japan

The creation of Sapporo as a settler-colonial capital was connected to global flows of ideas, people, and plants. Its growth as a settler-colonial city is also worth considering in a comparative context: the nineteenth century was an era of settler-colonialism around the world, and putting Sapporo in that context helps put Japan into a global history of the nineteenth century.

⁵ Emer O'Dwyer, *Significant Soil* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2015), p. 24.

As David Hugill outlined, the establishment of an autonomous economic base in the settler-colony, the persistence of the colonial situation, and the exclusion of Indigenous people characterizes many settler-colonial cities.⁶ James Belich has stressed boom-and-bust economic cycles and extraordinary periods of population growth as key features of Anglophone settler-colonialism.⁷ Sapporo's history fits neatly into these definitions: the high rate of population growth; the intention to establish a permanent settlement, rather than just a site from which to extract labor or raw materials; booms and busts; and the exclusion of the Ainu. The comparisons and connections between settler-colonialism in Hokkaido and settler-colonialism elsewhere deserve more sustained attention, but I wish here to provide some provisional thoughts on how Sapporo's history modifies and extends some of these and other features of settler-colonial urbanism.

Most obviously, Sapporo is a reminder that settler-colonial urbanism is not just an Anglophone or European story. While Japanese migration to Hokkaido did not match the numbers of Anglo migration to the American West or Australia, it did match the population of New Zealand (and today exceeds it slightly). Sapporo did not grow as large as the most famous cities of the Anglophone settler world: Chicago grew from 100 people to 1.1 million people between 1830 and 1890, while Melbourne had reached 500,000 people; it would take Sapporo's population until 1970 to surpass one million. But Denver, with only a few thousand people in the 1860s, underwent rapid growth at the same time as Sapporo, growing to perhaps 107,000 people by the end of the 1880s.⁸ The booms in other western settler towns, such as Seattle, did not get

⁶ David Hugill, "What Is a Settler-Colonial City?," *Geography Compass* 11 (2017): pp. 6–7.

⁷ James Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783–1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 71–89.

⁸ Belich, *Replenishing the Earth*, p. 339.

under way until the 1880s and 1890s, while Los Angeles—the “last best West” of the U.S.—did not see massive settler growth until the early decades of the twentieth century.⁹ As these examples suggest, Japan’s efforts at Sapporo unfolded at the same time as similar cities were being established by settler populations to anchor the colonization of broad stretches of territory around the world.

The examples of Chicago and Melbourne in particular, though, do highlight a key difference with Sapporo: they were centers of trade and industry as well as colonial administration. Sapporo did not become a major economic center until the twentieth century, in large part because it was neither a port nor a major railway center. The railway did come to Sapporo relatively early—the first line opened in 1880—but the city was primarily a point to pass through on the way to the coalfields further inland, or the port at Otaru. The dominance of two major ports, Otaru and Hakodate, until the 1920s suggests that Sapporo’s urban centrality was less intense than that of Chicago, whose economic motors drove not only urban growth but also the settlement of the wider west, or Melbourne, where finance and port facilities together turned the Victorian gold rush into viable and explosive urban growth.¹⁰ The state was certainly present in Anglophone settler cities, both as government institutions and as a source of cheap financing for infrastructure and other city-building projects; in this respect, Sapporo was not unusual.¹¹ Yet, the relative absence of trade and large-scale private business owners did distinguish Sapporo, a feature that Japanese observers worryingly pointed to as a limitation on

⁹ Belich, *Replenishing the Earth*, p. 405.

¹⁰ On Chicago, see William Cronon’s masterpiece, *Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991). On Melbourne, Belich, *Replenishing the Earth*, pp. 356–72.

¹¹ Belich, *Replenishing the Earth*, p. 362.

Sapporo's growth.¹² Improving infrastructure to facilitate industry was a major priority, long after the end of the Colonial Agency.

