Nystrom, Leigh E.Morelli, Sylvia A.Cohen, JonathanGreene, Joshua2009-06-302008Greene, Joshua D., Sylvia A. Morelli, Kelly Lowenberg, Leigh E. Nvstrom, and Jonathan D. Cohen. 2008. Cognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment. Cognition 107(3): 1144-1154.0010-02771873-7838http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3124123Traditional theories of moral development emphasize the role of controlled cognition in mature moral judgment, while a more recent trend emphasizes intuitive and emotional processes. Here we test a dual-process theory synthesizing these perspectives. More specifically, our theory associates utilitarian moral judgment (approving of harmful actions that maximize good consequences) with controlled cognitive processes and associates non-utilitarian moral judgment with automatic emotional responses. Consistent with this theory, we find that a cognitive load manipulation selectively interferes with utilitarian judgment. This interference effect provides direct evidence for the influence of controlled cognitive processes in moral judgment, and utilitarian moral judgment more specifically.en-UScognitive loadcognitive controlmoralityutilitarianmoral judgmentJournal Article10.1016/j.cognition.2007.11.004