Lahaie, SébastienParkes, David2010-04-282008Lahaie, Sébastien, and David C. Parkes. 2008. A modular framework for iterative combinatorial auctions. SIGecom Exchanges 7(2).1551-9031http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4000332We describe a modular elicitation framework for iterative combinatorial auctions. The framework includes proxy agents, each of which can adopt an individualized bidding language to represent partial value information of a bidder. The framework leverages algorithms from query learning to elicit value information via bids as the auction progresses. The approach reduces the multi-agent elicitation problem to isolated, single-agent learning problems, with competitive equilibrium prices used to facilitate auction clearing even without complete learning.en-UScombinatorial auctionpreference elicitationquery learningResearch Paper or Report2010-04-2810.1145/1399589.1399597