Third, despite the best efforts of boosters in the Japanese government, no ideology equivalent to manifest destiny took root in Japan: "go north, young man" did not figure as a prominent slogan. Instead, most early migrants to Sapporo treated their time in Hokkaido as a sojourn, albeit for many an extended one, whether they were poor laborers, agricultural students, or government bureaucrats. While the comparison of convicts sent to Australia is a useful corrective to the notion that all settlers were enthusiastic pioneers, Hokkaido never quite shook its reputation as a cold, distant place, far from familiar and undesirable as a permanent home, as newspaper editors bemoaned. It would take until the interwar period for boosterism to really take root in Sapporo. This stands in marked contrast to the Anglophone world, where an explosion in booster literature after 1815 helped generate the massive increase in British and American settlement throughout the nineteenth century.¹³

One final and related distinctive feature of settler-colonialism in Sapporo is the overlay of this nineteenth-century form of colonization with older attitudes toward the region. Japanese elites long believed that they had a privileged position vis-à-vis Hokkaido, whether in terms of cultural superiority, political suzerainty, or economic privileges. These longstanding ideas underpinned the new forms of colonization of the mid- and later nineteenth century. In other words, ideas about city-building in the late Tokugawa period, and the actual construction of Sapporo starting in 1869, were shaped by older visions of Japanese control of Ezochi, and Japanese elites' desires to address the particular problems of the early-modern system, most

¹² Toida Ryūdō, "Hokkaido kikō shōshutsu," 1882, 別 915-Hi, NSC, <http://www2.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/cgi-bin/hoppodb/record.cgi?id=0A004460000000000>.

¹³ Belich, *Replenishing the Earth*, pp. 153–57.

notably the decentralized process of border management and ethnic relations under Matsumae Domain. It turns out that the answers to those problems lay in settling the region, a goal that dovetailed nicely with the proposals of Westerners brought in by the Meiji regime. An urban capital lay at the heart of both early-modern and modern forms, because it enabled both the extension of familiar types of military power and bureaucratic apparatus (in the form of a castle town), as well as the introduction of new techniques of settlement and state control (in the form of a model city and colonial capital). Other settler societies had pre-settlement histories with their colonies (the English settlement of Ireland in Tudor times, for instance, and the Han Chinese settlement of Manchuria in the later Qing era), but they lacked the creation of an urban hierarchy as a key driver of colonization.

Revisiting Nineteenth-Century Japanese Urban History

Sapporo was thus the product of both longstanding historical attitudes toward Ezochi on the part of Japanese elites, as well as new ideas about the proper technologies of colonial settlement. Many visitors to Sapporo today comment on its “American” feeling: the numbered street grid, wide roads, and agricultural college. Yet, many of these characteristics predated any American involvement in Sapporo, although U.S. advisors certainly affirmed and enhanced these characteristics somewhat later in the city’s history. This feature of Sapporo’s history allows me to return to the question at the very beginning of this thesis: how did Japanese cities change across the nineteenth century? Obviously the study of one city, and an unusual one at that, is an insufficient pulpit from which to make any sweeping claim, but I want to conclude by pointing to two overarching features that I hope will inform studies of Japanese urbanization in the mid-nineteenth century.

First, new networks connected Japan to the world across the nineteenth century, and Sapporo played a key role in making those connections. While the treaty ports have long been understood as nodes in global networks, other cities like Sapporo also developed through the interplay of local, regional, national, and transnational forces. Second, these processes were not inexorable: bureaucratic bickering, local enthusiasm (or disinterest), and policy changes all mattered to the production of urban space in Sapporo. In Sapporo at least, a growing range of actors played a role in this production: a class of local notables emerged, local bureaucrats and foreign advisors played key roles, and the large class of laborers, brothel workers, and impoverished migrants placed their own pressures on the ideas of the state. Sapporo was not a city parceled into self-governing neighborhoods organized by status: rather, new forms of municipal authority emerged that governed a less fractured urban space.

