Bond, DougMiner, Michael DJones, Brad2026-09-0120262026-09-012026Jones, Brad. 2026. Dual Use Power and Great Power Competition: Revisiting the Sources of Power that Matter Most. Masters Thesis, Harvard University Division of Continuing Education.32863221https://dash.harvard.edu/handle/1/42754265There are few concepts in international relations that are of more consequence, and yet more amorphous, than power. In the struggle for mastery among the great powers – on and off the battlefield – this study seeks to shed new light on the measurement, nature, and exercise of power since the introduction of the modern state system four centuries ago. The contributions and findings can be distilled as follows. In utilizing recently developed data sets and new proxies for state power over a longer period than comparable studies, I put different measures of power to the test and find striking differences in their ability to predict war and dispute outcomes. Of particular significance, many of the representations of raw or gross might that are intuitively appealing and ubiquitous in international relations scholarship – like gross domestic product, the composite indicator of national material capability, military spending, and the size of the armed forces – are shown to perform no better than a coin toss in predicting the outcomes of great power conflicts. These results pose a challenge to the large body of analysis that emphasizes measures of raw might as rough but reliable guides to power and influence in the international arena. By contrast, measures of latent capability I refer to as ‘dual use power’ (spanning technology, trade, and finance) have accurately foreshadowed the outcome of around 80 per cent of great power conflicts. In a case study of cycles and transitions in hegemonic power based on a novel systematic dating exercise, I also identify several stylized facts when breaking national capability down into its key elements. First, while dominant states have often enjoyed lengthy leadership cycles in individual sources of power lasting well over a century, periods of simultaneous leadership in these dimensions of power have been much shorter at around seven decades. Second, power transitions are best conceptualized as multi-stage phenomena rather than a singular cross-over event. Third, a peak in relative power rarely portends an imminent power transition. Fourth, global leadership in sea power is an early-cycle marker of hegemonic ascendency. And fifth, global leadership in finance and technology is typically more enduring than for trade, which could partly reflect stronger network effects in the former. In concluding with a review of the limits of material power and predatory coercion, I argue that while the ability and willingness of the pre-eminent state to shape the international system differed across three hegemonic eras – Dutch, British, and American – each sought to make key tenants of the international order tolerable or attractive to a sufficiently large cohort of states that it boosted their influence beyond that possible by their material resource advantage alone. As a new era of great power contestation dawns where competition is intensifying across a range of domains, the results in this study should be of more than historical interest. I conclude with several implications pertaining to the dynamics of power transitions, the integration of different elements of national power, and the conduct of modern economic statecraft incorporating dual use power.application/pdfenFinanceGreat Power CompetitionPowerTechnologyTradeWarInternational relationsPolitical scienceMilitary studiesThesis or Dissertation2026-09-01