Minor, Dylan Blu2016-02-232016-02-23Minor, Dylan. "Executive Compensation and Misconduct: Environmental Harm." Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 16-076, January 2016.http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:25538424We explore the relationship between managerial incentives and misconduct using the setting of environmental harm. We find that high powered executive compensation can increase the odds of environmental law-breaking by 40-60% and the magnitude of environmental harm by over 100%. We document similar results for the setting of executive compensation and illegal financial accounting. Finally, we outline some managerial and policy implications to blunt these adverse incentive effects.en-USexecutive compensationcorporate governancemisconductenvironmental performanceaccounting scandalsustainable financeResearch Paper or Report2016-02-2310.2139/ssrn.2714438