Landeo, Claudia M.Spier, Kathryn2014-09-302013Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, Shotgun Mechanisms for Common-Value Partnerships: The Unassigned-Offeror Problem, 121 Econ. Letters 390 (2013).0165-1765http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:12967824Shotguns clauses are commonly included in the business agreements of partnerships and limited liability companies (LLCs), but the role of offeror typically remains unassigned. In a common-value, one-sided asymmetric information setting, unequal and inefficient outcomes occur with an unassigned offeror. Experimental results are aligned with our theory.en-USJournal Article2014-09-3010.1016/j.econlet.2013.09.016