Dekel, EddieFudenberg, DrewLevine, David2009-07-282002Dekel, Eddie, Drew Fudenberg, and David K. Levine. 2002. Subjective uncertainty over behavior strategies: A correction. Journal of Economic Theory 104, no. 2: 473-478.0022-0531http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3200611In order to model the subjective uncertainty of a player over the behavior strategies of an opponent, one must consider the player's beliefs about the opponent's play at information sets that the player thinks have probability zero. This corregendum uses “trembles” to provide a definition of the convex hull of a set of behavior strategies. This corrects a definition we gave in [E. Dekel, D. Fudenberg, and D. K. Levine, 1999, <i>J. Econ. Theory</i> 89, 165–185], which led to two of the solution concepts we defined there not having the properties we intended.en-USself-confirming equilibriumrationalizabilitysubjective uncertaintybehavior strategiesextensive-form games10.1006/jeth.2001.2866