Siegel, Susanna2014-12-032014-12-03Siegel, Susanna. 2016. How is wishful seeing like wishful thinking? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):0031-82051933-1592http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:13456932This paper makes the case that when wishful thinking ill-founds belief, the belief depends on the desire in ways can be recapitulated at the level of perceptual experience. The relevant kinds of desires include motivations, hopes, preferences, and goals. I distinguish between two modes of dependence of belief on desire in wishful thinking: selective or inquiry-related, and responsive or evidence-related. I offers a theory of basing on which beliefs are badly-based on desires, due to patterns of dependence that can found in the relationship between experiences and desires as well. This conclusion brings us a large part of the way to the conclusion that like beliefs, experiences can be ill-founded by depending on a desire.en-USperceptual justificationcognitive penetrabilitywishful thinkingrationalityirrationalityimplicit biasJournal Article10.1111/phpr.12273