Heese, JonasPerez Cavazos, Gerardo2020-04-222019-06Heese, Jonas, and Gerardo Pérez Cavazos. "Fraud Allegations and Government Contracting." Journal of Accounting Research 57, no. 3 (June 2019): 675–719.0021-8456http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:42661215This paper examines whether fraud allegations affect firms’ contracting with the government. Using a dataset of whistleblower allegations brought under the False Claims Act against firms accused of defrauding the government, we find that federal agencies do not reduce the total dollar volume of contracts with accused firms; however, they substitute approximately 14% of the harder-to-monitor cost-plus contracts for fixed-price contracts. This effect is concentrated in the procurement of services and explained by contract and service substitution. Lastly, we find that after the conclusion of the investigation, the government reduces the contract dollar volume by approximately 15% for cases that resulted in a settlement. Our findings indicate that contract-design changes are used to mitigate uncertainty in suppliers’ reputation.en-USEconomics and EconometricsAccountingFinanceWhistleblowerFraud AllegationsGovernment and PoliticsContractsCrime and CorruptionRisk and UncertaintyBusiness and Government RelationsRisk AllocationFalse Claims ActJournal Article2020-04-2210.1111/1475-679x.12258