Finally, and perhaps somewhat at odds with these changes, Sapporo's early history demonstrates the persistence of ideas about urban space into the modern era. Familiar forms of urban governance and urban design powerfully shaped the introduction of new models, and many of those new models were significantly adapted to make them more familiar. The function of the city as an administrative headquarters ultimately differed from the vision of a military stronghold offered by Kondō Jūzō or Tokugawa Nariaki, but the form of the castle town had striking effects on the layout of Sapporo, while the regional geography of an urban-centered agricultural province sounds awfully similar to the domains of early modern Japan—ironically this model resembles mainland Japanese domains much more than Matsumae, the only domain on Hokkaido. All told, Sapporo's history offers a window into some enduring conceptions of urban space in nineteenth century Japan, even as its particular planning and development illustrates the introduction of a new form of settler-colonial urbanism.

Glossary*People*

Aizawa Seishisai	会沢正志斎	Kinda Akihiro	金田章裕
Akiba Minoru	秋葉実	Kitajima Kumejirō	北島条次郎
Arai Hakuseki	新井白石	Kitajima Masamoto	北島正元
Arai Kinsuke	荒井金輔	Kondō Jūzō	近藤重蔵
Fujita Hana	藤田はな	Kotoni Mataichi	琴似又市・一
Fukaya Tetsusaburō	深谷鉄三郎	Kudō Heisuke	工藤平助
Funakoshi Chōzen	船越長善	Kudō Toki	工藤トキ
Hasegawa Yae	長谷川やえ	Kudō Tomoe	工藤義衛
Hayashi Shihei	林子平	Kuroda Kiyotaka	黒田清隆
Honda Tadakazu	本多忠籌	Mamiya Rinzō	間宮林蔵
Hori Jun'ichi	堀純一	Matsudaira Sadanobu	松平定信
Imamura Wasaburō	今村和三郎	Matsumoto Jūrō	松本十郎
Inō Tadataka	伊能忠敬	Matsumoto Yazaemon	松本弥左衛門
Isaburō	伊三郎	Matsuura Akira	松浦章
Ishikawa Ryūsen/Tomonobu	石川流宣	Matsuura Takeshirō	松浦武四郎
Ishikawa Shōzō	石川正蔵	Matsuyama Megumi	松山恵
Itō Tama	伊藤タマ	Minami Takajirō	南鷹次郎
Iwamura Michitoshi	岩村通俊	Mizuno Tadakuni	水野忠邦
Jūmonji Ryōsuke	十文字龍助	Mogami Tokunai	最上徳内
Kaiho Mineo	海保嶺夫	Mori Arinori	森有礼
Kaneko Sadakichi	金子定吉	Morikawa Toshihachi	森川年八

Settling Sapporo

Glossary

Nakagawa Genzaemon	中川源左衛門	Suibara Torazō	水原寅藏
Nakamura Shōtarō	中村庄太郎	Suzue Eiichi	鈴江英一
Ninomiya Sontoku	二宮尊徳	Takakura Shin'ichirō	高倉新一郎
Nishizawa Yayo	西沢ヤヨ	Takamizawa Gonnojō	高見沢権之丞
Ōe Shinobu	大江忍	Takano Tamotate	高野保建
Ogawa Takuji	小川琢治	Takase Kenjirō	高瀬健次郎
Ōkubo Toshimichi	大久保利通	Takase Wasaburō	高瀬和三郎
Ōmura Kōtarō	大村耕太郎	Takemura Risa	竹村リサ
Ono Satarō	小野佐太郎	Tamamushi Sadayū	玉虫左太夫
Ono Toyo	小野トヨ	Tamura Sadao	田村貞雄
Ōoka Sukeuemon	大岡助右衛門	Tanaka Akira	田中彰
Ōshima Keisuke	大島圭介	Tanaka Yoshio	田中義夫
Ōtomo Kametarō	大友亀太郎	Tanimoto Akihisa	谷本晃久
Ozawa Hiromu	小澤弘	Tanuma Okitsugu	田沼意次
Sakamoto Tadahisa	坂本忠久	Toida Ryūdō	樋田龍洞
Sakura Genjirō	佐倉原次郎	Tokugawa Nariaki	徳川斉昭
Sanjō Sanetomi	三条実美	Tsukada Takashi	塚田孝
Satō Yoko	佐藤ヨコ	Unno Kazutaka	海野一隆
Shima Yoshitake	島義勇	Watanabe Takashi	渡辺隆
Shimizudani Kinnaru	清水谷公考	Yabe Kōjūrō	八戸厚十郎
Shiroto Yasaburō	城戸弥三郎	Yamaguchi Shigejirō	山口茂次郎
Sonoda Yasukata	園田安賢	Yamashita Jihē	山下治兵衛
Sugimoto Fumiko	杉本史子	Yamazaki Kiyomi	山崎清

