Fudenberg, DrewTakahashi, Satoru2016-07-272011Fudenberg, Drew, and Satoru Takahashi. 2011. Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play. Games and Economic Behavior 71, no. 1: 100–120. doi:10.1016/j.geb.2008.11.014.0899-8256http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:27755310Stochastic fictitious play (SFP) assumes that agents do not try to influence the future play of their current opponents, an assumption that is justified by appeal to a setting with a large population of players who are randomly matched to play the game. However, the dynamics of SFP have only been analyzed in models where all agents in a player role have the same beliefs. We analyze the dynamics of SFP in settings where there is a population of agents who observe only outcomes in their own matches and thus have heterogeneous beliefs. We provide conditions that ensure that the system converges to a state with homogeneous beliefs, and that its asymptotic behavior is the same as with a single representative agent in each player role.en-USJournal Article2016-04-04201110.1016/j.geb.2008.11.014