Bredin, JonathanParkes, David2010-04-302005Bredin, Jonathan, and David C. Parkes. 2005. Models for truthful online double auctions. In Uncertainty in artificial intelligence: Proceedings of the Twenty-First Conference: July 26-29, 2005, Edinburgh, Scotland, ed. F. Bacchus, T. Jaakkola, et al., 50-59. Corvallis, Oregon: AUAI Press.09749039149780974903910http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4031550Online double auctions (DAs) model a dynamic two-sided matching problem with private information and self-interest, and are relevant for dynamic resource and task allocation problems. We present a general method to design truthful DAs, such that no agent can benefit from misreporting its arrival time, duration, or value. The family of DAs is parameterized by a pricing rule, and includes a generalization of McAfee’s truthful DA to this dynamic setting. We present an empirical study, in which we study the allocative-surplus and agent surplus for a number of different DAs. Our results illustrate that dynamic pricing rules are important to provide good market efficiency for markets with high volatility or low volume.en-USMonograph or Book2010-04-30