Shepsle, KennethWeingast, Barry R.2017-04-072012Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast. 2012. Why so much stability? Majority voting, legislative institutions, and Gordon Tullock. Public Choice 152, no. 1/2: 83–95. doi:10.1007/s11127-011-9853-4.0048-5829http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:32095380Gordon Tullock, nearly a half century ago, raised questions about Arrow’s Theorem (“a phantom has stalked the classrooms and seminars of economics and political science”). He followed this up by asking, in light of Arrow’s Theorem, “Why so much stability?” In this paper a more nuanced understanding of the operating characteristics of majority rule in institutional settings, anticipated and stimulated by Tullock, is spelled out. A major distinction is made between preference cycles and voting cycles, suggesting why Arrow’s phantom still stalks, but that Tullock’s intuitions are germane as well.en-USvoting cyclespreference cyclesmajority ruleequilibriumJournal Article2016-03-27201210.1007/s11127-011-9853-4