Bachrach, YoramParkes, DavidRosenschein, Jeffrey S.2015-07-072013Bachrach, Yoram, David C. Parkes, and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein. 2013. “Computing Cooperative Solution Concepts in Coalitional Skill Games.” In Artificial Intelligence 204: 1–21. doi:10.1016/j.artint.2013.07.005.0004-3702http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:17115453We consider a simple model of cooperation among agents called Coalitional Skill Games (CSGs). This is a restricted form of coalitional games, where each agent has a set of skills that are required to complete various tasks. Each task requires a set of skills in order to be completed, and a coalition can accomplish the task only if the coalitionʼs agents cover the set of required skills for the task. The gain for a coalition depends only on the subset of tasks it can complete. We consider the computational complexity of several problems in CSGs, such as testing if an agent is a dummy or veto agent, computing the core and core-related solution concepts, and computing power indices such as the Shapley value and Banzhaf power index.en-UScoalitional game theorycorepower indicesJournal Article2015-06-29Yoram Bachrach, David C. Parkes, and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein2015-07-0710.1016/j.artint.2013.07.005