McGinn, KathleenMilkman, Katherine L.Noth, Markus2012-08-012012McGinn, Kathleen L., Katherine L. Milkman, and Markus Noth. "Walking the Talk in Multiparty Bargaining: An Experimental Investigation." Journal of Economic Psychology 33, no. 1 (February 2012).0022-1015http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:9346337We study the framing effects of communication on payoffs in multiparty bargaining. Communication has been shown to be more truthful and revealing than predicted in equilibrium. Because talk is preference-revealing, it may effectively frame bargaining around a logic of fairness or competition, moving parties on a path toward or away from equal-division agreements. These endogenous framing effects may outweigh any overall social utility effects due to the mere presence of communication. In two studies, we find that non-binding talk about fairness within a three-party, complete-information game leads toward off-equilibrium, equal division payoffs, while non-binding talk focusing on Competitive Reasoning moves parties away from equal divisions. Our two studies allow us to demonstrate that manipulated pre-game talk and spontaneous within-game dialogue lead to the same results.en-USCommunicationFairnessBargainingNegotiationsJournal Article10.1016/j.joep.2011.10.008