Siegel, Susanna2009-07-082002Siegel, Susanna. 2002. The role of perception in demonstrative reference. Philosophers' Imprint 2, no. 1: 1-21.1533-628Xhttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3153302Siegel defends "Limited Intentionism", a theory of what secures the semantic reference of uses of bare demonstratives ("this", "that" and their plurals). According to Limited Intentionism, demonstrative reference is fixed by perceptually anchored intentions on the part of the speaker.en-USKent BachMarga ReimerHoward WettsteinColin McGinnDavid Kaplanreference-fixingdemonstrativesdemonstrativereferenceintentionsintentionality