Alesina, AlbertoDrazen, Allan2010-11-091988Alesina, Alberto, and Allan Drazen. 1991. Why are stabilizations delayed? American Economic Review 81(5): 1170-1188.0002-8282http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4553028When a stabilization has significant distributional implications (e.g., tax increases to eliminate a large budget deficit), socioeconomic groups may attempt to shift the burden of stabilization onto other groups. The process leading to stabilization becomes a "war of attrition," each group attempting to wait the others out and stabilization occurring only when one group concedes and bears a disproportionate share of the burden. We solve for the expected time of stabilization in a model of "rational" delay and relate it to several political and economic variables. We motivate this approach and its results by comparison to historical and current episodes.en-USJournal Article2010-11-0910.3386/w3053