Yamori Kazuhiko	矢守一彦	Yoshizumi Sunpei	吉住寸平
Yasui Sokken	安井息軒	Zusho Hirotake	調所広丈
Yoshida Nobuyuki	吉田信之		

Places

Abashiri	網走	Kagoshima	鹿児島
Akita	秋田	Kairakuen	偕楽園
Aomori	青森	Kamikawa	上川
Aoyama	青山	Karafuto (Sakhalin)	樺太
Asahikawa	旭川	Kikonai	木古内
Chishima (Kuriles)	千島	Kotoni	琴似
Chitose	千歳	Kunashiri	国後
Esashi	江差	Matsumae	松前
Ezo	蝦夷	Minmaya	三厩
Ezochi	蝦夷地	Mito	水戸
Ezogachishima	蝦夷ヶ千島	Monbetsu	紋別
Hakodate	函館・箱館	Muroran	室蘭
Hiyama-dōri	檜山通	Nanae	七重・七飯
Hokkaidō	北海道	Nanbu	南部
Honshū	本州	Nemuro	根室
Horobetsu	幌別	Obi Domain	小尾藩
Imari	伊万里	Ōdōri	大通
Ishikari	石狩	Otaru	小樽

Saga	佐賀	Tsugaru	津軽
Sagami	相模	Tsugaru Straits	津軽海峡
Sakata	酒田	Tōbetsu	当別
Sapporo	札幌・札幌	Urakawa	浦河
Saru	沙流	Usu	有珠
Sendai	仙台	Utashinai	歌志内
Shiribeshi-dōri	後志通	Wajinchi	和人地
Shizunai	静内	Wakuya	涌谷
Sorachibuto	空知太	Yoichi	余市
Susukino	薄野	Yūbari	夕張
Sōseigawa	創成川	Yūfutsu	勇払
Takashima	高島	Zenibako	銭函・銭箱
Toyohira River	豊平川		

Other key terms

bakumatsu	幕末	the late Tokugawa period (c.1830–1868)
chihōzei	地方税	regional taxes
chinjufu	鎮守府	military base or headquarters
chinpu	鎮府	military base or headquarters
chisho	治所	headquarters
chō kyōdōtai	町共同体	town neighborhood community
chōdai	町代・丁代	town clerks
daishōku seido	大小区制度	system of large and small districts

