Fudenberg, DrewLevine, David2009-08-052007Fudenberg, Drew, and David K. Levine. 2007. The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games. Journal of Economic Theory 132, no. 1: 461-473.0022-0531http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3203772We show that the use of communications to coordinate equilibria generates a Nash-threats folk theorem in two-player games with “almost public” information. The results generalize to the <i>n</i>-person case. However, the two-person case is more difficult because it is not possible to sustain equilibria by comparing the reports of different players, and using these “third parties” to effectively enforce contracts.en-USrepeated gamescommunicationprivate monitoringfolk theorem10.1016/j.jet.2005.08.006