Richard, Mark2016-04-042013Richard, Mark. 2013. "What are Propositions?" Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43, nos. 5-6: 702-719.0045-5091http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:26326978This paper defends the view that propositions – that is, what are picked about by complement clauses and the range of quantifiers like that in ‘Sanna believes all that Matti said' – are states of affairs. States of affairs – and thus propositions – are not, in the primary sense, representational; what is representational and what is true or false in the first instance are mental states and sentence tokens that represent propositions. There is, it is argued, a derivative sense in which propositions are bearers of truth, but truth in that sense is a derivative, non-explanatory notion. This view is contrasted with views like the one Scott Soames develops in What is Meaning?. It's argued that this view is superior to Soames' in various ways.en-USpropositionsrepresentationpropositional attitudestruthstates of affairsJournal Article2016-04-0410.1080/00455091.2013.870738