Shneidman, JeffreyParkes, David2010-05-052004Shneidman, Jeffrey and David C. Parkes. 2004. Specification faithfulness in networks with rational nodes. In Proceedings of the twenty-third annual ACM symposium on principles of distributed computing: PODC 2004: July 25-28, 2004, St. John's, Newfoundland, Canada, ed. ACM Special Interest Group for Algorithms and Computation Theory, and ACM Special Interest Group in Operating Systems, 88-97. New York, N.Y.: Association for Computing Machinery.1-58113-802-49781581138023http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4054443It is useful to prove that an implementation correctly follows a specification. But even with a provably correct implementation, given a choice, would a node choose to follow it? This paper explores how to create distributed system specifications that will be faithfully implemented in networks with rational nodes, so that no node will choose to deviate. Given a strategyproof centralized mechanism, and given a network of nodes modeled as having rational-manipulation faults, we provide a proof technique to establish the incentive-, communication-, and algorithm-compatibility properties that guarantee that participating nodes are faithful to a suggested specification. As a case study, we apply our methods to extend the strategyproof interdomain routing mechanism proposed by Feigenbaum, Papadimitriou, Sami, and Shenker (FPSS) [7], defining a faithful implementation.en-USalgorithm compatibilitycommunication compatibilitycomputational mechanism designdistributed algorithmic mechanism designfailure modelsincentive compatibilityrational failurerational manipulationMonograph or Book2010-05-0510.1145/1011767.1011781