Bulow, JeremyRogoff, Kenneth2014-07-141989Bulow, Jeremy, and Kenneth S. Rogoff. 1989. A constant recontracting model of sovereign debt. Journal of Political Economy 97(1): 155-178.0022-3808http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12491028We present a dynamic model of international lending in which borrowers cannot commit to future repayments and in which debtors can sometimes successfully negotiate partial defaults or "rescheduling agreements." All parties in a debt rescheduling negotiation realize that today's rescheduling agreement may itself have to be renegotiated in the future. Our bargaining-theoretic approach allows us to handle the effects of uncertainty on sovereign debt contracts in a much more satisfactory way than in earlier analyses. The framework is readily extended to analyze the conflicting interests of different lenders and of banks and creditor country taxpayers.en-USJournal Article2014-07-1410.3386/w2088