Dajōkan	太政官	Council of State (Meiji period)
dekasegi	出稼	sojourning, seasonal employment
dorui	土塁	earthen ramparts
Eizenkyoku	營繕局	Department of Construction
<i>Ezoron</i>	蝦夷論	treatise by Yasui Sokken
gochō	伍長	household-group head
goningumi	伍人組	household groups
gonkuchō	権区長	acting district head
gun • kōri	郡	(rural) district
gunyakusho	郡役所	district office (rural)
han	藩	early-modern domain
Higashi Honganji	東本願寺	major Buddhist sect
hinin	非人	outcaste group
Hokkaidō (Teikoku) Daigaku	北海道(帝国)大学	Hokkaido (Imperial) University
honchō	本庁	(Sapporo) Subdivision
honseki	本籍	permanent resident/residence
<i>Hoppō mirai kō</i>	北方未来考	treatise by Tokugawa Nariaki
hyōjo	表所	headquarters
idokoro	居所	residence (of a lord)
iiki	異域	foreign land (pre-Meiji)
Ishikari kaikaku	イシカリ改革	Ishikari Reforms (1858)
Ishiki kaii jōrei	違式誹違条例	municipal ordinances against misdemeanors
jichi	自治	self-governance/local autonomy

jinya	陣屋	fort (in lieu of a castle)
jitō	地頭	steward
ka-i chitsujo	華夷秩序	geopolitical concept of rings of civilization
kadotsuke geinin	門付芸人	itinerant entertainers
Kaihōrei	解放令	1872 edict liberating prostitutes
Kaikeika	會計課	Department of Finance (Col. Agency)
Kaikongakari	開墾掛	Department of Cultivation (Col. Agency)
kaitaku	開拓	to reclaim land for cultivation; to colonize
kaitaku sanjin	開拓三神	Three Gods of Colonization
kaitaku seishin	開拓精神	“pioneer spirit”
Kaitakushi	開拓使	Colonial Agency
kiryū	寄留	temporary resident
kochō/fukukochō	戸長・副戸長	headman/deputy headman
Kōgyōka	工業課	Department of Industry (Col. Agency)
oku	石	measure of rice (approx. five bushels)
koma	小間	measure of area, roughly 3.3 m ²
komawari	小間割	method of property assessment by <i>koma</i>
kosansha	怙産者	very wealthy person
kōsatsuba	高札場	town noticeboard
koseki (shirabe)	戸籍(調)	household registration (survey, i.e. census)
kosūwarizei	戸数割税	household tax
ku	区	(urban) district
kuchō/fukukuchō	区長・副区長	district head/deputy district head

kuni	国	province (of ancient ritsuryō state)
kuniezu	国絵図	maps of provinces
kuyakusho	区役所	district office (urban)
machidoshiyori	町年寄	town elder
machiyōgakari	町用掛	municipal aide
machiyōsuke	町用助	town assistant
megumi	恵	benevolence (of rulers)
meibōka	名望家	local notables
Minjikyoku	民事局	Department of Civil Affairs (Col. Agency)
Minshūshi	民衆史	‘people’s history’
mon	文	unit of bronze cash, Tokugawa period
muraezu	村絵図	maps of villages
Naichi	内地	mainland Japan (Honshū, Shikoku, Kyūshū)
otesakuba	御手作場	government-run farm (pre-1868)
ri	里	linear distance, approximately 4 kilometers
ryōshu	領主	local lords
sairui	砦壘	fort, military outpost
Sanshinpō	三新法	Three New Laws (1878)
Sapporo Nōgakkō	札幌農学校	Sapporo Agricultural College
shichō	支庁	subdivision of Colonial Agency
shigai/shichū	市街・市中	urban area
Shōheizaka Academy	昌平坂学問所	shogunal academy
shū	州	province (alternate for <i>kuni</i>)

shukkōzei	出港税	Export Tax
shugo	守護	lord, regional military ruler
sōdai	総代	general representatives
Sokuryōgakari	測量掛	Department of Surveying (Col. Agency)
tawaramono	俵物	dried and bagged marine products
Tōkyōrō	東京楼	‘Tokyo House’ (brothel name)
tondenhei	屯田兵	soldier-farmer
Wajin	和人	ethnic Japanese
wakihonjin	脇本陣	annex to Col. Agency headquarters
yōgo narabini kei’ei	擁護並警衛	defense and protection
zaijū	在住	permanent settler status (pre-1868 Ezochi)

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