Li, FengSrinivasan, Suraj2016-12-092011Li, Feng, and Suraj Srinivasan. "Corporate Governance When Founders Are Directors." Journal of Financial Economics 102, no. 2 (November 2011): 454–469.0304-405Xhttp://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:29660922We examine CEO compensation, CEO retention policies, and M&A decisions in firms where founders serve as a director with a non-founder CEO (founder-director firms). We find that founder-director firms offer a different mix of incentives to their CEOs than other firms. Pay for performance sensitivity for non-founder CEOs in founder-director firms is higher and the level of pay is lower than that of other CEOs. CEO turnover sensitivity to firm performance is also significantly higher in founder-director firms compared to non-founder firms. Overall, the evidence suggests that boards with founder-directors provide more high powered incentives in the form of pay and retention policies than the average U.S. board. Stock returns around M&A announcements and board attendance are also higher in founder-director firms compared to non-founder firms.en-UScorporate governanceexecutive compensationretentionpolicymotivation and incentivesperformancegoverning and advisory boardsmergers and acquisitionswagesJournal Article2014-04-23Suraj Srinivasan2016-12-0910.2139/ssrn.1014157