Mathis, ColleenMoskowitz, DanielSchneer, Benjamin2020-06-112019-09Mathis, Colleen, Daniel Moskowitz, and Benjamin Schneer. "The Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission: One State's Model for Gerrymandering Reform." Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, 2019.http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:42671418Independent redistricting in practice has proven remarkably successful along several dimensions. This policy brief outlines key lessons learned from redistricting in Arizona, a state with a five-person independent redistricting commission. Based on a mix of empirical evidence and first-hand experience, we argue that Arizona’s approach to redistricting increases transparency through public engagement and participation in the mapping process; fosters increased competition in districts, which has several effects thought to be beneficial for democratic representation; contributes to higher levels of compactness (i.e., how far the district extends from its center) in newly-drawn districts and promotes partisan fairness in the state as a whole; and benefits from its multi-partisan composition and ought to be insulated from legislative interference.en-USThe Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission: One State's Model for Gerrymandering ReformResearch Paper or Report2020-06-110000-0001-9336-8303