Ma, HongyaoMeir, ReshefParkes, DavidZou, James2018-01-242015Ma, Hongyao, Reshef Meir, David C. Parkes, and James Zou. 2015. Are you Going to Do That? Contingent-Payment Mechanisms to Improve Coordination. Proceedings of the 3rd Conference on Auctions, Market Mechanisms and Their Applications, 2015. doi: 10.4108/eai.8-8-2015.2260721http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:34732139In this extended abstract, we consider simple coordination problems, such as allocating the right to use a shared sports facility in a way that maximizes its usage, or picking the time of a meeting in a way that maximizes attendance. More generally, an alternative is selected by a mechanism in period zero based on reports from agents. This induces a decision problem facing agents in the next period (e.g., to use a resource, or to attend a meeting.) Outcomes are designated as either good or bad, and the design goal is to maximize the probability of good outcomes. For example, a good outcome may be the resource being used, or having enough people attend a meeting.en-USCoordinationIncentivesContingent paymentsMechanism designConference Paper2017-03-09201510.4108/eai.8-8-2015.2260721