Ng, ChakiParkes, DavidSeltzer, Margo2010-05-182003Ng, Chaki, David C. Parkes, and Margo Seltzer. 2003. Virtual worlds: Fast and strategyproof auctions for dynamic resource allocation. In EC '03: Proceedings of the 4th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce: June 9-12, 2003,San Diego, California, ed. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, Association for Computing Machinery, and Special Interest Group on Electronic Commerce, 238-239. New York: ACM Press.1-58113-679-X9781581136791http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4101705We consider the problem of designing fast and strategyproof exchanges for dynamic resource allocation problems in distributed systems. The exchange is implemented as a sequence of auctions, with dynamically arriving requests from agents matched with each auction. Each auction is associated with some consignment of the resources from a single seller. We provide a simple Virtual Worlds (VW) construction, that extends a fast and strategyproof mechanism for a single auction to apply to this sequence-of-auctions setting. Rather than match each buyer with a single auction, the VW mechanism allows buyers to be considered for multiple auctions while retaining strategyproofness.en-USMonograph or Book2010-05-1810.1145/779928.779977