Chen, YilingChong, StephenKash, Ian A.Moran, TalVadhan, Salil2014-07-252013Chen, Yiling, Stephen Chong, Ian A. Kash, Tal Moran, and Salil Vadhan. 2013. Truthful Mechanisms for Agents That Value Privacy. In Proceedings of the Fourteenth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce - EC ’13, 215-232. New York: ACM Press.978-1-4503-1962-1http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12560997Recent work has constructed economic mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private. In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from the truthfulness; it is not incorporated in players' utility functions (and doing so has been shown to lead to non-truthfulness in some cases). In this work, we propose a new, general way of modelling privacy in players' utility functions. Specifically, we only assume that if an outcome o has the property that any report of player i would have led to o with approximately the same probability, then o has small privacy cost to player i. We give three mechanisms that are truthful with respect to our modelling of privacy: for an election between two candidates, for a discrete version of the facility location problem, and for a general social choice problem with discrete utilities (via a VCG-like mechanism). As the number n of players increases, the social welfare achieved by our mechanisms approaches optimal (as a fraction of n).en-USTheoryEconomicsMechanism designprivacydifferential privacyConference Paper2014-07-2510.1145/2492002.2482549