Muthoo, AbhinayShepsle, Kenneth2011-03-312009Shepsle, Kenneth A. 2009. Information, institutions, and constitutional arrangements. Public Choice 144(1-2): 1-36.0048-5829http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:4783875This paper develops a theory of optimal institutional structure for staggered-term (overlapping generations) organizations such as legislative bodies. Our model is a simple stochastic game of multi-principal, multi-agent dynamic relationships. Our results emphasize two key features that are determined by legislative founders at the “constitutional moment”. First, they will agree to institute a mechanism that endows (imperfectly informed) legislators with information about the history of play. Second, we provide conditions in which legislative founders will be indifferent to the structure of legislative procedures.en-USinstitutionsstaggered-term legislaturesoverlapping generationstransparencyprincipal-agentsJournal Article2011-03-3110.1007/s11127-009-9500-5